Physical Layer Security Game: Interaction between Source, Eavesdropper, and Friendly Jammer



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EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking


Physical layer security is an emerging security area that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between intended network nodes, while malicious nodes that eavesdrop the communication obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdroppers. We investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the useful data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "masking" the eavesdropper. To obtain distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined such that the source pays the jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, therefore, increasing the secrecy capacity. The friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for the jamming, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we investigate a Stackelburg type of game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The distributed game solution is shown to have similar performances to those of the centralized one.



Channel Gain, Malicious Node, Centralize Scheme, Stackelberg Equilibrium, Secrecy Capacity


Copyright 2010 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking. Recommended citation: Han, Zhu, Ninoslav Marina, Mérouane Debbah, and Are Hjørungnes. "Physical layer security game: interaction between source, eavesdropper, and friendly jammer." EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2009, no. 1 (2010): 452907. DOI: 10.1155/2009/452907. URL: Reproduced in accordance with the original publisher's licensing terms and with permission from the author(s).