Why Accounting Regulation? An Interplay between Investor Experience and Managerial Manipulation

Simple item page
dc.contributor.advisorLu, Tong
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLin, Haijin
dc.contributor.committeeMemberSivaramakrishnan, Konduru
dc.contributor.committeeMemberKumar, Praveen
dc.creatorGu, Kai
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-29T00:50:49Z
dc.date.createdMay 2022
dc.date.issued2022-12-08
dc.date.updated2022-12-29T00:50:50Z
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I ask the question whether accounting regulation is beneficial or detrimental from the angle of investors’ information processing behaviors. It is well established that managers engage in various kinds of reporting manipulations, and the rewards from manipulations are determined by how investors, guided by their experiences, react to reported information. Based on the view that accounting disciplines unmanipulated patterns in financial information, I analyze managers’ manipulation incentives in an unregulated economy versus in a regulated economy and examine the efficiency implications of accounting regulation, conditional on different types of investor experience. I find that 1) while accounting regulation generally improves investment efficiency, it can impair investment efficiency and lead to more managerial manipulations; 2) investor sophistication may, but not always, strengthen the effects of accounting regulation; 3) accounting regulation may induce investors to act more conservatively; and 4) optimal accounting regulation varies with investor experience and often features a corner level of stringency. A number of implications are also discussed.
dc.description.departmentAccountancy and Taxation, Department of
dc.format.digitalOriginborn digital
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10657/13130
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsThe author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s).
dc.subjectAccounting regulation
dc.subjectPast experience
dc.subjectEvaluation method
dc.subjectManagerial manipulation
dc.subjectInvestor sophistication
dc.titleWhy Accounting Regulation? An Interplay between Investor Experience and Managerial Manipulation
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.genreThesis
dcterms.accessRightsThe full text of this item is not available at this time because the student has placed this item under an embargo for a period of time. The Libraries are not authorized to provide a copy of this work during the embargo period.
local.embargo.lift2024-05-01
local.embargo.terms2024-05-01
thesis.degree.collegeC. T. Bauer College of Business
thesis.degree.departmentAccountancy and Taxation, Department of
thesis.degree.disciplineBusiness Administration
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Houston
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
GU-DISSERTATION-2022.pdf
Size:
710.02 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
PROQUEST_LICENSE.txt
Size:
4.42 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
Download
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
LICENSE.txt
Size:
1.81 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
Download

Collections

Published ETD Collection