

AUTHORITARIANISM, THREAT, AND DECLINING TOLERANCE AND
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: EVIDENCE FROM THE POST-ARAB SPRING
MIDDLE EAST

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of Political Science

University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Matthew M. Ward

May, 2018

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ABSTRACT

Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Middle East has backslid from a promising march toward democracy back into autocratic rule. The effects of these events on intolerance and support for democracy, however, have yet to be investigated. I offer evidence that threat posed by the Arab Spring has resulted in an increase in intolerance and a decrease in support for democracy. I argue that these population-level changes are driven by the unique interaction between authoritarianism and threat. Authoritarianism—a value continuum that places the need for conformity and order over independence and self-expression—is known in Western samples to interact with both normative and existential threats to increase intolerance. Specifically, those high in authoritarianism become more intolerant when cultural and societal norms are threatened and those low in authoritarianism (libertarians) become more tolerant, as they fear an authoritarian backlash that threatens their value system emphasizing independence and diversity. When personally threatened, high authoritarians are unreactive as their value system is not threatened, but libertarians become *less* tolerant as their basic security needs are not met, thus threatening their value system that emphasizes independence. These conditional relationships between authoritarianism, threat, and intolerance are the principal components of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory (ADT). In addition to explaining intolerance, I expand this framework to the study of support for democratic and autocratic political institutions in the context of such a threatening environment. As democracies are characterized by political competition and pluralism, I argue that the authoritarian need for order and defense of established, autocratic norms in the region render high authoritarians less supportive of democracy and more supportive of autocratic

arrangements. Conversely, libertarians should be more supportive of democracy and less so of autocracy. I expect that these preferences will be subject to the same dynamics of normative and existential threat as intolerance.

Using an original measure of authoritarianism, I find evidence that libertarians in the Middle East react as predicted by ADT. Under personal threat, libertarians become more intolerant, more supportive of autocracy, and less supportive of democracy. Under normative threat, libertarians become less intolerant, less supportive of autocracy, and more supportive of democracy. High authoritarians are largely unmoved by threat. Unexpectedly, however, I find that high authoritarians are generally *more* supportive of democracy and *less* supportive of autocracy. I find post-hoc suggestive evidence that this is due to authoritarian support for Islamists during their ascension to power at the ballot box in the region. I then present a laboratory experiment conducted in Egypt to link specific Arab Spring threats to authoritarianism, intolerance, and support for political institutions. I find evidence that libertarians are generally more tolerant and supportive of democracy and less so of democracy than high authoritarians, as hypothesized. This suggests that, five years after the forced removal of democratically-elected Islamists, authoritarians no longer had an instrumental interest in supporting democracy and returned to relying on their authoritarian value system for influencing their institutional preferences. The expected changes in support and intolerance conditional upon threat are in the correct direction, though statistically insignificant. The experiment suggests that libertarians are largely responsible for the decreased polarization in intolerance and support for institutions as their attitudes and preferences move closer to those of authoritarians. Ironically, evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that those who

are most amenable to tolerance and supporting democracy have the capacity to contribute to the erosion of democratization under sustained, personally threatening conditions.

Implications and future directions are discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful for the emotional, financial, and academic support that I have received as a graduate student at the University of Houston. First, I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Ryan Kennedy, for guiding me along my journey from a student curious and a bit naive about politics into an academic with his own budding research agenda. Without your patience, advice, trust, mentorship, and encouragement, this journey would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my committee member, Justin Kirkland, for his unwavering belief in my abilities, seeing promise in me as a scholar, and taking the time to mentor me throughout my graduate career. Thank you for your open door and advice. I would also like to thank Scott Clifford, Pablo Pinto, and Marc Hetherington for their helpful comments and suggestions for improving the dissertation manuscript throughout the experimental design, writing, and editing processes. Thank you all. Without your invaluable feedback, I would not have been able to achieve this milestone in my academic career.

I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues for their emotional and academic support throughout this process. To Mira Lindner, Billie Schatz, Yeaji Kim, Leonardo Antenangeli, Markie McBrayer, Scott Hofer, Jonathan Solis, Luke Williams, Adam Ozer, Kenicia Wright, Melodee Baines, Andrea Eckelman, and countless others: thank you for your friendship, advice, and support you have provided during this challenging but rewarding process. I would also like to thank Edward Manouelian for encouraging me to apply to the Political Science program at the University of Houston

and for checking in on me throughout the years. Your support has been very much appreciated.

While writing this dissertation, I was fortunate to have institutional and financial support from the University of Houston's Political Science department, including 5-year funding, a 2-year academic fellowship, and assistance with conference travel throughout the years. I am also grateful for the generous grant provided to me by Rice University's Center for the Middle East housed at the Baker Institute. Without this grant, I would not have been able to carry out the experiment I conducted in Egypt with Dr. Mazen Hassan at Cairo University. A very warm thank you to these institutions for their support of me during my graduate career.

Importantly, I would like to thank those close to home. To my fiancé, Michael Lopez, thank you for your steadfast and unwavering support of me during graduate school, comprehensive exams, and the dissertation writing process. Thank you for being so supportive of me and my goals and for being my sounding board, source of support and encouragement, and an objective voice throughout this process. Your love, encouragement, and compassion have helped keep me focused and motivated throughout the dissertation process. Thank you, Wendy, for teaching me to be a strong and independent individual and not letting me get in my own way when difficulties arose. And thank you, Aunt Shari, for always being there for me during best and the most difficult times in my life. Our bond has been a deep source of strength throughout my life. Thank, you mom, for always believing in me growing up and being a constant source of support throughout the years. And finally, thank you, Pat, for caring and loving me as your own son. Without your love, support, and the stability you provided while growing

up, it would have been very difficult for me to achieve everything I have accomplished in my life. I also would not have learned the value of a light switch. 😊 Thanks, dad!

Finally, I would like to thank those who helped foster in me a desire to pursue the study of politics and society in the Middle East. Thank you, Nahla El-Senousy and Mohamed Elsayi, for your encouragement and support while studying abroad in Egypt from 2010-2011. Your support was critical in my pursuit of continuing my study of Arabic and learning to navigate, appreciate, and fall in love with Egyptian culture and its people. I would also like to acknowledge the millions of Egyptians who have fought since 2011 for justice, dignity, and a better life. You are an inspiration to democrats everywhere. Thank you for opening up your hearts, homes, and lives to me. I am forever changed.

هتكون مصر و شعبها دائما في قلبي. وأحلام عام ٢٠١١ ونضالاتكم من أجل العدالة والكرامة الانسانية مش منسية. وإلى ضحايا الظلم والوحشية قبل وبعد أحداث عام ٢٠١١: إنَّ شجعاتكم وحبكم لمصر مصدر الإلهام للديمقراطيين في كل مكان.

إِنَّا لِلّٰهِ وَإِنَّا إِلَيْهِ رَاجِعُونَ.

وتستمر الثورة.

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To my father, Pat

INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, an impoverished street vendor, was selling his goods from a cart in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. He was stopped by the police and his scales and goods were confiscated for not having a permit. The police taunted and publicly humiliated Mr. Bouazizi. He was struck by a female police officer, spat at, and his cart tossed aside on the street.¹ Without funds to bribe authorities, he had little recourse. Speaking with Reuters after the incident, his sister declared, “What kind of repression do you imagine it takes for a young man to do this? A man who has to feed his family by buying goods on credit when they fine him...and take his goods. In Sidi Bouzid, those with no connections and no money for bribes are humiliated and insulted and not allowed to live.”² Enraged, Mr. Bouazizi immediately went to the governor’s office, where he stated, “If you don’t see me, I’ll burn myself.”³ He was refused his scales and an audience with authorities. In the midst of the humiliation and frustration, Mr. Bouazizi procured a gasoline canister and self-immolated in front of the governor’s office, shouting “How do you expect me to make a living?”⁴ His funeral a few weeks later was attended by approximately 5,000 Tunisians, chanting “Farewell, Mohammed, we will avenge you. We weep for you today. We will make those who caused your death weep.”⁵

¹ Beaumont, Peter, “Mohammed Bouazizi: the dutiful son whose death changed Tunisia's fate” last modified January 20, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/20/tunisian-fruit-seller-mohammed-bouazizi>.

² Noueihed, Lin. “FEATURE-Peddler's martyrdom launched Tunisia's revolution” last modified January 19, 2011, <https://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE70G18J20110119>.

³ Abouzaid, Rania. “Mohammed Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, last modified January 21, 2011, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html>.

⁴ Simon, Bob. “How a slap sparked Tunisia's revolution” last modified February 22, 2011, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-a-slap-sparked-tunisias-revolution-22-02-2011/>.

⁵ “Mohamed Bouazizi Ignites the Arab Spring,” *History Channel online*, last modified December 17, 2011, <https://www.historychannel.com.au/this-day-in-history/mohamed-bouazizi-ignites-the-arab-spring/>.

Mohammed Bouazizi's death instantly became a rallying cry in Tunisia against the abuse, degradation, and unchecked power of Tunisian security forces and the autocratic government of President Ben Ali. After approximately a month of protest, strikes, a declared state of emergency, 338 dead, and 2,147 wounded, the Tunisian military turned on President Ben Ali, refusing to continue the suppression and violence. On January 14, 2011, President Ben Ali was forced from office and fled for exile in Saudi Arabia.

Within weeks, Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution" morphed into what is now known as the Arab Spring, a historical period of popular uprisings and rebellions against Arab autocrats and sclerotic regimes in the region that spanned approximately from late 2010-2014. Following the self-immolation of Bouazizi, revolutionary fervor spread to Egypt, leading to two weeks of protest against President Mubarak's 30-year autocratic regime. Protestors demanded the same concessions: dignity, an end to corruption in politics and the economy, an end to widespread police brutality, and, eventually, the resignation of President Mubarak himself. Attempting to preserve itself, the subsequent regime crackdown led to 846 deaths, 6,467 injuries, and over 12,000 arrests. President Mubarak was finally forced from office on February 11, 2011, after the military refused to turn its weapons on the protestors. The Arab Spring quickly spread throughout the region, with domestic and international hopes running high that, after having missed the Third Wave of democratization, the Arab World was on the path to more accountable, democratic governance.

In the years that followed the initial outbreak of uprisings in late 2010, the Middle East has experienced political and social convulsions unprecedented in modern history.

So far, Tunisia represents the only success story on the path of democratization. Egypt has experienced the vacillation between democratically elected civilian rule and military governance, and the gains in human rights in the early days of the Arab Spring have all been erased. The protests and rebellions led to the fall of Libyan President Gadhafi and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, leading to fractious civil conflicts. In Syria, the initial protests and the refusal of President Bashar al-Assad to step down have devolved into a bloody civil war. Other protests movements were decimated, such as those in Bahrain in the early days of the Arab Spring. These events in the region disturbed the autocratic status quo in the region that could previously count on complacent, politically disengaged publics.

Theoretical Summary

The current trajectory toward democratization in the region is highly uncertain, despite initial optimism of the power of the awakened Arab street. The waves of protest, the partial and total regime collapses, civil wars, and the rise of terrorism in the aftermath of the initial uprisings have created insecure, unpredictable, and generally threatening environments through which politics and society must navigate. In this dissertation, I argue that such threatening circumstances and the failure of the Egyptian democratic experiment and the continued instability in Tunisia have resulted in an environment hostile to democratization. Specifically, I argue that the perpetual state of instability in the Middle East following the Arab Spring created a threatening environment that grew increasingly inhospitable for social and political tolerance, and, by extension, democratic institutions.

I explore how these shifting attitudes were precipitated by the dynamics of threat and authoritarianism, a cognitive disposition that is defined by the importance on which an individual places the value of obedience to authority over individual autonomy (Feldman 2003). Authoritarian Dynamic Theory (Stenner 2005) posits that there is an interactive relationship between threat and authoritarianism that impacts individual-level intolerance. When authoritarianism is “activated” by *normative* threat, such as threats to culture or established norms, individuals who score high in authoritarianism (“authoritarians”) become increasingly more intolerant toward authority-sanctioned outgroups. Those scoring low in authoritarianism (“libertarians”) tend to value tolerance, plurality, and inclusiveness, eschewing authoritarian concerns about ingroup cohesion and the protection of societal norms and culture. When faced with normative threat, these individuals become *more* tolerant, as they fear an authoritarian backlash against the diversity and personal autonomy they value most. When faced with *existential* threat, however, libertarians become *less* tolerant, thus narrowing the polarization in intolerant attitudes between authoritarians and libertarians. Threatening environments such as the political, social, and economic instability after the initial 2011 uprisings provided fertile ground for the flourishing of intolerance across the authoritarianism spectrum.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on authoritarianisms, intolerance, and democratization in the following ways. First, though it is well known that increased macro-level intolerance is precipitated by increased threat perception (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), the micro-level dynamics that contribute to the macro-level are underexplored. Linking the literature on authoritarianism to the intolerance literature is a crucial contribution to this understanding. Additionally, Authoritarian Dynamic Theory

(ADT) provides a framework for distinguishing between what *types* of threats—normative or existential—contribute to waxing and waning individual-level intolerance that contributes to macro-level trends. Indeed, the dynamics of authoritarianism demonstrate that all types of threat do not equally affect a population. Broadly speaking, understanding these nuances is important for devising strategies to address waning public support for democracy and the need to keep the public engaged in the process of democratization at precisely the time it is most crucial.

In addition to the contribution to the intolerance literature, this dissertation expands the theoretical application of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory to unstable, developing countries. ADT has primarily been validated in Western samples and stable, democratic contexts. In order to more definitively claim that the authoritarian autonomy-conformity dynamic is more than just an artifact of Western publics and threatening issues with which these countries grapple (e.g. immigration policy), unstable developing countries contend with myriad normative and personal threats that are absent in the West (e.g. civil war, coups, and genocide). Validating the applicability of ADT to such contexts offers to expand the investigatory approaches to waning support for tolerance and democracy that complement institutional and macro-level explanations for the presence and perpetuation of conflict in these countries.

General Direction of the Dissertation

Before investigating the causal mechanisms of threat and authoritarianism on intolerance and support for democracy in the context of the Arab Spring, I first investigate the effects of the general applicability of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory in the

Middle East. Using survey evidence from Wave 6 of the World Values Survey, I test the proposition that changes in intolerance are functions of the dynamics of authoritarianism and both normative and existential threat. I find evidence that those low in authoritarianism react similarly to normative and personal threat in predicting intolerance. I find that “libertarians” are responsible for macro-level increases and decreases in intolerance, not authoritarians. Libertarians are generally more tolerant than authoritarians, becoming less so when exposed to personal threat that impacts their ability to exercise their independence and autonomy. Similarly, libertarians become more tolerant when normative threat is high and less so when personal threat is high. Surprisingly, I find inconsistent changes in intolerance for those scoring high in authoritarianism, regardless of the nature of the threat. Authoritarians in the context of the Middle East are perpetually more intolerant

Despite the rich literature linking authoritarianism to intolerance, it is surprising that there has been little research conducted linking authoritarianism to preferences for autocratic governance and institutions. I argue that the threatening environment fostered by Arab Spring instability not only interacted with authoritarianism to change individual-level intolerance, but also support for democracy and autocracy. Because of the well-established, interactive relationship between authoritarianism and threat, I argue that support for democratic and autocratic institutions in the context of the Arab Spring is a natural extension of ADT. Using the same Wave 6 of the World Values Survey, I find evidence for the hypothesis that exposure to Arab Spring threat was associated with a decrease in support for democracy among libertarians and an increase in support for autocratic political arrangements. Authoritarians were unmoved by the perception of

threat, remaining more committed to democracy than libertarians. However, unlike intolerance, I find that authoritarians were generally *more* supportive of democratic institutions and *less* supportive of autocracy than libertarians. To explain this unexpected finding, I hypothesize that, because authoritarianism and religiosity are theoretically closely connected in the survey and because, at the time of the survey, Islamists had made substantial and historical gains in electoral politics, authoritarians' support for democracy was more instrumental than an embrace of libertarian values. Implications for Authoritarian Dynamic Theory are discussed.

After having explored applicability of the ADT framework in the region, I focus on the specific experience of Egyptians, their exposure to Arab Spring-related threat, and the individual-level impact on intolerance. In the spring of 2017, I conducted a laboratory experiment at Cairo University to test the causal mechanism of threat and its influence on the dynamics of intolerance among authoritarians and libertarians. This experiment leverages the post-Arab Spring environment in Egypt. Because the instability since 2010 has largely generated personally threatening conditions rather than cultural shifts and other normative threats, I expected that libertarians would become more intolerant and authoritarians more so when exposed to personally threatening, Arab Spring messaging. Libertarians exposed to such messaging should also become less supportive of democracy and more so of autocracy. Generally, I find suggestive evidence that threat and authoritarianism interact to produce the expected changes in intolerance. To my knowledge, this study is the first to test the validity of measurements of authoritarianism and the experimental confirmation of ADT in the Middle East and in a collectivist

cultural environment. This study is also one of the first tests (either observational or experimental) of the determinants of intolerance in the region.

Finally, the experiment explores the role of ADT in influencing attitudes toward democracy and autocracy. I find suggestive experimental evidence that support for democracy and autocracy is influenced by authoritarianism and threat in a manner consistent with ADT. I find that exposure to threatening Arab Spring messaging increased support for autocratic governing practices among libertarians and decreases support among authoritarians, as expected. I fail to find that support for democracy is influenced by the dynamics of threat and authoritarianism. Most of the effects were statistically insignificant, but in the hypothesized directions. Possible explanations, including sample characteristics and pretreatment effects, are discussed.

Because these results are generally consistent with studies conducted in the West, I am optimistic that this theoretical framework of ADT can be used to investigate intolerance and support for political institutions in other conflict zones and unstable countries. At least in the near future, the intolerant and undemocratic consequences of the dynamics of instability-induced threat and authoritarianism present unwelcomed news for the prospect of building more tolerant and inclusive societies in the wake of regime collapse in the Middle East.

This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, I present survey evidence from the Arab Barometer (Waves II-IV) of increasing intolerance and decreasing support for democracy in the Middle East since the 2011 rebellions. In Chapter 2, I introduce the theoretical background and development of authoritarianism and its measurement, as well as its theoretical connection with threat and intolerance and democracy. I introduce the

hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 presents evidence from the World Values Survey for the relationship between authoritarianism, threat, intolerance, and support for democracy in several Middle Eastern countries. In Chapter 4, I experimentally test the causal relationship between authoritarianism, threat, and support for democracy and autocracy by manipulating exposure to Arab Spring threat messaging. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this dissertation and implications for democracy in the region and for the study of authoritarianism in general.

CHAPTER 1

Intolerance and Waning Support for Democracy in the Middle East

Political tolerance, or the "willingness to put up with disagreeable ideas and groups" (Gibson 2007) in politics, and to extend civil rights to and permit the free expression of ideas or interests of these individuals (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982) is often placed at the heart of democratic theory. The ability to present opinions and positions is a hallmark of modern liberal democratic orders, where the majority rules and the rights of the minority are respected (Dahl 1971). This interconnectedness between tolerance in democracy was noted in early work on the role of political culture in the development of democracy (Dahl 1971; Almond and Verba 1963; Huntington 1984). Theoretically, democracy requires "a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of principles underlying freedom of speech, media, assembly, religion, or the rights of opposition parties, of the rule of law, of human rights, and the like" (Lipset 1994; 7).

Tolerance, however, is among the most difficult democratic attitudes to learn and evidence suggests that living in a well-established, democratic society is associated with higher aggregate levels tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). In their model of democratic learning, Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) surmise that tolerance develops as a result of experiencing the "rough and tumble" of politics as citizens become accustom

to exposure to competing ideas. The authors find that the disconnect between espousing democratic, tolerant principles in the abstract and the willingness to apply those values to unpopular groups in Western countries is relatively small (though still prevalent) compared with non- or newly-democratic countries. Despite the almost universal support for democracy in Muslim-majority countries (Inglehart 2003) and indeed, most countries around the world, evidence of a large “slippage” between stated support for democratic and tolerant principles in the abstract and a willingness to apply tolerance to specific groups has been found in Eastern and Central European countries and Russia (e.g. Gibson and Duch 1993; Rohrschneider 1996). However, this disconnect between hypothetical and applied tolerance in well-established democracies is often cited as evidence that tolerance is not a precondition for democracy to take root and flourish. During a regime or major political transition, the political stakes are high and political enemies appear to pose a greater threat than they otherwise would (Gibson 1998; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). Findings from post-Soviet Russia demonstrate this phenomenon (e.g. Gibson and Duch 1993; Behary, Boaz, and Gordon 1996). In the context of the Arab Spring and the unstable conditions that threaten experimentation with democracy, these theoretical concerns and evidence from transitional regimes are indeed worrisome.

Furthermore, Gibson (1998) argues that this larger slippage between stated and applied intolerance in newly democratized countries might negatively affect the development of democracy in transitional regimes or new democracies. He presents four characteristics of intolerance that could imperil these new regimes. Intolerance that is principled, or part of a general orientation toward politics; focused on a particular group, rather than cross-cutting and pluralistic; perceived to be majority opinion; and espoused

by "opinion leaders", Gibson argues, is particularly threatening to the democratic nature of such regimes (43).

Political and Social Intolerance in the Middle East

Arguably, many of Gibson's criteria for politically consequential intolerance were met in the years following the outbreak of the Arab Spring, particularly with regard to specific social and religious groups. Two years after the initial uprising, popular and military forces in Egypt had grown discontented with President Morsi, Egypt's first democratically elected president and member of the once-banned Muslim Brotherhood. In the summer of 2013, the Egyptian army arrested President Morsi and installed a military caretaker government. Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Brotherhood media stations, such as Misr25, Al-Jazeera's Mubasher Misr, and the pro-Islamist stations Al-Hafiz and Al-Nas were shut down in the hours and days following the military coup. Pro-Brotherhood protests against military rule were violently suppressed, culminating with the Rabaa Massacre in Cairo on August 14, 2013, in which between 817 and over 1,000 pro-Morsi sit-in protestors were killed by Egyptian security forces.⁶ This crackdown was followed by a ban on the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was itself outlawed and branded a terrorist organization in December 2013.⁷ Public opinion polling on attitudes toward members of

⁶"Egypt: Rab'a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity," *Human Rights Watch* online, last modified August 12, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity>.

⁷ Cunningham, Erin. "Egypt's military-backed government declares Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization" last modified December 25, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-military-backed-government-declares-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization/2013/12/25/7cf075ca-6da0-11e3-aecc-85cb037b7236_story.html?utm_term=.a4bd8959d717.

the Brotherhood are scarce, but a Pew poll⁸ conducted a year after the coup recorded a significant drop in support of the Brotherhood from 68% in 2013 to 38% in 2014. In the same poll, 54% of Egyptians supported the ouster of President Morsi.

Consistent with Gibson's criteria, the targeting of the Muslim Brotherhood (and Islamists in general) was laser focused and negative opinion of the organization was widely shared. These policies and the general branding of the group as a terrorist organization was advanced by military officials. These military officials were arguably the "opinion leaders" in at the time as they hold absolute power and enjoyed wide support in Egypt. Moreover, the suppression of Islamists and the Brotherhood have a long history in Egypt dating back to the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Arguably, this intolerance toward religion in politics and the Brotherhood in particular is core to the identity of the Egyptian state under various forms of military and autocratic rule since 1952. This suspicion and persecution of even the moderate and more mainstream elements Muslim Brotherhood that respect the rules of the political game is widespread among secular and religious Middle Eastern governments⁹ alike. The group was declared a terrorist organization by Bahrain¹⁰, Syria¹¹, Egypt, Saudi Arabia¹², and the United Arab

⁸ "One Year after Morsi's Ouster, Divides Persist on El-Sisi, Muslim Brotherhood," *Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends*, last modified May 22, 2014, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/22/one-year-after-morsis-ouster-divides-persist-on-el-sisi-muslim-brotherhood/>.

⁹ Hamid, Shadi, William McCants, and Rashid Dar. "Islamism after the Arab Spring: Between the Islamic State and the nation-state" last modified January 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/islamism-after-the-arab-spring-english-web-final.pdf>.

¹⁰ "Bahrain FM reiterates stance on Muslim Brotherhood," *Andalou Agency* online, last modified March 21, 2014, <https://aa.com.tr/en/archive/bahrain-fm-reiterates-stance-on-muslim-brotherhood/172889>.

¹¹ "Assad says 'factors not in place' for Syria peace talks," *Daily News* online, last modified October 21, 2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/assad-says-factors-not-in-place-for-syria-peace-talks-56611>.

¹² "Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood 'terrorist group'," *BBC News* online, last modified March 13, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092?print=true>.

Emirates¹³ in the years since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, evincing a more intolerant mood toward the group in general.

