An experimental analysis of auction theory

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dc.contributor.committeeMemberKagel, John H.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLevin, Dan
dc.contributor.committeeMemberHarstad, Ronald M.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBattalio, Ray C.
dc.creatorDyer, Stephen Douglas
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-02T20:49:26Z
dc.date.available2023-02-02T20:49:26Z
dc.date.copyright1988-08-24
dc.date.issued1987
dc.description.abstractThe dissertation examines modern auction theory using experimental economics as a research tool. Auctions provide a clear view of actual price formation, while the laboratory setting enables us to isolate specific economic forces under controlled conditions. The first essay provides empirical evidence on the theoretical prediction that uncertainty regarding the number of bidders is important. As predicted for buyers with constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, resolving numbers uncertainty decreases seller's revenues. We conclude however that risk aversion, at least in the context of von Neuman-Morganstern expected utility theory, cannot explain our empirical findings. The second essay provides evidence as to the validity of experimental methods as a research tool in economics. Results using experienced construction contractors do not differ significantly from results using student subjects in common value auction experiments, as the winner's curse is found to generalize across auction form, market size, and subject population.
dc.description.departmentEconomics, Department of
dc.format.digitalOriginreformatted digital
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.other17571371
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10657/13750
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsThis item is protected by copyright but is made available here under a claim of fair use (17 U.S.C. Section 107) for non-profit research and educational purposes. Users of this work assume the responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing, or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires express permission of the copyright holder.
dc.subjectAuctions
dc.subjectMathematical models
dc.titleAn experimental analysis of auction theory
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.genreThesis
dcterms.accessRightsThe full text of this item is not available at this time because it contains documents that are presumed to be under copyright and are accessible only to users who have an active CougarNet ID. This item will continue to be made available through interlibrary loan.
thesis.degree.collegeCollege of Social Sciences
thesis.degree.departmentEconomics, Department of
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Houston
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

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