

MILITARY VS. CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT  
THREE CASE STUDIES: BRAZIL, GHANA, AND TURKEY

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A Thesis  
Presented to  
the Faculty of the Department of Political Science  
University of Houston

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In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts

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by  
J. Judson Kilpatrick  
August, 1978

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my thesis committee chairman, Professor Hugh Stephens, under whose careful direction this work was completed, and to the two other members of the committee, Professors John Sloan and Hannah Decker, each of whom made some valuable comments on an earlier draft. Of course the responsibility for the content of the thesis is entirely my own. I also owe a debt of deepest gratitude to Ms. Phyllis Friday for her long hours of painstaking typing, extending from the first rough draft to the final product.

It is very likely that this exercise would not have even been started, much less successfully completed, had it not been for the love, inspiration, and material support given to me by my parents. To them, thank you, from the bottom of my heart.

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## ABSTRACT

This study sets out to answer the question, "Does it make a difference whether or not politicians, technicians, and bureaucrats wear uniforms?" in the context of the developing nations. The applicability of the civilian-military governmental typology to the study of the politics of the developing nations is examined. By testing the validity of the two assumptions upon which this typology is based, it was possible to determine the extent to which civilian and military governments actually differed in Brazil, Ghana, and Turkey. The validity of these two assumptions - (1) that military men carry into politics a distinctive set of values, capabilities, and administrative techniques, and (2) that military governments lack legitimacy - was tested by comparing the personnel, policy orientations, and governing styles of civilian and military regimes from the three nations.

Military government was defined as a government formally headed by military men. Brazil, Ghana, and Turkey were selected for study because of their dissimilarity in most features except that each has, at some time since World War II, been directly governed by the military. The comparison of the personnel - heads-of-state and those holding cabinet or ministerial posts - of civilian and military regimes revealed

that a high degree of military professionalism exists in the developing nations, which serves to distinguish military from civilian values and capabilities. However, it was also revealed that in the developing nations, military men do not always conform to type when placed in governing positions. Nor did the analysis of military and civilian government personnel show any consistent differences along any other parameter.

The set of quantitative policy orientation indicators, used in addition to the personnel comparison, to test the validity of Assumption 1, did not reveal any consistent policy emphasis related to either civilian or military governance. Thus, Assumption 1 appears to have little validity.

Assumption 2, that military governments lack the legitimacy of civilian governments, was tested by comparing the extent to which civilian and military governments employed 'coercive' versus 'consultative' governing styles. Again, this parameter revealed little consistent difference between civilian and military governance.

Thus, the answer to the question, "Does it make a difference whether or not politicians, technicians, and bureaucrats wear uniforms?" is no. It appears that to make little consistent whether or not political affairs are in the hands of civilians or soldiers in the developing nations.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The notion persists that military government - defined as a government formally headed by military men - is fundamentally different from all civilian governments, be they democratic or authoritarian, capitalist or communist, progressive or reactionary. This notion is based on two assumptions: (1) that military men carry into politics a distinctive set of values, capabilities, and administrative techniques, and (2) that military governments lack legitimacy.

It is my contention that the predominant characterization of military government in the developing nations as authoritarian, direct, and often naive in its political approach, as being isolated from and insensitive to popular needs, but possessing a 'national' outlook valuable in countries divided by ethnic, regional, and religious differences, would not necessarily distinguish it from many civilian governments. My thesis is that unless the two assumptions which provide the basis for the oft-used civilian-military typology can be validated in the context of the developing nations it would be not only unnecessary but confusing and misleading

to maintain the distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' governments. Because these terms have so many implications, if they do not describe fundamentally different types of government, their use in a classificatory scheme would be highly questionable.

In order to test the two assumptions which underlie the civilian-military governmental typology, selected civilian and military governments will be directly compared in order to examine their differences and similarities along specified parameters. The need to identify the characteristics of military rule has been assumed, and so the curious homogeneity of the predominant portrait of military government<sup>1</sup> appears to be a result of broad descriptive studies comparing only military governments. What is also needed is an answer to the question: "Does it make a difference whether or not politicians, technicians, and bureaucrats wear uniforms?" In order to establish whether or not the civilian-military government dichotomy is valid, what is needed is: (1) a comparison of military and civilian governments, in order

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<sup>1</sup>Many works give this picture of military government, including S.E. Finer, ibid., p.9, S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p.229; Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations pp.84-85; W.F. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics (Methuen Press, 1969) p.143.

to isolate those features which distinguish one from the other, and then (2) a comparison of those features, in order to determine whether or not there are characteristic differences between civilian and military governments.

The specialized training of the military professional and his unique relationship to the means of coercion is what has made government by soldier the object of so much recent attention. As coup d'etat and direct military government have become commonplace in the developing nations, political analysts have put a great deal of effort into determining the causes and consequences of military rule.

Concern with military influence in politics has its origins in traditional liberal-democratic thought. In nineteenth century Europe the parallel development of liberal ideas and military professionalism accented the growing division between civilians and military men. Liberal values stood in stark contrast to the military Weltanschauung of the professional soldier, provoking Gladstone to make the statement that "a standing army can never be turned into a moral institution." As the military function became more specialized in the increasingly complex societies of industrial Europe, the military officer came to be identified as a new social type. His training involved not only the acquisition of special expertise in 'the management of violence', but

also the development of a particular social outlook, characterized by his loyalty to the national state, his esprit de corps and bureaucratic orientation, and his 'military' ethic.<sup>2</sup> The social distinctiveness of the military professional was heightened by his dress, his barracks life, and his immersion in military life. This prompted one analyst of civil-military relations to argue that the

(s)ocial origins and early backgrounds are less important to the professional military man than to any other high social type. The training of the future admiral or general begins early and is thus deeply set, and the military world which he enters is so all-encompassing that his way of life is firmly centered within it. To the extent that these conditions exist, whether he is the son of a carpenter or a millionaire is of little consequence.<sup>3</sup>

The military Weltanschauung has been described as "conservative, protectionist, and exclusive."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, chapters 1 and 3; Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, part I.

<sup>3</sup>C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p.192.

<sup>4</sup>A. Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, p.2.

Traditional liberal-democratic wariness of military influence in politics<sup>5</sup> was increased after World War II, when it became apparent that the military could be easily co-opted by civilian groups espousing anti-democratic and xenophobic political programs, and used by those groups to gain power. The ready alliance of the German High Command with the National Socialists, of the Japanese army with the anti-Meiji reactionary politicians, as well as the tacit approval granted to the political programs of Mussolini's Fascists and Charles Maurras' Action Francaise by the Italian and French officer corps, respectively, seemed indication enough that the proper military role was an apolitical one.

When it became obvious that the military was to play a prominent role in the politics of the developing nations of Latin American, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, the first reaction of specialists in the politics of these nations was one of blanket condemnation. Edwin Lieuwin, in an early and influential work, criticized the role played

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<sup>5</sup>As expressed by Herbert Spencer in The Principles of Sociology (D. Appleton & Co., 1900) part II, pp.568-642, and Alexis de Toqueville in Democracy in America II (Schocken Books, 1961) pp.317-329.

by the Latin American military as reactionary, anti-democratic, and predatory.<sup>6</sup> Recently, however, a more positive view has been taken of military government by many specialists in the same field. It has been argued that the 'national' orientation of military officers,<sup>7</sup> their bias in favor of technological and industrial development,<sup>8</sup> and their self-appointed role as 'modernizers'<sup>9</sup> all tend to render government by soldier an asset to the developing nations.

But both the traditional and 'neo-realist' perspectives rely on the assumption that whatever qualities a military government does bring with it into office, whether it is a bias against politics and a penchant for planning and rational policy-making or a capacity for administering

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<sup>6</sup>E. Lieuwijn, Arms and Politics in Latin America (Praeger Publishers, 1960).

<sup>7</sup>For example, see Guy Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," World Politics XI (April, 1959), p.342; J.J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America; p.261; D.A. Rustow and R.E. Ward (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, pp.352-388.

<sup>8</sup>Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in J.J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, p.40.

<sup>9</sup>William Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States, pp.9-10.

only "the most primitive community,"<sup>10</sup> they are necessarily the result of its 'military-ness'. Although one would expect to find the professional soldier, with his distinctive code of morals and manners, in a society where military institutions have long been established, where he undergoes prolonged and highly specialized training, and where the tradition of civilian control of the military has been long established, all lending considerably to his particular outlook and esprit, this might not be the case in the developing nations. It may be that the civilian-military typology has little meaning in the developing nations except to inform the analyst that one set of political leaders dress in uniform and adorn themselves with military titles, while others don mufti and occupy the offices of president or prime minister.

The assumption that military governments lack legitimacy has reinforced the notion that they must operate differently from civilian governments. In Western Europe, along with military professionalism, there developed a tradition of civilian control. Armed forces did not play a direct role in politics. When viewed from the perspective of European experience, the direct involvement - the

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<sup>10</sup> S.E. Finer, The Man On Horseback, p.12.

'intervention' - of the military in politics was regarded as exceptional and regrettable, and above all, illegitimate. Samuel Finer notes that of the "two crippling weaknesses" of military government, one is its "lack of title to govern." He argues that military government, having gained power by force of arms, must continue to hold that power by force of arms.<sup>11</sup> But while a military government may encounter distinctive problems in a nation where the political culture is 'civilist' and highly developed, the fact that the military has just taken power by force may have little effect on its ability to govern in a country where civilian politicians are considered to have no more right to govern than military officers.

By comparing civilian and military regimes from the same country, it should be possible to chart the nature and extent of the differences between civilian and military government. Then when these differences are compared cross-nationally, a composite image can be drawn of both civilian and military government using their common, basic features.

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp.14-16.



### The Independent Variables:

#### Civilian and Military Governments

Identified in the following table are the governments which will be compared. The three nations selected for the analysis are Brazil, Turkey and Ghana. Each of these nations has at some time since World War II been directly ruled by the military, which assumed power by means of a coup d'etat, and which held power for some time. The identification of the independent variables is thus a relatively simple and clear-cut matter. Furthermore, each 'type' of government held power for a number of years, enhancing the prospects for drawing some valid and substantial conclusions about the nature of civilian versus military government. In each case more than one regime is considered under the headings 'civilian' or 'military' government, in order to avoid equating 'civilian' or 'military' governance with the actions of a single regime (see FIGURE 1.1).

FIGURE 1.1

## Independent Variables

Nation	Civilian Regimes	Military Regimes
Brazil	Here the successive governments of Juscelino Kubitschek (1955 to 1960) and Joao Goulart (1960 - March 1964, excluding the seven-month Presidency of Janio Quadros) will be treated as the independent variable "civilian government" for the Brazilian case.	Brazil has been governed by the military since Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco's coup of March 1964. The successive regimes of Castello Branco (1964-1967), Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) and General Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-1974), will be the independent variable "military government" used in the case of Brazil.
Ghana	The government headed by Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah (elected Prime Minister in 1956 and President in 1960) and the Convention People's Party, until it was ousted by a military coup in 1966, and the government headed by P.M. Kofi A. Busia and Head-of-State Edward Akufo-Addo from August 1969 until its ouster in January 1972.	The government headed by the Ghanaian military, initially under the leadership of Lt. General Joseph A. Ankrah, and which has held power since 1966 under Brigadier A.A. Afrifa (April to August 1969) and Colonel I.K. Acheampong (1972 until the present). This analysis will cease in 1975.

FIGURE 1.1 (cont.)

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Turkey	The government which gained office in May 1950 (subsequently re-elected in 1954 and 1957) and which was headed by President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of the Democratic Party. This government was overthrown by coup d'etat in 1960.	The regime which gained power in 1960 and which was headed by General Cemal Gursel until 1966, and by General Cevdet Sunay until 1972. Although Admiral Fabi Koruturk succeeded Gen. Sunay in 1972, that date will be used arbitrarily as a cutoff point for the analysis.
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### Testing the Assumptions

Assumption 1: Military men take into government values, capabilities, and administrative techniques different from those of civilian politicians.

This assumption will be tested by (1) examining for variations the factors which influence the acquisition of values, interests, and administrative techniques by civilian and military rulers, and (2) by comparing certain policy consequences of civilian and military government.

Assumption 2: Military governments lack the legitimacy of civilian governments.

This assumption will be tested by comparing the methods used by civilian and military governments to deal with their respective political opposition.

Analyzing Military and Civilian Government Personnel

It is a well established fact of political life that an individual's background - his social origins, his education, his career choice - contributes significantly to his political outlook. This is especially true of the military officer, particularly in those nations where military professionalism is highly developed. In these nations the soldier's education begins with a rigorous introduction to military life. Thus,

The harsh initiation at The Point or The Academy - and on lower levels of military service, in basic training - reveals the attempt to break up early civilian values and sensibilities in order the more easily to implant a character structure as totally new as possible.<sup>12</sup>

The degree of specialized military training received by the professional military man is critical to the formation of his values and interests, his capabilities, and his predilection for certain administrative techniques. In the developing nations, if systematic differences between the extent and nature of formal education and specialized training undergone by civilian and military rulers are revealed, at least the foundations of a viable civilian-military governmental typology will exist.

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<sup>12</sup>C.W. Mills, op.cit., p.193.

However, in most of the developing nations wearing a uniform still does not always make an individual first of all a soldier. Military professionalism still remains primarily a characteristic of the armed forces of the developed nations. But there still may exist fundamental differences between soldiers and civilians. The military may still represent a distinct and homogeneous group when assessed according to other parameters. Much has been made of the "middle class" composition of the armed forces and its impact on their values and interests.<sup>13</sup> The detection of consistent class or ethnic differences between civilian and military regime personnel would be significant due to the assumed impact differences of this nature would have on their political outlook and capabilities.

Finally, because of the predominance of "Young Turks" - younger officers in the junior ranks - in many of the coup d'etats in the third world, it has been argued that the military overthrow of a government is analagous to

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<sup>13</sup>Jose Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (Oxford U.P., 1967); Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti"; S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; E. Lieuwijn, op.cit., Victor Alba, "The Stages of Militarism in Latin America," in J.J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries.

elections and popular referenda in the more stable nations, in a sense an institutionalized means of political competition.<sup>14</sup> Dissatisfied and personally frustrated by their social progress, the young, ambitious "modernizing personalities" of the developing nations find the military an excellent means to social mobility.<sup>15</sup> Provoked by the conservatism of governments dominated by tradition-bound civilian politicians, they then discover that coup d'etat provides immediate access to policy-making, and a chance to effect revolutionary changes. This being true, if military rulers proved consistently younger than civilian governments, the terms 'civilian' and 'military' may refer to fundamentally different types of government. Of course age differences in the reverse direction (older military regimes/younger civilian regimes) may indicate an equally important difference. In the case of Latin

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<sup>14</sup>David C. Rappoport, "Coup d'etat: the View of the Men Firing Pistols," in C.J. Friedrich, ed., Revolution (Atherton Press, 1966); S.P. Huntington, "Patterns of Political Violence in World Politics," in Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (Free Press, 1962).

