Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Loan Contracting

dc.contributor.advisorNewberry, Kaye J.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLu, Tong
dc.contributor.committeeMemberZhao, Yuping
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLangberg, Nisan
dc.creatorYu, Xiaoou
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-02T21:51:26Z
dc.date.available2018-03-02T21:51:26Z
dc.date.createdAugust 2014
dc.date.issued2014-08
dc.date.submittedAugust 2014
dc.date.updated2018-03-02T21:51:26Z
dc.description.abstractI study the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan contracting. I find empirical evidence supporting that overconfidence as a personal trait of borrowing firm’s manager impacts loan contracting terms. Specifically, loans initiated between banks and firms with overconfident managers have significantly lower interest rates on average. However, I also find that overconfident managers are willing to accept a higher initial interest rate if the loan contract includes a performance pricing provision, and that the likelihood of including a performance pricing provision is greater for overconfident managers. These results are consistent with predictions that performance pricing provisions are a useful mechanism for alleviating the agency conflicts arising from managerial overconfidence. Furthermore, I find that managerial overconfidence is associated with higher covenant intensity, longer maturity, and larger loan amounts. For syndicated loans with overconfident managers, lead banks reduce their risk exposure by inviting more participant lenders, retaining lower shares of the loans, and reducing syndicate concentrations.
dc.description.departmentAccountancy and Taxation, Department of
dc.format.digitalOriginborn digital
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10657/2798
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsThe author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s).
dc.subjectManagerial overconfidence
dc.subjectDebt Contracts
dc.subjectLoan terms
dc.subjectLoans
dc.titleManagerial Overconfidence and Bank Loan Contracting
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.genreThesis
thesis.degree.collegeC. T. Bauer College of Business
thesis.degree.departmentAccountancy and Taxation, Department of
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountancy and Taxation
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Houston
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

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