In addition to the scapegoating of the Brotherhood and other Islamists, other minorities, particularly homosexuals, have suffered increased persecution in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in the Middle East.¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶¹⁷ As an already unpopular group in the region (85.08% of respondents in the region rate homosexuality as “never justifiable” in the 6th Wave of the World Values Survey), the military government in Egypt has since invoked indecency laws to entrap and arrest gay men using social media apps, and subject them to various forms of sexual assault and torture.¹⁸ In Tunisia, homosexuals have continued to be persecuted since the fall of President Ben Ali in 2011 and their persecution is often met with public indifference and increases in LGBT harassment and assaults.¹⁹ Evidence, however limited, also exists that intolerance toward other religious and social minorities has also increased in the wake of the uprisings. This was measured by the World Value Survey question that asked respondents to name individuals or groups they would not like to have as neighbors, including those from another religion,

¹³ “UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group,” *Reuters* online, last modified November 15, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-politics-brotherhood/uae-lists-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSKCN0IZOOM20141115>.

¹⁴ “Tunisia police disperse LGBT protesters,” *Daily Mail* online, last modified January 27, 2018, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-5320095/Tunisia-police-disperse-LGBT-protesters.html>.

¹⁵ “Egypt 'escalates LGBT crackdown' after rainbow flag display,” *BBC News* online, last modified October 3, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41482001>.

¹⁶ “Tunisia: Men Prosecuted for Homosexuality,” *Human Rights Watch* online, last modified March 29, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/29/tunisia-men-prosecuted-homosexuality>.

¹⁷ Yahyaoul, Amira. “

Five Years After the Revolution, Tunisia Is Sliding Back to the Past” last modified December 6, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/amira-yahyaoui/tunisia-revolution-anniversary_b_8971822.html.

¹⁸ Youssef, Nour and Liam Stack. “Egypt Expands Crackdown on Gay and Transgender People” last modified October 3, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/world/middleeast/egypt-gay-arrests.html>.

¹⁹ “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011,” United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, accessed February 23, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186663.pdf>.

unmarried couples, immigrants, and those who speak a different language (Spierings 2014). Increasing intolerance in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings arguably threatening any movement toward a more liberal, democratic society.

Rising Post-Arab Spring Intolerance: Evidence from the World Values Survey

I present evidence in Tables 1.1-1.3 that suggests that tolerance in the region has increased in the wake of the Arab Spring. These tables display mean levels of three political, religious, and social intolerance indicators during and after the initial rebellions from the Arab Barometer Waves II (2010-2011), III (2012-2014), and IV (2016-2017). All tables present the pooled average of respondents from all countries in the wave, as well as country-level mean intolerance in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, three countries that experienced considerable unrest during this period.

Wave II was administered in Egypt in June and July of 2011, approximately 4 months following the ouster of President Mubarak. It was administered in Tunisia from September-October 2011, or about 10 months following the fall of President Ben Ali and the legalization and election of the moderate Islamist Ennahda Party to lead parliament. Finally, the survey in Yemen was fielded in February 2011, a few months before the initial unrest that led to the ongoing civil war. In this wave, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the following statement: "*In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights than Muslims.*" The results are presented in Tables B. Almost one quarter (24.74%) of respondents from all countries polled either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. Respondents were slightly more tolerant in Egypt

(21.49%), much more tolerant in Tunisia (14.05%). and slightly less so than respondents in Wave II in Yemen (26.41%).

Table 1.1: Respondent Level of Agreement in the Middle East, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, with the Statement: “*In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights than Muslims.*”

All Countries [†]				Egypt			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Δ		Wave 2	Wave 3	Δ
Strongly Disagree	26.55%	25.30%	-1.25%	Strongly Disagree	42.99%	42.81%	-0.18%
Disagree	38.16%	38.67%	0.51%	Disagree	34.04%	40.89%	6.85%
Agree	18.08%	21.78%	3.70%	Agree	17.88%	6.52%	-11.36%
Strongly Agree	6.66%	7.91%	1.25%	Strongly Agree	3.61%	1.76%	-1.85%
<i>Increase[°] in Political Intolerance: 4.95%</i>				<i>Increase in Political Intolerance: -13.21%</i>			

Tunisia				Yemen			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Δ		Wave 2	Wave 3	Δ
Strongly Disagree	17.81%	33.69%	15.88%	Strongly Disagree	15.42%	22.17%	6.75%
Disagree	47.66%	34.03%	-13.63%	Disagree	46.25%	27.92%	-18.33%
Agree	10.37%	16.01%	5.64%	Agree	18.58%	29.50%	10.92%
Strongly Agree	3.68%	9.42%	5.74%	Strongly Agree	7.83%	14.92%	7.09%
<i>Increase in Political Intolerance: 11.38%</i>				<i>Increase in Political Intolerance: 18.01%</i>			

[†] Wave 2: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen

Wave 3: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen

[°] Sum of the changes in the differences of “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” between Waves 2 and 3.

Agreement with the statement that non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights than Muslims increased by 4.95% for all respondents between Wave II and Wave III. Likewise, agreement with this statement increased in both Tunisia and Yemen by 11.38% and 18.01%, respectively. Egyptians, however, were *less* intolerant compared with those in the previous wave by -13.21%.²⁰ Apart²¹ from the Egyptian anomaly, the instability plaguing these countries during Wave III appears to be reflected in the decline in this indicator of intolerance, which was conducted between March-April 2013, in Egypt, February 2013, in Tunisia, and November-December 2013, in Yemen. During this period, falling confidence in the newly-elected Morsi government and its inability to contain the spiraling economic crisis and the increasingly autocratic tendencies of the President in Egypt led to a new round of societal unrest before the military coup in June of that year. During the implementation of this survey in Tunisia, a prominent opposition leader and prominent critic of the ruling Islamic Ennahda Party, Chokri Belaid, was assassinated, leading to a fresh round of protests. The unrest caused the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali to dissolve the Islamist-led government on February 6, 2013 and install a technocratic government until new elections could be held. In the two-year interim between Waves II and III in Yemen, Arab Spring protests devolved into civil conflict between loyalists and rebels after the initial refusal of President Saleh to resign and a sham presidential election in February 2012. By this time, Islamist extremists and

²⁰ One possible explanation for the decrease in intolerance during this period is the support of the Coptic Church, which represents between 9-15 million Egyptians, in ousting President Morsi. The Coptic Christians have a long history of oppression in Egypt; it is possible that the opposition to Morsi of the Copts and a large swath of the country contributed to a sense of unity.

²¹ This increase in tolerance observed in Wave III is possibly a function of the similar distaste for the Morsi government among both non-Brotherhood members and the Coptic Christian community, the latter of which comprises 9-15 million members in Egypt. After the election of Morsi, thousands of Copts fled the country for fear of the Islamization of Egypt. The temporary unity against the Brotherhood was short lived, however, as attacks against Coptic Christians continued under military rule after the 2013 coup.

terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, had taken *de facto* control of several areas in the country. The tumult is reflected in falling intolerance in the Arab world in general and in Tunisia and Yemen.

Table 1.2 depicts mean responses to the following item²²: "*Would you like to have people of a different religion as neighbors?*" The mean percentage of those who objected to a neighbor of a different religion in the region increased slightly by 0.95%, from 25.27% to 26.22%, between Waves II and IV. In the two Arab Spring countries for which there is data, however, the increase was much larger. Intolerance toward neighbors of another religion more than doubled in Egypt between Waves II and IV, from 6.48% to 14.00%, and increased by a similar percentage in Tunisia, from 19.90% to 27.25%. By this time, Egypt's military had solidified its control over political institutions after the 2014 overwhelming victory²³ of Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi to the presidency, historically-low turnout for the 2015 parliamentary elections (which were largely viewed internally as simply a referendum on President Sisi)²⁴, and a continued crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and protestors, accusations of state-sanctioned torture, disappearances of regime dissidents, general deterioration of respect for human rights, and strict limits on the freedom of association and other civil rights.²⁵²⁶

²² Wave III did not include this item.

²³ "El-Sisi wins Egypt's presidential race with 96.91%," *Ahram Online*, last modified June 3, 2014, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/102841/Egypt/Politics-/BREAKING-PEC-officially-announces-AbdelFattah-ElSi.aspx>.

²⁴ "Low turnout as Egyptians shun elections designed to shore up Sisi," *The Guardian* online, last modified October 18, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/18/egypt-parliamentary-elections-shore-up-sisi>.

²⁵ "Egypt: Events of 2016," *Human Rights Watch* online, last accessed January 14, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/egypt>.

²⁶ "Timeline of Human Rights Violations in Egypt since the Fall of Mubarak," *Freedom House* online, last modified August 9, 2013, <https://freedomhouse.org/article/timeline-human-rights-violations-egypt-fall-mubarak>.

Table 1.2: *Would you like to have people of a different religion as neighbors?*[†]

	All Countries [°]				Egypt		
	Wave 2	Wave 4*	Δ		Wave 2	Wave 4	Δ
Do Not Object	72.83%	73.33%	0.50% ^{**}	Do Not Object	93.44%	84.83%	-8.61%
Would Not Want	25.27%	26.22%	0.95%	Would Not Want	6.48%	14.00%	7.52%

Tunisia			
	Wave 2	Wave 4	Δ
Do Not Object	79.43%	72.50%	-6.93%
Would Not Want	19.90%	27.25%	7.35%

[†] Note: The question in Wave IV gave 5 possible choices instead of the 2 given in Wave II: strongly dislike, somewhat dislike, would not care, somewhat like, and strongly like. "Strongly dislike" and "somewhat dislike" were grouped as "would not want" and the rest were grouped as "do not object."

[°] Wave 2: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen

Wave 4: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia

* The question was not asked in Wave 3.

**The increase in both categories is due to slightly more respondents taking a position on this item in Wave IV rather than responding "I don't know," which were not counted from either Wave III or Wave IV.

In Tunisia, the economy has failed to recover to its pre-2011 levels and internal security incidents have the unemployment rate is still 13% higher²⁷ than before the fall of President Ben Ali, and 30% among Tunisian youth. High-profile terrorist attacks have halved tourism visits, which account for 20% of the economy.²⁸ The shifting of

²⁷ "Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)," *The World Bank* online, accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=TN>.

²⁸ <https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/11/tunisia-economic-crisis-threatens-political-progress>

government focus to internal security has moved financial resources out of investments in critical infrastructure projects.²⁹ Large-scale, and often violent, protests³⁰³¹³²³³ and the fear of the return of Tunisian Islamic State fighters³⁴ to Tunisia continue to source of anxiety in the country.

Finally, Table 1.3 depicts the level of agreement with the following item in Waves II-IV: *“To what extent do you think the lack of respect for human rights is justified in order to maintain security in your country?”* Between Waves II and III, the mean percentage of all respondents who selected “Somewhat” or “Very much” increased 5.70%, from 19.72% to 25.42%. Between Waves III and IV, the mean percentage increased to 29.86%, representing a 10.14 percentage-point net increase since the 2011 uprisings. Egyptian public opinion matched that of the average Arab citizen in the Waves, increasing from 19.44%-25.76% from Wave II-III, and to 28.33% in Wave IV, a net increase of 8.89 percentage points in support for sacrificing human rights for security. The increase between Waves II-IV was much starker in Tunisia, from 15.31% in Wave II, to 21.52% in Wave III, and almost doubling to 39.08% in Wave IV, representing a net increase in endorsing this statement by 23.77 percentage points. Finally, in Yemen,

²⁹ Strasser, Fred. “In Tunisia, Economic Crisis Threatens Political Progress,” last modified November 12, 2015, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/11/tunisia-economic-crisis-threatens-political-progress>.

³⁰ Amara, Tarek. “Tunisian Job Protests Hit Oil and Gas Output,” last modified May 8, 2017, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-08/tunisia-protests-hit-energy-output-by-two-foreign-firms-radio>.

³¹ “Thousands of Tunisian lawyers protest 2017 draft budget,” *Daily Mail* online, last modified December 6, 2016, www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4006850/Thousands-Tunisian-lawyers-protest-2017-draft-budget.html.

³² “Protests mark Tunisian revolution's sixth anniversary,” *Al-Jazeera* online, last modified January 14, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/protests-mark-tunisian-revolution-sixth-anniversary-170114203028731.html>.

³³ Amara, Tarek. “Tunisia police, protesters clash in several towns over jobs,” last modified January 19, 2016, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-tunisia-protests/tunisia-police-protesters-clash-in-several-towns-over-jobs-idUKKCN0UX1YY>.

³⁴ Gall, Carlotta. “Tunisia Fears the Return of Thousands of Young Jihadists,” last modified February 25, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/europe/isis-tunisia.html>.

which was still engulfed in civil war, the percent increase in endorsing this statement rose from 20.66% to 26.25% between Waves II and III.³⁵ These trends suggest that the deteriorating security in the region and in the three primary Arab Spring countries in particular had indeed greatly affected tolerance and support for human rights.

³⁵ The question was not asked in Yemen in Wave IV.

Table 1.3: Respondent Level of Agreement in the Middle East, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, with the Statement: “*To what extent do you think the lack of respect for human rights is justified in order to maintain security in your country?*”

All Countries [†]					Egypt				
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Δ		Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Δ
Not at all	56.97%	51.76%	50.55%	-6.42%	Not at all	63.17%	55.18%	48.50%	-14.67%
Not	15.28%	15.46%	13.99%	-1.29%	Not	11.73%	8.86%	13.25%	1.52%
Somewhat	13.50%	17.19%	18.73%	5.23%	Somewhat	15.67%	14.97%	21.00%	5.33%
Very Much	6.22%	8.23%	11.13%	4.91%	Very Much	3.77%	10.79%	7.33%	3.56%
	Net increase [°] in support for human rights violations: 10.14%					Net increase in support for human rights violations: 8.89%			

Tunisia					Yemen				
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Δ		Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4*	Δ**
Not at all	53.26%	60.13%	48.17%	-5.09%	Not at all	46.67%	45.25%		-1.42%
Not	14.38%	13.43%	9.50%	-4.88%	Not	20.67%	19.67%		-1.00%
Somewhat	11.71%	15.93%	21.75%	10.04%	Somewhat	11.58%	14.42%		2.84%
Very Much	3.60%	5.59%	17.33%	13.73%	Very Much	9.08%	11.83%		2.75%
	Net increase in support for human rights violations: 23.77%					Net increase in support for human rights violations: 5.59%			

[†] Wave 2: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen

Wave 3: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen

Wave 4: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia

[°] Sum of the changes in the differences of “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” between Waves 2 and 4.

* Not asked in Yemen in Wave 4.

** Sum of the changes in difference of “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” between Waves 2 and 3.

Waning Post-Arab Spring Democratic Support: Evidence from the World Values Survey

In addition to the decline in tolerance, support for democracy fell between the fielding of Wave I and Wave IV of the Arab Barometer survey. Using Wave I of the Arab Barometer, Benstead (2015) devises a measure of support for democracy that considers both the general evaluation of a democratic system and its suitability for one's country. To measure changes between both waves, Table 1.4 presents the crosstabs of responses to both variables in Wave IV in a similar fashion as Benstead's analysis (7, Table 3). Each cell lists the percentage of respondents in the survey answering that combination of responses and adds to 100%. "Suitable" of democracy is defined as a score of 0-4 and "Unsuitable" from 6-10.³⁶ "Pro-democracy" is defined as agreeing or strongly agreeing with following statement: "Despite its flaws, democracy is the best political system." "Rejection of democracy" is defined as a respondent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with that statement. Thus, Table 1.4 is divided into four panels: *pro-democracy and suitable*, *pro-democracy and unsuitable*, *rejection of democracy*, and *rejection of democracy and suitable*.³⁷ The percentage of respondents falling in each category is also given.

³⁶ The midpoint category of "5" was not grouped with either classification and represents a "suitability ambivalence" category.

³⁷ Because the responses in this last category appear theoretically non-sensical and only represent a small percentage of given responses (5.78%), the category is excluded from the analysis. Benstead (2015) found a similar percentage of respondents in Wave I (6.08%).

Table 1.4: Respondent Belief in the Suitability of Democracy for Their Country and General Evaluation of a Democratic System (Wave IV)

		Democracy is Best Political System			
		Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)
Suitability of Democracy For Own Country	Totally Unsuitable	2.24%	2.85%	1.03%	0.81%
	1	0.99%	1.40%	0.42%	0.17%
	2	1.10%	2.09%	0.62%	0.28%
	3	1.69%	4.24%	1.05%	0.29%
	4	2.09%	4.22%	1.06%	0.29%
		<i>Pro-democracy and unsuitable[°]: 22.91%</i>		<i>Rejection of democracy: 6.02%</i>	
	Neutral [†]	5.03%	10.04%	1.91%	0.46%
	6	3.01%	6.43%	1.17%	0.39%
	7	3.98%	6.83%	1.17%	0.20%
	8	4.28%	6.44%	0.86%	0.11%
	9	2.28%	2.96%	0.57%	0.20%
	Totally Suitable	5.87%	5.76%	0.62%	0.48%
		<i>Pro-democracy and suitable: 47.84%</i>		<i>Rejection of democracy but suitable: 5.78%</i>	

Table X illustrates the crosstabulation of a respondent's belief that democracy is the best political system (Strongly Disagree [1]-Strongly Agree [4]) and their belief that democracy is suitable for their country (Totally Unsuitable [0]-Totally Suitable [10]). The percentages in each cell are the percentages of survey respondents who chose that level of suitability of democracy and that level of agreement that democracy is the best political system. The percentages in all cells add up to 100%. The source of the data is Wave 4 of the Arab Barometer survey from the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia.

[†] This midpoint category (5) was not assigned to either the "suitable" or "unsuitable" category. It was not included in calculating the total percentages in the four categories (pro-democracy, suitable; pro-democracy, unsuitable; rejection of democracy, but suitable; and rejection of democracy).

[°] The four categories were calculated as the sum of the percentages in each of the four quadrants. "Pro-democracy" is defined as choosing "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" with the statement "A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems"; "Rejection of democracy" is defined as choosing "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" with that statement. "Unsuitable" is defined as the range from 0 ("Totally Unsuitable") to 4. "Suitable" is defined as the range between 6-10 ("Totally Suitable").

In Wave I, Benstead (2015) found that 60.10% of respondents believe democracy was suitable for their country and that they either strongly agreed or agreed


that it was the best system of government. In Wave IV, this figure drops to 47.84%, as depicted in the bottom-left panel of Table 1.4. Benstead also finds that 27.23% of respondents in Wave I believed that democracy was unsuitable for their country despite their agreements that democracy was the best system of government. This figure drops to 22.91% in the fourth wave of the survey (depicted in the top-left panel of Table 1.4), though the percentage of those who feel similarly about democracy but are ambivalent about its suitability for their country was approximately 20.10%.³⁸ Similar percentages of respondents believed that democracy was both unsuitable for the country and disagree that it was the best political system (6.59% in Wave I and 6.02% in Wave IV), depicted in bottom-right panel of Table 1.4. These results suggest that, even though support for the concept of democracy remained high, an increasing number of individuals believed that the system was not suitable for their country.

Figure 1.1 presents the changes in the percentage of respondents who fell into the “pro-democracy and suitable”³⁹ category in Waves I-IV for all respondents of each wave and for respondents in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. For ease of explanation, I will refer to these individuals simply as *democrats*.

³⁸ “Ambivalent” meaning those who rated suitability of democracy for their country as “5” on a scale of 0-10. The scale use in Benstead’s 2015 analysis of Wave I was different than that in Wave IV, ranging instead from 1-10, with no midpoint category. It is possible that the drop in the percentage of respondents who believed democracy is the best system and suitable for their country between Waves I and IV, as well as the drop in pro-democracy individuals who believe democracy is suitable for their country between the two waves, is attributable to this midpoint category of pro-democracy/ambivalent suitability category.

³⁹ Respondents who scored suitability between 6-10 and agreed or strongly agreed that democracy was the best political system were aggregated to calculate the percentage of respondents who were “pro-democracy” and found it a suitable system for their country.

Figure 1.1: Support for Democracy in Arab Spring Countries Over Time (Waves I-IV)



The top-left panel of Figure 1.1 depicts the change in the percentage of *democrats* between Waves I and IV in all countries in the survey. Apart from the initial drop between Waves I⁴⁰ and II, the percentage of *democrats* held steady between Waves II and IV, fluctuating between 45.22% and 47.84% of survey respondents in the region. Between Waves II and III, however, the percentage of *democrats* in both Egypt and Tunisia declined by 17.56% and 14.83%, respectively. This percentage *increased* slightly in Yemen, from 40.7% to 44.13%, though it remained 27.58% lower than the statistic in Wave I. By Wave IV⁴¹, the percentage of *democrats* increased slightly (2.49%) in Tunisia, though this percentage was almost 10% lower than the average respondent in the region. Overall, the data suggest that, though support for democracy and the belief it is a

⁴⁰ Data to calculate the percentage of *democrats* were unavailable for Egypt and Tunisia.

⁴¹ Data to calculate the percentage of *democrats* were unavailable for Egypt and Yemen.

suitable system for one's country remained steady in the region during the Arab Spring, support did indeed drop in the countries that experienced the most instability and insecurity for which there is data.

Conclusion

Observational data from the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey demonstrates that intolerance has increased slightly in the Middle East after the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In the countries most affected by the uprisings for which there are data (Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt), these increases in social and religious intolerance and support for security over human rights were much larger. After the Arab Spring, support for democracy has also generally fallen from a majority to a plurality of the population in the region believing democracy is an acceptable system of government and believing it is suitable for their country. This fall in support is particularly stark in Egypt and Tunisia, two countries whose citizens bore the blunt of the political and social instability from 2011 onward.

In the next chapter, I argue that waning support for democracy and the increased level of general intolerance is a function of authoritarianism—an individual predisposition that orders conformity and obedience over autonomy and independence—and exposure to threat. The historical development of the concept is discussed, as well as current controversies and evolutions of the predisposition, its relationship with threat, and its relevance to the post-Arab Spring political, social, and economic environment. I then present the hypotheses that will be tested in the subsequent empirical chapters.

CHAPTER 2

Authoritarianism and Threat

In the last chapter, I established observational evidence for an increase in intolerance and decrease in support for democracy in the Middle East after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. In this chapter, I explore the psychological mechanism—authoritarianism—that I posit is responsible for these changes through its interaction with threatening conditions. I explore the historical development of the concept of authoritarianism, an individual predisposition to value obedience and conformity over autonomy and independence. Understanding the development of this concept and the various methodological and theoretical controversies will be important for defining what I do and do not mean by authoritarianism, as well as justifying the inclusion or exclusion of criteria used for hypothesis testing in the context of the post-Arab Spring Middle East. I then explain the importance of threat to authoritarianism and resulting intolerance. I also argue that the dynamics of threat, authoritarianism, and intolerance can also be applied to support for democracy. Finally, I explain the hypotheses I will test in the subsequent chapters.

Authoritarian Personality Theory

The concept of the authoritarian personality was introduced by Adorno et al. (1950) in an attempt to explain the type of individual that was susceptible to the

intolerant and undemocratic messages of fascism in Europe during the 1930s. Their primary concern was what individual characteristics made individuals susceptible to blind obedience and others not. The original theory was fleshed out using a Freudian, psychodynamic framework. “Authoritarians” were thought to possess a constellation of ten traits: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intellectualism, anti-interception (a dislike of subjectivity), superstition and stereotypy, power and toughness, cynicism, projectivity, and exaggerated preoccupation with sex. This personality was thought to be the result of childhood in which the individual was harshly punished by controlling parents, whom the individual grew up to both resent and idolize. By extension, authoritarians projected that idolization outward to societal authority figures that preached order and respect for established norms. The development of the constellation of these traits and their outward, aggressive projection toward state-sanctioned minorities and those who were framed as threatening established norms were thought to be responsible for the rise in anti-Semitism in Europe and, as a result, the Holocaust. Adorno and colleagues developed the F-scale (Fascist) that was used to diagnose individuals as having this personality syndrome. It contained items that measured each of the nine theoretical dimensions of the authoritarian disposition.

However, the scale and the theory were criticized for several reasons. In terms of the scale, all items used were presented in the same, acquiescent direction. This was recognized early on as causing response bias, in which individuals tend to agree with statements written in a positive direction (Couch and Keniston 1960). The F-scale was unable to distinguish between authoritarians, who were theoretically prone to compliance and submission, and others who were acquiescing to the items because they were unsure

of how to respond (see: Zuckerman and Eisen 1962; Bass 1955; Gage, Leavitt, and Stone 1957; Jackson, Messick, and Solley 1957). Reversing the response choices and comparing the resultant scores to the scores derived from the original scale yielded a positive correlation, rather than the expected negative correlation, suggesting that the F-scale was not measuring authoritarianism but indeed acquiescence bias (Jackson, Messick, and Solley 1957). Moreover, Shils (1954) found that communists scored low on the F-scale even though they held authoritarian views. The inability to accommodate “left-wing authoritarians” led to further criticism of the measure.

