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Margarita M. Ramírez
August, 2017

WHY DO LEGISLATORS COF? CONGRESSIONAL OPEN FORUM SPEECHES AND
ELECTORAL INCENTIVES IN PRESIDENTIAL AMERICA

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of Political Science

University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies legislative behavior under open speech forums on the congress floor. Recent scholarship has found that under collective vote-gathering incentives, party leaders are more likely to give speeches, screen who speaks, and delegate less often to backbenchers. On the other hand, under personal incentives, leaders are more likely to give vulnerable legislators and ideologically extreme legislators opportunities to strengthen their links with their constituencies. Even more recent findings, however, complicate this neat categorization. Evidence shows differences between the types of legislators who speak during bill debates and those who speak during non-lawmaking venues, and different categories within.

In this dissertation, I present evidence suggesting that electoral incentives do not shape lawmakers' behavior in non-lawmaking venues during the legislative session. I argue that in less visible venues that allow legislators to speak on the topics of their choice, legislators who are in electorally and institutionally disadvantageous positions are more likely to deliver a speech under scenarios that promote collective incentives. I analyze which members of congress deliver non-lawmaking speeches under the electoral incentives of differing nations: Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama, and Chile. This dissertation uses a novel dataset created by collecting and coding these speeches for each country, except Chile. The results suggest that legislative incentives do not drive the behavior of legislators in congressional open forums. In addition, it also suggests that there is no clear, specific institutional and electoral trait affecting the legislators' probability of giving a speech during these venues.

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1. Introduction

There is a consensus in the literature that electoral incentives shape legislative behavior. The literature offers two premises. When the electoral rules give the party leadership and the party label the power to include legislators on the ballot and affect their likelihood of being elected, the electoral rules make the party leaders the legislator's principal. In contrast, when the likelihood for a legislator to be elected depends on the citizens selecting them as their preferred candidate, the electoral rules make the constituency the legislator's principal. Legislators will exhibit different legislative behavior depending on the principal they are serving.

The literature has found evidence on the effects of the electoral incentives on different legislative tools. Traditionally, empirical studies have focused on bill proposals and voting behavior. However, some in the field have recently turned their attention to legislative speeches delivered on the floor. These studies claim that floor participation, rules governing floor access, and speech content are shaped by electoral incentives. Concerning floor participation, the consensus in the literature is that under individual vote-gathering incentives, ideologically extreme legislators speak more frequently than those who toe the party line. Some studies, but not all, find a significant effect created by how electorally secure the legislator is and if she is a member of the opposition coalition. On the other hand, under collective vote-gathering incentives, the party leadership speaks more frequently. The rationale behind this difference is that while in candidate-centered systems each legislator has to cultivate his reputation among his peers within and outside the party, studies have found evidence that in party-centered systems, the leadership is more cautious about who takes the floor as the fate of all legislators from the party is tied together.

The recent studies on legislative speeches and electoral incentives have been important for understanding legislative behavior facing competing electoral incentives, party organization, and the role of floor speeches for parties and legislators; however, the existing literature fails to provide answers about some key aspects. First, most of the studies focus on parliamentary systems and the U.S. presidential system. Thus, we should acknowledge the limitations for the generalization of their results for presidential systems. While the relationship of the legislative and the executive branches in the parliamentary and presidential systems is inherently different, the decentralized candidate selection and majoritarian elections of the United States are not always shared in the rest of the Americas. Second, though legislators are behaving a particular way to please their principal in order to maximize their chances of being reelected, most studies do not account for the legislators' ambition to stay in congress. Third, the literature agrees that ideologically extreme legislators are more likely to deliver speeches under candidate-centered systems. These studies use roll call votes to measure the ideological positions of the party leaders and legislators. However, there are a few issues when trying to replicate this exercise for other countries: not all countries regularly record roll call votes; in some cases, individual votes are reported upon request; and in other cases, the records are made public.

More importantly, most of the standing literature gathers all floor speeches into a single group, on the assumption that floor speeches are all the same. However, this is a serious misinterpretation. The legislative session is composed of different sections that serve particular purposes. For that reason, we should expect that it is unlikely that the electoral incentives shape in the same way speeches given during different sections of the legislative session that serve different purposes. I argue that during venues of the legislative session that

are set aside for the legislators to speak the topic of their choice (what I call Congressional Open Forums [COF]), the incentives promoted by electoral institutions are not the primary determinant of speech organization. Rather, behavior during COF is grounded in individual, goal-oriented behavior, and intra-chamber variation among legislators is therefore more decisive for understanding speech participation.

So why should the scholarship care about legislative speeches, and more specifically, COF speeches? I must admit that I hear that question often. To answer this, one should turn to the attention to legislators and reformers, who clearly appreciate the benefits. First, in the legislative state of nature, plenary time is unregulated, which turns the floor into a bottleneck as all legislators have incentives to use the floor (Cox 2006). Therefore, plenary time is a scarce resource, and its management is crucial for the parliamentary efficiency. It is therefore in the legislators' interest to hand their power of plenary time to party leaders, who can organize the plenary time in a way that fits the electoral incentives of the party and the individual legislators.

Speeches are useful for parties and their members to achieve their electoral and policy goals. In general, speeches delivered on the floor are an important tool to bring public awareness to an issue and to rally support for a political course of action. For that reason, we often see legislators letting their constituencies know about the legislators' interventions in congress. COF speeches are not constrained by the rules and limitations typically associated with bill debates. This allows legislators to address the topic of their choice to enhance their position.

The contribution of this dissertation is threefold. First, I expand on the existing legislative literature by examining the purpose of NLS, how they are perceived by legislators and

parties, and why parties and members use them. Second, I expand on the study of Latin American legislative institutions by examining speeches, which are mostly missing from the new scholarship focused on the region's congresses. Third, I expand our understanding of the behavior of goal-seeking legislators by examining how their individual incentives affect the behavior in COFs.

The remainder of the dissertation is divided into the following chapters. In Chapter 1, I present a survey of the scholarship on two main subjects: the incentives promoted by the electoral rules, and the effects of electoral rules, specifically on floor speeches. In Chapter 2, I present my hypothesis that legislators with institutionally and electorally disadvantageous positions in their party and chamber are more likely to deliver speeches during COF. I propose that disadvantaged legislators need to be able to address the chamber to win support from their peers, yet their status in the chamber and in the party does not give them many opportunities to speak. This group of legislators also needs to address their electorate to develop a connection in order to ensure a vote for the party or themselves, depending on the rules. Again, given their position in the party and chamber, they might not have the resources to do so. That is why members of congress in disadvantaged positions need every resource available to rally support from their party and peers, and/or from the electorate. Consequently, they are more likely to deliver speeches during COFs. Under my theory, the disadvantaged position of the legislators and their need to connect with their constituencies and/or party goes beyond the electoral incentives. In other words, regardless of the electoral incentives, I expected all congresses to behave the same during COFs. To test my hypothesis, I selected four cases: Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama, and Chile.

In the final subsection Chapter 2, I present a survey of venues for non-lawmaking speeches (NLS) in Latin American congresses. Here I make the case for how present NLS venues are across presidential America by providing an outline of this venue across the countries. Then I empirically test my expectations. Here, I present the four cases that I use in my dissertation and I explain the rationale behind them.

In the third chapter, I explain in more detail the cases chosen, the data gathering process, and the methodology. Here, I test the likelihood of participating in COFs for legislators of the lower or only chamber of Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Panama. The intuition is that legislators who are in a disadvantaged position within the chamber or party and electorally, participate during COFs at a higher rate.

The fourth chapter examines qualitative evidence. In the first two sections of this chapter, I evaluate descriptive statistics of the key variables for each country. I also include additional variables that are specific to each country that might give a better understanding of the use of COFs. The third and final section looks at the topics of and intended audiences for COF speeches.

The final part of the dissertation is the conclusion. Here I summarize the main findings of my study and discuss how my findings could shape future research in the field.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

It has long been agreed in the literature that electoral systems generate different electoral incentives. Electoral systems vary in the extent to which they motivate legislators to cultivate a personal vote in order to maximize their reelection chances or career prospects. Such motivations have an impact on legislative behavior that is reflected in a wide range of parliamentary tools.

In recent years, there has been a surge in research focused on how electoral incentives shape parliamentary debate organization. The scholarship has found evidence that floor participation, rules governing floor access, and speech content are shaped by electoral incentives. However, most of these studies focus on either parliamentary democracies or the U.S. Congress, which makes generalization problematic for other presidential systems. In addition, most studies are single-case analyses, which prevent an understanding of the effects of the electoral rules. Second, most of the studies do not take into account how legislator decisions to run again for congress affect their behavior on the floor. Finally, and more importantly, with few exceptions, these studies consider all types of floor speeches together. In other words, they assume that the nature and goal of a bill debate is the same as a non-lawmaking speech, and therefore the electoral rules will have the same impact on all type of speeches. My theory rests on the claim that the assumption of viewing all speeches as one is wrong and can bias results. I have two main aims in this chapter. First, I will provide a survey of the literature of electoral incentives especially for floor speeches. Second, I will make the case on why it is important to study non-lawmaking speeches the same as we would any other legislative tool.

The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I review the arguments about the incentives that electoral rules produce. In the second section, I focus on the effects of electoral incentives specifically for speeches. Here, I also make the case for why the scholarship should pay more attention to studying legislative speeches delivered on the floor. I conclude the chapter by indicating the puzzles and gaps that are yet to be answered regarding speeches and electoral incentives.

Electoral Incentives -

The section is divided into two parts. First, I provide a survey of the literature regarding what are the principal effects the electoral rules produce given the relationship of the party, the legislator, and the constituency. In addition, I also explain the incentives that legislators have in order to satisfy their principals and achieve their goals. Next, I offer a brief summary of the main evidence of electoral incentives on the most studied legislative tools: bills and legislators' voting behavior. The goal of this section is to lay the groundwork for our expectations about how electoral rules affect legislative speeches on the floor.

A standing literature on electoral systems and legislative behavior argues that different electoral rules set different principals for the legislators. Under rules in which candidates depend on the party leadership to be included on the ballot and/or their rank in the ballot, and depend on the electoral success of the party label to get a seat, legislators are motivated to cultivate their own reputations with the party leadership and to appeal to the electorate under the party label (Mitchell, 2003). Under rules in which candidates depend on voter selection as a preferred candidate to get a seat, legislators are motivated to cultivate their individual reputations with the electorate (Mitchell, 2003). In other words, different electoral rules

promote incentives that move along a continuum of whether the legislator is responding to her party or her constituency.

In their seminal paper, Carey and Shugart (1995) lay out the four variables that interact to develop individual vote-seeking incentives: ballot control, vote pooling, the number and types of votes cast, and district magnitude. First, the stronger the control of party leaders over the candidates that make up their party ballot, the higher the deterrent to individual members to cultivate their personal reputations. Second, when votes are not pooled by parties, citizens vote for individual candidates. Such systems encourage competition among members of the same party as well as against other parties. Third, if ballots are cast for one or more candidates, rather than for a party, parties and individual members face strong incentives for individual vote-seeking. The fourth variable is district magnitude. When there is intraparty competition in a system, as magnitude increases, so do the incentives for personal reputation. Where there is no intraparty competition, as district magnitude increases, the incentives for personal reputation decrease. In a nutshell, when leaders have little control over ballot access, citizens can choose their preferred candidates, and votes are not pooled by party, the system will have incentives that promote individual behavior.

The fact that members of congress are so responsive to who has authority over them is due to the legislators' goal of reelection. Based on the literature of U.S. politics, it is assumed that members of congress are single-minded seekers of reelection (Mayhew 1974, 5). Thus, members of congress make political decisions that maximize their chances for reelection (Schlesinger 1966). To conclude, legislators are receptive to their principal to ensure reelection, and they will be more likely to use resources at their disposal to please their principal and maximize their future electoral outcomes.

To the extent that legislators believe their reelection lies in the hands of the party label or leadership, they will work to enhance the party label. On the other hand, to the extent that they believe that their fate relies on being able to differentiate themselves from their peers within and outside the party, they will work to enhance their individual reputations. Under this last scenario, although a party reputation might help, it is not enough to differentiate themselves from their peers, and the personal reputation they cultivate is not shared with other members of their party.

However, whereas personal reputation and ideology are largely private goods that legislators pursue on their own behalf, party reputation is a public good for all legislators in the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 123). This public good refers to actions, beliefs, and outcomes that are a credit to the party (110). For Cox and McCubbins (1993), given that the legislators' goal is to be reelected, there is little chance that legislators will contribute to the cost of developing the public good, especially in majoritarian systems, but rather they will focus their efforts on developing their private goods. To correct for this inefficiency, party leaders use their resources as leverage to ensure that legislators have incentives to work for the collectivity. This can include rewarding loyalty through committee assignments, internal advancement (Cox and McCubbins 1993), opportunities for participation on the floor, or higher ranking in the party ballot, just to mention a few.

Until now, we have talked in abstract about different types of systems. Here are some concrete examples. Closed-list PR, in which citizens vote for the party list rather than their preferred candidate, is considered to be a party-centered system, since the candidate selection depends on the party reputation and on the rank of the legislator in the list. Here, the principal is the party leadership. Majoritarian systems, like single transferable vote (STV)

where voters cast a vote for their preferred candidate(s) from an open list, is considered to be a candidate-centered system in which there are high incentives to develop personal votes, and as a consequence, accountability to the candidate is higher (Mitchell 2003). Here, the principal is the constituency. However, within each “extreme,” there are shades created by some variation of factors (e.g., the way the votes are counted) that cause the system to shift along the spectrum. Table 2.1 displays a summary of the main categories of electoral systems and its principals.

Table 2.1: Summary of electoral systems and principals

Electoral system	Example	Principals
Party-centric system	Closed-list PR	Party leadership
Candidate-centric system	Majoritarian system	Constituency

Different electoral systems create different principals. The scholarship has found solid empirical evidence of differences in legislative behavior based on the electoral incentives, as legislators will practice certain activities, and refrain from others, to connect with their principal. The effects of the electoral system have mostly been studied on bills drafted, voting behavior, and party unity. In the following few paragraphs, I will present a survey of the main findings regarding electoral incentives on these three legislative activities, but later on I will focus on the legislative tool that this dissertation centers on: speeches.

Individual-centered systems encourage legislators to promote legislation on private or local goods (Cox and McCubbins 2001), as these have credit-claiming potential, whereas party-centric systems create incentives for legislators to work together to enhance the collective reputation by putting forward broad programmatic policies and claim credit for

major political shifts (Crisp et al. 2004). The literature has found evidence for this argument. Candidate-centered systems promote more narrow local and money bills that benefit a particular community (Ames 1995; André, Depauw, and Shugart 2013; Crisp et al. 2004).

Legislators recognize the necessity of voting either along constituency or party needs, as voters electorally reward or punish a legislator. Various studies have argued that candidate-centric systems generate incentives to deviate from one's party, leading to lower levels of party cohesion (Carey 2007). Under this set of incentives, the principal is the citizen who will cast a vote for his preferred candidate. On the other hand, in party-centered systems, it is in the legislator's best interest to be in good terms with the party leaders, as they are the ones who control candidate selection and the ballot. Evidence suggests that party-centered systems decrease motivations to dissent from the party line, which leads to high party unity rates (Morgenstern 2003, Carey 2007). Hix (2004) studies the voting behavior of members of the European Parliament (MEP). The author finds evidence for different voting patterns within the European Parliament based on the diverse electoral rules and the candidate selection rules under which members are elected in their own country. The results reveal that where the national party has control over the ballot, MEPs are less likely to vote against the national party. Where the national party has less control, legislators are more likely to vote with their European party group or against their national party. Under this last scenario, parliamentary cohesion at the European Parliament increases.

Speeches

The main goal of the first section was to explain the expectations that electoral institutions develop for party leaders, individual legislators, and to some degree, the voters, given the goals of the individual legislators and parties. In general, there is a consensus in the

scholarship that candidate-centric electoral systems generate incentives to cultivate personal reputation. The scholarship has largely focused on observing such effects in bill drafting and voting behavior. Yet, in recent years scholars have given increased attention to another type of legislative output: floor speeches. The main purpose of this section is to focus on the effects of electoral incentives on floor speeches, as well as the puzzles and gaps left by the scholarship.

Recent research has analyzed speeches delivered in congress as a legislative tool that had been traditionally overlooked by the scholarship. This development has given an opportunity to move away from heavy dependence on certain legislative tools – such as targeted bills, fiscal policies, and roll call votes – in the literature. Different factors explain the surge of speeches as a compelling legislative tool. One is the recent availability of speech data as well as modern ways of collecting and analyzing speech data.

The second factor is the shortcomings of roll-call votes as the traditional unit of analysis. While voting behavior only signal approval or disapproval for a bill, non-voting legislative behavior discloses the degree in which a legislator cares about an issue, his willingness to act for such issue (Hall 1996), and his level of issue specialization (Victor 2011, 10). Also, not all parliamentary rules allow for roll call votes or for fiscal policies initiated by legislators, which creates bias in the analysis. Regarding fiscal policies, in countries like England or Chile, the executive has exclusive initiation rights over significant areas of policy (Alemán 2015). Experts claim that the field's high degree of reliance on roll call votes have narrowed down the existing research on personal votes into "a synonym with fiscal particularism" (Shane 2011, 340). Not all countries regularly record roll call votes. In some cases, individual votes are only reported upon request, and in some others, the records are not

even made public. Therefore, if all the votes in the country are neither visible nor made public, roll call vote data suffers from selection bias (Carrubba et al. 2006; Hug 2010).

The third reason for the increase in the studies of speeches is that while bill sponsorship that can be costly and the legislative process can take a great deal of time, speeches take less effort to prepare and share. Floor speeches are a great venue to communicate policy preferences, as well for advertisement, position taking and credit claiming (Mayhew 1974). Party leaders and legislators recognize their colleagues, the audience visiting the chamber, viewers of the institutional TV channel, lobbyists, journalists, and hometown constituents as possible audiences for their speeches (Victor 2011, 10). In addition, whereas whether extra-legislative statements are shared outside congress depends on the discretion of editors (Schulz 2008), when the legislator addresses the parliament, she has a guaranteed audience and her statement remains on record (Keh 2015). To sum up, speeches delivered on the floor are a great communication tool for legislators and parties, and they carry valuable information for the students of electoral institutions.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I explain why we should expect floor speeches to be affected by electoral incentives. Second, I present a survey of the literature about the relationship of electoral incentives to speeches. Here, I mainly focus on speech organization and content. Then I discuss the importance of studying non-lawmaking speeches (NLS) compared to other types of floor speeches. I conclude the chapter by describing the puzzles and gaps not yet addressed by the scholarship.

Why should it be expected that floor speeches may be affected by electoral rules? Plenary time is essential for legislatures. At a minimum, every bill needs plenary time to be considered. For Cox (2006), in the legislative state of nature, plenary time is unregulated; in

other words, all members of congress have an equal chance to make a motion at any stage of the legislative process, and they can do so with no time restriction. While this may be true, under other states, plenary time is a scarce resource, and its management is crucial for parliamentary efficiency (Cox 2006).

The need to access the debate and voting agenda is closely tied to electoral incentives. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, when considering how to invest their time and resources in the institution, legislators with individual vote-seeking incentives seek activities that allow them to enhance their reputations. The unregulated and equal distribution of plenary time soon turns the floor into a bottleneck. We can assume that legislators are motivated to use the floor as much as possible among other activities that are helpful to “show off.” In addition, when lawmakers can initiate parochial bills and amendments, and offer numerous questions and speeches, “the legislative process become less predictable and more erratic” (Shomer 2015, 7).

The overuse of the common pool resource of plenary time creates the need to develop institutions (Cox 2006). Legislators recognize that if the party fails, they themselves will be at risk. The possibility of facing adverse effects and their common electoral fate drives legislators to delegate their power over floor time and to follow the rules placed by the leadership (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993). It is therefore to the legislators’ advantage to delegate their power of plenary time to party leaders, who can organize the plenary time in a way that fits the electoral incentives. Setting permanent rules instead of discussing how to proceed in each situation facilitates the handling of parliamentary business. It also avoids the selection of rules solely on the bases of anticipating the consequences of the specific procedure and then choosing the one that “promises the

egotistically best outcome” (Mueller and Sieberer 2014, 315). With this in mind, party leaders should set legislative activities and venues that allow lawmakers to enhance their personal reputations as well as ensure the predictability and organization of the legislative process. To sum up, parties organize the structure of the sessions and use of the floor through institutions that are likely to benefit their electoral and policy purposes.

Recently, various scholars have found evidence that supports the claim that electoral incentives shape floor debates. In their seminal work, Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2015) developed a theory of legislative speech for parliamentary democracy. Their theory states that party rules for debates are shaped by electoral institutions and therefore will either favor party leadership control or backbencher Members of Parliament (MPs) exposure. For the authors, the legislators’ ideological and party leadership positions determine who takes the floor.

While in candidate-centric systems, party leaders are generally more likely to take risks and give the chance to speak to backbenchers and legislators who are more likely to deviate from the party line, in party-centric systems, leaders are risk averse and more careful about who takes the floor, as an individual speech can harm the collective party. Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2015) find evidence that in the British House of Commons, where members are elected in single-member districts (SMD), party leaders offer more opportunities to take the floor and allow speeches to legislators with extreme ideological positions. On the other hand, leaders in the German mixed, closed-list system give backbenchers fewer chances to deliver speeches and repress the participation of extreme legislators. Furthermore, Bäck and Debus (2016) notice that German national party leaders are less likely to allow legislators from districts with economic problems to take the floor; this likelihood is even lower for

legislators elected in SMD. The reason for this finding is that these legislators are more likely to defect from the party line, given the pressure to be responsive to their constituencies.

The impact of electoral rules on floor participation is also evident during times of changes in the electoral institutions. New Zealand parliament went through a replacement of the electoral rules from candidate-centered to party-centered in 1993. Proksch and Slapin (2015) found that leaders are more likely to give the opportunity to speak on the floor to backbenchers that toe the party line post-reform than they were pre-reform. Furthermore, after the reform, leaders and backbenchers were equally likely to participate on the floor. In other words, changes from individual vote-seeking incentives to collective vote-seeking incentives increase the rate of participation for party leaders and backbenchers ideologically closer to the party.

