Female Leaders and Foreign Policy

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a first-cut exploration into the examination of foreign policy behavior of female leaders. We know a lot about in general Female politicians, their substantive and descriptive representation, how gender stereotypes influence their election and behavior. Yet how gender stereotypes influence conduct of foreign policy of female executives remains unclear. This dissertation offers to fill this gap by specifically examining factors that help to alleviate the negative side of gender stereotypes for female leaders. The three chapters, while written as individual papers, contribute to a single story that deepen our understanding of gendered decision-making at the executive level. In the first chapter, I jointly explore two factors, namely gender of the leader and preferences of parties, that has not been considered together to analyze whether a gender of the executive leader makes a difference in the allocation of foreign aid. Through analysis of 34 OECD donor countries from 1960 to 2015, I find that female leaders, supported by internationalist parties, are more likely to increase foreign aid. In the second chapter, I shift focus to voters' evaluation of foreign aid policy and test the partisan argument experimentally. The results show that voters are less likely to stand behind the foreign policy agenda of a female leader that involves aid increase, compared to similar agenda by male leader. Yet, support of copartisans shields women from negative effects of stereotypes. The last chapter examines how stereotypes influence speeches and voting behavior of female leaders at the global institution. Analysis of speeches reveals that female executives are more likely than their male colleagues to focus on women, on the issues of development and co- operation, and their implications for women in their annual statements. However, countries voting records at the UNGA do not change depending on the leader's gender.

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Recent research has focused on the role of leaders in shaping state behavior. In this dissertation I advance this literature by specifically focusing on the gender of a leader and its impact on foreign policy. We know a lot about female politicians, their substantive and descriptive representation, how gender stereotypes influence their election and behavior. Yet how gender stereotypes influence conduct of foreign policy of female executives remains unclear. This dissertation offers to fill this gap by specifically examining factors that help to alleviate the negative side of gender stereotypes for female leaders.

First, I argue that given the gender stereotypes and association of foreign policy with masculine traits, women executives will be more cautious in changing foreign policy, specifically on gendered issues. Yet, I argue that party's position on such issues will shied women from negative effects of stereotypes. I utilize the direct measure of their position on foreign policy issues by relying on party manifestos. Through analysis of OECD donor countries from 1960 to 2015, I find that female leaders, supported by internationalist parties, are more likely to increase aid.

Next, I look at the implications of this theory also in an experimental setting. In the second paper, I shift focus to voters' evaluation of gendered foreign aid policy and test the partisan argument experimentally. The results show that voters are less likely to stand behind the foreign policy agenda of a female leader that involves aid increase, compared to similar agenda by male leader. Yet, information about copartisan support helps to negate the effect of gender stereotypes.

Lastly, the third paper brings to attention how stereotypes influence the behavior of female leaders at the global institution. Specifically, I ask whether global substantive representation of women's interest in also seen among female executives. By employing three different text analysis methods, I explore gendered rhetoric in the annual speeches of female executives. Analysis of speeches reveals that female executives are more likely than their male colleagues to focus on women, on the issues of development and cooperation, and their implications for women in their annual statements.

Overall, jointly these papers make a number of contributions to literature. First, results reinforce the recent findings that leader's attributes matter for the study of international relations. Second, this study also provides greater insights into the underlying drivers of differences in gendered perceptions of the executive post. Findings offer implications of how female executives can craft foreign policy in different contexts. In addition, the study extends gender and communications literature by adding copartisan support as a factor that can shield women from gender stereotypes.

Aside from contributing to the literature on gender and politics, findings also contribute to the emerging literature, which analyzes the determinants of support for foreign aid in donor countries.

Lastly, applying concepts of representation to foreign policy research permits us to assess the ripple effects of transnational feminist activism. By studying how female leaders engage with women's equality agendas on the global stage promises to advance our understanding of global gender ties.

Female Leaders and Foreign Aid: The Role of Party Preferences

Ulkar Imamverdiyeva

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Introduction

Recent research has shown greater interest in connecting personal traits of politicians with actual policy outcomes (Jones and Olken 2005). A number of studies show that the characteristics and preferences of different leaders may lead to different policy outcomes. While studies on variation in executive behavior have focused on an educational background (Besley et al. 2011; Dreher et al. 2009), prior military experience (Horowitz and Stam 2014), there has been less attention on the influence of gender of executives on foreign policy (Schwartz and Blair 2020). This inattention is largely due to the paucity of women that have served in the executive post. Yet, with the number of female executives steadily growing —as can be seen from Figure 1— analysis of their influence on countries' foreign policy is long overdue. Despite this growth, politics is still male dominated field. In general while there are a number of reasons behind the underrepresentation of women, one of the arguments in the literature is related to different gendered preferences of women that might, in turn, influence foreign policy of a country. However, it remains questionable whether it is the case. Thus, in this study, I analyze the impact of female executives on states' foreign policy behavior. Specifically, to test my expectations about when female executives bring to light their gendered policy preferences, I look into foreign aid policy.

According to prior research, gender is clearly important in explaining political behavior and one's foreign policy preferences.[1] As early as in nineteenth-century scholars already posited that women would bring a greater focus on peace and social justice to the foreign policy arena (Jeffreys-Jones 1997, Jabri and O'Gorman 1999). Recently, literature has also shown how female representation in national parliaments, and gender equality in general, impact the foreign policy of a country.[2] Female legislators, for example, are more likely to increase aid allocation (Hicks et al. 2016) and support humanitarian military interventions (Shea and Christian 2016). These studies, collectively point to discernible differences between the behavior of men and

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[1] See Reiter (2015) and the response from Sjoberg et al. (2017) for a review of gender and conflict.
[2] For the most recent discussion of literature on women legislators see Lawless (2015).

Figure 1: Female leaders across years

women in political posts. Having identified these baseline differences, however, they have not accounted for the institutional differences across countries that might condition the effect of women on foreign policy.

Separate from the literature on female politicians, studies have shown how policy-making authority of presidents and prime ministers depends on the institutions. In regards to that, some studies analyzed how partisan preferences of the major parties in the legislature would influence the foreign aid policy. Yet, they mostly rely on a traditional left-right dichotomy that does not capture the heterogeneity within the parties with the same ideology (Noël and Thérien 1995). In addition, ideology is itself a composite measure that contains issue positions of parties on a number of policies and these positions change over time. By allowing preferences of parties on foreign aid to change over time and across parties with the same ideological leaning, I expect to see a more detailed image of institutional constraints and opportunities facing

female leaders. Thus, I will attempt to directly measure parties preferences with respect to development assistance by referring to the Comparative Party Manifesto dataset, and analyze how it conditions the influence of gender on such policies. Specifically, I will use *internationalism* variable that captures government' preferences for engaging and influencing foreign countries relative to isolationism (Greene and Licht 2017). Although theories of foreign policy have begun to account for the gender of policymakers (Koch and Fulton 2011) and partisan politics (Tingley 2010; Brech 2014), no attempt has been made to bring these together in analyzing a foreign policy. Taken together, my model of aid giving explains the heterogeneity of foreign aid policy by focusing on the gender of leaders and partisan preferences. To the extent that those characteristics overlap with the preferences of parties, we are more likely to see changes in foreign policy.

Put simply, I will argue that while some institutional settings would facilitate women to bring forward their feminine sides, others would inhibit such behavior. To the extent that foreign aid is a gendered issue (Hicks et al. 2016; Lu and Breuning 2014) and has a gendered effect on the recipient countries, such as empowering and educating women, one might be tempted argue that female leaders would be more likely to change the foreign aid policy. Yet, my expectation is that due to a selection process of politicians into office and also because of the different gendered stereotypes facing men and women at this selection process, elected women might not display any change in foreign policy behavior absent certain conditions. Female politicians, while having discretionary power over the foreign aid policy, do not make these decisions in a vacuum. Regardless of the gender, every leader relies on the support of domestic actors to stay in power. Because leaders wish to stay in power, any foreign policy direction leaders want to take should also be favored by parties. Women may face even further constraints in exercising their policy preferences that men do not. As women executives operate within the male-dominated field, women need to be especially conscientious of how their actions will be portrayed in the media and perceived by voters. Going against the policy positions of parties, specifically in the gendered issues, may be interpreted as stereotypical

feminine behavior. Thus, an institutional and political context surrounding women executives will condition how they strategically influence policy outcomes.

The article proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review the literature on how gender and partisan politics affect the foreign policy. While the literature offered many insights on how an ideology of governments and women's representation in political life influence policy decisions, these two have been studied separately. [3] Based on this research, the second section will argue why women may face constraints in implementing their policy preference, and how parties' preferences regarding an issue are important factors. Yet, to build the argument I will first refer to foreign aid policy and show why it is a gendered issue. Thus, by focusing on the gender of the executive and preferences of the parties, this research also highlights the domestic politics of aid allocation. Most of the literature treats donor countries as virtually the same rich democratic nations, due to small variance among them in terms of resources and institutions. From that perspective, this paper offers a more nuanced account of the domestic processes that direct aid-giving in source countries. The third section will outline the research design along with summary statistics of variables. By analyzing the foreign aid flows of 34 countries from 1970 to 2012, in the fourth section, I provide the preliminary results. The final section concludes with some discussion of a future work.

Gender, foreign policy and political context

A quick look at the recent gathering of world leaders at the United Nations General Assembly reveals that politics is a male-dominated field. Out of almost 200, only 15 countries were represented by a female president or prime minister. One of the reasons behind the underrepresentation of women is sought to be different gendered preferences of women that might in turn influence foreign policy of a country. Indeed, several studies have found that women have different positions than men on a variety of foreign policy matters (Togeby 1994; Fite et al. 1990). For example, women have been found to favor protectionist trade policies (O'Rourke and Sin-

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[3]Even when these two have been jointly analyze, studies looked into women in parliament, not in the chief executive position.

nott 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Burgoon and Hiscox 2008; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Ardanaz et al. 2013; Mansfield et al. 2014; Guisinger 2016), support development assistance more than men do (Togeby 1994), and are less supportive of the use of military force than men (Eichenberg 2003). Similarly, in studies of generosity, women appear more sensitive to gift giving and donate twice as much money as men (Eckel and Grossman 1998). Based on these findings, as early as in nineteenth-century scholars already posited that women politicians would bring a greater focus on peace and social justice to the foreign policy arena (Jeffreys-Jones 1997, Jabri and O'Gorman 1999).

While the unexpected loss of Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election has piqued scholarly interest in studying women leaders (Anderson 2017), so far there are a few studies at the nexus of gender and foreign policy. With some exceptions, this literature generally focused on female legislators and their impact on different foreign policy instruments. In one of the earliest studies, Togeby (1994) argued that since female parliamentarians are expected to have a stronger commitment to international solidarity, they would support higher amounts of aid to developing countries. Looking at the percentage of women in donors' national legislatures and the percentage of women cabinet members, Breuning (2001) and Lu and Breuning (2014) find a positive relationship between women's representation in donor countries and the amount of foreign assistance provided. While Kleemann et al. (2016) finds no significant difference in the allocation of aid for education between female and male development ministers, Lu and Breuning (2014) find a negative association, and Fuchs and Richert (2015) show that female development ministers gave less official development assistance (ODA) in general.

However, little is known about how female presidents and prime ministers — figures with more voice in the formulation of foreign policy— influence the foreign policy of a country (Koch &Fulton 2013, Caprioli and Boyer 2001). Looking at the conflict behavior of countries with female leadership, Caprioli and Boyer (2001) and Koch and Fulton (2011) find that female leaders are more likely to engage in conflict. The idea is that females that operate in a masculine environment are forced into male-posturing, and thus behaving more aggressively. While this

might be true, what is not accounted in the literature is how each president, regardless of gender faces different political context that shapes use of presidential authority. Separate from the literature on female executives, there is a long scholarly literature on the influence of executive-legislative relations on a foreign policy of a country. Milner and Tingley (2015) argue that executive and legislative body have different incentives and constraints with respect to foreign policy. While presidents take into account international environment more than legislators, " support for internationalism, is not a given". In order to realize her objectives, presidents need to take into account distributional consequences of their policies, as well as ideological division over issues. Other studies have also shown how a convergence of preference between executive and legislative branches is a key component of the foreign policy outcome (Clark 2000, Howell and Pevehouse 2005, 2007).

For many scholars, one of the factors that shape the preferences of the parties on foreign policy matters is ideology. Some studies find that ideology plays an important role in determining the countries foreign aid budget (Tingley 2010, Brech and Potrafke 2014, Fleck and Kilby 2001, Chong and Gradstein 2008). However, some other studies find no association between ideology and foreign aid (Noel and Therien 1995, Round and Odedokun 2004). While these studies provide contradictory results, they all agree that parties and their preferences on foreign policy are important in understanding the foreign policy of a country. Nonetheless, these findings have been largely overlooked in the investigation of female leaders' influence on a variety of foreign policy outcomes.

Therefore, the purpose of this study to bring more clarifications into the question by focusing on the gender of leaders and partisan preferences of parties. While the literature on gender and foreign policy has steadily grown, there remains a lack of strong theoretical and empirical analysis underpinning these studies. Most of the studies in this literature either draw insights from the survey research or fail to account for the political context that female executives operate. While studies do a careful job linking gendered preferences of average women to the policy preferences of a female politician, they fail to account for the institutional factors

that might also shape females' behavior. The theory I propose tackles these issues. Building on recent studies that analyze foreign policy behavior from a leadership perspective, in the next section I theorize when does the gender of the executive leader matter in the foreign aid allocations.

Female executives and foreign policy: accounting for political context

One of the campaign promises of Angela Merkel during the Germany's recent election was to raise the foreign aid spending to record levels, making Germany the second largest contributor of international aid overtaking Britain.[4] Similarly, commenting on the importance of development assistance, Prime Minister Theresa May described the foreign aid as a "critical pillar" of the country's foreign policy, emphasizing the accomplishments of "the British taxpayer in terms of international aid."[5] In contrast to those two candidates, current French president Emmanuel Macron did not emphasize foreign aid as one of his foreign policy strategies. Chiding African countries for a mismanagement and overall ineffectiveness of foreign aid, Macron argued that what those countries need is not "more aid" as their problems are not financial.[6].

Perhaps one of the obvious differences that separate Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister May, from Macron is gender. Aside from this anecdotal evidence, empirical research has also shown gender gap among public in regards to foreign aid. For example, asking respondents about their preferences on foreign aid, Togeby (1994) finds that women are more supportive of aid to developing world than men. A number of experimental research also shown why aid allocation is a gendered issue. In regards to foreign affairs, women are more likely to hold altruistic foreign policy goals (Breuning 2001). In addition, women tend to support social equity more than men do, which has been linked with the support for foreign aid. Similarly, Guth,

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[4]https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-06-14/merkel-pledges-german-development-aid-increase-if-wins-election?src=usn_tw

[5]http://www.theweek.co.uk/63394/how-much-does-the-uk-spend-on-foreign-aid"

[6]http://www.breitbart.com/london/2017/07/11/macron-africa-needs-fewer-children-civilisational-issues/

Carsten Schmidt, and Matthias Sutter (2007) find that in contrast to men female participants are more likely to offer an equal split of the gain and link this to altruistic and the inequality aversion preferences of women. Overall, studies that run similar experiments find that women are significantly more inequality averse than men are.