<sup>15</sup>"Not infrequently high school teachers and lawyers, dissatisfied with their professions or believing their ambitions can be better attained in the army, enter military schools and resume their public careers in the military service." Mahjid Khadduri, "The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics," American Political Science Review, XLVII (June, 1963) p.517.

America, for example, it might represent the difference between reactionary "middle-class" officers and young, radical civilian politicians.

The first section of each of the following chapters will consist of a descriptive comparison of the social (ethnic, class), educational and career backgrounds of the important personnel in each civilian and military regime. In the context of each nation different factors may be salient, and it is those factors which will be focused upon. For example, while the identification of general differences in the class backgrounds of civilian and military governments in Brazil would be considered important, differences in the tribal or ethnic origins of civilian and military governments in Ghana would be deemed salient. The thrust of the first section of each case study chapter will be to determine whether or not there are differences in the backgrounds of civilian and military government personnel which could be expected to give each type of government a different character.

Personnel here refers to the heads-of-state (presidents, prime ministers, military rulers, junta members), and those holding cabinet or ministerial posts.

## The Dependent Variables:

### I) Policy Orientation

A government's policy responses to specific social, political, and economic problems indicate the values and interests it deems important and the administrative techniques it considers appropriate. If military and civilian rulers differ in any of these respects, then one would expect the policy consequences of civilian and military government to be different.

The policies of military and civilian governments will most likely differ in the extent to which they conform to either a 'militarist' or 'civilist' policy orientation. Militarism has been defined as "the imposition of heavy burdens of people for military purposes, to the neglect of welfare and culture, and the waste of the nation's best manpower in unproductive army service."<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, militarism represents "an attitude toward public affairs which conceives war and the preparation for war as the chief instruments of foreign policy...."<sup>17</sup> Thus, the relative positioning of the policy orientations of each pair of

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<sup>16</sup>A. Vagts, op.cit., p.14.

<sup>17</sup>"Militarism," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, X, p.446.



civilian and military governments on a continuum ranging from 'militarist' to 'civilist' will entail comparison of the policy outputs of each government in the areas of welfare policy and military policy.

Assessments of the causes and consequences of military dominance reveal substantial disagreement over the impact it has on public policy. There exist two major models of military governance, the "predatory-incompetent" model and the "modernizing-proficient" model. Advocates of the first model<sup>18</sup> argue that a primary motive of military men will be the promotion of their institutional interests to the relative detriment of civilian social interests. Budgetary constraints then provide incentives for military governments to resist increases in welfare expenditure, if not to actually reduce such expenditures. According to the "predatory-incompetent" model one would expect the policy orientation of a military government to be 'militarist' when compared to a civilian government's if the degree of 'militarism-civilism' was assessed according to the following indicators:

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<sup>18</sup>Edwin Lieuwin, Edward Shils, S.E. Finer, William Gutteridge, Eric Nordlinger.

- 1) the ratio of military expenditures (MILEX) to welfare expenditures (WELEX), each set of expenditures representing absolute monetary unit expenditures. WELEX is the total government expenditure for public health and education.
- 2) the ratio of MILEX to the annual national budget, recorded in absolute monetary unit values and measured as a percentage.
- 3) the ratio of WELEX to the annual budget, recorded in absolute monetary unit values and measured as a percentage.

Thus, the policy orientation of military government A will be considered 'militarist' relative to that of civilian government B if:

FIGURE 1.2

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

<u>Military Government A</u>		<u>Civilian Government B</u>	
<u>MILEX</u>	greater than	<u>MILEX</u>	
WELEX		WELEX	
<u>MILEX</u> (%)	greater than	<u>MILEX</u> (%)	
Total Budget		Total Budget	
<u>WELEX</u> (%)	less than	<u>WELEX</u> (%)	
Total Budget		Total Budget	

- 4) a ratio of armed forces (ARMFOR) to the potential work force (WORFOR) - men whose ages range from 16 to 45 - measured as a percentage. Where work force data is unavailable, population data will be substituted.
- 5) the ratio of per capita ARMFOR expenditures to national income (GNP per capita).<sup>19</sup>

The policy orientation of military government A will be considered 'militarist' relative to civilian government B if:

FIGURE 1.3

POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

<u>Military Government A</u>		<u>Civilian Government B</u>	
<u>ARMFOR</u> (%) WORFOR	greater than	<u>ARMFOR</u> (%) WORFOR	
<u>MILEX/ARMFOR</u> GNP per capita	greater than	<u>MILEX/ARMFOR</u> GNP per capita	

<sup>19</sup> Jack Parsons, Population Fallacies (Unwin Bros., 1976) pp.174-175.

The "incompetence" portion of the model refers to the adverse effect that the professional isolation of officers from the main currents of society is supposed to have on their political capabilities. Military governors would have little direct political experience, and so would not have been able to develop the necessary and complex decisional infrastructure linking government - bureaucracy - interest group - public.<sup>20</sup> As well, the professional military ethic regards politics and its civilian practitioners as "unwholesome." So the officer-governor tends to shun "collaboration" with those probably most able to aid in the formulation and implementation of sound policies, essential to social, political, and economic development. The proponents of this model argue that "(s)ince (military governments) have very little of a program except what they take over from the planning boards and civil servants of the old regime, for

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<sup>20</sup>Fred W. Riggs argues that when "the political arena is shifted to the bureaucracies - a shift marked by the growing power of military officers in conflict with civilian officials - the consequences are usually ominous for political stability, economic growth, administrative effectiveness, and democratic values" from "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in J. LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton U.P., 1967) p.120.

whom they have no respect, they are left directionless."<sup>21</sup>

An anticipated consequence of the inexperience and unwillingness to co-operate with other groups of military regimes would be that development rates would suffer and either remain static, or slow down.\*

While the concepts "political development" and "social development" have not yet been precisely or clearly established, and so are very difficult to operationalize, "economic development" has both a fairly specific meaning and a well established set of indicators. If the political and administrative techniques and capabilities of military and civilian governments are generically different, one would expect the sensitive indicators of economic development to show the impact of such differences. Those factors

\* Since this third set of policy orientation indicators taps government performance rather than policy emphasis, it may appear unrelated to the previous two sets of indicators. However, since the aim here is to detect differences between civilian and military governance which are the result of the "civilian-ness" or the "military-ness" of government leaders, the lack of relevance is only apparent. This set of indicators provides a measure of the differences in administrative ability and technique which may be the result of a civilian versus a military background. And it is this same factor which is assumed to be the cause of those differences in policy emphasis which are revealed.

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<sup>21</sup>E. Shils, op.cit., p.56 - emphasis added.

important to economic development - capital accumulation, industrial development, rational investment allocation, and so on - are profoundly affected by government policy. Regime "incompetence" should have a detrimental impact on economic development. Using the following indicators of economic development, civilian and military regime competence will be compared and assessed.

- 1) GNP growth rate, measured as the average annual percentage increase in a nation's GNP.
- 2) Inflation rates, measured as the average annual change in inflation rates.
- 3) The ratio of exports to imports, measured as the average annual percentage change.
- 4) Ratio of government expenditure to revenue (extent of budget deficit/surplus) measured as a percentage. A value of 100% or more indicates a budget deficit.<sup>22</sup>

The policy orientation of military government A will be considered "incompetent" relative to civilian government B, if:

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<sup>22</sup>Jere R. Berhman, "Development Economics," in Sidney Wientraub (ed.), Modern Economic Thought (U. of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); R. Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries and Patterns of Trade and Development (Oxford U.P., 1967); A.K. Cairncross, Factors in Economic Development (Allen and Unwin, 1962); Alasdair I. Macbean, Export Instability and Economic Development (Harvard U.P., 1966).

FIGURE 1.4

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (III)

<u>Military Government A</u>		<u>Civilian Government B</u>
GNP growth rate	less than	GNP growth rate
Inflation rate	greater than	Inflation rate
<u>Export</u> Imports	less than	<u>Export</u> Imports
<u>Expenditure</u> Revenue (%)	greater than	<u>Expenditure</u> Revenue (%)

Advocates of the "modernizing-proficient" model of military government<sup>23</sup> argue the opposite of proponents of the "predatory-incompetent" model. But both models hypothesize fundamentally different policy orientations from civilian and military governments. It may be, as Samuel Huntington argues, that both models are accurate depending upon the predominant

<sup>23</sup>John J. Johnson, Manfred Halpern, Samuel Huntington, Daniel Lerner.

government-society relationship in a particular nation.<sup>24</sup> However, the proposition that the policy consequences of civilian and military regimes will always be different is common to both. The purpose of the policy orientation variable is to test this proposition alone, and not to test the two models.

Thus, while the explanation of the substance and validity of policy orientation indicators involved directional hypotheses, for the purposes of this thesis only the differences in regime policy orientations are important - not their direction. If few significant differences between the personnel backgrounds and policy orientations of civilian and military governments are revealed, Aristide Zolberg's statement that "(a) military take-over and rule of officers never constitutes a revolution..., but rather a limited modification of existing arrangements"<sup>25</sup> would appear to hold more than a

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<sup>24</sup>Samuel Huntington, op.cit., p.221.

<sup>25</sup>A. Zolberg, "Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa: A Preliminary Report" in Jacques Van Doorn (ed.), The Military Profession and Military Regimes (Mouton Press, 1969) p.198. See also Phillipe Schmitter's "null hypothesis" about the policy consequences of military intervention in "Military Intervention, Political Competiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America" in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Armies and Politics in Latin America (Holmes & Meir Pub., 1976) pp.117-118.



kernel of truth. In this case the validity of any civilian-military governmental typology would be severely undermined.

## II) Governing Style

This last variable will be used to test Assumption 2. The lack of legitimacy imputed to military government implies that different methods will be employed by military rulers and civilian politicians in order to gain compliance to policy demands. Coercion rather than compromise is expected to characterize the relationships between a military government and its political opposition. Since soldiers have a special relationship with the means of coercion because of their profession, it is argued that they will have fewer qualms about using or threatening to use violence in the pursuit of their policy goals.<sup>26</sup> The resort to coercion by military governments is considered more likely because soldiers should be less skilled than civilian politicians in the arts of persuasion and compromise, and have had fewer contacts with the lives of those they govern, due to their military values and professional isolation from the mainstream of society.

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<sup>26</sup>Even in the formulation of his "null hypothesis," Schmitter states that "regime style may change when the generals take over, especially as regards such 'regulatory' issues as freedom of expression." Ibid., p.118. S.E. Finer, op.cit., pp.14-16, makes much of this argument.

The variable Governing Style ranges from "coercive" to "consultative." It will be determined by the predominant character of each regime's relationship to those opposed to its policies. Unlike the policy orientation variable, this parameter will not be quantified. In the case of each nation, the comparison of the governing styles of military and civilian governments will rely on a descriptive history of each regime's relationship with opposition newspapers, labor unions, politicians, bureaucrats, and political parties.

A "coercive" governing style is one which incorporates such measures as outlawing free speech, the imprisonment, exile, or execution of individual government opponents, the dissolution of political parties or labor unions, the use of troops and violence to break strikes or to break up anti-government demonstrations, the confiscation of property owned by citizens or domestic enterprises, and the use of terror methods to ensure opposition quietude or cooperation. A "consultative" governing style is one which provides institutionalized access to the policy-making process by government opponents. This would mean, for example, extending the franchise, creating joint regime-interest group planning agencies, making policy compromises with major opponents, increasing the avenues of contact between the governed and the government by localizing administration and decentralizing policy-making.

## The Analysis

### A Synopsis

When the analysis is completed, it will be possible to fill in the following table with specific information, and as a result be possible to assess the extent of the differences between civilian and military governments, with special reference to the critical factors of government personnel, policy orientation, and governing style.

FIGURE 1.5

### SYNOPSIS

Variable	Type of Government	
	Civilian	Military
Personnel	Extent of the military-civilian dichotomy in terms of social background, training, and age.	
Policy Orientation	a) Militarist/ Civilist	a) Militarist/ Civilist
	b) Competent/ Incompetent	b) Competent/ Incompetent
Governing Style	Coercive/ Consultative	Coercive/ Consultative

## CHAPTER II

## BRAZIL

1) Civilian and Military Government Personnel

Brazilian politics has been, and remains, elitist. Prior to the Revolution of 1930, Brazilian politics had been dominated by an oligarchy of wealthy landowners - fazendeiros - who with the support of the military, governed through a system of semipatriarchal state parties. After 1930, however, under Getulio Vargas' prolonged presidency, the nature of civilian politics changed significantly. The Revolution was carried out by a coalition of young military officers and middle-class civilian politicians who were disgruntled with the continued political dominance of traditional landed interests. The major beneficiary of the Revolution, Getulio Vargas, brought to politics an inspired populism which by the end of his Estado Novo had turned into a genuine, albeit limited, political mobilization. Whereas in 1908 the voting population was only 5 per cent of the total, by 1945 it was up to 16 per cent.<sup>1</sup> The return of electoral politics after

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<sup>1</sup>Georges-Andre Fiechter, Brazil Since 1964: Modernization Under a Military Regime, p.3.

1945 was accompanied by the creation of a party system in which the primary goal was to return a candidate to office, and little else. Electoral alliances and coalitions which made party platforms meaningless became a central feature of Brazilian politics.<sup>2</sup>

It was in this environment that Juscelino de Oliveira Kubitschek and Joao Belchoir Marques Goulart began their political careers. Both were the direct heirs to Vargas' political legacy, and were the products of his two political machines - the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). It has been argued that Brazil's elite is composed of "vertically" structured groups, a structure which has kept that elite from developing a particular class orientation.<sup>3</sup> This "cross class character" of the Brazilian elite is exemplified by the very different class backgrounds of Kubitschek and Goulart. Kubitschek rose from a genteel lower-middle class poverty by dint of his considerable personal ambition, while Goulart was the son of a wealthy and prominent rancher - and Vargas' neighbor - in Rio Grande do

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<sup>2</sup>Jose Bello, A History of Modern Brazil 1889-1964, p.313-314.

<sup>3</sup>Douglas A. Chalmers, "Political Groups and Authority in Brazil: Some Continuities in a Decade of Confusion and Change", in Riordan Roett (ed.), Brazil in the Sixties (Vanderbilt U.P., 1972) pp.51-76.

