Why do Legislators COF? Congressional Open Forum Speeches and Electoral Incentives in Presidential America

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dc.contributor.advisorAlemán, Eduardo
dc.contributor.committeeMemberScarrow, Susan E.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberCantu, Francisco
dc.contributor.committeeMemberDriscoll, Amanda M.
dc.creatorRamirez Rubio, Margarita Maria
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-15T23:12:43Z
dc.date.available2019-09-15T23:12:43Z
dc.date.createdAugust 2017
dc.date.issued2017-08
dc.date.submittedAugust 2017
dc.date.updated2019-09-15T23:12:44Z
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation studies legislative behavior under open speech forums on the congress floor. Recent scholarship has found that under collective vote-gathering incentives, party leaders are more likely to give speeches, screen who speaks, and delegate less often to backbenchers. On the other hand, under personal incentives, leaders are more likely to give vulnerable legislators and ideologically extreme legislators opportunities to strengthen their links with their constituencies. Even more recent findings, however, complicate this neat categorization. Evidence shows differences between the types of legislators who speak during bill debates and those who speak during non-lawmaking venues, and different categories within. In this dissertation, I present evidence suggesting that electoral incentives do not shape lawmakers’ behavior in non-lawmaking venues during the legislative session. I argue that in less visible venues that allow legislators to speak on the topics of their choice, legislators who are in electorally and institutionally disadvantageous positions are more likely to deliver a speech under scenarios that promote collective incentives. I analyze which members of congress deliver non-lawmaking speeches under the electoral incentives of differing nations: Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama, and Chile. This dissertation uses a novel dataset created by collecting and coding these speeches for each country, except Chile. The results suggest that legislative incentives do not drive the behavior of legislators in congressional open forums. In addition, it also suggests that there is no clear, specific institutional and electoral trait affecting the legislators’ probability of giving a speech during these venues.
dc.description.departmentPolitical Science, Department of
dc.format.digitalOriginborn digital
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10657/4712
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsThe author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s).
dc.subjectNon-lawmaking speeches
dc.subjectSpeeches
dc.subjectCongress
dc.subjectLatin America
dc.subjectElectoral incentives
dc.titleWhy do Legislators COF? Congressional Open Forum Speeches and Electoral Incentives in Presidential America
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.genreThesis
thesis.degree.collegeCollege of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Science, Department of
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Science
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Houston
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

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