A brief analysis of the impact of foreign aid on the recipient countries reveals that development assistance also has "gendered" effect. Research on the effectiveness of aid finds that an increase of foreign aid is associated with an improvement in the human development index, and the gender inequality index through financing public expenditures on health and education (Pickbourn and Ndikumana 2013). Bush (2011) also finds that the more development assistance countries receive the higher the likelihood of adopting gender quotas. Some more evidence comes from the analysis of aid agreements. For example, as a part of development assistance program, both US and EU countries obliged Jordan to increase its gender quota. In fact, training female candidates in host countries, conditioning foreign aid to the adoption of gender quotas, have become a typical condition of foreign aid giving since the end of Cold War (Bush and Jamal 2015).

Considering these gendered implications of the foreign aid, female leaders have additional incentives to increase aid budget. The underlying premise is that women politicians share the distinct gender-specific concerns and experiences with other women and have a feeling of mutuality. These shared experiences not only make women more concerned about the need of women within national border, but also those outside of it. The idea that women might care about the women outside of their borders is supported both by quantitative studies (Angevine 2017, Barraza Vargas 2019, Atkinson 2019, Antrobus 2004; Joachim 2003; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Peterson and Runyan 1993), as well as anecdotal evidence. In of the Senate hearings, Senator Jean Carnahan (D-MO) claimed that "[o]ur bond as women reaches across national, ethnic, and religious boundaries" (November 29, 2001). Hence, these shared experience of being a woman fosters a global affective gender tie and makes women more likely to act in the interest of women across the world.

However, this global relationship is not straightforward or linear (Carroll 2002) and factors such as the type of issue (Swers 2002) and the polarization of the parliments (Swers 2013) will affect female leaders' behavior. Politics as a male-dominated field puts more pressure on female leaders than it does on male ones. Specifically, in the context of the executive post, a gender of the leaders gains an exaggeratedly vivid attention. For example, one of the criticisms of Angela Merkel's immigration plan was that she has a "heart, but no plan" when deciding to accept refugees.[7] Since the executive post has historically been a masculine domain, the policy changes women executives initiate are viewed through a prism of gender. This puts a dual challenge on the women executives. On one hand, they attempt to meet the expectations related to their gender by displaying markers of femininity. Yet at the same time, they try to meet the exigencies of their post, which given its masculine character requires women leaders not to deviate from a traditional role (Montecinos 2017). Female executives are thus under pressure to demonstrate their strength, determination and other masculine characteristics while moving not far away from stereotypically feminine behavior. In the face of this disadvantageous double standard, I argue that women executives will be more cautious in changing foreign policy, specifically on gendered issues that lack support of their parties. In such circumstances, avoiding the most controversial aspects of gender policymaking might be rewarding for women, as seemingly identical actions are likely to be perceived differently depending on the sex of the leader.

Numerous historical examples show that women executives generally shied away from touching the gender-related issues during their tenure when the situation was not fit. For instance, analysis of the tenure of Philippine's first female president —Corazon Aquino— reveals that because of the lack of strong party support and institutional barriers, Aquino dropped her initiatives on the gendered issues (Montecinos 2017). Aside from historical narratives, scholarly studies have also shown that women politicians perform better and are more in advantages

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[7]https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/opinion/will-merkel-pay-for-doing-the-right-thing.html?hpwrref=opinionaction=clickpgtype=Homepagemodule=well-regionregion=bottom-wellWT.nav=bottom-well

positions in countries with less institutionalized parties (Schwindt-Bayer 2017).

Various factors also make women leaders more constrained, making them more receptive to the preferences of the parties. First of all, women are seen are more risk-averse than men. Experimental research from economics and finance show that participants tend to assume that women select more conservative gambles, whereas men are more risk-takers (Jennifer S. Lerner et al. 2003; Michele Grossman and Wood 1993). This cautious behavior have also been observed among female politicians. For example, while being described as the world's most powerful woman,[8] the chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, was repeatedly characterized as *A Cautious Chancellor* for her stance on issues of European Union reforms, and other foreign policy matters.[9] This perception of women as more risk averse and cautious has implications for women politicians in general and their ability to negotiate to achieve favorable policy positions. To the extent that women disregarding the parties' position on policies can threaten their survival, women would be more likely to concede their positions.

Second, compared to men, women face more bias in the election process. The importance of parties' position for the election-seeking leaders becomes more evident once we consider different selection process facing men and women in politics. In contrast to male candidates, women face more obstacles due to the gender stereotypes. Research on candidate evaluation depicts that, voters perceive male and female politicians as differently able to handle foreign policy issues (Bos 2011; Bauer 2017; Schneider 2014) which also influences their vote choice. Even though the number of female executives has increased over time, stereotypes about women's incompetence in the realm of foreign policy still endure. Particularly, stereotypes of women being empathic, and compassionate, sensitive in contrast to men being strong and aggressive yield different expectations of foreign affairs under male and female executive. Because of these gendered expectations, women face heightened scrutiny for their foreign policy decisions. Consequently, this could very well make female leaders proceed with caution in

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[8]https://www.expatica.com/de/angela-merkel-germanys-successful-cautious-chancellor/

[9]https://www.nytimes.com/1911/10/18/archives/germany-is-cautious-chancellor-points-out-difficulties-of-present.html

regards to foreign aid policy.

Lastly, the introduction of policies that favor women does not guarantee that it will pass the legislature. As rational politicians, they must compete to find issues that can be successfully pursued. Thus, leaders will search for foreign policy instruments that can achieve their desired outcome with less legislative backlash. Foreign aid is one of such tools, as its costs are distributed evenly. Compared to trade policy, for example, development assistance is a less politically divisive issue. In addition, considering some of the gendered benefits of aid, such a policy can help female leaders to win an audience abroad and at home. Nonetheless, as discussed above, women presidents and prime ministers need to look both "presidential" and "feminine" without facing public retaliation for deviating from a masculine outlook of the executive post. As such, having parties that support their pro-aid policy can help female leaders to elude the attention of the media. In other words, the gendered policy preferences of presidents or prime ministers will not be successfully implemented when other members of decision-makers espouse contrasting views.

In sum, policy performance of a woman leader will be conditional on the expectations of policy processes. Thus, I argue that unless female politicians preferences on aid giving overlap with those of the parties in the government, they would be less likely to increase foreign aid.

Hypothesis 1: The effect of female leadership on development aid will be conditional on the preferences of the parties: female leaders, supported by parties who favor more aid giving, are more likely to increase aid compared to male leaders

However, female leaders can have a different effect on the foreign aid allocation depending on which channel is used. My expectation is that, female leaders would have relatively more influence over bilateral aid, rather than multilateral aid as later is channeled through International Organizations where it is determined by some pre-arranged rules. The comparison of bilateral aid versus multilateral will also provide a falsification test for the theory. If some unobserved factors are the major determinants of changes in the aid policy, this should be reflected in both multilateral and bilateral aid budget, but if the theories predictions are right we

would see changes only in the bilateral aid flows.

Hypothesis 2: Female leaders, conditional on the preferences of parties, will positively influence bilateral aid flows, while fail to have impact on the multilateral aid

Data and Research Design

To test the hypotheses derived above, I will utilize a cross-sectional time-series design with country-year as the unit of analysis for 34 developed countries from 1970 to 2012.[10] The dependent variable is Official Development Assistance (logged), which measures the annual aid flows from donor states. For the hypothesis one, it takes into account total aid that comprises of both grants and loans part (see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data). To test the second hypothesis I will use disaggregated data on aid commitments provided by the OECD's DAC Creditor Reporting System.

To identify a gender of the countries leader I rely on Archigos data (Goemans et al. 2009). This variable is binary coded 1 for females, and zero otherwise. To measure parties' preferences, I rely on Comparative Manifesto Project, which offers ideal dataset to test my hypotheses as parties' position on foreign aid allocation will be displayed prominently in their manifestos, given the high media coverage and attention from political elites in matters of foreign policy (Williams 2015). The CMP performs content analysis of party manifestos and codes emphasis of individual issues (e.g., positive statements about free market economy or positive statements about the defense spending) as a proportion of the entire manifesto document for each party in a given election. As such, a number of studies refer to CMP dataset to measure position of parties regarding defense spending (Williams 2015), foreign aid (Greene and Licht 2017), and pacifism (Heffington 2016).

Specifically, to identify preferences regarding foreign aid, I utilize "internationalism" variable that measures party's emphasis on international cooperation, with references to specific

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[10]An availability of data was the major reason that restricted the sample to 34 countries.

policies such as foreign aid. In other words, it measures parties preferences for engagement with the outside world versus isolation. In order to have a continuous measure of *internationalism* I subtract the percentage of negative statements from the percentage of positive statements in regard to foreign aid. Consider the example below from the Republican party's 2008 manifesto:

> "Decades of massive aid have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries where it has often propped up failed policies and corrupt rulers (Republican Party Manifesto 2008)"

Such negative emphasize on foreign aid, and international cooperation in general, is one of the many statements of parties that have isolationist preferences. This variable is interacted with FEMALE variable to test the conditional hypothesis.

In addition to main explanatory variables, I include several economic and political regressor to control for the factors discussed in the literature as important determinants of donors' aid allocation decisions. First, I include *TRADE (% of GDP)* variable to measure the dependence of donor on trade with other countries. Previous research demonstrates that countries that rely more on trade are likely to have higher levels of foreign aid. (Lundsgaarde et al. 2007) Second, I also include GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2000 US dollars; logged) to control for the level of economic development. Literature on foreign aid allocation indicates that as countries become more wealthy they are more likely to allocate foreign aid. In addition, previous research has also shown how percentage of women in national parliaments impacts development assistance . Thus, I also include variable that measures gender composition of national parliaments taken from World Development Indicators and Paxton et al. (2008) to fill the gaps.

Models are estimated with state-level fixed effects to address the unit heterogeneity that might bias the results. This approach also allows to account for some unmeasured variables associated with particular countries and to isolate the effect of independent variables on the variation of each state's foreign aid policy. In addition to that, due to dynamic nature of the dependent variable, models will be estimated with lagged dependent variable to account for

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contemporaneous correlation and robust standard errors clustered by country.[11] The resulting equation is:

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 FEMALE_{i,t} + \beta_3 Internationalism_{i,t} +$$
$$\beta_4 FEMALE_{i,t} x Internationalism_{i,t} + \beta \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1} + \eta_i + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

where $\beta \mathbf{X}_{t-1}$ is is a vector of coefficients associated with a matrix of control variables, η_i is donor fixed effects and ϵ is a normally-distributed error term. The major coefficient of interest is β_4, which given the theory is predicted to be positive.

Results

Table 1 presents main results. The preliminary findings are broadly consistent with my expectation. In each of the two models presented in Table 2, more aid is given in cases where both female leaders and parties supported aid giving. In both models coefficient of interaction term is statistically significant and in the anticipated direction. In addition, consistent with theory I find that male leaders, even if supported by internationalist parties, do not have effect on the foreign aid. The coefficient of *Internationalism* fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance on both models, and carries a negative sign.

A more accessible way to convey the same basic results is to look at a graphical representation. Figure 2 displays the marginal effects of female leadership on development assistance across different values of aid preferences of the parties, when other regressors are fixed at their mean values. The plot shows that preferences of the parties in the government conditions the positive association between ODA flows and female leadership. In sum, the results described in Table 2 and Figure 2 are consistent with Hypothesis 1.

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[11]Excluding lagged dependent variable from the models do not change the results. I estimated all models without lagged dependent variable, which helped to increase the number of observations, yet the main results remained robust.

Table 1: Relationship between female leadership, parties' preferences and foreign aid

	Model 1 (clustered SE)	Model 2 (PCSE)
Lagged DV	0.726***	0.726***
	(0.071)	(0.036)
Female	-0.062	-0.062
	(0.043)	(0.049)
Internationalism	-0.008	- 0.008*
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Female * Internationalism	0.0162*	0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Women in Parliament	-0.004	-0.004**
	(0.003)	(0.002)
GDP growth	0.010	0.010 *
	(0.006)	(0.006)
GDP per capita	0.172***	0.172***
	(0.048)	(0.030)
Trade as a percentage of GDP	0.003**	0.003***
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	0.020	0.431
	(0.294)	(0.207)
R-squared	0.94	0.97
N	908	908
Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes

$*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$; Two-tailed test. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Model 1 estimated with panel-corrected standard errors

The results also show that macroeconomic factors have important influence on the annual aid flows. In both models, per capita GDP reaches statistical significance and is in expected direction. More precisely, the results reveal that as donor countries development level increases they tent to allocate more resources to foreign aid. In regards to trade the results generally support the arguments that countries that are more interdependent on global market are also allocating more resources to foreign aid. In addition, the estimates suggest *GDP growth* size has either no impact or slightly positive impact on foreign aid budget.

Overall, the theory seems to fit the data well. The results are consistent with the expectation that female leaders whose preferences overlap with the parties in the government, in regards to foreign aid would significantly increase the foreign aid budget.

Next, I break down dependent variable by channel, and analyze how female leaders are

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Female leaders on Foreign aid conditional on the aid preferences of parties

associated with bilateral vs. multilateral aid. Given that multilateral aid is also influenced by international actors, such as IOs, NGOs, and might even be based on formulaic agreements negotiated together with international institutions like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank my expectation is that only bilateral aid will have a positive relationship with the major variable of interest. If the theory is right, then one would see positive association between bilateral aid and interaction variable. In that regards, this comparison is also a falsification test for my theory.

Models 3 and 4 displayed in Table 2 examine the relationship between female leaders, parties preferences and foreign aid separately for bilateral aid and multilateral aid. Again, when it comes to the major variable of interest — *female*internationalism*— the results are

Table 2: Foreign aid disaggregated by channel.

	Model 3	Model 4
	DV: bilateral aid	DV: multilateral aid
Lagged bilateral aid	0.671***	
	(-0.03)	
Lagged multilateral aid		0.550***
		(-0.07)
Female	-0.03	-.041
	(.039)	(.057)
Female*Internationalism	0.012**	0.013
	(-0.005)	(-0.009)
Internationalism	-0.0023	-0.009*
	(-0.005)	(-0.005)
GDP growth	0.007	-0.002
	(-0.004)	(-0.006)
Women in parliament	-0.002	-0.002
	(-0.003)	(-0.003)
GDP per capita	0.21***	0.23***
	(-0.06)	(-0.04)
Trade	0.002**	0.003***
	(-0.0008)	(-0.0009)
Constant	-0.147	0.146
	-0.405	-0.256
Observations	905	904
R-squared	0.756	0.731
Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes

$*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$; Two-tailed test. Robust standard Errors are in parentheses

in line with my expectation. I find that female leaders, conditional on the internationalism of governing parties have positive effect on aid allocations, and the findings are statistically significant at conventional levels. These results are consistent with my theoretical argument: female leaders, conditional on the preferences of parties in the government, are able influence bilateral aid flows, while fail to have impact on the multilateral one.[12]

Regarding the macroeconomic factors, as the per capita income level raises in donor countries, governments are more likely to allocate to foreign aid. Both bilateral aid and multilateral aid are also responsive to the development level. In addition, countries with more trade depen-

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[12]As a robustness check, I also estimated models with a linear time trend to control for any common shifts in aid allocation.

dence are also more generous in aid giving. In fact, number of studies show how aid giving is sometimes tied to trade relationship between countries(Stiglitz and Charlton 2006; Silva and Nelson 2012).