The second critique was the psychodynamic nature of the approach to fleshing out authoritarianism theory. As part of the process for studying authoritarians, Adorno and colleagues selected those who scored high on the F-scale for further study and those selected were administered a Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a projective test similar to the Rorschach ink blot test. Subjects were presented with an image of a person and have to describe the situation, the motives, and feelings of the depicted individual, and complete the story of what happened after the picture was taken. The resulting narratives of high scoring authoritarians were used to further develop the Authoritarian Personality theory. Techniques such as this, however, have been criticized for their subjectivity in interpretation by the administrator and the lack of standardization, resulting in a lack validity and consistency. Such was the general critique of untestable approach to exploring the unconscious mind upon which psychodynamic analysis was based. The measure was untestable and unfalsifiable (Hyman & Sheatsley 1954; Altemeyer 1981, 1988; Gough & Bradley 1993).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Recognizing the theoretical and methodological shortcomings of the F-Scale, social scientists developed other scales and inventories to measure authoritarianism, including the scales of Toughmindedness (Eysenck 1954), Tolerance (Gough 1957, 1987) Dogmatism and Rigidity (Rokeach 1960), and Directiveness (Ray 1986). However, the most widely used modern incarnation of authoritarianism theory and its measurement were improved in the 1980s by Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996; Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006). Altemeyer focused on three principle components of the original theory that were highly correlated: submission to authority, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer 1981). That is, authoritarians are highly submissive to established and legitimate authority figures, aggressive toward minorities or deviants that are sanctioned by legitimate authority as targets, and adhere to traditional and conventional norms and believe that others in society should follow these norms (Altemeyer 1994; 133).

Rather than a personality trait, Altemeyer theorized that authoritarianism was socially learned it is socially learned during childhood through habits, values, and norms passed down by parents. Those scoring high on the RWA scale were thought to have been raised in “traditionalist” households (perhaps religious), learned to distinguish between “good” and “bad” groups of people, and raised with a strict moral code (Altemeyer 1996; 80). These individuals came to expect and cherish group boundaries and value authority. Those low in authoritarianism were likely raised in more permissive households that emphasized individuality and personal autonomy, growing up to question authority. Groups were not presented as dichotomies of “good” and “evil.” These

individuals did not have a strong need to identify with those similar to them, whereas high authoritarians did. Correlation between RWA and such in-group sentiment (using Altemeyer's Group Cohesiveness Scale) was quite high ($r=0.52$), Altemeyer concluded that "right-wing authoritarians, as we would expect from their background of tight circles, believe in group cohesiveness, group loyalty, group identification, unity before 'outsiders', and so on" (Altemeyer 1996; 84). The social learning explanation for the origins of authoritarianism were rooted more firmly in the falsifiable, scientific tradition that departed from the subjective approach of psychodynamics.

To measure an individual's level of authoritarianism, Altemeyer developed a 30-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale that contained statements consistent with authoritarian submission, aggression, and conventionalism, with higher scores indicating higher levels of authoritarianism. Because the authoritarianism is a "syndrome" and each of the three components do not alone indicate authoritarianism, Altemeyer designed the questions to be double-barreled. That is, statements included more than one of the three components. The item "*Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs*", for example, taps both conventionalism (respect for morality and tradition) and aggression ("smashing" those who challenge such traditions). The item wording was evenly split between pro-trait and anti-trait statements to avoid the acquiescence bias that plagued the original F-scale. The scale currently consists of 22-items⁴², and shorter versions have been developed (Zakrisson 2005; Duckitt et al. 2010). In 2016 alone, the RWA scale and its variants accounted for over 62% of studies that

⁴² Johnson, Chris. "The RWA Scale," last modified September 9, 2012, <http://www.panojohnson.com/automatons/rwa-scale.xhtml>.

mentioned “authoritarianism”, “RWA”, and “right-wing authoritarianism” on *PsychInfo* (Conway et al. 2017). Altemeyer’s RWA scale is by far the most widely used scale to measure authoritarianism in the literature (Feldman 2013).

Criticisms of RWA

Though representing a much-needed improvement upon the original F-scale, Altemeyer’s RWA scale and the theoretical components upon which it is based have been challenged. A common critique of the scale is the correlation between individual items of RWA and outcomes of interests, particularly in the study of intolerance and prejudice. Stenner (2005; p.82-83) writes that the RWA scale is authoritarianism partly “expressed” and the authoritarian responses to the RWA scale are “not the *explanatory variables*, rather, they are among the phenomena that might *be explained* by our fundamental predisposition. Feldman (2003) echoes these concerns by citing the following items from the 1996 version of Altemeyer’s RWA scale as problematic in predicting attitudes, such as negative attitudes toward outgroups, support for punitive policies, and support for strongman leadership:

Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.

The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

Once our government leaders give us the “go ahead,” it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

Instead of “predicting” attitudes that are theoretically expressed by authoritarianism, the RWA scale is more akin to a correlational investigation between authoritarian attitudes expressed in the measure and similarly intolerant, aggressive, and conventional attitudes researchers care about, such as attitudes toward immigration (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius 2008), homosexuality (Whitley & Lee 2000), and sexism (Sibley, Wilson, and Duckitt 2007).

Another criticism of the RWA measure is its inclusion of conventionalism (i.e. conservatism). Indeed, in a review of research, Stone (1980; see also Stone and Smith 1993) finds that there is no indication that authoritarianism is associated with left-wing ideology, such as communism, which also includes authoritarian-like characteristics. This has led researchers to argue that RWA is simply a measure of conservatism (Forbes 1990; Ray 1976, 1983).

As Stenner (2005) argues, however, there is a theoretical difference between authoritarians and status quo conservatives. Though they both demonstrate obedience to authority, tradition, and norms, authoritarians differ from conservatives in that they are willing to abandon authority figures and the status quo when they deviate from the goal of protecting or increasing sameness and decreasing diversity (p. 22). The RWA measure confounds these two concepts with items that tap attitudes toward specific groups and activities, such as homosexuals, women, “traditional family values”, and sex. Investigating the inherent confounding of the measure with conservatism, Feldman (2003) writes, “It is clear from these results that people can obtain RWA scores as high as

the middle of the scale simply because they hold conservative attitudes” (Feldman 2003; p. 65). Using an alternative measure of authoritarianism based on his proposed obedience-autonomy scale, Feldman (2003) concludes that conservatism content in the measure is not an integral part of authoritarianism (p. 67). As conventionalism is usually correlated with religiosity, using this measure might prove particularly problematic in studying authoritarianism in the Middle East due to individuals’ relatively high level of religiosity (Tessler 2002).

Child Traits Measure

Since the fielding of the 1992 American National Elections Survey, a measure of authoritarianism has been included that is based upon the desired qualities of children. Four forced-choice items ask the respondent to choose whether a child should be respectful or independent; obedient or self-reliant; well-behaved or considerate; and well-mannered or curious. The more restrictive trait choices (respectful, obedience, well-behaved, and well-mannered) an individual chooses, the more authoritarian they are.⁴³ Though respondents might desire a mix of both traits in each item, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that these forced choice responses are similar to the forced choices we are required to make in politics (p. 50). The measure successfully predicts intolerance, policy hawkishness, gay marriage, gay adoption, lax respect for civil liberties, and anti-immigration attitudes (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).

⁴³ In analyses, of course, half of these trait pairs are reversed coded to control for the acquiescence bias that plagued the original F-scale.

The focus on child traits items can be traced back to the original F-scale. This theoretical underpinning of this focus is based, at least implicitly, on the universal tension between autonomy and social conformity. Because ensuring social conformity is difficult to monitor and guarantee, those who value it expect others to as well (Kelman and Hamilton 1989). The way individuals are raised as children to either conform and obey authority or not thus becomes a critical concern of those who find social cohesion and obedience important in society (Kohn 1977; Kohn and Schooler 1983). In advancing the theory that desired behaviors of children reflect an individual's value system, Martin (1964) writes:

“The subject of child-rearing techniques pinpoints a fundamental proposition in human relations: how should people (superordinate parents in this case) treat other people (subordinate children, in this case)? Should parent-offspring relations be based on mutual trust, genuine affection, and cooperation—democratic, in a word—or is the ideal relationship an “authoritarian” one, based upon power, fear, obedience to a power figure, and mutual distrust, or some compromise between these “polar” position (p.87).”

The measure has gained popularity because of its ideologically-neutral content that includes neither a direct reference to conservatism nor mentions social or political issues that authoritarianism is meant to predict (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Perez and Hetherington 2014; Stenner 2005).

Threat, Authoritarianism, and Intolerance

The large effect that threat has on intolerance and punitive policies and attitudes is well documented (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1992; Stenner 2005). Individuals who have more pronounced physiological responses to threat have been found to favor conservative stances on defense spending, capital punishment, patriotism, and the Iraq War (Oxley et al. 2008). Arousal of anxiety from threat, such as the 9/11 terror attacks

(Bonanno and Jost 2006; Huddy et al. 2005) can lead to more conservative views (Nail et al. 2009). Terror Management Theory (TMT) theorizes that the adoption of conservative values is a means to cope with existential crises that induce anxiety, such as one's own mortality (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1986; Greenberg et al. 1990; Rosenblatt et al. 1989). Moreover, in political environments with cross-cutting policy solutions, anxious individuals tend to gravitate toward the political party that "owns" the issue (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; 145). For example, worry about immigration tends to move both Republicans and Democrats toward a Republican position, such as restricting immigration (Albertson and Gadarian 2015).

Threat and anxiety lead to an overall increase in support for more punitive policies and protection-seeking behavior, as well as increasing negative attitudes and opinions about outgroups. Research has linked authoritarianism as important variable in the threat-intolerance relationship, acting as either as a mediator or a moderator (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996; Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005; Lavine et al. 2002; Stenner, 2005; Hetherington and Suhay 2011). In the early days of the study of authoritarianism, Lipset (1959) theorized that this predisposition was prevalent among working class individuals because of the high amount of personal economic and psychological insecurity. Altemeyer (1988; 168-169) found that his RWA measure correlated strongly with the belief that the world is a dangerous place ($r=0.50$). It is also theorized that authoritarianism is adopted to cope with stress (Dallago and Roccato 2010; Hiel and De Clercq 2009). Hetherington and Suhay (2011) contend that those who score higher in authoritarianism should be more anxious and exhibit different preferences than those who score lower during "normal

time” (p. 548) precisely because authoritarians tend to see the world in “black and white” and reject ambiguity and nuance that they find threatening (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Napier and Jost 2009). This cognitive rigidity can be caused by acute exposure to stress, which tends to hamper information processing (Evans and Schamberg 2009; LeDoux 1996).

The exact nature of threat’s relationship with authoritarianism and intolerance, however, remains a point of contention in the literature. Some researchers believe that authoritarianism itself increases in the presence of threat (Duckitt 2001; Shafer and Duckitt 2013), whereas another branch of research posits that authoritarianism interacts with threat, which in turn influences intolerance and prejudice. There is also a debate concerning what *types* of threat—normative and existential—are the catalysts for authoritarian attitudes of prejudice and intolerance. Such discrepancies and inconsistencies in the literature render it difficult to generate testable research hypotheses and have led to conflicting findings of the effects of threat on intolerance. In the next section, I discuss two primary authoritarian-threat models that treat authoritarianism as a mediator (direct effect model) or a moderator (interaction model), the nature of threat, and a justification for how the models in this dissertation will be designed and tested.


Direct Effects Model

A prominent theoretical model of authoritarianism that posits a direct relationship between threat and authoritarianism was proposed by Duckitt (2002) to explain two dimensions of “authoritarian” attitudes, RWA and Social Dominance Orientation

(SDO).⁴⁴ In this Dual Process Model (Duckitt 2002; Duckitt and Sibley 2010), individuals possess a personality disposition that represents the inherent tension between conformity and autonomy that is largely shaped by punitive and strict childhood socialization. This personality disposition in turn shapes a “worldview” that the world is a dangerous place. This inspires the motivational goal of social control, that, in turn, influences an individual’s level of authoritarianism, a cluster of “social attitudes.” Finally, these attitudes influence one’s prejudice and intolerance. The view that the world is threatening can also be changed through experience (i.e. exposure to threat [such as intergroup threat] can alter one’s worldview, thus altering the motivational goals and social attitudes of the individual) (Duckitt 2002; 90-91, 96-97). Conversely, permissive and “tolerant” socialization can activate a view that the world is a secure and safe place, which activates a motivational goal of autonomy and freedom. To satisfy this motivational goal, individuals adopt nonauthoritarian beliefs and values (low RWA scores). These latter social attitudes are associated with more tolerance and less prejudice (Duckitt 2002; 48-53, 58). The causal model in Duckitt’s theory of authoritarianism is presented below in Figure 2.1.

⁴⁴ Because SDO is conceptually different than RWA and follows its own causal path from a distinct socialization style (unaffectionate socialization), and for the sake of clarity in discussing authoritarianism, the concept is not discussed here.

Figure 2.1: Duckitt's Dual-Process Model⁴⁵



Duckitt's model is important for several reasons. First, it emphasizes and finds empirical support for the importance of childhood rearing and socialization on the adoption of authoritarianism, adding credence to this notion that was used to develop the RWA measure (Altemeyer 1981). In turn, this socialization leads to the adoption of a threatening worldview. This is consistent with the observation that those who score high in authoritarianism are intolerant to ambiguity and particularly sensitive to threatening conditions (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; 548). Finally, the model accounts for situational threat, which is an important component to the theory of authoritarianism.

However, there are a few shortcomings of the authoritarian causal path of the Dual-Process Model. Though belief in a dangerous world can explain the generally observed pattern of high authoritarianism in the absence of an apparent threat, the assertion that authoritarianism is “highly reactive” to situational threat (thus increasing or decreasing an individual's level of authoritarianism) is based solely on the RWA measure of authoritarianism. As previously mentioned, an enduring critique of RWA is that it

⁴⁵ Duckitt, John, Claire Wagner, Ilouize du Plessis, and Ingrid Birum. 2002. “The Psychological Bases of Ideology and Prejudice: Testing a Dual Process Model.” *Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes*, 83 (1): p.77.

partially measures the *expression* of intolerant and prejudicial attitudes (Stenner 2005). The fact that this measure “reacts” to changes in situational threat, then, is not surprising, given the established relationship between threat and increased prejudice and intolerance. The difference between “social attitudes” expressed by RWA and “outgroup attitudes” (prejudice) in the model is also less clear, especially since many of the RWA items correlate with (and in some cases, are duplicate manifestations of) the prejudice and intolerance we wish to investigate. Though the model does offer a stronger theoretical and empirical basis for the argument that childhood socialization impacts the adoption of socially conforming behavior, RWA’s correlation with dependent variables of interest and the placement of threat in the causal chain render the second half of the model problematically tautological.

Interactive Model: Authoritarian Dynamic Theory (ADT)

The interactive model of authoritarianism and threat addresses many of the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the Duckitt (2002) model by using an alternative measure of authoritarianism free of political content and a novel argument about threat (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). In terms of defining authoritarianism, researchers advancing this line of theory conceptualize it as “an individual predisposition concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity, on the other” (Stenner 2005; 14). This tradeoff between autonomy and conformity is similarly part of the Dual-Process Model (Duckitt 2002), except it is not conceptualized as a personality, nor is it a precursor to authoritarianism. The predisposition *is*

authoritarianism. Stenner defines a predisposition as “any preexisting and relatively stable tendency to respond in a particular way to certain objects or events” (Stenner 2005; 14; Rosenberg and Hovland 1960; Greenstein 1987). The need for group conformity requires the suppression of differences and the need for a group authority to enforce it, leading to the often-cited characteristic of authoritarians, obedience to authority (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996). An individual’s particular predisposition is situated on a continuum from the most authoritarian to the least authoritarian. At the “libertarian” end of the continuum, individuals are predisposed to prefer difference and individual autonomy (Stenner 2005; 15). This model is usually employed with the ideological content-free child traits measure (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hetherington and Suhay 2011). Finally, the theoretical framework developed by Stenner (2005) does not specifically lay out what *causes* individuals to fall on a certain point along the libertarian-authoritarian continuum. The Dual-Process Model (Duckitt 2002) theoretical framework of socialization and personality fills in this gap nicely.

Recall that empirical evidence exists that authoritarianism is a stable predisposition (Stenner 2005). In the interactive model, authoritarianism—an individual’s position on the conformity-autonomy continuum—is reactive to normative threat, such as a lack of ingroup consensus, diversity, and freedom “run amok” (Stenner 2005; 26). That is, authoritarianism interacts with threat to produce manifestations of prejudice and intolerance. Under nonthreatening circumstances, authoritarianism is thought to lie “dormant”, with expressed attitudes of high authoritarians mirroring those of middle- and

low-scoring authoritarians (libertarians).⁴⁶ This interaction hypothesis of authoritarianism was coined the Authoritarian Dynamic Theory (ADT) by Stenner (2005).

ADT has the advantage of not only explaining authoritarian reactions to threat and the resulting prejudice and intolerance, but also explaining the dynamics of threat and authoritarianism at the opposite end of the autonomy-conformity continuum. The predisposition of low authoritarians, or libertarians, is not merely the absence of a need for ingroup cohesion and sameness. They believe that ingroup needs should be “subordinated as completely as possible to the autonomy and self-regulation of the individual member (Duckitt 1989; 71). Libertarians do not necessarily disregard ingroup welfare, but they believe in “flexible rule application, independence of thought, and reluctance to ostracize out-groups” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; 46).

As with authoritarians, libertarians react to normative threat. However, they react by becoming even *more* tolerant rather than less tolerant. This results in attitudinal polarization, or the steepening of the slope in models predicting intolerance, restrictions on civil liberties, and other attitudes that are activated to preserve ingroup cohesion. Libertarians are thought to “double down” on their values of autonomy and preference for diversity, expressing more tolerant attitudes in the potential wake of a normatively threatened, authoritarian backlash calling for the restrictions of such liberties or intolerance toward minority groups (see Stenner 2005; 64, 66, and 182 for experimental evidence). Libertarians “bolster their commitment to individual freedom and tolerance of

⁴⁶ Hetherington and Weiler (2009) elaborate on the attitudes of “nonthreatened” authoritarians in the context of the United States. They argue that social cohesion in the post-9/11 era in the U.S. is constantly threatened. Thus, authoritarian individuals are expected to express more intolerant (rather than similar) attitudes compared with low- and middle-scoring authoritarians. Indeed, empirical analyses using the child traits measure of authoritarianism demonstrate that this seems to be the case (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hetherington and Suhay 2011).


difference just as authoritarians rise up in defense of obedience to group authorities and conformity to the collective order” (Stenner 2005; 63). In sum, threats to oneness and sameness are celebrated by libertarians and loathed by authoritarians.

Of course, all threats are not normative challenges to ingroup cohesion, order, and authority. In the face of *existential (personal) threat*—such as personal economic difficulties, negative perceptions of the national economy, and crime victimization— the dynamics of authoritarianism and threat are reversed. Under such circumstances, authoritarians actually “improve their behavior”, becoming *more* tolerant as distracting their focus on maintaining group conformity (Stenner 2005; 41, 58, 68). Libertarians exposed to existential threat or personal trauma become *less* tolerant. Stenner hypothesizes that this might be a “frustration-aggression” mechanism (Stenner 2005; 58; also see: Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Berkowitz 1998). For instance, the exercise of personal autonomy and freedom requires a baseline of protection from authority. In the absence of such protection, libertarians become frustrated by their inability to carry out activities tied to their predisposition, resulting in a similar call for authority to “reign in” individuals and/or groups that are the cause of such instability. In these circumstances, the slope of authoritarianism predicting attitudes such as intolerance flattens, decreasing the polarization between the two extremes.⁴⁷ In such an environment and “when ordinary people perceive a grave threat to their safety, they are susceptible to adopting antidemocratic preferences regardless of whether they score high in authoritarianism. In this rendering, antidemocratic preferences can quickly become popular, mainstream

⁴⁷ For an example of such attitude change, see: Hetherington and Suhay, 2011.

positions under the right circumstances” (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; 557). Figure 2.2 depicts the theoretical expectations of the ADT model of normative and personal threats.

Figure 2.2: The Interactive Effect⁴⁸ of Authoritarianism and Threat on Intolerance



This interaction (ADT) model is a welcome addition to the study of prejudice and intolerance. First, it not only specifies the value system underlying those high in authoritarianism, it also lays out the predispositions of those at the low end of the spectrum. Second, the interactive relationship between threat and authoritarianism rather than a direct path from threat to authoritarianism is consistent with previous research demonstrating the stability of authoritarianism over time. Third, the use of the child traits measure over the RWA measure decreases the worry of endogeneity between authoritarianism and common attitudes the predisposition is supposed to predict. That RWA has been shown to react to changing threat levels is consistent with this model, as it

⁴⁸ Note: The Low Normative and Low Personal Threat lines are presented as flat because theory dictates that there should be no difference between libertarians and authoritarians under such circumstances. However, as noted in an earlier footnote in this chapter, it is also possible that threat is already “activated” and we might observe a more positive slope (i.e. higher intolerance for authoritarians). Regardless, the flattened slope was chosen for theoretical consistency.

views RWA as manifest attitudes caused by authoritarianism, rather than authoritarianism itself. Fourth, the Authoritarian Dynamic Theory framework addresses the important distinction between normative and existential, or personal, threat, illustrating that the nature of threat can increase or decrease intolerance and support for democratic norms among both libertarians and authoritarians. Finally, though ADT takes an agnostic approach to the actual origins of authoritarianism, Duckitt's Dual-Process Model (2002) and Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) offer persuasive theoretical justification for an early childhood socialization origin. For these reasons, I rely on the ADT framework to explore the relationship between threat, authoritarianism, intolerance, and support for democracy in the Middle East in the chapters that follow.

Authoritarianism and Support for Political Institutions: A Theoretical Extension of ADT

Our understanding of ADT's contribution to intolerance and illiberalism has mostly been gleaned in politically stable, Western countries. In these environments, intolerance, outgroup aggression, and undemocratic attitudes are largely contained by a strong commitment to the rule of law and institutions designed to air and debate grievances. We know very little about how this obedience-autonomy value spectrum operates in developing countries and transitional regimes where these threats are more apparent, the rule of law is weaker, and a strong tradition of free expression is nonexistent. We know neither how ADT effects attitudes in these countries nor if threats to individuals at either end of this value continuum result in political behaviors that can affect democratization or intolerant, violent actions against ethnic, religious, and political

outgroups. Also, we do not yet have empirical research investigating the effect of authoritarianism and threat on support for democracy in general.

The extension of the ADT framework to preferences for democratic and autocratic political institutions is particularly crucial for understanding public opinion and individual attitudes in the Middle East, where evidence suggests that both tolerance and support for democracy have been on the decline in the wake of the Arab Spring (Benstead 2015; Spierings 2017). These trends coincide with increased political, economic, and social turmoil that has gripped the region since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, as described in the previous chapter. These events engender multiple normative and existential threats that interact with the authoritarianism continuum. This interaction produces increased intolerance of authority-sanctioned outgroups and declining support for the political uncertainty and contestation that is the hallmark of liberal democracy.

As noted in the previous chapter, support for democracy has declined in three Middle Eastern countries in which the Arab Spring was most disruptive. The Arab Spring rebellions represented a demand for a clean break with past authoritarian arrangements and the forging of new institutions, with protestors demanding more government accountability, free and fair elections, and a solution to the stagnant economic crises plaguing the region. In the early days of the Arab Spring, citizens demanded an end to corruption and police brutality, due process, government accountability, and a more democratic system of governance. Protests of varying size and sustainability that erupted in Syria, Bahrain, Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Morocco, and Jordan have had little success in bringing out the change initially sought. Even Tunisia, heralded as the only successful

transition to democracy in the region, has been plagued by political assassinations, government instability, continued protests, terrorism, and tensions between Islamists and secularists.

In general, the power vacuums brought on by the total or partial collapse of Middle Eastern governing institutions exposed the population to an increased risk of economic recessions or depressions, terrorism, disappearings, looting, corruption, and inter-group tensions. Citizens risk facing financial loss and violence, as well as an environment in which these events become more likely in their personal estimations. Intangible benefits such as representative government and increases in civil rights and liberties began to pale in comparison to the promise or desire for immediate security and stability. Elite disagreement and conflict can worsen the perception of democracy. When the government is unstable and there exists severe disagreement among the elite concerning the ideological or institutional direction of the country, this can increase anxiety individuals, engendering an increase in government cynicism about the process of democratic debate.

I argue that the same authoritarian-threat dynamics that affect intolerance should similarly affect support for democracy and autocracy in the region in the presence of threatening societal and political conditions in the wake of the Arab Spring. These threats are largely a byproduct of the push for democracy and increased government accountability that led to partial or entire regime collapse, economic recession, civil war, terrorism, and a resurgence of state-sponsored targeting of minorities and regime dissidents. Because these threats are consequences of overthrowing relatively stable autocratic arrangements in favor of more democratic and accountable governance, and

because of the general failure to achieve these aims since 2011, individual support for democracy should be influenced by these threats and authoritarianism and conform to the dynamics of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory.

In developing ADT, Stenner (2005) argues that authoritarians should find democracy normatively threatening, particularly when they live under a democratic system, and autocracy preferable in all contexts, writing, "...quite simply, authoritarians are never more tolerant than when reassured and pacified by an autocratic culture, and never more intolerant than when forced to endure a vibrant democracy" (Stenner 2005; 334). She states that "the overall lesson is clear: when it comes to democracy, less is often more, or at least more secure" (Stenner 2005; 335). Indeed, the contentious nature of democratic politics and the uncertainty it engenders has the potential to trigger a popular, authoritarian reaction, as "democracy is virtually an invitation for social movements to challenge power-holders" (Markoff 2011; 242) and encompasses diversity of opinion, the management of dissent, and the rotation of power among parties and groups (Schumpeter 1950; Sartori 1997).