Sul. The "classless" character of Brazil's civilian political elite is duplicated in the military elite. The Brazilian military began its progress toward professionalization early on, and achievement norms have long been used in the selection of future officers. Thus there is a similar diversity in the class backgrounds of the three military governors of Brazil since 1964. Marshal Humberto de Alencar Costello Branco's father was a well known and respected General, and as such was clearly a member of the upper class.<sup>4</sup> The class origins of General Artur da Costa e Silva and General Emilio Garrastazu Medici are middle class.<sup>5</sup> While much has been made of the middle-class nature of the military elite in Brazil and in Latin America as a whole, this feature does not provide the basis for any convincing civilian-military elite dichotomy. Brazil's civilian political elite appears to have as close a

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<sup>4</sup>According to the class division defined by Prof. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, as detailed in Fiechter, op.cit., pp.14-15.

<sup>5</sup>Costa e Silva's father owned and operated a general store, while Medici's father was a rancher in Rio Grande do Sul.

<sup>6</sup>Edwin Liewin, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America" in J.J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, pp.134-135; Victor Alba, "The Stages of Militarism in Latin America," ibid., pp.178-181; Jose Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup" in Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (Oxford U.P., 1967); Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti," pp.1131-1148; Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics, chapter 3, pp.30-56.

relationship with the broad middle class as does the military.<sup>7</sup>

To the degree that the Brazilian military represents a group professionally isolated from the rest of society, there may be some basis for distinguishing between military and civilian governance. Brazilian military and civilian education has been formally separate since the creation of the Royal Military Academy in the early 1800's. There did exist a basic difference in the philosophical orientation of military and civilian higher education from the late 1880's on. The universities taught the values of eighteenth century European humanism with their classical, Latinist education. But the positivism of Comte and Spencer, with "(i)ts stress upon progress and responsible social authority" had become "the 'gospel of the military academy' ".<sup>8</sup> This bias in military education rendered its graduates subject to an attraction for guided social development, and oriented them particularly toward the need for technological development. So in Vargas the military found a kindred spirit, and throughout the period

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<sup>7</sup>Chalmers argues that "(w)hether class or any other basic cleavage accurately describes the differences between Brazilian power contenders of any period is highly questionable," op.cit., p.65.

<sup>8</sup>Bello, op.cit., p.29, 41; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p.89.

of the Estado Novo (1937-1945) Vargas and his semi-fascist corporative state had consistent military support. The military also saw Vargas' move toward the centralization of political authority as being in their own institutional interests.<sup>9</sup>

Nor did the kind of professional training received by most civilian politicians (primarily training as doctors or lawyers) appear to enhance their technical or administrative skills to the extent that higher military education did for officers. But for the post-war civilian politician, career success did not depend on technical expertise or on administrative efficiency. Success usually came after a fairly long climb up through the ranks of one of the major parties, and appointment to important government posts was based more on party affiliation and rank than on ability. This contrasted sharply with the emphasis placed on accomplishment in military promotions. Political success depended very much on a candidate's ability to appeal to the voters' sentiments. Electoral success was very much a matter of

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<sup>9</sup>"For Goes (Vargas' Army Chief of Staff) and Dutra (War Minister), the goal was a 'strong Army within a strong state'. Their efforts to give the national Army a monopoly of force coincided with Vargas' own plans for a personal dictatorship." Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, p.26.



personality and polemics, and the poor showing of the military candidates for president - usually as UDN\* candidates - Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, General Juarez Tavora, and Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, indicates how little military life prepared them for active politics.

Career experience, in the case of Brazil shows a clear distinction between civilian and military government personnel. To begin with, after the 1964 coup there is a marked increase in the number of military professionals in the cabinets of military governments, apart from the War, Army, Navy and Air ministries which have traditionally been the domain of the military. In the Kubitscheck administration the posts of Agriculture minister and Transportation minister were held by military officers. Under Goulart no cabinet positions were ever filled by military personnel. After the coup Costello Branco appointed three military men to cabinet posts, Costa appointed five, as did Medici. Nor does this simple measure tell the whole story. In addition to the institutional innovations which enabled the military governments to effectively extend military authority into other

\* The Uniao Democratica Nacional, a coalition of conservatives who opposed Vargas and his political heirs.

spheres of government,<sup>10</sup> the military put a much greater emphasis on the appointment of technical experts, without much apparent regard for prior political experience. For example, appointments to the Labor Ministry - for which complete data is available - clearly indicates the preference of military governments for apolitical tecnicos rather than experienced politicians (see FIGURE 2.1 ).

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<sup>10</sup>"(E)ach civilian ministry includes as an integral part of its organization a Division of Security and Information which serves as a watchdog in matters of national security (whose definition can be as arbitrary as it is broad) and reports directly to the (National Security) council and the National Information Service, the latter directed by an army general..... These agencies are all headed by army majors, colonels, or generals." C.N. Ronning and H.H. Keith, "The Shrinking Political Arena: Military Government in Brazil Since 1964" in Keith and R.A. Hayes, Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil, p.240.

FIGURE 2.1

## BRAZIL

Career Patterns of Labor Ministers<sup>\*</sup>  
Civilian Versus Military Appointments

<u>Labor</u> Ministers	<u>Regime</u>	
	Civilian	Military
With Political Experience	7	0
Without Political Experience	2	3

<sup>\*</sup>Excluding Military Personnel

Source: Kenneth P. Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics (U. of California Press, 1977) Table 10.

In fact, with the exception of two former tenentes, Juracy Magalhaes and Juarez Tavora, and the armed forces ministers, Castello Branco's first cabinet was composed entirely of tecnico's,<sup>11</sup> some of whom had served in previous civilian

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<sup>11</sup>Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, p.132.

governments.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore none of the military presidents of Brazil after 1964 had had any prior political experience. Their career experience was limited to the military.

It is interesting to note that, within the military, political divisions existed between groups of officers which paralleled those between civilian politicians. Apart from their rather highly developed institutional interests, the Brazilian military does not have a single, coherent political voice. In fact, as one author has convincingly shown, the Brazilian military is not a "unitary and self encapsulated" institution, isolated from outside political influences, as it has been often portrayed in both traditional and "neo-realist" literature. Rather, it has been a highly political institution, "permeated and shaped by outside political forces."<sup>13</sup> Since 1946 the Brazilian military has been divided on the major issues of post war Brazilian politics, the issues of national economic development and the political mobilization of the working classes. These issues have been closely linked and vehemently argued from two viewpoints,

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<sup>12</sup>Jose Maria Alkimim (Vice President), who had been Kubitschek's Finance Minister, Roberto Campos, who had served in the Goulart administration as Brazil's ambassador to the United States.

<sup>13</sup>Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics, p.10.

the pro-Vargas (Getulista) and the anti-Vargas (anti-Getulista).<sup>14</sup> Those adhering to the former viewpoint took a more radical, nationalist, and statist stand on the issues, while the anti-Getulistas represented a conservative and traditionally liberal position.

Getulio Vargas' populism and shift to the left were the two major determinants of Brazil's post-war politics. Prior to being forced from office by the military in 1945, Vargas had overseen the creation of the PSD and the PTB parties,<sup>15</sup> which carried on his political legacy, opposed mainly by the UDN (see page 33, above). The close association between civilian politics and intra-military politics was clearly manifested in the elections for the presidency of the Clube Militar.<sup>16</sup> The Getulista's, calling themselves the verde-amarelo faction, came into bitter conflict with the anti-Getulista azul faction at the time of the election

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<sup>14</sup>So-called because prior to his final political demise in 1954, Getulio Vargas set the tone of Brazilian politics, and one was either for Vargas or against him.

<sup>15</sup>The Partido Social Democratica and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro. The PSD was the Vargas machine which extended into the rural municipios (electoral divisions), with the PTB being its urban based counterpart.

<sup>16</sup>The Clube Militar was founded in 1887 by a group of officers in order to give the military a coherent voice in political affairs.

of the Kubitschek - Goulart (PSD-PTB) ticket in 1956.<sup>17</sup> The verde-amarelo faction, in the persons of Generals Henrique Teixeira Lott and Odilio Denys, successfully supported the election of Kubitschek and Goulart. The resulting tension within the military remained subdued throughout Kubitschek's administration, due to his careful avoidance of policies which might have caused unrest in military circles.<sup>18</sup> But Goulart's apparently irresponsible radicalization of politics and neglect of military institutional interests allowed the conservative Democratic Crusade faction to gain control of the Clube Militar, and consequently to exercise control over the military's political voice.<sup>19</sup> It was members of this group which directed the 1964 coup, and which took over the powers of government under Marshal Castello Branco.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The azul faction had become the Democratic Crusade in 1952. The verde-amarelo faction became the Military Constitutionalist Movement (MCM) in 1956 as a result of their constitutional support of the Kubitschek-Goulart elections. See R.A. Hayes, "The Military Club and National Politics in Brazil," in Keith and Hayes, op.cit., pp.139-176.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p.162.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p.164.

<sup>20</sup>For an excellent account of the origins of the ideological orientations of the Democratic Crusade group, and the interrelationship between these orientations, the impact of service in Brazil's Foreign Expeditionary Force during World War II, and Brazil's highest military school, the Escola Superior de Guerra, see Stepan, op.cit., chapter 8.

Thus a final major distinction between the civilian and military governments is one of political ideology, unrelated in any strict sense to a civilian-military dichotomy, for both perspectives were represented by military and civilian coalitions.<sup>21</sup> However, it is true that there does appear to be an age difference between the pre- and post- 1964 governments, corresponding to the traditional older-conservative/younger-radical political truism. The average age of the three military presidents was sixty-four, while Goulart and many of his Cabinet ministers in their early forties or younger.<sup>22</sup>

## 2) Policy Orientations

The Brazilian military time and again had exhibited its concern for its own institutional interests. It has

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<sup>21</sup>As evidenced by the simultaneous purge of civilian politicians and military officers after the 1964 coup. See Fiechter, op.cit., chapter 7.

<sup>22</sup>Goulart was 43; Labor Minister Amino Afonso - 33; Minister Extraordinary For Planning, Celso Furtado - 42; Transportation Minister, Virgilio Tavora - 42; Finance Minister, Miguel Calmon - 41. In contrast to the older Costello Branco cabinet, with the youngest being Planning Minister, Roberto Campos - 47; Industry and Commerce Minister, Daniel Faraco - 53; Labor Minister, Arnaldo Mendonca - 59; Foreign Minister, Vasco Cunha - 59; Vice-President, Jose Alkimim - 63.

been argued that one of the factors leading to Goulart's downfall was the fact that military salaries were allowed to fall behind the ruinous inflation rate facing Brazil.<sup>23</sup> Another author has pointed out the unified military protest at Goulart's minimum wage increases of 1954 and 1962, which served to put the military at a relative financial disadvantage.<sup>24</sup> And a third has chronicled the "growth of military institutional fears" culminating in the 1964 coup.<sup>25</sup> An examination of TABLES 2.1-2.5 does indicate a difference in the policy orientations of the civilian and military governments of Brazil which can be related to the institutional priorities of military governors.

TABLES 2.1 and 2.2 show a steady decrease in military expenditures as a percentage of the national budget from 1956 until 1964, and a simultaneous increase in the proportion spent on national health and education. And it is clear that after the coup of 1964 the military budget rises and the welfare budget drops.

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<sup>23</sup> Hayes, op.cit., p.164.

<sup>24</sup> Skidmore, op.cit., pp.127, 243.

<sup>25</sup> Stepan, op.cit., pp.153-171.



TABLE 2.1

## BRAZIL

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

## Annual Values

Year	<u>MILEX</u>	<u>MILEX</u> (%)	<u>WELEX</u> (%)
	WELEX	Total Budget	Total Budget
1956	3.6	24	6.6
1960	1.9	21	10.8
1964	1.7	18	10.9
1968	2.3	19	8.2
1971	3.4	25	7.3
1974	2.4	14	6.0

Sources: 1956-1970 MILEX data is from Gertrude E. Heare, Trends in Latin American Military Expenditures 1940-1970 (U.S. Dept. of State pub. 8618, 1974) p.12. 1971-1974 MILEX data is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, 1976 (M.I.T. Press, 1977) pp.172-173.

1956-1974 WELEX data is from the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks for 1962, 1968, 1972, 1976.

1956-1974 Budgetary data (Government Expenditures) is from the Statesman's Yearbooks of 1961, 1964-65, 1967-68, 1974-75. The 1974 value used is an estimate from the 1976-77 edition.

TABLE 2.2

## BRAZIL

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

## Regime Comparison

Regime	<u>MILEX</u>	<u>MILEX</u> (%)	<u>WELEX</u> (%)
	WELEX	Total Budget	Total Budget
Civilian (1956-1960)	2.8	25.2	9.4
Civilian (1962-1963)	1.7	19.5	11.7
Military (1964-1966)	1.7	22.0	12.8
Military (1967-1970)	2.4	24.6	10.1
Military (1970-1974)	3.0	20.0	7.0

Sources: See TABLE 2.1

From TABLE 2.2 we see that the government with the extreme "civilist" policy orientation was, appropriately, the civilian government of Joao Goulart. And the extreme "militarist" government was the military government of Medici. But the civilian government of Kubitschek ranks second in militarism while the government of Marshal Costello Branco ranks second in civilism. Consequently, when the results are pooled (TABLE 2.3), there is little apparent difference between the overall policy orientations of civilian and military governments in Brazil.

TABLE 2.3

## BRAZIL

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

## Military vs. Civilian Regimes

Indicators (I)	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
<u>MILEX</u>	2.4	2.3
WELEX		
<u>MILEX</u> (%)	22.2	22.4
Total Budget		
<u>WELEX</u> (%)	10.0	10.6
Total Budget		

Source: See TABLE 2.1

Looking at TABLES 2.4 and 2.5, we see that according to these indicators, there is a more definite general distinction between the policy orientations of civilian and military governments, with the military governments appearing more 'militarist' than the civilian governments.

TABLE 2.4

## BRAZIL

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

## Annual Values

YEAR	<u>ARMFOR</u> (%) LABFOR	<u>MILEX/capita</u> GNP / capita
1956	.39	6.4
1960	.38	5.4
1964	.40	4.2
1968	.39	6.6
1970	.41	4.6
1972	.42	5.3
1974	.42	2.7

Sources: 1956-1962 ARMFOR data is taken from the Statesman's Yearbooks 1956-1962 and consists of approximated values. 1963-1973 ARMFOR data is from World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency pub. 74, 1974) p.23. The 1974 ARMFOR value is from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975 (USACDA pub. 90, 1977) p.22.

1956-1974 LABFOR data represent total population values from International Financial Statistics (I.F.S.) (International Monetary Fund IMF, May 1978).