In regards to gender composition of parliament, all of the models either do not find any relationship between *women in parliament* and foreign aid, or find negative relationship. In fact, even in cases where coefficient of *women in parliament* fails to reach the statistical significance, the sign if negative. Thus, these results side with studies that find no significant difference in the allocation of aid related to women in parliament (Kleemann et al. 2016; Fuchs and Richert 2015). Overall, the theory seems to fit the data well. The results are consistent with the expectation that female leaders whose preferences overlap with the parties in the government, in regards to foreign aid would significantly increase the foreign aid budget.

Conclusion and future work

Despite the efforts of activists, politicians and international organizations, women all over the world continue to be underrepresented in a political sphere, "often as a result of discriminatory laws, practices, attitudes and gender stereotypes.[13] Specifically, in the context of executive post, women remain highly underrepresented. This has largely been attributed to the belief that women hold different preferences on both domestic and foreign policy matters. However, the literature has tended to focus on the legislative branch to analyze the veracity of gendered decision making, while analysis of female executives has been overlooked. Even among those works, studies typically focused on domestic politics. This is unfortunate, because there are reasons to suspect that women will behave differently in different institutional settings. Thus, in this paper, I analyze the gendered foreign policy making of female executives and how parties position conditions it.

In doing so, this study differs from existing research in several ways. It is one of few studies

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[13]Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, 19 December 2011. $http$: $//www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol = A/RES/66/130$

to focus on female executives, not representatives. Executive and legislative branches tend to have different preferences with respect to foreign policy, with the former having more authority and internationalist orientation. Thus, by studying female executives, this study adds to a literature on the influence of female representation in political positions. In addition, the study also considers how domestic political institutions put different constraints on leaders, which also changes across years. Some scholars have integrated measurements of partisanship into their theoretical explanations, yet extant scholarship has not empirically analyzed how such dynamics shape female leaders behavior. Lastly, while most studies rely on left-right dichotomy to measure the parties preferences on foreign policy issues, I utilize the direct measure of their position on the issues by relying on party manifestos.

This study finds that while gender does matter, its effect on the foreign policy of a country will be conditional on the partisan preferences of the parties. My argument highlights the role of domestic institutions, and thus challenges the assumption that gender can have an unconstrained effect on a policy area. To the contrary, different forms of institutions will either facilitate or hinder women's gendered policy goals. According to the theory, parties preferences can either facilitate (when they are internationalist) or constrain the relationship between gender and policy preferences. Thus, aside from offering an understanding of the foreign policy behavior of female politicians, this research also informs about the extent of constraints female politicians face.

Beyond contributing to the literature at the nexus of gender and foreign policy, this study aims to add to the growing literature on domestic politics of foreign aid allocation. The literature to date has done a careful job discussing the effectiveness of foreign aid while understanding major factors behind aid volatility received less attention. Studies that looked into determinants of aid budget either focused on macroeconomic factors, strategic links between donor and recipient nations. To my knowledge, no study so far has tied changes in the foreign aid to an explicit theory focusing on leaders. This paper is the first that proposes a theory of aid giving along with an empirical test that centers on the donor countries leader, specifically

gender. In doing so, I also account for the preferences of parties.

Looking at aggregate aid flow, I find that the gender of the leaders per se does not necessarily lead to differences in the foreign aid allocation. Much depends on the support of the parties as well. As long as parties supported internationalism, female leaders do have an influence on aid budget. The similar results emerge, once we look at the different mechanism to channel aid. These results highlight a strong connection between parties preferences and foreign policy issues and speak to a number of important lines of literature, including the constraining effects of politics on female leaders. Yet, it is important to be clear and recognize that our argument captures only one dimension of foreign policy where gender could have an effect. Rather than assuming that leaders residing in the same institutional contexts will behave similarly, future research needs to uncover a relationship between female leaders and other instruments of foreign policy.

Another interesting extension of this research agenda might be to explore the extent to which female leaders change the direction of foreign aid. New dyadic data on bilateral aid flows might be useful in this regard. Particularly, it would be interesting to see whether recipient countries characteristics, such as level of corruption, inequality and most importantly availability facilities for women' access weights more heavily in the policy of foreign aid of donor country with female leaders. It seems plausible that female leaders would be more cautious in giving aid to corrupt governments. With more and more women running for executives post across the world, I believe that it is imperative to understand how gender stereotypes and institutional context affect the foreign policy decision making of female leaders.

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Gender Stereotypes and Foreign Aid Policy

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Introduction

Women's access to the executive branch has been always very difficult. As of 2019, among the 192 sovereign states recognized by the United Nations, only a dozen have a female president or prime minister. Many other women have tried to break the glass ceiling, but few have succeeded. One prominent explanation is that voters are biased against female politicians. While women are stereotyped as being compassionate and compromising, men are viewed as tougher and better able to handle military crises (**??**). In regards to policy areas, women tend to be associated with issues such as education, health care, welfare of children and families, but men are usually linked to areas such as military affairs, foreign policy, crime, and economic management.

Such gender stereotypes are not necessarily harmful to women. When issues such as environmental pollution, welfare policies, or corruption dominate the agenda, stereotypes may serve to women's advantage. Nonetheless, traits such as softness and compassion that may appear fairly neutral, or even work to women's advantage on domestic issues, serve to undermine women executives, specifically in dealing with foreign affairs. Since foreign affairs is a high-prestige area, offering individuals more visibility and significant control over policy it has been slow in accepting women (**?**). Moreover, a number of studies have shown how respondents see masculine qualities necessary for success in foreign affairs (**???**). As the executive office is mostly identified with the masculine issues of foreign policy, women are seen as poorly equipped for this job. Such evaluation of females through gender stereotypes have been well documented in the matters of military crises and defense spending. Yet, we know little about how these stereotypes influence evaluations of different foreign policy tools, such as foreign aid. Toward this end, I investigate how common gender stereotypes influence the evaluation of foreign aid policy.

Aid has long been one of the primary instruments that states use to improve diplomatic relations. Yet, most importantly, it presents an ideal case to evaluate depth and limits of effect of gender stereotypes on policy evaluation. For one, parties devote specific attention to expression

of their foreign aid agenda in the party manifestos (Dietrich, Milner, Slapin 2018). In addition, public opinion on aid policy has been show to play a key role in shaping the decision-making regarding aid policy (**???**). In particular, recent theories have debated the moral and political concerns in supporting aid policy. However, in contrast to military spending and conflict escalation, foreign aid, regardless of its purpose, operates as an instrument of soft power. In addition, a number of studies have found a gender gap in support of development aid (**??**) as well as an association between female minister (Fuchs and Richert 2017; Dreher et al.,2015; Kleemann et al., 2016), parliamentarians (Lu and Breuning, 2014; Hicks et al., 2016; Breuning, 2001; Lundsgaarde et al., 2007; Olsen-Telles, 2013; Fuchs et al., 2014) and aid budget. Lastly, gender equality and women empowerment have, for the last several years been at the center of development initiatives. Just in 2016 and 2017 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members allocated 38 percent of the bilateral aid towards gender equality and women empowerment.[1] Hence, foreign aid is a suitable area of foreign policy in which to explore how gender stereotypes influence female presidents' evaluation.

Building on insights from gender and politics, as well as foreign aid literature, I develop a theoretical framework that guides the analysis. I argue that, given the historically masculine nature of the executive office, along with a masculine perception of the foreign affairs portfolio, a female executive might be rewarded for avoiding gendered policy-making. Studies have shown that to avoid being seen as soft and weak, and thus to combat gender stereotypes female leaders acted tough during international crises. Even in the medieval era, married queens were more likely than kings to be aggressors in interstate conflicts (Dube and Harish 2017). Although overt media bias and voter discrimination has been in decline, female executives still face heightened scrutiny for their foreign policy decisions. Because public is stereotypically inclined to believe women to be less competent in handling foreign affairs, policy instruments with gendered implications will be viewed through the prism of gender. I argue that, when voters apply a gendered lens to their evaluations, female presidents with the pro-aid policy will

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[1]http://www.oecd.org/development/gender-development/development-finance-for-gender-equality-and-women-s-empowerment.htm

be evaluated less favorable compared to their male counterparts. This is partly due to foreign aid being seen as a form of soft power, and partly because of the gendered connotation of the policy.

Moreover, I expect this to be conditional on the support of parties. Numerous historical examples show that women executives generally shied away from touching the gender-related issues during their tenure when the situation was not fit. For instance, analysis of the tenure of Philippine's first female president, Corazon Aquino, reveals that because of the lack of strong party support and institutional barriers, Aquino dropped her initiatives on the gendered issues (**?**).[2] As such, parties' support of gendered aid policy offers assurance to people that female leaders are competent enough, which I expect will help to mitigate bias again female presidents with pro-aid policy.

To isolate the effects of gender stereotypes on public evaluations of leaders with pro-aid policy, I conducted a survey experiment. Compared to an observational study, experimental setting allows me to randomly vary leaders' genders and party support while holding other factors constant. More specifically, I rely on a 3 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment to the expectations of the theory. All of the respondents are asked to read about the foreign policy agenda of a hypothetical president of the US in the year 2029. Following the treatment conditions where the president's gender, partisan affiliation, and co-partisan's approval are randomized, respondents are asked to indicate their level of support for the president's policy and whether they approve president's job. The results show that voters are less likely to offer support to pro-aid policy if the policy is offered by a female president. Female presidents favoring an aid increase also gained lower competence score and job approval compared to male presidents. Corroborating expectations, results suggest that once respondents are informed about the support of parties for the aid policy, female presidents enjoy higher foreign policy support, receive higher approval, and are considered more competent.

In sum, this study makes a number of contributions. First of all, results reinforce the recent

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[2]Aside from historical narratives, scholarly studies have also shown that women politicians perform better and are more in advantageous positions in countries with less institutionalized parties (Schwindt-Bayer 2017).

findings that leader's attributes matter for the study of international relations. While much of this emerging literature focus on factor like age (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015), term limits (Carter and Nordstrom 201), leaders' preferences (Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon 2018, (**?**)), and military background less attention is paid to gender. Although theories of foreign policy have begun to account for the gender of policymakers (**??**) all of these studies are limited to the study of conflict behavior. As more women gain executive office, it is important to understand how gender of a leader affects different areas of foreign policy. In this study, I approach gender in foreign policy from a different angle, analyzing public reaction to foreign aid policy.

Second, this study also provides greater insights into the underlying drivers of differences in gendered perceptions of the executive post. Findings offer implications of how female executives can craft different foreign policy tools in different contexts. In conditions where their aid policy is not supported by co-partisans, female politicians should adopt a cautious approach and steer clear of any gendered foreign policy strategies.

In addition, the study extends gender and communications literature by examining the relationship between gender stereotypes, co-partisan support and foreign policy. Numerous studies have examined the gender stereotypes across different issue areas, yet few have explored how adoption of certain issues influence public's evaluations. A new studies on this topic, have examined how threat of terrorism influence female candidates (**???**). However, no study we are aware of has analyzed the impact of gender, and partisan support on leader's approval.

Aside from contributing to the literature on gender and politics, findings also contribute to the emerging literature, which analyzes the determinants of support for foreign aid in donor countries. In particular, the recent literature on foreign aid started to emphasize the role of public opinion in donor countries as a key to explain complex decision-making regarding foreign aid (Milner 2006, Heinrich 2013, Milner & Tingley 2015, Heinrich and Koboyashi 2018). Moving beyond the material factors, ideology, and identities, these new studies found that factors such as generalized trust (Bayram 2017), anti-aid rhetoric (Bayram and Thompson, 2019),

and populist governments (Heinrich et al 2016) are a crucial component of a support for foreign aid. By showing the effect of politician's gender on attitudes toward foreign aid, this paper leads to an improved understanding of the attitudes towards foreign aid.

Gender and Foreign Policy

A quick look at a gathering of world leaders reveals that politics is a male dominated field. While women have been breaking —"the highest glass ceiling"— in the last couple of decades, the pace has been slow. As of 2019, only 28 countries had women serving as heads of state or government. What explains this immense disparity in descriptive representation? In examining why so few women reach positions of power, studies have posited that voters are biased against female politicians and the source of this bias is stereotypes (**?**). Stereotypes are shared beliefs about a group of people and tend to be sticky. Specifically, gender stereotypes are pervasive and very slow-changing, as they can be distinguished quickly and shapes much of social life (**?**).

Decades of research on gender stereotypes reveal that generally, such stereotypes are pervasive in politics and often put women in a disadvantageous position (**?**).[3] According to this view, voters do not have a baseline gender preference, rather prefer male politicians because of the characteristics they are perceived to possess. One such stereotype is about women being perceived to be more liberal and progressive than their male counterparts (**?**). Most importantly, voters are more likely to associate masculine traits such as competence and strong leadership with male politicians, while associating women with collaborative traits (**??**). Overall, gender

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[3]Is there a situation where gender stereotypes give female politicians an upper hand? As women are considered outsiders in the male dominated politics, when honesty is more valued in politicians, women are generally in the advantage. Consistent with this, studies found that voters who value honesty are more likely to vote for women than for men (**?**). Additionally, a number of studies has shown a positive association between women in politics and reduced corruption. (**???**). The perception that female politicians being honest and thus less corrupt has gained traction among not just among scholars, but also public. In Uganda, for example, women are selected to lead the investigations of corruption in the police force (**?**). Yet, understanding how corruption incidents in the foreign policy matters influence evaluation of female leaders remains under-explored. Studies on gender and politics have shown that female politicians are punished more harshly if the wrongdoing is revealed. In regards to aid policy, this will imply that voters respond differently to mismanagement by male and female politicians. More precisely, voters might evaluate sending aid to corrupt regimes differently depending on the gender of policy maker. This seems to an interesting question, which can be examined in future research.

stereotypes portray women as communal (e.g., showing concern for others) and men as agentic (e.g., assertive; Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011). Given that such traits are considered important characteristics of a president, women are less likely to be preferred. Such gender stereotypes are so strong that even when it is not "explicitly acknowledged, it often operates in the background, affecting our assumptions about who are legitimate political actors and how they should behave" (Carroll and Fox 2006, 4).

While men are considered to be strong, aggressive, and decisive, women are perceived to be compassionate and caring. Hence, in areas where aggressiveness and decisiveness are valued, men are seen as more competent. Whereas women are considered more competent to handle the communal areas, where compassion is well-received. As such, gendered personality traits are thought to map on to different policy areas. For example, men are perceived more competent in handling national security, defense and foreign policy issues, while women are usually associated with education, healthcare and social issues (**??**). Such trait attribution moves beyond issue ownership and play a role in shaping voting behavior. When the national security concerns dominate the agenda, voters are more likely to vote for a male candidate. Through a series of survey experiments, recent work demonstrates that when terrorism threat is activated, masculine stereotypes have a negative influence on female candidates, but such influence is conditional on the president's party affiliation (**???**).

Stereotypes also influence the appointment of women to ministerial positions. Even when women break barriers and attain cabinet office, they are appointed to portfolios in feminine or "soft" domain with lower prestige, while men are more likely to hold portfolios in masculine and high prestige domains, such as defense, finance, and foreign affairs (**??**). However, the political context in the country also plays an important role. When the politics become less masculine and the orientation of the portfolio changes, women are appointed to historically "hard" portfolios such as defense minister (**?**).

