Morrison, IainOliveira, Luis R. G.Sommers, TamlerTayyan, Marwan M.2020-08-042020-08-042020-05https://hdl.handle.net/10657/6935This thesis presents a response drawn from the Islamic theological tradition to the argument from evil, or the contention that the suffering in our world is evidence against theism. Two types of arguments from evil are distinguished: one claiming that God would eliminate suffering qua normatively perfect agent, and one claiming that God would eliminate suffering qua possessor of traditional theological attributes—mercy, compassion, love, goodness, etc.—understood non-normatively. This thesis is primarily concerned with the first type of argument, and argues that since the Islamic view that God transcends normative standards can be reasonably held, suffering does not constitute even prima facie evidence against Islamic theism. Two lines of argument for the applicability of normative standards to God are considered and rejected. Finally, the outline for an Islamic response to the second type of argument is proposed. This consists in a variant on skeptical theism that emphasizes the limits of our knowledge of God’s nature and perfection.enThe author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s).Problem of EvilArgument from EvilIslamic TheologyIslamTheodicyTheismMoralityNormative StandardsSufferingSkeptical TheismDivine AttributesDivine TranscendenceDivine PerfectionReligion philosophyHonors Thesis