MILEX data from TABLE 2.1 was used to compute the MILEX/capita values.

GNP data is from the U.N. Yearbook of National Account Statistics, V.2, 1962 and V.1, 1976. The 1974 value is a GDP value from IMF - I.F.S.

TABLE 2.5

## BRAZIL

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators (II)	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
<u>ARMFOR</u> (%)	.40	.38
LABFOR		
<u>MILEX/capita</u>	6.00	5.07
LABFOR/capita		

Sources: See TABLE 2.4

Insofar as the relative "competence" of civilian and military government in Brazil is concerned, it appears that the military governments had more success with controlling inflation, maintaining Brazil's balance of payments, and balancing the budget.

TABLE 2.6

## BRAZIL

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (III)

## Annual Values

YEAR	GNP GROWTH RATE (%/annum)	INFLATION RATE (%/annum)	EXPORTS IMPORTS	GOV'T EXPENDITURE GOV'T REVENUE (%)
1956	18	21	.83	144.5
1959	42.9	37	.68	116.8
1960	35	35	.73	113.6
1963	83.1	72	.70	138.9
1964	92.4	87	1.4	142.7
1967	38.7	30	.99	105.0
1968	33.2	24	.91	122.5
1971	30.9	21	.80	96.6
1972	32.9	17	.84	96.9
1973	----	16	.90	96.3
1974	----	--	.63	-----

Sources: 1956-1973 GNP Growth Rate data was computed from the GNP values of TABLE 2.4.

1956-1973 Inflation Rate data was computed from the Consumer Price Index values given in the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks for 1962, 1968, 1974, and 1976.

Export and Import data is from the Statesman's Yearbooks for 1961, 1964-65, 1967-68, 1970-71, 1974-75, and 1976-77.

Government Expenditure and Revenue data is from the Statesman's Yearbooks for 1961, 1964-65, 1967-68, 1974-75, 1976-77.

TABLE 2.7

## BRAZIL

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (III)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators (III)	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
GNP Growth Rate (% / annum)	46.7	49.7
Inflation Rate (% / annum)	36.5	26.2
Exports/ Imports	.99	.68
Gov't Expenditures/ Revenues (%)	111.6	127.8

Sources: See TABLE 2.6.

While TABLE 2.7 shows that the inflation rate ran at a higher average rate under the military regimes, from TABLE 2.6, we see that the Costello Branco government managed to cut the inflation rate by almost half in only two years - from a high of 87% in 1964, to only 30% in 1967. Nor has the GNP growth rate suffered much under the military

These results have been attributed to the ability of the military governments to ignore public pressure and to impose the harsh measures necessary in order to achieve

Brazil's "economic miracle."<sup>26</sup> Describing Brazil's post-war period of democratic politics, the noted Brazilian economist, Eugenio Gudim, stated that under the popularly elected governments

the worth of a president or a governor of a state, apart from his political ability, is measured by what is called his 'capacity to accomplish', that is, his ability to build or at least start the construction of roads, stadia, power plants, palaces, and so forth, no matter what the price in terms of increased indebtedness, distortion, and disorganization of the country's economy. Seriously unbalanced budgets are a natural consequence, and the mainspring of inflation.<sup>27</sup>

But under the military the populist system was replaced with an authoritarian, technocratic polity, under which the finance minister can now do by decree what used to have to go through Congress.

### 3) Governing Style

In terms of its governing style, the Brazilian military has conformed to type, thus further distinguishing civilian and military governance in that country. It has

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<sup>26</sup> Stefan H. Robcock, Brazil: A Study in Development Progress, chapter 1.

<sup>27</sup> Quoted in ibid., p.125 - emphasis in the original.



been fairly well established that Brazil's political structure is basically corporatist.<sup>28</sup> As a result, whether under a civilian or military government, the predominant governing style has never been truly "consultative." However, as was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the post-1946 period marked a resurgence of electoral and party politics in Brazil, and there was a considerable liberalization of the political process. One of Kubitschek's first actions upon taking office was the ending of the press censorship which had been in force since early in Vargas' tenure.<sup>29</sup> Although there had been a considerable relaxation of government controls by the end of the Estado Novo, until Kubitschek censorship laws could be enforced.<sup>30</sup> And even though Kubitschek did on occasion resort to censorship, as in the government seizure of copies of Carlos Lacerda's Tribuna da Imprensa in 1956, such instances remained isolated.

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<sup>28</sup> See Kenneth P. Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics, chapter 1. Phillipe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford U.P., 1971) pp.95-106; Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Allyn and Bacon, 1972), chapter 5.

<sup>29</sup> Under the direction of the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda.

<sup>30</sup> Skidmore, op.cit., pp.48-49.

The liberalizing process continued to gain momentum under Kubitschek and later under Goulart. In both administrations the major issues were communism and economic instability. On the communist issue Kubitschek remained ambivalent, trying to appease both left and right, in the latter case especially the military. So while the Communist party, banned under the previous Dutra administration, was not legalized, Communist leaders were allowed to resume their political activities in 1958. Carlos Prestes, the long-exiled Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) leader, returned to Rio de Janeiro in that same year in response to the Supreme Court's revocation of his 1950 arrest order. But even while press and party freedoms advanced under the Kubitschek and Goulart regimes, the corporatist structure of Brazil's political system remained virtually unchanged.

When labor politics in Brazil is carefully examined, this fact becomes more apparent. It has been pointed out that

The re-establishment of liberal democratic government with the Constitution of 1946 did not alter the corporative nature of the labor system, for the Constituent Assembly soundly defeated a proposed amendment to free the sindicatos from state tutelage or interference.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Erickson, op.cit., p.30.

Under Vargas the system of government - labor relations had been strictly defined. Under the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) promulgated in 1943, a trifold structure consisting of a set of government sanctioned labor organizations (sindicatos), a social security system, and a labor court system ensured the dominance of the state over Brazilian labor affairs. The move to populist politics, and the attempt by Goulart to establish a power base in the working classes allowed labor leaders a measure of influence hitherto unknown to them.<sup>32</sup> The strike became, for a time a relatively effective means of gaining government acquiescence to some labor demands.<sup>33</sup>

With the coup and the institution of military government, the liberalizing trend in Brazilian politics not only ceased, but reversed. The institutions of government under the military have been altered in order to effectively institute a dictatorship. Civilian participation has been systematically reduced since 1964.<sup>34</sup> The first actions of the Castello Branco government were to cancel the political

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., chapter 3.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., Table - "Political" Strikes in Brazil, 1960-65: A Summary.

<sup>34</sup>C.N. Ronning and H.H. Keith, op.cit., p.230.

rights of those opposing the coup-makers. In the First Institutional Act over 100 names of proscribed opponents were listed. Press censorship was reintroduced. Political parties were banned, with the exception of two government parties, the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) and the PTB based Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB).<sup>35</sup>

The Castello Branco government moved to strengthen their controls over the labor activity by intervening in hundreds of labor organizations and purging their existing leaders (as they had in political parties, the civil service, the armed forces, academia, the media and other sectors). Government organization now conformed to a military pattern, with a direct chain of command, leading from the President through the National Security Council and the Supreme Military Council on to lower administrative levels.

Under Medici more coercive measures have been instituted in the attempt to silence opponents of the government. The use of special police terror squads, detention without trial, and even torture and execution have been resorted to. While not part of the government's open policy

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<sup>35</sup>Established by Complementary Acts Nos. 2 and 4 of 1965.

toward dissidents, nor widely used, the use of these measures has been acknowledged by President Medici. It appears that as the military seeks to increase its hold over Brazilian politics, the trend is toward a rigidly structured and uncompromising governing style, not unlike that instituted under Vargas in the 1930's and 1940's. The likeness is enhanced by the formation of the ARENA party, revealing the desire of the military to go beyond the rule of force and to attempt to establish a legitimizing base of electoral support, much in the manner of Goulart in his use of the PTB.

## CHAPTER III

## GHANA

1) Civilian and Military Government Personnel

Independent Ghana was born in 1957 with the Convention People's Party (CPP) in control of the government, a situation which was to exist until the coup d'etat in 1966 removed the CPP from power. Kwame Nkrumah, the founder of the CPP, guided that party to a position of dominance in Ghanaian politics from 1951 - when he was elected at the head of a CPP ticket as one of the Accra municipality's two representatives on the newly established Gold Coast Legislative Assembly<sup>1</sup> - until his ouster in 1966. Nkrumah had created the CPP as a protest to the growing conservatism of Ghana's first nationalist political party, Dr. J.B. Danquah's UGCC. As UGCC General Secretary, Nkrumah had built up a following among the more radical nationalists of the UGCC. And as the founder of the African Students Association, the Vice-President of the West African Students

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<sup>1</sup>The two CPP candidates, Nkrumah and Thomas Hutton-Mills, won with 90% of the total vote. The third running United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) candidate, E.O.O. Lamptey, polled only 3.6% of the votes. See David Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, p.103.

Association, and a member of the Committee on Youth Organization, Nkrumah had many ties with Ghana's younger intelligentsia. It was around these two sources of support that the CPP organization was built. And it was from within this small group that Ghana's first national government came.

By independence in 1957, Nkrumah and the CPP had governed Ghana for three years. The cabinet appointed by Nkrumah after his victory in the 1956 elections was essentially the same as Ghana's first all-African cabinet appointed in 1954, and was composed of a group of men which had been active in the CPP since its creation in 1949. Many had also been long-time friends of Nkrumah's, and activists in the growing African nationalist movement of the late 1940's. The educational and career backgrounds of this core group were both similar and distinctive.<sup>2</sup> All had received at least a high school level education, while some had degrees from either American or British universities. All were very nearly the same age, with most being in their early forties, the average age of the group being 43. Clearly

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<sup>2</sup>The members of this group were Ako Adjei, Kojo Botsio, Komla Gbedemah, Archie Casely-Hayford, Aaron Ofori-atta, Nathaniel Welbeck, J.H. Allassani, Kofi Baako, Krobo Edusei, and Imoru Egala.

Nkrumah was the center of the group, and it was around him that the rest gathered. The charged atmosphere in which these future leaders of Ghana served their political apprenticeships created a uniformity of outlook and purpose which overcame the tribal and class background differences which existed between them. Their revolutionary ardor gave to the CPP an ideological unity which its opponents lacked.

Regional and tribal issues formed an important part of Ghanaian politics, and it was because of this that a viable opposition to the CPP existed in Ghana for a number of years after independence.<sup>3</sup> But the diverse regional and tribal backgrounds of the central figures in Nkrumah's government did not appear to affect either their unity or their political orientations.<sup>4</sup> The radical nature of Nkrumah's approach to Ghanaian independence and the British opposition

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<sup>3</sup>Anton Bebler, Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali, p.29.

<sup>4</sup>Nkrumah was an Ahanta (Fante) from Axim as was Casely Hayford; Adjei was a Ga from Lapalda; Botsio was a Fante from Winneba; Edusei was an Ashanti from Kumasi; Baako was a Ga from Saltpond; Gbedemah was a Ewe from Nigeria (Warri). And while Nkrumah's father was a goldsmith; Botsio's was a civil servant; Ofori-Atta's was the powerful Nana Ofari Atta II, the paramount chief of Akim Abuakwa, an outspoken opponent of the CPP; Adjei's father was a cocoa farmer; Gbedemah's was a government medical dispenser in Nigeria.



to his ominous proposals for "positive action" provided events which brought the backgrounds of the CPP-government core group into even closer alignment. Of the eleven central figures in the 1956-1961 CPP government, six (Nkrumah, Adjei, Baako, Botsio, Edusie, and Gbedemah) were "prison graduates" all having served terms in James Fort Prison in Accra for their "subversive" activities prior to independence. This, together with their overriding anti-colonialist sentiments rendered differences of social origin unimportant.

Although the composition of Nkrumah's government changed somewhat after 1961, when the CPP leader was beginning to consolidate his own personal power, it still retained most of its original members when it was overthrown by two officers from Kumasi, Colonel E.K. Kotoka and Major A.A. Afrifa on February 24, 1966.<sup>5</sup> The National Liberation Council (NLC) which was the instrument of government created by the coup-makers, consisted of a group of eight senior army and police officers, with General Joseph A. Ankrah as its chairman.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Botsio and Gbedemah resigned in 1961 (Botsio returning as Foreign Minister in 1963); Edusie was ousted in 1962.

<sup>6</sup>The seven other members were coup leaders Kotoka and Afrifa, Major A.K. Ocran, and police officers J.W.K. Harlley (Inspector General of Police), A.K. Deku, J.E. Nunoo, and B.A. Yakubu.

The most obvious difference between the NLC government and Nkrumah's government was the fact that all were either army or police personnel, while all of Nkrumah's government had been civilians. Nor had the military ever played an important part in Ghanaian politics prior to 1966.

The Ghanaian Army had its beginnings in Britain's. Royal West Africa Frontier Force (RWAFF), which had been headquartered in the Gold Coast. After World War II, the British colonial forces in West Africa "had been reduced to semi-static forces, whose sole duty was to aid the civil power."<sup>7</sup> At the time of independence the structure and membership of the officer corps was primarily British, with 184 expatriates and only 27 Ghanaian officers.<sup>8</sup> In spite of the Africanization of the officer corps, which by 1962 was virtually complete,<sup>9</sup> the Ghanaian military was still intimately related with Britain's professional military establishment. Coup leaders, Ocran and Afrifa, and most of Ghana's younger officers had had some training in England. When the Ghanaian Military Academy was established in 1960

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<sup>7</sup> Maj. Gen. H.T. Alexander, African Tightrope, p.10.

<sup>8</sup> Bebler, op.cit., p.31.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

it was arranged that after six months instruction, the most promising cadets would be sent to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England. In addition, Ghanaian officers were periodically sent to other British military schools to update their military training.<sup>10</sup> And the Ghanaian army had a British Chief of Staff in the person of Major General H.T. Alexander, until he and 200 other expatriate officers and NCO's were dismissed when Nkrumah declared himself Commander-in-Chief in 1961.

As a result of the close connection between the British and Ghanaian military traditions, Ghanaian officers had developed a professional sense of isolation from civilian politics and political institutions, and an awareness of their own institutional interests.<sup>11</sup> And unlike the civilian politicians of Nkrumah's regime, the military had played no active role in the independence movement. So their relationship to the nation was far more detached than that of the CPP government. In fact, it became increasingly apparent that the senior officers in the Ghanaian Army identified

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<sup>10</sup>Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States," p.407.

