Presidential influence and the administrative state

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dc.contributor.committeeMemberBarke, Richard P.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberStimson, James A.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberOppenheimer, Bruce I.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberMelosi, Martin
dc.creatorWaterman, Richard W.
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-02T20:49:28Z
dc.date.available2023-02-02T20:49:28Z
dc.date.copyright1989-10-04
dc.date.issued1986
dc.description.abstractRichard Nathan in his books on the administrative presidency strategy has urged presidents to politicize the presidency through the use of a variety of techniques. These include the appointment of loyalists, the removal of recalcitrant civil servants, the use of the budget as a management technique, and reorganization of the bureaucracy. Nathan has asserted that the administrative presidency strategy is an effective means of increasing presidential influence over the administrative state. In this dissertation I analyze the administrative presidency strategy. Using the comparative case study approach, I examine four bureaucratic entities under three presidents: The Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I argue that Nathan's assertion that the administrative presidency strategy promotes presidential influence ignores certain risks such as increased opposition to the president's programs from Congress, the courts, interest groups, and the bureaucracy, which can actually reduce presidential influence. Instead of Nathan's confrontational approach to presidential administrative relations, I suggest that presidents should attenpt to bargain and coirpromise with key elements within the bureaucracy. Through use of their powers of persuasion, presidents can seek to build support for their policies without raising the risks of increased congressional oversight or interest group opposition. Rather than relying on Nathan's command techniques, presidents should adopt a more conciliatory approach.
dc.description.departmentPolitical Science, Department of
dc.format.digitalOriginreformatted digital
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.other17734388
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10657/13754
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsThis item is protected by copyright but is made available here under a claim of fair use (17 U.S.C. Section 107) for non-profit research and educational purposes. Users of this work assume the responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing, or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires express permission of the copyright holder.
dc.subjectPresidents
dc.subjectUnited States
dc.subjectExecutive power
dc.titlePresidential influence and the administrative state
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.genreThesis
dcterms.accessRightsThe full text of this item is not available at this time because it contains documents that are presumed to be under copyright and are accessible only to users who have an active CougarNet ID. This item will continue to be made available through interlibrary loan.
thesis.degree.collegeCollege of Social Sciences
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Science, Department of
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Science
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Houston
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

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