Qualifying this authoritarian-threat relationship, Dunn (2014) finds that authoritarianism is a stronger predictor of intolerance in democratic societies, but authoritarians in democracies are far more tolerant than in nondemocracies. Because authoritarians are norm enforcers and concerned with the "demarcation of people, authorities, institutions, values, and norms that... defines who 'we' are, and what 'we' believe in" (Stenner 2005; 17), authoritarians in democratic societies are expected to defend the democratic norms upon which society is based. This is despite the fact that "democracy allows for and facilitates the expression of pluralism" (which would

theoretically pose a threat to stability sought by authoritarians). Because of this, Dunn writes, that, in a democracy, “apparent normative conflict will wax and wane and individual exposure to such will vary. Authoritarians should not, therefore, be constantly “manning the barricades [in a democratic society]” (Stenner 2005). Living in an effective democracy will expose authoritarians to a greater frequency and degree of normative threat than if they were residents in an autocratic country; they will therefore be, on average, more intolerant than the average person” (Dunn 2014; 224). As respected authorities endorse the rules of the game of a democracy, so too should authoritarians defend this system and democratic norms. Empirical evidence he provides from democratic and autocratic countries demonstrates that authoritarians are, above all, norm enforcers rather than opposed to the mere notion of democracy. Contentious politics in a democracy, then, is not a constant source of normative threat and are far more tolerant in democratic regimes than in autocracies.

Instead, the concept of democracy is more of a normative threat to authoritarians living under an autocratic system. Autocratic regimes are characterized by their relative political stability and predictability. The “rough and tumble” of politics of democracy is not an engrained norm that authoritarians recognize as an integral feature of their political life. Therefore, any suggestion of a fundamental change or challenge to the political system that threatens to upend these autocratic political norms should trigger not only authoritarian intolerance in autocracies, but also resentment and opposition toward the emergence of a political system that is characterized by contentious politics. Since the very idea of a democratic transition should almost always be normatively threatening to authoritarians living under the orderly and predictable rule of autocracy, I expect that

support for democracy should be consistently lower among authoritarians in autocratic regimes. Because of the ongoing instability in the Middle East as an ongoing struggle between the demand for more democratic norms and practices with the legacy of autocratic norms, the intolerant and undemocratic attitudes of authoritarians might also be “expressed”, as this particular threat to the normative order is ongoing in the political and social background (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Thus, in terms of modeling, I expect that high levels of authoritarianism and exposure to normative threat cues will either have a negative effect (or no statistical impact, per the findings of Hetherington and Weiler [2009]) on changes to intolerance and support for democracy. Authoritarians, then, should be generally more intolerant and less democratic than libertarians. When normatively threatened, libertarians are expected to become more supportive of democracy, as they double down on institutions that uphold and defend their value system of autonomy and independence.

Consistent with the ADT framework, I expect increased personal threat to negatively impact libertarian preferences for democracy and increase their support for democracy autocracy. Until unstable regimes establish economic, personal, and political security for their populations, there is a waning of an incentive for libertarians to support a regime of new institutions over the former, especially when the former was more stable. Such continued insecurity could become a rallying cry for the restoration of the more stable, previous regime, regardless of how autocratic it was. Such attitudes can move libertarian support away from demands for a more democratic system, thus facilitating the rise of more authoritarian leaders or groups that promise to restore security in exchange for less robust democratic norms and institutions. Because authoritarian

intolerance and illiberalism might already be expressed due to the normative nature of the conflict between democracy and autocracy, any decrease in the polarization of these attitudes between libertarians and authoritarians should be precipitated by the perception of personal threat to libertarians and their value system.

Thus, the observed, overall increase in intolerance and decrease in support for democracy in the Middle East in the previous chapter is due to the changing attitudes of libertarians and that their preferences have increasingly aligned with those of the usually-intolerant and undemocratic authoritarians. In this sense, I argue, much of the focus on normatively threatened authoritarians underestimates the influence of personally threatened libertarians and their impact on population-level increases in both intolerance and support for democracy. In the context of an unstable political situation, the culmination of these threats can hamper any movement toward a more tolerant, democratic society precisely when the support of libertarians is needed the most.

Proposed Hypotheses

I propose the following hypotheses to test in the subsequent chapters. Because authoritarians have been found to generally have lower tolerance in nondemocracies and because democracy challenges the established norms of society, I expect that

H1a: Authoritarians will be both more intolerant and less supportive of democracy than libertarians under low normative threat. Exposure to normative threat will have no impact on authoritarian intolerance or support for democracy.

Alternatively, normative threat might increase intolerance and support for autocracy, while decreasing support for democracy, among authoritarians. As previously noted, there is empirical evidence to support both of these proposed dynamics. Thus, I also propose that

H1b: Authoritarians will be equally as tolerant and supportive of democracy as libertarians absent normative threat. Exposure to normative threat will increase authoritarian intolerance and decrease support for democracy.

Second, I expect that libertarians will react to existential and normative threat in a manner consistent with Authoritarian Dynamic Theory. Consistent with ADT, I expect that

H2: Libertarians will become more tolerant and more supportive of democracy and less so of autocracy when exposed to normative threat.

This reaction is a way of counteracting a potential authoritarian backlash against both tolerance and democracy. Under such circumstances, attitudinal polarization between libertarians and authoritarians is expected to increase. I also expect that

H3: Libertarians will become more intolerant and decrease their support for democracy when exposed to existential (personal) threat.

This is because their values of autonomy and independence become more difficult to sustain independent of a strong authority to reestablish a safer, more orderly environment. Under such circumstances, I expect attitudinal polarization between libertarians and authoritarians to decrease. As attention shifts from concerns about the normative order to personal circumstances, I also expect that

H4: Under existential (personal) threat, authoritarians will become more tolerant and supportive of democracy.

Conclusion

The concept authoritarianism has developed substantially from its psychoanalytical roots into coherent and an empirically verifiable concept that seeks to explain how individuals come to hold intolerant views. Authoritarianism is now conceived as a value continuum from those who place a high value upon individual autonomy and independence (libertarians), to those who value obedience to authority and social conformity (authoritarians). An individual's ordering of these priorities is shaped by childhood experiences, parent-child dynamics, and broader socialization processes that lead an individual to judge how dangerous the world is.

More recently, the role of threat has been proposed to interact with the authoritarian predisposition and its effect on intolerance in several nuanced ways. First, threats to the normative order are responded to by both libertarians and authoritarians but in opposite directions, with libertarians becoming more tolerant and authoritarians less so. Under such circumstances, authoritarian values are threatened and the respond by

seeking authority to protect these boundaries of group norms. Fearing this authoritarian reaction, libertarians become more tolerant, doubling down on their value system of inclusion that emphasizes diversity and pluralism. Under such circumstances, we see a polarization of intolerant attitudes. Under conditions of personal threat, however, this polarization decreases as authoritarians either do not change their attitudes or become more tolerant and libertarians become less tolerant. Under such circumstances, authoritarians become distracted from their concern for group norm and boundary maintenance and more so on their personal plight. Libertarians become more intolerant because the exercise of autonomy and independence requires a certain threshold of security. Its absence threatens the libertarian value system. In this case, we observe a decrease in attitudinal polarization between the two groups.

These dynamics, however, as well as the concept of authoritarianism itself, need to be established as useful explanators of intolerance and support for institutions in the Middle East. In the next chapter, I test these hypotheses with data from Middle Eastern countries in Wave 6 of the World Values Survey. After validating the applicability of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory in this context, I present an experimental manipulation of Arab Spring threat on intolerance, support for democracy, and support for autocracy in Egypt in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

Authoritarian Dynamic Theory and Its Application in the Middle East: Evidence from the World Values Survey

The analysis in this chapter seeks to test the general applicability of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory in the context of the Middle East. Specifically, I investigate how the perception of normative and personal threat affect social and religious tolerance, support for democracy, and support for autocracy. I expect that authoritarians will generally be more intolerant, less supportive of democracy, and more supportive of autocracy than libertarians under normative threat.⁴⁹ This is because threats to the social and normative order are not yet threatened and authoritarianism's effect on intolerance is similarly not activated. Per Hetherington and Weiler (2009), we might also expect no difference between the two groups in threat is already “expressed” in society. In terms of dynamics, I expect that increased normative threat will render libertarians more tolerant, more supportive of democracy, and less supportive of autocracy than authoritarians, whose value system has been threatened. Fearing an authoritarian response to the threat, libertarians are expected to “double down” on their shared values of defending pluralism and diversity, the very thing authoritarians find threatening. This will cause an increase in

⁴⁹ Because authoritarianism is a continuum, percentile cut-offs are discussed for ease of explanation and interpretation. I use the term “authoritarian” to refer to individuals scoring at or above the 75th percentile of the authoritarianism scale. “Libertarian” refers to those at or below the 25th percentile.

attitudinal polarization between the two groups. Perceived personal threat will have the opposite effect, moving libertarians toward the attitudes of authoritarians, resulting in a decrease in polarization. As basic security needs that are necessary for diversity to flourish and personal autonomy to be guaranteed are not met, libertarians become motivated to support a more ordered system that can ensure these basic parameters of their value systems. Finally, authoritarians are expected to become less intolerant and more supportive (or at least less hostile) toward democracy as their concern shifts from maintaining ingroup-outgroup boundaries and norms to their personal affairs.

Data Description

Wave 6 of the World Values Survey (2010-2014) was used to test the hypotheses. The Middle Eastern countries of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories were included in the analyses, totaling 10,517 individual observations. Because of the hierarchical nature of the data, multilevel regression models with country-level random intercept estimations⁵⁰ were used to test the relationships between authoritarianism and threat with intolerance and support for democratic and autocratic institutions.

Measuring Normative Threat

Since this chapter investigates the role of the Arab Spring and the resulting instability on intolerance and support for political institutions, an appropriate measure of normative

⁵⁰ Likelihood ratio testing indicated no statistical difference between random intercept and random slope models. Comparing log likelihoods of both sets of models revealed that the loglikelihood of the random intercept model was lower and thus most appropriate for these analyses.

threat in this context is that to the political system. Since political diversity and disagreement among political elites would be perceived as challenges to dominant national norms, authoritarians should become more intolerant than conditions in which such a threat is absent. Stenner and Feldman (1997) provide precedent for such a measure in the context of the U.S. political system. To create a normative threat variable, the authors rely on a measure of average individual ideological distance from and negative attitudes toward presidential candidates and the Democratic and Republican parties.

The World Values Survey does not directly ask questions related to perceptions of normative threat nor ideological distance from candidates or political parties. However, the survey does inquire about confidence in various political institutions, including the parliament, political parties, and the executive branch government. Following similar logic as Stenner and Feldman, I argue that low confidence in these government institutions is an indicator that the political elite are diverging from the expectations of the individual. Also, because individuals tend to perceive the general public as sharing in their views (Ross, Greene, and House 1977), authoritarian individuals should perceive this divergence from their own preferences as divergence from the that of the general public. That is, authoritarians would regard such a divergence and increased discord as a threat to their perception of consensus, and thus, to their value system. Therefore, *decreased* confidence should *increase* the level of intolerance among more authoritarian individuals. The variable *political threat* ($\alpha=0.79$, $eigenvalue=1.46$) was calculated for each individual as the average of the three responses to the following items, ranging from 1 (none at all) to 4 (a great deal of confidence):

*I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*⁵¹

Parliament

The Government

Political Parties

Measuring Existential Threat

In *The Authoritarian Dynamic*, Stenner (2005) presents empirical evidence that libertarians are susceptible to existential threat. When experiencing an economic downturn, for example, Stenner suggests that libertarians become more intolerant than normal due to a frustration-aggression mechanism (58; see Davis 1962; Gurr 1970; Feierbend et al. 1972; Berkowitz 1998). Similarly, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) find the 9/11 terrorist attacks flatten the slope of the relationship between authoritarianism and a lack of support for civil liberties. That is, libertarians are more willing to give up basic civil liberties in exchange for more protection under conditions of heightened personal threat, whereas there is no change in the relatively high levels of illiberal attitudes among authoritarians. Under conditions of perceived threat to the functioning of daily life, personal autonomy, and safety, authoritarian thinking can enter mainstream political discourse and decrease the effect of authoritarianism on illiberal policy preferences among the general public.

The variable *personal threat* ($\alpha=0.83$, $eigenvalue=2.10$) is comprised of four questions gauging rather extreme economic, medical, food, and physical insecurities

⁵¹ Other institutions, such as the military or the police, were not used do to the relatively low level of variance in support for these institutions in the region.

perceived within the last year. It is derived from the following prompt and response options, which ranged from 1 (Never) to 4 (Often) and were averaged into an index ($M=1.64$, $SD=0.74$):

In the last 12 month, how often have you or your family:

Gone without a cash income
Gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed
Felt unsafe from crime in your home
Gone without enough food to eat

Measuring Authoritarianism: Child Traits Index

Recall that a prominent measure of authoritarianism is comprised of traits that an individual believes a child should possess. Respondents are asked to answer four questions that require a forced-choice preference between an “authoritarian” with a “libertarian” trait. The choices are typically as follows: (1) independence or respect for elders, (2) curiosity or good manners, (3) obedience or self-reliance, and (4) being considerate or well behaved. This measure has been employed in studies employing samples of Westerners and is a common measure of authoritarianism on the American National Elections Survey (ANES) used frequently by Americanists and political psychologists (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Suhay 2011). The measure has been lauded as an improvement over the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) measure, which has been criticized for reasons previously discussed.

The World Values Survey includes similar authoritarian and libertarian child trait items. These items are commonly combined into an index to measure authoritarianism

when employing the survey (Dunn 2014; Napier and Jost 2008; Dunn and Singh, 2011, 2014). Unlike the standard forced-choice responses, however, respondents were asked to choose five out of 11 traits they believed were important for a child to possess. To construct this variable for use in this analysis, four items were used, with two items measuring the libertarian end of the authoritarian spectrum and two items measuring the authoritarian end were chosen as components measuring the concept. Respondents who chose *Obedience* and *Religious Faith* over *Self-Expression* and *Independence* held more authoritarian child trait preferences, placing less of an emphasis on personal autonomy of children and more on obedience and submission. All items were recoded 0 if the respondent did not mention the trait as important and 1 if it was. The items were combined⁵² into an *Child Traits* index ranging from -2 (libertarian) to 2 (authoritarian) ($M=0.54$, $SD=1.09$).

This measure, however, proved to be problematic. The correlation between the two libertarian traits ($r= -0.03$, $p=0.00$) and the authoritarian traits ($r=0.16$ $p=0.00$) were quite low. The correlations between the libertarian and authoritarian traits were negative, but only weakly so. *Independence* correlated with *Obedience* and *Religious Faith* at $r= -0.17$ ($p=0.00$) and $r= -0.09$ ($p=0.00$), respectively. *Self-Expression* were even more weakly correlated with *Obedience* and *Religious Faith* at $r= -0.05$ ($p=0.00$) and $r= -0.08$ ($p=0.00$), respectively. Moreover, the Cronbach's alpha coefficient revealed that the internal consistency of the items as an index was weak, falling well below the suggested threshold for acceptable consistency ($\alpha=0.28$). Principal components analysis also

⁵² The variable was created using the *predict* command after the PCA command and a varimax rotation in Stata 15.1.

revealed empirical weaknesses of this measure. The analysis suggested that the variables loaded onto two factors rather than one, with the second factor being quite weak (*eigenvalue*=1.30 and *eigenvalue*=1.04). When restricting the four components to one factor, the total variance explained was only 32.42%. *Independence* was strongly and negatively correlated with this factor ($r=0.52$). The correlation of the factor with *Self-Expression*, however, was weak ($r=0.20$). *Obedience* and *Religious Faith* were strongly and positively correlated with this factor ($r=0.63$ and 0.55 , respectively). Finally, the amount of unexplained variance for each component of the factor was also quite high. For *Independence* and *Self-Expression*, the amount of unexplained variance was 66.50% and 95.03%, respectively. For *Obedience* and *Religious Faith*, the unexplained variance was 48.87% and 60.83% respectively.

The *child traits* measure is also theoretically problematic in the context of collectivist cultures like those in the Middle East (Harik and Marston 1996), where authoritarian parenting styles are common (Dwairy et al. 2006). The cultural norms of collectivist cultures emphasize similar values as the authoritarian motivation for in-group cohesion and individualistic cultural norms similar to those of libertarians. In collectivist cultural system, child rearing focuses on in-group solidarity and obligations to that group (Triandis 1989; Triandis, McCusker, and Hui 1990). This is opposed to individualist cultures that emphasize individual autonomy that is often more valued than concerns and norms of the broader group to which the individual belongs (Killen and Wainryb 2000; Triandis 1988).

In Western individualistic cultures, authoritarianism is thought to be the result of harsh, punitive parenting that leads children to become sensitive to social conformity and

threats to it. In the West, these practices are theoretically tied to intolerance and authoritarian parenting in individualistic cultures would contravene the cultural norm of encouraging individual autonomy. This internalized relationship with authority leaves these individuals maladapted to navigate the tension between the values with which they were instilled and individualism that is insisted upon in Western culture. This unresolved tension encourages these individuals to seek out security and shelter from established authority when their value system is threatened, causing rigid adherence to their value system and suppressed aggression (Oesterreich 2005).

Though Middle Eastern parenting can be overly protecting and controlling (Harik and Marston 1996), authoritarian parenting is generally not associated with a lack of warmth, maladaptation, or inflexible, rigid behavior as it is in the West (Rudy and Grusec 2001, 2006). In collectivist cultures where the importance of the family and group are placed above that of the individual, a measure of authoritarianism that relies on preferred child traits would at the very least be confounded with—if not indicative of—cultural norms toward childrearing and therefore would be an unlikely correlate of prejudice and intolerance.⁵³ In conjunction with the preceding empirical weaknesses of the measure, this suggests that using the *child traits* measure of authoritarianism is inappropriate for capturing the tension between submission to authority and deference to personal autonomy in this context.

⁵³ Empirically, this also seems likely because the item “obedience” was mentioned by 47.96% of the respondents in Wave 6. Only 18.06% and 39.48% of respondents mentioned the other items that measured “libertarian” attitudes toward child preferences (imagination and independence), respectively.

Measuring Authoritarianism: *Authoritarian Submission Index*

The inadequacy of the *child traits* measure requires the construction of an alternative measure of authoritarianism. Altemeyer (1981) contends that authoritarianism is comprised of three core components: submission to authority, aggression, and conventionalism. However, as Feldman (2003) argues, conservatism (conventionalism) is not a core component of the concept but should nonetheless correlated with it (p.67). Stenner (2005) further clarifies the relationship between authoritarianism and conservatism by noting that an underlying motivation of conservatism is the maintenance of the status quo, whereas authoritarians are motivated to maintain of the status quo so long as it supports and protects cultural sameness and does not contribute to disorder and the dissolution of group boundaries. If not, authoritarians are not opposed to rejecting the status quo in favor of authority that will enforce cultural oneness and unifying norms.

As for aggression, Feldman (2003) contends that authoritarians become aggressive toward outgroups when they are perceived as threatening social order and common norms. These individuals then seek out authority figures to punish those who deviate from these norms and to restrict their ability to do so (67). Passini (2017) provides empirical evidence that aggression is not an inherently detectable component of authoritarianism absent normative threat:

“...authoritarian submission seems to more specifically detect a passive obedience to authority which may support violent actions towards minorities and outgroups in the case of social threat. That is, authoritarian submission seems to detect people who may be considered as “latent aggressive” individuals. Indeed, even if these people preferred to stay in the background, did not intend to keep supremacy and control over others, and did not oppose universalism values, in the event of external threat they might shift their passivity into more blatant and direct hostile and aggressive behaviors (81).”

Instead of a conceptualization of authoritarianism that includes Altemeyer's three sub-components, both Feldman (2003) and Passini (2017) advocate for a theoretical understand of the concept that is, at its core, authoritarian submission. That is, individuals whose worldview reflects a preference for submission to authority and group conformity over individual autonomy and diversity. It should be considered separately from aggression, which is arguably a byproduct of threats to this this value system.⁵⁴ It should also not be confounded with or contain elements that measure conservatism, as this is theoretically problematic (Stenner 2005; Feldman 2003; Passini 2017).

For these reasons, an alternative measure of authoritarians was developed that solely measures authoritarian submission and obedience. Wave 6 of the World Values Survey contained three items that explicitly reflected this tendency. The first item, *authority*, addresses the authoritarian value of respect for and submission to authority. The variable was reversed to range from 1 (Bad) to 3 (Good) and poses the following question:

I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?

Greater respect for authority

The second component, *behaved*, was included to reflect the emphasis authoritarians place on group conformity and deference to social norms. Responses to *behaved* were

⁵⁴ For more research that has similarly deconstructed authoritarianism into a multidimensional concept, see Duckitt & Fisher 2003; Funke 2005; Passini 2008; Stellmacher & Petzel 2005.

reversed in the direction of an authoritarian answer, ranging from 1 (Not at all like me) to 6 (Very much like me) and represents the responses to the following item:

Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you?

It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.

The final component of this measure, *parents proud*, captures the respondent's tendency to submit to and please authority by asking respondents to evaluate the authoritarian dynamic of her own relationship with her parents. The item reflects the individual's perceived relationship with authority rather than the expression of preferences for others' relationship with authority, as is captured in the child traits measure. The item was reversed to range from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 4 (Strongly agree) and reflects the responses to the following question:

One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud.

The items held together much better as components of a measure of the underlying concept of authoritarianism than did the proposed child traits measure. The correlation between *behaved* and *authority*, *behaved* and *parents proud*, and *authority* and *parents proud* was $r=0.15$ ($p=0.00$), $r=0.22$ ($p=0.00$), and $r=0.21$ ($p=0.00$), respectively. Though still under the suggested threshold of $\alpha=0.70$ for internal consistency, the measure was much more internally consistent than *child traits* ($\alpha=0.42$).

Principal Components Analysis (PCA) revealed one common factor⁵⁵ (*eigenvalue*=1.39) that accounted for 46.22% of the variance, much higher than that accounted for by the child traits index. The amount of unexplained variance for each component was also lower for these items than it was for the child traits index and ranged from 47.1% to 58.6%. Moreover, the correlations of each item with the factor was much higher than the *child traits* components, ranging from $r=0.55$ to $r=0.62$. For these empirical and theoretical reasons, the items were combined⁵⁶ into the *authoritarian submission* index and used as the main independent variable in the subsequent analyses. The resulting variable ranges from -5.83 (most libertarian) to 1.21 (most authoritarian) ($M=0$, $SD=1.18$).⁵⁷

Additionally, this avoids the theoretical problem using preferred child traits to measure authoritarianism in a collectivist cultural context. This renders *authoritarian submission* a more valid construct of the measure because preferences for certain child traits might represent a cultural norm rather than authoritarianism that is linked to intolerance. Indeed, the *child traits* measure appears to tap another concept other than authoritarianism in this context. The correlation between *authoritarian submission* and the child traits measure is weak ($r=0.19$). The child traits measure did not correlate with attitudinal items that have been found to be correlated with authoritarianism, such as

⁵⁵ The next highest eigenvalue was 0.85 and only explained 28.43% of the total variance.

⁵⁶ The variable was created using the *predict* command after the PCA command and a varimax rotation in Stata 15.1.

⁵⁷ Admittedly, the measure suffers from weak internal consistency. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient did not meet the suggested threshold of $\alpha=0.70$. However, the three items that comprise the scale are much more internally consistent than the proposed child traits measure and loaded onto one rather than two dimensions. The *authoritarian submission* variable directly measures the core component of authoritarianism (submission and obedience to authority) that is implicitly captured by the child traits measure, rendering it a more valid construct of the concept. Because of its immediate relevance to an individual's relationship with authority, it also explains more variance than the *child traits* variable can.

nationalism and conventionalism (Altemeyer 1981, 1996). For example, the child traits measure correlated weakly with a variable⁵⁸ capturing national pride ($r=0.12$, $p=0.00$), but the correlation was much higher between this variable and *authoritarian submission* ($r=0.27$, $p=0.00$). The child traits measure was also weakly correlated with conventionalism⁵⁹ ($r=0.17$, $p=0.00$) and *authoritarian submission* more strongly so ($r=0.38$, $p=0.00$).

For these reasons, measuring authoritarianism with the unidimensional *authoritarian submission* index represents an empirical and theoretical improvement upon the child traits items in the World Values Survey that has been employed in previous studies, at least in the context of the Middle East.