<sup>11</sup>For a description of Nkrumah's transgressions against the interest of his officers' institutional interests, see Bebler, op.cit., pp.31-36.

more closely with the interests of Britain and the Commonwealth, of which Ghana was a part, than with Ghanaian nationalism.<sup>12</sup> Thus as Nkrumah moved rapidly out of the western camp, the military moved into the anti-CPP camp. Thus, while the coup was carried out by the Army and the police, it had considerable civilian support. Nor did the military stay in complete charge beyond the first few days after the coup.<sup>13</sup> And by 1968 the government was beginning to "have the 'old intelligentsia' look about them" incorporating many of Ghana's pre-CPP political elite and long-time CPP opponents.<sup>14</sup>

When the government was handed over to the civilian leadership of Kofi Busia, some of the civilian members of the previous two military governments returned to office.<sup>15</sup> Under Busia the "once wealthy group of businessmen and lawyers who had tried year after year, through a variety of party forms, ...to oppose the CPP" came to power.<sup>16</sup> However, the

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<sup>12</sup>Price, op.cit., p.410.

<sup>13</sup>Thus, by early 1968, apart from the five NLC members, the nineteen member Executive Council (the Afrifa 'cabinet') was composed of civilian administrators.

<sup>14</sup>D. Austin, Ghana Observed, p.108.

<sup>15</sup>Victor Owusu, Richard Quarshie, and Joseph Mensah.

<sup>16</sup>D. Austin, Ghana Observed, p.109.

return to civilian politics of pre-CPP Ghana was short-lived. With the 1972 coup led by Col. I.K. Acheampong, a virtually all-military regime took power.<sup>17</sup> This regime was made up of young men, whose average age was only 39 - of the fifteen members of the governing NRC, eight were under 40 - and who had received their preliminary training in the military academies of England and the United States. The Acheampong regime is made up of young career officers trained according to the tenets of modern military professionalism.

In Ghana, while the 1966 coup d'etat did bring about a major change in government personnel, the Ankrah/Afrifa/Busia governments consisted primarily of long-time civilian opponents of Nkrumah and the CPP. The 1966 coup appears to have been an attempt to return Ghana to competitive politics, and to end the political hegemony of the Nkrumah/CPP government. It was not until the Acheampong coup of 1972 that the military set out to dominate Ghanaian policy-making and administration, even excluding the police, who had played

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<sup>17</sup> There were two civilians appointed to government positions, although not as members of the all-military National Redemption Council (NRC). These were J. Appiah, appointed as Ghana's Roving Ambassador to Europe, and E.N. Moore - a lawyer - appointed as Justice Minister and Attorney General.

such an important role in the 1966 coup. Thus, while the Acheampong regime appears to conform to the traditional picture of 'military' government, at least in terms of its personnel, the Ankrah/Afrifa regimes clearly did not.

## 2) Policy Orientation

From the evidence given in the following tables, no clear pattern of militarism is associated with either type of government. While Ghana's military governments did spend more for their own institutional benefit, they also spent more on public health and education than did the civilian governments. (TABLE 3.3)

TABLE 3.1

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

Annual Values			
YEARS	1 <u>MILEX</u> WELEX	2 <u>MILEX</u> (%) Total Budget	3 <u>WELEX</u> (%) Total Budget
1956	.20	3.9	19.9
1958	.29	5.6	19.5
1961	.43	8.0	18.5
1962	.35	10.7	25.8
1965	.36	8.2	23.2
1966	.41	11.4	27.4
1968	.61	15.3	25.3
1971	.38	10.5	27.3
1972	.34	8.9	26.2
1974	.44	12.7	28.9
1975	.23	6.5	28.5

Sources: 1956-1974 MILEX data is from the SIPRI Yearbook for 1977. The 1975 figure is from Africa South of the Sahara 1976-77 (Europa publications).

1956-1975 education and health expenditure data is from the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks for 1962 (1956-1961), 1968 (1962-1966), 1973 (1967-1973), 1976 (1975-1976).

1956-1975 budget data is from the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks for 1962 (1956-1961), 1968 (1962-1966), 1973 (1967-1973), 1976 (1975-1976).

TABLE 3.2

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

## Regime Comparison

REGIME	<u>MILEX</u>	<u>MILEX</u> (%)	<u>WELEX</u> (%)
	WELEX	Total Budget	Total Budget
Civilian (1956-1965)	.34	7.2	20.9
Military (1966-1969)	.53	14.2	26.9
Civilian (1970-1971)	.40	10.9	27.0
Military (1972-1975)	.35	9.7	27.7

Sources: See TABLE 3.1



TABLE 3.3

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
<u>MILEX</u>	.44	.37
WELEX		
<u>MILEX</u> (%)	12	9.1
Total Budget		
<u>WELEX</u> (%)	27.3	24
Total Budget		

Sources: See TABLE 3.1

And while the size of the armed forces increased to a greater extent under the military governments, the military did not increase the relative burden placed on the civilian population beyond that of the civilian governments to any real extent. (TABLE 3.6)

TABLE 3.4

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

## Annual Values

YEAR	<u>ARMFOR</u> (%) WORFOR	<u>MILEX/ARMFOR</u> (%) GNP / Capita
1957	4.2	5.8
1960	5.1	7.0
1962	4.8	9.1
1963	4.8	7.4
1965	6.3	5.0
1966	8.3	3.8
1969	8.7	5.9
1970	8.8	5.0
1971	8.7	4.6
1972	10.1	3.4
1973	----	3.4
1974	----	4.6

Sources: 1956-1962 ARMFOR data was estimated from the Statesman's Yearbooks for that period. 1963-1973 ARMFOR data is from USACDA publication 74, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1973. 1974-1975 data is from USACDA pub. 90, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975.

1956-1975 WORFOR data was computed from Work Force indices given in the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, for 1966 and 1968, and from work force data given in the Europa Yearbooks for 1961, 1966, and 1975-76, and Africa South of the Sahara (Europa pub.), 1976-77.

Sources: 1956-1975 MILEX data is from the  
(cont.) SIPRI Yearbook, 1977.

1956-1975 GNP data is from the U.N.  
Yearbook of National Account Statistics,  
1969 and 1976 (Vol. II).

TABLE 3.5

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

## Regime Comparison

REGIME	<u>ARMFOR</u> (%) WORFOR	<u>MILEX/ARMFOR</u> GNP / capita
Civilian (1956-1965)	5.2	6.2
Military (1966-1969)	8.6	6.9
Civilian (1970-1971)	8.8	4.8
Military (1972-1975)	10.1	3.8

Sources: See TABLE 3.4

TABLE 3.6

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
<u>ARMFOR</u> (%)	9.4	7.0
WORFOR		
<u>MILEX/ARMFOR</u>	5.6	5.5
GNP / capita		

Sources: See TABLE 3.4

From TABLES 3.7 and 3.8, it appears that the Ghanaian military, with all of its complaints about civilian economic mismanagement,<sup>18</sup> fared worse in terms of "competently" handling Ghana's economic problems than did the civilians.

<sup>18</sup>Col. A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, pp.88-92; Bebler, op.cit., p.57.

TABLE 3.7

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (III)

## Annual Values

YEAR	GNP GROWTH RATE (%/annum)	INFLATION RATE (%/annum)	EXPORTS IMPORTS	GOV'T EXPENDITURE REVENUE (%)
1956	4.1	.9	.98	111.8
1959	13.9	2.	1.	116.9
1960	7.0	.9	.89	125.4
1963	9.8	4.2	1.	157.8
1965	18.1	28.6	.71	130.1
1966	12.	4.9	.76	116.5
1969	17.6	9.1	.94	131.3
1970	13.	2.4	1.1	123.9
1972	12.6	9.5	1.4	123.7
1973	24.7	11.3	1.4	139.3
1974	33.1	27.3	.89	127.6
1975	----	41.1	1.	144.3

Sources: 1956-1968 GNP data is from the U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics for 1969; 1969-1974 GNP data is in fact GDP data from the same source, 1976 edition. Since the discrepancies between the two values are slight, (averaging only .82% for the 1956-1975 period), they were used interchangeably.

1956-1975 inflation rate data was computed from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) values given in the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks for 1962 (1956-1961), 1968 (1962-1964), and 1976 (1965-1975).

1956-1975 import and export data is from the Stateman's Yearbooks for 1959 (1956-1959),

Sources: 1964-1965 (1960-1963), 1970-1971  
(cont.) (1964-1970), 1974-1975 (1971-1974).  
The 1975 values are from Africa  
South of the Sahara 1976-1977.

1956-1975 expenditure and revenue  
data are from the U.N. Statistical  
Yearbooks of 1962 (1956-1961), 1968  
(1962-1964), and 1976 (1965-1975).

TABLE 3.8

## GHANA

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (III)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
GNP Growth Rate (%/annum)	17.6	10.5
Inflation Rate (%/annum)	15.1	4.8
<u>Exports</u>	1.1	.96
Imports		
<u>Expenditures</u> Revenue (%)	129.	120.7

Sources: See TABLE 3.7

While the GNP growth rate was considerably higher under the military regimes, so was the inflation rate, particularly during the Acheampong government. The military regimes consistently registered higher budget deficits as well, while both civilian and military governments managed to maintain their trade balance, although in this latter instance the military governments fared somewhat better.

### 3) Governing Style

Under Nkrumah and the CPP open political opposition was virtually eliminated. Of the five post-independence governments of Ghana, Nkrumah's was by far the most coercive. By 1959 Nkrumah had almost total control of Ghanaian political affairs. In a speech delivered on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CPP, Nkrumah was able to declare with considerable accuracy that "the CPP is Ghana and Ghana is the CPP."<sup>19</sup> In eliminating his political opponents and consolidating his power, Nkrumah had resorted to what he called "emergency measures of a totalitarian kind." He and the CPP

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<sup>19</sup>Quoted in Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order, p.60.

applied a full repertoire of suppression short of overt physical destruction: cooptation, intimidation, prohibition of organizations on regional, tribal, religious, and other grounds, deportation, modification of the constitution and of the electoral law, and so forth.<sup>20</sup>

Beginning with the Deportation Act of August, 1957, the Nkrumah government introduced a series of repressive laws designed to eliminate any opposition voice. In December of the same year the Political Parties Restriction Bill was passed, making any party but the CPP in Ghana illegal.<sup>21</sup> Under the auspices of this measure, and the more ominous Preventative Detention Act of 1958 - which empowered the government to arrest a person and hold him without the right of court appeal for up to five years - all major opponents of the government were either imprisoned or exiled.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Bebler, op.cit., p.29; see also Zolberg, ibid., p.66.

<sup>21</sup>This bill became the Avoidance of Discrimination Act.

<sup>22</sup>Dr. Danquah, the UGCC leader, died in prison; Kofi Busia, the United Party (UP) leader, was exiled in 1959; thirty-eight leaders of the Ga opposition were arrested in 1958. After the "Major Awhaity Affair," wider use was made of these laws. As the result of a CPP purge, Gbedemah joined Busia in exile in 1961; Adjei was arrested in 1962. See also David Austin's story of the stool elder who was imprisoned for five years because he had been "annoying Kwame Nkrumah with (his) UP propaganda," in Austin, Ghana Observed, p.121.



CPP authority was extended to cover the judiciary. In the new constitution of 1960 the president - Nkrumah - gained the power to dismiss judges of the Supreme Court "at any time for reasons which appear to him sufficient." Nkrumah used this power in 1967 in response to an unfavorable court decision.<sup>23</sup> In 1965 Nkrumah abolished the Civil Service Commission, the keeper of Britain's colonial legacy of an independent and apolitical bureaucracy. The Establishment Secretariat, a party-run body, was established in order that the CPP might directly influence civil service appointments, promotions and recruitment. Other heavy handed institutional changes were made at the state and regional level in order to give the government control over dissidents with support at these levels, like those controlling the Akim Abuakwa, Asanteman, and Komasi state councils.<sup>24</sup>

The CPP had monopolized Ghanaian press, radio and television, to the extent that even CPP minister Krobo Edusei called the "press of Ghana" those "who say 'Osagyefo' \*

\* 'Osagyefo' - the Savior, Redeemer, Messiah - was a popular name for Nkrumah at the height of his power and influence.

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<sup>23</sup> Austin, ibid., p.87.

<sup>24</sup> Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp.377-380.

says'."<sup>25</sup> In 1961 the Criminal Code was amended to include a statute which provided "a practically general restraint on political discussion and debate in the country."<sup>26</sup> The statute outlawed the publication "by any manner whatsoever" matter which could be considered "defamatory or insulting" to the President.<sup>27</sup> And in 1964, reacting to the comment by an English communist on the similarity of the contents of British and Ghanaian libraries and bookstores, a government committee was created "in order to remove all 'anti-CPP' publications."<sup>28</sup>

The CPP had coopted the nascent trade union movement early in its development. In 1953 CPP member John Kofi Tettegah was elected as the full-time secretary of the Ghana Trade Union Congress (TUC). After 1950 and the TUC general strike in support of the CPP's positive action program, the CPP had progressively drawn into its own structure the entire

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p.411.

<sup>26</sup>W.B. Harvey, Law and Social Change in Ghana, p.317; and chapter 7, "The Legal Tools of Monopoly."

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1961, Act 82.

<sup>28</sup>Zolberg, op.cit., p.98.

trade union movement.<sup>29</sup> The 1958 Industrial Relations Act established a centralized structure of a limited number of national unions under CPP control. As well, the right to strike had been abolished under that Act. Thus, the only significant union action under Nkrumah, the strike of railway and harbor workers in Sekondi-Takoradi in 1965, was put down by police and military force at the government's behest.<sup>30</sup>

The general pattern of quasi-totalitarian coercion was ended with the military coup in 1966. Although the first actions of the new NLC government were to abolish the CPP, close parliament, suspend the constitution, prohibit political activities and organizations of any kind, and to rule by decree, by 1968 the Detention Act had been repealed, and those imprisoned under its provisions released. In April of 1969 Gen. Ankrah announced the end of the party ban, and immediately parties were formed around the two exiled anti-CPP figures of Gbedemah and Busia. Gen. Ankrah had announced a return to press freedom in Ghana in March of 1966, and a number of

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<sup>29</sup>P.C. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change (Penguin, 1972), p.205.

<sup>30</sup>The strike came at the height of Ghana's economic problems, in 1962. Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp.400-401.

proscribed journalists were allowed to return.

