2019-2020 Senior Honors Theses
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10657/6786
This collection contains theses produced by Class of 2020 Honors students
Browse
Browsing 2019-2020 Senior Honors Theses by Department "Philosophy, Department of"
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
- Results Per Page
- Sort Options
Item How Can We Refer to God?(2020-05) Mayorga, Layla Y.When we talk about objects in the world, we picture them as existent objects. However, unlike most names, if the word God refers, it does not do so in the same way, other names refer to a physical object. The term God has no image at the result of any causal interaction with God Himself. Nevertheless, we still use the word God in the same way we use any other name, thereby prima facie indicating that it does refer, even if it does so by a different mechanism than other titles. Since we have no image of God other than false images, how is it possible to refer to God? I affirm that the word God refers to through revelation and preserves its referential causal chain through inspiration and forms of life. Although we were not revealed the word of God as the writers of the Bible, through the activities of linguistic communities and the guidance of the Holy Spirit, we can refer to God.Item Transcendence and Theodicy: An Islamic Theological Approach to Arguments from Evil(2020-05) Tayyan, Marwan M.This thesis presents a response drawn from the Islamic theological tradition to the argument from evil, or the contention that the suffering in our world is evidence against theism. Two types of arguments from evil are distinguished: one claiming that God would eliminate suffering qua normatively perfect agent, and one claiming that God would eliminate suffering qua possessor of traditional theological attributes—mercy, compassion, love, goodness, etc.—understood non-normatively. This thesis is primarily concerned with the first type of argument, and argues that since the Islamic view that God transcends normative standards can be reasonably held, suffering does not constitute even prima facie evidence against Islamic theism. Two lines of argument for the applicability of normative standards to God are considered and rejected. Finally, the outline for an Islamic response to the second type of argument is proposed. This consists in a variant on skeptical theism that emphasizes the limits of our knowledge of God’s nature and perfection.