Another high-prestige area that has been resistant to the entry of women is foreign affairs. Given the perceived discordance between the qualities women possess and the qualities neces-

sary for success in foreign affairs, affairs of states in dealing with other states have been mostly off-limits to women (**?**). This also explains the persistent gender hierarchy within diplomacy. While some legal changes have been adopted to bring more women to diplomacy, patriarchal values along with difficulties of reconciling work and family remain major obstacles for women (Rahman 2011). For example, after examining the representation of women in Australian Foreign Service Conley Tyler et al. (2014) find that direct and indirect gender discrimination, traditional gender stereotypes, and obstacles to work-life balance are the major barriers for women. As stereotypes portray men as better able to handle foreign policy issues, women tend to be excluded from the decision-making in international affairs.

As the executive is considered the most masculine branch of government (Duerst-Lahti 1997), gender becomes particularly salient. Compared to the legislative post, the executive has a high perception of "maleness" and still lags behind legislative in regards to women's access (**??**). In addition, compared to executives, legislators enact laws collectively. Perhaps because of this, executives receive more media attention than a single member of the parliament. In turn, the gender of an executive also gets vivid media attention. This leads the public to evaluate female presidents more harshly than male presidents (**?**)

Consequently, gender stereotypes feed skepticism toward female executives. This is evident in double standards that women face, as their actions subjected to closer scrutiny and stricter demands than their male colleagues (Skard 2015, 78). Because of discordance in the qualities, women are perceived to possess, and the qualities necessary for success in foreign affairs, female executives face heightened scrutiny for their foreign policy decisions (**?**). In the face of this disadvantage, studies examined mechanisms that female leaders use to combat gender stereotyping. Koch and Fulton (2011) argued that pressures to reject feminine stereotypes urge them to adopt a masculine stance in politics. In other words, in masculinized leadership positions, such as executive office, women can confront the credibility challenge by endorsing masculine policies, such as defense spending. Similarly, Swers (2007) also finds that female senators were more likely to sponsor defense related bills to overcome credibility challenges on

national security issues. Beyond defense policy, female leaders were also found to act tough during international crises to combat stereotypical expectations (Caprioli and Boyer 2001). Even high-ranking female bureaucrats in the traditional masculine portfolios, were found to advocate for more aggressive foreign policy (Bashevkin 2018).

Ample evidence from campaigns of women running for the executive office also suggests that women candidates emphasize traditionally masculine traits to counter stereotypes. Tansu Ciller, the first female prime minister of Turkey, run campaign advertisements showing her wearing a helmet and flak jacket passing through Bosnian capital. To emphasize her strong stance on the Kurdish issue, her slogan was "a vote for the DYP (her party) is a bullet to the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party)."[4] To communicate "toughness" and the ability to be competent in masculine issues, similar campaign messages have also been adopted by female candidates in the US. For example, Clinton run an ad featuring her answering a phone ringing at 3 am in the White House, while the narrator said: "Your vote will decide who answers that call. Whether it's someone who already knows the world's leaders, knows the military, someone tested and ready to lead in a dangerous world. It's 3am and your children are safe and asleep. Who do you want answering the phone?". Likewise, in the Finish elections of 2000 with four female candidates for the presidential office, women candidates preferred to focus on foreign policy, instead of other issues (**?**). Overall, when it comes to female executives and foreign policy demonstration of "toughness" by promising defense spending, signaling a tough approach to international crises, or even wearing a military uniform is explained by an incentive to counter gender stereotypes.

But what does this scholarship tell us about gender stereotypes and foreign aid policy? Extant scholarship points to the advantage of adopting a more hawkish position in international affairs for female leaders. The association of increased defense spending and conflict behavior with masculinity explains this well. In the light of findings regarding stereotype counterbalancing and defense spending, how would foreign aid spending factor into the equation? Below

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[4]https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/01/11/crackdown-on-kurds-boosts-turkeys-ciller/b7436068-eb93-4338-928a-3ee9eb625925/

I answer these questions by taking stock of existing foreign aid literature.

Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool

States can use different tools of foreign policy, such as sanctions, military force, diplomacy, and foreign aid to further their goals. While the first two of those represent the confrontation approach to international affairs, the last two are usually identified as positive inducements. States can choose to use sticks—punitive measures such as force and sanctions— and carrots— trade deals and foreign assistance to deal with international problems (**?**). In contrast to military force (i.e. sticks), sending aid as a response to the international problems is a manifestation of soft diplomacy (**?**). While the pure motives and objectives of sending aid to other countries is still debated in the literature, the ostensible purpose of aid is to help economic development in poorer countries. Every year donors send billions of dollars in aid to the world's poorest countries. Aside from helping the poor, aid is thought to win the hearts and minds of people in the aid-recipient countries (**???**).

Despite this, foreign aid is received with skepticism, and polling reveals that the public tends to exaggerate aid spending. For example, average American predicted aid budget to be close to 25 percent and thus supported aid cuts.[5] The similar patterns have been found in other donor countries. What explains these attitudes towards foreign aid? In other words, what are the individual determinants of citizen support for foreign assistance?

Existing research in this area pointed to the connection of foreign aid to the welfare policies (Lumsdaine 1993).**?** viewed aid as an altruistic move and examined how moral obligations influence the preferences for aid spending. Aside from that, one of the consistent findings is that gender and income are important determinants of preferences for welfare policies and foreign aid. In regards to gender, women typically found to be more altruistic than men (Greeno and Maccoby, 1993) and more likely to express concern for the wellbeing of others (Flanagan et al.,

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[5]https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-support-foreign-aid-oppose-paying-it; http://worldpublicopinion.net/american-public-vastly-overestimates-amount-of-u-s-foreign-aid/

1998). They are also more likely to hold altruistic foreign policy goals (**?**). In addition, women tend to support social equity more than men do, which has been linked with the support for foreign aid. Similarly, Guth, Carsten Schmidt, and Matthias Sutter (2007) find that in contrast to men female participants are more likely to offer an equal split of the gain and link this to altruistic and the inequality aversion preferences of women. Overall, studies that run similar experiments find that women are significantly more inequality averse than men are.

While the clear linkage between foreign aid and inequality reduction can be debated, survey experiments consistently show that overall, women are more supportive of development assistance. (**??**). To further identify whether the gender gap, if any, exist in support for foreign aid, I extensively surveyed the the public opinion research on foreign aid. While not being directly focused on the gender gap, many studies *do* find that women are more supportive of aid to developing world than men are (**???????**).[6] Perhaps even more convincing, studies have shown that percentage of women legislators and cabinet members is positively correlated with foreign aid (**???**). Similarly, an increase in women in legislatures is also positively associated with foreign aid spending on women's programs, and expenditure for gender equality programs (**?**)

Even though it is reasonable to connect gender and support for foreign aid, what are the main drivers of the gender gap? While foreign aid is basically an extension of redistribution outside state's border, it is *foreign*. Unlike domestic redistribution, foreign aid is about sending government's resources to help strangers. Nonetheless, women tend to care more about those issues that are likely to affect women and children. A brief analysis of the impact of foreign aid on the recipient countries reveals that development assistance also has "gendered" effect. Research on the effectiveness of aid finds that an increase of foreign aid is associated with an improvement in the human development index, and the gender inequality index through financing public expenditures on health and education (Pickbourn and Ndikumana 2013). **?** also finds that the more development assistance countries receive the higher the likelihood of

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[6]There are exceptions to the gender gap in foreign aid. Looking across countries, Chong and Gradstein (2008) find no differences between the genders in support for foreign aid.

adopting gender quotas. **?** finds a similar pattern in Afghanistan, where development programs increase the female participation in village governance and economic activities. Some more evidence comes from the analysis of aid agreements. For example, as a part of development assistance program, both US and EU countries obliged Jordan to increase its gender quota. In fact, training female candidates in host countries, conditioning foreign aid to the adoption of gender quotas, have become a typical condition of foreign aid giving since the end of Cold War (**?**).

Thus, to the extent that foreign aid is a gendered issue and has a gendered effect on the recipient countries, I expect a gender gap in public's support for foreign aid. To follow up with the previous findings and to compare the results, I begin this study with the following hypothesis:

H1: Women, on average, are more likely to support foreign assistance to developing countries than men are.

Female Leaders and Partisan Cues

As mentioned previously, significant research shows that women face higher scrutiny for their foreign policy behavior. Yet these studies mainly focus on female legislatures, rely on observational data, and have not incorporated the role of copartisan's approval in this process. Building on existing literature and its findings about the effects of candidates gender on citizens' evaluations, here I develop a theoretical framework that fills these gaps. I hypothesize that female executives with gendered foreign policy agenda will receive lower support, but parties' approval of such policies will mitigate the bias against them. The intuition behind these hypotheses is shaped by findings on gender stereotypes and research on foreign aid preferences.

First, gender stereotypes tend to lead the public to consider executive politics with masculine attributes and be biased against female leaders. Because women historically were not in positions of authority, they are viewed less favorable. Men, on the other hand, are seen as

possessing traits that 'fit' with the leadership role and thus evaluated more favorable. Because of this "role incongruity" between leadership and female qualities, coupled with the executive office being traditionally in the male domain, female presidents will be less popular than the male one.

The claim that female executives receive lower evaluations than male executives might be regarded as unreasonable at first glance. Given that women who are elected to the office have to convince the electorate of their abilities to govern, it could be that such voters do not view female presidents through a gendered lens. Nonetheless, female politicians' access to power is often filled with gender disparities. A brief examination of the past presidential campaigns reveals that women candidates for the presidential office were tormented with gendered expectations and media coverage (**?**). Women not only receive less media coverage but also less substantive coverage by the media (**?**). While such gendered view has been in decline, it is far from being vanished. During an interview, drawing attention to Hillary Clinton's gender, Trump argued that "Hillary is a person who doesn't have the strength or the stamina... She's not a strong enough person to be president" (ABC News 2015).

Specifically in the area of foreign policy female executives face more challenges. As foreign affairs generally regarded as a masculine issue where tough and ambitious policies are valued, foreign aid policy with its gendered attributes might be regarded as a signal of compassion and thus femininity. After all compared to punitive measures such as force and sanctions, development assistance is about helping development in other countries while winning hearts and minds. The quote below from Prime Minister Julia Gillard supports this idea:

> "Beyond 2015-16, as economic and fiscal conditions permit, Federal Labor will progressively increase Australia's official development assistance until we reach 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income. Australians are generous people. They help out those in need. But they also have every right to expect that our aid dollars are used wisely and have a real impact on the lives of those less fortunate. (Australian Labor Party Manifesto 2010)"

Considering this, I expect to see gendered bias towards female executives with pro-aid policy. As voters associate foreign policy with masculine attributes, any policy that deviates from that will receive lower support.

H2: Female presidents with a pro-aid foreign policy will receive lower support than male presidents.

Some might questions whether gender gets the attention in policy evaluation. In other words, voters can evaluate foreign aid policy based on its own merits. This would require them to possess knowledge about the success and failures of foreign aid, along with understanding trade-offs between strategic, humanitarian, and economic objectives of aid. Nonetheless, given the high overstatement of the aid budget by the public, it is unlikely that policy merits will be considered. As discussed above, aid is usually seen as an extension of welfare policies, only to people outside of borders. Considering the association of aid and welfare policies with gendered expectations, many people will rely on gender cues in evaluating the president's foreign policy.

Nonetheless, while gender will have an influence on evaluations, it is likely to be conditional. Aside from gender, another factor that will influence how people evaluate the foreign policy is partisan support. Indeed many studies examined how divergence of opinion between legislatures and president can be a constraining force (**??**). While legislators exercise the institutional constrains on presidential policies through power of the purse, doing so provides public with new information. When it comes to foreign policy most lack the basic information on which to evaluate it. Specifically, on issues such as foreign aid public lack information needed to form their opinions. Therefore, parties approval of the policy can be an important cue. Similar or overlapping preferences among copartisans tend to increase policy credibility.

Such partisan cues provides even more information, when policy under concern is gendered and initiated by a female president. As foreign affairs is seen under the masculine domain, male leaders have an inherent advantage in pursuing a gendered foreign policy. The reason is that while public sees such initiatives as an established strategy, they assume that females who

propose a gendered policy are extremely feminine. They might think that a male president's aid policy is in the countries best interest. On the other hand, when women adopt a similar policy public can question its objective. In other words, they will have a difficult time identifying whether it is a necessary policy or just extension of gendered preferences. Yet, when public have get the information about the parties approval, they are likely to be more confident in the merits of gendered policy.

In regard to female executives, having parties that support their pro-aid policy can help them to elude the attention of the gendered stereotyping. Given that majority of members of parties are male, public will no longer associate foreign aid policy with the leader's gender. Therefore I expect that evaluation of female presidents foreign policy will be conditional on parties approval of the policy.

H3a: Female presidents facing co-partisan policy support will receive lower penalty than those that lack co-partisan support.

On the other hand, disapproval of policy by the members of the president's party can turn public against the executive's policy. While the executive office is commonly seen as an important actor in foreign policy-making, criticisms of the legislative branch are quite influential over public opinion. Even in issues of war and conflict, where executives enjoy more prerogative, disagreement between the elites have proven to move public opinion(**???**). Given the low-information setting of foreign affairs, the support of parties provides a cue about the plausibility of the policy. Yet, when members of the legislature dislike presidential policy initiatives public can question the policy rationale. Of course, some may resist updating their belief given the new information. Nonetheless, as women face heightened scrutiny for their foreign policy decisions partisan disapproval can further erode support for a female president's foreign policy. In other words, legislatures can put pressure on presidents by shaping public opinion.

Aside from shaping the popular attitudes toward a policy, such a fall out among elites also gets wide media attention. Extensive research in political communication shows how the media links its tone to the official debate among elites (e.g., Bennett 1990). Disputes that emerge

among co-partisans especially receive prominent coverage in the media. The newsworthiness of such issues increases a lot when the ability of a president to successfully conduct foreign policy is challenged. One obvious source of the challenge is the pervasive gender stereotype that men are better equipped to handle foreign affairs. If people are influenced by gender stereotypes in the ways conventional wisdom would suggest, then the cost of adopting a gendered foreign policy that lacks the support of co-partisans will be higher for female presidents.

Besides, the lack of support from the members of the party can be seen as a unilateral action that is usually disliked by the public. Such beliefs can especially be upsetting for female executives given the traditional expectation that female politicians are more compromising. Therefore, the policy agenda of the president that fails to get partisan approval, can make them look authoritative and unyielding. As these attributes do not feet with gendered expectations, voters may respond negatively. In other words, the activation of counter-stereotypical traits will affect public opinion when the female leader's foreign aid promise receives partisan objection. Therefore, I expect female presidents with partisan disapproval to get lower evaluations from the respondents.

H3b: Female presidents facing co-partisan policy disapproval will receive higher penalty compared to male ones.

Research Design and the Survey Experiment

To test the hypotheses developed above, a survey experiment was fielded on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform in January 2020. A total of 1,800 U.S.-based respondents were recruited and asked to provide their opinions on a series of questions that had experimental treatments embedded in them.[7] An experimental approach is suitable for this study because it allows me to identify the causal impact of leader's gender on the support for foreign policy,

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[7]While not completely representative as the national samples, based on observable characteristics MTurk samples are found to be more representative than student-based samples(**?**). More importantly, researchers were able to successfully replicate the results of MTurk samples using more representative samples (**??**).

by manipulating leaders gender while holding constant the policy area. By randomly assigning respondents to treatment conditions with a hypothetical president in the future, I can be confident that other factors, such as current image of female candidates running for the presidential elections does not confound the results. In this regard, the US context offers a setting with relatively minimal pre-treatment effects given the lack of female president in the history US.