Although single case studies typically lack institutional diversity of electoral rules, studies on the U.S. House of Representatives have been key to uncovering the effects of candidate-oriented systems on who delivers a speech. Maltzman and Sigelman (1996) analyze one- and five-minute speeches and special orders during a congressional term. The authors argue that participation in these venues is a decision of the legislator based on their electoral and policy motivations. However, the results reveal that House members do not use these venues for electoral motivations, but for policy ones. Through the analysis of the number of speech lines attributed to each member in the *Congressional Record*, the authors demonstrate that NLS venues are disproportionately used by ideologically extreme members – confirming the expectations of Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2015) – and members of the minority party. Contrary to Maltzman and Sigelman, Harris (2005) argues that one-minute speeches are rather structured by parties. The author argues that both individual and

collective goals motivate members to deliver on-message speeches along the party line. By examining the proportion of speeches delivered by Democrats that fits the party message shared by the Democratic Message Board (DMB), the author finds that electorally vulnerable legislators and ideologically extreme members are more likely to deliver the party message. Following the studies on one-minute speeches, Akirav's (2014) analysis of one-minute speeches in the Israeli Knesset finds similarities with findings from the U.S. (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996, Morris 2001, Rocca 2007). The author observes that under personalist incentives, institutional and electorally disadvantaged legislators are more prone to deliver a speech. Her findings suggest that opposition, junior, Jewish-minority, and ideologically extreme MPs are more likely to participate in Israel's NLS forum.

To sum up, studies – mainly focused on the American politics experience – have found evidence that under individual vote-seeking incentives, electorally vulnerable legislators and ideologically extreme legislators deliver speeches at a higher rate than their peers in venues dedicated to open speeches.

Furthermore, there is evidence of the interaction of electoral incentives with the legislators' political ambitions. In their study of 727 MEPs over a period of 15 years, Høyland, Hobolt, and Hix (2017) find evidence that MEPs with the ambition to be reelected delivered a higher rate of speeches than MEPs who seek to be elected to their country's parliament. This difference is especially greater if candidates are going to be competing in candidate-centric systems. The authors argue that this difference is explained by the fact that in systems with individual incentives, candidates have more incentives to be visible in order to win the intra-party competition.

Some studies recognize the different types of floor speeches, and analyze how the electoral rules affect the different venues. In an analysis of 16 western European states, Keh (2015) finds that closed Parliamentary Policy Statements (PPS) that have a clear addressee (i.e., oral and written questions, and interpellations) are less centralized, whereas open PPS (i.e., committee reports and plenary debate) with no clear addressee are centralized. Contrary to closed PPS, open PPS receive more media attention and provide the “electorate with an opportunity to directly compared both parliamentarians’ and party groups’ issue stances” (1091); therefore, the leadership is more willing to monitor open PPS. In addition, the more accountable the legislator is to the electorate, the less centralized the rules of PPS are. In other words, the decision about who delivers a speech, its topic, and when to deliver it is a prerogative of the MPs and not of the party’s leadership in the chamber. Similarly, Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin (2017) show that speech participation differs in venues for bill deliberation and non-lawmaking speeches. The authors demonstrate that in the Chilean House of Deputies, a country with competing electoral incentives, parties’ leaders solve the electoral tension between legislator and party by organizing speech participation differently in these two venues. The authors find that members who are more likely to dissent with the party and from districts distant to the capital are more likely to participate in *Hora de Incidentes*, while those who are not seeking reelection and who are from important committees are less likely to participate. On the other hand, those from important committees and those that have been in office for more than one term are significantly more likely to participate during bill deliberation.

The scholarship has also found evidence of electoral rules influencing speech content. Driscoll (2014) argues that electoral rules, as well as candidate nomination rules and electoral

competition, determine the scope of the legislators' speeches. Studying legislative speeches in Argentina and Brazil, the author finds that under Brazil's candidate-oriented electoral rules, self-statements (e.g., I am, I will be, I will do, mine) are more prominent than in Argentina's party-centric systems, under which collective statements are mentioned more often (e.g., we are, we have, we know, our). Driscoll's evidence suggests that under both types of incentives, legislators' incentives to cultivate a personal vote might be conditional on visibility. In other words, legislators appear more self-referential when competing against a low number of competitors.

Studies, mostly centered in the U.S. Congress, have also shown the influence of individual motivations on speech content. Hill and Hurley (2002) argue that speeches match particular home style activities, based on the legislator's political ambition, his leadership position, and his district's electoral competitiveness. The authors analyze a manually coded sample of floor debates from the U.S. Senate and find that candidates who won their previous race with relatively lower vote margins are more likely to deliver constituency identification ("I am one of yours") and empathy ("I understand you") speeches. Senators seeking reelection more regularly deliver empathy speeches, while senators with presidential ambition are more likely to express general policy positions. Following the same line, Quinn et al. (2010) study speeches from the U.S. Senate from 1997 to 2004, analyzing them through a topic model method. The authors find that U.S. senators facing reelection are more likely to deliver a speech on symbolic (related to honor, fallen heroes, sports, etc.) or social (related to education, social welfare, Medicaid, violent crime, etc.) issues, compared to senators whose reelection prospects are further in the future. Finally, members who are retiring are less likely to give speeches in general.

In addition, Victor (2011) studies the speeches given by first-term members of five congresses in the U.S. House. The author argues that ambition and campaigning for higher office has an effect on legislators' need to demonstrate policy specialization. Victor finds evidence that speeches by ambitious freshmen members reflect policy specialization as they have incentives to be perceived as competent, effective, experts, and intense. However, during a campaign for higher office, candidate-legislators face a broader constituency; therefore, they tend to demonstrate less policy specialization. Finally, Morris (2001) studies who is more likely to engage in partisan rhetoric in the House, through the study of one-minute speeches during a single congressional term. Morris shows that tenure, district competition, and reelection or higher office aspirations are negatively associated with the number of partisan speeches, while ideologically extremist members are more apt to voice partisan rhetoric in their speeches.

As modifications to the electoral rules might change the principal of the legislators, electoral reforms can consequently change speech content. Bjørn and Søyland (2015) find evidence of a substantial shift on the prevalence of the topics of the speeches delivered in Norwegian parliament between 1906 and 1940, the period in which the candidate-centered electoral system was replaced by a party-centered system. Drawing on a structural model of textual analysis, the authors find that before the reform, speeches centered on topics that allowed legislators to claim credit (e.g., pension and salary issues), while post-reform speeches centered on party-political issues (e.g., regional infrastructure and autonomy, social security, economic system, and left- right ideology). In a study of the speeches of the British House of Commons between 1832 and 1915, Spirling (2016) observes that suffrage extension led to cabinet members to turn, to a higher degree, to simpler linguistic expressions

during their floor speeches, compared to backbenchers. The author argues that members of parliament had strong incentives to lure the new voters to their party, particularly the party leaders, who were trying to promote the party. In summary, legislators recognize the principals that the electoral rules assign to them, and they shape their speeches to address these principals and ensure a higher likelihood of electoral success.

Finally, studies show that electoral incentives have an impact on procedural rules governing access to the floor. In a study of 55 legislative bodies across time, Taylor (2006) finds that electoral rules influence the degree of procedural rights for rank-and-file members to terminate debates. In other words, in parliamentary systems, individual electoral incentives increase the probability of debates being terminated by decentralized procedures. In their study of speeches delivered in the Italian parliament between 2001 and 2006, Giannetti and Pedrazanni (2016) find that leaders' control over the floor depends on procedural restrictions on floor participation. Under un-restricted rules (debates on decree laws), floor access does not depend on the ideological distance from the party leader, while under restricted rules (debates for ordinary bills), opposition legislators ideologically further from the party leader speak less frequently. In addition, in the majority coalition, leaders speak more frequently than backbench MPs. Whether the congressmen was elected under PR or SMD in Italy's mixed-member system did not have any effect on the results. To sum up, procedural rules for managing the floor reveal that under collective vote-gathering incentives, the rules tend to be centralized, while under individual vote-gathering incentives, the rules tend to be decentralized.

Legislative reformers and American political scholars have argued that floor speeches provide members of congress and parties a venue to communicate with their constituents and

express their policy positions. A number of studies have demonstrated that members of the U.S. congress make use of floor speeches to take positions that appeal to central target audiences (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Hill and Hurley 2002), to establish party positions (Harris 2005), and under coalition governments, for coalition parties “to make their case to their target audiences concerning the stance the party has taken on a particular bill” (Martin and Vanberg 2008). The scholarship has also made clear the effects of electoral incentives in speech organization and content. Yet floor debates have attracted relatively little scholarly attention in the comparative literature, especially in presidential systems and in Latin American congresses.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I focus on NLS. When legislators have incentives to promote their own reputation at the expense of the party label, members of congress strive for autonomy in the instruments of parliamentary communication. However, not all floor speeches venues serve the same purpose (Ken 2015). Therefore, when studying speeches, it is important to not only divide those from lawmaking debates to those from other sections of the legislative session (Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017), but also understand the different categories within non-lawmaking venues. There are different considerations for why is this case. First, while speeches during lawmaking debates constrain the legislators to address the bill itself, during NLS forums, legislators can address the topic of their choice. This condition allows parties and legislators to shape speeches to their own advantage.

Second, simply because NLS are not about a specific bill does not mean it is cheap talk. Under individual incentives, legislators value opportunities to claim credit, to raise awareness about their districts, or to give honorary speeches (Grimmer 2013). Third, in order to publicize their contributions (in the media, press releases, or social media), lawmakers need

to provide media outlets with new and important material (Mueller and Sieberer 2014). For example, the one-minute speeches at the U.S. House, the best-known NLS venue in the literature, are considered an attractive communication tool for individual members and party elites. They have a national audience composed of C-SPAN television viewers and webcast users. Also, they occur at the beginning of the daily congressional session, which gives the legislators the chance to be covered by the evening media. In addition, some members share their speeches through other channels, “such as mailing constituents a copy of the speech printed in the Congressional Record or providing local news organizations with a video press release” (Mulvihill and Schneider 1999, 5). In short, the flexibility and visibility of NLS speeches, compared to other parliamentary and extra-legislative activities, make this venue an important resource.

Despite the progress made in the literature surveyed in this section, there is still much to be said about speeches and NLS forums, as well as about their use in other geographical regions. First, although the findings in parliamentary systems and the U.S. are an excellent basis for further studies, we should acknowledge the limitations of their generalization. The relationship of the legislative and the executive branches in parliamentary and presidential systems is inherently different. Given the direct election of the president in presidential systems legislators have more liberty to respond to incentives produced by the electoral system, but they are also more vulnerable (Crisp et al. 2004). In addition, in parliamentary systems, party defection is more costly than in presidential systems, as all fates are more likely to be tied together; party or coalition division can bring down the government and therefore the dissenter’s own seat (Morgenstern 2003, 89). Furthermore, U.S. single-member-district elections, decentralized candidate selection, and weak parties are features

that are not always shared with the rest of the continent, making the U.S. system unique. Therefore, it is still to be demonstrated how parties organize their speeches in other presidential systems in the Americas.

Second, most studies of speech organization do not take into account the legislators' career prospects. In other words, are candidates using speeches as an active electoral tool to appeal to an expected constituency? This point goes hand-in-hand with the content of the speeches. It is still to be answered if the speeches are either addressing target communities or national issues, if they are used for partisan rhetoric or even to address bills.

Third, and more importantly, with just a few exceptions, as seen throughout this literature review, the scholarship does not systematically distinguish between different venues of NLS that can be used for communication. Furthermore, a quick view of the different chambers in presidential America reveals that not all of them have non-lawmaking venues. The scholarship needs to question why this is the case, and if the presence of these venues is tied to the electoral incentives that the systems set on the parties when party leaders are organizing floor time.

Conclusion

In short, institutions move along a continuum between the party leaders and the constituency as legislators' principals. Given who is their principal, the legislator will behave differently in order to please them. If she depends on how well the party label does on Election Day and depends on the party leader to be included on the ballot at the next election and/or ranked more favorably on the party's list, she will have incentives to vote along party lines. If the party leader has weak control over the ballot and the legislator depends on the

electorate to be chosen as its preferred candidate, she will develop local bills and be more responsive to voting with the district's views rather than the party line.

Legislators are incentivized to use the floor of the chamber to maximize their chances of reelection. The overuse of the common pool resource of the plenary time develops a collective action problem. The party leaders assume responsibility for organizing the floor participation in a way that maximizes the party's and the legislators' opportunity to win the elections.

A new surge in the literature has found evidence that electoral institutions shape participation on the floor, procedural rules governing participation, and speech content. For the purpose of this dissertation, I focus on the findings on floor participation. The consensus is that when the principal is the electorate, ideologically extreme legislators speak more frequently than moderates. Some studies, but not all, find a significant effect from how electorally secure the legislator is and if he is part of the opposition coalition. On the other hand, when the principal is the party leadership, in other words under collective vote-gathering incentives, the party leadership speak more frequently. The leadership control is more evident when looking at procedural rules governing floor participation. The rationale behind this difference is that in the former system, each legislator has to cultivate her reputation among her peers within and outside the party, while in the latter system, the leadership will be more cautious about who takes the floor, as the fate of all legislators is tied together.

Despite the consensus in the literature, there are also some gaps that have not been covered. First, as seen in the survey of the literature, most of the studies focus on parliamentary systems and the U.S. presidential system. The focus in these two groups

mostly overlooks presidential systems. As claimed earlier in the chapter, the findings in the U.S. presidential system cannot be easily generalized due to the systems uniqueness. Second, with a few exceptions, the studies treat all floor speeches as a single group, assuming they are all the same. However, this is likely a misinterpretation. Thus, we should expect that it is unlikely that electoral incentives shape different venues in the same way. Third, though legislators are seeking to please their principal and be reelected, most studies do not take into account the legislator's ambition to stay in congress. Finally, the agreement in the literature is that ideologically extreme legislators are the ones that are the ones more likely to deliver a speech under candidate-centered systems. Yet, as mentioned previously in the chapter, there ARE a number of issues with regards to the possibility to measure ideological position, such as not all countries regularly record roll call votes, in some cases individual votes are reported upon request, or in some others cases the records are made public. The lack of resources to measure the ideological position of the legislators hinders the possibility for the researcher and in a lesser degree to party leadership to determine the position of the legislator to the party.

Following the scholarship on electoral incentives as well as the questionings presented in the previous paragraph, I ask who is more likely to deliver a speech during NLS sections of the legislative session that are open for legislators to address the topics of their choice. Should we expect that in venues for open speech, a party will allow legislators to work under unregulated speech time or will party leaders have a stake in organizing the venues? I expect to contribute to the scholarship with the analysis of open speeches in four presidential systems in Latin America

Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses

Legislators can use the floor chamber to reach their constituents and communicate with their peers. This forum allows legislators to share their ideological positions, expectations, and efforts. It is in the legislators and parties' best interest to spend time and energy conveying their stands on policy issues and advertising their work. For the public, to be informed about how and what is done in congress fosters political learning and strengthens accountability (Mueller and Sieberer 2014). In short, the floor serves different purposes for the different actors. Yet, while comparatively few scholars recognize the importance of the parliamentary arena for communication, legislators seem to appreciate its benefits.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, legislators shape the chamber rules to ensure resources that will allow communication opportunities from the floor. In recent years, there has been a surge in research focused on how electoral incentives shape parliamentary debate organization. For instance, Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2015) developed a theory of legislative speech for parliamentary democracy, which states that the way parties organize debates is shaped by the electoral institutions. Based on previous studies on the U.S. floor and in line with Proksch and Slapin's theory, other scholars have expanded the research on floor organization to other cases (Keh 2015, Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017, Høyland, Hobolt, and Hix 2017), and examined the effects of electoral institutions on the content of the speeches (Driscoll 2014, Bjørn and Søyland 2015) and in the parliamentary rules governing speech organization (Giannetti and Pedrazanni 2016).

In this dissertation, and stepping away from the majority of the standing literature on the subfield, I argue that there are various types of legislative speeches, which differ in their purpose and visibility. I focus on non-lawmaking speeches (NLS) given during what I call

Congressional Open Forums (COF), which are those that allow legislators to raise the topic of their choice. I have two goals in this chapter. First, I explain why COFs are a relevant legislative tool to which the scholarship should pay more attention to. I argue that such speeches reveal substantial information about parties and legislators. Second, I present my main theoretical argument, which is grounded in individual, goal-oriented behavior. I expect legislators' individual characteristics to shape COF. This perspective differs from prior works that have underlined the overall incentives of the type of electoral rule in place in the country as the primary determinant of speech organization. My perspective also implies that we should observe relevant intra-chamber variation among legislators in terms of their speech participation. More specifically, I expect electorally and institutionally disadvantaged legislators to be the more likely to participate in COF venues than others.

The remainder of the chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section, I present the theory and hypotheses, identify the main actors and their goals, and explain how COFs help legislators achieve their objectives. The second section is an exploratory overview of COFs. I show that these forums exist across different electoral systems in presidential countries in the Americas and explain some of their main structural characteristics.

Speeches and the legislative session

Speeches are an important tool to bring public awareness to an issue and to rally support for a political course of action. The media frequently reports on particular congressional speeches, and legislators often make sure key constituencies know about their interventions in congress. Speeches are therefore useful for parties and their members to achieve their electoral and policy goals; thus, opportunities for giving speeches are highly sought after.

Despite how intensively speech opportunities can be coveted, we do not see a bottleneck on the chamber floor resulting from everyone's wish to speak. This is in part due to the chamber and the parties' rules that structure and restrict the use of floor time, but also because not all legislators have the same speech priorities. Some legislators are more likely to deliver a speech than others due to the particular circumstances of the individual legislator and the nature of the speech opportunity. This segment will describe the variables that are expected to primarily determine who is more likely to speak, focusing specifically on NLS. In this section, I describe the main actors on the floor of congress and their goals, describe COF speeches and how they differ from speeches given during bill deliberation, and explain how COF speeches can help legislators achieve their goals.

Political Actors and Electoral Incentives

There are two main actors on the floor: parties and legislators. Each of these actors has goals that can be grouped into two main categories: policy and electoral. I safely assume that party leaders are primarily seeking to advance the interests of the party. Leaders want to draft, support, and pass bills that align with the party's ideology and vision for the nation. To do so, they need to have control over their members to guarantee party unity and to increase the probability of passage for the bills they want enacted into law. In addition, they need to ensure party unity in order to have leverage during negotiations with other parties and with the executive. Regarding the party's electoral goals, leaders want to increase, or at least maintain, the number of seats the party holds in the chamber. In addition, they seek to enhance the likelihood that their party wins the national executive. In short, the party leadership seeks to advance the electoral and policy goals of the party.

With respect to the rank and file members, I assume that they primarily want to achieve their own electoral and policy goals, which most often but not always coincide with those of the party they belong to. Party members want to introduce and pass bills that further their policy positions. Career-oriented legislators also want their party's support in the next electoral cycle or to move up the party ladder. In general, if the party as a whole does well, the individual legislator is likely to enjoy the influence and resources won by the party, and to achieve her own electoral and policy goals.

As described in the Literature Review, the members' strategies are affected by existing electoral rules. Under electoral rules that promote individual vote-gathering incentives, such as majority rule in a single-member district or a proportional system with an open list, the legislator's reputation is central to achieving electoral success. As a consequence, party leaders should allow their members to draft bills, vote, and deliver speeches that enhance their individual reputations with their constituencies.

Under electoral rules that promote collective vote-gathering incentives, such as proportional systems with closed list, the party label is central to the prosperity of the party at the ballot box. Consequently, party leaders should be more likely to protect the party label on the chamber floor as opposed to allowing legislators to enhance their individual reputations in their own terms. Leaders therefore seek party unity during legislative votes, rallying support for specific bills proposed by their members and monitoring who gives speeches on the floor. Individual members have incentives to cooperate with the leadership, as their political fate is tied to their party and they need leadership support to further their own careers. This support typically increases the likelihood that they will be included on the ballot at the next election or ranked more favorably on the party's list.

Whether the electoral rules promote individual or collective incentives is likely to shape which legislators are more likely to give a congressional speech as well as that addressee's content. Under electoral rules which promote individual vote-gathering, party leaders have fewer incentives to monitor who delivers a speech. They recognize that speeches allow legislators to address their constituencies and shape their reputation based on constituency needs and their ideological position, which is supposed to increase the electoral fortunes of the party. On the other hand, under electoral rules that promote collective vote-gathering, the leadership has greater incentives to monitor who takes the floor and the content of their speeches. Since voters are more likely to be motivated by the party's reputation and positions than by individual stances, the leadership is more concerned about presenting a cohesive party message. From this perspective, leaders and members who toe the party line are more likely to be granted the opportunity to address the chamber from the floor, than those that disregard the party's ideological position. This view follows from the arguments advanced by Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2015) regarding speech participation in parliamentary countries.

Although Proksch and Slapin's behavioral expectations have been tested and verified when looking at speeches generally, I argue that electoral incentives do not necessarily shape all types of speeches delivered in the chamber. On the contrary, I expect variation within the broad category of floor speeches based on their degree of visibility. I assume that speeches are more visible whenever they have a policy consequence or when they involve executive agencies. This includes bill debates and, to some extent, executive oversight. Even in these instances, we should expect different degrees of monitoring and visibility, depending on how important the issue is to the nation, a constituency, or interest groups. To sum up, electoral

rules should not shape sections of the legislative session that are not very visible to the audience outside the chamber.

Up until this point, I have laid out the main goals of legislators and party leaders and how electoral rules model the way in which party leaders and rank and file members organize floor participation. In addition, I have noted that we should expect different legislative behavior during non-lawmaking sections of the legislative session compared to bill debates. In the next subsection, I focus on one of the non-lawmaking sections, Congressional Open Forum (COF). I explain what COFs are, why the non-lawmaking speeches delivered during these forums differ from those speeches given during bill debate, and why the scholarship should care about them. I argue that they differ in their purpose, intended audience, content, and visibility.

Congressional Open Forums (COF)

COF fill an important need for parties and their members. Bill debates and other opportunities for participation on the floor of the chamber typically impose significant limits on legislators' participation. Speeches given during bill debates, for example, are most likely focused exclusively on the bill being discussed. In some cases, the chamber has standing germaneness rules that force legislators to address only the subject being discussed or amended. As a result, lawmakers must leave some topics to the side that they would otherwise like to discuss and leave on the record. Nor can everything a legislator might want to say be expressible through drafting bills or voting. It could be that a legislator wants to voice her dissatisfaction with a governmental action, to rally peers behind her bill, to share the need for school supplies in her district, or to pay tribute to the soccer team on its performance at the regional championship. In other words, COF speeches offer speech

opportunities that are not constrained by the rules and limitations typically associated with bill debates.