While the NLC pursued former CPP office-holders, imprisoned some, and tried others for "corruption" of various forms,<sup>31</sup> most were released after a few weeks of detention; the post-coup actions of the new regime with regard to most former CPP members were temperate. The initial stages of rule by decree, while not consultative, were not coercive either. The coup and the NLC had been met with considerable popularity, and was able to legitimize its rule by relying on the good offices of the "'old establishment': the old elites of chiefs, professional men, wealthy traders, senior civil servants who tended to be older, better educated, wealthier, pro-British and who held higher traditional offices."<sup>32</sup> Military rule was also legitimized, in part, due to the profound anti-CPP/Nkrumah sentiment which prevailed at the time. Nor did the NLC prove immune to public pressure. For example, in its drive to stabilize Ghana's economy, and to bring in much needed foreign capital, the NLC proposed to reprivatize some of the state sector by selling unprofitable enterprises to foreign investors. The country's widespread

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<sup>31</sup>See V.T. LeVine, Political Corruption: the Ghana Case (Hoover Inst. Press, 1975), introduction.

<sup>32</sup>Bebler, op.cit., p.41.

and vocal opposition caused it to modify this policy.

In 1967 the NLC restored the Civil Service Commission to its pre-CPP autonomy, perhaps reflecting its own professional bias toward institutional independence. And the NLC did not tamper with the structure of the civil service or its personnel. Having dismissed the CPP ministers the NLC allowed the permanent secretaries to take over as ministry and agency heads.

The return of civilian government was a smooth process, and with the dissolution of the three-man presidential commission<sup>\*</sup> in August of 1970, military involvement in politics was ended. With the exception of a renewed emphasis on eliminating all remaining CPP elements from Ghanaian politics, the election of the Busia government marked a return to free and open party politics in a revitalized parliamentary system. In the short 27 month life of the Busia government Westminster reasserted itself, in procedure and in political style, although an element of revenge tinged some of its actions. In November of 1969, the elected leader of the NAL<sup>\*\*</sup> opposition

<sup>\*</sup> whose members were Gen. Afrifa, Inspector Harlley, and Maj. Gen. Okran.

<sup>\*\*</sup> National Association of Liberals, founded by Gbedemah in 1969.

party, K.A. Gbedemah, was barred from parliament under the provisions of Article 71 of the 1969 constitution.<sup>33</sup> And the Busia government did provide a return to some pre-coup heavy-handedness in its dealings with the civil service and public corporations - dismissing 568 officers in 1970 - and with the courts through the actions of the attorney general in a case related to the dismissals.<sup>34</sup>

The Busia government also played roughly with the trade unions. The austere economic program of 1971 caused widespread hardship, especially among the working classes, and resulted in strikes and labor violence. The government rushed through legislation disbanding the TUC, labeling it

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<sup>33</sup>Article 71 disqualified from holding political office those persons against whom a commission of inquiry (see LeVine, op.cit.) has made adverse findings. "Gbedemah was known to be affected by such a provision (prior to its adoption), and was unseated after the election through an action in the High Court." Austin, Ghana Observed, p.154-see also pp.116-118. This action duplicated one made by the NLC with its Disqualification Decree in January, 1968. Bebler, op.cit., p.52.

<sup>34</sup>Busia tried to justify this action with the statement that "My government will exercise its right to employ only those whom it wishes to employ" and that "if the judges want to play politics, I am quite ready to take them on." Austin, ibid., p.153.

an "illegal institution," arguing that, as a CPP holdover, it had continued to exist "by oversight."<sup>35</sup> This action was taken under the government's 'emergency powers,' as was the Bill passed prohibiting the advocacy of 'Nkrumaism.' The government also proceeded to summarily expel all non-Ghanaians, and to propose legislation to protect the Prime Minister from 'insult'

Colonel Acheampong's coup of January 13, 1972 marked the end of an increasingly unpopular regime with the institution of a relatively popular one. Exhibiting a greater responsiveness "to the needs, feelings, and opinions of wide segments of the Ghanaian population than was the case under the parliamentary Second Republic,"<sup>36</sup> the National Redemption Council (NRC) initially passed a number of highly popular measures. It unilaterally repudiated almost one quarter of its total foreign debt, it revalued the Ghanaian currency (cedi) - which the previous government had devalued by 44 per cent - it ordered a subsidy for certain staple commodities, and it repealed the ban on trade unions.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p.160; Facts-on-File, 1971, p.778, Fl.

<sup>36</sup> Bebler, op.cit., p.61.

However, the NRC has acted in a characteristically direct military manner in many of its actions. Its first actions were to dismiss all previous regime personnel, replacing them with military men. Parliament was dissolved, the constitution was nullified, political parties were banned, and rule by decree was instituted. Over one hundred former regime personnel were arrested, as well as a large number of others.<sup>37</sup> The new government also dealt with a group of coup plotters by sentencing eight of the nine tried to death (four civilians and five soldiers), one civilian getting 25 years.<sup>38</sup> The NRC abolished the Supreme Court in 1972,<sup>39</sup> and decreed a selective tax on minorities in 1974.<sup>40</sup>

In terms of governing style, the 1966 coup marked the reinstitution of consultative and competitive politics in Ghana. The regimes with the most coercive governing styles were the civilian regime of Nkrumah and the CPP, and the military regime under Acheampong. However, in terms of

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<sup>37</sup>Most of whom were released by July. Facts-on-File, 1972, p.580.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p.1007. The death sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (KCA), 1973, p.25682.

<sup>39</sup>KCA, ibid.

<sup>40</sup>KCA, 1975, p.26314.



legitimacy, both military governments enjoyed much more popular and elite support than did either of the civilian regimes. It would appear that both civilian regimes alienated many of their original supporters in their efforts to enhance their governing authority and legitimacy. The military, on the other hand, stepped in when civilian government was beginning to prove untenable. By claiming only to be filling a governmental 'vacuum', the military had a built-in source of support in the 'popular will' and 'national interest.' In neither instance did the military attempt to institutionalize its legitimacy, but remained content simply to control the political system, either until a viable governing alternative appeared - such as the Busia government - or indefinitely, as has the Acheampong government.

## CHAPTER IV

## TURKEY

1) Civilian and Military Government Personnel

The 1950 elections in Turkey marked the beginning of a distinctive era in Turkish politics. As a result of these elections the dominance of the Republican People's Party (RPP), the party of the father of the Turkish republic - Kemal Ataturk - was ended. The new governing party, the Democrat Party (DP), had managed to unseat the well-entrenched ruling party through the process of democratic election, a rare feat in the developing nations.<sup>1</sup> One authority has amply demonstrated the elitist nature of Turkish politics, even in its most democratic periods.<sup>2</sup> By and large the major events in modern Turkish political history - the Young Turk's revolt of 1908, the Kemalist revolution of the 1920's, the general election of the 1950's - mark the ascension of a new segment of that elite to power. The traditional Turkish religious elite had lost its authority to the primarily

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<sup>1</sup>Eleanor Bisbee, "Test of Democracy in Turkey," Middle East Journal 4:2 Autumn, 1950.

<sup>2</sup>Frederich W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite.

intellectual and official arm of the elite at the time of the Kemalist revolution. This newly ascendent elite ruled through the RPP until the 1950 election, during which time

an important and alternative elite component gathered strength. Instead of being pre-dominantly intellectual and official in background, ... (i)t was primarily intellectual and local in character, being led to a large extent by lawyers and men of trade and commerce.<sup>3</sup>

And it was the elite component which was removed from power by the military in the coup of May 27, 1960.

The new DP government of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes which took over the government in 1950 was composed primarily of university trained lawyers, who, together with those trained in other professions (medicine, engineering) and those with commercial backgrounds, made up over half of the Bayar-Menderes cabinet of 1950. And by 1954 this characteristic was even more pronounced.\* Another feature of the new government, which indicate that power had changed hands from one elite group to another, was its collective lack of

\* In the 1950 cabinet 52% had had professional or commercial backgrounds. By 1954 this figure was increased to 73%.

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.388.

political experience. Of the fourteen member Bayar-Mendares cabinet of 1950, only five had ever held a seat in parliament, and so could have been considered 'political' appointments.<sup>4</sup> The remainder had technical and bureaucratic backgrounds. This technocratic orientation was a new factor in Turkish politics, and certainly in Turkish government. Again, in 1954, including the holdovers from the previous cabinet, only half of the cabinet members were men with prior political experience.

In addition to their technical and bureaucratic backgrounds, the DP cabinets were also the first cabinets not to have a substantial portion of their membership made up of military men. While military men had composed nearly a quarter of the membership of the eight cabinets prior to 1950,<sup>5</sup> the first Bayar-Mendares cabinet had only two military men in it,<sup>6</sup> and the second had none. The new DP government

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<sup>4</sup>These five were Foreign Affairs Minister Fuat Koprulu, Labor Minister Hasan Polatkan, Communications Minister Tevfik Ileri, Customs and Monopolies Minister Nuri Ozsan, and National Economy Minister Zuhtu Velibese.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p.283, Table 10.5.

<sup>6</sup>Retired Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek took over the Communications Ministry on August 11; General Fahri Belen had been appointed Public Works Minister, but was replaced in December. See F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975, p.79ff.

personnel were products of the Kemalist revolution, but their experiences and interests were one step removed from the revolution. Tempered by the inter-war period of regression from the democratic ideals of Kemalism, the members of the DP regimes of 1950-1960

neither shared nor perhaps even understood Kemalist sensitivity over backsliding in reform. Rather, their approach was predicted on the proposition that the individual, not the state, was the proper driving force for Turkish development.<sup>7</sup>

These 'new men in Turkish politics' owed less to the idea of the revolution than to its impact on society. The liberal extension of political rights to all adult citizens and the rapid increase in the literacy of the newly potent electorate<sup>8</sup> meant more to the leaders of the DP government than Kemalism and its principles. Their political careers had begun primarily in the period of one-party RPP dominance, and in the period of populist politics culminating in the elections of 1950.

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<sup>7</sup>George S. Harris, "The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey," p.440.

<sup>8</sup>The Constitution of 1924 created a parliamentary form of government, and extended the vote to all males over 18. In 1934 the franchise extended to women. The secret ballot was introduced in 1946.

The feeling of responsibility to the electorate, and the commitment to local interests was far more pronounced in the DP governments than it had been at any time since the early 1920's.<sup>9</sup> With their dependence on electoral politics and their independence from the tenets of Kemalism, the personnel of the DP regimes of 1950-1960 had a very different conception of their political responsibilities than that of any previous regime since foundation of the republic. Their ties with the traditional sources of political power in Turkey, and particularly with the military were weak. Their attention was focused on the interests of the common man and on pleasing the "new commercial and industrial and middle class which had grown up in Turkey during the previous decades."<sup>10</sup> The Democrats had a significantly different attitude, for example, toward etatisme than their predecessors, as a result of their own secular education and professional training, and their relationship with the Turkish electorate.

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<sup>9</sup>Frey, op.cit., pp.275-278.

<sup>10</sup>Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p.113; G. Harris, op.cit., p.441.

With the 1960 coup d'etat, the Turkish military returned the political arena to the statist-bureaucratic elite - of which they were a member - which had lost considerable influence after 1950. As the oldest social institution in Turkey, the military was the only organization which still had intimate ties with the pre-republican era of traditionalist politics.<sup>11</sup> With the revolution of the 1920's, the military not only ensured its continued existence as a critical element in Turkish politics, but it also reformed the political system to the extent that it created the circumstances of its political eclipse in post-war politics. The political reforms of the Kemalist era led naturally enough to the growing isolation of the military from the political process. Without a role in electoral and party politics, the military had relied on its intimate relationship to the Republican People's Party - Ataturk's party, and so in a sense the military's party - to maintain their political and elite status, and to look after their institutional interests.

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<sup>11</sup>Kemal Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-1964," p.1656.

The military had had a distinctive position in Turkish society since the early years of the Ottoman Empire.\* The bifurcation of Ottoman society into military/bureaucratic and 'other' branches continued even after the fall of the Empire and the creation of the republic.<sup>12</sup> However, the professional and functional distinctiveness of the Turkish military had its origins much later, in the nineteenth century organization of a modern army, created to "strengthen the power of the new centralized government, to defend Ottoman territory, and eventually to destroy the power of the local gentry."<sup>13</sup> At this time, Western techniques and ideas relating to the formation of a modern professional army were borrowed. Military professionalism along European lines was enhanced in the Turkish army by the creation of a system of military schools utilizing western (especially French and German) military instructors. In 1795, the first wholly military school was opened,<sup>14</sup> to be followed in the

\* The Ottoman Empire spanned the centuries from 1299-1918.

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.1657.

<sup>14</sup> An artillery school featuring instruction by French officers. See Frey, op.cit., pp.32-33.



early nineteenth century by the opening of schools of military engineering, military medicine, and in 1849, a War College. The War College, or Harbiye, was to become one of the primary educational influences of the Turkish elite, the other being the civil service school - the Mulkiye - founded in 1859. The establishment of a separate system of military education was to further distinguish the military from the civilian bureaucratic elite.

Because of their close ties with Europe, Turkish military schools played a major part in the dissemination Western liberal-democratic ideals. They helped to create not only a professional military elite, but a military elite particularly receptive to western ideas.<sup>15</sup> As a result, military officers led in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment of the first Turkish republic. In 1889 a group of young cadets from the Military Medical School\* organized a secret society committed to the overthrow of the Empire. Its members were strongly attracted to the positivist

\* The Mektebi Tibbiyeyi Askeriye

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<sup>15</sup> Lewis, op.cit., p.59.

philosophy of August Comte, and it was this society, called the Progress and Union society, which led the 'Young Turks' revolt of 1908, which in turn paved the way for the Ataturk revolution of 1923.<sup>16</sup>

While the leaders of the Kemalist revolution were professional military men, graduates of the War and General Staff colleges, the constitution of 1923 clearly established a civilian government, in which it was illegal for active military officers to play a political role - either to hold office or to even be members of a political party. By 1946 the "civilianization" of the Turkish politics had gone so far as to disenfranchise military officers, soldiers, military students, and members of the police force.<sup>17</sup> This isolation of the military from the political arena was in complete accord with the tenets according to which the officers who led the coup in 1960 were educated and trained. Nevertheless, because of its special relationship to the Turkish republic, as its founder and guardian, the military never could become

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<sup>16</sup>The society's motto was "Order and Progress." The society was later renamed the Committee for Union and Progress. See Ernest E. Ramseru Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, U.P., 1957). See also Chapter ii (Brazil), p. 31.

