Intentionality and the background

Date

1987

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Abstract

John Searle claims that because some mental states (viz., the Background) are non-Intentional, we cannot model them in a manner appropriate for artificial intelligence programming. Hence, the Al project is doomed. This paper disagrees. It argues the following: (1) Searle confuses two different types of mental states and erroneously forces them under the heading of "Background." The first type a sort of belief state, is Intentional after all; and the second, though not Intentional, is computer-encodable as a production system. (2) Searle makes the mistake that he does because he inappropriately extends his own linguistic analysis of Intentional mental states. Searle's model of mental states is incorrect, and the corrected model does not preclude the possibility of artificial intelligence.

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Keywords

Intentionality (Philosophy)

Citation