COF speeches should not be understood as a catch-all term representing any forum where a speech is given on a non-lawmaking matter. They are specific venues set aside for legislators to address a topic of their choice. This forum allows speeches that are characterized by two clear traits. First, they are open regarding subject matter. Therefore, they are separate from speeches given in venues specifically dedicated to celebrations, honors, and discussion of the daily agenda. Second, while in COFs, legislators can address government agencies, the venue is not exclusively designated for oversight activities. The COF's main function is to give legislators the opportunity to address the chamber on any topic.

Members of congress may use COF speeches for various purposes. First, these speeches are a tool for representation, allowing lawmakers to advertise to their constituency their stands on several issues and to voice demands for their districts. Second, they are also a tool for announcing and explaining their policy positions. In some countries, rules even allow legislators to address bills being currently discussed in the agenda. In these cases, lawmakers publicize their stand on the bill and the reasons for their voting decisions, and show off their expertise and thoughtfulness. Consequently, COF speeches can be used as a tool for persuasion: they allow lawmakers to prompt others to support their initiatives. Finally, they are also a consolation for legislative actors in weak positions who are unable to frequently participate in bill debates, such as members of the minority party or coalition. In short, these speeches are very useful to parties and their members.

As with bill debates, speeches that are delivered during COF become part of the congressional record and depending on the country can also be aired on TV and then, if the legislator is fortunate enough, may be shared on the radio or on social media. A printed version of the speech or a soundbite is very useful for the legislator and the party. It can be sent to a constituency, an interest group, a media outlet, or the principal that needs the school supplies demanded by the legislator. To have a speech on record allows lawmakers to prove they are voicing the needs of their constituency in the national arena, as well as to explain their position with respect to the party and government.

However, it should also be recognized that speeches delivered during COFs might have a more limited impact on the party label's or legislators' reputation than addresses during bill deliberation. First, they are not directly affecting or shaping a piece of legislation. Second, speeches delivered during COF are not as visible as bill debates. They occur either early or late in the legislative session, and usually need a reduced quorum in the chamber. In addition, the media and public are more likely to focus on bill debates rather than on speeches about an open topic from random members of congress. Third, there is a cost to giving a speech. COF speeches have a time limit. In most countries, there are rules setting the length of time of this venue per session or week, and how this time is to be distributed between the parties. Therefore, whenever a legislator has the opportunity to deliver a speech, he generally needs to come prepared to make the most of it, and in some cases he needs to ask for permission from the party leader to participate. In other words, legislators typically invest time to prepare their speeches. Presumably, legislators take into account the benefits and the costs of these speeches, and approach this venue differently than they do bill debates.

Theoretical Puzzle and Hypotheses

A section of the legislative session devoted to COF speeches is common in many congresses, which reflects that many leaders and rank and file members perceive a benefit from using them. Yet, what types of legislators are most likely to make use of this congressional tool is a largely unexplored question.

As mentioned in the previous section, COF speeches differ from speeches delivered during bill debates with respect to their implications for the political process, their visibility, and their costs and benefits. To place all of these particular differences into a single category, we could say that the behavioral incentives for delivering a speech during COF are systematically different than those for debating a bill on the chamber floor. In this section, I explain the incentives that individual legislators and parties have for participating in COFs, and I lay out the hypotheses I will be testing.

My first assumption is that parties and their members weigh the costs and benefits of delivering a speech. The individual member evaluates if the time and effort needed to prepare a speech is worthwhile. As explained earlier, the extant literature suggests that under a system with collective incentives, leaders are typically more likely to monitor who addresses the floor in order to protect the party label. Therefore, leaders themselves, or legislators who hold ideological views that are more consistently similar to those of the party, are more likely to deliver a speech. However, these factors are unlikely to be significant in explaining who participates during COF. Since only a targeted audience follows COF speeches, there are fewer incentives for the leadership to actively monitor their party members' activity here.

Fewer incentives for party leaders to monitor COF speeches should also apply to countries that have electoral systems that emphasize the personal vote. I therefore argue that the country's electoral rules are not the main determinant of who delivers a speech during COF. Instead, institutional variables and the legislator's own electoral circumstances are more likely to shape the observable behavior in this arena.

Hypotheses

It makes sense to assume that the majority party/coalition is going to favor the bills initiated by their own members over those initiated by members of other parties. Since majority parties most often have control of the congressional agenda, opposition legislators typically have fewer opportunities than government legislators to speak during bill debates and to rhetorically push their ideological agenda. Consequently, the opposition has a greater incentive than the majority to use other available opportunities to voice their positions. Thus, regardless of the electoral rules, legislators from the minority party or coalition should find COF particularly useful. My first hypothesis derives from this idea.

Hypothesis 1: Opposition members should be more likely to deliver a speech during COF than members of the majority.

Second, as mentioned earlier, leaders are more likely to screen who takes the floor in order to protect the party label from extreme and divisive messages. Yet, leaders have little reason to expect COF speeches to be as visible, as bill debates. Therefore, COF speeches should not be strongly monitored and controlled by the party leaders.

However, while majority-party leaders have little incentive to closely monitor speeches delivered during COFs, opposition leaders in party-centric systems do. Since COFs might

offer one of the few ways to address the chamber and to generate some attention for the opposition's agenda, it is in the opposition parties' best interest to use their time wisely. Therefore, in order to ensure the maximum utility of their scarce resource, leaders of the opposition should participate at a higher rate in COF than their rank and file members. In contrast, under electoral rules that stress the personal vote, party leaders have fewer incentives to monitor speeches, including those delivered during COF. Leaders recognize that those legislators who benefit from delivering a COF speech will seek to participate, and take a hands-off approach.

Hypothesis 2: Opposition leaders are more likely to deliver a speech during COF than leaders of the majority, but only under party-centric systems.

Third, tenure is also likely to matter. First-term legislators, in addition to uncertainty about their future electoral performance, have other types of incentives for participating during COFs. Freshmen legislators should tend to be eager to demonstrate to their constituents and party leaders that they are hard workers. Furthermore, given their typical legislative inexperience, few relationships with other members in the chamber, and lack of powerful institutional positions in the chamber (e.g., being a member of an important committee or holding a leadership position), they are likely to have fewer opportunities to participate during bill debates.

Hypothesis 3: First-term legislators are more likely to deliver a speech during COF than more senior legislators.

Lastly, the types of members of congress likely to benefit from participating in COF are those wanting to stay in congress. In other words, those seeking reelection and electorally

disadvantaged legislators who want to increase their chances of keeping their seat in the next election. They are likely to want to increase their visibility with key constituencies. Most legislators have electoral goals, yet only some of them find the utility of delivering a speech higher than its cost (mostly time to prepare the speech). Rank and file members at risk of losing their seats based on previous electoral results should be more likely to want to participate in COFs.

Hypothesis 4: Legislators who are less secure electorally are more likely to deliver speeches during COF than those that have a secure seat.

Table 3.1: Summary of hypotheses and expected effect of number of COF speeches

Hypothesis	Variable	Expected effect on the number of COF speeches
1	Opposition	+
2	Leaders of the opposition (only in party-centric systems)	+
3	First-term in office	+
4	Electorally Vulnerable	+

Unit of analysis: legislator of country x

A few corollaries are deduced from the mentioned hypotheses. If leaders from the opposition are in fact more likely to participate during COFs, we could conclude that they are also more likely to monitor who speaks during COFs. In other words, opposition leaders have incentives to behave collectively under electoral rules that promote such behavior in order to maximize a resource that the party has given the lack of other venues during the legislative session. This behavior is not expected in leaders of the government coalition. For that reason, disadvantaged legislators from the government coalition will be more likely to participate.

Congressional Open Forums in Presidential America

The purpose of this section is to describe COF in Latin America and to make a first assessment to determine if their presence is associated with the electoral incentives in place. The section is divided in two main parts. First, I give an overview of the COF available in presidential countries in the Americas considering their electoral system. The overview of COF reveals differences among congresses in the region regarding COF existence and structure. Second, I explain these forums in each country, detailing how they are structured and organized, and the purpose they serve.

Based on previous studies of chamber rules and floor access, differences among countries with respect to the presence and structure of COFs are likely to be associated with differences in their electoral rules. In other words, countries with electoral rules that nurture individual vote-gathering incentives should be more likely to have COFs and fewer rules of procedure that restrain its use than countries with collective vote-gathering incentives.

In order to understand the relationship between COFs and the rules that structure their use, I examined the standing orders and informal rules of the lower or only chamber in presidential countries in Latin America and the United States. The goal is to assess which countries have COF, and if so, what their rules of procedure are. I proceed in three steps when deciding whether a country has COF. In Step 1, I check the standing rules of legislative sessions in each country for the year 2005.¹ To be classified as a COF, the rules should set a specific time during the legislative session in which legislators can address a topic of their

¹ I chose the year 2005 due to the data used to determine the degree of legislative incentives in the system, the Index of Individual Incentives by Wallack and Johnson (2006).

choice (aside from rules preventing bill debating) not solely restricted to celebrations or oversight.

Table 3.2: Congressional Open Forums (COF) and electoral incentives

Country	Ranking personal incentives	Has COF?	Standing rules	Rules/Conventions		
				Timeframe per session	Accessibility	Timeframe per intervention
El Salvador	1	0				
Honduras	1	0				
Guatemala	1	0				
Argentina	1	0				
Paraguay	1	1	1	1	0	1
Costa Rica	1	1	0	1	0	1
Nicaragua	1	*				
Ecuador	3	0				
Dominican R	3	1	1	0	0	1
Uruguay	3	1	1	1	1	1
Peru	5	0				
Chile	5	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	6	0				
Panama	6	1	1	1	1	1
Brazil	7	1	1	1	0	1
Venezuela	10	0				
Bolivia	10	0				
U.S.	10	1	0	0	0	1
Colombia	12 [±]	1	1	0	0	0

Source: the author. The ranking for personal incentives was taken from Wallack and Johnson (2006).

* It was unclear if Nicaragua has a COF or not, and it was not possible to find session records.

[±] ranking of personal incentive based on electoral system prior to the 2003 reform.

Next, for those countries with these venues in their standing rules, I code the features that structure them: timeframe per session and per intervention, and accessibility. A value of 1 is given when there are clear rules that structure time and accessibility (either in the standing

rules or by norm). Timeframe per session refers to the specific amount of time the chamber allots to the forums. Timeframe per intervention refers to whether the rules regulate the distribution of time among legislators. Finally, accessibility refers to whether decisions about the distribution of the time among legislators is centralized in the party leadership, or whether decisions about speech participation are decentralized in the hands of the individuals.

I also checked the legislative records to determine if the chamber has set COF by convention, even if the COF is not specified in its parliamentary rules. In the review of the records, I looked for two things: whether the countries with COFs in their standing rules do in fact use these venues, and if despite the lack of COFs in their standing rules, countries have developed norms that recreate such venues.

Finally, to assess individual electoral incentives in each country, I use Wallack and Johnson's (2006) data set on electoral systems. Following Shugart and Carey (1995), the authors rank countries by their individual vote-gathering incentives, which are evaluated based on three traits: party control over ballot access, options available to citizens when casting a vote, and whether votes are pooled across candidates of the same party. The index is an ordinal rank of the country scores for their lower or only chambers. It ranges from 1 to 13. A value of 1 is for a country with the lowest amount of individual incentives, while a value of 13 corresponds to a country with the highest amount of incentives to cultivate personal reputation.

Table 3.2 presents results for all presidential countries in the Americas. The first column lists the countries; the second shows the corresponding Wallack and Johnson's ranking for individual vote-gathering incentives. The third column indicates whether the lower or only

chamber has a COF and the fourth specifies if the rules are included in the chamber's standing rules. The final three columns describe the characteristics of such forums for the countries with COF. The coding for the final three columns is based on the findings from the standing rules and the legislative transcripts.

Table 3.2 reveals the variation in the degree of personal incentives that each system creates, as well as in the presence of COF. Some countries create COF through formal chamber rules, while others do so through either chamber norms or parliamentary conventions. In addition, among the countries with COF, rules can vary, particularly with regards to the amount of time dedicated to COF and how that time is distributed between the parties and its members.

The descriptive data suggest that there is no clear relationship between the countries' electoral rules and the presence (or absence) of venues for COF. Countries with COF appear at various locations in the personal incentive rankings. As Table 3.2 shows, countries without COFs include Guatemala, Honduras, Argentina, and El Salvador, which have the lowest values in the index (i.e., 1); Mexico (6) and Peru (5), which have values in the middle range; and Bolivia and Venezuela, which have some of the highest values in this index (10). On the contrary, the U.S. (10) and Costa Rica (1) have COF venues, but these are not formally set in the internal rules of the chambers, while formal parliamentary rules for COFs are found in Paraguay (1), Uruguay and Dominican Republic (3), Chile (5), Panama (6), Brazil (7), and Colombia (12). To sum up, a snapshot of the congresses in the region reveals that the presence of COF in a legislative session is not tied to the incentives generated by the electoral rules.

If the existence of COF is not explained by the type of electoral rule, then what is driving their presence? Trying to understand the existence of such rules and norms in a chamber raises challenging questions. However, a snapshot of the electoral rules and the chamber rules limits robust claims. A longitudinal study that looks at the origins of these institutions is likely to provide further information. We could look at when the practice first appeared in each country, or what led to changes in the practice (such as constitutional changes affecting chamber structure or changes in the distribution of time). This investigation would require a meticulous tracking of the session transcripts and parliamentary rules, which would be well beyond the focus and purposes of this study. As the scholarship on COF is scant in the subfield of legislative behavior, there is a great deal to be studied and said about the matter. The origins of COF in each country are a subject for future research.

In the following, and final, part of this chapter, I present an overview of the COFs in presidential America. The section is divided in two. First, I examine the countries that do not decree COFs in their chamber rules, but have COFs by custom. In the second part, I examine those countries that stipulate COFs in their standing rules. For each country, I address when COFs appear in the legislative agenda, how time is allocated, and restrictions in the interventions.

Congressional Open Forums by Convention

United States: The U.S. House of Representatives has two types of COFs: special venues and one-minute speeches. Yet none of these are officially included in the chamber rules; rather, they are set by unanimous consent. “Typically, on the opening day of a new Congress, unanimous consent agreements and the Speaker’s announced policies governing the conduct

of non-legislative debate during that Congress are stated” (Schneider 2012, 3). The norm governing this practice has evolved over time in response to the contemporary needs of the chamber and its members. The rules governing one-minute speeches have been in place since 1984, as set by the Speaker at the time,² and they have continued ever since in every congressional term. Given time constraints and germaneness rules, these types of venues are valuable and attractive to the members of the U.S. House of Representatives as they give them the opportunity to raise issues outside the consideration of the legislative business (Schneider 2012).

One-minute speeches are made at the beginning of the legislative day, but may occur at other times as well, whereas Special Orders take place at the end of the day, after the legislative business is completed. Recognition to participate in one-minute speeches is a prerogative of the Speaker, who can limit the daily speeches to a certain number. Members sit on the first row of the party’s side of the chamber, and the Speaker alternates the recognition between the parties. Members can speak for up to one minute and are not allowed to ask for additional time. If legislators run out of time, the undelivered portion of the speech can be included in the *Congressional Record*, with the previous consent of the Chamber. The legislator can also include other types of materials, as newspaper articles or a constituent letter. On the other hand, recognition to participate during Special Orders is a prerogative of the Speaker, and members reserve their time in advance through their party’s leadership. Each party can select a member to speak for up to one hour. If more members desire to speak, they can do so for up to 30 minutes, alternating between the parties.

² See Congressional Record vol. 130, August 8, 1984, p. H8552.

One-minute speeches and Special Orders have been a “staple” of the House since Newt Gingrich used it as a member of the minority party to criticize the Democratic majority. During the '80s, Gingrich, then a new member in the House, saw the benefits of airing one-minute speeches through C-SPAN. Gingrich delivered “fiery” one-minute speeches to speak in favor of his conservative agenda and against Democratic policies (Perloff 2013, 146). Although there might not be a large number of members at the chamber at the time of one-minute speeches, every office at the House tunes in to C-SPAN to watch the morning procedures and to monitor the issues being brought at the floor. One-minute speeches reflect a mixture of party messaging (OConnor 2005), “members’ policy priorities, and district concerns” (Straus and Glassman 2016).

Costa Rica: The Costa Rican Assembly also uses COFs despite their not being codified in standing orders. The time used for COFs is usually known as *Control Politico* (Political Oversight), although little to no oversight occurs during it. By informal convention, this section takes place before bill deliberation and runs for 30 minutes, divided into five minutes per intervention, except on Wednesday, when COFs last for up to an hour. The members’ speeches, as well as undelivered portions of them and additional material, are printed in the congressional record. For recognition, legislators freely register their name days and even weeks in advance, yet members may yield their time to other legislators.

The opportunities to deliver a speech during the COF are highly coveted by Costa Rican legislators. There are multiple accounts of legislators expressing their hopes for a better organized venue. In the words of PLN congressmen Oscar Eduardo Nunez, “the [parties] factions’ leadership should spend time analyzing what will happen and how we will finally solve the issue of *Control Político* to improve time management (...) if it should be given to

factions to determine who speaks that day and when, and on what topic.”³ In addition, multiple legislators have expressed the importance of the venue. As Carlos Manuel Gutierrez, a legislator from the party *Movimiento Libertario*, states, “I think it [*Control Político*] is important, and I want to draw the attention of the Chair to please try to maintain the section of Control Politico, which is very healthy for a democracy like ours.”⁴ Or in the words of Francisco Javier Marin, member of *Partido de Liberación Nacional*, “there are so many important issues to speak about in *Control Político* and so little time to outline the thoughts that a legislator has on some national issues.”⁵

Congressional Open Forums structured by parliamentary rules

Among those countries where COFs are codified in their chamber rules, their specificity tends to vary. Some of the guidelines include when COFs take place, the amount of time allocated, the distribution of the time among parties or individual legislators, and the time limits for individual speeches. Here I present an overview of COFs in countries with formal parliamentary rules on the matter.

Brazil: The Chamber of Deputies has two COFs, *Pequeno Expediente* and *Grande Expediente* (*Resolución n° 17, de 1989, Reglamento Interno de la Cámara de Diputados*),

³ Congressional Transcript, *Asamblea General*. March 3, 2007. Session 174. Author’s translation.

⁴ Congressional Transcript, *Asamblea General*. March 20, 2007. Session 169. Author’s translation.

⁵ Congressional Transcript, *Asamblea General*. , September 24, 2007. Session 79. Author’s translation.

with strict rules of proceeding. *Pequeno Expediente* lasts for sixty minutes and is done before bill debates. Lawmakers can speak for up to five minutes, and their interpellations can be done orally or by submitting a written document. The time is allocated to deputies who have signed up personally to the *Mesa*, or chamber's directorate, with preference given to those who have not spoken previously. Members are not allowed to yield their time to someone else. If the COF's time runs out and other members of congress are lined up to give a speech, their slot is transferred to the next session.

Grande Expediente is right after *Pequeno Expediente*, and it lasts for 50 minutes. Interpellations can be for up to 25 minutes. The list of speakers is determined by electronic lottery, but members can yield their time. A deputy can speak in *Grande Expediente* up to three occasions per semester, once by lottery and twice through time transfer by legislators who have been drawn in the lottery.

Chile: Chile has very strict and exhaustive COF rules. The country's COF is known as *Hora de Incidentes*. The parliamentary rules (*Reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, Art 116-117*) set aside 180 minutes for COFs per week, divided evenly between the week's scheduled sessions, usually three per week. The time allocated to each party is proportional to the amount of seats each party has, and members can yield their time to other lawmakers and parties. In addition, the allocated time to each party can be expanded if the whole chamber unanimously agrees. In the first session of the congressional term, the party with the highest amount of seats has the first turn to address the floor, then the second party, and so forth. In the next *Hora de Incidentes*, the second largest party has the first turn; the next turn is given to the third party, and so on. If two or more parties have an equal number of members of congress, the turn is given to the parties by alphabetical order.

The oral statements given by the legislators during COFs are printed in the congressional records. In addition, these legislators can turn in a written statement to the chamber's chair. However, the total of the oral and the written statement cannot exceed the time fixed for *Hora de Incidentes* per session. For this reason, according to the parliamentary rules, one written, double-spaced statement equals two minutes of oral speech. Legislators can ask the chamber to send an *oficio*, the official transcript of their speech, to specific individuals or government agencies. In addition, *Hora de incidents* is followed by the media. Newspapers report on the speeches given, and videos and quotes from the speeches are used for news. Legislators and the chamber also promote their speeches in social media.

Colombia: Colombia's COF is known as *Lo que propongan los miembros* (*Reglamento del Congreso – Sección 2*). As its name reveals, this is a section for members to propose what they desire. No further information about its use or organization is revealed in the parliamentary rules, and it is not commonly used by the legislators.

Dominican Republic: The Dominican Republic's COF is called *Turnos Previos* (*Reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados de la Republica Dominicana Art – 53, 104*). Those members who are given time to speak during the COF have five minutes each, and only two members of each party can speak per session. An online search of *Turnos Previos* reveals that the media follow what the legislators address during such speeches, and the chamber raises awareness of them through members' social media. No further information about the COF's use or organization is revealed in the chamber rules.

Panama: Panama's COF is known as *Periodo de Incidencias* and is done before bill deliberation. It was added to the parliamentary rules in 1992, and it has been there ever since. Formally, the incident period takes place for up to 30 minutes. The time is distributed to the

parties, proportional to the number of seats they have, and legislators can intervene for up to five minutes. However, the use of COFs is so valuable to the lawmakers that the Assembly constantly spends more time on them than what is stipulated, and on some occasions, the congressional sessions are solely dedicated to the incident period without any discussion on bills.

Paraguay: Under Paraguay's legislative rules, statements not related to bills are made before bill deliberation, and members should list their names with the Chamber's chair at least 30 minutes prior to the beginning of the legislative session. If there are members listed, the COF can take up to 30 minutes. The number of legislators should not be more than six per session, and each has up to five minutes to speak. If other lawmakers are mentioned during an intervention, up to two legislators can reply, and each will have five minutes to do so. These legislators do not need to have listed their names previously in order to make their reply.