<sup>17</sup>Election Law of 1946, Article 8.

completely detached from politics. And because of the long period of almost complete domination by Kemal Ataturk's RPP, first under his leadership, and later under that of retired Army officer Ismet Inonu, the Army did indeed have an informal place in Turkish politics.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the predominant characteristic of the Turkish military officer - beyond his technical expertise, his high degree of corporate identification, and his awareness of the military's institutional interests, all results of his education and career experience - was his special relationship to the state and nation.<sup>19</sup>

The class structure of the military group which took over the government in 1960 was as diverse as its age and experience characteristics. As a result of its liberal recruiting policy, the army had always drawn its recruits from a wider social circle than either the religious or civil bureaucratic elites. Thus, "the poor and the provincial, the

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<sup>18</sup>"Informal" in the sense that there still was a high proportion of ex-military personnel in both the Grand National Assembly and in the cabinet prior to 1950. See Frey, op.cit., p.181, Table 7.5, and p.283, Table 10.5.

<sup>19</sup>The nationalism of the Turkish officer has also been traced to the institution of general conscription in 1855, which resulted in an all-Muslim, and more importantly, an all-Turkish army. See Karpas, op.cit.

low-born and the uneducated, all had their chance in the armed forces."<sup>20</sup> So the group which took over the government of Turkey as the National Union Committee (NUC) was a combination of young officers, old military hands with wartime service experience, most with lower-class backgrounds, and some foreign-born. However, in keeping with the object of a professional military education, "social background seemed to have had less impact than education, on (these) officers' attitudes."<sup>21</sup> Thirty-two of the thirty-eight original members of the NUC<sup>22</sup> were graduates of both the War College and the General Staff College.<sup>23</sup>

Immediately after the coup the NUC took over the legislative powers of the Grand National Assembly, thereby giving that group of officers control of the government. However, Gen. Cemal Gursel, appointed Prime Minister by the

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<sup>20</sup>Lewis, op.cit., p.463.

<sup>21</sup>Kapat, op.cit., pp.1666-1668.

<sup>22</sup>On November 30 fourteen young, radical officers, primarily with the rank of colonel, were dismissed from the NUC. The leader of the radical group, Col. Alparslan Turkes, who had held the NUC office of Prime Minister, was replaced by a civilian bureaucrat, Hilmi Incesulu. At this time the NUC membership was reduced to 23.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

NUC, took over the state's administrative functions with the aid of a fifteen member cabinet.\* FIGURE 4.1 shows the civilian and military personnel composition of Gursel's first four cabinets. It is clear that the regime's administrative functions were dominated by the civilian bureaucracy - from whence the majority of the cabinet members had come - from the outset. Thus, while the military professionals formally ran the legislative process, the civilian bureaucrat/technocrat was responsible for running the government, as he had under the previous Bayar-Mendares governments. However, under the military these civilian policy-makers were not subject to either electoral or party pressures. From the biographical information available, it also appears that Gursel's cabinet appointees were apolitical, generally having never held parliamentary seats prior to their appointment.

On October 15, 1961 - after elections were held according to the provisions of the new constitution of May, 1961 - the cabinet structure became exclusively civilian. General Gursel was elected president by the newly-created National Assembly, and the NUC members became lifetime senators in the upper house of the reconstituted Grand National Assembly. Party politics resumed with the 1961 elections,

\* Expanded to seventeen in August, and nineteen in January of 1961.

FIGURE 4.1

Composition of P.M. Gursel's First Four  
Cabinets of May 27, August 4 (1960), January 4  
and January 7 (1961)

Ministry	Cabinet			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Foreign Affairs	C	C	C	C
State	C,C	C,C	C,C	C,C,M
Justice	C	C	C	C
Interior	M	M	M	M
Finance	C	C	C	C
Public Works	C	C	C	C
Commerce	C	C	C	C
Health & Social Welfare	C	C	C	C
Customs & Monopolies	C	C	C	C
Agriculture	C	C	C	C
Communications	M	M	M	M
Industry	C	C	C	C
Information & Tourism	C	C	C	C
Reconstruction	C	C	C	C
Defense	-	-	M	M
Education	-	-	C	C
Deputy P.M.	-	-	-	M

Source: Facts-on-File, 1960 and 1961.

and the government was headed by former RPP President Inonu (1961-1964), Suleyman Demirel of the Justice Party (1965 until he was removed by the military in 1970), and Nihat Erim - an "above-politics" military appointee (1971-1972). The presidency remained firmly in military hands, under Gen. Gursel (1961-1966) and Gen. Cevdet Sunay (1966-1972). But even with the return to electoral politics under the post-coup "military democracy,"<sup>24</sup> the nature of cabinet personnel changed little. Most ministerial posts continued to go to civilian bureaucrats with little or no previous political experience. From an examination of the backgrounds of Labor, Finance and Foreign Affairs ministers from 1963 to 1972, it is possible to see that this is the case.<sup>25</sup> Of the six individual Finance Ministers holding office during this period, only two had had more than five years of political experience. Five of the six Labor Ministers had been in parliament less than five years prior to their appointment to the Labor ministry, while three of the four Foreign Affairs Ministers were in a similar position.

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<sup>24</sup>Metin Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, p.60.

<sup>25</sup>The choice of these three ministries was dictated by the availability of adequate biographical information.

## 2) Policy Orientation

An examination of TABLES 4.1 and 4.2 reveals that in terms of the first set of policy orientation indicators, the civilian governments of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes were much more "militarist" than the post-1960 military governments of Gen. Gursel and Cevdet Sunay.

TABLE 4.1

### TURKEY

#### POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

##### Annual Values

YEAR	<u>MILEX</u>	<u>MILEX</u> (%)	<u>WELEX</u> (%)
	WELEX	Total Budget	Total Budget
1950	2.4	37.6	15.5
1955	2.5	36.6	14.4
1956	2.4	48.9	20.6
1960	2.3	38.7	16.9
1961	1.6	----	----
1965	1.5	26.9	18.2
1966	1.3	24.3	18.9
1970	1.3	19.7	15.7
1971	1.1	18.3	16.9

Sources: 1954-1972 MILEX data is from the SIPRI Yearbook, 1976 (pp.152-153); 1950-1953 data is from the 1969 edition (p.202).

1950-1972 WELEX data is from the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks 1953, 1958, 1962, 1968, 1976.



Sources: 1952-1959 budget data is from the  
 (cont.) Statesman's Yearbooks, 1956, 1961;  
 1950-1951, 1960-1972 data is from  
 the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks,  
 1953, 1962, 1968, 1976.

TABLE 4.2

## TURKEY

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (I)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
<u>MILEX</u>	1.5	2.6
<u>WELEX</u>		
<u>MILEX</u> (%)	23.8	39.8
Total Budget		
<u>WELEX</u> (%)	16.4	15.2
Total Budget		

Sources: See TABLE 4.1

While the neglect of the Bayar-Mendares governments of military institutional interests has been cited as a major cause of the 1960 coup,<sup>26</sup> the fact remains that military expenditures averaged well over a third of the government's total budget for the 1950-1959 period. In addition, while it has also been argued that the DP governments "concentrated on measures to please the common man,"<sup>27</sup> not only were their military budgets double their welfare budgets, but the post-1960 military regimes gave a higher budgetary priority to welfare than did the civilian regimes.

According to the second set of policy orientation indicators, detailed in TABLES 4.3 and 4.4, there appears to be little overall difference in the level of militarism sustained by the military and civilian regimes.

TABLE 4.3

## TURKEY

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

## Annual Values

YEAR	<u>ARMFOR</u> (%) WORFOR	<u>MILEX/ARMFOR</u> GNP / capita
1953	1.8	2.9
1955	1.8	3.3
1958	1.7	2.5
1960	1.6	3.3
1961	1.5	3.5
1965	1.6	3.2
1969	1.6	2.7
1972	1.7	2.6

Sources: 1950-1963 ARMFOR data consist of estimates taken from the Stateman's Yearbooks for those years. 1963-1972 ARMFOR data is from USACDA pub. 74, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1972.

1953-1972 WORFOR data is population data from IMF, I.F.S., May, 1978, pp.386-387.

1953-1972 GNP data is GDP data from IMF, I.F.S., May, 1978, pp.386-387.

TABLE 4.4

## TURKEY

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (II)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
<u>ARMFOR</u> (%)	1.6	1.7
WORFOR		
<u>MILEX/ARMFOR</u>	2.9	2.9
GNP / capita		

Sources: See TABLE 4.3

The essential difference between the economic policy orientations of the pre- and post-1960 governments of Turkey lay in their attitudes toward etatisme, or state intervention in the economy. The Bayar-Mendares governments were profoundly anti-statist, and their economic programs stressed free enterprise and an open market. The post-coup governments took just the opposite approach, advocating a strictly planned economy. The latter initially adopted the program of economic stabilization which the last Mendares government had introduced, but which "for political reasons - the

measures would have been unpopular and lost (the DP) votes --<sup>28</sup> had not been implemented.

From TABLES 4.5 and 4.6, it is possible to see that both the civilian and military regimes were fiscally responsible, and neither government accrued a large budget deficit, although each indulged in deficit spending to a degree.

TABLE 4.5

## TURKEY

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (III)

## Annual Values

YEAR	GNP GROWTH RATE (%/annum)	INFLATION RATE (%/annum)	<u>EXPORTS</u> IMPORTS	<u>GOV'T EXPENDITURE</u> (%) GOV'T REVENUE
1950	----	----	.92	1.1
1953	2.1	3.1	.74	1.1
1954	2.0	10.3	.70	1.0
1956	15.4	14.3	.75	.78
1957	33.0	11.3	.87	1.1
1959	25.0	27.0	.80	.99

<sup>28</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., p.269. See also chapters 5 and 10.

TABLE 4.5 (cont.)

YEAR	GNP GROWTH RATE (%/annum)	INFLATION RATE (%/annum)	<u>EXPORTS</u> IMPORTS	<u>GOV'T EXPENDITURE</u> GOV'T REVENUE (%)
1960	6.7	5.5	.78	.97
1963	13.5	7.5	.53	.99
1964	6.8	3.0	.76	1.1
1966	18.8	4.4	1.1	1.0
1967	1.1	6.4	.95	.99
1969	10.0	5.7	.77	1.1
1970	16.9	8.7	.67	.99
1972	24.0	12.9	.53	---

Sources: 1950-1972 inflation rate data was computed from the CPI values given in the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks for 1953, 1958, 1962, 1968, 1976.

1952-1959 export and import data is from the Statesman's Yearbooks for 1956 and 1961; 1950-1951, 1960-1972 data is from the U.N. Statistical Yearbooks for 1953, 1958, 1962, 1968, 1976.

TABLE 4.6

## TURKEY

## POLICY ORIENTATION INDICATORS (III)

## Military vs. Civilian Government

Indicators	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
GNP Growth Rate (%/annum)	12.9	17.1
Inflation Rate (%/annum)	5.7	11.8

TABLE 4.6 (cont.)

Indicators	<u>Government Type</u>	
	Military	Civilian
<u>Exports</u>	.72	.77
Imports		
<u>Gov't Expenditure</u> (%)	1.0	1.0
Gov't Revenue		

Sources: See TABLE 4.5

The essential differences in the economic performances of the pre- and post-coup governments lay in their management of economic growth. While the pre-coup DP governments managed a considerably higher GNP growth rate than the military regimes, they also incurred a devastatingly high inflation rate. On the other hand, for the major part of the 1960-1970 decade, the post-coup governments managed a lower GNP growth rate, but also controlled inflation to a much greater degree, keeping it, on the average, at half the rate of the 1950-1960 decade.

### 3) Governing Style

With the elections of 1950, it seemed that parliamentary democracy had taken hold in Turkey. This apparent fact seemed proven by the acquiescence of the ruling RPP to the revealed will of the electorate, and the institution of

the new Democrat government. However, the appearance was not the reality, and from the outset the DP regime began to restrict the freedom of its not-so-loyal opposition. Only two weeks after the election, in the first session of the Grand National Assembly, the DP government contravened parliamentary practice. It refused to allow the opposition to exercise its right to reply in the debate over the government's first program.<sup>29</sup> And in its first major foreign policy decision, the Democrats dispatched the first Turkish contingent to Korea without having consulted with the opposition.

Throughout the 1950-1960 period, party hostility was considerable. The RPP relentlessly criticized the government's every move, and in response the DP became increasingly oppressive and autocratic in its dealings with the opposition. Although the government did not at the outset directly attack the political rights of RPP and other opposition party deputies, it did begin as early as 1952 to limit their organizational freedoms. On May 4, 1952 Prime Minister Mendares proposed a bill which would make any public criticism of cabinet officials illegal and punishable by imprisonment.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p.36.

<sup>30</sup>New York Times, May 5, 1952, p.4



Although the bill was tabled and was never passed, it set the tone for future government - opposition relationships. The first significant action taken by the DP regime directly against its party opponents was its decision to close down the Nation Party on July 8, 1953 and to arrest the leader of the party, the editor of its newspaper, and thirteen of its highest ranking members.<sup>31</sup> The Democrats accused the NP of inciting religious sentiment against the government. This step marked a beginning of a period of even more virulent DP-RPP hostility, and from 1953 on the Democrats used their considerable legislative majority to pass laws inhibiting the political activities of their opponents.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, in 1954, immediately prior to the elections the government expropriated the property of the RPP, including the party newspaper, Ulus. In July of that year the government strengthened its virtual monopoly hold over the media by banning the use of the press for 'political propaganda' purposes, although the government continued to use the media

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., July 9, 1955. The NP leader was Mustafa Kentli; the newspaper editor was Mr. Adricoglo.

<sup>32</sup>In 1950 the DP had won 408 Assembly seats to the RPP's 69. After the 1954 elections the proportion was 503 to 31. The DP "setback" in the 1957 elections changed the ratio to DP-424, RPP-178.

for just those purposes.<sup>33</sup> Again, just before the 1957 opposition party members arrested for "illegal electioneering."<sup>34</sup> The government also, and much more ominously, granted to the police the power to fire on those taking part in 'unlawful' political gatherings.<sup>35</sup> In September of 1957 the government also passed a measure barring opposition parties from forming electoral coalitions, thereby hoping to prevent the growing popularity of the RPP and other opposition parties from having too great an impact on its legislative majority.<sup>36</sup> Finally, the DP took direct action against individual opposition deputies. Four RPP deputies were stripped of their parliamentary privileges, and were thus left open to prosecution under Mendares' press act of June 8, 1956, for criticizing and insulting the government. The litany of the DP regime's transgressions against the rights of its opposition culminated in the banning of all party activity in April

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<sup>33</sup>NYT, July 2, 1954, p.3.