Overall, the experiment consisted of three sets of questions: 1) questions about preferences on foreign aid budget and different types of aid; 2) questions on support for policy after the manipulations; 3) background questions on respondent's socio-demographic characteristics. To begin, all respondents are asked to read about foreign policy agenda of hypothetical President in the year of 2029, who has served in Congress for eight years before becoming president. In designing the experimental vignette I followed **?**. Specifically, respondents were introduced to the following vignette:

> *The year is 2029. The U.S. President is Karen Bailey. President Bailey took office in 2028 after serving in the U.S. Senate for eight years. She is a lifelong member of the Republican Party. In her 2029 State of the Union speech, President Bailey spoke of United States' foreign policy strategies. After discussing the strategic importance of foreign aid for U.S national interest, she announced her plan to increase the level of U.S. foreign aid towards developing countries.*

Respondents were randomly assigned in a condition where the president is either a Republican Female, Republican Male, Democrat Female, or Democrat Male. This allows me also to test in-partisan and out-partisan gender biases. President's gender was manipulated with the names Karen Bailey and Kevin Bailey and with the pronouns. Previous studies using these names indicate that these names do not cue respondents to think of existing politicians(**???**). In addition, as the study was fielded in the 2020 campaign cycle with many female candidates running for presidential office, I believe that the possibility of participants thinking about specific female when evaluating the foreign policy is less likely.

Next, the respondents read one piece of additional information, selected at random and designed to frame the information in terms of one of the three conditions. In the first treatment respondent were told that the policy proposed by the president will not be supported by members of the executive's party. The second treatment told otherwise. The last condition, serves as a clean control group and omits the information about the partisan support. However, even the control group included information about president's gender and party identification for the reason that in such situations respondents tend to assume the politician is a man (**?**). Hence, I did not include a non-gendered control. In total, this produced a 2 x 2 x 3 design, where president's gender (male or female legislator), party (Republican or Democrat) and co-partisan support of the policy(control, approval, disapproval) were randomized. Table**??** summarizes treatment conditions along with their expected effect.

Table 1: **Survey Experiment Treatments**

CONDITIONS	INFORMATION	EXPECTATIONS
Control	{No added information}	Baseline comparison
Partisan disapproval	*Such a policy will not receive a support from members of the Republican/Democratic party.*	Lower support for female president's foreign policy
Partisan approval	*Such a policy will be supported by members of the Republican/Democratic party.*	Higher support for female president's foreign policy

After reading through the vignette, the respondents are asked to indicate their level of support for president's policy and chose among five response options. In addition to that, I asked respondents to evaluate president's competence and performance. While the first outcome variable is intended to capture the effect of pro-aid policy on overall support for president's foreign policy agenda, these last two are aimed at capturing to what extent such policy influences job approval and perceived competence (**?**). Ideally we would like to know how respondents' vote choice changes depending on gender and experimental conditions. Nonetheless, asking re-

spondents to indicate their likelihood of voting for a certain president in the future is found not to be effective in experiments with limited information (**??**). In addition, such questions are usually confounded with social desirability pressure (**?**).

Following **?**, I also included a series of questions designed to capture the core difference among respondents that might confound the results. In this context, the most likely source of confounding is that some individuals might be more internationalists and also less gender-biased. To check for this possibility, I included two questions: the first asked individuals about their opinion of the U.S's role in world politics, while the second asked whether the U.S. should trust other nations.

Participants also completed a short questionnaire measuring their support for development assistance. To measure their support for foreign aid, the first question asked how important it is to help the poor in the developing world, with answer choices ranging from "very important" to "not at all important". Based on the participants' answers, I constructed the *AID IMPOR-TANCE* variable by mapping the answer categories into 4 point scale. However, while some people might indicate to be more philanthropic, when it comes to making sacrifices they could deviate from their initial response. As such, the next question prompted respondents to think about the personal monetary consequences of helping the poor abroad (**?**). The next two sets of questions in the survey experiment were measuring participants' support for different aid types.

The last question asked respondents to indicate their support on five different types of foreign aid: disaster aid, aid to women and girls, food and medical assistance, aid to promote economic development, and democracy aid.

Results

As a first pass at understanding whether my expectations are correct, I examine the effect of gender on the attitudes towards foreign aid. I start with *AID IMPORTANCE* variable and then

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move to *AID CHANNEL* and *PAY MORE* outcomes. For this analysis, I focus on the main effect of the respondent's gender. In addition to that, the section also shows results across different types and channels of aid. The next part examines how the gender of the presidents impacts the support for foreign policy. I then compare the treatment conditions with the control condition for male and female presidents. The section breaks down the respondents' answers by partisan conditions.

The effect of respondent's gender on support for foreign aid

On average, I found strong support for foreign aid. Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated that sending aid to developing countries is either "very important" or "fairly important". A smaller proportion of the subjects, only 23 % indicated that aid is not important. Yet, there is a substantial variation in respondents' support for foreign aid depending on gender. Figures **??** and **??** present the results of this analysis. In line with previous research, the results show the gender gap in support for development assistance. Female respondents, in contrast to males are more likely to favor sending aid to countries in need (p=0.01). However, when it comes to making sacrifices for helping other countries there is only a marginal difference between male and female participants (p=0.09). Women do not indicate strong support for paying more for products to help the poor in other countries. Together, these results provide support to the hypothesis that aid is a gendered policy.

Participant-level characteristics matter too. On average, Republicans and those that identify themselves as conservative are less likely to consider aid to be important. On the other hand, income and education do not have any influence on the probability of favoring aid. Participants with high trust in other nations are more likely to support aid, as are internationalists who favor the United States' playing an active role abroad.

When it comes to different types of development assistance, I find similar patterns. Female respondents, are more likely to favor disaster aid, women aid, development aid, and food aid compared to males. Except for the democracy aid, the coefficient of *FEMALE* is positive and

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Figure 1: Respondent's Support for Foreign Aid and Willingness to Pay More

Notes: The point estimates are coefficients from ordered logit model with lines representing a 95 % confidence interval around the estimates.

Figure 2: Support for Different Types of Foreign Aid

Notes: The point estimates are coefficients of FEMALE from separate logit models with lines representing a 95 % confidence interval around the estimates. All models include demographic controls.

statistically significant across all models. [8] It should be noted that here I am not attempting to unearth the origins of the gender differences that ultimately lead to differential support for aid. Fuller explorations of why women tend to support aid more, except the democracy aid, need to be addressed by future research. The key point of this section was to show that aid is still a gendered issue, as previous data used to examine the gender gap have come from studies that included gender only as a control variable and did not differentiate between types of aid. Having established that, next I examine how treatment conditions influence the support for foreign aid.

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[8]This is understandable, given the overall enterprise of democracy promotion coming under stress. Even though this type of foreign aid has a specific goal to foster and advance democratization, it does not fall within the spectrum of sources that drive the gender differences in support for foreign aid. The most common explanation for gender differences in foreign aid preferences has to do with women being more inequality-averse and philanthropic. In addition, democracy stagnant or in retreat in many parts of the world, along with fraught wars in Iraq and Afghanistan damaged the standing of democracy aid in the eyes of many people (**?**). The lively debate about the ethics and efficacy of international democracy promotion is still ongoing among scholars and practicioners.

Presidents, Foreign Aid and Partisan Support

I begin by showing the variation in response rate across three different experimental groups. Specifically, Figure **??** displays the proportion of respondents who selected a given answer for each experimental condition across the president's gender. Looking first at the percentage of outcomes, we can see that there is a decrease in the proportion of "strongly support" for presidents of both genders between control and *partisan disapproval* condition. However, while only 18% of respondents in the first treatment condition indicate "strong support" for female president's foreign policy, this increases to 20% for male presidents. When I compare responses with Male and Female Presidents in the control condition, I find some support to the hypothesis that gender will condition the support for the president with pro-aid policy. The graph shows that the proportion of support outcomes is higher for male presidents under the control condition. Overall, these comparisons suggest some preliminary support for the ability of the treatment conditions to influence the support for the foreign policy.

Figure 3: Distribution of foreign policy support by experimental treatment

(a) Female President   (b) Male President

To specify more precisely the statistical significance of these differences and to account for a series of individual-level characteristics thought to affect the main outcomes of interest, I turn to ordered logit analysis. Figure **??** presents the results from a set of regression models estimating the effects of the president's gender on the support for foreign policy, job approval,

and competence. Each line in Figure **??** shows the coefficient estimates along with 95 percent confidence intervals.[9] The results are in line with the theoretical expectation. On average, female presidents with pro-aid policy received lower support for their foreign policy compared to males. The same pattern emerges with the job approval and competence outcomes.

Figure 4: Do female presidents with pro-aid policy receive less support?

Notes: The point estimates are coefficients of FEMALE PRESIDENT from separate ordered logit models with lines representing a 95 % confidence interval around the estimates. All models include demographic controls.

Yet, gender is not the only factor that matters in shaping voter preferences. Research on the evaluation of leaders suggests that party affiliation can shield women from some of the negative effects of gender stereotypes (**?**). Particularly, the Republican party's image as stronger on national security and foreign affairs can work against the negative effects of foreign aid on evaluations of female presidents. If so it would mean that lower support for female president's foreign policy is contingent on their partisan affiliation. To determine whether party affiliation

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[9]For the mode specification see Appendix.

influences support for foreign policy, I split the sample to Republican and Democratic presidential groups. I find that the male president's advantage in all three outcomes —foreign policy support, job approval, and competence— is statistically significant for both parties. In Figure ?? I plot mean foreign policy support toward each Republican Female, Republican Male, Democratic Female, and Democratic Male presidents. Results indicate that subjects did not respond differently depending on the president's party. Female presidents of both parties on average got lower support for their foreign policy, lower job approval, and were perceived to be less competent relative to male presidents of the party. Mean evaluations of Republican Female are 3.3, and significantly lower than Republican Male presidents (p=0.002).[10] Comparison of Democratic male and female presidents reveals a similar pattern.

Figure 5: Mean Support for Foreign Policy across President's Party and Gender

So far, results provide support to the expectation that pro-aid female presidents will be less likely to see support for their gendered foreign policy than males with a similar policy. How-

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[10] Here I only have results for the foreign policy support; see appendix for job approval and competence analyses.

ever, such bias toward female politicians could weaken if a policy is approved by copartisans. The main theoretical argument of this study is that gender bias will weaken or intensify depending on the partisan cues. In other words, I argued that partisan approval and disapproval provides valuable information about the merits of the gendered policy. To examine this, now I turn to a difference in difference analysis.[11] Table **??** reports results for the both treatment conditions relative to control group.[12] In general, evidence indicates that respondents display gender-based biases that are variable based on the partisan cues. For the first treatment, I find that that male presidents receive lower support when the aid policy is not backed by their party. There is no statistically significant difference in the female president's support level. In other words, lacking the approval of copartisans does not reduce the average support for the female president's foreign policy. One explanation behind these results could be that given the already lower evaluations (i.e. floor effect), it is difficult to move the respondents' evaluation even further. It could also be that partisan disapproval cue is only relevant for the female democrats. In the appendix, I examine this and other possibilities. I examine whether individuals react differently to the treatment depending on their gender and partisanship.

In regards to partisan approval, results show that treatment condition does improve the level of support for female presidents. Results indicate that respondents display gender-based biases that are variable on partisan approval. In the control condition, average support for the female president's foreign aid policy was 3.32. However, in the treatment condition, featuring partisan approval cue, support for male and female presidents' foreign policy diverge significantly ($\mu = 0.27, p < .10$). This implies that co-partisans approval is strongly accounted when the president is female.[13]

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[11]The results do not change significantly if I employ ordered logit model.

[12]The results get even stronger when I control for the individual's political ideology, aid-favorability, sex, age, education, political interest, internationalism, trust to other nations, and partisan identification

[13]Partisan approval cues are so strong that the average support for females goes above the average support for males in the control condition.

Table 2: **Effect of Treatments and President's Gender**

	Control	Partisan Disapproval	Effect
Female President	3.32	3.33	0.009
	315	*303*	p=0.9
Male President	3.45	3.24	-0.20**
	302	*290*	p=0.03
Difference in Difference			0.21
			p=0.12

	Control	Partisan Approval	Effect
Female President	3.32	3.51	0.19*
	315	*287*	p=0.05
Male President	3.45	3.37	-0.07
	302	*294*	p=0.4
Difference in Difference			0.27*
			p=0.05

$*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$; The table shows the mean support for foreign policy and sample size by each group. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.

Heterogenous Treatment Effect

While I find that *partisan approval* condition reduces the bias towards female presidents, not all voters are likely to support the female presidents in the same manner. To test whether gender bias was mitigated or exacerbated by respondent gender, Tables **??** and **??** presents similar analyses to those conducted previously, dividing the sample by into male and female respondents. I find a clear difference between male and female respondents. Both treatment conditions only influence the behavior of male respondents. This is in line with previous research that shows that males are more likely to apply gender stereotypes in the evaluation of female candidates.

Ultimately, though, it could be that participants respond differently not just based on treatment's conditions, but also based on the partisanship of the president as well respondent itself.

Table 3: Effect of Partisan Disapproval by respondent's gender

	Female Respondents			Male Respondents		
	Control	Partisan Disapproval	Difference	Control	Partisan Disapproval	Difference
Female President	0.115 160	0.039 161	-0.075	0.006 144	0.091 139	0.084
Male President	0.189 158	0.06 151	-0.126	0.433 155	-0.035 142	0.469
Difference			0.050			0.55*

$*p < 0.05$; The table shows the mean support for foreign policy and sample size by each group.

Table 4: Effect of Partisan Approval by respondent's gender

	Female Respondents			Male Respondents		
	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference
Female President	0.23 *160*	0.32 *148*	0.09	0.149 *144*	0.38 *139*	0.23
Male President	0.305 *158*	0.282 *146*	-0.022	0.574 *155*	0.266 *148*	-0.307*
Difference			0.113			0.538*

$*p < 0.05$; The table shows the mean support for foreign policy and sample size by each group.

Yet, the effect of *partisan approval* treatment for presidents of both parties is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Table **??** shows the effect of the treatment on the support for male and female presidents holds across partisan affiliation of the president. However, participants who identify as Republicans may respond to Republican Presidents differently than participants who identify as Democrats. Thus, next I examine in-partisan and out-partisan effects of treatment conditions. Tables **??** and **??** show some evidence of these heterogeneous treatment effects.

Results show that the Democratic party president gets a similar level of support regardless of the partisan affiliation of the respondent and treatment condition. In other words, having the support of parties for aid increase does not influence the support for the foreign policy regardless of the partisanship of the survey taker. Nonetheless, such a condition does change the evaluation of a Republican president by Republican voters. Female Republican presidents re-

Table 5: Effect of Partisan Approval across Partisan Affiliation of the Respondent

	Democrat			Republican		
	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference
Female President	0.258 *155*	0.466 *144*	0.208*	0.089 *147*	0.213 *143*	0.124
Male President	0.44 *163*	0.37 *139*	-0.073	0.440 *152*	0.154 *155*	-0.285**
Difference			0.281*			0.409**

$*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$; The table shows the mean support for foreign policy and sample size by each group.

ceive more support for their foreign policy from their partisan respondents when it is supported by members of the Republican Party. This means that republican respondents care more about the position of their party on foreign policy issues than does do respondents that identify with the Democratic Party. However, I should note that these results should be taken with a grain of salt given the small sample per treatment condition once I divide the sample into smaller subgroups.