Measuring Intolerance

Tolerance encompasses the willingness to extend civil and political rights to groups and individuals one finds objectionable. However, because many of these rights are weak or non-existent in the MENA region, tolerance is often measured by the extent to which an individual extends acceptance of others into their community and neighborhoods (e.g. Ciftci 2010; Moaddel 2007; Spierings 2014). To measure intolerance in this chapter, two variables were chosen that represent social and religious intolerance. The social intolerance variable was created from an item asking respondents whether they would *not* wish to have various types of neighbors. These proposed neighbors included individuals of another race, foreigners, those with AIDS, homosexuals, those of a

⁵⁸ V211: “How proud are you to be [nationality]?” The variable was recoded to range from “1” (Not at all proud) to “4” (Very proud).

⁵⁹ V79: “Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family.” The variable was recoded to range from 1 (Not at all important) to 6 (Very important).

different religion, alcoholics, unmarried couples, and those who speak a different language. If respondents mentioned that they would not like to live next to an individual in one of these categories, each variable was coded as 1, otherwise 0. The eight variables were averaged into a *neighbor index* ($\alpha=0.71$, $eigenvalue=1.92$, $M=0.49$, $SD=0.27$). A second indicator captures religious intolerance. Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed with the statement, "*The only true religion is my religion.*" The variable *religion* was recoded in the direction of agreement with this statement and ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) ($M=3.46$, $SD=0.80$).

Control Variables

Several control variables were used in the subsequent analyses that are related to intolerance or authoritarianism. In studies of authoritarianism, gender has been found to have inconsistent and contradictory effects on intolerance and restrictions on civil liberties. However, empirical evidence suggests that women are at least somewhat more prone to hold negative views toward pro-immigration policies and more willing to forgo civil liberties after a terrorist attack (see tables from Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 170; Hetherington and Suhay 2011). *Male* is coded as 0 if the respondent was female (50.23%) and 1 if the respondent was male.

Education tends to be negatively correlated with authoritarianism and intolerance (McFarland 1998, 1999; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Gibson 1992; Stouffer 1955), both of which tend to be more strongly with working class status (Lipset 1959). Indeed, Stenner (2005) remarks, "Ultimately, there is no more important determinant of authoritarianism than (lack of) education" (p.154). Highly educated individuals have developed the

knowledge and cognitive tools to deal with complexities and differences, a trait that authoritarians tend to lack (Stenner 2005 161). The variable *education* ranges from 1 (*no formal education*) to 9 (*university-level education, with degree*) ($M=5.14$, $SD=2.79$). As education is usually correlated with income, a variable capturing the levels of individual income was also calculated and ranges from 1 (lowest step) to 10 (highest step) ($M=5.13$, $SD=2.17$).

Religiosity is also correlated with intolerance (Feagin 1964; Kirkpatrick 1993; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, and Kirkpatrick 2002) and authoritarian values of obedience to and respect for religious authority (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Indeed, Brandt and Reyna (2014) find evidence that authoritarianism and traditionalism are contributing factors to fundamentalist intolerance. The variable *religiosity* captures the importance of religion in the respondent's life, ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important) ($M=3.79$, $SD=0.54$). Because conservatism tends to be at least moderately correlated with authoritarianism and religiosity, a variable capturing *ideology* was included in the analyses. The variable ranges from 1 (Left-liberal) to 10 (Right-conservative) ($M=6.17$, $SD=2.32$).

Additionally, the age of respondents was included as a control variable. Many scholars and journalists⁶⁰ have credited the youth and their social media savviness for the outbreak of the Arab Spring demonstrations and the demand for an end to authoritarian rule (Lynch 2013; 70). This frustration was viewed as an outgrowth of economic

⁶⁰ "Arab Youth Look Forward in Anger," *The Economist* online, last modified August 6, 2016, <https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21703362-treating-young-threat-arab-rulers-are-stoking-next-revolt-look-forward-anger>.

frustrations and lack of opportunities that have plagued the growing population of Arab youth (Mulderig 2013). Age ranged from 16-99 years of age ($M=38.12$, $SD=14.25$).

Finally, nationalism is a known predictor of hostility toward minority groups and intolerance (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). To account for this, *national Pride* was derived from the following survey item: “*How proud are you to be [nationality]?*” Responses ranged from 1 (not proud at all) to 4 (very proud) ($M=3.60$, $SD=0.63$).

The mean individual in this dataset is female, middle income, middle aged, proud of her nationality, religious, leans conservative, and has completed secondary school. She is slightly authoritarian, though she believes that democracy is important and a good political system. Her responses indicate that autocratic and military governments are unfavored. Despite this relative support for democracy at the expense of autocracy, she was moderately intolerant, naming nearly half of the neighbors as individuals next to whom she would not want to live. She also agreed with the statement that her religion was the only acceptable religion.

Hypotheses 1: Intolerance

Per the Authoritarian Dynamic theoretical framework, authoritarians should generally be more intolerant than libertarians. Libertarians experiencing low *political confidence* (high normative threat) should be more tolerant compared with libertarians experiencing high levels of *political confidence* (low normative threat) and compared with authoritarians in general, regardless of threat perception. In terms of *personal threat*, I expect that the more libertarians experience a shortage of income, medical treatment, crime, and hunger, the more intolerant they will become, thus decreasing the polarization

between libertarians and authoritarians. Finally, authoritarians should be less intolerant when *personal threat* is high, as they shift their focus from concerns of maintaining group boundaries and norms to worrying about their personal stresses.

Results: Political Confidence, Authoritarianism, and Intolerance

Table 3.1 presents the fixed portion of the multilevel regression results predicting intolerance as a function of authoritarianism and perceived normative and existential threats. *Ideology* (conservatism), *national pride ideology*, and *religiosity* are all positive and statistically significant predictors of intolerance under normative threat, as depicted in Columns 1-4 ($p < 0.10$). Increases in *income* and *education* were negatively related to intolerance in the region ($p < 0.05$). These correlates are consistent with results in Western samples.

Columns 1 and 3 present the main effects of the variables on intolerance toward neighbors and other religions without the interaction between *authoritarian submission* and *political confidence*. As expected, *authoritarian submission* is a statistically significant predictor of these measures of intolerance ($p = 0.00$). The coefficient of *political confidence* is also positive and statistically significant in Column 3 ($p < 0.05$). Without accounting for the interaction with authoritarianism, higher *political confidence* (lower normative threat) in political parties, the government, and parliament, *increases* intolerance. Religiosity has a consistently positive and statistically significant effect on intolerance. As with Western samples, income and education have a negative and statistically significant effect on intolerance in models 1-4. Finally, males tend to be more intolerant than females, with *male* reaching statistical significance in 2 of the 4

models. Interestingly, *age* is negatively related to intolerance and achieves statistical significance in 2 of the 4 models in Table 3.1. Holding the other variables at their means, the younger generations of respondents were slightly more intolerant than their elders, though the coefficient is too small to have substantive meaning and implications.

Table 3.1: Authoritarianism and Threat Interactions Predicting Intolerance	(1) Undesirable Neighbors Mentioned (%)	(2) Undesirable Neighbors Mentioned (%)	(3) Only My Religion Is True Religion	(4) Only My Religion Is True Religion	(5) Undesirable Neighbors Mentioned (%)	(6) Undesirable Neighbors Mentioned (%)	(7) Only My Religion Is True Religion	(8) Only My Religion Is True Religion
Authoritarian Submission	0.00827*** (0.00299)	0.0268*** (0.00757)	0.0984*** (0.00912)	0.170*** (0.0231)	0.0126*** (0.00289)	0.0226*** (0.00692)	0.0990*** (0.00882)	0.168*** (0.0210)
Political Confidence	0.0288*** (0.00446)	0.0276*** (0.00448)	0.0339** (0.0136)	0.0295** (0.0137)				
Auth. Submission x Political Confidence		- 0.00915*** (0.00344)		-0.0355*** (0.0105)				
Personal Threat					0.0252*** (0.00473)	0.0243*** (0.00476)	0.0221 (0.0144)	0.0164 (0.0145)
Auth. Submission x Personal Threat						-0.00576 (0.00359)		- 0.0397*** (0.0109)
Age	-0.000285 (0.000246)	-0.000299 (0.000246)	-0.000820 (0.000753)	-0.000881 (0.000752)	-0.000302 (0.000238)	-0.000300 (0.000238)	- 0.00143** (0.000725)	-0.00141* (0.000724)
Ideology	0.00813*** (0.00135)	0.00802*** (0.00135)	0.0416*** (0.00413)	0.0412*** (0.00413)	0.00802*** (0.00130)	0.00800*** (0.00130)	0.0417*** (0.00397)	0.0415*** (0.00397)
National Pride	0.0107** (0.00525)	0.0101* (0.00525)	0.112*** (0.0162)	0.110*** (0.0162)	0.0109** (0.00513)	0.0110** (0.00513)	0.114*** (0.0158)	0.115*** (0.0157)
Income	-0.00410** (0.00166)	-0.00397** (0.00166)	-0.0215*** (0.00508)	-0.0210*** (0.00508)	-0.00185 (0.00164)	-0.00191 (0.00164)	- 0.0201*** (0.00498)	- 0.0205*** (0.00497)
Education	- 0.00877*** (0.00139)	- 0.00898*** (0.00139)	-0.0227*** (0.00423)	-0.0235*** (0.00424)	- 0.00876*** (0.00134)	- 0.00878*** (0.00134)	- 0.0240*** (0.00408)	- 0.0242*** (0.00408)
Male	0.0139** (0.00644)	0.0139** (0.00643)	0.0218 (0.0197)	0.0214 (0.0197)	0.0118* (0.00622)	0.0122* (0.00622)	0.0210 (0.0189)	0.0236 (0.0189)
Religious	0.00984* (0.00578)	0.0103* (0.00578)	0.184*** (0.0176)	0.185*** (0.0176)	0.0137** (0.00564)	0.0142** (0.00565)	0.180*** (0.0172)	0.184*** (0.0172)
Constant	0.387*** (0.0423)	0.391*** (0.0424)	2.165*** (0.131)	2.183*** (0.131)	0.376*** (0.0431)	0.374*** (0.0432)	2.222*** (0.133)	2.209*** (0.134)
Observations	5,886	5,886	5,790	5,790	6,358	6,358	6,247	6,247
Countries	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9


Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

However, the effect of *political confidence* on the number of neighbors mentioned and a respondent's religious intolerance is conditional upon a respondent's *authoritarian submission* score. The interaction coefficients in Columns 2 and 4 are statistically significant and negative in both cases ($p=0.00$). The left-hand panel of Figure 3.1 plots the predicted percentage of undesirable neighbors named as a function of the interaction between *authoritarian submission* and *political confidence*.⁶¹ The right-hand panel displays predicted levels of religious intolerance, measured by the degree to which the respondent believes only their religion is the one true religion. The solid black line in both models indicates the relationship between authoritarianism at low⁶² levels of threat on the dependent variables. The dashed grey line indicates the same relationship at high levels of threat. Predicted values are calculated for libertarians and authoritarians at the 25th and 75th percentiles of *authoritarian submission*, respectively, for ease of explanation.

⁶¹ In the subsequent analyses, I will use the term “high normative threat” to indicate “low political confidence” and “low normative threat” to indicate “high political confidence” for ease of explanation and reference. High normative is defined as the lowest value of political confidence (1) and low normative threat is defined as the highest value of political confidence (4).

⁶² Low level threat is defined at *political confidence*=4, indicating the highest level of confidence. High threat is defined as *political confidence*=1, indicating the lowest level of confidence.

Figure 3.1



In the left panel of Figure 3.1, the slope of the solid black line is flat, indicating that when normative threat is low, there is little or no difference between libertarians and authoritarians in the percentage of undesirable neighbors they named. Libertarians named 55.71% of the possible groups as undesirable and authoritarians named 54.31%, a statistically insignificant difference of 1.41% ($SE=1.06\%$). When normative threat is high, however, the difference in the percentage of neighbors mentioned between libertarians and authoritarians grows by 2.52% and becomes statistically significant ($SE=0.66\%$). Both became less intolerant, but the comparatively larger decrease in the percentage of neighbors mentioned for libertarians, from 55.71% to 46.64% compared with that of authoritarians from 54.31% to 48.15% now renders authoritarians statistically more intolerant than libertarians. The -10.08% fewer neighbors mentioned by libertarians

is statistically significant ($SE=1.44\%$), as is the -6.15% decrease of highly threatened authoritarians.

Polarization of attitudes between these two groups increased as expected, with libertarians moving in a more tolerant direction compared with libertarians experiencing no normative threat. Though the slopes of the two low and high normative threat lines are in the expected directions and the dynamics of libertarianism and threat moved in the predicted, negative direction, the slight decrease in authoritarian intolerance is unexpected.

The right-hand panel of Figure 2 depicts the interaction between *authoritarian submission* and normative threat predicting agreement with the belief that one's religion is the only true religion. Again, the solid black line plots the relationship between *authoritarian submission* and agreement with this statement when normative threat is low. The dashed grey line plots the same relationship when normative threat is high. Recall that, per the Authoritarian Dynamic framework, it is expected that there will be no difference between libertarians and authoritarians in terms of intolerance when normative threat is low. When normative threat libertarians and authoritarians are expected to move in opposite directions, with libertarians becoming more tolerant and authoritarians less so.

Indeed, when normative threat is low, the difference between libertarian ($M=3.35$) and authoritarian ($M=3.39$) agreement with this statement is statistically insignificant ($\Delta=0.04$, $SE=0.03$). When normative threat is high, however, libertarian agreement with this statement decreases from 3.35- to 3.19-points, a -0.16-point decrease that is statistically significant ($SE=0.04$). Authoritarian agreement is virtually unchanged

between the two threat conditions ($\Delta = -0.01$, $SE = 0.05$). Finally, libertarians experiencing high normative threat are statistically significantly more tolerant than authoritarians by 0.19-points ($SE = 0.02$). Again, libertarians become more tolerant than authoritarians when normative threat is high. Contrary to expectations, however, authoritarians were unmoved by threat.

In these two analyses, libertarians behaved in a manner consistent with ADT. Exposure to normative threat decreased intolerance, thus increasing attitude polarization. Otherwise, both libertarians and authoritarians were equally as (in)tolerant. However, this increase in polarization was driven by libertarian reactions to normative threat and not by threatened authoritarians, who were either unmoved by normative threat or actually became slightly more tolerant. The overall pattern of polarization is consistent with ADT, though the within-group dynamics that theoretically fuel them are largely driven by threatened libertarians.

Results: Personal Threat, Authoritarianism, and Intolerance


In Columns 5-8 of Table 3.2, *authoritarian submission* is again statistically significant and a positive predictor of the social and religious intolerance indicators. *Personal threat* is statistically significant in 3 of the 4 models. The positive coefficients in the models indicate that *personal threat* is associated with higher levels of intolerance, consistent with previous research on the role of threat in shaping intolerance in general (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Again, religiosity is positively and statistically significantly associated with intolerance. *Income* and *education* are also statistically significant and negatively related to social and religious intolerance in Models 5-8, and

age is negative in 2 of the 4 models. Finally, males are positively associated with intolerance and the coefficients are statistically significant in 2 of the 4 models.

In Columns 6 and 8 of Table 3.2, the interaction between perceived *personal threat* and *authoritarian submission* is negatively related to both social and religious intolerance indicators, though the interaction in Column 6 just misses statistical significance in predicting the percentage of undesirable neighbors mentioned ($p=0.11$). Figure 3.2 depicts the effects of the interaction between *authoritarian submission* and *personal threat* on the percentage of undesirable neighbors mentioned in the left panel and agreement with the intolerant religious statement in the right panel. The solid black lines plot the predicted values of *authoritarian submission* on the dependent variable when threat is low⁶³ and the dashed grey lines depict the same relationship when threat is high.

⁶³ High threat is calculated at the highest value of *personal threat* (4) and low threat is calculated at the lowest value of the variable (1).

Figure 3.2



When personal threat is low, the slope of the relationship between authoritarianism and the number of undesirable neighbors mentioned is positive. Libertarians who do not feel threatened name 46.58% of the total possible neighbors in the survey and authoritarians name 49.00%. The difference of 2.41% is statistically significant ($SE=0.57\%$), deviating from the expectation that intolerance under non-threatening conditions would not differ between these two groups.

At the highest level of *personal threat*, libertarians become more intolerant as expected, increasing the percentage of neighbors mentioned from 46.58% to 55.01%, a statistically significant difference of 8.43% ($SE=1.52\%$). At the same level of *personal threat*, authoritarians also become more intolerant, naming 5.96% more undesirable neighbors, a statistically significantly higher percentage than unthreatened authoritarians

($SE=1.74\%$). The 0.06% difference between libertarian and authoritarian percentages when personal threat is high is statistically indistinguishable from zero ($SE=1.23\%$). As expected, the polarization between libertarian and authoritarian intolerance decreased because of increasing libertarian intolerance when personal threat is high.

The right-hand panel of Figure 3.2 plots the interaction of the *authoritarian submission* and *personal threat* in predicting agreement with the statement that the respondent's religion is the only true religion. Recall that the dependent variable ranges from 1 (no agreement) to 4 (very strong agreement). When personal threat is the lowest, libertarians rate agreement with this statement a 3.21 and authoritarians a 3.39. This 0.18-point difference is statistically significant ($SE=0.02$). Again, despite the absence of perceived personal threat, authoritarians are more intolerant than libertarians.

Moving from the lowest to highest value of *personal threat*, libertarian intolerance increases from 3.21 to 3.34, a statistically significant increase of 0.13-points ($SE=0.05$). Authoritarians are unmoved by this increase in *personal threat* ($\Delta = -0.04$, $SE=0.05$). The increase in libertarian intolerance rendered the difference in intolerance between the two groups statistically insignificant ($\Delta=0.01$, $SE=0.04$).

Consistent with expectations, libertarians became more intolerant when exposed to personal threat, thus decreasing the polarization in intolerance between the two groups. When exposed to normative threat, they become *more* tolerant, as expected. However, authoritarians were inconsistently reactive to personal threat, and when they were reactive, they became *more*, not less, intolerant. The inconsistent reaction of authoritarians to personal threat was also apparent with normative threat. Despite the inability to draw more definitive conclusions about the reactions of authoritarians, the

general pattern of decreased polarization in intolerant attitudes—driven by libertarians—is consistent with ADT and findings in Western samples.

Hypotheses 2: Support for Democracy

Recall that I hypothesized that the Authoritarian Dynamic Theory framework is applicable to support for political institutions in addition to tolerance. As inter-group competition increases the uncertainty in the context of once-stable autocratic political arrangements in unstable regimes and because strong, decisive leadership is more difficult to achieve in a system that emphasizes political compromise, authoritarians should be less supportive of democracy than libertarians. They should also be more supportive of autocratic political arrangements, as they facilitate such strong, decisive leadership that authoritarians prefer.

The within-group, libertarian-authoritarian dynamics, however, are expected to be different when both personal and normative threat are varied. When normative threat is high, libertarians should become more supportive of democracy as they are expected to fear an authoritarian backlash against such a regime. This is consistent with ADT. Authoritarians should become less supportive of democracy under high normative threat. Because normative threat in these analyses is measured as confidence in political institutions, and because those institutions (i.e. political parties, parliament, and the government) at the time of the survey were relatively more democratic than they were before the Arab Spring, authoritarians who do not have confidence in these institutions are expected to have even less support for democracy. We should observe an increase in polarization in support for democracy under such circumstances.

When normative threat is low (high political confidence), libertarians and authoritarians are expected to be equally as supportive of democracy. As high political confidence is expected to reflect well upon the more democratic political regimes in many of these Arab countries, this confidence is expected to spill over into support for such a regime as “threat” to the fabric of society is perceived as lower. Alternatively, it is possible that authoritarians view democratic institutions as inherently threatening. Under such circumstances, confidence in political institutions might be irrelevant as their very existence challenges the well-established, autocratic political norms that existed before the Arab Spring. If this were the case, authoritarians would be expected to be unmoved by changes to political normative threat. Finally, when normative threat is low, libertarians are expected to be closer to authoritarians in their evaluation of democracy, as they do not have to double down on their values due to fear of an authoritarian backlash.

Recall that, when moving from low to high personal threat, libertarians should become less supportive of democracy, as they would perceive the more democratic governance as ineffective at guaranteeing personal and economic security necessary to exercise personal autonomy. Again, there are two possible reactions of authoritarians. Consistent with ADT, authoritarians might increase their support for democracy (or at least, soften their opposition to it), as the focus shifts from defending societal and political norms to concerns about their personal economic and security situation. However, democracy is still inherently more contentious, with competing ideas, interests, and norms that undermine the predictability and strong, decisive leadership to which authoritarians are drawn. In this case, it is possible that authoritarians either remain steadfast in their opposition to democracy or it *increases*, as an increase in personal threat

contributes to the perception that democracy not only threatens long-establish political norms, but that it also entails increased personal insecurity that threatens their livelihood. In this case, I expect authoritarians to either remain steadfast in their opposition to democracy or increase it.

Measuring Support for Democracy

I rely on two measures for support for democratic regimes. Respondents were asked whether having a democracy was very bad (1), bad (2), good (3), or very good (4) ($M=3.42$, $SD=0.79$). Respondents were also asked the level of importance they place on having a democratic system, ranging from 1 (none at all important) to 10 (very important) ($M=8.23$, $SD=2.20$). Again, threat is operationalized in terms of the *political confidence* and *personal threat* indices, defined earlier in the chapter.

Results: Political Confidence, Authoritarianism, and Support for Democracy

Table 3.2 presents the results of the fixed portion of the random intercepts models, with authoritarianism and threat predicting support for democracy. Contrary to expectations, *authoritarian submission* is *positively* associated with support for democracy in all models. As with tolerance, *education* and *age* are positively and significantly related to support for democracy in all models. The more educated and older respondents are, the higher their support for democracy. *National pride* is also statistically significant in all models, indicating that stronger feelings of national pride are positively correlated with support for democracy. Contrary to the negative correlation between *religious* and tolerance, the variable is positively associated with the democracy

support indicators at statistically significant levels in 4 of the 8 models. As expected, increasing levels of *personal threat* are negatively associated with support for democracy in Models 1-8 ($p < 0.01$). Though normative threat—measured by confidence in political institutions—is negatively associated with the stated importance of democracy, the coefficients are only statistically significant in Models 3 and 4, which predict the importance of democracy. Finally, unlike the coefficients on the interactions predicting intolerance, the interactions in Table 3.2 are all positive and statistically significant in 3 of the 4 models, indicating a different relationship between authoritarianism and threat than that predicting intolerance.

Table 3.2 Authoritarianism and Threat Interactions Predicting Support for Democracy	(1) Democratic System A Good Thing	(2) Democratic System A Good Thing	(3) Importance of Democracy	(4) Importance of Democracy	(5) Democratic System A Good Thing	(6) Democratic System A Good Thing	(7) Importance of Democracy	(8) Importance of Democracy
Authoritarian Submission	0.0900*** (0.00838)	0.0685*** (0.0213)	0.276*** (0.0229)	0.0737 (0.0579)	0.0955*** (0.00810)	0.0168 (0.0192)	0.271*** (0.0221)	0.116** (0.0525)
Political Confidence	-0.000922 (0.0120)	-0.000768 (0.0120)	-0.0602* (0.0329)	-0.0577* (0.0328)				
Auth. Submission x Political Confidence		0.0107 (0.00972)		0.101*** (0.0264)				
Personal Threat					-0.0656*** (0.0122)	-0.0648*** (0.0122)	-0.212*** (0.0335)	-0.210*** (0.0335)
Auth. Submission x Personal Threat						0.0440*** (0.00974)		0.0867*** (0.0266)
Age	0.00128** (0.000648)	0.00129** (0.000648)	0.00441** (0.00178)	0.00451** (0.00178)	0.00149** (0.000628)	0.00149** (0.000627)	0.00495*** (0.00172)	0.00496*** (0.00172)
Ideology	-0.0124*** (0.00369)	-0.0123*** (0.00369)	-0.00274 (0.0102)	-0.00220 (0.0102)	-0.0116*** (0.00356)	-0.0116*** (0.00355)	-0.00383 (0.00977)	-0.00376 (0.00977)
National Pride	0.0712*** (0.0142)	0.0717*** (0.0142)	0.317*** (0.0391)	0.322*** (0.0390)	0.0672*** (0.0139)	0.0665*** (0.0139)	0.283*** (0.0382)	0.282*** (0.0382)
Income	0.00604 (0.00450)	0.00584 (0.00450)	0.0314** (0.0123)	0.0294** (0.0123)	-0.00178 (0.00446)	-0.00144 (0.00446)	0.00870 (0.0122)	0.00939 (0.0122)
Education	0.0238*** (0.00366)	0.0240*** (0.00366)	0.0577*** (0.0100)	0.0597*** (0.0100)	0.0227*** (0.00354)	0.0228*** (0.00353)	0.0546*** (0.00969)	0.0548*** (0.00968)
Male	-0.0307* (0.0176)	-0.0306* (0.0176)	-0.0213 (0.0483)	-0.0203 (0.0483)	-0.0251 (0.0170)	-0.0286* (0.0170)	-0.0135 (0.0466)	-0.0198 (0.0467)
Religiosity	0.108*** (0.0169)	0.108*** (0.0169)	0.0117 (0.0462)	0.00830 (0.0462)	0.103*** (0.0164)	0.0998*** (0.0164)	0.0133 (0.0448)	0.00556 (0.0448)
Constant	2.664*** (0.0987)	2.662*** (0.0986)	6.616*** (0.268)	6.599*** (0.267)	2.841*** (0.100)	2.860*** (0.0999)	7.081*** (0.274)	7.117*** (0.274)
Observations	7,237	7,237	7,345	7,345	7,662	7,662	7,806	7,806
Countries	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10


Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The left panel of Figure 3.3 represents the interaction between normative threat and authoritarianism predicting support for a democratic system of governance. The dashed grey line represents the lowest level of normative threat (high political confidence) and the solid black line plots the highest level of normative threat (low political confidence). What is immediately apparent is that authoritarians are actually *more* supportive of democracy than libertarians, regardless of normative threat perception. When normative threat is low, libertarians rate support for democracy at 3.36 points out of 4 and authoritarians rate it as 3.52 out of 4. The difference of 0.16-points between the two groups is statistically significant ($SE=0.03$). When normative threat is high, libertarian support for democracy remains unchanged, moving statistically insignificant 0.02 points in the direction of support for democracy ($SE=0.04$). Authoritarians are similarly unimpacted by the increase in normative threat. Their support decreases by statistically insignificant -0.02 points ($SE=0.04$). Finally, under high levels of normative threat, the difference between libertarians is still statistically significant ($\Delta=0.11$, $SE=0.02$).