Uruguay: Uruguay has two COFs, known as *Media Hora Previa* and *Media Hora Final*. *Media Hora Previa* is the most commonly used. It is done every legislative session, 30 minutes prior to bill deliberation. The number of legislators should not exceed six per session, and each has up to five minutes to speak. In the last session of each month, legislators list their names in order to be able to deliver a speech in the upcoming month, yet members may yield their time to other legislators. As in the case of Panama and Chile, legislators in the chamber can request the chair to send the session's transcript to the constituency of interest or the executive agencies that were mentioned in the speech.

To sum up, there are two types of COFs in presidential America: by parliamentary rules, and by convention. Contrary to the first ones, those set by convention are not included in the chamber rules but rather structured by informal rules. The two countries with this type of

COFs are the U.S. and Costa Rica. The other countries in the region that have these forums are under the category of COFs by parliamentary rules. Within this category, there is a lot of variation. As shown, some countries have detailed rules of when should COFs take place, how long they should last, and how long each intervention should be. This is the case of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. On the other extreme, other countries do not give much detail of the structure of COFs and leave those decisions to the prerogative of the chamber, the parties, and the individual legislators. This is the case of Colombia and Dominican Republic.

Summary of the chapter

Speeches are a central element to deliberative democracy. They allow parties and their members to bring public awareness to an issue and to rally support for a political cause. To the electorate, legislators' speeches enhance political accountability and foment public awareness. Given the importance of congressional speeches in the political process, it is surprising the scant attention that political scientists have given them. Only recently have scholars started studying the different types of legislative speeches. One of the lines of study has been the effects of electoral incentives on speech organization.

I argue that speeches delivered during COFs have a different purpose and level of visibility than speeches delivered during bill debates, and therefore all speeches delivered on the floor should not be grouped together. COFs serve a different aim for party leaders and rank and file members, and electoral rules affect them differently compared to how they shape floor organization for other types of speeches. I argue that the legislators' individual electoral fate and institutional position inside the chamber, rather than the overall incentives of the type of electoral rule in place in the country, shape speeches delivered in COFs. In COFs, party leaders have little to no incentive to monitor the speeches. Therefore, rank and

file members who lack access to the floor during bill debates should be more likely to address peers through COFs. In addition, minority and first-term members should be likely to speak during COFs, as well as those at risk of losing their seats based on previous electoral results.

In this chapter I have also present a survey of the countries of Latin America and whether they have or not COF venues. For those that have the venues, I give details on how it is structured and its rules. I made a comparison between the presence of COF venues and the electoral incentives for the countries by 2006. Contrary to the expectations, the small appraisal suggests a lack of an obvious association between electoral rules and their presence. In other words, countries with individual electoral incentives are not more likely to have COFs and/or fewer rules of procedure that restrain its use than countries with collective vote-gathering incentives.

Chapter 4: Legislative Incentives and Participation in Congressional Open Forums

Throughout this dissertation, I have maintained that there are different types of floor speeches, which vary significantly in purpose and visibility. The most commonly studied speeches are those delivered during bill deliberation. The literature has made claims about speech behavior based on the incentives developed by the electoral rules. I posit that this is unlikely to apply to all types of speeches on the floor.

The goal of this empirical chapter is to test the hypothesis that during forums for open speech, electoral rules do not dictate the legislators' behavior. Rather, individual characteristics do. Legislators under open speech forums are free to choose if they want to participate. Consequently, only those who benefit the most from these venues are likely to participate. I argue that while in candidate-centric systems, leaders have little to no incentive to control these venues even if their party is in a disadvantageous position, in party-centric systems, opposition leaders will take charge of the floor *only* when they believe that they might benefit from organized participation.

The chapter is divided as follows. First, I briefly summarize my hypotheses about COF participation. The second section describes the cases selected to test the hypotheses. To control for the effect of electoral rules, I chose Uruguay, Chile, Panama, and Costa Rica, which present a mix of electoral incentives. In this section I describe their legislative and party systems. In the third section, I present the operationalization of the variables. Next, I explain the models and their results, and end the chapter with the analysis of the results and the conclusions.

The results do not allow me to confidently reject or confirm my hypotheses. In Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay being a member of the opposition positively affects the likelihood of a legislator delivering a speech during COFs. However, the results are only statistically significant for Costa Rica and Panama. In addition, there is evidence that freshmen legislators deliver more speeches in Uruguay and Costa Rica, as well as electorally vulnerable members in Chile, Panama, and Uruguay. However, the coefficients lack statistical significance.

Party and individual behavior under different electoral incentives

There is a consensus in the literature that under systems that foster collective vote-gathering, party leaders are more likely to deliver speeches themselves during parliamentary debates in order to protect the party label. On the other hand, under systems that foster individual vote-gathering, ideologically extreme legislators speak more frequently. However, I argue that different sections of the legislative session serve different purposes for the chamber than for the members. Hence, we should expect electoral incentives to affect them differently. The party leaders' behavior in these collective incentive systems is unlikely to be uniform across all types of parliamentary speeches.

I previously stated that those who benefit the most from preparing and delivering speeches during COF are the ones more likely to participate. COF speeches have limited visibility and effect on legislation. Both party leaders and members recognize this. Previous scholarship has gathered all types of speeches into a single group and drawn their findings from this sample (mainly speeches from bill debates). However, I claim that participation in forums for non-lawmaking speeches differs from bill debates. Specifically, only some members of congress consider giving a speech in COF advantageous. My expectation is that

members who would benefit the most from giving a speech are institutionally disadvantaged legislators with fewer opportunities to take the floor during bill deliberation (such as opposition and first-term members), as well as those who need to speak to their peers and constituency for electoral purposes (such as the electorally vulnerable).

Case selection

Due to the nascent state of the literature on parliamentary speeches, it is difficult to consistently define the non-lawmaking category of speeches across different countries, or which countries even have COFs. As explained previously, I define a COF as a venue specifically set aside for legislators to address a topic of their choice. Therefore, the speeches analyzed in this dissertation are separate from any of the following other instances in which legislators deliver speeches: those given during venues specifically dedicated for bills, celebrations, honors, and discussions of the daily agenda. In none of these instances do legislators have the freedom to speak on a topic of their choosing.

I initially identified four presidential countries in Latin America that have electoral rules characterized by high collective incentives and a COF in their legislative sessions that is regularly used by the legislators and parties. To determine the countries that would serve as party-centric cases, I initially identified four countries with a rank of 5 or less in Wallack and Johnson's (2006) Index of Individual Incentives⁶ that have COF venues: Paraguay, Costa

⁶ As explained before, Wallack and Johnson's (2006) index is an ordinal rank of the country scores for their lower or only chambers, with values ranging from 1 to 13. A value of 1 is for a country with the lowest amount of individual incentives, while a value of 13 corresponds to a country with the highest amount of incentives to cultivate personal reputation.

Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay. However, only Costa Rica and Uruguay have been selected for this study. Previous works on the Dominican Republic are scant. In addition, its past congressional records are incomplete, and the records that exist are not readily available on the congressional web page. Paraguay provides records for its congressional sessions, but these are only available in audio, which makes data gathering very time-intensive.

Two problems rise from the fact that these countries' full congressional records are not shared on their official government web pages. First, trying to otherwise obtain them by directly contacting the institution is difficult and overly time-consuming. Second, there is the strong possibility that even after obtaining the records, they will not be formatted in searchable pdfs, but only available as photocopies. This situation makes data gathering difficult, and undoubtedly explains why such limited research exists thus far on these legislatures. For these reasons, neither Paraguay nor the Dominican Republic was chosen for this study.

Costa Rica and Uruguay do not have these barriers to research. Both of these countries are also considered to have highly stable democratic traditions, especially when compared with the rest of the region (Mainwaring 1998, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In addition to electoral rules characterized by collective incentives (Wallack and Johnson 2006), these countries have different institutions, which allow for illuminating comparisons along with other potentially relevant factors, such as the possibility of consecutive reelection.

Concerning the cases that would represent the group of candidate-centric systems, I initially identified five countries with COF venues during their legislative sessions with a

rank of 5 or more in Wallack and Johnson's (2006) Index of Individual Incentives: Chile, Panama, Brazil, the United States, and Colombia.

Only Chile and Panama were included as examples of individual vote-gathering incentives. Data on Brazilian legislative sessions are available online on the chamber's web page. The lower House's COF speeches are well structured and used extensively during the legislative sessions. However, given my lack of knowledge of Portuguese, I decided not to include Brazil as one of the study cases.

Finally, the United States was initially going to be included as one of the cases. Its COF venue is very well structured and easy to identify; in addition, they have session transcripts available on the House of Representatives website. I already had access to the ICPSR dataset, which has the speeches in Excel. However, I found two significant problems with the data provided that made me doubt the reliability of it and hence the findings. From the sample of one-minute speeches for the congressional terms 110 and 109, close to 15% of the speeches were wrongly assigned to the Speaker of the House. In addition, half of the total sample of speeches were duplicates but with different speakers. I unsuccessfully tried to get the data from other sources, and to scrape the data from the chamber's web page was potentially time-consuming given my limited expertise in data scraping. Given the high cost of adding the United States as a case selection and that it has already been the most studied regarding speech organization, I decided to not incorporate it in the dissertation.

On the other hand, Chile and Panama are good examples to study COF venues under individual incentives. They provide two different degrees of incentives. Chile is the country within the candidate-centric group with the lowest ranking for individual incentives. While some believe that the country in fact cultivates collective behavior due to the PR election, its

electoral rules promote tension between the collective and individual incentives. In the section dedicated to Chile's party and electoral system, I discuss this in more detail. Panama offers a mixed system, yet contrary to the norm in mixed systems, those elected through PR are chosen through open list. To sum, the variation in the degrees of individual incentives with these three cases will help to understand the strength of my hypothesis under individual incentives.

Chile

Chile is the first country representing individual incentives and is by far the most-studied country of the four selected. Chilean Senators and House members are elected through PR open list, using a D'Hondt seat allocation system. Before the 2015 electoral reform, there were 60 districts for the House, and each district had a magnitude of two. Parties run as members of a coalition and not independently.

Chile's electoral system creates incentives for personal vote-seeking (Carey 2009, Morgenstern et al. 2012) Votes are pooled by coalition, but it was rare for a party/coalition to get both seats in a district, and more likely than not the seats were going to be between *Concertación* and *Alianza*. (Navia 2008) Pre-2015, the first-place list in a district won both seats only if they got more than double the votes of the second-place list (Carey 2015). To be more specific, to obtain one seat, a party or a coalition needed around one-third of the district's votes of the two largest parties/coalitions. To obtain both seats, the list had to win 66.7% of the votes (Siavelis 2002). Chile's electoral rules fostered inter- and intra- coalition competition, as members of the same coalition individually compete to get the highest amount of votes inside the coalition. Finally, there are no reelection restrictions in Chile. In

fact, less than 70% of House members seek to be reelected every four years, with a high success rate, as more than 80% of those seeking reelection get elected (Navia 2004, 5).

To test my expectations, I study the speeches delivered in *Hora de Incidentes* between 2006-2008. During this time, there were two consolidated coalitions. The center-left coalition, *Concertación*, is comprised of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Socialist Party (PS), Party of Democracy (PPD), and Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD), while the conservative coalition, *Alianza*, is comprised of National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) (Navia 2008)

As mentioned earlier, Chile's COF is known as *Hora de Incidentes*. The parliamentary rules set aside 180 minutes for COFs per week, usually three days per week. The time allocated to each party is proportional to the amount of seats each party has, and members can yield their time to other lawmakers and parties. Legislators can ask the chamber to send an *oficio*, the official transcript of their speech, to specific individuals or government agencies. In addition, *Hora de incidents* is followed by the media. Newspapers report on the speeches given, and videos and quotes from the speeches are used for news. Legislators and the chamber also promote their speeches in social media.

Panama

Panama is the second country representing individual incentives. The country has a unicameral congress composed of over 70 legislators elected by a mixed electoral system, approximately 27 single-member districts and 14 multi-member districts with magnitude ranging between two and six legislators (Guevera Mann 2000). Panama's electoral history is known for its constant change in the electoral rules. It is believed that every new elected

Assembly suggests changes for the next election (García Díez 2000). In addition, the total number of representatives and the magnitude of the districts are subject to constant change. Mainly, legislators change the seat allocation rules in multi-member districts, to place emphasis on the electoral connection between the legislators and the constituency. For the legislative term selected for this study (2009–2014), the country had 39 electoral districts, 26 elected in SMD and 45 through PR open list, with district magnitude ranging between two to seven.

Panama's legislative system allows for reelection of its members, and over half of the legislators seek reelection. However, the percentage of those that win is low. For example, in 1999, 88.7% of the legislators sought reelection, but only 49.2% of these were elected (Guevara Mann 2000), while for 2004, the reelection rate was 47%.

Panama's seat allocation formula promotes personalistic behavior. Although only one-third of the assembly is elected in single member districts (SMD), as a result of the seat allocation formula more than half of the assembly is elected by plurality: 63% of the assembly for the 1994–1999 legislative term, 60% for 1999–2004 (Guevara Mann 2006), and over 50% for the terms 2004–2009 and 2009–2014⁷. As a consequence, 95% of the districts

⁷ The 2007 electoral rules for Panama set the following steps to allocate the seats in PR: Step 1: The valid votes for each list will be divided by the quotient (all the valid votes in the district will be divided by the district's magnitude). The result will be the number of seats each list gets. Step 2: If there are remaining seats, the list that had at least half of the quotient, but did not receive seats in the previous step, receives one seat. Step 3: If there are remaining seats, seats will be given to the remaining candidates, *not the list*, with the highest amount of

in Panama are of small magnitude or SMD. In addition, the seat allocation formula also over-represents larger parties (García Díez 2000). This causes Panama to be considered the most disproportional system in Latin America (Sonnleitner 2010). Consequently, the legislators emerge in activities that would potentially promote electoral connections with their constituencies. Panama's candidates and legislators often walk around the districts surrounded by family members, music bands, and supporters, and introduce them to the constituency. More importantly, some incumbents have the advantage of appropriations, or *partidas circuitales* (Guevara Mann 2006). This relationship is more evident in districts with a small population, where is possible for the legislators to create a closer relationship with the voters and therefore provide them with more pork (Guevara 2004). The government has used the distribution of pork as a way in which the executive can delegate power to the legislators to vote with government bills in exchange for the money (Guevara 2004).

Party switching is very high in Panama. However, to keep track of the changes in some cases is troublesome as these are done informally, and the Assembly does not keep records of them. In addition, party switching is done throughout the legislative term. The 2009–2014 congressional term is known for its high degree of party switching; 24 of 71 deputies switched to another party (La Prensa 2014), mainly to the government coalition. The government party, *Centro Democrático*, won 14 seats in the elections, but by the end of the legislative period had 37, whereas its ally, *Morelia*, elected two legislators and ended the

votes. In this final step, all votes obtained by each candidate in all lists where he was postulated, are counted. But in any case, the seat belongs to the party of which the candidate received the highest amount of votes (Guevara Mann 2006). This final stage works as a plurality system.

period with five. On the other hand, the opposition parties lost members. While PRD started with 26 seats, it ended the period with 17, while *Panameñistas* started with 21 and ended with 11 (La Prensa 2014).

Guevara Mann (2000) offers a few reasons to explain the high degree of party switching in the country. First, parties that obtain less than 5% of the vote in either the presidential, legislative, or municipal elections are declared extinct. A second factor is ideological differences. A third factor is electoral purposes or to increase the possibilities to obtain *partidas*. The manner in which the *partidas* are allocated is solely in the hands of the executive. The president decides based on the adherence to the government bloc, the membership of the Budget committee, and the leadership role in the assembly (Guevara Mann 2000). This money is discretionary and lacks effective government control over its disbursement.

As mentioned earlier, Panama's COF is known as *Periodo de Incidencias*. Formally, the incident period takes place for up to 30 minutes. The time is distributed to the parties, proportional to the number of seats they have, and legislators can intervene for up to five minutes. There are a number of ways in which citizens learn about what is being said and done during *Periodo de Incidencias*. On one hand, legislators in the chamber can request the chair to send the session's transcript to the constituency of interest or the executive agencies that were mentioned in the speech. In addition, the media follows this section closely. A quick search on google reveals a number of news based on speeches delivered during *Incidencias*.

Uruguay

The second case selected to represent collective incentives was Uruguay. Its Senate is composed of 30 members representing a single national district, while its Chamber of Deputies is composed of 99 members representing 19 districts. Magnitude depends on the distribution of the population in the country for each electoral term. Most districts have between two and four seats, while Canelones has around 14 and Montevideo approximately 42.

Uruguay is considered to have electoral rules that promote collective vote-gathering. Members of the Senate and the House are elected through closed list PR. Unlike parties in other Latin American countries, Uruguayan parties are divided into formal factions, which compete against each other at election time. Citizens vote for one *hoja de votación*, which represents the candidates of a faction, in a sort of straight ticket. Each *hoja* for the national election includes the faction's lists for the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and the *Juntas Electorales Departamentales* (state offices under the Electoral Court in charge of administrative electoral issues). Factions usually only provide one *hoja* to avoid dividing their votes as factions given that they cannot accumulate votes from different lists (Piñeiro 2007). Votes for the different factions are pooled by parties. The seats allocated to the party are distributed through the different factions by the D'Hondt formula.

Party factions have a central role in Uruguayan politics. In all parties, factions are highly institutionalized. They do not have party chiefs, but rather faction leaders who can impose discipline inside their faction. These leaders have control over the factions' political agenda (Altman 2000), candidate nomination process, ballot ranking, committee assignments (Morgenstern 2001; Moraes 2008; Chasquetti forthcoming), distribution of other main

positions in Congress (Morgenstern 2001), and decision whether to be part of the government coalition or to join the opposition (Altman 2000, 2005). These powers give faction leaders the ability to reward or punish legislators from their faction based on their behavior inside the chamber.

Yet the degree of party discipline in Uruguay is debatable. While some claim that the electoral system produces highly institutionalized and disciplined factions yet undisciplined parties (Morgenstern 2001), others argue that Uruguayan parties as a whole are cohesive (Buquet et al. 1998; Lanzaro and Caetano 2000, Koolhas 2004). Morgenstern (2001) argues that while factions benefit electorally from party unity, it is also in their interest to distinguish themselves from other factions in the party. In that sense, Morgenstern concludes that party discipline is only possible when it benefits the faction. On the contrary, some claim that the parties as a whole and coalitions are disciplined. Chasquetti (forthcoming) argues that the Colorado and National Parties tend to exhibit high levels of unity. In addition, he finds evidence that *Frente Amplio* has shown perfect unity since coming to power in 2005. Furthermore, through the study of Senate's roll call votes during periods controlled by government coalitions, Koolhas (2004) finds evidence that in around 90% of the votes, the coalitions maintained perfect discipline.

To test my hypotheses in Uruguay, I focus on the congressional term of 2005–2010. For a long time, Uruguay had a perfect bipartisan system (Chasquetti forthcoming), but the 2004 presidential win by the left-wing party *Frente Amplio* broke 175 years of electoral dominance by the traditional parties, Blanco and Colorado (Luna 2007). During the studied legislative term, *Frente Amplio* had 53% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 55% in the Senate,

as well as control over the Executive, while the traditional parties were the opposition forces (Chasquetti 2007).

Uruguay's legislative session has two COFs, known as *Media Hora Previa* and *Media Hora Final*. Unlike in Costa Rica, their rules are included in the parliamentary statutes. Compared to the Senate, members of the Chamber of Deputies use these venues extensively, and evidence from the 2010–2015 Assembly reveals that time is distributed evenly across parties during the 47th Congress (Moraes 2014). Yet according to Moraes (2014), most of the time is used by legislators of districts other than the capital; although Montevideo legislators make up almost half of the assembly, only 26% of the COF time is used by them. There are different ways in which the constituency can learn what is said during COFs. First, as in the case of Chile and Panama, legislators in the chamber can request the chair to send the session's transcript to the constituency of interest or the executive agencies that were mentioned in the speech. Second, newspapers often mention these speeches. Third, legislators share soundbites of their speech through their own social media accounts (see for example: <https://twitter.com/SenJavierGarcia/status/872196206918860801>) .

Costa Rica

The Central American country of Costa Rica has a unicameral chamber, comprised of 57 members. The totality of the chamber is elected every four years through proportional representation (PR) using a closed list of candidates. The country is divided into seven electoral districts with medium to high magnitude, ranging from four to twenty members,

depending on population distribution. Consecutive reelection for legislators is not permitted.⁸

Though legislators may run for reelection after sitting out at least one term, only a small number of former legislators ever return to the legislature: on average, from 1997 to 2008, only 3.5% of its legislators had served previously on the chamber (Legislatura).

Though immediate reelection is not allowed and only a few legislators seek more than one term, studies have shown that Costa Rica's legislators are not amateur politicians. 79% of the legislators that served from 1974 to 1990 were appointed or elected to a public or party office before their election at the Assembly (Carey 1996). In addition, most legislators wish to remain involved in politics after their term in the Assembly concludes. Legislatura's elite survey found that 82.1% of the 2010–2014 legislators claimed they would like to continue in politics post-Assembly. The survey also reveals a wide range of possibilities that legislators see for their future careers, yet there is not a predominance of one career over another.

While scholarly studies claim that term limits have detrimental effects on the behavior of legislators, Costa Rica seems to be the exception to the rule. The ban on reelection drives legislators to rely on executive appointments to continue their political careers after their terms in office come to an end (Taylor 1992, Carey 1996). However, there are not enough political offices to be appointed to. Estimates suggest that on average only 48% of the deputies between 1949 and 1986 received at least one appointment (Carey 1996, 99). This reveals a shortage on the supply side.

⁸ Any type of presidential reelection was once prohibited in Costa Rica until the 2006 elections. Since then, former presidents can run again for office after two obligatory terms out of office (Treminio 2015).

In addition, the post-assembly fates of the party and of the legislator are tied together, as the probability for a legislator to achieve an executive post depends on which party wins the presidency (Carey 1996). Consequently, incentives to get a post-Assembly position enhance partisan behavior that otherwise would be discouraged by term limits, and parties are encouraged to aid deputies in connecting with their constituencies in order to ensure a vote for the party in the next elections; on the other hand, members increase their odds of being considered by the leadership for post-assembly jobs by delivering constituency service and pork, which are signs of loyalty and deservedness (Taylor 1992). In other words, although term limits might deter members from fostering electoral connections with their constituencies and from following party discipline, in Costa Rica the deputies' post-Assembly expectations and the parties' ambition to win the executive office motivate them to be loyal to the party and develop electoral connections with the electorate.