Table 6: Effect of Partisan Approval on foreign policy support for Democrat: in-partisan and out-partisan effects

	Democrat			Republican		
	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference
Female Democrat	0.236 *70*	0.341 *64*	0.105	0.110 *35*	0.514 *34*	0.404
Male Democrat	0.409 *64*	0.324 *63*	-0.085	0.396 *46*	0.248 *36*	-0.148
Difference			0.189			0.55

$*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$; The table shows the mean support for foreign policy and sample size by each group.

In summary, drawing on experiment data, I find female executives still face biased evaluations. Compared to male presidents, a promise of aid increase received lower support for female president's foreign policy. Nonetheless, such bias against female presidents diminishes once they enjoy the partisan support for their policy. In addition, results reveal a few het-

erogeneous effects based on the party identification and gender of the respondent. However, irrespective of the partisan predisposition of the president subjects negatively evaluated female presidents with a gendered foreign policy. These results potentially hold important implications for the way female presidents perform foreign policy. On the issues that females have co-partisans' approval, given the historically masculine nature of the executive office, a female executive can evade the gendered evaluations.

Table 7: Effect of Partisan Approval on foreign policy support for Republican: in-partisan and out-partisan effects

	Democrat			Republican		
	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference	Control	Partisan Approval	Difference
Female Republican	0.958	0.675	-0.282*	1.23	2.19	0.96***
	70	64		35	34	
Male Republican	1.04	0.774	-0.268	2.03	1.75	-0.28
	64	63		46	36	
Difference			-0.024			1.24***

$*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$; The table shows the mean support for foreign policy and sample size by each group.

Discussion

Politics is a male-dominated field, and this is the most obvious at the executive level. A great deal of countries are represented by a male head of state or government rather than female ones. While there remain many reasons behind this underrepresentation of women at the highest level of office, one widely accepted explanation is related to gender stereotypes. Decades of research revealed that voters apply stereotypical expectations to female politicians. Such stereotypes are found to make female presidents less popular on average and subject to security and corruption dynamics in the country (Carlin et al. 2019). What is missing from this literature is how stereotypes influence the support female presidents receive in foreign policy matters, a policy that is usually seen to be in the masculine domain. This study attempted to answer this and many other questions.

To assess how individuals view female presidents with gendered foreign policy, this study relied on a survey experiment. Particularly, respondents were introduced to a hypothetical scenario in the future and were asked to indicate their support for the foreign policy of the president. Results show that voters are less likely to offer support to a pro-aid policy if the policy is offered by a female president. Female presidents favoring aid increases were also gained lower competence score and job approval compared to male presidents. Corroborating theoretical expectations, the results also suggest that once respondents are informed about the support of parties for the aid policy, female presidents enjoy higher foreign policy support.

The findings contribute to scholarship on gender and politics, by showing that executives with gendered foreign policies receive less support from respondents, though this can be moderated by partisan support. Most importantly, the study advances the literature by focusing on actors that have received relatively less attention — female executives. Despite a growth of research on female presidents, most of the studies on gender stereotypes and issue ownership focus on female legislators. However, because legislators are not unitary actors, voters are less concerned with their leadership abilities compared to presidents and prime ministers. Studying how female executives are viewed by the public is important given that more and more women

are running to represent their country at the highest level. While some recent studies started to examine policy implications of female presidents and prime minister, those were mainly centered on domestic politics.

While experiments are the gold standard for causal identification but they also can be subject to the problem of confounding. one of the sources of confounding in experimental settings could be respondents updating their beliefs about not experimentally manipulated factors (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018). To eliminate possibility for one such confounding, the experimental design explicitly controlled for the party of the US president. Another concern, is the possible that respondents intuited from the experiment of the main focus being gender stereotypes and adjusted their behavior to appear less biased. However, he open-ended question at the end of survey found no evidence for this concern. In addition, even if this was the case, it would in fact make the actual results even more substantive.

Despite these, some limitations need to be solved before making generalizations. One possible limitation is the sample used in the analysis not truly representative. Respondents from MTurk do not represent a random sample of the U.S. population, yet it is found to be more representative than student samples. While the random assignment of treatment conditions ensures the internal validity, to guarantee that results have external validity the study needs to be re-tested with a more representative sample. Another step that can boost the external validity is conducting more information-rich experiments that better resembles a reality. In other words, like all survey experiments, the approach taken in this study does not reflect the reality of how people get different information, at times conflicting, from a variety of sources almost continuously. To ensure the external validity of results, perhaps a conjoint experiment with more information about presidents' policy stance need to be explored in future research.[14]

As another extension of this study, one can manipulate the framing of aid policy as either "helping the poor" or "strategic interests" and analyze the gendered perceptions. Evaluation of the president's aid policy might depend on the perception of security and development aspects

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[14]This would also allow me to get a clean counterfactual.

of aid policy. While foreign aid was essentially sought to "help the poor", donor governments use aid to for "strategic interests" (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). These two considerations operate jointly and might lead to different attitudes.

Vote like a Man, Talk like a Woman: Female leaders and UNGA

Ulkar Imamverdiyeva

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Introduction

A quick look at a gathering of world leaders at the United Nations General Assembly reveals that politics is a male-dominated field. Despite making up more than half of the global population, women constitute 15 percent of world leaders. This is actually an improvement, as female presidents or prime ministers were rare just a couple of decades ago. But how does this underrepresentation translate into women's voices being heard within the global arena? While the number of women at the executive office has been increasing, scholars interested in substantive representation for women have focused primarily on legislative behavior.[1] This is the area where most scholars focus and document gender differences in legislators' communication and voting behavior.[2] Whether it is talking more about women (Pearson and Dancey 2011b) or "women's issues" (Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; Osborn and Mendez 2010), scholars have consistently shown that female representatives are more likely to elevate the voice of women both within (Pearson and Dancey 2011a) and beyond the halls of government (Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003).

While these studies offer many insights that guide research on gendered decision-making, we need other models to account for institutional differences. There is a possibility that female executives will be different from female legislators in regards to policymaking as in the later case outcomes are a result of collective action and often involve quid pro quo. Furthermore, the greater visibility and prominence of the executive means that the gender of leaders gains exaggeratedly vivid attention. In regards to women's access, the executive still lags behind the legislative branch and thus has a high perception of "maleness". Many female candidates that run for the executive office have faced stereotypical perceptions. For instance, Geraldine Ferraro, the first major-party female vice-presidential candidate in US history was questioned whether she is "strong enough to push the [nuclear] button". Similarly, in an interview in the spring of 2016, Donald Trump argued that U.S. foreign policy involves dealing with "very,

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[1]For the analysis of female presidents of Latin America, see Thomas and Reyes-Housholder (2015), Reyes-Housholder (2016), Reyes-Housholder and Schwindt-Bayer (2016).

[2]See Lawless (2015) for a comprehensive review of this scholarship.

very tough people" which Hillary Clinton cannot handle as she does not have "the strength or the stamina" (ABC News 2015). Overall, many studies and examples make clear that gender stereotypes operate at different levels of politics, yet are strongest at the executive level. These differences make the executive office a distinct institution to analyze gendered decision-making. As such, in this study, I examine the substantive contributions of women executives to international issues, asking whether female leaders offer distinct perspectives on global issues.

Particularly, I examine how the gender of a leader influences the content of speeches as well as votes for resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly. We know little about how the gender of a leader shows itself in the discussions of international issues where the main audience is a global community. Since gender stereotypes dictate that women are ill-equipped to handle foreign policy many studies posited that female leaders may have political incentives to "act masculine". However, such a strategy brings the risk of a counter-stereotypic backlash for being too tough and not nice enough, especially from voters of the opposite political party (Krupnikov and Bauer 2014). Women can adopt a masculine style to obtain leadership positions, but the same masculine style contradicts the electorate's perceptions of gender stereotypes, leading to lower evaluations (Eagly and Carli, 2007). Hence, they find themselves in a double bind (Jamieson et al. 1995). Considering this disadvantageous double standard, how will female executives behave at the UNGA? In what cases can we expect them to bring change?

I argue that female executives will adopt gendered rhetoric at the UNGA for three main reasons. First of all, shared ties of gender are not constrained by political borders. Due to the prevalence of gender-based discrimination worldwide, gender is also a salient factor beyond borders Angevine (2017). Second, while gender stereotypes are prevalent, female politicians can adapt their rhetoric and style to communicate a balance of masculine and feminine traits. In the discussion of masculine issues, feminine rhetoric will serve as a way for women to show their feminine side. This has been shown to be especially useful for some political women who may have problems with perceptions of warmth and likeability (Winfrey and Schnoe-

belen 2019, Jones 2016). Lastly, compared to UNGA votes, speeches are not institutionally connected to decision-making in the UN. As a result, leaders face few constraints when delivering UNGD statements compared to voting in the UNGA (Baturo, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov, 2017). As such, the low-stakes nature of UNGA speeches offers a great platform for women to show their true priorities and adopt feminine rhetoric. Building on these, I hypothesize that female leaders will focus on aspects of global politics that are more pronounced for women and girls. This could entail delivering more content on women-empowerment, gender equality, or highlighting the importance of development goals for women and children.

To support my argument, in this study I examine how gender conditions the behavior of female executives at the United Nations General Assembly. The UNGA offers a great venue to answer this question as every year leaders around the world gather to discuss important global issues and adopt resolutions. As such, during annual meetings leaders deliver statements and vote on resolutions, which yields data that allows me to compare those two outcomes and identify gender differences. Particularly, I employ a newly developed technique for automated text analysis, structural topic modeling (STM), to explore gender differences in annual meeting speeches and compare this to their voting behavior. Analysis of speeches and votes reveals that, while female and male executives focus their speeches on distinct topics of foreign policy, this difference does not translate into votes. Results show that voting in the General Assembly does not change depending on the leader's gender. However, female presidents and prime ministers are more likely to emphasize issues of development and cooperation in their speeches and emphasize women's interests. Speeches also provide a venue in which female leaders can voice the concerns of women across the world. Using a dictionary-based word methodology, I find that female leaders on average are significantly more likely than their male colleagues to focus on women in their annual statements.

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Gender and Foreign Policy

For decades studies uncovered that women have different preferences than men in many areas of foreign policy. Women have been found to favor protectionist trade policies (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Burgoon and Hiscox 2008; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Ardanaz et al. 2013; Mansfield et al. 2014; Guisinger 2016), support development assistance more than men do (Togeby 1994), and are less supportive of the use of military force than men (Eichenberg 2003). Some studies argued that the gender gap in the public attitudes towards the use of force is a result of women being compassionate, and perceived by society to be caregivers (Ferris 1993). Based on these findings, as early as in nineteenth-century scholars already posited that women politicians would bring a greater focus on peace and social justice to the international affairs (Jeffreys-Jones 1997; Jabri and O'Gorman 1999). If we take this public opinion level evidence at face value, we should expect that female executives will make a difference in the foreign policy of a country.

Perhaps the best place to examine this is the research on female legislators and substantive representation, as literature, for the most part, is focused on legislative behavior. Studies that examined the behavior of female legislators at the national parliaments found that gender does make a difference. In the context of the US, Congresswomen are more likely to sponsor bills on issues related to women (Gerrity et al. 2007), gain more federal spending for their districts (Anzia et al. 2011), and on average sponsor more bills than men.[3] Overall, most found that female legislators make a substantive difference, yet this difference is sometimes conditional on institutional and partisan factors. With these findings corroborated by many others, scholars have more recently started examining the involvement of women in foreign policy issues. Female legislators, for example, are more likely to increase aid allocation (Hicks et al. 2016) and support humanitarian military interventions (Shea and Christian 2016). Several other studies show women are more active sponsors of defense and homeland security-related bills than are their male colleagues (Atkinson and Windett 2019; Swers 2007; Volden et al. 2013). These

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[3]See Lawless (2015) for a review of this literature

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studies, collectively point to discernible differences between the behavior of men and women in terms of foreign policy.

Aside from differences in parliamentary voting, campaign-style and media coverage gender differences in naturally-occurring speeches have been also discussed in the legislative studies and political communication literature (Yu 2014; Osborn and Mendez 2010; Pearson and Dancey 2011b,a; Lowande et al. 2019; Wagner 2019; Wang 2014; Wineinger 2019; Russell 2018; Bäck and Debus 2019; Evans and Clark 2016; Clayton et al. 2017). Women are found to be more likely than their male counterparts to participate in floor speeches (Pearson and Dancey 2011a) and to reference women in those speeches (Pearson and Dancey 2011b; Osborn and Mendez 2010; Shogan 2001). For example, in their speeches during debates over abortion coverage for women insured by Medicaid, congresswomen are significantly more likely to discuss women's health and women's rights, while congressmen are more likely to discuss legal and moral issues (Levy, Tien, and Aved 2001). Female politicians also point to their experiences as women and mothers during debates on women's issues (Swers 2002). Yet, when it comes to issues not traditionally referred to as "women's issues", there is limited research. One study that examined the rhetoric of Congresswomen found that even when discussing the so-called "masculine issues" such as terrorism and war, female members focus on the needs of women (Atkinson et al. 2019).

But how does gender influence the communication style and content of speeches of female presidents and prime ministers? There has been limited systematic research examining actions and preferences of female leaders. Emerging literature started to examine the consequences of women in the executive branch, yet this was mainly constrained to domestic politics and cabinet-level outcomes (Atchison and Down 2009; Thomas and Reyes-Housholder 2015; Reyes-Housholder 2016; Reyes-Housholder and Schwindt-Bayer 2016; Barnes and O'Brien 2015), with few exceptions. Looking at the conflict behavior of countries with female leadership, Caprioli and Boyer (2001) and Koch and Fulton (2011) find that female leaders are more likely to engage in conflict. Most of these studies agree that female leaders must contend

with gender stereotypes to be elected to office. Typically, men are considered to be strong, aggressive and decisive, while women are perceived to be compassionate and caring. However, while women politicians at all levels face challenges based on gender stereotypes, the presidency (and prime minister office) present unique gendered expectations and barriers. For example, men are perceived as more competent in handling national security, defense and foreign policy issues, while women are usually associated with education, healthcare, and social issues (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Lawless 2004). As such, the studies argued that incongruity between the essential qualities of leadership and perception of feminine traits would lead females to "overdo" male posturing (Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Koch and Fulton 2011).

However, female politicians are not necessarily rewarded for acting more masculine. Some studies have shown that female candidates can actually receive backlash from voters of the opposition party when they act masculine (Krupnikov & Bauer, 2014). This puts a dual challenge on female executives. On one hand, they attempt to meet the expectations related to their gender by displaying markers of femininity. Yet at the same time, they try to meet the exigencies of their post, which given its masculine character requires female leaders not to deviate from its traditional role. This leads to a double bind in which female politicians need to show leadership qualities, without receiving backslash. Because of this double-bind, female executives face heightened scrutiny for their foreign policy decisions (Carlin et al. 2019). However, I argue that female executives act strategically to navigate around this bias. Building on political communication and Fridkin and Kenney (2014)'s strategic stereotyping theory below I develop a framework that explains why female executives will add feminine content to their speeches while not substantially changing the direction of foreign policy.

