The influence of conflict of interest, value dissensus, and accountability on the bargaining behavior of negotiators

Previous investigations (Love, 1975; Rozelle, Druckman, and Mittelmark, 1977) have found that when two role-playing negotiators attempt to resolve a conflict that has both conflict of interest and conflict of ideology components, the conflict of interest factor accounts for the greatest part of the variance in negotiation outcome. In both studies, it had been expected that ideological conflict (value dissensus) would also account for a significant portion of the variance in outcome. The purpose of the present study was to assess the degree to which various levels of a negotiator's accountability to a constituency might interact with the interest and ideology factors to moderate the previously obtained main effect of conflict of interest and increase the effect of value dissensus. In a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA design which contained high and low levels of conflict of interest, value dissensus, and accountability, negotiations between two factions of a Prisoner Services Committee were simulated. Ninety-six male subjects, who played the roles of representatives of the two factions, were formed into dyads which met in face-to-face negotiation sessions that were convened to resolve a conflict concerning the manner of distribution of $40,000 among four proposed prisoner services programs. Based on the findings of the bargaining and negotiation literature, it was hypothesized that dyads in the high conflict of interest condition, as well as dyads in the high accountability condition, would have the greatest difficulty reaching a balanced funding compromise, would require the most time to complete negotiations, and would allocate the smallest proportion of the $40,000 in available funds. Based on a series of propositions developed in this study, it was further hypothesized that, 1) within the high accountability condition, high conflict of interest dyads would have greater difficulty reaching compromise than would low conflict of interest dyads, and 2) within the low accountability condition, high value dissensus dyads would have greater difficulty reaching compromise than would low value dissensus dyads. The major finding of the study was that a pervasive main effect of conflict of interest occurred. However, accountability proved to be an important qualifying factor in that within the low accountability condition, the otherwise strong effect of conflict of interest did not occur. Also, based on responses to a post-negotiation perception questionnaire, it was determined that within the low accountability condition, high value dissensus dyads, as compared to low value dissensus dyads, were more responsive to role obligations, were less satisfied with the outcome of negotiations, perceived compromise to more like defeat, and perceived the negotiations to be more futile than productive. It was concluded that when accountability is high, vested interest considerations are given a higher priority by the negotiator than are ideological considerations, and the effect of conflict of interest is manifested in the nature of the funding compromises reached. When accountability is low, more abstract and underlying ideological issues may be the higher priority factor with the effect of ideological conflict being manifested mainly in the nature of the perceptions that the negotiators form as a result of participation in the negotiations. Implications of these conclusions are discussed and suggestions for further research are made.