To test my hypothesis in Costa Rica, I examine data from the National Assembly for the 2006–2010 legislative term. The country used to be a bipartisan system, led by the traditional parties PLN and PUSC (Vargas 2007). Currently, there are four main political parties at the national level: the two just mentioned, the PAC, and the Libertarian Movement Party (PML) (Alfaro 2006, 2010). The 2006 election is considered to signal the end of the bipartisan era that encompassed the previous 20 years. The PUSC had previously won three of the last four executive elections and never had less than 30% of vote share, but in the 2006 elections, the party only got 3.5% (Vargas 2007). In addition, the difference in votes between the winning party, the PLN, and the second party, the PAC, was only 1.1% of the total vote (Alfaro 2006). In the legislative elections, the PLN party won more seats (25), but not enough to acquire the majority. The PAC won 17 seats, the PML six, and the PUSC five (Alfaro 2006).

The remaining four seats were distributed among four new legislative parties. The PLN created a coalition with the parties on its right: the PML, the small parties *Restauración Nacional* and *Unión Nacional*, and the PLN's previous rival party, the PUSC. The PAC, on the other hand, created an opposition coalition with the small parties on its left, *Accesibilidad sin Exclusión* and *Frente Amplio* (Vargas 2007).

Operationalization

To test my hypotheses, I built a comprehensive data set of COF speeches. I built the data for most of the cases and used already existing data from Chile. My dependent variable, *Speeches*, is the count of COF speeches given by each legislator during the entire studied legislative term. As seen in Table 4.1, my number of observations per country is the number of legislators in the chamber, except for the case of Costa Rica where I include the substitutes.

For Chile, I used existing data. The data on speeches during *Hora de Incidencias* was generously provided by Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin (2017). The authors gathered data from the chamber's web page⁹ for the 354 and 355 congresses (from March 11th, 2006 to March 6th, 2008). The data excludes from the study surrogates and deputies who resigned or passed away during their terms, including their permanent replacements instead. In Chile, the House provides already sorted information of each intervention during the session: the speaker, the section in which the speech was given, and the duration of the speech. For the 354 and 355 congresses, there were a total of 1,960 speeches delivered during *Hora de Incidencias*. The number of speeches by the 120 deputies in the chamber ranges from 0 to 73.

⁹ https://www.camara.cl/trabajamos/sala_sesiones.aspx

Figure 4.1: Index Session Transcript from Uruguay's Chamber of Deputies

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Source: Index of the “*Diario de sesión*” of the December 9, 2008 session.

The strategy to gather each speech delivered during a COF was straightforward in the case of Uruguay and Panama, but less so in Costa Rica, given the informality of its rules- For Uruguay, I gathered the information through their session transcript (*diario de sesión*)

available on the congressional web page.¹⁰ The House's meeting brief is well organized, and it clearly identifies the different sections of the legislative session. In addition, the document includes an index of the session's different sections. In the case of *Media Hora Previa* and *Media Hora Final*, it discloses who gave a speech and the title of the intervention (see Figure 4.1). I gathered information on the 351 ordinary sessions of the House during the legislative term of 2005–2010, for a total of 1,190 speeches. The number of speeches given by the 99 individual deputies ranges from 0 to 37.

For Panama, I gathered the information through their session transcript or *Actas de Sesión*. The transcripts were taken from the Assembly's webpage¹¹. The institution provides the transcripts from the country's founding, 1904, until today. The transcripts are in PDF or in photocopy format. The strategy to gather each speech delivered during a COF in Panama was straightforward. All transcripts have an index that notes if there was a *Periodo de Incidencias* in the session. If the session had a *Periodo de Incidencias*, I looked at the rest of the transcript and gathered the name of the legislators who gave speeches (see Figure 4.2). For the 2009–2015 congressional term, there was a total of 4,619 speeches given during *Hora de Incidencias*. The number of speeches given by the 71 deputies in the chamber ranges from 0 to 243. When I included the substitutes in the sample, the total of speeches rose to 5,917, and the number of speeches remained between 0 and 243.

¹⁰ <https://parlamento.gub.uy/camarasycomisiones/representantes/plenario/documentos/diarios-de-sesion>

¹¹ <http://www.asamblea.gob.pa/buscadordelpleno/>

Figure 4.2: Index Session Transcript from Panama’s National Assembly

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Source: Index of the *Actas* of General Assembly session July 22, 2009.

In general, as revealed in Table 4.1, Panama has the highest dispersion in comparison to the other countries studied. The data reveal a positive skew; while half of the legislators delivered 46 or fewer speeches during COF, the other half delivered between 47 and 243.

The data collection for Costa Rica was not as straightforward. The main shortcoming was that Costa Rica does not have a formal COF period set in the country’s procedural rules. Rather, the legislators generally use *Control Político* as a COF opportunity rather than for oversight. This was discovered through a detailed review of congressional records when making the case selection. By informal convention, this section takes place before bill

deliberation and runs for 30 or 60 minutes, divided into five minutes per intervention. Little to no oversight occurs during *Control Político*, with the exception of some speeches calling for the impeachment of cabinet members. I therefore decided not to include speeches that were part of the impeachment debates. These addresses were easy to identify, as they are marked as *voto de censura*.

Figure 4.3: Index Session Transcript from Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly

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Source: Index of the *Actas* of General Assembly session N. 70 September 8, 2009.

The data for Costa Rica was collected from their congressional records, available on the Assembly's web page¹². As in Uruguay, the Assembly's session transcripts have an index (see Figure 4.3). Although the index identifies speeches that were part of impeachment debates or executive hearings during *Control Politico*, the speech list did not discern appeals that were mere interruptions for points of order. This situation made the data collection more cumbersome as I had to examine each transcript to parse out COF intervention from mere interruptions. I was able to gather the 857 sessions of the 2006–2010 legislative term, which included 705 ordinary sessions and 152 extraordinary sessions, for a total of 1,883 speeches¹³. Although Costa Rica has 57 elected deputies, as seen in Table 4.1, the data also includes information for seven additional deputies who came in as replacements for those who resigned to their seats (for a total of 64 legislators).

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics

a. Chile

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Speeches	122	16.066	14.648	0	73
Party Leader	122	0.246	0.432	0	1
Opposition	122	0.467	0.501	0	1
Vulnerability	122	0.971	0.116	0.5	1
Reelection	122	0.893	0.309	0	1
First Term in Congress	122	0.336	0.474	0	1
Member of Key Committee	122	0.205	0.405	0	1
Distance to Capital (Log)	122	5.061	1.845	0	7.778

¹² <http://www.asamblea.go.cr/glcp/Actas/Forms/Plenario.aspx>

¹³ During this time, there were 87 speeches on the impeachment of cabinet members. These speeches were not included.

b. Panama

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Speeches	71	65.056	59.638	0	243
Party Leader	71	0.141	0.350	0	1
Vulnerability	71	0.872	0.189	0.25	1
First Term in Congress	71	0.690	0.466	0	1
Reelection	71	0.901	0.300	0	1
Member of Key Committee	71	0.746	0.438	0	1
Distance to Capital (Log)	71	2.893	2.751	0	6.092

c. Uruguay

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Speeches	99	10.939	8.175	0	37
Party Leader	99	0.172	0.379	0	1
Opposition	99	0.475	0.502	0	1
Vulnerability I	99	0.803	0.280	0.100	1
Vulnerability II	99	0.596	0.288	0.026	0.996
First Term in Congress	99	0.677	0.470	0	1
Reelection	99	0.565	0.498	0	1
Member Key Committee	99	0.364	0.483	0	1
Distance to Capital (Log)	99	2.607	2.341	0	5.737

d. Costa Rica

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Speeches	64	29.422	16.877	3	89
Party Leader	64	0.250	0.436	0	1
Opposition	64	0.328	0.473	0	1
Vulnerability	64	0.773	0.284	0.143	1
First Term in Congress	64	0.968	0.175	0	1
Reelection	64	0.078	0.270	0	1
Member of Key Committee	64	0.250	0.436	0	1
Distance to Capital (Log)	64	2.235	1.989	0	5.345

In order to test my hypotheses, I matched each speech with the individual information of the legislator. In the analysis that follows, the unit of analysis is the individual legislator. My key independent variables are as follows. First, I include one of Proksch and Slapin's (2012, 2014) main explanatory variables, *Party Leaders*. The authors argue that due to the importance of the party label under collective incentives, the leadership has incentives to monitor floor deliberations. For that motive, party leaders and members ideologically closer to the party are more likely to give a speech. Members' ideological positions were not included as a variable because there were not enough roll call votes in Panama, Chile, and Uruguay to make a reliable estimate of ideological position.

With the dummy *Party Leader*, I test Proksch and Slapin's (2012, 2014) expectations for legislative speech under party-centric systems. The variable *Party Leader* indicates whether the legislator was a party leader during the selected legislative term, with some caveats in Chile and Panama. For Chile, contrary to the other countries, *Party Leader* indicates whether the legislator served on the chamber's directive board (*Mesa*) or was a leader of a party caucus. For Panama, I did not include leaders of the smaller parties if their names were not officially provided to the chamber's *mesa* (for example, the party *Molinera* officially presented a party leader in only one of the five years). The information of the leaders was provided by the Chamber's library, also known as *Centro de Estudios Parlamentarios*. In addition, I am missing the data for the *Leaders* for the Party *Panameñista* (PAN) 2009–2010 and 2013–2014, and *Centro Democrático* (CD) 2009–2010, as neither the Chamber's library nor the parties themselves have safe that information.

My theory states that institutionally disadvantaged legislators use COFs because of the lack of opportunities they have to address the floor otherwise. I operationalize institutional

disadvantage legislators in the following two variables: *Opposition* and *First Term in Congress*. *First Term in Congress* indicates when a legislator is elected for the first time to congress. I expect a positive relationship between this variable and the dependent variable as first-term legislators have higher incentives to deliver speeches in COFs as they have to prove to their constituency and their party their value yet they have little resources to do so given their inexperience.

The variable, *Opposition*, indicates whether the legislator is part of the government opposition. This means that the legislator is not a member of the government party or coalition. For the cases and years selected, the executive and legislative branches were in the hands of the same party or coalition. Following my first hypothesis, I expect a positive relationship of the variable *Opposition* to COF speeches, as members of the government coalition have fewer incentives to prepare and deliver a speech in venues that are not as visible as bill debates, as they already control the agenda. In addition, I include the interaction *Leader*Opposition*. As stated in the second hypothesis, I expect that leaders of the opposition deliver a higher amount of speeches during COF than leaders of the government coalition. It is in their own benefit to maximize opportunities to monitor the COF as I foresee the control of this venue to be neglected by the government coalition.

For Chile, *Opposition* is coded as 1 if the legislator was a member of *Concertación* (formed by DC, PPD, PRSD, and PS). For Chile, *Opposition* is coded as 1 if the legislator is a member of *Alianza* (formed by UDI and RN). Due to Panama's high levels of party switching, the variable of *Opposition* is coded based on the legislators' party by 2009. The models were also run based on the legislator's party during 2011. By 2011, the executive party in Panama, the CD Party, had the support of the Patriotic Union (UP) Party. When

measuring *Opposition* based on 2011 data, I did not include the PAN as part of the coalition, as they officially withdrew their support from the executive government in mid-2011. As seen in the summary statistics, Costa Rica is the country with the smallest opposition coalition. In this country, *Opposition* is coded as 1 if the legislator is a member of PAC, *Accesibilidad sin Exclusion*, or *Frente Amplio*. Finally, for Uruguay, the variable is coded 1 if the legislator is not a member of the coalition party *Encuentro Progresista -Frente Amplio – Nueva Mayoria* (Coalition FA from here on) (Chasquetti 2007).

I also hypothesized that legislators who are electorally vulnerable should have more incentives to deliver speeches on the floor. I use a methodology developed by André, Depauw, and Martin (2015) to calculate this variable. The authors' provide different measurements given the different types of electoral systems. The different measurements are comparable without any need to try to fit the distinct electoral rules in one fit-all calculation. *Vulnerability* indicates the level of inter-party electoral competition in the district during the previous election and it ranges from 0 to 1. A 0 indicates that the candidate is not electorally vulnerable, while 1 indicates the candidate is very vulnerable. I decided to use inter-party and not intra-party competition as it can be measured for all of the four cases.

Electoral inter-party *Vulnerability* measures threats of inter-party defeat. Given that in PR closed list the order in which members are elected is pre-fixed, the party is only at risk of losing its seat to other parties (André, Depauw and Martin 2015). The measure used to capture a legislator's electoral inter-party vulnerability for closed list is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Inter – party Vulnerability non – preferential (DM > 1)} \\ & = \frac{\text{Legislator's rank in the party list}}{\text{Total number of seats won by the party in the district}} \end{aligned}$$

For legislators in Costa Rica and Chile, I used the measurement for preferential systems with a magnitude over one:

$$\text{Inter-party Vulnerability preferential (DM > 1)} = \frac{\text{Order of election}}{\text{Party's total seat in the district}}$$

Panama, on the other hand, has a mixed system. Some of its legislators are elected on SMD while others are elected under PR open lists. For deputies elected by PR, I used Andre, Depauw, and Martin's measurement for preferential systems with a magnitude over one. For those elected under SMD, I used the common measurement of vulnerability in single-seat districts as noted below.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Inter-party Vulnerability in preferential systems} \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{\text{vote for winner} - \text{votes for runner up}}{\text{total of valid vote}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

I must add some caveats for the specificities of the electoral systems. In Costa Rica, whenever a legislator renounces his position, he is replaced by the first legislator in the ballot who was not elected. If this candidate does not accept the position, the seat goes to the next on the list and so forth. Therefore, to avoid complications with substitutes' scores, as they are over 1, I cap the vulnerability score to 1. Given that in Chile, all districts have only two seats, and for most of the cases each coalition only won one seat, there is very little variance in its inter-party coalition score. As seen in the descriptive statistic, the mean for this variables is close to 1.

I also use an alternative measurement for Uruguay to account for the specificities of its electoral system. Even though in Uruguay the electoral lists are closed, parties are divided among factions that compete with their own list of candidates. The votes are pooled by party

and later distributed to the different factions' lists. As the votes that each faction achieves are added to their party's total, individual legislators compete against other parties as well as against other factions in their party. Following André, Depauw, and Martin's calculation for vulnerability,¹⁴ I create a measurement that weighs inter-party competition between the different factions *within* the party.

$$\text{Vulnerability II} = \left(\frac{\text{Order of the election within the Party}}{\text{Total number of seats won by the party in the district}} \right) * \left(1 - \frac{\text{vote for list} - \text{votes for first nonelected list of the party}}{\text{total vote for party}} \right)$$

The first part of the measure seeks to capture inter-party competition by dividing the order of each legislator in the election on the total of seats won by the party in the district. The measurement taken is used by André, Depauw, and Martin for preferential systems. Although lists in Uruguay are close and votes are pooled by party, I used this alternative measurement for preferential systems, as voters can elect between the different lists offered by the different party's factions (Appendix A helps to illustrate this point).

While in the first part, I calculate inter-party competition, in the second part, I measure intra-party competition. This measurement seeks to capture competition among the factions

¹⁴ André, Depauw, and Martin's (2015, p. 472) measurement of inter-party vulnerability in preferential systems: $\left(\frac{\text{order of election}}{\text{party's seat total in the district}} \right)$.

Measurement for intra-party vulnerability in strong preferential systems:

$$1 - \frac{\text{Votes of the list} - \text{Votes of the first nonelected list}}{\text{Votes for the party}}$$

within each party. Following André, Depauw, and Martin, I measure intra-party vulnerability as 1 minus the margin separating the total votes of the legislator's list from the first loser list of his party. As expected, *Vulnerability II* scores the legislators of the party Coalition FA in the state of Canelones the following way: the congressman Esteban Perez, elected first within the party, has the lowest score (0.108), while Horacio Yanes from the list N. 99000 (see Appendix A), the last legislator to receive a seat within the party, is considered very vulnerable (0.991).

Control variables

Finally, I include the following control variables. The dummy *Member of Key Committee* captures the expectation that members of such committees are less likely to speak during COF. By being part of these committees, they can participate in bill debate and discuss important pieces of legislation. The literature identifies the following committees in each country as the most influential: in Costa Rica, the Treasury committee (Heath et al. 2005; Schwindt-Bayer 2010); in Chile, the Finance Committee and the Constitution, Legislation, and Justice Committee (Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017); and in Uruguay, the Budget, Foreign Relations, Constitutional Laws, or Economic Affairs Committees (Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014). Lastly, for Panama, I identify if the deputy was a member of the Budget committee during the studied period. I considered this to be the most prevalent committee in Panama as it is highly sought after given that is where pork is assigned. Also, following other literature, for Panama I include the Constitutional Committee as an important one. I am missing the members of both committees for the term 2012-2013. I was not able to get the transcripts for either of the two committees, nor was it possible to get that information from the library of the *Asamblea* or the *Centro de Estudios Parlamentarios*, nor the committees

themselves. I believe that the missing data for these years will not have a strong impact on the results, as throughout the years in question, the members of these two committees remained very similar.

Finally, I include those legislators seeking reelection and the logged number of the distance in kilometers to the country's capital (Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017). I coded as 1 all those legislators who are seeking to get reelected or wanting to be elected to the upper chamber. I checked whether the legislator had run for reelection in the following legislative election and the data was gathered from the country's electoral tribunal. The idea behind this variable is that these legislators have a higher incentive to speak in order to connect with their peers and electorate for electoral purposes. For the distance, I take the logarithm of distance to the capital to account for a potential non-linear relationship. The rationale behind this variable is that legislators closer to the capital have less urgency to deliver a speech during COFs as their constituencies' needs are more likely to be picked up by the national media as well as the national government.

Models

In order to test my hypotheses, I run a series of negative binomial regressions. The dependent variable, *Speeches*, is the count of speeches given by each legislator during the entire studied legislative term. A Poisson regression is the most basic model for this type of data. However, the conditional distribution of the dependent variables is over-dispersed; its conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean (the test of the dispersion parameter α is highly significant in both countries). In such a scenario, the standard error of a Poisson regression model may be biased downwards, which leads to overestimation of the significance of the variables (Long 1997). Given the over-dispersion attribute of the outcome

variable, a negative binomial regression model fits the data better compared to a Poisson regression.

The range of the variable *Speeches* goes from zero, when a legislator gave no speeches, to the highest maximum of speeches a legislator gave in that chamber. In Uruguay, a legislator can only give one intervention during the COF per session, while in the rest of the countries, legislators can deliver more than one intervention in each session. Under both cases, an intervention is coded only once if the legislator was interrupted. If after finishing his speech and after hearing speeches from other peers another member of congress yields her time to him, this second speech will be considered as a separate intervention.

I have also gathered additional information at the legislator level (leadership position, member of the opposition, first term in office, and electoral vulnerability). Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the individual legislators in both countries.

Results

The following tables report the results of the negative binomial. For all countries, Model (1) is the baseline. Model (2) includes the battery of the control variables. For Costa Rica and Uruguay, as examples of collective incentives, I run a third model that includes the interaction terms of leadership and opposition.

My theory claims that members of congress with disadvantageous positions in Congress are more likely to give speeches during COFs, either because they are electorally vulnerable or because they have minor roles and little visibility in their party or chamber as a whole. For the vulnerable legislators and leaders in the opposition, COF provides them an opportunity for visibility that otherwise they lack. In addition, I claim that under collective incentives,

leaders of the opposition are more likely to speak than other members of the coalition and their peers in the majority, and that this behavior should be translated into significance in the interaction terms. To view if the electoral rules have any effect on COF, I group the countries based on their electoral incentives. First, I show the results from Chile and Panama, which are the examples of individual incentives, and then those from Costa Rica and Uruguay, which are the examples of collective incentives.

Chile

In general, the results in Table 2 reveal that during *Hora de Incidentes* in Chile's House of Deputies, the rate of participation of institutionally and electorally vulnerable legislators is not different than the rate of participation of secure legislators. In Model (2), while *Party Leaders* and *Intra-party Vulnerability* show the anticipated direction of the variables, these are not significant. The variable *Opposition* is not statistically significant at traditional levels ($p=0.123$) and, contrary to the anticipated direction, the sign of the coefficient is negative. This result is likely explained by the fact that Chile's rules distribute time during NLS based on the number of seats each party has in the chamber. The opposition at the time, *Alianza*, was composed of the parties *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI) and *Renovación Nacional* (RN), which had 56 legislators.

Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Chile (2006-2008)

	(1)	(2)
Party Leader	-0.139 (0.220)	-0.237 (0.208)
Opposition	-0.267 (0.191)	-0.276 (0.179)
Vulnerability	0.823 (0.812)	0.145 (0.838)
First Term in Congress	-0.0490 (0.194)	-0.126 (0.185)
Reelection		0.494* (0.290)
Member of Key Committee		-0.551** (0.240)
Distance to Capital (Log)		0.158*** (0.0474)
Constant	2.143*** (0.759)	1.670* (0.857)
Observations	122	122

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results also show that *Reelection*, *Members of Key Committees*, and *Distance to Capital* have a significant impact on the number of speeches that a deputy delivers during *Hora de Incidentes*. Model (2) shows that legislators who are seeking to stay in the chamber for another term or to move to the Senate speak more frequently. A member who is seeking reelection speaks 17 times on average, a difference of almost seven from those not seeking reelection. This is because legislators with the ambition to stay in congress are motivated to address the floor more often, as this serves as a tool to connect with the constituency and, therefore, increase the probability of being elected.

Figure 4.4: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COF by Opposition in Chile




Figure 4.5: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COF by legislators seeking reelection in Chile





Figure 4.6 reveals that members from Santiago de Chile speak significantly less, whereas legislators from districts further from the country's capital tend to speak more. For Alemán,

Ramírez, and Slapin (2017), a significant coefficient for distance to capital suggests that compared to deputies from the capital or nearby districts, members from distant districts feel a need to inform the central government about what is happening in their districts. The authors also suggest that for legislators from these districts, participation during COF signals to their constituents “that they are standing up for their interests in the faraway capital” (13). On average, members from the furthest district speak over 20 more times than members from the capital.

