Queueing Game for Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks



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IEEE Communications Letters


In this letter, we investigate the problem of spectrum access decision-making for the secondary users (SUs) in the cognitive radio networks. When the primary users (PUs) are absent on certain frequency bandwidth, SUs can formulate a queue and wait for the base station (BS) to serve. The queue of the SUs will be dismissed if the PU is emerging in the system. Leveraging the queueing game approaches, the decision-making process of the SUs that whether to queue or not is studied. Both individual equilibrium and social optimization strategies are derived analytically. Moreover, the optimal pricing strategy of the service provider is investigated as well. Our proposed algorithms and corresponding analysis are validated through simulation studies.



Queueing game, pricing, Nash equilibrium strategies, social optimizations, spectrum access, cognitive radio


Copyright 2015 IEEE Communications Letters. This is a pre-print version of a published paper that is available at: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7273844. Recommended citation: Chang, Zheng, Tapani Ristaniemi, and Zhu Han. "Queueing game for spectrum access in cognitive radio networks." IEEE Communications Letters 19, no. 11 (2015): 2017-2020. DOI: 10.1109/LCOMM.2015.2480768. This item has been deposited in accordance with publisher copyright and licensing terms and with the author's permission.