The right-hand panel plots the same interaction predicting the level of importance respondents place on having a democratic system in their country. Again, authoritarians are more supportive of democracy. The difference between authoritarian importance ($M=8.53$) and libertarian importance ($M=7.85$) is statistically significant ($SE=0.08$). Moving from low to high normative threat, libertarians rate democracy as more important than they did when normative threat was low ($M=8.22$). This 0.37-point change is in the expected direction and statistically significant ($SE=0.11$). Authoritarians remain steadfast

in their belief in the importance of living in a democracy. The -0.06-point decrease is statistically insignificant ($SE=0.12$).

Support for the expectation libertarians increase in support for democracy under normative threat is mixed, either remaining unchanged (support for democracy) or increasing (importance of democracy).⁶⁴ Surprisingly, authoritarians are generally more supportive of democracy than libertarians, and that support is not contingent upon perceptions of normative threat.




Results: Personal Threat, Authoritarianism, and Support for Democracy

Figure 3.4 displays the effect of the interaction on general support for a democratic system (left panel) and stated importance of democracy (right panel). The

⁶⁴ A possible reason that there was no change in support for democracy among libertarians is the general tendency of stating that one supports democracy in principle. This would explain the lack of libertarian movement in a less supportive direction.

solid black lines depict the relationship between authoritarianism and the dependent variable when personal threat is low. The dashed grey line depicts the same relationship when threat is high. When personal threat is low, libertarians are again less supportive of democracy than authoritarians, who rate democracy as 3.45 and 3.54, respectively. This difference of 0.09-points is statistically significant ($SE=0.02$). Moving from low to high levels of personal threat, libertarian support for democracy decrease from 3.45 to 3.17, a statistically significant -0.28-point decrease in support ($SE=0.04$). This is consistent with expectations. Support among authoritarians also decreases slightly from 3.54 to 3.45, a statistically significant decrease of -0.09-points ($SE=0.04$). Though this decline in support is unexpected, authoritarians remain more supportive of democracy and the decrease is substantively small. The decrease in support for democracy among libertarians is expected from the extension of ADT to support for democracy.

Figure 3.4
Support for Democracy
Personal Threat Interaction



The right panel of Figure 3.4 plots the interaction between *authoritarian submission* and *personal threat* predicting stated importance of democracy. Again, authoritarians believe democracy is more important than libertarians, who rate the importance as 8.29 and 8.58, respectively. This difference is statistically significant ($SE=0.04$). Moving from low to high personal threat, libertarians rate democracy as far less important. Mean importance falls from 8.29 to 7.49, a statistically significant decrease of -0.80-points ($SE=0.11$). This is consistent with the ADT framework. The importance authoritarians place on democracy also decreases significantly by -0.43-points, from 8.58 to 8.15 ($SE=0.12$). This decrease in importance, however, was half as large as libertarians, suggesting that libertarians are much more responsive to personal threat than authoritarians. Contrary to the expectation that personal threat would decrease polarization, polarization on attitudes toward democracy actually increases. Again, this is due to the expected, negative reaction to personal threat, but also because authoritarians were unexpectedly more democratic than libertarians.

Hypotheses 3: Support for Autocracy

In this section, I investigate support for autocratic institutions to complement the previous analysis of democratic support. Per the ADT framework, I expect authoritarians will be more supportive of autocratic governance and army rule than libertarians. As normative threat increases, libertarians are expected to be less supportive of autocracy (i.e. more democratic), again, doubling down on their value system. Under similar conditions, authoritarians are expected to become more supportive of autocracy, which

promises more decisive leadership than the “rough and tumble” of democratic politics and norms that have, in some Arab countries, been upended by the Arab Spring.

Measuring Support for Autocracy

Two questions were chosen to gauge support for autocratic regimes. Respondents were asked to rate a system in which there is a “*strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections*” on a scale ranging from 1 (a very bad thing) to 4 (a very good thing) ($M=2.41$, $SD=1.12$).⁶⁵ Respondents were also asked about their support for army rule, with responses ranging from 1 (very bad) to 4 (very good) ($M=2.08$, $SD=1.03$).⁶⁶ Normative and personal threat, as well as authoritarianism, are measured using the *political confidence*, *personal threat*, and *authoritarian submission* variables used in the previous analyses in this chapter.

Results: Political Confidence, Authoritarianism, and Support for Autocracy

Table 3.3 presents the results predicting support for autocracy and military rule. *Education* is a consistent, negative predictor of support for both autocratic institutions and army rule in all models, consistent with the effects of this variable on positive support for democracy in the previous section’s analysis. Contrary to empirical evidence

⁶⁵ Recall that part of the *authoritarianism submission* index includes an item asking respondents whether greater respect for authority in the future would be a good or bad thing. This item, however, includes not just support for a strong leader, but also one that does not have to follow democratic processes. This does not merely contain the same content, but the extent to which an individual is willing to support an all-powerful leader at the expense of democracy.

⁶⁶ Again, this item does indicate content that might overlap with an item in the *authoritarian submission* index. However, this item specifies a particular autocratic institution that has a controversial governing past in the region and in the persecution of Islamists of all stripes. One would not expect highly religious authoritarians to support such a governing institution, for instance. This item is meant to capture the extent to which (or if) authoritarians will compromise other interests (e.g. the desire for Islamist politics) in favor of their need for ingroup sameness and obedience to authority.

derived from Western samples, however, income is a *positive* and statistically significantly correlated with support for these indicators in 6 of the 8 models. Unlike the inconsistently significant effects on support for democracy, *national pride*, *ideology*, *male*, and *religious* did not have a statistically significant effect on support for either autocratic governance or army rule.

Surprisingly, authoritarianism alone is a poor predictor of support for autocracy and military governance. In only 3 of the 8 models is *authoritarian submission* statistically significant, and in one model indicates an unexpected negative correlation between authoritarian and support for the dependent variables. *Political confidence* is positive in all 4 models in which it is used, and statistically significant in support for army rule. This indicates that decreased normative threat (increasing political confidence) is associated with an increase in support for army rule. *Personal threat* is positively associated with increased support for both dependent variables in the 4 models in which it is included. Interestingly, these two threats have opposing effects on support for autocracy and army rule, with personal threat increasing support for these arrangements and normative threat decreasing support.


Table 3.3 Authoritarianism and Threat Interactions Predicting Support for Autocracy	(1) Support for Autocratic System	(2) Support for Autocratic System	(3) Support for Army System	(4) Support for Army System	(5) Support for Autocratic System	(6) Support for Autocratic System	(7) Support for Army System	(8) Support for Army System
Authoritarian Submission	-0.00545 (0.0114)	-0.0554* (0.0290)	-0.00258 (0.0126)	0.116*** (0.0320)	-0.00153 (0.0111)	0.0448* (0.0263)	0.000572 (0.0122)	0.0444 (0.0290)
Political Confidence	0.0158 (0.0163)	0.0160 (0.0163)	0.104*** (0.0189)	0.0975*** (0.0189)				
Auth. Submission x Political Confidence		0.0248* (0.0133)		-0.0584*** (0.0145)				
Personal Threat					0.104*** (0.0167)	0.104*** (0.0167)	0.115*** (0.0199)	0.111*** (0.0200)
Auth. Submission x Personal Threat						-0.0258* (0.0133)		-0.0252* (0.0151)
Age	0.000561 (0.000884)	0.000581 (0.000884)	- 0.00347*** (0.00104)	- 0.00358*** (0.00104)	0.000421 (0.000859)	0.000418 (0.000859)	-0.00295*** (0.00100)	-0.00293*** (0.00100)
Ideology	0.000349 (0.00502)	0.000461 (0.00502)	0.000742 (0.00568)	0.000175 (0.00568)	0.00278 (0.00485)	0.00277 (0.00485)	0.00434 (0.00547)	0.00426 (0.00547)
National Pride	0.0115 (0.0194)	0.0126 (0.0194)	0.0179 (0.0224)	0.0145 (0.0224)	0.0164 (0.0190)	0.0166 (0.0190)	0.0309 (0.0219)	0.0313 (0.0219)
Income	0.00726 (0.00611)	0.00678 (0.00612)	0.0237*** (0.00697)	0.0245*** (0.00696)	0.0198*** (0.00610)	0.0196*** (0.00609)	0.0359*** (0.00686)	0.0357*** (0.00686)
Education	-0.0248*** (0.00498)	-0.0243*** (0.00499)	-0.0168*** (0.00585)	-0.0183*** (0.00586)	-0.0231*** (0.00484)	-0.0232*** (0.00484)	-0.0162*** (0.00565)	-0.0163*** (0.00565)
Male	0.0267 (0.0240)	0.0269 (0.0240)	-0.0244 (0.0272)	-0.0248 (0.0271)	0.0228 (0.0233)	0.0249 (0.0233)	-0.0302 (0.0263)	-0.0283 (0.0263)
Religiosity	-0.0285 (0.0231)	-0.0292 (0.0231)	-0.0242 (0.0243)	-0.0221 (0.0243)	-0.0243 (0.0225)	-0.0219 (0.0225)	-0.0208 (0.0237)	-0.0184 (0.0237)
Constant	2.525*** (0.185)	2.522*** (0.185)	2.102*** (0.166)	2.130*** (0.165)	2.262*** (0.186)	2.251*** (0.186)	1.964*** (0.165)	1.956*** (0.165)
Observations	7,115	7,115	5,476	5,476	7,527	7,527	5,882	5,882
Countries	10	10	8	8	10	10	8	8

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Moving from low to high personal threat, I expect that libertarians will become more supportive of autocracy, as deteriorating personal conditions challenge their independence and autonomy. I expect that authoritarians will become *more* supportive of autocracy as deteriorating personal conditions are compounded with the challenges to political norms in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Figure 3.5 plots the interaction between *authoritarian submission* and normative threat predicting support for autocracy (left panel) and support for army rule (right panel). Low threat (high political confidence) is depicted by the dashed grey line in both panels. High threat (low political confidence) is depicted by the solid black lines. When normative threat is low, support for an autocratic system is similar for libertarians ($M=2.44$) and authoritarians ($M=2.50$) and the 0.06-point difference is statistically insignificant ($SE=0.04$).

Figure 3.5



Moving from low to high normative threat has no impact on libertarian attitudes, as the predicted mean for both conditions is 2.44 out of 4 ($SE=0.06$). This is inconsistent with the expectation that normative would render libertarians more democratic and less supportive of autocracy. The same change in normative threat decreases authoritarian support for autocracy by -0.11-points, moving from 2.50 to 2.39, though this change is statistically insignificant ($SE=0.06$). Finally, the 0.04-point difference between libertarians and authoritarians who experience the highest level of normative threat is statistically insignificant ($SE=0.03$). These comparisons indicate that libertarians and authoritarians hold similar levels of support for autocracy, regardless of threat.

The right panel of Figure 3.5 plots the interaction between *authoritarian submission* and normative threat predicting support for an army-run political system. When normative threat is lowest, libertarians are more supportive of such a system than

authoritarians (2.45 and 2.28, respectively). The 0.17-point difference is statistically significant ($SE=0.04$). Though inconsistent with theoretical expectations, this relationship compliments the negative relationship between libertarians and support for democracy.

At high levels of normative threat, both libertarian and authoritarian support for an army system of governance decreases. Libertarian support decreases from 2.45 to 2.05, a statistically significant -0.41-point decline in support ($SE=0.06$). Authoritarian support decreases from 2.28 to 2.13. This -0.16-point decrease is also statistically significant ($SE=0.07$). When normative threat is high, there remains a statistically significant difference between libertarian and authoritarian attitudes of approximately 0.08-points ($SE=0.03$). The direction of the relationship between authoritarianism and threat with the dependent variable has changed from negative to positive. That is, when normative threat was low, libertarians were more supported of an army-run system than authoritarians. When normative threat was highest, however, the dramatic decrease in support for such a system among libertarians compared with the more minor decrease among authoritarians rendered authoritarians more supportive of an army-run system.

The effects of authoritarianism, conditional upon normative threat, on support for autocracy and an army-run political system are mixed. *Authoritarian submission* and *political confidence* had no effect on support for autocratic-style governance, contrary to all expectations. Support for an army system was also inconsistent with expectations. Libertarians were far more supportive of such a system than authoritarians when threat was low and became less supportive than both unthreatened libertarians and threatened authoritarians. This decrease in support for autocracy comports with the expectation that

normative threat would push libertarians to become more democratic and thus less supportive of autocracy.


Another interesting finding is the decreased support for an army-run system when it was expected that authoritarians would become more supportive of such a system under high normative threat. This decrease in support for an army-run system under high normative threat coincides with the high level of importance authoritarians place on democracy, which was statistically unaffected by high normative threat.

Results: Personal Threat, Authoritarianism, and Support for Autocracy

Figure 3.6 plots the effect of *authoritarian aggression* on support for an autocratic system (left panel) and support for an army-run system (right panel), condition upon personal threat. Low personal threat is indicated by the dashed grey line and high personal threat by the solid black line. At the lowest level of personal threat, libertarians and authoritarians support autocracy equally ($M=2.34$, $M=2.37$, respectively; $SE=0.02$). Moving from low to high personal threat increased support among libertarians from 2.34 to 2.71, a statistically significant increase of 0.36-points ($SE=0.06$). Likewise, authoritarian support for an autocratic system increased by 0.25-points, a statistically significant increase from 2.37 to 2.62 ($SE=0.06$). There was no statistical difference between the support for autocracy between the two groups ($\Delta=0.08$, $SE=0.04$).

Figure 3.6

Predicted Support for Autocracy and Army Rule Personal Threat Interaction



The right panel of Figure 3.6 plots the relationship of the interaction predicting support for an army-run system. At the lowest level of personal threat, there is no difference between libertarian support ($M=2.10$) and authoritarian support ($M=2.13$) ($\Delta=0.03$, $SE=0.02$). Moving to the highest level of personal threat, libertarian support increased from 2.10 to 2.48, a statistically significant increase of 0.38-points ($SE=0.06$). Authoritarian support also increased from 2.13 to 2.40. This increase of 0.28-points was statistically significant ($SE=0.07$). Again, the difference between libertarians and authoritarians was not statistically distinguishable from zero ($\Delta=0.08$, $SE=0.05$).

Consistent with ADT, there was no statistical difference between the preferences of libertarians and authoritarians when personal threat was low. Moving from low to high threat, however, increased support for autocracy and an army-run political system for both groups rather than just for libertarians. Authoritarians become more amenable to both types of rule when personal threat is high and decreases support for such systems

when normative threat is high. That is, when authoritarians had little to no confidence in their political parties, parliament, and the government, they increased the importance they placed on living in a democracy, but when their personal livelihoods were threatened, they became less supportive of democracy and more supportive of autocratic arrangements. These findings run counter to expectations made using the ADT framework. Libertarians were much less supportive of democracy and more so of autocracy compared with authoritarians, contrary to expectations. The movements toward and away from democracy and autocracy, however, comport with the expectations of the ADT framework, despite the unexpected baseline lack of support for democracy and stronger support for autocracy of libertarians compared with authoritarians. Personal threat made them more democratic and less supportive of autocracy and normative threat had the opposite effect.

Discussion

I find consistent support that libertarians are affected by perceived normative threat and personal threat in a manner consistent with Authoritarian Dynamic Theory. When political confidence is low (high normative threat), intolerance toward other groups and religions decreases among libertarians, increasing the polarization between both groups. When normative threat is low, libertarian intolerance is lower or similar to that of authoritarians. When perceptions of personal threat are high, libertarians become more intolerant. Authoritarian changes in intolerance when both personal and normative threat changed, however, were inconsistent in the models. For example, authoritarians named fewer undesirable neighbors at high levels of normative threat, rather than fewer.

Conversely, they named more when personal threat was high. There was no statistical change in the belief that an authoritarian's religion is the only true religion when either personal or normative threat increased.

As with tolerance, the dynamics of libertarianism affect support for democracy in a manner consistent with the theoretical extension of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory. Under high levels of personal threat, libertarians become less supportive of democracy. When normative threat is high, authoritarians rate democracy as more important than they did absent such a threat. Authoritarian support for a democratic system also increases, but this effect is statistically insignificant.

When normative threat increase, neither libertarians are unmoved in their support for democracy. Normative threat did, however, increase the importance of democracy among libertarians, as expected, though it had no statistical effect on authoritarian preferences. As expected, increased personal threat decreased support for democracy and its importance among libertarians. Support for a democratic system and the importance of democracy also decreased for personally threatened authoritarians, though this unexpected decrease was much smaller than that of libertarians.

Finally, when normative threat was high, libertarian support for an army-run system of governance decreased as expected, though it also unexpectedly decreased among authoritarians. There was no change within groups in support for an autocratic system at low and high levels of normative threat, and libertarians and authoritarians were statistically similar at low and high levels of such threat. Moving from low to high personal threat, libertarians became more supportive of autocratic systems and army-run systems, as expected. Again, however, authoritarians moved similarly with libertarians,

also becoming more supportive of such systems of governance. From these analyses, I find that increases in aggregate level intolerance and support for autocracy and decreased support for democracy is driven by libertarian reactions to threat. Authoritarians do, in some cases, also increase their levels of intolerance and support for autocracy, but the effects are inconsistent.

Most surprisingly, I find that the theoretical relationship between authoritarianism and support for autocratic and democratic institutions is reversed. Authoritarians are much more supportive of democracy and less so of autocracy compared with libertarians. One possible explanation for high support for democracy and low support for autocracy among authoritarians lies in the particular dynamics of authoritarian rule and the political role of religion in the Middle East. In the next section, I conduct a post-hoc exploration the unexpected and most interesting finding in these analyses that authoritarians were more democratic than libertarians at low and high levels of personal and normative threat. I propose that the timing of the survey and the unique political context of early, post-Arab Spring era exhibited a strong force on authoritarian considerations of democracy. As authoritarians tend to be more religious and as Islamists were granted unprecedented legitimacy as a political force and access to the political system, I surmise that authoritarians adopted more pro-democratic stances as a matter of opportunism rather than a genuine adoption of libertarian values.

Authoritarianism, Political Islam, and Support for Democracy: A Post-Hoc Analysis

One possible explanation for higher support for democracy and lower support for autocracy among authoritarians compared with libertarians lies in the particular dynamics

of authoritarian rule and religion in the Middle East and the theoretical relationship between religiosity and authoritarianism. Before the Arab Spring, Middle Eastern regimes were overwhelmingly secular and hostile toward political Islam. Political religious movements have faced violent regime crackdowns. The Muslim Brotherhood is banned in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. These movements were often chased underground and only briefly held political power in the wake of the Arab Spring. With political-religious parties and movements banned or viewed with regime suspicion, supporters have been unable to openly and effectively debate or implement their political desires in these autocratic systems. During the early days of the Arab Spring, protestors demanded freedom from political oppression and increased political space to air their ideas and grievances. The Muslim Brotherhoods Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt was an Islamist success story that emerged from the overthrow of the oppressive Mubarak regime before being banned again in the latter following the military coup of 2013. In Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda Party similarly came to power through the ballot box only to be expelled from office following the assassination of a vocal, secular opponent in 2013. Furthermore, as one of the most well-organized political and social groups in the region, the Brotherhood offered an agenda that could credibly be implemented once elected into office. Indeed, supporters of the group had much to be hopeful for when the democratic elections were held.

This brief period between 2011-2013 coincides with the fielding of Wave 6 of the World Values Survey used in the preceding analyses in this chapter. It is plausible that religious individuals would be more in favor of democratic governance and be more optimistic about the positive effect democracy would have on their political lives with the

rise of Islamists to power through democratic means. Authoritarianism tends to correlate moderately with religiosity in Western samples, so I suspect that the particular experience of the religious politics in the region weighs heavily on authoritarian support for democracy and antipathy toward autocracy.

There is suggestive evidence of this from the data. Religiosity and authoritarianism are positively and significantly correlated ($r=0.30$, $p=0.00$) and authoritarians were more religious⁶⁷ than their libertarian counterparts ($M=3.91$, 3.64 ; $p=0.00$). T-tests indicate that highly religious individuals were more likely than the non- and low-religious respondents to believe that, in a democracy, “civil rights protect people’s liberty from the state” ($M=7.26$, 5.90 ; $p=0.00$) and “people choose their leaders in free and fair elections” ($M=7.77$, 5.90 ; $p=0.00$). The more religious were also more likely to say that, in a democratic system, “religious authorities interpret the laws” ($M=5.50$, 4.25 ; $p=0.00$). Finally, the differences between support for a democratic system is higher for the highly religious ($M=3.54$) than those for whom religion is less important ($M=3.18$), a statistically significant difference ($p=0.00$). Highly religious individuals also find democracy more important ($M=8.26$) than less religious individuals ($M=7.43$). This difference is highly significant ($p=0.00$). This suggests that highly religious individuals were more optimistic about the protections that democracy would afford individuals. This was coupled with the belief that having religious authorities interpret the laws and run the government was an essential characteristic of democracy.

These differences between highly and less religious individuals are similar to

⁶⁷ The variable *religious* used as a control variable in the analyses in this chapter was dichotomized to conduct difference in means testing. The variable, *religious2*, was coded 0 if *religious* was equal to 1 or 2 (low religiosity) and 1 if equal to 3 or 4 (high religiosity).

those between authoritarians and libertarians. Authoritarians at the 75th percentile of *authoritarian submission* were more likely than libertarians at the 25th percentile to agree that essential characteristics of democracies are to protect civil rights ($M=7.59$ and $M=6.52$, $p=0.00$), choose leaders in free and fair elections ($M=8.08$ and $M=8.86$, $p=0.00$), and to have religious authorities interpret the laws ($M=5.64$ and $M=5.09$, $p=0.00$). Finally, authoritarians were more likely to support a democratic system ($M=3.54$) than libertarians ($M=3.18$). They were also more likely to find democracy important than libertarians ($M=8.53$ and $M=7.70$, $p=0.00$). These results suggest that authoritarianism is very much related to religiosity and that both highly religious, authoritarian individuals were more likely to support democracy because they believed that it would protect their rights and allow them to participate in the government, both of which were nonexistent in Mubarak's Egypt and Ben Ali's Tunisia.

Another possibility is that ideology is confounding the relationship between religiosity and authoritarianism if conservative ideology and religiosity are highly correlated as they are in the West. However, this does not appear to be the case. The correlations between ideology and authoritarianism ($r=0.03$, $p=0.01$) and between ideology and religiosity ($r=0.01$, $p=0.24$) are very close to zero.

There was a statistical difference in conservatism⁶⁸ between authoritarians at the 75th percentile of *authoritarian submission* and libertarians at the 25th percentile, but the difference was small ($M=6.27$, and $M=6.10$, $p=0.00$). This was also the case in the difference between highly religious and low religious individuals ($M=3.81$, $M=3.73$, $p=0.00$). Unlike the highly religious, conservatives were less sure than liberals about the

⁶⁸ *Conservatism* is a dichotomized variable constructed for t-testing. *Conservatism* equaled 1 if *ideology*>5 and 0 if *ideology*<=5.

essential characteristics of democracy, though these differences were small. Compared with liberals, conservatives were slightly less likely to say that the following were essential characteristics of a democracy: Civil rights protect individuals from the state ($M=7.16$ and $M=7.33$, $p=0.00$) and free and fair elections ($M=7.63$ and $M=7.93$, $p=0.00$). They were, however, more slightly more likely to believe that religious authorities interpret the laws ($M=5.58$ and $M=5.05$, $p=0.00$). There was no real substantive difference between conservatives and liberals on support for a democratic system ($M=3.41$, $M=3.45$, $p=0.01$) or the importance of democracy ($M=8.23$ and $M=8.23$, $p=0.94$).

