INTERESTS VERSUS IDEAS IN THE DESIGN OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: THE CASE OF THE ASSUMPTION OF STATE DEBTS

This research analyzes a Constitutional issue that arose in the First Federal Congress and was connected with a question addressed during the 1787 Federal Convention, specifically, the assumption of state debts to pay the United States. The objective of this research is to analyze The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, The Federalist papers, and the First Federal Congress of 1789-1791 journals, as well as the republican ideas that influenced the constitutional issue of the assumption of state debts by the federal government. The dissertation argues that the relationship between the success of the assumption of state debts during the 1787 Federal Convention through the First Federal Congress was a matter of republican values rather than the popular notion that Madison negotiated successfully by trading votes for assumption of state debts with the placement of the seat of the United States Capitol. The analysis identifies shared political ideas as a more important factor than material or political factors, as it relates to the issue of the assumption of state debts.