Browsing by Author "Tang, Xiao"

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Jamming Mitigation via Hierarchical Security Game for IoT Communications
(IEEE Access, 1/15/2018) Tang, Xiao; Ren, Pinyi; Han, Zhu
In the Internet of Things (IoT), the malicious node with sensorial capability can smartly launch jamming attacks only when it detects the legitimate transmission, known as the reactive jamming. Compared with the conventional constant jamming model, the reactive nature enables highly efficient and long-lasting attacks with limited energy supply, which thus presents a significant threat upon the secure communications in IoT. In this paper, we investigate the anti-reactive-jamming transmission strategy for IoT by exploiting the inherent weakness of the jammer. Specifically, since the reactive jamming depends on the detection of the legitimate transmission, the legitimate user can elaborately determine its transmit power to tradeoff between its achieved signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio and the probability to be detected and jammed by its adversary. Meanwhile, the jammer can smartly allocate the jamming power based on its observation of the legitimate transmission. We formulate the rivalry between the legitimate user and jammer as a hierarchical game, where the legitimate user takes action first as the leader while the jammer is the follower. We analyze the game equilibrium for both single-channel and multi-channel scenarios and derive the optimal transmission and jamming strategies for the legitimate user and jammer, respectively. Finally, we present the numerical results to evaluate the performance of the secure IoT communications under our proposal.
Modelling Cyber Attacks on Electricity Market Using Mathematical Programming With Equilibrium Constraints
(IEEE Access, 2/25/2019) Ahmadian, Saeed; Tang, Xiao; Malki, Heidar A.; Han, Zhu
With the development of communication infrastructure in smart grids, cyber security reinforcement has become one of the most challenging issues for power system operators. In this paper, an attacker is considered a participant in the virtual bidding procedure in the day-ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) electricity markets to maximize its profit. The cyber attacker attempts to identify the optimal power system measurements to attack along with the false data injected into measurement devices. Towards the maximum profit, the attacker needs to specify the relation between manipulated meters, virtual power traded in the markets, and electricity prices. Meanwhile, to avoid being detected by the system operator, the attacker considers the physical power system constraints existing in the DA and RT markets. Then, a bi-level optimization model is presented which combines the real electricity market state variables with the attacker decision-variables. Using the mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints, the presented bi-level model is converted into a single level optimization problem and the optimal decision variables for the attacker are obtained. Finally, simulation results are provided to demonstrate the performance of the attacker, which also provides insights for security improvement.
Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework
(IEEE Access, 10/27/2017) Tang, Xiao; Ren, Pinyi; Han, Zhu
Information security is of paramount importance yet significant challenge for wireless communications. In this paper, we investigate the power-efficient transmissions with security concerns in the presence of a full-duplex (FD) active eavesdropper. With FD capability, the eavesdropper can launch jamming attacks while eavesdropping, which affects the legitimate transmissions, such that the legitimate power allocation becomes more favorable for eavesdropping. However, the jamming attacks require additional power consumption and result in self-interference at the eavesdropper itself. The legitimate user intends for a power-efficient manner to effectively guarantee the secure transmissions to defend against the simultaneous eavesdropping and jamming attacks. We formulate the problem within a Stackelberg game framework, where the eavesdropper takes action first as the leader and the legitimate user acts as the follower. We analyze the security game model for both single-channel and multi-channel cases. Furthermore, by exploring the properties of the game equilibrium, we propose the optimal transmission strategy and jamming strategy for the legitimate transmission and eavesdropping, respectively. Finally, we provide extensive simulation results to corroborate our theoretical analysis and evaluate the security performance.