Browsing by Author "Tran, Nguyen H."
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Item Joint Cache Allocation With Incentive and User Association in Cloud Radio Access Networks Using Hierarchical Game(IEEE Access, 2/15/2019) Le, Tra Huong Thi; Tran, Nguyen H.; Vo, Phuong Luu; Han, Zhu; Bennis, Mehdi; Hong, Choong SeonIn this paper, we consider a cloud radio access network-based system consisting of one network operator (NO) and several content providers (CPs). The NO owns a cloud cache and provides caching as a service for CPs, who provide contents to users. While the NO wishes to motivate CPs to rent its cache and maximize its profit, CPs want to optimize the service performance for users and their renting utilities. Due to the time separation between cache allocation and user association problems, we model the interactions between the NO and CPs as a hierarchical game, i.e., a cache renting scheme between the NO and CPs in the cache allocation problem and the willingness of CPs in the user association problem. In the cache allocation problem, we propose a contract theory-based incentive mechanism in which the NO designs and offers an optimal contract to various types of CPs. We then formulate the user association problem as a many-to-many matching game with externalities. To solve this matching game, we propose a matching algorithm that converges to a two-sided exchange stable matching with low complexity. The simulation results demonstrate that this proposed approach is beneficial to the NO's profit and incentivize the CP to rent the cache with truthful private information. In addition, the system performance of the proposed approach in terms of the total data rate-delay tradeoff outperforms than the benchmarks.Item Joint Communication, Computation, Caching, and Control in Big Data Multi-access Edge Computing(IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 3/29/2019) Ndikumana, Anselme; Tran, Nguyen H.; Ho, Tai Manh; Han, Zhu; Saad, Walid; Niyato, Dusit; Hong, Choong SeonThe concept of Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) has been recently introduced to supplement cloud computing by deploying MEC servers to the network edge so as to reduce the network delay and alleviate the load on cloud data centers. However, compared to the resourceful cloud, MEC server has limited resources. When each MEC server operates independently, it cannot handle all computational and big data demands stemming from users' devices. Consequently, the MEC server cannot provide significant gains in overhead reduction of data exchange between users' devices and remote cloud. Therefore, joint Computing, Caching, Communication, and Control (4C) at the edge with MEC server collaboration is needed. To address these challenges, in this paper, the problem of joint 4C in big data MEC is formulated as an optimization problem whose goal is to jointly optimize a linear combination of the bandwidth consumption and network latency. However, the formulated problem is shown to be non-convex. As a result, a proximal upper bound problem of the original formulated problem is proposed. To solve the proximal upper bound problem, the block successive upper bound minimization method is applied. Simulation results show that the proposed approach satisfies computation deadlines and minimizes bandwidth consumption and network latency.Item Joint Incentive Mechanism for Paid Content Caching and Price Based Cache Replacement Policy in Named Data Networking(IEEE Access, 6/18/2018) Ndikumana, Anselme; Tran, Nguyen H.; Ho, Tai Manh; Niyato, Dusit; Han, Zhu; Hong, Choong SeonInternet traffic volume is continuing to increase rapidly. Named data networking (NDN) has been introduced to support this Internet traffic growth through caching contents close to consumers. While caching in NDN is beneficial to both Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), ISPs serve cached contents independently without any coordination with CPs. By authorizing the ISPs to cache and distribute the contents accessible on payments, it becomes impractical for CPs to control content access and payments. In this paper, we address these challenges by proposing a joint incentive mechanism and a price-based cache replacement (PBCR) policy for paid content in NDN that improves the ISP's and CPs' profits. We use an auction theory, where the ISP earns profits from caching by alleviating traffic load on transit links and participating in contents selling. Therefore, before the ISP starts selling cached contents, it needs to cache them first. Furthermore, the ISP cache capacity is limited; therefore, we propose PBCR, where the PBCR triggers the content that needs to be replaced when the cache storage is full based on both content price and link cost. The simulation results show that our proposal increases the profits of all the network players involved in paid content caching and improves cache hit ratio.Item Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks(IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 10/17/2013) Tran, Nguyen H.; Hong, Choong Seon; Han, Zhu; Lee, SungwonThis paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iteraIntive algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.