I also conducted a factor analysis to investigate whether authoritarianism, religiosity, and ideology could be summarized by the same underlying concept. Conducting principle components analysis (CPA), I find that these variables combine best into two factors. *Authoritarian submission* and *religious* correlated strongly with the first factor ($r=0.71$ and $r=0.70$, $eigenvalue=1.34$). *Ideology* loaded onto the second factor ($r=1.00$, $eigenvalue=1.00$). Restricting the analysis to a two-factor solution left 33.10% of the variance unexplained in *authoritarian submission*, 32.9% unexplained in *religiosity*, and 0.00% unexplained in *ideology*, the latter loading completely onto the second factor. Restricting the CPA to one factor, however, increased the amount of variance unexplained in *ideology* to 99.10%.

There is little evidence that conservatism was driving support for democracy in this dataset. The correlation between authoritarianism and religiosity was moderate and significant and that between authoritarianism and ideology was not. There were also similar changes in attitudes toward democracy among libertarians and the less religious

compared with authoritarians and the highly religious. There were also differences between conservatives and liberals, but these differences were very small and in the opposite direction, with liberals being more supportive of democracy. Moreover, principle components analysis revealed that the variables most appropriately loaded onto two factors, not one.

This evidence suggests that religiosity is very much related to authoritarianism in the Middle East, but not conservatism. This relationship is different than in the West, where conservatism (conventionalism) is often used as a theoretical component of the concept (Altemeyer, 1981). These findings suggest that measures that rely on religious content, such as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), would probably be measuring two separate concepts if used in research in the region. As ideology is unrelated to support for a democratic system ($r=-0.03$, $p=0.01$) and the believed importance of democracy ($r=-0.01$, $p=0.28$), any measure that contains an ideological component dilute and underestimate the relationship between authoritarianism and support for democracy. This is also true for measuring intolerance, as the correlation between ideology and intolerance having certain groups as neighbors ($r=0.05$, $p=0.00$) and religious intolerance ($r=0.10$, $p=0.00$) are also low.

In the context of the Middle East, authoritarians tend to be more religious and more likely to believe that their civil rights and free and fair elections would be protected under a democratic regime. These data comport with the general trend of authoritarian support for democracy and their lack of support for autocratic institutions. However, caution should be noted when interpreting these results in the context of the Middle East. Rather than authoritarians being supportive of democratic institutions because they value

them for the liberal values they protect, it is possible that they approach support for democracy in a more transactional way. Evidence for this is apparent in the comparatively high levels of social and religious intolerance found in analyses early in this chapter. That is, their preferences for institutions might be motivated by political opportunity whereas authoritarian intolerance is not. Support for democratic institutions and antipathy toward autocratic rule appears to be rooted in the collective experience of the repression of many religious movements and the political participation of Islamists by secular autocrats rather than representing a total reversal of the autonomy-authority values dynamic inherent in the Authoritarian Dynamic framework.

Further evidence of the contextual nature of authoritarian support is presented in the next chapter where I experimentally manipulate exposure to Arab Spring threat in 2017 (approximately 4 years after the fielding of Wave 6 of the World Values Survey). I find that the expected relationship between authoritarianism, support for democracy, and support for autocracy comports with the original, theoretical expectations. After 3 years of new waves of crackdowns on Islamists in the region and their exit from power appears to have rendered authoritarians less supportive of democracy and more supportive of autocracy.

Conclusion

The results of the preceding analyses demonstrate the importance of investigating the Authoritarian Dynamic in a comparative context. Future investigation of the posited hypotheses concerning the role of Islam in public life should be pursued to validate the theoretical role of secular vs. religious politics and motivations in the context of the

Middle East in the wake of the instability of the Arab Spring. Regardless of the motivations behind these observed dynamics, however, the apparent relationship between the Authoritarian Dynamic, intolerance, and institutions evinces a sobering reality in modern Middle East politics. The coupling of authoritarian intolerance toward religious and social minorities, the lack of support for democracy and the increased support for autocratic regimes among threatened libertarians paints a gloomy picture for popular support for democratic transitions in non-democratic regimes in the region.

Though all of the countries included in these analyses were in some way affected by the Arab Spring, not all have been continuously exposed to threatening environments. To investigate more precisely the effect of Arab Spring on intolerance and preferences for political institutions, the next chapter focuses on post-uprising Egypt. I present a laboratory experiment carried out in early 2017. The purpose of the experiment was to establish a clearer causal path between the authoritarianism, intolerance, and preferences for autocracy and democracy as contingent upon Arab Spring threat messaging.

The experiment also hopes to shed light on the unexpected finding that authoritarians, regardless of threat exposure or threat type, were highly supportive of democracy and libertarians were not. The surveys used in this chapter were taken during an encouraging period for Islamists in politics, and the favorability of democracy among authoritarians (who are more religious than libertarians) was higher than ADT would predict. Hopes ran high that Islamists would continue to be voted into power and that they would restore the stability left in the wake of the uprising. Authoritarians viewed it as an opportunity to finally participate in the politics they had been locked out of for decades, and so they embraced democracy as a means to such an opportunity. Since then,

however, Islamist rule has been considered a failure in the eyes of the public, particularly in Egypt. By 2013, public opinion had turned against the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood that ruled the country for a brief, one-year period from 2012-2013. Since then, the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed and many of its members arrested. Given this failure of leadership under the FJP, I expect that authoritarians will have abandoned their affinity for religious rule in favor of the promise of a return to stability under army rule. I expect that authoritarians will now consider autocratic rule more preferable to democratic rule and no longer hold democracy in higher esteem than do libertarians. I expect that the dynamics of authoritarianism will return to pre-Arab Spring patterns.

CHAPTER 4

Arab Spring Threat and Authoritarianism: Experimental Evidence from Egypt

On January 25, 2011, Egyptians took to the streets to demonstrate against the oppressive 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak. Inspired by the recent ouster of long-time autocrat Ben Ali in neighboring Tunisia, protestors demanded “bread, freedom, and human dignity” (عيش حرية كرامة انسانية)! Corruption, human rights, economic reforms, and general political and social malaise created an environment in Egypt that was ripe for the mass movement. Demonstrators demanded an end to arbitrary detentions, police abuses, disappearances, corruption, and, eventually, the Mubarak regime itself.

The 2011 uprising and its immediate consequences no doubt fostered a threatening atmosphere. In the three weeks leading up to the ouster of strongman President Mubarak in February 2011, over 800 people were killed, and an estimated 6,000 individuals were injured (Amnesty International estimate, 2016). After his ouster and subsequent imprisonment, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) formed a caretaker government until relinquishing power following the elections that were held in the summer of 2012. For the first time in Egypt's history, citizens voted in a relatively free and fair election characterized by very real candidate competition. Egyptians elected President Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood—the first Islamist head-of-state

in the Arab world—to oversee the creation of a new constitution and the transition to democracy.

Shortly after the election, however, Morsi’s popularity and perceived effectiveness at handling the spiraling economy and political transition plummeted. A poll taken by Zogby Research Services in 2013 revealed deep ideological divides within society concerning the perceived state of the economy, general welfare, and support for the President Morsi.⁶⁹ Islamist support for the president was over 90%, while the organized opposition support stood at a paltry 6%. Approval rates of the new constitution, constructed under the Morsi government, stood at similar levels for each group.


The Arab Spring, Threat, and Egypt: Evidence from the Arab Barometer

Fear for personal security was evident. Data from Wave III of the Arab Barometer (2013) indicated that non-trivial percentages of Egyptians experienced some sort of negative externality because of the Arab Spring, as depicted in Figure 4.1. 14.97% experienced theft, 13.80% experienced the destruction of public property and institutions that affected their general condition, 7.27% lost a job or an income subsidy, and 5.77% report the destruction of their place of work or residence. 2.93% of Egyptians report having an immediate family member who was forced to emigrate abroad, 2.84% had family members who had to return to Egypt, and 2.51% were displaced internally. In a country of 85.9 million in 2011, these percentages represent millions of individuals who

⁶⁹ “Egyptian Attitudes, September 2013,” *Zogby Research Services, LLC* online, last modified November 26, 2013, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/5294bf5de4b013dda087d0e5/1385480029191/Egypt+October+2013+FINAL.pdf>.

reported property theft, loss of income, decreased access to services, and personal and familial displacement.

Figure 4.1



By 2013, merely two years after the initial uprising and only one year after Egypt's first democratic election, it was clear that Egyptians not only felt more insecure, but that they also had soured on the Morsi government. According to the Arab Barometer, a staggering 90.3% of Egyptians believed the government was doing a "bad" or "very bad" in terms of creating employment opportunities and 81.02% believed the government was failing to improve basic health services. In terms of the transition to democracy, 77.51% believed the government was doing a "bad" or "very bad" job at managing this process. 52.1% of Egyptians reported it being "difficult" or "very difficult" to obtain assistance from public security, and 53.01% found it similarly difficult to obtain access to relevant officials to file complaints when their rights were violated. Finally, 56.6% of Egyptians reported the state of democracy and human rights in Egypt as being "bad" or "very bad" and, on a scale from 0 (not at all democratic) to 10 (very democratic), Egyptians scored the current regime a paltry 3.31. On the same scale, Egyptians had a

similarly pessimistic view of the appropriateness of democracy as a political system, rating it 4.66 out of 10, where 10 was the most favorable response. These pessimistic views of the Morsi government and the experience of the Arab Spring left 38.52% of Egyptians believing that the Arab Spring was a personal loss. 44.96% of those polled held mixed or unsure views about what had transpired.

Finally, relations between religious groups were also stressed in 2013. Arab Barometer data indicates that approximately 1/4 (24.66%) of respondents believed that relations between the Muslims and the Coptic Christian minority were strained. In Wave 6 of the World Values Survey (2012), 59.9% of Egyptians did not trust individuals from another religion and 35.9% did not believe that people from other religions were just as moral as those of the respondent's own religion. This discord between religious groups in Egypt in the wake of the Arab Spring uprising suggests an intolerant social environment.

The various devolving crises engulfing Egypt between 2012-2013 eventually led to four days of mass demonstrations against the Morsi government in the summer of 2013. Calls for reform and accountability, however, evolved into overtures for military intervention to depose the newly-elected president. Those calls were heeded on July 3, 2013, after a 48-hour ultimatum issued by the military for Morsi to either resolve the crisis or resign.

The military takeover, however, has done little to reassure Egyptians of their security. As of 2014, it was estimated that between 16,000-41,000 individuals, including at least 3,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, had been detained.⁷⁰ State-sanctioned violence against and persecution of Egyptians also increased. In 2013, Egyptian military

⁷⁰ "Egypt: Generation Jail: Egypt's youth go from protest to prison," *Amnesty International* online, last modified June 30, 2015, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde12/1853/2015/en/>.

forces raided two camps of protestors in Cairo to break up sit-ins that protested the removal of President Morsi a month earlier. What became known as the Rabaa massacre⁷¹ resulted in at least 1,089 deaths.⁷² Human Rights Watch referred to the massacre as "one of the world's largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history."⁷³ Since then, hundreds of activists, academics, and protestors have been arrested or disappeared. Terrorist attacks in Cairo and in the Sinai have also increased in recent years, resulting in at least 600 security officer deaths as of 2015.⁷⁴ The threat of terrorism and even media coverage of terrorism that is unfavorable to the military government are often used as a pretext for arbitrary detentions across the country and for the frequent flaunting of civil rights. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Egypt ranked third⁷⁵ behind Turkey and China for the most jailed journalists worldwide in 2017. Of the journalists jailed in Egypt, 100% were jailed for spreading "false news", 90% were jailed on anti-state charges, 30% were a result of retaliation, 5% were accused of defamation, and 10% were not charged and have been held indefinitely.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Hamid, Shadi. "The Massacre That Ended the Arab Spring," last modified August 14, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/arab-spring-rabaa-massacre/536847/>.

⁷² "Egypt: Security forces must show restraint after reckless policing of violent protest," *Amnesty International* online, last modified August 23, 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/08/egypt-security-forces-must-show-restraint-after-reckless-policing-of-violent-protest/>.

⁷³ "Egypt: Rab'a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity," *Human Rights Watch* online, last modified August 12, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity>.

⁷⁴ ⁷⁴ "Egypt: Generation Jail: Egypt's youth go from protest to prison," *Amnesty International* online, last modified June 30, 2015, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde12/1853/2015/en/>.

⁷⁵ "Record number of journalists jailed as Turkey, China, Egypt pay scant price for repression," *Committee to Protect Journalists*, last modified December 13, 2017, <https://cpj.org/reports/2017/12/journalists-prison-jail-record-number-turkey-china-egypt.php/>.

⁷⁶ "Explore CPJ's database of attacks on the press," *Committee to Protect Journalists*, accessed January 20, 2018, <https://cpj.org/data/>.

Acknowledging the complex timeline and gravity of what transpired since 2011, this narrative can be summarized as follows: In 2011, Egyptians overthrew an infamously brutal and corrupt regime. Hopes for a more democratic government and increased respect for human rights and dignity ran high. In 2012, Egyptians elected—for the first time ever—a civilian to lead the country and to oversee Egypt's democratic transition. A year later, deteriorating conditions led protesters back into the streets, imploring the military to remove President Morsi. Since then, the military has enjoyed broad societal support, despite the suppression of civil rights, greater censorship of the press, the disbandment and branding of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, and arbitrary arrests, detentions, and rumors of torture. At the end of this brief, two-year hope of a transition to more accountable, democratic governance, Egyptians seem to have traded in their revolutionary optimism for the stability that the military promises to provide. This demand for a return of the military to politics suggests that many Egyptians had grown impatient with the unstable transition to democracy, preferring instead a return to authoritarian-style government. In the next section, I argue that the personally hostile political and social environment and the trends toward increasing intolerance and autocracy are consistent with the framework of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory. Consistent with ADT and the motivations of libertarians and authoritarians previously mentioned, I expect that under such personally threatening conditions, authoritarians will become less intolerant, more supportive of democracy (or at least less hostile toward it), and less supportive of autocracy.

Experimental Design

In the next section, I introduce the experiment used to test the moderating effect of personal threat on the relationship between authoritarianism and intolerance, support for democracy, and support for autocracy. Subjects were recruited at Cairo University using a flyer calling for students of all majors to participate in a study on “social behavior.” 144 students signed up to take part in the half-hour- to hour-long experiment, which took place in the computer lab in the College of Economics and Political Science from April 23-27, 2017. Individuals were divided into a control and treatment group. Before the administration of these vignettes, subjects were asked to record their level of authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (SDO), and a suite of demographic questions. After the administration of the treatment and control, respondents were asked items that measured intolerance and support for autocracy and democracy. Students were paid one Egyptian pound per question that they answered. At the end of the experiment, subjects were debriefed and compensated commensurate with the number of questions they answered.⁷⁷

Pre-treatment Measures

Before treatment assignment, subjects filled out a shortened, modified version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale consisting of 13 items (Zakrisson 2005). The scale includes items that measure three principle components of authoritarianism: obedience to authority, outgroup aggression, and conventionalism. Reversed items were recoded in the direction of increasingly authoritarian responses and averaged into an

⁷⁷ This experiment was conducted in collaboration with Dr. Mazen Hassan of Cairo University. I would like thank Rice University’s Center for the Middle East for their generous funding for this project.

index for each subject. Parallel factor analysis and varimax rotation revealed only one underlying factor (*eigenvalue*=2.86). The resulting index ranged from 1.40 to 4.20 (*alpha*=0.75, *M*=2.87, *SD*=0.52). The Child Traits measure (Stenner 2005) was also included in the survey. However, as with the WVS analysis, the measure performed poorly (*alpha*=0.39, *eigenvalue*=0.56). A few components were moderately correlated (respect and manners [*r*=0.28], respect and obedience [*r*=0.25]), but most were not (respect and behaved [*r*=0.06], manners and obedient [*r*=0.11], manners and behaved [*r*=0.06], and obedient and behaved [*r*=0.07]). For these methodological reasons and the theoretical issues mentioned previously, I rely on the RWA measure of authoritarianism, despite its previously mentioned methodological issues.⁷⁸

Several control variables were included. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) captures attitudes toward power and social hierarchy. Those scoring high in SDO advocate for higher levels of inequality between groups, support outgroup discrimination, and hold anti-egalitarian attitudes (Pratto et al. 1994). These attitudes are fundamentally at odds with values of political inclusiveness upon which democratic ideals and institutions are founded. SDO is measured using the 8-item SDO7 scale (Ho et al. 2015). Items were averaged into an index for each subject, ranging from 1.00 to 4.25 (*alpha*=0.69, *M*=2.19, *SD*=0.57).

A suite of demographic questions was asked of subjects. The variable *read* measures the frequency with which individuals read either the Quran or the Bible

⁷⁸ Because of the failure of the child traits measure in the survey and the reliance on the RWA measure, interactions between threat and authoritarianism might be more difficult to achieve statistical significance. This is because that RWA is already “expressed” intolerance that might have previously been activated by threat. In this sense, the use of RWA in the subsequent analyses represent a “hard test” of the dynamics of authoritarianism in the context of Arab Spring intolerance.

($M=2.89$ $SD=0.82$). This item has been validated as a reliable measure of religiosity (Jamal and Tessler, 2008). *Economic status* measures whether the respondent's family could purchase necessities and have enough money to save, only purchase necessities, or could not afford necessities. The variable was recoded in the direction of higher economic security ($M=1.88$, $SD=0.65$). *Age* ranges from 18-29 ($M=21.12$, $SD=1.48$) and the variable *male* is a dichotomous gender identification variable. The gender composition was highly skewed, with females representing 72.22% of the sample. Finally, *muslim* was coded 1 if the respondent was Muslim and 0 otherwise. Muslim students made up 91.67% of the sample.

Random Assignment to Control and Treatment Conditions

Subjects were randomly assigned to either a control or treatment group. The treatment depicted a vignette detailing societal instability in the wake of the 2011 uprising. The control group received an unrelated vignette detailing the life cycle and characteristics of parrots. Both vignettes are depicted below in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below.

Figure 4.2



As you know, the social and political instability that has occurred since 2011 in a number of countries in the region has led to civil wars, thousands of deaths, and a rise in terrorism. In 2011, many were killed during clashes resulting from the attempt to topple President Hosni Mubarak. During these clashes, several government buildings were torched as fighting broke out, looting increased, causing observers to describe Cairo and Alexandria as “war zones.” Currently, terrorism has targeted the police, the armed forces, and Egyptian citizens, resulting in further casualties. In this short time, Egypt has witnessed a large number of ongoing demonstrations and transfers of power, making the Egyptian political and social destination uncertain.

Figure 4.3



The parrot is known for its bright colors ranging from green, red, blue and yellow. There are close to 353 species of this bird. It eats walnuts, grains, and fruits, especially wild figs. It lives in the woods and travels among the high trees. Among its many capabilities is mimicking sounds, including some simple human words. It can use its feet to catch and put food in its mouth, as well as use them to cling to and climb onto branches. In captivity, parrot uses the upper jaw to latch onto the twigs and hammocks attached to the cage. The shortest parrot is 10 cm tall and the largest is 100 cm. Parrots are generally non-migratory birds whose nests are located in tree holes. Their white eggs are round and generally free of impurities or other colors. When breeding, the female incubates between 2-4 eggs for 30 days (5 weeks). The male gathers food and feeds the female while she is nesting.

On average, assignment to treatment and control conditions were well balanced on all variables except RWA ($p=0.02$), which was slightly higher in the treatment group

($M=2.99$) than in the control group ($M=2.77$). The difference in mean levels in both groups were statistically significantly different ($p=0.01$).

Experimental Manipulation Check

Before and after reading the control and treatment vignettes, subjects were asked to record their emotional reactions to ensure the success of the threat manipulation. Threat-induced anxiety is assumed to be a necessary precursor to increases in intolerant attitudes in ADT (Stenner 2005; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003). To ensure that the treatment condition caused an increase in anxiety and the control condition did not, respondents were asked to rate their levels of anxiety, fear, and nervousness on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The values were averaged into an index for both pretreatment ($\alpha=0.60$, $M=3.85$, $SD=2.29$) and post-treatment ($\alpha=0.79$, $M=4.19$, $SD=2.70$) anxiety.

Overall, these results suggest that the threat vignettes were successful in inducing increased levels of anxiety in the treatment condition. Subjects in the treatment group reported a mean-level increase of anxiety of 1.22, from 3.89 to 5.12 ($p=0.00$) between the pre-treatment and post-treatment levels. Subjects in the control condition reported a statistically significantly 1.94-point *decrease* in anxiety in the treatment condition, falling from 3.88 to 1.94 ($p=0.00$). This decrease in anxiety among subjects in the control group after its administration is unexpected but not problematic since the treatment vignette was the only cause for an increase in anxiety.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Had anxiety also increased after the administration of the control, this would indeed be a cause for concern.

Post Treatment Measures

Two variables were included that measured intolerance. The first item measured subjects' attitudes toward political inclusion, asking to what extent they agreed with the following statement on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree): "*All Egyptians, regardless of political or religious beliefs, should have the opportunity to run for office*" ($M=7.93$, $SD=2.57$). Outgroup aggression was measured by asking subjects their level of agreement with the following statement, again on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree): "*Violence can be justified against those who threaten the values of society and public order*" ($M=3.41$, $SD=2.78$).

To capture support for democracy, subjects were asked two questions gauging their attitudes toward elections and the appropriateness of a democratic system for Egypt. Following the treatment and control vignettes, subjects were asked to rate the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree): "*Elections bring nothing but chaos and disorder to society*" ($M=2.56$, $SD=2.15$) and "*Despite its flaws, a democratic system, in which more than one party is vying for power through free and fair elections, is the best system of government for Egypt*" ($M=7.03$, $SD=2.83$).

Support for autocracy was measured in two items asked of respondents after both the treatment and control vignettes. The first item asked respondents to rate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) their support for a "*strong leader who does not have to bother with Parliament*" ($M=4.68$, $SD=3.09$). I also wanted to gauge support for the extra-constitutional removal of the executive, a proxy⁸⁰ question for

⁸⁰ Because Morsi remains such a polarizing figure and because of the general aversion to criticizing the military government at the time of this experiment, I used this alternative phrasing that did not mention the presidency or Morsi specifically in order to attenuate response bias.

support for the removal of President Morsi in 2013. This second item also ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) and asked respondents whether they believe that "elected leaders can be replaced when national security is threatened" ($M=5.72$, $SD=2.94$).

Results: Intolerance

OLS regression with bootstrapped standard errors were used to estimate the relationship between authoritarianism, treatment assignment, and support for the two intolerance statements. Results are presented in Table 4.1.


Table 4.1: Interaction of Authoritarianism and Exposure to the Experimental Arab Spring Threat Vignette Predicting Tolerance	(1) All Egyptians Should Be Able to Run for Office	(2) All Egyptians Should Be Able to Run for Office	(3) Violence Against Others is Justified Under Threat	(4) Violence Against Others is Justified Under Threat
RWA	-1.099** (0.438)	-1.863*** (0.598)	2.434*** (0.454)	1.781*** (0.585)
Treatment	0.0108 (0.488)	-4.666* (2.388)	0.0413 (0.420)	-3.956* (2.236)
RWA x Treatment		1.624** (0.840)		1.388* (0.816)
SDO	-0.706** (0.351)	-0.668* (0.346)	0.331 (0.340)	0.363 (0.336)
Male	0.614 (0.525)	0.684 (0.518)	1.037** (0.435)	1.096** (0.433)
Muslim	0.129 (0.755)	-0.156 (0.773)	-0.869 (0.747)	-1.112 (0.772)
Economic Status	0.232 (0.338)	0.313 (0.339)	0.886*** (0.311)	0.954*** (0.307)
Religiosity	0.166 (0.250)	0.155 (0.248)	-0.389 (0.252)	-0.398 (0.252)
Age	-0.0317 (0.131)	-0.0432 (0.132)	-0.275* (0.161)	-0.285* (0.160)
Constant	12.09*** (3.333)	14.49*** (3.682)	1.386 (3.673)	3.436 (3.860)
Observations	144	144	144	144
R-squared	0.067	0.091	0.278	0.294

In the control group, RWA negatively predicts support for allowing all Egyptians, regardless of their politics and religion, to run for office, as depicted in Column 2 ($p=0.00$). It is also positively associated with the belief that violence against others is justifiable when societal norms are violated ($p=0.00$). This pattern is exemplary of authoritarian hostility toward political plurality and the propensity for aggression against groups and individuals that threaten their worldview and the cohesion of unifying cultural norms.

As evinced by the interactions in Columns 2 and 4, the direction of the relationship between authoritarianism and support for these statements is conditional on exposure to threat messaging. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction predicting support for allowing all Egyptians running for office suggests that authoritarians become more supportive of this statement in the threatening condition compared to the control.

The left panel of Figure 4.4 displays the predicted level of agreement with the statement, conditional on treatment assignment, that all Egyptians should be able to run for office. The solid black line indicates the effect of authoritarianism on agreement with the statement in the control group. The dashed grey line plots the same relationship for individuals exposed to the treatment. The right panel plots the marginal difference between the control and treatment groups across values of RWA with 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 4.4



The left panel of Figure 4.3 above depicts the interaction between exposure to the control and treatment and authoritarianism and the resulting effect on support for the statement. The right panel depicts the marginal changes in support for this statement between the two group assignments across levels of RWA with 90% confidence bands.