Figure 4.6: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COF by based on Distance from the Capital in Chile



Finally, *Members of Key Committees* participate at higher rates than members of other committees. The rationale behind the result is that during *Hora de Incidentes* expertise does not matter much compared to other sections of the legislative session, while in other parts of the session experts speak more (Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017). While members of the Finance Committee and the Constitution, Legislation, and Justice Committee only speak

approximately 10.5 sessions on average, deputies from other committees on average participate on *Hora de Incidentes* up to 18 times.

Panama

The results capturing speech participation of members of the General Assembly in Panama during the *Periodo de Incidencias* appears in Table 4.3. Given the frequency of party switching throughout the congressional period, I decided to gather information about the legislators' opposition status for 2009 (i.e., when their term started). In addition, I added a fourth column with additional control variables addressing the peculiarities of the case of Panama: deputies from SMD and deputies that switch to another party at some point during the legislative term. Legislators elected through SMD have additional incentives to create an electoral connection with their constituencies, and hence they might be more likely to give a speech. On the other hand, legislators that switch to another party were more likely to switch to the government party. The change of label provides them with additional perks helpful to connect with the constituency, such as a higher percentage of pork. For legislators running for SMD speeches might be then used as a tool to connect with the electorate, which is not necessarily the case for those switching to another party.

Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Panama (2009-2014)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Leader	-0.027 (0.343)	-0.002 (0.359)	-0.126 (0.352)
Opposition (2009)	0.491* (0.245)	0.490* (0.250)	0.478* (0.246)
Vulnerability	0.582 (0.681)	0.391 (0.678)	0.484 (0.701)
First Term in Congress	0.019 (0.259)	0.044 (0.289)	-0.009 (0.286)
Reelection		-0.380 (0.413)	-0.162 (0.412)
Member of Key Committee		0.212 (0.312)	0.129 (0.310)
Distance to Capital (Log)		0.0356 (0.0444)	0.0411 (0.0477)
SMD			0.0382 (0.295)
Party Switching			-0.592** (0.264)
Constant	3.443*** (0.777)	3.660*** (0.787)	3.641*** (0.786)
Observations	71	71	71
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

The results of column 3 show that legislators who switch to another party were also less likely to participate, with 99% confidence. While a member that never changed his party during the legislative term gave on average 77 speeches, a legislator that switches to another party gave 41.5. The drastic difference between one group of legislators and the other could be due to the purpose that the COF serves for the legislators. As mentioned earlier, most of the legislators who changed to a different party switched to the government coalition. Having switched to the government coalition, these legislators are likely to have lessened their disadvantage, and therefore they have less need to speak during this venue. It has been

documented in the media that legislators who switch to the government coalition receive a high degree of benefits through the *partidas circuitales*.

Figure 4.7: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COFs by Opposition (measured in 2009)





Figure 4.8: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COF by principal legislators who switch to another party



Uruguay

The results for Uruguay appear in Table 4.4. The results show that during *Media Hora Previa* and *Media Hora Final*, the leadership is less likely to speak than rank-and-file members. The coefficient is significant, unless we include the interaction term. Figure 4.9 plots the number of sessions that party leaders participate at COFs. Based on Model (2), leaders participate in average 7.5 times, while rank-and-file members participate on average 11.5 times.


Table 4.4: Negative Binomial Uruguay (2005–2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Leader	-0.492** (0.234)	-0.395 (0.244)	-0.668** (0.339)
Opposition	0.213 (0.171)	0.181 (0.174)	0.104 (0.187)
Leader*Opposition			0.511 (0.465)
Vulnerability	0.619** (0.301)	0.245 (0.360)	0.246 (0.361)
First Term in Congress	0.254 (0.184)	0.165 (0.200)	0.179 (0.199)
Reelection		0.197 (0.179)	0.229 (0.180)
Member of Key Committee		-0.0513 (0.209)	-0.0640 (0.209)
Distance to Capital (Log)		0.0787* (0.0464)	0.0824* (0.0467)
Constant	1.661*** (0.304)	1.709*** (0.325)	1.708*** (0.323)
Observations	99	99	99
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

In addition, the models reveal mixed results regarding the effects of inter-party *Vulnerability* on the legislators' participation. The variable always has a positive sign, but it is only statistically significant in the model shown in the first column. When the control

variable *Distance to Capital* is included in the models, the variable inter-party *Vulnerability* is no longer significant. Although the variables are not highly correlated, the lack of significance is most likely a result of lower levels of vulnerability for members from the country's capital, Montevideo, as opposed to members from the other districts.

Figure 4.9: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COF by Party Leaders in Uruguay



Lastly, the results show that the variable capturing whether a legislator is in the opposition always has a positive sign, but lacks statistical significance. Model (3) in Table 4.4 includes the interaction term that encompasses leaders of the opposition as well as the control variables. The sign of the coefficient is positive, as expected by Hypothesis 2, but also lacks statistical significance.

Table 4.5 shows the negative binomial results for Uruguay, using the alternative measurement for inter-party vulnerability, *Vulnerability II*. The results show that the coefficient for *Vulnerability II* is not statistically significant in any of the models, and in has a negative sign in two of the models. To conclude, the results exhibited in Table 4.5 for the

most part do not support my expectations for legislators' participation in COF.

Table 4.5: Negative Binomial Uruguay (2005-2010) with Vulnerability II

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Leader	-0.519** (0.238)	-0.386 (0.243)	-0.653* (0.338)
Opposition	0.255 (0.172)	0.156 (0.175)	0.0797 (0.188)
Leader*Opposition			0.502 (0.465)
Vulnerability II	0.224 (0.310)	-0.390 (0.386)	-0.384 (0.387)
First Term in Congress	0.190 (0.197)	0.219 (0.211)	0.234 (0.211)
Reelection		0.248 (0.175)	0.280 (0.176)
Member of Key Committee		-0.0166 (0.208)	-0.0266 (0.208)
Distance to Capital (Log)		0.127*** (0.0489)	0.130*** (0.0492)
Constant	2.064*** (0.236)	1.944*** (0.269)	1.937*** (0.268)
Observations	99	99	99
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

Costa Rica


Table 6 shows the negative binomial results for Costa Rica. The results, if we do not include the interaction term, find support for Hypothesis 1: opposition members are more likely to give a speech during a COF than members of the government coalition. Based on Model (2), on average, an opposition member speaks 35.5 times while members of the government coalition participate on average 26 times apiece. For Model (3), *Party Leader* is not significant at the traditional levels (p-value of 0.120). The rest of the expectations do not find support in the findings. Neither electoral vulnerability nor other institutionally

disadvantageous positions affect the likelihood of a legislator to deliver a speech.

Table 3.6: Negative Binomial Costa Rica (2006-2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Leader	0.289* (0.159)	0.210 (0.173)	0.163 (0.204)
Opposition	0.334** (0.147)	0.320** (0.150)	0.278 (0.179)
Leader*Opposition			0.148 (0.347)
Vulnerability	-0.338 (0.254)	-0.350 (0.254)	-0.330 (0.258)
First-Term in Congress	0.289 (0.414)	0.311 (0.412)	0.327 (0.413)
Reelection		0.274 (0.264)	0.271 (0.264)
Member of Key Committee		-0.109 (0.167)	-0.126 (0.172)
Distance to Capital (Log)		-0.0157 (0.0375)	-0.0137 (0.0377)
Constant	3.155*** (0.425)	3.204*** (0.427)	3.187*** (0.428)
Observations	64	64	64
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

Figure 4.10: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COF by Opposition members in Costa Rica



Countries as dummies

Finally, Table 4.7 presents a series of regression with data from all chambers (with country dummies). A series of categorical variables control for the countries' specific characteristics that may impact the predictor. The results show that the variables capturing the effects of being a member of the opposition, being a first-time member of congress, and being more electorally vulnerable, all have a positive sign, as I hypothesized. However, the standard errors are not small enough, and as a result the coefficients lack statistical significance at the conventional levels.

Table 4.7: Negative Binomial, with country dummies

	(1)	(2)
Party Leader	-0.033 (0.121)	-0.033 (0.120)
Opposition	0.143 (0.098)	0.138 (0.097)
Vulnerability	0.327 (0.224)	0.111 (0.229)
First Term in Congress	0.095 (0.114)	0.001 (0.116)
Reelection		0.218 (0.133)
Member of Key Committee		-0.214* (0.117)
Distance to Capital (Log)		0.066*** (0.022)
Costa Rica	0.625*** (0.167)	1.057*** (0.216)
Panama	1.383*** (0.140)	1.703*** (0.171)
Uruguay	-0.396*** (0.136)	-0.119 (0.156)
Constant	2.377*** (0.237)	2.100*** (0.267)
Observations	356	356

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Regarding the control variables, *Key Committee*, *Distance to Capital*, and *Reelection* have a substantive effect on the lawmakers' participation in COF. As expected, members of key committees speak less frequently, while those from farther away from the capital are less likely to speak. While a member from a national capital speaks 21 times on average, a member from a more distant district delivers approximately 28 speeches. In addition, while a member of a key committee delivers on average 24 speeches, a member of any other committee speaks on average approximately six more times. Furthermore, although not significant at traditional levels (p-value of 0.101), reelection positively affects the likelihood

of a lawmaker on delivering a speech. While a member seeking reelection delivers on average 29 speeches, a member who is not seeking reelection delivers on average approximately six fewer speeches. Finally, lawmakers from Costa Rica and Panama are more likely to give speeches than lawmakers in Chile (the left out variable), while Uruguayan lawmakers give fewer speeches.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I analyzed legislative and party behavior during COFs under electoral systems that give incentives for collective and individual vote-gathering behavior. The results do not allow me to confidently reject or confirm my hypotheses (see table 4.8 for a summary of the results). The outcome from the country regressions of Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay, as well as the results aggregating the data from all four countries reveal a positive coefficient for the *Opposition* variable, as expected by Hypothesis 1. In the cases of Panama and Costa Rica, the results are statistically significant but not in the other cases.

My second hypothesis stated that under collective vote-gathering incentives, opposition leaders should be more likely to deliver speeches. The results from the two cases examined to evaluate this, Costa Rica and Uruguay, show the expected positive sign for the interaction term. However, the coefficients lack statistical significance at the conventional level.

I also expected first-time legislators and those considered to be electorally vulnerable to give more speeches. There is some evidence that first time legislators deliver more speeches in Uruguay, Panama, and Costa Rica, but the opposite seems to be the case in Chile. Yet, coefficients are not statistically significant. Lastly, coefficients capturing electoral vulnerability have the expected positive sign in the cases of Chile, Panama, and Uruguay, but not in Costa Rica. Once again, the coefficients lack statistical significance.

Table 4.8: Summary of results

Hypothesis	Variable	Expected effect on the number of COF speeches	Results
1	Opposition	+	The coefficient is positive in Panama, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, but it is significant only in the first two countries. For Chile the effect is negative, but it is slightly below significance.
2	Leaders of the opposition (only in party- centric systems)	+	In the two countries that represent party-centric systems, Costa Rica and Uruguay, the coefficient is positive but non-significant.
3	First-term in office	+	The coefficient is positive in Panama, Costa Rica, and Uruguay but non-significant.
4	Electoral Vulnerable	+	The coefficient is positive in Chile, Panama, and Uruguay but non-significant.

Unit of analysis: legislator of country x

Does this suggest that COFs is not considered as a venue that can have a positive impact on the legislators' career? I do not think this is the case. As seen, in general, the legislators use COFs an important number of times. In addition, the overall results seem to indicate that three out of my four cases show a positive sign for electoral vulnerability and members of the opposition coalition. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of null effect for such variables. Further research, adding additional legislative terms for each country, may allow me to confirm with greater certainty some of my hypotheses. Given that I am using a negative binomial regression, the number of observations is reduced to the number of legislators, which is not very high in the cases studied.

Chapter 5: Countries' particularities and speech content

The previous chapter statistically examined the frequency of speeches across the four chambers. In this chapter, I provide a qualitative assessment of who participates in these venues. The aim of this chapter is to investigate possible factors that could explain the use of COFs (Congressional Open Forum Speeches) that were not taken into account in my earlier discussion. The chapter describes who is speaking and what they are speaking about. It is divided into three sections as follows. First, I review the descriptive statistics for the explanatory and control variables regarding legislators' participation in COFs. Based on what the descriptive statistics reveal, I discuss the variability among the variables. What explains the dispersion among certain groups of legislators? In this section, I include other variables specific to each country that can shed light on legislative behavior. Then, I describe the content of the speeches. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to perform textual analysis on the content of the speeches, so I limit this section to a small sample that may serve as a building block for future studies that want to focus on the content of COFs. Finally, I present the conclusion of the chapter.

Descriptive statistics

Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory and control variables used in the prior chapter. The first thing to highlight is the variation in the number of speeches delivered by legislators across these four countries. Panamanian and Costa Rican legislators delivered the highest amount of speeches apiece, 65 and 30 respectively, compared to an average of 16 in Chile and 10 in Uruguay. What explains this significant difference? A likely answer points to the internal rules of the chambers. In Costa Rica and Panama, NLS venues are not as structured as those in the other two countries. No parliamentary rule fixes the

amount of time dedicated either to NLS or to each intervention. The lack of structure allows legislators in these two countries to use more time of the session for COFs and for more legislators to deliver a speech in a session. With this in mind, despite the differences in the average of speeches, we can confidently conclude that in all countries legislators find COF speeches beneficial and use them a great deal.

The information provided in the descriptive statistics, as expected, is consistent with the findings of the prior chapter. First, regarding the participation of members of the opposition, Costa Rica and Panama show a significant difference of means in the count of COFs between members of the opposition and members of the government coalition: as expected, members of the opposition deliver more speeches than members of the government. In Uruguay and Chile, the difference between the means of the two groups is not significant. Second, regarding the participation of opposition party leaders in countries with collective vote gathering rules, the countries exhibit mixed trends. While for Uruguay, the table reveals that party leaders make on average fewer COF speeches than backbenchers, in Costa Rica leaders on average deliver more speeches. In both cases, a difference of means test confirms a significant difference between the population means of the number of COFs delivered by leaders and the backbenchers. Third, the test of means finds no difference between first-term legislators compared to senior or junior members in any of the countries.

It is interesting to look in more detail at the variables capturing electoral vulnerability (my fourth hypothesis). In the previous chapter, it was revealed that in Chile, Panama, and Uruguay – but not Costa Rica – inter-party vulnerability exhibits a positive sign (although not statistically significant). The descriptive statistics also reveal an association between these variables. In the cases of Chile and, more obviously, Panama, the more vulnerable

speak on average more often. In the latter case, we can see that as we move toward a higher degree of vulnerability, the average number of speeches rises. Such a correlation is less obvious in Uruguay and Costa Rica. Yet, in Uruguay we can see that the most electorally vulnerable legislators still speak more than the rest. In contrast to my expectation, in Costa Rica, the more vulnerable legislators speak less than others.

In addition, whereas in Panama, there is no difference between the average of speeches of members seeking *Reelection* compared to those who do not run again for office, in Chile those seeking reelection deliver speeches at a higher rate. The difference in the mean number of speeches given by those seeking reelection is significantly higher than the number of speeches given by those who do not seek reelection, with 95% confidence.

Particularities within each country


Next, I aim to analyze new variables not included in the previous chapter, which are particular to each country. The rationale behind this section is to address additional factors from each country that could be driving speech participation during COFs. I divide the section into subsections for each country, in which I describe why the newly proposed variable can help to explain the behavior in the particular country. I conclude the subsection with a description of the overall findings for all the countries.

Panama: Electoral Rules and the Distribution of Pork

Panama is the only country of the four studied that has an open-list mixed electoral system. Some of the districts elect a single legislator, while other districts have multiple seats. The different principals, to whom the legislators answer, based on the way in which they are elected, suggest variation in the incentives the deputies face. In addition, their seat

allocation formula for the proportional system is not straightforward, as explained in Footnote 7. The different incentives embedded in Panama's system leads to the question of whether the variability in NLS usage is associated with electoral rules – the magnitude of the district, the election type, or the seat allocation formula.

Figure 5.1: Dispersion of the number of COF speeches delivered by legislator in Panama, by district magnitude.



While in multi-membered districts, parties run under open list, in SMD parties only field one candidate. Rules allow the nominee to be the candidate of more than one party. Under this last scenario, the total number of votes for the candidate under the different lists is pooled together, and the winner is considered to be a member of the party from which he received the highest amount of votes. Candidates running in both types of districts (SMD and multimember) are competing for preferential votes; however, those elected by open list are also facing intra-party competition, which is expected to increase as DM increases. In order to differentiate themselves from their colleagues, legislators are likely to seek and foster activities that develop electoral connections with voters. Following the literature, we should

expect that legislators from SMD, followed by those in PR with the highest DM, are the ones more likely to give COF speeches with the purpose of connecting with their constituencies.

The district magnitude in Panama ranges from one to seven. Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of speeches among legislators elected from single-member and multi-member districts. The figure suggests that members of SMD behave less evenly compared to the other group, and also show a higher median. In addition, the figure shows that some of these are outliers, who deliver a high number of speeches. However, a means test reveals no difference in the number of speeches between the SMD group and the multi-member group. The lack of apparent different behavior is also seen in the negative binomial model presented in the previous chapter. When including a dummy variable for whether the legislator is elected in SMD, I find that the coefficient is not significant and reveals the opposite of the expected direction.

Out of the 71 members of the Panamanian chamber, 17 legislators were elected from districts with high DM. The data shows that legislators from these districts have the largest dispersion compared to legislators elected from smaller magnitudes, but an average median. A means test suggests no difference between the groups. Moreover, upon including in the negative binomial main model a dummy for whether the legislator is from a high DM, the coefficient reveals the expected direction but is not significant. To sum up, the data in Panama suggest that legislators elected in SMD and in districts with the highest DM do not deliver significantly more speeches than the rest of their colleagues.

Now, let us focus on the effects that the seat allocation formula can have on legislative behavior. If seats remain unassigned because none of the legislators achieve the quotient, or at least half the quotient in the second step, the seats are distributed to the remaining

candidates, *not the list*, with the highest amount of votes¹⁵. Therefore, despite the fact that over one third of the chamber is from SMD, in reality, due to the seat allocation rules, on average more than half of the assembly is elected by plurality. This suggests that a proper way to understand different behavior should be by the seat allocation formula through which they were elected rather than the DM, as those elected by *residuo* and in SMD should behave similarly.

The data suggest that the seat allocation formula does not have an effect on speech participation. Although the population for each subgroup elected through PR is small, while those elected by quotient and half of the quotient have a similar dispersion, those elected by *residuo* have the highest dispersion of all. However, when including a categorical variable on how was their seat allocated¹⁶, the direction of *Leader* remains insignificant but now shows a positive sign. In addition, the coefficient for *Seat Allocation* is insignificant and does not show the expected direction.

Next, I focus on pork. The literature on Panamanian politics suggests that the distribution of pork is very important to legislators. In Panama, the executive, parties, and legislators rely heavily on pork, also known as *partidas*. We can examine whether pork is associated with speech participation. We should expect that those who received less money have a higher need to use other available resources to address their constituency.

¹⁵ For the period studied, 26 legislators were elected in SMD, 16 by the quotient, 18 by half the quotient, and 11 by *residuo*.

¹⁶ 1 for those elected by quotient, 2 for those elected by half-quotient, and 3 for those elected by plurality (SMD and *residuo*).

Figure 5.2: Number of COF speeches delivered by legislator in Panama, by *Partidas* received (in dollars).





Figure 5.2 shows that deputies who received less money speak more often. On average, opposition members received lesser amounts: the mean of pork for a member of the opposition was 3,389,762 USD, while for a member of the government coalition it was 7,097,282 USD (the two variables are not correlated). The figure shows that in general legislators who receive less pork to bring to their constituencies have higher rates of speech participation. However, when including a variable for the log of pork in the negative binomial model, the coefficient appears to be statistically insignificant.

Figure 5.3: Dispersion of the number of COF speeches delivered by legislators in Panama, based on party switching.



Finally, I have noted before that Panama has a very high rate of party switching. In fact, during the term studied, 24 of 71 deputies switched to another party (La Prensa 2014), mainly to the government coalition. As revealed in Figure 5.3, those who switched to another party deliver fewer speeches. As seen before, deputies who switched to the government coalition received a higher amount of pork¹⁷, and pork is one of the main tools that the coalition uses to allure legislators to convert to its label. One could argue that those who switch to another party have less need to participate in COFs as they now have more resources available that had a greater impact on their ultimate goal.

¹⁷ The correlation between party switching and pork is 0.408.

Figure 5.4: Predicted Number of Speeches, with 95% confidence, delivered during COFs by legislators who switch parties in Panama




Figure 5.3 confirms the difference of means. With 99% confidence, those who switch parties deliver fewer speeches on average than those who stayed in the same party. Furthermore, upon including *Party Switching* in the negative binomial model, the results reveal a negative relation between party switching and number of COF speeches, and this relationship is significant. The rest of the coefficients reveal the same direction and significance than the main model. Based on model (5) in the Appendix's Table A.3, on average those who switch parties deliver 42.5 speeches, compared to 76 speeches delivered by those who remain in the same party. To sum up, in addition to opposition members, legislators who switch to another party have a significant effect on the number of speeches delivered during COFs in Panama. While members of the opposition on average deliver more speeches, members who switch parties tend to deliver fewer of them.

Uruguay: Governor Candidates and District Magnitude


The behavior of the Uruguayan legislators suggests that their participation during COF might be driven by electoral determinants. On the one hand, the data suggest different rates of usage of speeches for those who are the most electorally vulnerable. On the other hand, while the results show that all legislators – regardless of whether they are seeking reelection – have a similar mean, semi-interquartile range, and median, it is a different story when we take into account legislators who run for *Intendentes* (state governors).

As noted earlier, in recent decades the subnational executive post became “increasingly attractive” and has been seen as a new path for progressive ambition (Chasquetti and Micozzi, 2014). In a closed-list system where there are limited ways to foster individualization, those running for *intendente* – in special need to develop an individual electoral connection with their constituency – have been found to draft more bills targeting their district (Chasquetti and Micozzi, 2014), and should have a higher incentive to participate in COFs.

