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dc.contributor.authorZhang, Yanru
dc.contributor.authorSong, Lingyang
dc.contributor.authorPan, Miao
dc.contributor.authorDawy, Zaher
dc.contributor.authorHan, Zhu
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-11T16:14:26Z
dc.date.available2020-05-11T16:14:26Z
dc.date.issued2/20/2017
dc.identifier.citationCopyright 2017 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. This is a pre-print version of a published paper that is available at: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7859325. Recommended citation: Zhang, Yanru, Lingyang Song, Miao Pan, Zaher Dawy, and Zhu Han. "Non-cash auction for spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks: Contract theoretical model with joint adverse selection and moral hazard." IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 35, no. 3 (2017): 643-653. DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672178. This item has been deposited in accordance with publisher copyright and licensing terms and with the author's permission.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10657/6436
dc.description.abstractIn cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods require full payment from SU, which blocked many potential “buyers,” and thus limited the PU's expected income. To better improve PUs' revenue from spectrum trading in a CRN, we introduce a financing contract, which is similar to a sealed non-cash auction that allows SU to do financing. Unlike previous mechanism designs in CRN, the financing contract allows the SU to only pay part of the total amount when the contract is signed, known as the down payment. Then, after the spectrum is released and utilized, the SU pays the rest of payment, known as the installment payment, from the revenue generated by utilizing the spectrum. The way the financing contract carries out and the sealed non-cash auction works similarly. Thus, contract theory is employed here as the mathematical framework to solve the non-cash auction problem and form mutually beneficial relationships between PUs and SUs. As the PU may not have the full acknowledgment of the SU's transmission status, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arise in the two scenarios, respectively. Therefore, a joint adverse selection and moral hazard model is considered here. In particular, we present three situations when either or both adverse selection and moral hazard are present during the trading. Furthermore, both discrete and continuous models are provided in this paper. Through simulations, we show that the adverse selection and moral hazard cases serve as the upper and lower bounds of the general case where both problems are present.
dc.publisherIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
dc.subjectSpectrum trading
dc.subjectnon-cash auction
dc.subjectfinancing contract
dc.subjectadverse selection
dc.subjectmoral hazard
dc.subjectcontract theory
dc.titleNon-Cash Auction for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: Contract Theoretical Model With Joint Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
dc.typeArticle


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