Browsing by Author "Zhang, Yanru"
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Item Contract Theory Framework for Wireless Networking(2016-05) Zhang, Yanru; Han, Zhu; Ogmen, Haluk; Prasad, Saurabh; Pan, Miao; Xiong, Zixiang; Qian, LijunWith the rapid development of the modern communication networks, the problem we need to solve is no longer a pure engineering issue. In various heterogeneous network scenarios, there are service providers in need of performing economic analysis on how to ensure third parties' cooperation or attract end-users. In the other way round, third parties or end-users need to evaluate the economic benefits of cooperating or using the services from different service providers. Overall, the current wireless networks are facing a problem in which there is a tight coupling of industry-specific technologies and non-technology related network externality. Contract theory, the 2014 Nobel Prize of economic science, has been widely used in industries, from banking to telecommunications. Particularly, contract theory is an efficient tool in dealing with asymmetric information between employer/seller(s) and employee/buyer(s) by introducing cooperation. In wireless networks, the employer/seller(s) and employee/buyer(s) can be of different roles depending on the scenario under consideration. Thus, there is a great potential to utilize the ideas, methods, and models of contract theory to design efficient wireless network mechanisms. Given this background, this dissertation provides a theoretical research between wireless communications, networking, and economics. Especially, different contract theory models have been applied in various wireless networks scenarios. The main contribution of this dissertation are as follows. An overview of basic concepts, classifications, and models of contract theory is provided. Furthermore, comparisons with existing economics methods in wireless networks are conducted. Applications of contract theory for wireless networks are studied. Specially, three contract theory problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and a mixed of the two, are applied into device-to-device (D2D) communication, mobile crowdsourcing, cognitive radio network, respectively. Numerical results are provided to show that contract theory can be utilized for developing effective mechanisms for emerging wireless network scenarios such as traffic offloading, mobile crowdsourcing, as well as spectrum trading. The potential and challenges of contract theory as a tool for designing mechanisms in future wireless networks are discussed. This dissertation provides a theoretical research between wireless communications, networking, and economics, in which different contract theory models have been applied in various wireless networks scenarios. This work places a fundamental research on network economics, especially with the framework of contract theory. This research has the potential to contribute to the future of wireless networks network economics area, and have a long term effect on problems such as incentive mechanism and pricing schemes design, resource sharing and trading.Item Non-Cash Auction for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: Contract Theoretical Model With Joint Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard(IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2/20/2017) Zhang, Yanru; Song, Lingyang; Pan, Miao; Dawy, Zaher; Han, ZhuIn cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods require full payment from SU, which blocked many potential “buyers,” and thus limited the PU's expected income. To better improve PUs' revenue from spectrum trading in a CRN, we introduce a financing contract, which is similar to a sealed non-cash auction that allows SU to do financing. Unlike previous mechanism designs in CRN, the financing contract allows the SU to only pay part of the total amount when the contract is signed, known as the down payment. Then, after the spectrum is released and utilized, the SU pays the rest of payment, known as the installment payment, from the revenue generated by utilizing the spectrum. The way the financing contract carries out and the sealed non-cash auction works similarly. Thus, contract theory is employed here as the mathematical framework to solve the non-cash auction problem and form mutually beneficial relationships between PUs and SUs. As the PU may not have the full acknowledgment of the SU's transmission status, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arise in the two scenarios, respectively. Therefore, a joint adverse selection and moral hazard model is considered here. In particular, we present three situations when either or both adverse selection and moral hazard are present during the trading. Furthermore, both discrete and continuous models are provided in this paper. Through simulations, we show that the adverse selection and moral hazard cases serve as the upper and lower bounds of the general case where both problems are present.Item Offloading in Software Defined Network at Edge with Information Asymmetry: A Contract Theoretical Approach(Journal of Signal Processing Systems, 9/30/2015) Zhang, Yanru; Liu, Lanchao; Gu, Yunan; Niyato, Dusit; Pan, Miao; Han, ZhuThe proliferation of highly capable mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets has significantly increased the demand for wireless access. Software defined network (SDN) at edge is viewed as one promising technology to simplify the traffic offloading process for current wireless networks. In this paper, we investigate the incentive problem in SDN-at-edge of how to motivate a third party access points (APs) such as WiFi and smallcells to offload traffic for the central base stations (BSs). The APs will only admit the traffic from the BS under the precondition that their own traffic demand is satisfied. Under the information asymmetry that the APs know more about own traffic demands, the BS needs to distribute the payment in accordance with the APs’ idle capacity to maintain a compatible incentive. First, we apply a contract-theoretic approach to model and analyze the service trading between the BS and APs. Furthermore, other two incentive mechanisms: optimal discrimination contract and linear pricing contract are introduced to serve as the comparisons of the anti adverse selection contract. Finally, the simulation results show that the contract can effectively incentivize APs’ participation and offload the cellular network traffic. Furthermore, the anti adverse selection contract achieves the optimal outcome under the information asymmetry scenario.