Browsing by Author "Jiao, Bingli"
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Item Dynamic Popular Content Distribution in Vehicular Networks using Coalition Formation Games(IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 7/2/2013) Wang, Tianyu; Song, Lingyang; Han, Zhu; Jiao, BingliDriven by both safety concerns and commercial interests, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have recently received considerable attentions. In this paper, we address popular content distribution (PCD) in VANETs, in which one large popular file is downloaded from a stationary roadside unit (RSU), by a group of on-board units (OBUs) driving through an area of interest (AoI) along a highway. Due to high speeds of vehicles and deep fadings of vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) channels, some of the vehicles may not finish downloading the entire file but only possess several pieces of it. To successfully send a full copy to each OBU, we propose a cooperative approach based on coalition formation games, in which OBUs exchange their possessed pieces by broadcasting to and receiving from their neighbors. Simulation results show that our proposed approach presents a considerable performance improvement relative to the non-cooperative approach, in which the OBUs broadcast randomly selected pieces to their neighbors as along as the spectrum is detected to be unoccupied.Item Joint Relay and Jammer Selection for Secure Two-Way Relay Networks(IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 8/30/2011) Chen, Jingchao; Zhang, Rongqing; Song, Lingyang; Han, Zhu; Jiao, BingliIn this paper, we investigate joint relay and jammer selection in two-way cooperative networks, consisting of two sources, a number of intermediate nodes, and one eavesdropper, with the constraints of physical-layer security. Specifically, the proposed algorithms select two or three intermediate nodes to enhance security against the malicious eavesdropper. The first selected node operates in the conventional relay mode and assists the sources to deliver their data to the corresponding destinations using an amplify-and-forward protocol. The second and third nodes are used in different communication phases as jammers in order to create intentional interference upon the malicious eavesdropper. First, we find that in a topology where the intermediate nodes are randomly and sparsely distributed, the proposed schemes with cooperative jamming outperform the conventional nonjamming schemes within a certain transmitted power regime. We also find that, in the scenario where the intermediate nodes gather as a close cluster, the jamming schemes may be less effective than their nonjamming counterparts. Therefore, we introduce a hybrid scheme to switch between jamming and nonjamming modes. Simulation results validate our theoretical analysis and show that the hybrid switching scheme further improves the secrecy rate.Item Physical Layer Security for Two-Way Untrusted Relaying With Friendly Jammers(IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 7/23/2012) Zhang, Rongqing; Song, Lingyang; Han, Zhu; Jiao, BingliIn this paper, we consider a two-way relay system where the two sources can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay and investigate the physical layer security issue in this two-way untrusted relay scenario. Specifically, we regard the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept confidential, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first indicate that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way untrusted relay system even without the help of external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulation results verify the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme.Item Truthful Mechanisms for Secure Communication in Wireless Cooperative System(IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 8/26/2013) Deng, Jun; Zhang, Rongqing; Song, Lingyang; Han, Zhu; Jiao, BingliTo ensure security in data transmission is one of the most important issues for wireless relay networks, and physical layer security is an attractive alternative solution to address this issue. In this paper, we consider a cooperative network, consisting of one source node, one destination node, one eavesdropper node, and a number of relay nodes. Specifically, the source may select several relays to help forward the signal to the corresponding destination to achieve the best security performance. However, the relays may have the incentive not to report their true private channel information in order to get more chances to be selected and gain more payoff from the source. We propose a Vickey-Clark-Grove (VCG) based mechanism and an Arrow-d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (AGV) based mechanism into the investigated relay network to solve this cheating problem. In these two different mechanisms, we design different "transfer payment" functions to the payoff of each selected relay and prove that each relay gets its maximum (expected) payoff when it truthfully reveals its private channel information to the source. And then, an optimal secrecy rate of the network can be achieved. After discussing and comparing the VCG and AGV mechanisms, we prove that the AGV mechanism can achieve all of the basic qualifications (incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance) for our system. Moreover, we discuss the optimal quantity of relays that the source node should select. Simulation results verify efficiency and fairness of the VCG and AGV mechanisms, and consolidate these conclusions.