<sup>34</sup>Thus, on October 27, 1956 the general secretary of the RPP, Kasim Gulek, was sentenced to six months imprisonment for having shaken the hands of a group of shopkeepers. NYT, Oct. 28, p.21.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., June 24, p.1.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., Sept. 12, 1957, p.5. Even so, the opposition did manage to decrease the DP majority somewhat. See note 32, above.

of 1960, and the declaration of martial law a few days later.<sup>37</sup>

With their claim to an overwhelming popular mandate, the Democrat Party government concluded "that they had the right to monopolize all the institutions of the state."<sup>38</sup> The Bayar-Mendares governments passed numerous and repressive laws, restricting the freedom of the press to the extent that even international press organizations lodged formal protests.<sup>39</sup> In 1954, the government stepped up its efforts to control the press by amending the penal code. The amendment made it illegal to engage in "activity harmful to the national interest, including the spreading of false news."<sup>40</sup> Under this new libel provision opposition newsmen were arrested and their newspapers either suspended or closed permanently. Newsmen were imprisoned for such offenses as

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., April 19, p.4; April 29, p.1.

<sup>38</sup>Ahmad, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>39</sup>In 1959 the International Press Institute considered barring Turkish membership from its organization due to "grave infringements of press freedoms." The Institute pointed out that 800 newspapermen had been arrested in Turkey during the previous 4-5 years. NYT, May 26, p.5.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., March 1, p.24.

"injuring government prestige,"<sup>41</sup> criticizing government actions, and insulting government officials. In particular, the RPP paper, Ulus, suffered frequent shutdowns, and its editor - RPP leader Inonu's son-in-law - frequent arrests.

The DP also attempted to extend its authority to cover the judiciary and the civil service. In order to increase openings in both institutions for RPP appointees, the government passed a bill requiring civil servants and judges to retire after twenty-five years of service. And later the government reserved for itself the right to remove any civil servant, denying those removed any right of appeal. The DP regime had little trouble with Turkey's nascent trade unions for most of its term. Advantageous economic conditions and the continuing promise of concessions to the working classes kept the unions - who themselves were more concerned with getting established - relatively quiescent.<sup>42</sup> From 1950 until the coup of 1960 the DP regimes became increasingly repressive, and as a result engendered considerable popular

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<sup>41</sup>On Nov. 22, Istanbul Dunya editor Faik was arrested on this particular charge, based on his paper's criticism of a DP minister, ibid., Nov. 24, p.6.

<sup>42</sup>The DP continued to "dangle the carrot" of a law allowing trade unions the right to strike before the working classes, thereby rescinding the strike prohibition of the 1947 Trade Union Law. Although the bill was re-introduced in all three DP parliaments, it was never passed.

opposition to its government. The Democrat's increasingly autocratic policies culminated in April of 1960 with a ban on all party activity, the use of the military to prevent Inonu from touring Anatolia, and a declaration of martial law.

Interestingly, the post-coup military governments adopted a governing style only slightly different from that of the previous regimes. Throughout the period of government by the NUC, martial law prevailed. The adoption of the new constitution, and the lifting of the ban on party politics provided the means for returning to relatively democratic governance. But, for the most part party politics was carried on under the close supervision by the military, and government policy was closely monitored by the President and his staff of primarily military advisers, and by the Armed Forces Union (AFU).<sup>43</sup> In March of 1962, after Prime Minister Inonu had taken over the administration, an anti-criticism law was passed, making it a crime to criticize the 1960 revolution or the military.<sup>44</sup> And in September of that same year three

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<sup>43</sup>The AFU issued occasional memoranda to the effect that unless the government revised its policy positions, the military would once more directly intervene. The memoranda always had the desired (by the military) impact. See Ahmad, op.cit., p.288ff and Tamkoc, op.cit., pp.48-49.

<sup>44</sup>Facts-on-File, 1962, p.103.

newspapers were seized and their editors were arrested under the auspices of this law.<sup>45</sup>

Although the military tried the foremost members of the Bayar-Mendares government, sentencing fifteen to death, only Mendares and two of his ministers\* were in fact executed. Ultimately most former Democrat Party members were reincorporated into the political system with the formation of the Justice Party in February of 1961. This is where the governing styles of the pre- and post-coup regimes differ. While the DP government appeared unwilling to allow its opposition any leeway, the military allowed the electoral victories of the JP in 1965 and 1969 to stand.<sup>46</sup> However, while the essence of a viable opposition has been allowed to take part in post-coup politics, the government has instituted a close control over all aspects of Turkish society. Periodic declarations

\* Foreign Minister Zorlu, and Finance Minister Polatkan.

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p.341.

<sup>46</sup>But, in 1971 the military ousted then JP Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, and handed the government over to the "above party" Nihat Erim.

of martial law have enabled the military governments to prevent any group from gaining access to the policy process without its acquiescence. In 1971, with a series of constitutional amendments, the government ended the liberalizing trend which had been developing since 1965, which had to some extent allowed the Justice Party governments under Demirel to court the potential electoral power of the working classes by slowly drifting leftward in its policies. The amendments, proposed by the Erim government, met with little opposition. They would give the government greater control over almost all of the institutions of the state - the unions, the press, the universities, the judiciary. The amendments restricted the rights and freedoms which had been so carefully outlined in the 1961 constitution.<sup>47</sup>

In terms of their governing styles, the pre- and post-coup governments of Turkey differ little. Both the civilian and military governments seemed determined to eliminate opposition 'interference' in policy-making, and to exercise complete governmental authority. But while the civilian governments of Bayar and Menderes proved themselves unwilling to allow the free play of party politics, even

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<sup>47</sup>See Ahmad, op.cit., chapter 11.

within the elite, the post-coup military governments attempted to allow parliamentary consultation and compromise set the tone of Turkish policy-making, at least until policy began to take an undesired direction. Then they stepped into reset the government's policy course by changing governments.



## CHAPTER V

## Conclusions

1) The Criteria of Acceptance

The features of each regime, which provided the analytical foci for each of the three preceding chapters, were selected because they constitute the basis for the commonly used civilian-military governmental typology. In order to validate this typology, both categories - 'civilian' and 'military' - should be exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and consistent.<sup>1</sup> In terms of the two assumptions upon which the civilian-military governmental typology is based, this means that the validity of each assumption depends upon the detection of differences between the personnel, policy orientations, and governing styles of civilian and military governments which are common to all cases. It also means that when military governments are compared along these parameters, few significant differences should be revealed. This latter rule must also hold for the comparison of civil-

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<sup>1</sup>L.C. Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey (Dorsey Press, 1972) p.18.

ian regimes. Thus, for example, when examining the results of the first test of Assumption 1, it would not be enough to show that there was a significant age difference between the personnel of Joao Goulart's civilian government and those members of the military government of Marshal Costello Branco (p.39). It would also have to be shown that age was a significant distinguishing feature in every civilian-military regime comparison. And the discovery of significant age differences between regimes of the same type would, in turn, undermine the validity of the assumption. So the discovery that the personnel in the military regimes of General Ankrah and Colonel Afrifa were both significantly older than those in Col. Acheampong's government (p.61) appears to do just that.

Assumption 1: Military men carry into politics a distinctive set of values, capabilities and administrative techniques.

## 2) Civilian and Military Government Personnel

The evidence which results from the first test of this assumption - the comparison of the backgrounds and age characteristics of civilian and military government personnel - does not support the assumption. As pointed out above, there were no consistent age characteristics which would help to distinguish military from civilian government personnel. In

addition to the evidence cited above which would appear to render the first assumption invalid, in Turkey not only did the age factor not render civilian and military government personnel distinctive, it did play an important part in distinguishing different politically oriented factions within the military regime of General Gursel (p.92). Nor does the assumption appear to be validated by the existence of any evidence of consistent class differences between civilian and military regime personnel. While in Turkey the officer corps did appear to have a more diverse class background than the civilian elite (pp.91-92), this was not the case either in Brazil (pp.29-30) or in Ghana (p.56).

Of the factors which could have been responsible for the acquisition of fundamentally different values, capabilities, and administrative techniques by civilian and military government personnel, education and career experience appear to have had the only significant impact. The military officer in the three developing nations shared, to a considerable extent, the professional characteristics of corporateness, responsibility, and expertise, with his counterpart in the developed nations.<sup>2</sup> This substantiates the perspicacious

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<sup>2</sup>S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p.8.

observation of one scholar that, of all modern social structures, the one most readily established in a developing society is the modern army.<sup>3</sup> And it does appear that the distinctive education and training undergone by the military officers in all three countries ensures that the personnel appointed by a military government will share a distinctive set of values, capabilities and administrative techniques.

In each of the above cases, the advent of military rule meant that personnel with technical or bureaucratic career experience would dominate the government. However, the advent of military rule did not mean that all major government and administrative posts would be held by military professionals, nor that military values would predominate. Of course, in all instances of military government the proportion of military men in cabinet positions did increase from previous civilian levels. But only in Brazil (p.34) and in Ghana under Acheampong (pp.61-62) was a concerted effort made to place military officers in political or administrative positions. The general tendency was to allow

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<sup>3</sup>Lucien Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in J.J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, p.74.

apolitical civilian technicians and bureaucrats to take over the functioning of government. In Brazil under all three military regimes (pp.33-36), and in Turkey under Gursel and Sunay (pp.94-95), civilians with little or no political experience occupied most cabinet positions.<sup>4</sup> However, even this rather salient characteristic of military regimes was not restricted to military regimes. The Democrat Party governments of Turkey from 1950-1960 under the civilian leadership of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes consistently had cabinets in which technocrats with very little political experience dominated (p.89).

### 3) Policy Orientations

The officer corps of Brazil, Ghana, and Turkey all exhibited a high level of professionalism, and a consequent awareness of their own institutional interests. From this

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<sup>4</sup>Professor Fainsod attributes this tendency of military regimes to the military professional's limited expertise, and argues that "as their field of responsibility widens, they are not infrequently driven to lean more heavily on expert civilian administrators for advice." Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: the Russian and Soviet Case" in Joseph La Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton U.P., 1967), p.236. Edward Feit gives a more positive explanation in The Armed Bureaucrats (Houghton, Mifflin, 1973).

one would expect the first set of policy orientation indicators to show military regimes to be more consistently 'militaristic' than civilian regimes. In many instances when single regimes were compared, this was the case. However, when the results were pooled, the overall evidence again fails to support Assumption 1. Only in the case of Ghana do military governments have a more militaristic policy orientation than civilian governments (TABLE 2.3, p.43). In Brazil there is virtually no difference between the policy orientations of military and civilian governments (TABLE 3.3, p.65). And, in the case of Turkey, the pre-1960 civilian governments appear much more militaristic in their policy orientations than do the governments of Generals Gursel and Sunay (TABLE 4.2, p.97).

The evidence rendered by the second set of policy orientation indicators, which again measure the relative militarism of different governments appears inconclusive. While according to these two indicators the military governments of both Brazil (TABLE 2.5, p.45) and Ghana (TABLE 3.6, p.68) do have a more militaristic policy orientation than their civilian counterparts, in Turkey the policy orientations of civilian and military governments do not differ at all (TABLE 4.4, p.100).

According to the measures of government 'incompetence,' there is again little consistent support for Assumption 1. While the GNP growth rate experienced under the military governments of Brazil (TABLE 2.7, p.47) and Turkey (TABLE 4.6, pp.102-103) were considerably lower than those managed under civilian governments, in Ghana the situation was reversed (TABLE 3.8, p.70). Inflation ran at a much higher rate under the military governments of Ghana, but in both Brazil and Turkey the military was responsible for dramatically reversing inflationary spirals which had begun under the previous civilian regimes. In Brazil and Ghana, the civilian governments proved more adept at maintaining a good international trade balance, but in Ghana it was the military who fared better in this respect. Budget deficits ran higher under the civilian governments in Brazil, higher under military regimes in Ghana, and in Turkey both civilian and military governments managed to consistently balance their budgets.

From the evidence presented in the case study chapters, and summarized above, it is clear that Assumption 1 has little validity. It may be, as one scholar has convincingly argued, that military values and institutional interests are important factors in the process leading to

coup d'etat.<sup>5</sup> However, once in government, military officers appear to follow a variety of courses, dictated by their concern for social and political stability, their interest in economic and political development, their determination to prevent rapid political mobilization, as well as their more narrow institutional goals.

Assumption 2: Military governments lack legitimacy.

#### 4) Governing Style

The analysis of government relationships with opposition parties and politicians, the press, labor unions, and the bureaucracy, which is supplied under the heading 'governing style,' leads to the inevitable conclusion that in Brazil, Ghana, and Turkey, a regime incorporating a truly consultative governing style is a rare phenomenon. Nor does it result in evidence which supports Assumption 2. In each instance of coup d'etat cited above, the military had considerable civilian support. The civilian regimes of Nkrumah in Ghana and Bayar-Menderes in Turkey, because of their highly coercive governing styles, had engendered hostility not only within the political elite, but in the population

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<sup>5</sup>William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Sage Pub., 1973).



at large. So when the military did finally decide to take matters into its own hands, its actions met with little civilian resistance. As it turned out, in both cases the military was able to remove some of the controls on political activity which had been established under the previous regimes, allowing at least a qualified return to competitive politics.

But it is also true that the military intervened in the political process in response to what amounted to a civilian government's attempts at extensive political mobilization. One of the main aims of the Brazilian army when it overthrew the Goulart regime was to put an end to the radical changes in Brazil's political structure which were beginning to take place. The rapid introduction of new elements into the political system - in particular the growing urban working class- was creating demands on the government which it was unable to meet without disrupting existing political and economic arrangements. Unwilling to allow the political process to fall into new hands, the military intervened in order to prevent any further diffusion of political authority. The subsequent activities of the military regimes were designed to relocate power at the national level in the administrative organs of government. In order to carry out

this power relocation, a multitude of lines of government - polity consultation were cut. The press was coopted, control over labor unions was reaffirmed, and measures were instituted to silence all political opposition.

Even in this instance, however, the actions of the military were not met with widespread opposition. In the absence of any firmly established links between the government and the governed, the change from civilian to military governance did not appear to raise the question of legitimacy. The right to govern appears to be intimately related to the possession of political authority in the developing nations, whether that authority is based on a claim to represent the national will, or is simply based on force.

The fact that neither of the two assumptions proved to be valid means that the accepted civilian-military government typology has no certain descriptive value in the context of the developing nations. The answer to the question posed in chapter I asking "Does it make a difference in the developing nations whether or not politicians, bureaucrats, and technicians, wear uniforms" would be that it makes little consistent difference. While there may be characteristics common to Latin American military governments, or to African military governments, characteristics which distinguish them from Latin

American or African civilian governments, it seems clear enough that the terms civilian government and military government cannot be considered generic terms. This might mean that the cross-national comparison of the consequences of military intervention and military government, to be of any substantive value, would have to be limited to intra-regional comparisons, in order to pay sufficient heed to those contextual influences which dictate the essential characteristics of government in developing nations.

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