I find that authoritarian agreement with this statement increases in the treatment condition compared with the group in the control, as indicated by the dashed grey line in the left panel of Figure 4.4. Libertarian agreement with this statement declines. Turning to the marginal effects⁸¹ plot in the right panel, I find that this effect is statistically significant for libertarians below the 5th percentile of RWA ($\Delta = -1.68$, $SE = 1.01$) and authoritarians above the 95th percentile of RWA ($\Delta = 1.57$, $SE = 0.95$). These trends are consistent with the hypothesis that, under existentially threatening conditions,


⁸¹ Standard errors and mean changes in the dependent variables between the control and treatment groups were calculated using the *margins* command in Stata.

authoritarians become more tolerant and libertarians less so. The gap between libertarian and authoritarian agreement on this statement narrowed from 3.73 to 0.48.

Figure 4.5 plots the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction predicting support for the following statement: "Violence can be justified against those who threaten the values of society and public order." In the left panel, I find that support for violence increases among libertarians and decreases slightly among authoritarians moving from the control to treatment group. However, these effects are statistically insignificant at all levels of RWA. Despite this, authoritarianism remains a significant predictor of support for societal violence. A one standard deviation increase in authoritarianism is associated with a 1.24-point increase in agreement that violence against those who threaten public order and societal values is justified. This change accounts for 12.40% of the range of the dependent variable. Regardless of threat perception, authoritarians remain uniquely predisposed to outgroup aggression.

Figure 4.5

Violence Can Be Justified Against Those Who Threaten Norms



The left panel of Figure 4.4 above depicts the interaction between exposure to the control and treatment and authoritarianism and the resulting effect on support for the statement. The right panel depicts the marginal changes in support for this statement between the two group assignments across levels of RWA with 90% confidence bands.

Results: Support for Democracy

Results of the OLS regressions predicting support for the two democracy items with bootstrapped standard errors are presented in Table 4.2.⁸² Authoritarianism is positively and significantly associated with the belief that elections bring nothing but disorder and chaos in the control group, as presented in Column 2 ($p=0.01$). However, the treatment and its interaction with RWA is neither statistically significant in predicting support for this statement ($p=0.21$) nor in predicting support for the belief that democracy is the best system of governance for Egypt ($p=0.65$). In fact, the only significant

⁸² As the control and treatment samples were relatively small, bootstrapped standard errors were used for more precise estimates of the variance.


predictor in models 1-4 is being male. Males are less likely to hold negative views of elections and are more likely than females to prefer a democratic system for their country.

Table 4.2: Interaction of Authoritarianism and Exposure to the Arab Spring Threat Vignette on Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Elections Bring Nothing But Disorder and Chaos	(2) Elections Bring Nothing But Disorder and Chaos	(3) Democracy is the Best System for Egypt	(4) Democracy is the Best System for Egypt
RWA	1.239*** (0.391)	1.682*** (0.548)	-0.728 (0.626)	-0.971 (0.857)
Treatment	-0.375 (0.375)	2.340 (2.042)	-0.185 (0.530)	-1.675 (3.246)
RWA x Treatment		-0.943 (0.743)		0.517 (1.123)
SDO	0.409 (0.325)	0.387 (0.327)	-0.743 (0.542)	-0.731 (0.548)
Male	-0.583* (0.345)	-0.623* (0.347)	1.049* (0.588)	1.071* (0.594)
Muslim	0.143 (0.541)	0.308 (0.569)	-0.540 (0.843)	-0.631 (0.843)
Economic Status	-0.0796 (0.285)	-0.126 (0.296)	-0.267 (0.421)	-0.241 (0.427)
Religiosity	-0.109 (0.179)	-0.102 (0.178)	-0.0524 (0.336)	-0.0558 (0.338)
Age	-0.142 (0.0996)	-0.135 (0.100)	0.123 (0.139)	0.120 (0.139)
Constant	1.801 (2.361)	0.408 (2.527)	8.913** (3.663)	9.678** (3.924)
Observations	144	144	144	144
R-squared	0.123	0.135	0.071	0.072

Figures 4.6 and 4.7 depict the predicted agreement with these statements. The solid black line in each figure represents the predicted level of agreement in the control condition across RWA. The dashed gray line depicts the same relationship in the treatment condition. Marginal effects and statistical significance of the treatment with 90% confidence intervals are shown in the right panel of both figures.

Figure 4.6

Elections Bring Nothing But Disorder and Chaos To Society




The left panel of Figure 4.5 above depicts the interaction between exposure to the control and treatment and authoritarianism and the resulting effect on support for the statement. The right panel depicts the marginal changes in support for this statement between the two group assignments across levels of RWA with 90% confidence bands.

Though not statistically significant at any level of RWA in Figure 4.6, the plot does indicate that the direction of the changes in attitudes are consistent with the dynamics of ADT. Libertarians hold more negative attitudes toward election in the treatment group compared with the control group and authoritarians become somewhat less pessimistic. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on RWA ($p=0.00$) indicates that authoritarianism is correlated with increased agreement with this statement, regardless of condition assignment. A one standard deviation increase in authoritarianism is associated with a 0.88-point increase agreement with the belief elections cause disorder and chaos, representing 8.80% of the range of the dependent variable.

Turning to support for an Egyptian democracy, I find that the direction of the interaction is in the hypothesized direction in Figure 4.7, though the effect is not statistically significant. Moreover, authoritarianism is not associated with support for democracy at conventional levels of significance ($p=0.26$), though the coefficient is in the hypothesized, negative direction.

Figure 4.7

Despite Its Flaws, Democracy Is The Best System For Egypt



The left panel of Figure 4.6 above depicts the interaction between exposure to the control and treatment and authoritarianism and the resulting effect on support for the statement. The right panel depicts the marginal changes in support for this statement between the two group assignments across levels of RWA with 90% confidence bands.

Results: Support for Autocracy

Support for autocracy and forced leader removal as a function of authoritarianism and treatment exposure is presented in Table 4.3. In all four models, RWA is positive and statistically significant ($p=0.00$). The interaction between RWA and the treatment is statistically significant at the 10% level in predicting support for an autocratic system in

Column 2 ($p=0.07$). The negative coefficient on the interaction indicates that authoritarians become less supportive of autocracy when exposed to the threat messaging. The interaction on support for forced removal of a leader is not statistically significant ($p=0.61$), though it is in the hypothesized, negative direction.


Table 4.3: Interaction Between Authoritarianism and Exposure to the Arab Spring Vignette Predicting Support for Autocratic Institutions and Practices	(1) Support for Autocratic System	(2) Support for Autocratic System	(3) Support for Forced Leader Removal	(4) Support for Forced Leader Removal
RWA	2.068*** (0.576)	2.922*** (0.643)	2.239*** (0.508)	2.474*** (0.681)
Treatment	-0.239 (0.537)	4.991* (2.839)	-0.823* (0.492)	0.619 (2.897)
RWA x Treatment		-1.816* (0.997)		-0.501 (0.976)
SDO	0.538 (0.565)	0.496 (0.561)	0.181 (0.516)	0.170 (0.515)
Male	-0.139 (0.608)	-0.217 (0.606)	-0.388 (0.518)	-0.410 (0.522)
Muslim	-0.473 (0.884)	-0.155 (0.934)	-2.139** (0.851)	-2.051** (0.862)
Economic Status	0.215 (0.398)	0.125 (0.394)	-0.217 (0.355)	-0.242 (0.356)
Religiosity	0.0382 (0.323)	0.0501 (0.320)	0.165 (0.316)	0.168 (0.317)
Age	-0.0257 (0.172)	-0.0129 (0.175)	-0.328** (0.127)	-0.324** (0.129)
Constant	-1.788 (4.413)	-4.472 (4.879)	8.075** (3.521)	7.335* (3.918)
Observations	144	144	144	144
R-squared	0.118	0.140	0.207	0.209

Figure 4.8 depicts the interactive relationship between exposure to the treatment, authoritarianism, and predicted support for system of government with a strong, unaccountable leader. In both the treatment and control conditions, authoritarians were more supportive of autocracy than libertarians, as depicted by the solid black and dashed gray lines in the left panel of Figure 4.8. In this model, a one standard deviation increase

in authoritarianism is associated with a 1.09-point increase in support for an autocratic ruler, accounting for 10.85% of the total response range. Exposure to the Arab Spring vignette produced statistically significant differences in attitudes between the control and treatment groups at or above the 95th percentile of RWA. The average decrease in support of an autocratic leader among individuals in this more authoritarian domain of RWA was 2.22-points.

Figure 4.8

Prefers Strong Leader Who Does Not Bother With Parliament




The left panel of Figure 4.7 above depicts the interaction between exposure to the control and treatment and authoritarianism and the resulting effect on support for the statement. The right panel depicts the marginal changes in support for this statement between the two group assignments across levels of RWA with 90% confidence bands.

The left panel of Figure 4.9 depicts the interaction between authoritarianism, threat exposure, and support for the forced removal of an elected leader. The changes in attitudes between the control and treatment groups are in the expected direction, with authoritarians becoming less supportive and libertarians becoming more so. The marginal

changes in support for this action and 90% confidence intervals are depicted in the right panel. The slope of the marginal effects line is negative, indicating a decrease in support for this statement between the control and treatment conditions as authoritarianism increases. Exposure to the Arab Spring vignette was statistically significant in predicting support for the forced removal of a leader only at mid- to high levels of RWA (50th-90th percentile). The average decrease in support of this system among individuals in this more authoritarian domain of RWA was 0.94-points. The change in libertarian support was in the predicted, positive direction, though statistically insignificant. Finally, a one standard deviation increase in RWA is associated with a statistically significant 1.17-point increase in support for leader removal, representing 11.70% of the range of the dependent variable. The direction of these relationships and the positive coefficient of authoritarianism are consistent with Authoritarian Dynamic Theory.

Figure 4.9



The left panel of Figure 4.8 above depicts the interaction between exposure to the control and treatment and authoritarianism and the resulting effect on support for the statement. The right panel depicts the marginal changes in support for this statement between the two group assignments across levels of RWA with 90% confidence bands.

Discussion

As previously mentioned, intolerance in the Middle East is on the rise following the initial uprisings. Per Authoritarian Dynamics Theory, I expected that existential threat would increase intolerance among libertarians and decrease it among authoritarians. I find this to be the case when asked whether all Egyptians, regardless of their political or religious affiliations, should be able to participate in politics. This analysis suggests that this trend might be driven by threatened libertarians whose preferences move closer to those of authoritarians. If there is a silver lining, I find evidence that libertarian intolerance does not engender increased support for violence against those who challenge the status quo and disrupt society.

I find that *explicitly stated* support for democracy is not influenced by the authoritarian-threat dynamic at a statistically significant level, though the relationships and dynamics were in the predicted directions. Though falling short of evidence for our expectations, directly asking individuals about their support for democracy might be influenced by social desirability bias, as democracy is often viewed as a normative universality to which societies must strive. Finally, authoritarians were less supportive than libertarians of democracy in both the control and treatment conditions, consistent with our expectations. Moving forward, I plan to use questions designed to measure attitudes toward specific democratic institutions and norms, rather than explicitly invoking the word "democracy" in order to attenuate the threat of socially acceptable answers.

Finally, I find that authoritarians are generally more supportive than libertarians of an autocratic ruler and for the forced removal of an elected leader. I find suggestive support for the hypothesis that threatened libertarians become more supportive of autocracy and forced leader removal, though these effects are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Consistent with our expectations, however, authoritarians become significantly less supportive of both an autocratic ruler and the forced removal of a leader.

Generally, I find that authoritarians are more intolerant, less supportive of democracy, and more supportive of autocracy than libertarians, regardless of threat exposure. I also find suggestive evidence that, when exposed to Arab Spring threat messaging, the gap between authoritarian and libertarian intolerance and support for autocracy narrows. I find no evidence for the same effect regarding support for democracy, at least the way I have measured it here.

I suspect that the inability of the threat vignette to move libertarians toward or away from intolerance, support for democracy, and support for autocracy is due to the characteristics of our sample. Most glaring is our relatively small sample size due to student recruitment difficulties ($N=144$), which left us with 72 individuals in both the control and treatment group. As a result, the confidence intervals around our estimates were larger than expected. In the non-significant models, the direction of the relationship between threat, authoritarianism, and attitude change was in the predicted direction. Moving this research agenda forward, I will recruit much larger samples to generate more exact estimates with smaller confidence bands.

Another issue with the sample was that it was overwhelmingly female (74.07%). This is due to the skewed gender composition of the social science departments from which I recruited. Though there is no consensus about the relationship between gender and authoritarianism (e.g., Lippa, 1995; Whitley, 1999), there is evidence to suggest that males might be more authoritarian than females (e.g., Napier and Jost, 2008; Stenner, 2005), particularly in collectivist cultures that place the welfare of the group and its norms above that of the individual (Brandt and Henry, 2012). Future investigation will include a more balanced gender composition.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I posited that violence and insecurity in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings activated increased intolerance and support for autocratic governance through the dynamics of authoritarianism, an individual disposition that represents an individual's tradeoff between obedience to authority and assertion of personal autonomy. Applying the framework of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory to the case of Egypt, I conducted the first experimental inquiry into the role of threat and authoritarianism in increasing intolerance and undemocratic attitudes in the Middle East. Our results were mixed. I find suggestive evidence that subjects low in authoritarianism (libertarians) became more intolerant and more supportive of an autocratic system when exposed to threatening Arab Spring messaging, though all but one of the interactions were statistically significant. I also find suggestive evidence that those high in authoritarianism (authoritarians) became slightly more tolerant and less supportive of autocracy. Moreover, in all but two models and regardless of exposure to threat, authoritarians were

more intolerant, prone to endorse political violence, less supportive of democratic institutions, and more supportive of autocratic institutions and practices compared with libertarians.

Much of the focus in authoritarianism research has been on the potential challenges that normatively threatened authoritarians pose to liberal democratic orders because of their aversion to pluralism and intolerance in such environments (Stenner 2005; Dunn 2014). In this experiment, I find that, regardless of threat perception, this appears to be the case. Future investigation will consider the priming of normative threat—such as threats to Egyptian culture and dominant societal norms—and effect on authoritarian intolerance and democratic support.

In contrast with normative threat, regime and societal instability present threats to social and economic insecurity that affects individuals personally. Unlike in countries with a strong commitment to the rule of law, unstable regimes are often unable to guarantee such personal security. Under these circumstances, those who place a great importance on their personal autonomy do not feel sufficiently protected, compelling them to seek out authority to reestablish order and demand the compliance of their fellow citizens. In such an environment, it is not just the authoritarians who should give us pause. Ironically, it is also those who are predisposed to be the most committed to individual rights, tolerance, and pluralism on which the development of a healthy democracy lies who also threaten to derail the possibility of a democratic transition in the wake of autocratic regime instability or collapse. I find suggestive though not statistically significant evidence for these libertarian-threat dynamics. Moving forward, I plan to replicate this experiment with a larger sample size and variations on normative and

personal threat scenarios in the context of post-Arab Spring countries. This experiment contributes to our current understanding of authoritarian-threat dynamics and extends its application to intolerance and institutional preferences in societies undergoing revolutionary or disruptive political, social, and economic instability.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion and Future Direction

Summary of Findings

I generally find support for the application of Authoritarian Dynamic Theory (ADT) in the Middle Eastern for libertarian individuals, but the effects of threat do not consistently affect authoritarian intolerance or preferences for democracy and autocracy. Survey evidence from the 6th Wave of the World Values Survey demonstrates that libertarians tend to drive the closing of the intolerance gap between libertarians and authoritarians when personal threat is high and widening the gap when normative threat is high. Authoritarians, however, react inconsistently to both personal and normative threat. Where there are changes in authoritarian attitudes, they become less intolerant, moving slightly toward the attitudes of libertarians.

In the same analysis, I extended the ADT framework to gauge support for democratic and autocratic institutions. When normative threat increases, it was expected that libertarians would become more democratic and authoritarians less so or that their attitudes would not change, as their views toward democracy as a normative threat was predetermined before the survey. I find inconsistent evidence that this is the case, with libertarians becoming more democratic in 1 of the 2 models. Similarly, I find no statistical decrease in either of the two models between authoritarians experiencing low and high threat. It was also expected that libertarians would become less democratic and

authoritarians more so when personal threat increases. In fact, I find that both groups become less democratic. Again, the results in Chapter 3 comported with theoretical expectations that libertarians would become less democratic when their autonomy and independence are threatened. Finally, I find that support for autocracy is unmoved by normative threat for both groups, but support for an army system declines for both authoritarians and libertarians. Increases in personal threat also render both groups more supportive of an army system and an autocratic system.

One of the most interesting findings is that, generally, authoritarians are more supportive of democracy and less supportive of autocracy than libertarians. I conducted a post-hoc analysis investigating the contextual situation in which the survey was fielded. I hypothesized that, because religiosity is highly correlated with authoritarianism, the rise of Islamists to government positions through elections in the aftermath of the Arab Spring rendered authoritarians more supportive of democracy than ADT would predict. I find evidence that this might be the case.

To further investigate the authoritarian-threat dynamic in the context of the Arab Spring, I present results from an experiment carried out in 2017 in Egypt. Generally, I find authoritarians are more intolerant than libertarians, consistent with survey evidence. In terms of institutions, I find that authoritarians are more supportive of autocracy and less supportive of democracy than libertarians. These findings are consistent with the post-hoc hypothesis of the survey, which suggested that authoritarian support for democracy was instrumental and temporary. The predicted changes in intolerance and support for institutions among libertarians and authoritarians in Chapter 4 comported with ADT. However, these changes failed to reach statistical significance in most of the

models. This was likely a function of the small sample size and the use of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism measure, which represented a “hard test” of evidence for these dynamics.

Implications

Broadly speaking, this dissertation contributes to the study of democracy and intolerance in the following ways. Theoretically, it is important for those who study democratization to understand not only the elite-level processes that contribute to a democratic opening (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986) and the strategic dynamics between the elites and the middle and working classes (Collier 1999; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005), but also the psychological foundations of support for democracy and dictatorship. These micro-foundations of political institution preference formation are important for comparative political scientists in theorizing about the causes of democratization and regime change. The link between the democratic preferences of and tolerance fostered in a given culture and the effect on their effects on the nature of the political system has a strong theoretical foundation in political science (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2004). This dissertation also refines our current understanding of the dynamics of threat and intolerance. While much empirical evidence exists to link that threat to intolerance and support for aggressive policy preferences at the aggregate level (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), this dissertation explores *who* is moved by threat. It explores the individual-level dynamics that contribute to a richer understanding of macro-trends.

An individual-level analysis of personal authoritarianism under transitional regime rule offers to advance our theoretical understanding of failed democratic transitions. For example, analyzing the causal pathway of instability to preferences for autocratic and democratic rule offers a theoretical story for why economic structures such as inequality (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), high levels of economic development (Lipset 1960), a robust civil society (Diamond 1999), a fragmented political elite (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986), and other structural and cultural factors that often frustrate successful democratic transitions in the wake of sustained regime instability. The instability often experienced during such transitions threatens to derail these processes as individuals become more skeptical of the uncertain move toward more democratic governance. With waning support for democracy, elites have less of a reason to initiate and foster democratization.

This dissertation also contributes to area studies of the Middle East and comparative politics in general. Psychological processes and the linkage to broader political phenomena are scant in the survey work conducted in the region. Political psychological research in the United States, however, has opened up many theoretically interesting avenues of research in the areas of voting behavior and public opinion. Conducting this research in the region offers an understudied perspective on the cognitive motivations of supporting political institutions of competing ideologies. This intersection of authoritarianism and preferences for autocratic rule promise to build a bridge between political psychology research conducted in Western contexts and important questions in comparative politics, such as regime instability and democratization.

Finally, this manuscript contributes to a fuller and more nuanced understanding of the Authoritarian Dynamic. In both empirical chapters, I have strived to provide a detailed analysis of the libertarian end of the authoritarianism spectrum that is usually given short shrift in the literature, thus offering empirical evidence for how threat affects those who would be not normally thought of as “threats” to tolerance and democracy. The inclusion of the now-popular child traits measures in the survey analysis and the experiment conducted at Cairo University reveals issues with measurement in a collectivist cultural context. Though this measure is ideologically neutral and captures the appropriate dynamic of autonomy/conformity in the West, child rearing practices in the Middle East and the prioritization of the group over the individual make the measure inappropriate for the use in the region. The poor internal reliability and factor loadings of the variable provide evidence for this theoretical concern. Though the RWA measure did interact with threat in the predicted direction in the experiment, well-known problems with the measure, particularly its correlation with dependent variables of interest, make it a less than ideal measure moving forward in future studies. A culturally appropriate measure that captures the essence of the autonomy/conformity is sorely needed.

These analyses also contribute to our understanding of waning tolerance and support in the Middle East generally. When the Arab Spring protests erupted, there was much hope that the Arab World would finally democratize, governments would become more accountable to their populations, and respect for human rights would increase. Instead, political, social, and economic events since the outbreak of the Arab Spring rebellions have contributed to an increasingly hostile and threatening environment that has rendered Arabs more skeptical of the benefits of democracy. Increased intolerance of

unpopular groups also threatens to derail serious movements toward a more inclusive political regime. Even more disheartening, it appears that those who are most likely to support democracy and tolerance in politics—the libertarians—have lost patience with the prolonged exposure to instability.

For pro-democracy advocates and groups in the region and for policymakers, understanding the effect of personal insecurity during a political crisis is important for informing better foreign policies and better targeted funding to the humanitarian needs of stressed populations to avert potential autocratic backslides. The individual effects of personal threat also have implications for more established, Western democracies. To protect democracy from creeping anti-democratic impulses in the population and targeted oppression of unpopular groups, governments and political groups would do well to focus more aggressively on alleviating social stresses, including the reinforcement of strong social welfare programs, increase educational opportunities, and encourage civil debate and discourse. Such measures that seek to decrease perceptions of threat to an individual's finances and safety would work to keep the most anti-democratic impulses of from becoming mainstreamed.

Future Direction

I intend to develop my dissertation into a book manuscript. I will expand my research in the Middle East to include better powered experimental replications of the lab experiment conducted in Egypt in 2017. Similar studies will be field in other countries in the region to investigate the cross-cultural validity of ADT and its contribution to intolerance and illiberal attitudes in the region. This manuscript will also explore how

ADT impacts political behavior in the region. This line of research hopes to illuminate how the dynamics of authoritarianism contributes to outgroup aggression (e.g. political violence) and political mobilization (e.g. voting and protest). The study of ADT and its effect on political behavior represents an undeveloped line of inquiry that is particularly relevant in to the current political environment in the region.

The final section of my manuscript will investigate the emotional causal mechanisms that mediate the effect of threat on authoritarianism to produce intolerance, illiberal attitudes, and (potentially) political mobilization. Currently, it is assumed that anxiety more than any other emotion drives the relationship between threat, authoritarianism, and intolerance (Stenner 2005). Surprisingly, this emotional mechanism has yet to be tested. Preliminary research I am conducting in the United States suggests that it is anger that motivates intolerance and illiberal attitudes among high authoritarian individuals and anxiety that motivates threatened low authoritarians. Because anger motivates political participation and anxiety tends to lead to conflict-avoidance (Valentino et al. 2011), the emotional mechanism has consequential implications the extent to which ADT might propel threatened individuals toward or away from political action. If threatened individuals become intolerant and undemocratic because they are anxious, we would expect them to be risk and conflict averse, resulting in very little impact on the political system. If it is anger, then we might expect threatened individuals to take to the streets and ballot boxes to pressure for the implementation of these intolerant and undemocratic preferences. We might also expect to see spikes in inter-group violence, especially if it is sanctioned by authorities. The explicit link between authoritarianism and behavior has yet to be tested. Exploring the emotional mechanism

that connects authoritarianism to intolerance and political participation and activism promises to illuminate the real-world consequences of exposure to different sources of threat.

I plan to test the validity of common measures of and my new measure of authoritarianism in a non-Western context for the first time. This will allow future research on intolerance and political violence to apply Authoritarian Dynamic Theory to the developing world. This will be especially important for exploring the cognitive effect threat in unstable environments has on the individual, thus helping to illuminate the individual-level dynamics of population trends toward or away from tolerance and support for a more inclusive, democratic system of government. The U.S. studies will uncover the emotional mechanism assumed to be at the heart of intolerant reactions to threat. It will allow researchers to make predictions of political behavior, qualifying the current body of literature on emotions in politics with the authoritarian predisposition.

There are also practical consequences of this research agenda. Uncovering the effect of authoritarianism on intolerant political behaviors, such as voting, protesting, and participating in violence is particularly salient in the Middle East following the Arab Spring. It has the potential to explain participation in events that led to the fall of authoritarian leaders and protests that led to their reinstallation, such as in Egypt. It is also important for understanding which segments of the population are most vulnerable to threatening messaging and the actions they might take to defend their worldview. Extending the study of authoritarianism to include political behavior is important for understanding how intolerance translates into political and social action.

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