Women at the UN: speaking for the women

There are several reasons why female leaders will invoke feminine rhetoric in their speeches. First of all, one of the important premises underlying research on descriptive and substan-

tive representation is that women are socialized differently which influences their preferences and actions. Scholars have tested, and largely confirmed, this using data on roll call votes, bill sponsorship, and floor speeches. Second, compared to other institutional settings, women might face less gendered constraints in delivering UNGA speeches. This is related to UNGA being regarded as a cooperative entity along with speeches not being directly linked to formal decisions in the UN. Lastly, the feminine style of communication helps female candidates to navigate through and around double bind in the discussion of global politics. As women must be careful in balancing masculinity and femininity, gendered rhetoric will serve as a way for women to show their feminine style. Overall, in the context of UNGA, the feminine style provides a means for women to take advantage of the low stakes nature of speeches and privilege their experiences as women while building global ties.

Global Gender Ties

One of the frequently discussed rationales behind the gender differences in the behavior of public officials is that women share unique experiences in a society that is structured by gender (Reingold 2000). This distinct socialization shapes their preferences and manifests itself in the actions they take. For example, interviews with the Labour women MPs in the House of Commons revealed that the majority of them believed women to have a different approach to politics (Childs 2004). In addition, these shared experiences not only make women more concerned about women's needs and interests but also make them more effective at addressing them. As former Senator Jackie Spier put it "If you don't walk in high heels, it's hard to appreciate what it's like" (Pyle 1998).

It should also be noted that the different perspectives that women offer is not limited to women's issues. Rather, women view a wide range of policies through a different lens, which sometimes leads them to provide distinct insights and novel approaches to policy problems. In her speech, Nancy Pelosi also made a very similar claim by stating that "view every issue as a women's issue. We believe the national security of our country is a women's issue".

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These shared ties are not constrained by political borders. Due to the prevalence of gender-based discrimination worldwide, gender is also a salient factor beyond borders. Women across the world are still underrepresented in the political and economic sphere, are paid less in the formal workplace, and face various forms of discrimination. Based on this shared affective tie of gender, some female legislatures desire to represent women as a global group. Angevine (2017) finds that women in Congress dedicate their time and effort toward advancing international women's issues. The global representation of women can also be seen among female presidents and prime ministers. For example, in her address to an international audience at the UN, the prime minister of New Zealand Jacinda Arden called for equality for women and rediscovering the shared beliefs. She concluded her statement by a powerful message saying "Me Too must become We Too".[4] Similarly, the unforgettable misogyny speech by Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard has been applauded by other women in power across the globe.[5] In her memoir Hillary Clinton applauded Gillard for speaking against gender bias. The motivation to speak for women across borders also is documented among female leaders of international organizations that do not have constituents to act or speak for. Barraza Vargas (2019) finds that these female leaders were more likely to concentrate in areas traditionally associated with "women's issues". Hence, I expect female leaders to adopt a global perspective toward gender inequality and focusing more on women empowerment in their speeches.

H1: Female executives are significantly more likely to focus on women's empowerment in their speeches.

Gender stereotypes and Communication

As examined above, many studies and examples make clear that gender stereotypes operate at different levels of politics, and are strongest at the executive level. While men are expected to be tough, strong, aggressive, and competent women are perceived to be cooperative,

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[4]https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/28/we-are-not-isolated-jacinda-arderns-maiden-speech-to-the-un-rebuts-trump

[5]https://web.archive.org/web/20131021105724/http://www.australiantimes.co.uk/news/news-from-australia/australia-world-news/world-leaders-praise-gillard-sexism-speech.htm

compassionate, and emotional. These perceptions often benefit men over women in political contexts because leadership is often associated with these masculine traits. As a response to these stereotypical expectations, some have argued that women try to act more masculine by giving counter-stereotypical messages (Bauer, 2017). This counter-stereotypical messaging includes emphasizing traditionally masculine traits, such as aggression and self-confidence, and focusing on issues men are perceived to be more competent at handling, like the military or national security. For example, to emphasize her leadership ability and toughness, during the 2008 campaign Hillary Clinton run ads that focused on her knowledge of international politics as "someone who already knows the world's leaders, knows the military —someone tested and ready to lead in a dangerous world."[6] This shows making a successful change to the foreign policy can be problematic for women given the lack of credibility of women in foreign policy.

However, women must also be careful not to violate gender expectations and appear too masculine. If a female candidate is seen as cold or lacking in compassion, she may scare away voters because she does not fit gendered expectations. For example, during her presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton faced criticism for looking cold and uncaring, and not smiling, all critiques tied to her violation of expected gendered behaviors. Thus, female leaders must navigate the dual pressure of looking masculine while not deviating too much from the feminine outlook. This can be achieved through a strategy of gender adaptiveness: depending on the political issue and venue, adjusting how much feminine image to convey. For example, during the discussions of masculine issues the Iron Lady struct the balance by "dressing stylishly, carrying a handbag, and wearing her signature pearls" (Carroll 2009). Yet, it is also through political communication that women can show gender adaptiveness. One of the primary ways of navigating through and around the gender stereotypes is the use of the feminine style. As Campbell (1989) outlined, feminine style is a unique rhetorical style characterized by the use of personal tone and experience, connecting issues to women, and relies on traditional feminine strengths. As such, by reaffirming their womanliness discursively at the same time demonstrating their

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[6]https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2008/02/will-clinton-or-obama-protect-your-children.html

leadership abilities, feminine rhetoric helps women to overcome the challenge of double bind. This becomes specifically very important in the domain of foreign policy, which is perceived to be a masculine issue. In the discussion of issues of war and terrorism, feminine rhetoric serves as a way for women to soften their image.

While feminine rhetoric can manifest itself in different ways, here I focus on two measurable aspects. First, similar to female legistators I expect female leaders to focus on women more than their male counterparts.

H2: Female leaders are more likely than male leaders to focus on women in their speeches.

Second, I hypothesize that female leaders will focus on aspects of global politics that hold particular significance for women, girls, and communities to a greater extent than will their male colleagues. In other words, I expect female leaders to devote more attention to issues that have a significant impact on the lives of women and children. It is true that, when it comes to international matters ranging from war to elections, all have, to some degree, an impact on the lives of women and children. Nonetheless, it is with the Millennium Development Goals that member states of the UN showed their commitment to eliminating gender gaps. The international community realized that empowering women and eliminating all forms of gender inequality serves as an effective mean to achieve other development goals.[7] This initiative has been followed by numerous others, most recently the inclusion of an explicit gender equality goal in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), also known as the 2030 Agenda.

H3: Female leaders will focus on aspects of global politics that hold particular significance for women, girls, and communities to a greater extent than will their male colleagues.

UN as a forum for gendered rhetoric

While feminine rhetoric serves women to building global ties and show gender adaptiveness, it is the unique environment of the United Nations General Debate that facilitates it. Compared to other institutional settings, female executives might face less gendered constraints in

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[7]See: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/

adopting feminine rhetoric in their speeches at the UNGD for couple of reasons. First of all, numerous studies have started to focus on how new forms of media and platforms affect gendered communication in political contexts.[8] For example, Kaid (2012) argued that YouTube channels demand scrutiny with regard to gender specifically given the difference in audience between youtube viewers and the general public. A similar argument can be made about the different audience leaders face when delivering UNGD statements.[9] In contrast to speeches delivered within national borders, the target audience for the UNGD speeches is other world leaders and the international public. In addition, compared to televised political debates —that force politicians to create a persuasive relationship with the voters in the hope of affecting voting behavior— UNGD is not very well covered and discussed in the media. Therefore, I expect gender stereotypes to be less constraining for female leaders in the context of UNGD politics.

In addition, the UNGD is seen as a cooperative entity and thus serves as a good platform for women leaders to use gendered communication. Compared to UNGA votes, speeches are not institutionally connected to decision-making in the UN. Countries' votes in the UNGA are directly linked to the adoption of UN resolutions, whereas UNGD statements have no such direct institutional connection to formal decisions in the UN. As a result, leaders face few constraints when delivering UNGD statements compared to voting in the UNGA (Baturo, Dasandi and Mikhaylov, 2017). As such, the low-stakes nature of UNGA speeches offers a great platform for women to show their true priorities and adopt feminine rhetoric.

Despite being non-binding, votes are an important indicator of countries' stance on most foreign policy issues. For example, each year the State Department delivers a report to Congress on a similarity of voting between the US and other countries. Countries' voting record at the assembly provides insight into where they stand in terms of US interest. Therefore altering the

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[8]It should be noted that this literature is not very well established. See Kaid (2012) and Cook (2016).

[9]Some studies already started hinting how leaders' style changes across audiences. For instance, Levi and Tetlock (1980) argued that examination of leader's speeches should be guided by social context. Schafer and Walker (2006) focused on how regime type —democracy vs non-democracy— influenced the leadership style of Clinton and Blair. As to why would audience make a difference, Holsti (1976) explained that political discourse aims to 'persuade, justify, threaten, cajole, manipulate, evoke sympathy and support, or otherwise influence the intended audience ... to serve and advance practical goals of the moment". This literature, though, has not payed attention to the gender differences and how feminine style changes across audiences.

voting behavior of a country can be costly for female leaders who face credibility challenges in foreign policy. Hence, I argue that female leaders will not make a substantive difference in the voting behavior of a country.

H4: Female leaders will not have any impact on the voting behavior of a country at the UNGA.

In addition, while leaders are free to discuss matters they consider important, they face significant external constraints when voting. For some developing countries votes at the UNGA are tied to development assistance. A recent statement by President Trump to cut off American aid to any country that votes in favor of a resolution condemning the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is an indication of such practices.[10] Several works also mentioned coordination among a group of countries to vote as a block (Kim and Russett, 1996; Voeten, 2000). As the annual statements are not linked to resolution in the UN, coupled with no indication of coordination in speeches, Chelotti et al. (2018) argued that "shaming and social liking will marginally, (if at all) influence the statements". Thus, while I expect to see gendered rhetoric in the annual statement, I expect to see no difference between male and female leaders in terms of voting.

This, however, does not mean that the UNGD statements have little significance. Scholars of International Relations have long realized the value of statements (Matush 2018). For example, while statements cannot change the direction of policy at the UNGA, they can sometimes tip the scale by indicating to others that they have countries with a similar interest. Because votes are subject to international scrutiny, low-cost statements from leaders can sometimes change the discourse surrounding the global issue. As such, an examination of the public statements of executives at the UNGA can reveal whether female leaders focus their attention more on issues concerning women.

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[10](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/defying-u-s-financial-threats-u-n-votes-condemn-trump-n831906).

Data and Research Design

To test the hypotheses developed above, I rely on different empirical strategies. First, to examine the preferences of female leaders in terms of women empowerment I use a text-scaling approach to estimate the preferences of leaders, which is then used as an outcome variable. This allows me to get at the impact of gender on foreign policy with a proxy that overcomes the limitations of ideal-point estimates. Second, I employ the structural topic modeling (STM) developed by Roberts and Airoldi (2013) to classify the documents into topics and explore gender differences. This method allows me to see topic differences across speeches, as well as how the use of language differs within those topics. Next, instead of predefining some topics to be impactful for women, I analyze the focus on women across all topics. For this purpose, I create a dictionary category of "woman" and compare gendered rhetoric employed by male and female leaders in their speeches. Lastly, I test whether female leadership affects a country's votes at the UNGA.

While understanding the foreign policy preferences of a country is crucial to international relations theory, they are not directly observed and thus need to be inferred from some actions of states in the international arena. Building on advances in the roll call literature on how to estimate latent preferences from observed votes, Bailey et al. (2017) use votes at the UNGA to measure foreign policy preferences. To account for changes in the agenda of the UN, the estimation relies only on resolutions that were identical across years. The resulting estimate —ideal-points— show the position of a country relative to US-led liberal world order, where larger values indicate similarity to the US foreign policy position. Such a measure is used as a proxy for foreign policy preferences, as they are comparable and observable actions taken by many countries at set points in time. To test the effect of gender on the voting behavior of a country I relied on ideal-points estimates developed by Bailey et al. (2017).

A number of studies have used UN votes to measure changes in the foreign policy position of a country.[11] In this study, I am interested in understanding whether such changes are associ-

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[11] Refer to Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017) for how studies used ideal-point estimates as dependent and

ated with the gender of a leader. To identify the gender of a head of state on a given year I rely on the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al. 2009). In cases where several leaders assume office in a given year, I code gender according to a leader that was in office at the time of annual UN meetings.

The data on UNGA speeches comes from Baturo et al. (2017), which includes all the speeches delivered from 1970 to 2015. This amounted to some 8093 separate speeches. However, I have limited the initial analysis to the post-Cold War period for two main reasons: 1) the discussions at the UN had a different pattern in the Cold War period; 2) the major variables of interest have more coverage after the 1990s. Therefore, analysis and results, at this stage, will be limited to the period of 1990-2016. The resulting dataset included 4066 speeches, of which only a small proportion included women. To identify the gender of each speaker, first, I examined the country affiliation and position of each individual. When a speaker was either president or the prime minister of the country, I relied on the Archigos dataset to code the gender of a speaker. Yet, for cases where a country was represented by UN delegate or Minister of Foreign Affairs, I manually coded gender through internet search. The distribution of gender across the speech data is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Distribution of gender

	Document
Female	243
Male	3823

Some scholars suggested that women's presence in political life does not lead to change, but instead that women's presence in political life is evidence of greater gender equality, and that this greater gender equality has an impact on policy choice. In other words, female leaders represent more a equal society that will also reflect itself in their foreign policy. To minimize the possibility of this, I include several covariates to estimate the association between leader's gender and gendered rhetoric and voting behavior. Some of these control variables come from independent variable.

the World Development Indicators data, which provides information about the economic and political characteristics of each country. Particularly, I have selected *GDP growth* and *GDP per capita* as a measure of the development of countries, and amount of *trade*(logged) as a measure of economic openness. I expect the level of development, as well as trade dependency, to affect the voting behavior and topic proportion of speeches. Similarly, I expect the level of democracy and ideological orientation of the government to influence both votes and speeches at the UNGA. Thus, I include a level of democracy from Polity Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) and government orientation measuring whether the executive was represented with left, center or right parties (Cruz et al. 2016). Finally, I follow the previous literature and account for a dependence of UN votes on development assistance. Aid from the US data is taken from the International Development Statistics (IDS) managed by OECD.[12] This results in time-series cross-sectional data with country-year as the unit of analysis from 1990 to 2016.

Female Leaders and Women Empowerment

Following the development of methods in computer science and computational linguistics, political scientists also started to draw on natural language processing and machine learning to extract political actors' behavior from their speeches. One of the most innovative applications of automated text analysis methods is using speeches to estimate policy positions on dimensions of interest (Proksch and Slapin 2010; Schwarz et al. 2017). Among those, one of the widely used text-scaling methods is Wordscores that categorizes texts across a one-dimensional spectrum(Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). Like other scaling and topic models, Wordscores adopts a bag-of-words approach, where each text is represented by a bag of its words disregarding order and grammar. Once documents are represented as word counts, the model first estimates scores for each word type occurring in the reference texts and then combines these wordscores into a score for each new document.

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[12]http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/idsonline.htm

**Norway vs S.Arabia: Wordscore 2015**

Figure 1: Wordscores map 2015

Here I rely on the Wordscore method to estimate the position of countries relative to each other and derive differences between female and male executives. The first step in this process is the selection of reference texts that define the political positions in the space. In the context of this project, good reference countries are chosen based on Women Political Empowerment Index from the V-Dem project. To observe the movement of a country with female leadership towards countries with more gender equality I choose as a reference text two countries that score highest and lowest on the index.[13] Thus, Norway and Saudi Arabia were selected as reference countries against which the rest of documents were scored. The documents of these countries are first used to generate a score for each word, which is later aggregated across a document. The score measures the relative rate each word is used in the reference texts. This creates a measure of how well the word separates Norway from Saudi Arabia, which is later applied to the rest of the documents. Consequently, each document gets a weighted score that tells us how close they are to the Norway (and thus aloof from Saudi Arabia). To better illustrate this measure Figure 1 maps Wordscore estimates of all countries in 2015. This estimation reveals several features that one should expect to find, providing evidence of the model's validity. For example, the model correctly predicts that European countries are closer to Norway than they are to Saudi Arabia in terms of women empowerment.