A glimpse at the data confirms that legislators with local ambition speak on average more than others. As seen in Figure 5.5, the median number of speeches delivered by those seeking to be elected as *intendentes* is 15, while for others it is 8, and the data for this subgroup is skewed to the right. In addition, the figure suggests that regarding speeches delivered during Media Hora Previa and Final, the distribution of the number of speeches is less dispersed among those running for *intendentes* than among others. Furthermore, a difference of means confirms with 99% significance that on average, those running for *intendentes* deliver more speeches than others. However, when including in the negative binomial model a dummy for

whether the legislator ran for *intendente* in 2010 or not, the coefficient shows the expected positive direction, yet it is insignificant.

Figure 5.5: Dispersion of the number of COF speeches delivered by legislators in Uruguay running for *Intendentes*.




In addition to electoral ambition regarding the state governor's office, district magnitude also seems to have a distinct effect. Based on the literature, we should expect that legislators from smaller districts speak more times than their colleagues from larger districts. First, the asymmetry between population and representation in the chamber has effects on legislative behavior (Chasquetti and Micozzi, 2014). While Montevideo has 40% of the nation's population and Canelones 15%, none of remaining districts exceeds 5% in population. This is then translated into the number of seats in the chamber. In other words, the asymmetries reflect the importance of Canelones and Montevideo in congressional decisions. This should motivate legislators from the smaller districts to find other tools through which to participate.

The second argument regarding the effect of DM on COF participation relates to the effects of the closed list. On the one hand, in closed lists, as DM increases so does the

importance of party reputation, but in smaller districts, candidates allude to their personal reputation to gather votes (Carey and Shugart 1995). On the other hand, the closed and blocked lists at the faction level give party leaders greater control over legislators from Canelones and Montevideo. As mentioned earlier, leaders have control over the factions' political agenda, candidate nomination process, ballot ranking, committee assignments, and distribution of other main positions in Congress. However, leaders from the smaller districts have limited influence on the selection and order of the list (Chasquetti and Micozzi, 2014).

Figure 5.6: Dispersion of the number of COF speeches delivered by legislators in Uruguay, by district magnitude



Although legislators from smaller DM participate more than those from larger districts, their participation is not significantly larger. Figure 5.6 shows the difference in the use of speeches during *Media Hora Previa* and *Final* based on the district magnitudes. In the graphs, I divide the districts into three categories: all districts with small magnitude (DM 2 to 5); Canelones (DM 14); and finally Montevideo, the larger district with 42 seats. Across these groups we find a similar inter-quartile range (smaller districts 5, Montevideo 2.5, and

Canelones 7), but a different median. The graph shows that legislators from districts with smaller magnitude have a higher mean and median than the other two groups. In other words, they participate at a higher rate than those from larger districts. Legislators in Canelones show a greater dispersion than in the other two groups. Lastly, the figure shows that legislators from Montevideo, the country's capital, participate at a lower rate (and have the lowest spread). However, as seen in Table A.3 of the Appendix, when including a dummy in the negative binomial model for either Montevideo or for whether the legislator is from a small district, the variable shows the expected direction yet is insignificant.

Costa Rica: Opposition and district magnitude


As in Uruguay, the data reveals that although legislators elected from the Costa Rican capital, San Jose, have a similar median than members from other districts, there is more variability in the number of speeches delivered by the former. Upon adding the *San Jose* dummy at the negative binomial model (Table A3 on the Chapter's Appendix), there is no change in the main model (models (1) and (2)) or the ones that includes the interaction effect (models (4) and (5)). In other words, legislators from the country's capital are not significantly more likely to deliver a speech in COFs.

As is the case in Uruguay, the capital in Costa Rica has a significantly larger magnitude than the rest of districts. Almost 30% of its assembly is assigned to legislators from San Jose, followed by the district of Alajuela with 15%. Under a closed-list scenario, legislators from San Jose have a higher incentive to promote the party label than legislators from smaller districts. Though Costa Rica does not have consecutive reelection, leaders are able to exert control over their members given the legislators' post-Assembly ambitions. As a result, legislators in Costa Rica have incentive to try to differentiate themselves from their peers in

order to gain favor for a future post-Assembly position. However, the dummy for *San Jose* in the negative binomial model is insignificant.


Furthermore, while members of the government coalition have a similar participation rate, despite the DM, members of the opposition are different. In the medium-size districts (7 and 11), both groups behave similarly, while those from San Jose district, where the country's capital is located, and from smaller districts (4 and 5) have different strategies.

Figure 5.7: Dispersion of the number of COF speeches delivered by legislators in Costa Rica, based on district magnitudes and Opposition



Granting that opposition members from the capital are a small subgroup, it does appear that they speak more often than opposition members from elsewhere. When including an interaction term for *San Jose*Opposition*, the negative binomial in model (3) shows that opposition members from the country's capital are significantly more likely to deliver a speech than others. On average, while an opposition member from San Jose's district delivers 49 speeches, a government coalition member from that same district delivers on average 29.

Figure 5.8: Predicted Number of COF Speeches, with 95% confidence, by legislators in Costa Rica, based on district magnitudes and Opposition



Upon including an interaction of DM and Opposition, the coefficients show that opposition members are significantly more likely to deliver a speech than members of the government coalition, with substantive effects for the district of magnitude five and the country's largest district.¹⁸ The fact that the substantive results are significant for magnitude 5 but not 7 and 11, suggests me the significance in magnitude 5 might be due to district's particularities in the term studied. To sum up, opposition members, especially from the largest district, have the highest incentives to participate. There are two possible reasons. On one hand, members of San Jose may see the chamber's floor as the natural forum to address issues of the main district of the country, while members of smaller districts may prefer to bring attention to executive shortcomings in venues at the local level. On the other hand,


¹⁸ There are no predictions for the district of Guanacaste of magnitude 4, as for the time studied only one of its representatives is a member of the opposition.

legislators from San Jose may need to differentiate themselves from their peers to advertise their work and increase their probabilities for a post-Assembly job. Contrary to members from other districts, legislators from the capital have a more crowded and competitive district and therefore it can be more difficult for them to stand out.

Chile: Party dissents

As noted earlier, a recent study in Chile found that party dissenters are more likely to deliver a speech in *Hora de Incidentes*. The rationale behind this finding is that party leaders in Chile allow dissenters to speak more often during COF than during bill debates, in order to allow dissenters to enhance their individual reputations without harming the collectivity (Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017).

Figure 5.9: Predicted Number of COF Speeches, with 95% confidence, by legislators in Chile, based on party discipline



Upon including the variable for party distance in the negative binomial model, the results of the model do not show much change. As seen in Table A.6 of the Appendix, *Reelection*,

Member of Key Committee, and *Distance to Capital* remain significant and with similar coefficients. In addition, the new variable *Party Dissent Score* has a positive relationship with the count of speeches delivered in COFs and is significant at the 90% confidence level. A House member with the lowest party dissent score, 1.32, on average delivers 12.5 speeches, while the member with the highest dissent score delivers 33.2 speeches during COFs.

To sum up, in this section of the chapter I have explored specific characteristics within each country that might help us explain speech participation. In a nutshell, the new variables were the following: for Panama, I analyzed the electoral rules (the magnitude of the district, the election type, or the seat allocation formula), the distribution of pork, and party switching; for Uruguay, governor candidates and DM; for Costa Rica, DM; and for Chile, party dissents.

Among the results, I was able to determine that while in Panama neither electoral rules nor pork are significant factors for the rate of speech participation, party switching is a significant factor. On average, legislators who switch parties deliver more speeches than others. I believe that the reason for this difference is that those who switch did so mainly to the government coalition, which usually carries benefits such as pork. As a result, those who switch have little incentive to use their time and energy in activities that are not as profitable, given the mechanisms that now they have in hand for being part of the coalition. In Uruguay, the data show that neither district magnitude nor running for governor has a significant impact on speech participation. In Costa Rica, the data reveal that the interaction of DM and opposition have an effect on speech participation. At all magnitudes, opposition members are significantly more likely to deliver a speech than members of the government coalition, with

stronger substantive effects for a small magnitude district (five) and the country's capital. The likely reason for the difference in the count of speeches for legislators of the capital is either to enhance their chances for post-Assembly assignments and/or for opposition purposes. Finally, in Chile, the data show that party dissenters speak significantly more often than more disciplined legislators. The reason for this difference is that party leaders do not usually monitor COFs compared to bill deliberation, and they allow dissenters to enhance their individual reputations without harming the collectivity.

The quest for answers remains: Is there a reason shared by legislators of the different countries to use this venue? Is there a reason *among* the different categories of legislators to use this venue? Perhaps the speeches themselves can provide a clue. The following section of this chapter is the first attempt to answer such questions.

Topics: What are the legislators talking about?

In this final section, I examine the content of the speeches of the main variables of my hypotheses, as well as of leaders compared to backbenchers. My purpose is to determine why legislators are using COFs. Separating the legislators into groups can reveal different goals among them. For example, while some might view COFs as an opportunity to connect with their electorate, others might use COFs to address their peers in the chamber. I expect the results of this section to provide a building block for future research on text as data analysis.

For this section, I examined the speeches of the four countries. I began by randomly selected 10 speeches per country. I read myself each speech and categorize them on the following two aspects: to whom it was addressed to, and what the main topic was. With regards to whom the speech was addressed to, I created two categories: constituency and

party. An example of the former category is when the legislator raises attention to a need that his constituency has that is not being taken care of. An example of when the legislator is addressing his party is when he is sharing what should be the position of the party in a specific issue or rallying support of the party for a bill. For those speeches that do not fit into these two categories, I label them as “others”. However, soon after I started coding, I noticed a couple of things to have in mind on a future stage of the research. I found that legislators were often addressing the whole chamber as well as national and local governments.

The second aspect I tried to determine while reading the speeches was the immediate topic of the speech. For this aspect, I used the coding scheme developed by Taylor-Robinson and Diaz (1999): national, regional, sectional, local, and individual. I also included the administrative issue category, which have been used by subsequent studies building on Taylor-Robinson and Diaz categorization. Although the authors use these categories when classifying bills, they have also been used in the recent scholarship to classify speeches as well (Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017).

There are two final explanatory remarks regarding the coding process. First, the categories were not mutually exclusive as in one speech a legislator could address various issues. This was specially the case of Costa Rica and Panama. Second, each speech was categorized on two different aspects, to whom it was addressed to and what the main topic was.

Electoral vulnerability vs. electoral safety

To give a glimpse of the difference between the speeches delivered by legislators who are electorally vulnerable compared to those who are electorally safe, I chose a random sample

of the legislators with the lowest and the highest inter-vulnerability scores. Legislators from both groups seem to address different types of topics, at the district and national level. However, in the case of the electorally safe, they clearly focus some of their speeches on administrative issues of the chamber, and appear to consider their peers as their main audience. For administrative issues, I include topics related to the operation of the chamber, the performance of the legislative process, and even celebrations within the chamber. Here are some examples:

- Eugenio Tuma (7.12.2006 – Chile): Highlights the importance of the Congress Library and recognizes the help of the staff members of the library of the Universidad de La Frontera for instructing legislators on the tools of the Congress Library. On another occasion, the legislator pays tribute to the outgoing General Secretary and wishes luck to the incoming secretary.
- Francisco Antonio Pacheco (01.30.2008 – Costa Rica): Calls attention to his chamber's colleagues to develop needed legislation to implement the economic treaty with the U.S. approved by referendum.
- Pablo Alvarez Lopez (7.16.2008 – Uruguay): Shares with the chamber the proposal that he, along with other peers, proposed in the Latin American Parliament. The proposal creates an endowment to promote historical research on the region. In another session (06.05.2007), the legislator requests that the chamber develop better ways to inform citizens of the chamber's work and make that information more accessible to citizens with disabilities.
- Raul Pineda (10.22.2013 – Panama): Celebrates a journalist of the Chamber on her birthday, especially as a cancer victim. In a very different tone, in 10.31.2011

Pineda emphasizes the disapproval of his party, PRD, toward a particular government project, while criticizing members of the PAN party for their support, and hence corrupt practices of the government.

In comparison, electorally vulnerable legislators seem to lean toward delivering speeches with higher impact. Yet these are on a variety of topics, mainly national and local issues. In addition, the audience in these cases is the government and the constituency back home. Here are some examples:

- Miguel Fanovich (10.26.2010 – Panama): Invites the Agriculture Secretary to develop more agricultural projects in his district, Chiriqui, but not, however, before saying how pleased he is with the work of the government to support his district.
- Rosauo Martínez (07.06.2006 – Chile): The legislator is addressing problems with the initiation and management of a new toll in the city of Chillan.
- Rene Alinco (10.04.2006 – Chile): The legislator traces the tragic history of the social housing in *Puerto Cisnes*, in the district of Aisen, and welcomes the recent actions of the Housing Secretary.
- Monica Travieso (03.05.2008 – Uruguay): The congresswoman advertises the cultural and civic center in the Ciudad del Plata, district of San Jose. She announces that the project was developed by her party in collaboration with local authorities. She asks the chamber to send her speech to a range of offices, from the local party office, to the country's electoral tribunal, to a number of cabinet members.

- Gabriel Ascencio (12.12.2006 – Chile): The congressman asks the district's comptroller about the legality of a particular project presented by the *Centro de Estudios Científicos* in the district of Valdivia.
- Crispiano Adames (09.07.2009 – Panama): The legislator speaks to the executive government about the need to give more attention to the potential risk of the H1N1 flu virus.
- Andrea Marcela Morales (05.31.2006 – Costa Rica): The legislator calls the chamber's attention to the need for loans for infrastructure, given the high interest rates the country is already paying for delayed construction work.

I also compared the speeches between the senior members and first-term members, and between opposition and government coalition members. However, based on my small sample, it does not seem that members of these groups differ significantly from their contrasting groups, nor do they seem to have a particular audience to whom they are speaking.

Leaders vs. Backbenches

It can be expected that leaders would be more likely to focus on party and national issues. In a few cases, leaders also use COFs to address the chamber in order to set the position of the party with regards to a bill, or government or party action, or to discuss administrative issues of the chamber.

- Benicio Robinson (02.02.2011 – Panama): “And I would like to say to you, Mrs. Chair, that today [a news item] was released that the party has abstained and we wish to rectify our vote against. If there were any proposals that were made by our party, it

was to see if we could draft a proposal [Reform to the Mining Code] that would benefit all Panamanians.”

- Jorge Ivan Arrocha: (8.8.2012 – Panama): The legislator is addressing the chair, as he had promised before to set a meeting with the party to discuss the time slots and time frame of the sessions. However, he denounces the chair for never setting this meeting.

However, a closer look at the speeches shows that for the most part, leaders do not speak about national or partisan issues, but rather about local issues. In fact, the leaders mentioned their districts in almost all the speeches I looked at. Even when the legislator is addressing a national issue, she tries to mention her district. In some cases, leaders speak about a situation that a district, specific community, school, or family is experiencing.

- Marcelo Diaz Diaz (12.13.2006 – Chile): “Mr. Chair, I want to make known in this House a situation in the town of *El Sauce*, municipality of *Andacollo*, where eight families live next to a tremendous wall of mining tailings, which almost looks like a mountain chain.”
- Noriel Salerno (01.25.10 – Panama): “I decided to speak today, because yesterday morning I heard something that gave me concern for the district of Coclé, the teachers of Coclé.”
- Anibal Pereira (6.14.2006 – Uruguay): The legislator speaks about the security issues in his district and the changes in the police chain of command in the district.
- Patricia Romero (02.18.2009 – Costa Rica): The legislator speaks about a mining project in Cruitas, as well as the consequences of the project for the environment and for the region.

At other times, the leaders try to raise attention or create pressure for a specific government office to address this necessity. In Panama, Chile and Uruguay, legislators can ask the chamber itself to send the transcript of their speech to the different actors involved in their speech.

- Carlos Abel Jarpa (03.23.2006 – Chile): The legislator tries to rally support from the *Ministro de Obras Publicas* to finance a needed road in his district.
- Jorge Ulloa: (03.21.2007 – Chile): The legislator talks about an important road in his district. He sent an *oficio* to the involved parties in order to oversee the reason for the delays and the plans for the road.
- Federico Cassareto (08.04.2005 – Uruguay): The legislator urges the construction of a new hospital in the eastern region of the country that would also benefit his district, Maldonado.

Compared to the leaders, backbenchers discuss a broader range of topics and address different audiences. They raise national and local topics, as well as chamber and partisan issues. With their speeches, some are targeting their peers in the chamber, while others target local and/or national authorities and still others address the voters of their districts.

For example, first-term legislators – considered as the opposite of leaders – speak about a variety of topics. However, above all, they focus on local issues. When the legislators are addressing the voters, in some cases they talk about their district in general, about a particular group within their district, or a sector they represent. Although, formally, the audience is the chamber, the legislators seem to be addressing their constituency or local needs in order that their constituency recognizes that their representative is addressing their needs on the

chamber's floor. In some cases, the audience is also the competent authorities in charge of the specific need.

- Elias Castillo (04.08.2013 – Panama): The legislator informs the relevant authorities that the money invested in trash collection and transportation is not being reflected in better services in his district.
- Iracema de Dale (03.01.2011 – Panama): The legislator addresses the negative consequences of new educational regulations for teachers. In addition, she mentions specific schools in her district, Colon, that have been impacted.
- Crescencia Prado (04.25.2012 - Panama): The legislator talks about a few issues in her district. For example, she calls on the national government to address the infrastructure needs of her district, Ngäbe Buglé, especially as the rain season approaches.
- Dalia Bernal (07.11.2012 - Panama): The legislator advertises projects that she has been working on for the benefit of her district, San Miguelito, but also makes a public request to the government to address water safety issues.
- Clemira Pacheco (12.21.2006 – Chile): The legislator discusses how the high cost of energy is affecting a specific business in her district. She requests the cabinets of Economy and of Energy to address the high energy costs in this area.

I also examined the backbenchers in the 25th and 75th percentile for the total number of speeches delivered by the legislators of each chamber during their NLS venue. The rationale behind selecting the extremes is to have a glimpse of what the backbenchers address when they have an apparent need to talk more versus those with less need. Once again, compared to leaders, these legislators have a range of topics and audiences.

Among the speeches I read for 25th percentile group, the legislators are addressing issues to three different audiences: their district, their peers, and the executive government. When addressing the district or the executive branch, the speeches show that legislators primarily intend to bring attention to a need of their district.

When they are addressing their districts, the legislators are mainly discussing their constituency's needs and demands. These speeches are also an opportunity for the legislator to show expertise about and full knowledge of her district, so they do not spare on detail. This is, for example, evident in the speech of Panamanian Deputy Carlos Santana. Santana delivered a speech about infrastructure projects in his district. "There, in the city of Santiago, one of the main roads, 10th Street – where the universities, the parish, the health center, and Santiago's Bus Terminal are located – is not provided with a bridge for pedestrians".¹⁹

In some of the speeches, the legislators are addressing the executive branch. This choice appears to be for two main reasons. First, some speeches rally the government's support for a bill or a project that would benefit their district. Second, COF speeches are an opportunity for legislators to take a stand on actions of the president and other officials of the national executive branch. The stands are clearly supporting or criticizing the officials.

- Manuel Cohen (01.19.2010 – Panama) "I felt very comfortable listening to President Ricardo Martinelli above all saying two things: respect for the branches of government, since he has been criticized for not doing it, and this is totally false. He has been a respectful man."

¹⁹ 08.03.2009. Author's translation.

- Jose Luis Varela (04.12.2012 – Panama): The legislator criticizes the government's lack of respect for the institution, as a cabinet member failed to appear at the Assembly after having been summoned by the legislators.

Finally, the speeches show that the legislators are addressing administrative issues. In addition, they seem to speak in the chamber for two main reasons. First, the speeches raise issues inside the chamber, among peers or about the chamber's leadership – for example, the way in which time is being distributed among parties and legislators. Second, the speeches share with their peers the work of their office and their party.

- Silvia Cristina Charpentier (04.02.2008 – Costa Rica): The deputy updates the chamber on the work of her office and of the committee to which she belongs (Budget Committee).
- Sergio Iván Alfaro (09.21.2009 – Costa Rica): The legislator expresses his discomfort with some remarks given by a peer earlier in that day's session.

Regarding the speeches read by the top quartile legislators with the highest amount of COF speeches, it seems again that legislators talk about a wide range of issues, and for some countries even within each speech, as in Panama and Costa Rica. Consequently, legislators addressed multiple audiences in one speech. Overall, however, the legislators address mainly local issues. Among the speeches read for this group, I identified that legislators are addressing issues mainly to two audiences: their district and their peers. Here are some further examples:

- Alfonso de Urresti: (06.14.2007 – Chile): “In Corral Port, we found *Amargos* Cove, which is threatened by the possible landslide of a hill. With this, dozens of families who have lived there for a long time would be buried.”
- Irene Gallego: (9.1.2009 – Panama): The legislator speaks about a national issue, the education budget. In addition, the legislator connects the discussion to her constituency, constituted of an indigenous population: “For this reason, we believe that, from this chamber, we must raise our voice so that, on behalf of all indigenous peoples, because – this is not only the Ngöbe Buglé people – this affects all the districts, the seven Panamanian indigenous peoples. In addition, we want to develop, as the Indexes of failure, illiteracy, and school drop-out are extremely alarming in our area.”
- Iracema de Dale (01.26.10 – Panama): The legislator speaks about the summer training for teachers across the country. However, she condemns that the training is only going to be held in some districts, which denies a portion of teachers the opportunity to train and learn.
- Francisco Javier Marín (05.07.2006 – Costa Rica): The legislator refers to some remarks he made about a bill during its debate and urges legislative action in favor of the bill.

To sum up, the previous analysis reveals that legislators direct their speeches to three main groups: the primary audience is their district’s electorate, while the chamber and the executive government form secondary audiences. The content of the speeches also suggests that legislators are mainly focusing their efforts on district or constituency needs, on all sorts of topics: living conditions and quality of life, education, health, and security, just to mention

a few. Legislators also use COFs to rally support for bills or projects in their districts, or to share their party's position on a particular issue or proposal.

Among some of the differences between safe vs. electorally vulnerable legislators and leaders vs. backbenchers are the following. Compared to electorally vulnerable legislators, the electorally safest legislators tend to use COFs more often to deliver speeches regarding administrative issues. In addition, most of these issues have little to no impact on legislative work. In addition, a closer look at speeches delivered by leaders shows that leaders do not focus their time only on party and/or national issues, but they discuss their districts' issues and bring government awareness to their districts' needs. Finally, the small sample taken suggests no difference between the speeches or audiences of first-year legislators compared to senior legislators, and between opposition and coalition members. However, for a more robust conclusion, we would need to study a larger sample of speeches.

