Lobo, Gerald J.2014-12-192014-12-19August 2012012-08http://hdl.handle.net/10657/848This research investigates the determinants and consequences of compensation disclosure in the context of the SEC compensation regulation of 2006. Specifically, it focuses on the incentive-related compensation disclosure required by Reg. S-K 402(b). I find that compensation disclosure is negatively associated with managerial power and proprietary cost, but is positively associated with external monitoring. These relations are significant in both the pre- and post-regulation periods. With respect to the consequences of disclosure, I find that corporate information is more transparent when compensation disclosure is higher; however, this relation holds only in the post-regulation period. Additional tests further reveal that compensation disclosure may bring negative consequences that reduce corporate information transparency. For example, I show empirically that such disclosure fails to limit CEO excess compensation and may induce earnings management in the post-regulation period.application/pdfengThe author of this work is the copyright owner. UH Libraries and the Texas Digital Library have their permission to store and provide access to this work. Further transmission, reproduction, or presentation of this work is prohibited except with permission of the author(s).Executive compensationDisclosureInformation transparencySEC regulationIndustrial management2014-12-19Thesisborn digital