Next, I examine whether a leader's gender influences those policy positions. The expectation is that female leaders' position on women empowerment will be closer to Norway than that of Saudi Arabia. To examine this, I use resulting scores as an outcome variable in a regression model. As before, aside from the main variable of interest — *Female* — I included several economic and political controls in all models presented in Table 2. First, I start with a basic model with only country-fixed-effects. Model 2 includes several economic and political covariates. Both models reveal a positive association between female leadership and the gender-equal policy position. Model 3 drops the fixed effects. The results remain similar. Overall, these models

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[13]I also tested results with Women civil liberties index and Women civil society participation index from the V-Dem project. Given that reference documents represent maximum and minimum values, the country choices remained unchanged.

Table 2: Female Leaders and Wordscore estimates

	Dependent variable:		
	wordscore		
	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Female	0.14***	0.09*	0.10**
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.04)
	2,381	2,245	2,175
Controls	-	✓	✓
Fixed effect	✓	✓	-
R^2	0.004	0.01	0.09
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

reveal that the preferences expressed in statements in regards to women empowerment differ depending on leader's gender.

Female Leaders and Gendered Topics

To assess whether leader's gender changes what topics they address, I relied on an unsupervised text analysis model, particularly structural topic modeling. This model, similar to other topic modeling techniques, identifies topics from documents, without any prior specification. In other words, it is the hierarchical model in which documents are defined as a mixture of topics and topics as a mixture of words. Yet, the innovation of STM is allowing a researcher to incorporate document-level data in estimating a topic prevalence of documents. In other words, document-topic and topic-word distributions can also be a function of covariates, such as the speaker's partisanship and gender. This means that not just proportions of topics can be influenced by such covariates, but also the rate at which particular words are used in a given topic.

So in this project, this feature allows me to study a difference in topic proportions between male and female executives. Besides, I can examine whether female leaders influence

the content of topics. To begin with, I apply a variety of document pre-processing operations to prepare the data for STM modeling. I start with separating texts into terms that result in a document-term matrix. Next, in order to achieve some dimensionality, documents are pre-processed before the application of an analytical model. More precisely, all the words are transformed to lowercase and stemmed (reduced to their root form), while also removing English stop-words, punctuation, and numbers. To further refine the data, I removed terms that appear in more than 90 percent or less than 2 percent of documents as they provide little information to the model. On average, speeches contained 89 sentences and 835 unique words. Figure 2 shows the average frequency of types (a unique form of a word), tokens (individual words), and sentences for an average speech in a given year.

After pre-processing the data, I first identify the main topics in speeches of the UNGA corpus. As the major variable of interest is the gender of a speaker, I then use those topic proportions to model the probability that female and male executives from each country will deliver a speech on a given topic, while accounting for a range of country-specific factors that can also influence topic proportions.

Results

One of the advantages of STM is allowing to include document-level information in identifying topics. In this context, his feature allows me to study gender differences in the topics emphasized, as well as to incorporate other country-level metadata into the model. Thus, in addition to gender, I included the following covariates in the models: the measure of democracy, trade dependency, and development level, and government partisanship. Yet, before examining the results of this analysis, first I will discuss the topics and their content. Corpus level topic distribution is presented in Figure 3. The words listed for each topic display the top three words that make up the topic. For example, Topic 5 that discusses *Development* is the second most prevalent topic in the corpus, while Topic 6 on issues of the Middle East takes a relatively minor proportion of the discourse at the UNGA.

Figure 2: UNGA corpus: 1990-2017

Year	mean(Tokens)	mean(Sentences)	min(Sentences)	max(Sentences)
1991	3323	115	45	292
1992	3252	111	42	199
1993	3359	115	30	234
1994	3264	112	44	231
1995	3124	104	35	260
1996	2891	100	23	217
1997	2927	101	24	255
1998	2847	104	27	291
1999	2938	102	29	242
2000	2611	91	29	207
2001	2196	78	34	170
2002	2026	74	33	160
2003	2115	78	31	192
2004	2113	78	28	165
2005	1910	70	26	139
2006	2025	76	28	161
2007	2033	76	30	180
2008	2006	74	23	157
2009	2195	83	30	682
2010	2075	76	26	187
2011	2218	84	28	279
2012	2281	86	29	222
2013	2286	85	34	234
2014	2177	82	24	223
2015	2262	84	22	253
2016	2167	82	19	234
2017	2233	85	25	218

I label each topic depending on the top words as well as words with high exclusivity and frequency that belong to each topic. Figure 4 shows the high frequency of words within each topic. The third topic, which is labeled as "Security" is distinguished by the high frequency of words like "war, conflict, force, problem". On the other hand, the fourth topic that emphasizes words such as "africa, conflict, democracy, elections" is labeled as "Elections". The first topic, which I label "Freedom And Democracy" is distinguished by words such as "democracy, war, power, freedom, global".

Once the topics are labeled, I examine the influence of a leader's gender on the topic propor-

Top Topics

Topic 2: Cooperation and Reform of UN

Topic 5: Development

Topic 4: Elections

Topic 1: Democracy and Freedom

Topic 3: Security

Topic 6: Middle East

| 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 |

Expected Topic Proportions

Figure 3: Graphical display of estimated topic proportions.

tions. Figure 5 displays the results from models estimating the probability of offering speeches on six topics identified above. In each model, the outcome variable is the topic proportions, while the covariate of interest is the gender of the speaker. I also include fixed effects for each year in the sample period.[14] The coefficient of *Female* shows that as compared to male executives, females offer significantly more speeches related to " Development" and "Cooperation and Reform". On the other hand, female leaders are less likely to devote their statements to the "Security" topic. This finding is in line with the recent research that showed the underrepresentation of female legislators in debates focusing on masculine policy areas (Bäck and Debus 2019).

Aside from focusing on different issues of world politics, do female leaders offer different content in discussing those issues? To examine this, I included gender along with some of the covariates in estimating the topic's content. Having found that female executives are active

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[14]The results are from the model with six topics, which was decided to fit the data well after experimenting with 5 to 20 topic models. There is not a "right" answer to the number of topics that are appropriate for a given corpus (Grimmer and Stewart 2013), but the STM allows researchers to use a data-driven approach and select the number of topics based on calculations of residuals and semantic coherence. However, as the residuals decrease with the number of topics increasing, the overlap and correlation between topics increases.

22

Highest word probabilities for each topic

Figure 4: High frequency words in UNGA speeches across Six Topics

Figure 5: Proportion of All Speeches Across Gender and Topics

participants in UNGA discussions on global development I first examine the words that distinguish speeches given by women and men that fall into the "Development" category. The results are given in Figure 8. The analysis reveals that the words "women, climate change, poverty" distinguish speeches given by female and male executives. On the other hand, male executives are more likely to emphasize the "challenges, responsibility, and commitment" when it comes to the issue of global development. In short, the feminist rhetoric of female executives shows they promote gender-focused aid. Similar results have been reported by other studies. For example, Bashevkin (2014) and Duerst-Lahti (2016) show that female foreign and defense ministers are more likely to direct aid spending toward gender equality.

The quote below from the Malawi president Joyce Banda illustrates the context in which female leaders use these words.

> *"As the deadline for the MDGs draws closer, Malawi is stepping up its efforts to*
> *accelerate their attainment. We have identified best practices as well as bottle-*

challeng
goal achiev
global climat

trade

sustain
commit poverti

effect respons

women

agenda
address chang

**Male**   **Female**
(Topic 5)   (Topic 5)

Figure 6: How Female Executives discuss Development

necks in the context of our progress. In particular, we have understood that gender inequality and lack of empowerment of women are the common constraints limiting our progress towards the MDGs. In response, my Government has developed a new MDG acceleration framework that places significance on removing these barriers once and for all."

As expected, most of the discussion on global development revolves around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) program which was a cornerstone of UN Development Programs. Signed in September 2000 by all member states of the UN, the MDGs committed countries to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women. Some progress has been made, yet the development program tended to bypass women and not consider its effects on the environment. Therefore, the MDGs were replaced with Sustainable Development Goals which was adopted in 2015 by UN member states. In contrast to its predecessor, the SDGs recognize the necessity of balancing development with social, economic, and environmental sustainability.

This exercise elucidates the different approaches female and male executives bring to dis-

cussions of world politics. In sum, discussions in the UNGA are shaped by the speaker's gender. Female executives raise different topics in their statements, and their concerns are distinct from those of their male colleagues. These findings have practical importance. As women bring different content and topics to the discussions of world issues, including female participants at all levels of global politics can have a substantial influence on the outcomes. Only recently international institutions realized the importance of female voices in global decision-making. To address that, in 2015 UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 which attempts to give a greater role for women in peacebuilding initiatives around the world.

Speaking for the Women

In the context of female legislators, scholars have tested, and largely confirmed the propensity of women to invoke gendered rhetoric. The topic modeling also revealed that female leaders focus their speeches on different aspects of global politics and use a different discourse in doing so. However, the above analysis was only restricted to the set of topics that women spoke extensively. On the basis of a theoretical expectation that female leaders have incentives to advancing international women's issues, here I examine all speeches delivered at the UNGA. To identify the extent to which a leader's speech focus on women I created a dictionary that consisted of the different extensions of the word "women" and "female".[15] By searching and coding each documents for the existence of these words, I created a count measure for each statement-year. In contrast to topic modeling, my goal here is to examine whether women on average invoke gendered rhetoric more than men do. Given that UNGA statements cover topics ranging from development to the issues of the Middle East, the mention of women could be about an impact of those issues on women, how they magnify gender inequality, call for international empowerment for women in all areas of politics, or it could focus on women in some other way.

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[15]In creating the list of words t be included in the dictionary category "women" I followed Pearson and Dancey (2011).

Table 3: Predicting "women" word count in UNGA statements

	IRR	Confidence Interval	
Female	2.21	1.83	2.67
GDP growth	0.98	0.97	0.99
Trade	1.0	0.9	1.0
Left Executive	1.02	0.98	1.07
Democracy	1.01	1.00	1.01
Constant	1.14	1.01	1.29
Obs	3503		
Alpha	1.66		
Log-likelihood	-5376		

The table shows the Incidence Rate Ratios for each variable. 95% confidence intervals are in the third column.

As the outcome of interest is the word count, I use the negative binomial model to test the expectation. Aside from the gender of a speaker, I also control for country-specific factors described above.[16] The results are given in Table 3. The initial analysis provides strong support for the hypothesis that female leaders incorporate more feminine words into their statements. Female executives are expected to have a rate 2.21 times greater word count compared to male ones. To better illustrate the substantive significance of the results, I plot the predicted word count difference along with 95 percent confidence intervals in Figure 7. Female leaders on average are more likely to mention women in the speeches.

Female Leaders and Votes at the UN

As argued above, gender stereotypes put pressure on female leaders and increase scrutiny of their foreign policy. Hence, female leaders will shy away from substantially changing the direction of foreign policy. To analyze this, I use time-series cross-sectional data with ideal-points as the dependent variable. The model is estimated with state-level fixed effects to address

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[16]Given that each speech covers fifteen minutes, the number of words in each document is roughly the same. Yet, as I robustness check I rerun models by controlling for the total number of words in leader's speeches to ensure that if any group mentions women more often, it is not simply because they deliver longer speeches. The results did not change dramatically

Figure 7

the unit heterogeneity that might bias the results. This approach also allows to account for some unmeasured variables associated with particular countries and to isolate the effect of gender on the variation of each state's ideal-points. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Female Leaders and UN voting

	Dependent variable:	
	idealpoint	
Lagged DV	0.813***	—
	(0.011)	
Female	0.007	−0.040
	(0.015)	(0.025)
Observations	2,131	2,278
R^2	0.664	0.055
F Statistic	559.445***	20.757***
Fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

The preliminary analysis supports my expectations. The coefficient of *Female* in both models fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In other words, there is

no substantive and significant change in the voting behavior of a country depending on the gender of a leader. However, the effect of gender on foreign policy depicts itself in other types of behavior, such as speeches.

Discussion and Conclusion

The literature to date has done a careful job of assessing the female legislators' influence on a number of policy outcomes. However, little is known about the substantive effect of female executives on the different policy domains. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by providing new empirical evidence on the impact of female leaders on foreign policy. I use a new source of data on foreign policy — countries' annual statements and votes in the UN General Debate — which allows me to identify the effect of gender on different aspects of foreign policy. The analysis of speeches and votes reveals that, while female and male executives focus their speeches on distinct topics of foreign policy, this difference does not translate into votes. Results show that voting in the General Assembly does not change depending on the leader's gender. Yet, I find some evidence that female executives focus on the needs of women when debating the issue of Development. Moreover, acting as surrogate representatives for women across the world, female executives also use gendered rhetoric in discussing global issues.

The paucity of research on the policy impact of female executives makes this study well worth undertaking for multiple reasons. First of all, moving beyond the female legislators and examining the behavior of female executives can deepen our understanding of gendered decision-making as legislators and executives have different constraints, authority, and policy preferences. Second, by examining the gendered foreign policymaking, we can assess the extent to which representation moves beyond borders. In other words, we can understand whether female leaders are acting as global surrogate representatives. For example, we can examine whether female presidents and prime ministers focus on "women's issues" at interna-

tional institutions. Lastly, aside from contributing to the literature on gender and politics, this paper also speaks to the studies that focused on the role of leaders in shaping state behavior. In international relations, recently, there has been an increased theoretical and empirical focus on understanding the role of leaders' characteristics in shaping foreign affairs (Carter and Chiozza 2017). While this research program provided us with greater insights about the effects of particular leader attributes and characteristics, little knowledge was gained on how leaders' gender influences foreign policy.

So far studies showed how female executives need to navigate the male-dominated politics under the dual pressure of presenting themselves as both competent and likable. Building on this, I develop a framework that explains how female executives will strategically shape foreign policy and strike a balance between being feminine and masculine. As women feel pressure to establish their credibility in handling foreign policy, female leaders will act masculine in high-cost domains. However, women also feel pressure to present themselves as feminine. As such, speeches provide an opportunity for female leaders to distinguish themselves in a masculine environment without facing a backlash. In other words, I argue that female executives will incorporate gendered discourse into their statement, while not substantively changing the direction of foreign policy. I tested these hypotheses by comparing the votes and speeches of executives at the annual UNGA.

It is important to be clear and recognize that this study captures the behavior of female executives at the UNGA. Yet, it offers a starting point for a larger project that will examine the behavior of female executives at other international organizations. Going forward, I plan to expand this investigation to the UN Security Council and compare the statement of the leaders in these two venues. The theory developed here can also be applied to senior diplomats, foreign ministers, and women who actively participate in global politics. Future research can probe whether female diplomats are prompted to use gendered rhetoric on discussions of global poverty and development while adopting hawkish language in other instances. For example, a female foreign minister can feel pressure to act masculine in conflict resolution discussions.

Appendix

Figure 8: How Topic Proportions change across years

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