It is important to highlight the attention given to the electorate and their needs. The content of the speeches supports what was said early in the dissertation and mentioned in the literature regarding how COFs are an opportunity for legislators to give attention to a district issue that does not fit into a bill proposal. By doing so, they are accomplishing four main things. First, they are showing to their constituency that the legislator is representing them in the "distant capital". Second, members of congress want to show expertise about their constituencies. That is why we see throughout the speeches legislators talking about specific things in their districts, such as a family, a school, or a street. Third, legislators are trying to generate pressure on government officials to develop or finance projects that will benefit their constituencies. Fourth, legislators, regardless of their electoral and institutional situation, use these venues to address their electorate on district matters.

Although outside the scope of this dissertation, the outcome of this subsection could be a potential extension of this research. Much can be said about the purpose of the speeches during COFs: who is being addressed and what topics are being raised. A potential extension of the research could shed light on how this venue allows legislators to develop electoral connections with their constituencies, whether through advertisement, credit claiming, or position taking, without creating tension with the party label.

Conclusion

The question that drives this chapter is as follows: what explains the fact that some legislators participate more than others? Due to the lack of a generalizable trend seen across the countries, this chapter sheds light on possible factors that could explain the use of COFs that were not taken into account in the developed theory. The chapter was divided into three sections. The first section was a small description of the main variables; the second section was an analysis of new variables, particular to each country, that could explain COF behavior; and the third section briefly examined the content of COF speeches.

The findings suggest that country-specific variables might affect COF participation and that legislators are using COFs to promote electoral connection. The new variables suggest that members from districts of small magnitude tend to participate at a higher rate, with the exception of Costa Rica. Being from the country's capital also has an effect on participation, yet the direction of the effect varies in each country. I was able to determine that in Panama, party switching has an impact on COF participation rate. On average, legislators who switch parties deliver more speeches than others. The reason for this difference is that those who switch did so mainly to the government coalition, which usually carries benefits such as pork.

In Costa Rica, the data reveals that the interaction of DM and opposition has an effect on speech participation. In the country's capital, opposition members are significantly more likely to deliver a speech than members of the government coalition. The reason for the high count of speeches for the legislators of the capital is their political ambition post-Assembly.

Finally, in Chile, the data shows that dissenters speak significantly more often than more disciplined legislators. The reason for this difference is that party leaders do not usually monitor COFs compared to bill deliberation, and they allow dissenters to enhance their individual reputations without harming the collectivity.

In addition, an analysis of a small sample of the speeches appears to reveal that all legislators are addressing district matters. The legislators' primary audience is their district's electorate, and the content of the speeches mainly focuses on district or constituency needs, such as living conditions and quality of life, education, health, and security. However, it appears that electorally vulnerability and leadership position are the main variables that have an impact on the speech content. Nonetheless, I must highlight that the sample of the speeches is too small to reach firm conclusions and that the purpose of the chapter was to give a glimpse of the content.

6. Conclusion

It has long been agreed in the literature that electoral systems generate different electoral incentives for legislators. Given legislators' main goal of being reelected, even as they seek other objectives such as policy goals, electoral institutions shape legislative behavior, as is reflected in a wide range of parliamentary tools. Electoral incentives vary in the degree to which they motivate legislators to cultivate their personal reputation rather than the collectivity.

This dissertation focused on the effects of electoral institutions on speech participation in Congressional Open Forums (COF) – in other words, in venues during the legislative session dedicated to allowing legislators to address any topic of their choice. In contrast to bill debates or other non-lawmaking speech venues (i.e., the discussion of the daily agenda), a COF is not bound to a specific set of topics.

In this dissertation, I argue that electoral incentives produced by electoral rules do not shape all legislative activities in the same direction, specifically in the case of floor participation. I hold that when legislative activity has little visibility to the audience outside the capitol, the floor is somewhat immune to the electoral incentives. Stepping away from the majority of the standing literature in the subfield, I theorize that electorally and institutionally disadvantaged legislators are more likely to participate during COFs, despite the incentives set by the electoral institutions. This is because of the different nature and purpose of COF speeches. While other studies in the subfield emphasize the overall incentives of the type of electoral rule as the primary determinant of speech organization, my theory notes that we should rather observe relevant intra-chamber variation among legislators as determinants of speech participation. To summarize, the theory I propose in this dissertation is the following:

legislators with institutionally (opposition members, opposition leaders, and first-year legislators) and electorally (inter-party electoral vulnerability) disadvantaged positions in their party and chamber are more likely to speak during COFs. To test my hypothesis, I selected four cases: Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama, and Chile.

The results of my empirical analysis do not allow me to confidently confirm or reject my hypotheses. The hypotheses were not significantly consistent across the countries. First, the results support the expected positive direction of opposition coalition in COF participation in Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay, and when aggregating the countries. The rationale behind the expectation is that opposition members are more likely to use alternative tools to address the chamber and connect with their constituencies, given the lack of control over the legislative agenda and other conventional legislative tools. However, the impact is significant only for Costa Rica and Panama.

Second, I expected to find that under collective vote-gathering incentives, leaders from the opposition were more likely to give speeches. Compared to leaders of the government coalition, the opposition has a disadvantageous situation in both the floor agenda and time. They were thus expected to be more likely to monitor COFs to maximize their benefits. The results from the two cases representative of collective incentives, Costa Rica and Uruguay, show the expected positive sign for the interaction term. However, the coefficients lack statistical significance at the conventional level.

Third, I anticipated that first-term members were more likely to participate in COFs than more senior members. The results show that this is the case for Uruguay, Panama, and Costa Rica, but not for Chile. However, the coefficient does not have statistical significance in any of the cases. Finally, I predicted that electorally vulnerable legislators were also more likely

to use COFs as a way to boost their electoral outcomes in the next election. The variable shows a positive effect in Chile, Panama, and Uruguay, but not in Costa Rica; however, the coefficients again lack statistical significance.

The different direction of the results in the four cases selected leads us to conclude a lack of a behavioral trend among the countries. The countries behaved differently from one other in the way their legislators employed COFs, and their behavior cannot be grouped into electoral incentives. Along with the findings of the empirical chapter, in Chapter 3 I also presented evidence that seems to support such claim. Based on previous studies of chamber rules and floor access, differences among countries with respect to the presence and structure of COFs are likely to be associated with differences in their electoral rules. In other words, countries that promote individual vote-gathering incentives should be more likely to have COFs and fewer rules of procedure that restrain its use than countries with collective vote-gathering incentives. The results of the chamber rules and norms in presidential America did not support this expectation. In fact, the descriptive data suggest no clear ties between the countries' electoral rules and the presence (or absence) of venues for COFs.

Facing these unexpected findings, my dissertation took a turn for Chapter 5. I intend the work in this chapter to become the first building block for future studies on NLS. Although conclusions of previous studies in the literature fall short when explaining legislators' behavior in non-lawmaking participation, the implications of these studies can be said to extend to the content of the speeches delivered in such venues. Given this, I intended to explain two things. First, I included new variables that might explain the behavior for each country separately. Second, I gave a first look to the reader of this dissertation at what the legislators discuss during COFs. We know that this venue is open for the legislators to

address the topics of their choice, which raises the question: what are they deciding to speak about?

The findings of Chapter 5 suggest two things. First, the countries might have particular variables that affect the legislators' participation in COFs. In Panama, legislators who switch to another party, a practice very common in the country and that occurs from opposition parties to the government party, significantly decreases the likelihood of the legislator's participation in COFs. In Costa Rica, the data reveal that the interaction of opposition with the districts has an effect on speech participation; this effect is significant for the country's capital and a small magnitude district. In Chile, the data show that dissenters speak significantly more often than more disciplined legislators. However, the addition of the variables in the negative binomial models does not alter the direction or significance of most of the main variables.

Second, legislators use COFs to foster electoral connections with their constituencies and to promote local projects. Although I claim that the COF venues are not very visible to the audience outside the chamber compared to other sections of the legislative agenda, and therefore are not sensitive to electoral incentives, it is interesting that the speeches mostly address local and regional issues and are constituency-specific. This is revealed when the speeches of the different main groups of legislators are compared.

A small sample of speeches suggests that electorally safe legislators lean tend to give speeches on administrative issues with little to no significant repercussion to the constituency or to the legislative process (i.e., making a public mention on the birthday of a congressional staff member or asking the chamber to adopt new ways to make parliamentary information more accessible). On the contrary, the most electorally vulnerable legislators deliver

speeches mostly about local and district issues, which seem to have more effect on their constituency. Another finding from the content of the speeches is that leaders use them to address their individual constituency. This seems to happen at a higher rate than in the speeches they deliver regarding partisan issues. Finally, overall, all legislators use COF speeches to address a demand or need of their constituency.

Based on my knowledge of COFs gained through this research, I suggest that individual legislators use COFs as *potential* material to develop connections with their constituencies. A legislator can send a transcript or a soundbite, create a Facebook post, or make a claim in a town hall meeting with proof that he is in fact raising a need or demand of his district to the distant national government and party leadership. All in all, the fact that COF speeches are potential material for the legislator, does not mean that this venue is regularly followed by the constituency.

Despite the lack of robust results, there is more to learn about the different effects of electoral rules on different legislative tools, and this is one of the main contributions of this dissertation. The scholarship findings about the effect of electoral incentives on legislative participation have, before now, been consistent. However, while much has already been said about and done in the study of congress, my dissertation finds evidence that challenges the existing beliefs. Why is that? What, then, are the factors that determine legislative behavior under COFs?

The findings of my dissertation left me with the following lessons and questions. First, my findings lend support to the very small group of studies that have recently claim the different effects of electoral rules in the various sections of the legislative session. However, the question that develops from this claim is if the lack of impact of those electoral incentives

is generalizable to presidential systems outside Latin America and if it can also be seen in COFs in parliamentary regimes. Along the same line, I wonder if instead of considering COF venues immune to electoral incentives, they are rather a “gravity-free zone”. In other words, these venues develop very different incentives for legislators than bill debates. Third, the lack of statistical significance in the coefficients could be the result of studying only one legislative term per country. Future research should gather data from more terms. Last but not least, I strongly believe that the line of research that this subfield should explore is the analysis of the speeches’ content. Through this approach, we will be able to understand better the purpose of COFs and why they seem immune to electoral incentives. I hope that I and other researchers will be able to pursue the questions suggested by the research in the future, deepening our understanding of these important forums.

Appendix

Table A.1: Party Coalition Encuentro Progresista -Frente Amplio – Nueva Mayoria’s

Lists in the District of Canelones for the 2004 Elections

List Number	Total list votes	D'Hondt Seat Allocation				Seats assigned to the list
		Total list votes/1	Total list votes/2	Total list votes/3	Total list votes/4	
77	12,747	12,747	6,374	4,249	3,187	0
90	16,035	16,035	8,018	5,345	4,009	1
326	3,393	3,393	1,697	1,131	848	0
567	822	822	411	274	206	0
609	52,079	52,079	26,040	17,360	13,020	3
738	10,228	10,228	5,114	3,409	2,557	0
800	971	971	486	324	243	0
871	241	241	121	80	60	0
1303	3,600	3,600	1,800	1,200	900	0
1813	934	934	467	311	234	0
1968	379	379	190	126	95	0
2121	34,289	34,289	17,145	11,430	8,572	2
4010	351	351	176	117	88	0
5271	1,216	1,216	608	405	304	0
7777	155	155	78	52	39	0
99000	14172	14,172	7,086	4,724	3,543	1
931001	9435	9,435	4,718	3,145	2,359	0

The table contains the lists of the Coalition FA in the district of Canelones. For the 2004 election, Canelones had a magnitude of 14. FA got 161,879 votes and won seven seats. As seen in bold, the *hojas de votación* N. 90 and N. 99000 got one seat each, and N. 2121 got two. Now, let’s focus on the list N.609 (in bold and italics). 609 won three seats assigned in

first, third, and fourth place. The seats are given to the first three candidates available²⁰. In other words, for the 2004 election, Congressmen Esteban Perez's order of election (contrary to their rank in the ballot used for *Vulnerability I*) within the party was 1, Juan C. Souza's was 3, and Victor Semproni's was 4.

²⁰ In some cases a winner is not going to be available to receive his seat. In Uruguay, a candidate can be included as a nominee for both the House and the Senate. If the candidate achieves a seat in both chambers, she prefers to accept the Senate seat. In addition, a candidate can be in more than one faction list for the same party. In case he wins a seat in multiple lists, he will only take the seat for one of the lists.

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics**a. Chile**

Independent Variable	N. of Members in Congress	N. of Speeches	Avg. Speeches by Members
Leader	30	471	15.70
Not Leader	92	1489	16.18
Opposition	57	819	14.37
Government Coalition	65	1141	17.55
Inter-Vulnerability 0.5	7	88	12.57
Inter-Vulnerability 1	115	1872	16.28
First Term in Congress	41	665	16.22
Not First Term in Congress	81	1295	15.99
Seeking Reelection	109	1834	16.83
Not Seeking Reelection	13	126	9.69
Member of Key Committee	25	306	12.24
Not Member of Key Committee	97	1654	17.05
Distance to Capital (Log Km 0 - >2)	10	57	11.00
Distance to Capital (Log Km 2 - >4)	22	337	15.31
Distance to Capital (Log Km 4 - >6)	38	395	10.39
Distance to Capital (Log Km >= 6)	52	1171	22.50

b. Panama:

Independent Variable	N. of Members in Congress	N. of Speeches	Avg. Speeches by Members
Leader	10	653	65.30
Not Leader	61	3966	65.02
Opposition 2009	26	2248	86.46
Government Coalition 2009	45	2371	52.69
Opposition 2011	33	2992	90.67
Government Coalition 2011	38	1627	42.82
Inter-Vulnerability 0 - >0.25	0	0	0.00
Inter-Vulnerability 0.25 - >0.5	2	36	18.00
Inter-Vulnerability 0.5- >0.75	11	612	55.63
Inter-Vulnerability 0.75- 1	58	3971	68.46
First Term in Congress	49	3129	63.86
Not First Term in Congress	22	1490	67.73
Seeking Reelection	64	3955	61.80
Not Seeking Reelection	7	664	94.86
Member of Key Committee	53	3453	65.15
Not Member of Key Committee	18	1166	64.78
Distance to Capital (Log Km 0 - >2)	33	1923	58.27
Distance to Capital (Log Km 2 - >4)	0	0	0.00
Distance to Capital (Log Km 4 - <6)	29	1892	65.24
Distance to Capital (Log Km >6)	9	804	89.33

c. Uruguay

Independent Variable	N. of Members in Congress	N. of Speeches	Avg. Speeches by Members
Leader	17	115	6.76
Not Leader	82	968	11.8
Opposition	47	511	10.87
Government Coalition	52	572	11
Vulnerability 0 - >0.25	4	39	9.75
Vulnerability 0.25 - >0.5	11	93	8.45
Vulnerability 0.5- >0.75	18	133	7.39
Vulnerability 0.75- 1	66	818	12.39
Vulnerability II 0 - >0.25	17	136	8.00
Vulnerability II 0.25 - >0.5	24	269	11.21
Vulnerability II 0.5- >0.75	18	149	8.28
Vulnerability II 0.75- 1	40	529	13.23
Seeking Reelection	56	650	11.61
Not Seeking Reelection	43	433	10.07
First Term in Congress	67	797	11.90
Not First Term in Congress	32	286	8.94
Member of Key Committee	36	327	9.08
Not Member of Key Committee	63	756	12.00
Distance to Capital (Log Km 0 - >2)	42	336	8.00
Distance to Capital (Log Km 2 - >4)	16	162	10.13
Distance to Capital (Log Km 4 - >6)	41	585	14.27

d. Costa Rica

Independent Variable	N. of Members in Congress	N. of Speeches	Avg. Speeches by Members
Leader	16	582	36.38
Not Leader	48	1301	27.10
Opposition	21	766	36.48
Government Coalition	43	1117	25.98
Vulnerability 0 - >0.25	3	22	7.33
Vulnerability 0.25 - >0.5	9	361	40.11
Vulnerability 0.5- >0.75	13	432	33.23
Vulnerability 0.75- 1	39	1068	27.38
Member of Key Committee	16	404	25.25
Not Member of Key Committee	48	1479	30.81
First Term in Congress	62	1844	29.74
Not First Term in Congress	2	32	16.00
Distance to Capital (Log Km 0 - >2)	24	1278	53.25
Distance to Capital (Log Km 2 - >4)	27	717	26.56
Distance to Capital (Log Km 4 - >6)	14	374	26.71

Table A.3: Negative Binomial Panama (2009-2014) - with country's specific variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Party Leader	-0.00216 (0.359)	-0.0245 (0.362)	0.0279 (0.357)	-0.00529 (0.358)	-0.127 (0.353)	-0.0294 (0.347)
Opposition (2009)	0.490* (0.250)	0.465* (0.254)	0.516** (0.249)	0.431* (0.257)	0.472* (0.242)	0.472* (0.244)
Vulnerability	0.391 (0.678)	0.285 (0.712)	0.438 (0.676)	0.208 (0.707)	0.458 (0.674)	0.467 (0.677)
First Term in Congress	0.0448 (0.289)	0.0838 (0.298)	0.102 (0.293)	0.0767 (0.292)	0.000345 (0.275)	-0.0407 (0.286)
Reelection	-0.380 (0.413)	-0.375 (0.412)	-0.404 (0.411)	-0.401 (0.409)	-0.165 (0.411)	-0.230 (0.402)
Member of Key Committee	0.212 (0.312)	0.235 (0.316)	0.288 (0.317)	0.214 (0.314)	0.136 (0.306)	0.0757 (0.318)
Distance to Capital (Log)	0.0356 (0.0444)	0.0503 (0.0512)	0.0300 (0.0444)	0.0514 (0.0463)	0.0439 (0.0427)	0.0122 (0.0490)
SMD		-0.176 (0.302)				0.772 (0.521)
Partidas (Log)			0.0651 (0.0456)			0.0550 (0.0419)
Seat Allocation				0.123 (0.116)		0.301 (0.200)
Party Switching					-0.581** (0.249)	-0.671** (0.264)
Constant	3.660*** (0.787)	3.735*** (0.805)	2.581** (1.098)	3.513*** (0.802)	3.658*** (0.776)	2.117* (1.107)
Observations	71	71	71	71	71	71

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4: Negative Binomial Uruguay (2005–2010) - with country's specific variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Party Leader	-0.395 (0.244)	-0.668** (0.339)	-0.377 (0.244)	-0.642* (0.339)	-0.381 (0.245)	-0.635* (0.340)
Opposition	0.181 (0.174)	0.104 (0.187)	0.168 (0.174)	0.0939 (0.186)	0.179 (0.174)	0.108 (0.186)
Leader*Opposition		0.511 (0.465)		0.495 (0.464)		0.475 (0.464)
Vulnerability	0.245 (0.360)	0.246 (0.361)	0.241 (0.359)	0.241 (0.360)	0.331 (0.342)	0.339 (0.343)
First Term in Congress	0.165 (0.200)	0.179 (0.199)	0.148 (0.201)	0.163 (0.200)	0.159 (0.201)	0.174 (0.201)
Reelection	0.197 (0.179)	0.229 (0.180)	0.209 (0.179)	0.239 (0.180)	0.181 (0.176)	0.208 (0.177)
Member of Key Committee	-0.0513 (0.209)	-0.0640 (0.209)	-0.0832 (0.212)	-0.0946 (0.212)	-0.102 (0.213)	-0.114 (0.213)
Distance to Capital (Log)	0.0787* (0.0464)	0.0824* (0.0467)	0.0631 (0.0500)	0.0675 (0.0504)		
Intendente			0.182 (0.231)	0.172 (0.230)	0.213 (0.228)	0.205 (0.228)
Montevideo					-0.217 (0.221)	-0.230 (0.222)
Constant	1.709*** (0.325)	1.708*** (0.323)	1.732*** (0.325)	1.730*** (0.323)	1.923*** (0.385)	1.932*** (0.384)
Observations	99	99	99	99	99	99

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5: Negative Binomial Costa Rica (2006-2010) - with country's specific variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Party Leader	0.210 (0.173)	0.184 (0.173)	0.147 (0.169)	0.163 (0.204)	0.149 (0.202)
Opposition	0.320** (0.150)	0.319** (0.150)	0.0883 (0.184)	0.278 (0.179)	0.286 (0.178)
Leader*Opposition				0.148 (0.347)	0.117 (0.349)
Vulnerability	-0.350 (0.254)	-0.349 (0.250)	-0.286 (0.245)	-0.330 (0.258)	-0.333 (0.255)
First Term in Congress	0.311 (0.412)	0.338 (0.411)	0.323 (0.399)	0.327 (0.413)	0.348 (0.411)
Reelection	0.274 (0.264)	0.273 (0.262)	0.235 (0.255)	0.271 (0.264)	0.271 (0.262)
Member of Key Committee	-0.109 (0.167)	-0.0959 (0.166)	-0.136 (0.162)	-0.126 (0.172)	-0.109 (0.171)
Distance to Capital (Log)	-0.0157 (0.0375)			-0.0137 (0.0377)	
San Jose		0.129 (0.154)	-0.0629 (0.177)		0.119 (0.156)
San Jose*Opposition			0.584** (0.297)		
Constant	3.204*** (0.427)	3.098*** (0.428)	3.158*** (0.414)	3.187*** (0.428)	3.093*** (0.428)
Observations	64	64	64	64	64

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Negative Binomial Chile (2006-2008) - with country's specific variables

	(1)	(2)
Party Leader	-0.237 (0.208)	-0.111 (0.226)
Opposition	-0.276 (0.179)	-0.0859 (0.198)
Vulnerability	0.145 (0.838)	0.297 (0.918)
First Term in Congress	-0.126 (0.185)	-0.001 (0.199)
Reelection	0.494* (0.290)	0.510* (0.308)
Member of Key Committee	-0.551** (0.240)	-0.706*** (0.249)
Distance to Capital (Log)	0.158*** (0.0474)	0.152*** (0.0487)
Party Dissent Score		0.051* (0.0298)
Constant	1.670* (0.857)	1.104 (0.988)
Observations	122	114

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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