

Organizing and Using National Security and Review Directives

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this project to my husband, Manish Khatri, and our daughter, Priya. Their patience, understanding, and belief in my abilities has been the greatest gift I could ever have been given. I would like to thank my friends and family for being so loving and supportive throughout this entire PhD journey.

“Winning is easy, young man, governing is harder.”

-“Hamilton: An American Musical.” By Lin-Manuel Miranda

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful committed citizens can change the world."

- “Election Night Part II” *The West Wing*, NBC

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Abstract

Studies regarding the scope of presidential power have mainly been focused on the role of the president as enforcer or implementer, but more work in the field needs to be done to understand the president as a planner or policy developer. The method used to define the scope of the president's role as implementer in chief is the executive order, but they do not provide insight into the president as the planner in chief nor does this tool of the presidency focus on the president's high level of agency in foreign and national security policy. Insight into the planner facet of the presidency, especially as it pertains to the roles of the president as Head of State and Commander in Chief, can be gained through the lens of the National Security and Review Directives. National Security and Review Decision directives are an important vehicle available to presidents to steer foreign and national security policy with the help of the National Security Council (NSC) and their National Security Advisor (NSA). The main impediment to growing the field's understanding of these directives is the lack of organization of the population of these documents. This dissertation has collected, analyzed, scoped, and defined the contents of the declassified population of National Security and Review Directives and organizing these directives into an originally developed dataset, offering a better understanding into how foreign and national security policy formed. NSDs and RDs are key to understanding the priority of the information presidents need, what information they get, who they get it from, and what they do with it and is exemplified in case studies focused on the use of NSDs and RDs in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Operation Allied Forces. Analyses that do not take into account the National Security and Review Directives created throughout an administration leave gaps on comprehensively understanding the role of the president in the intricacies of the foreign policy making process, specifically with respect to foreign policy, as that as an arena where they are minimally constrained by Congress.

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1.0 Introduction

The policy positions a president makes while in office can serve to mobilize voters, sway Congress members, establish or demolish alliances, initiate or end international events or serve as comfort and solace to those in need. Inside the White House, the contents of memoranda produced by the president helps turns the gears of government, implementing policies and creating an environment consistent with the president's vision for the country. The job description of the president is infinitely vaster than what it was at the beginning of the country and every president does what he¹ can have the office rise as to what is demanded of them. Sometimes, Congress provides guidance and statutory support for the president in their ever-expanding role. In the realm of domestic policy, the presidential role is largely constrained by Congress. However, congressional oversight is far more limited in the realm of foreign policy, and therefore presidents find themselves able to make and implement most of their policy preferences without needing the leave of Congress.

A true understanding of the foreign policy making process of an American administration is incomplete without the inclusions of National Security Directives (NSDs) and Review Directives (RDs). Distinct from other forms of presidential memoranda, such as proclamations and executive orders, these mostly classified directives are focused on directing the actions of the members of the National Security Council (NSC). National Security Directives (NSDs), and their companion Review Directives (RDs), are the primary method used to coordinate activities that affect national security. They paint a more holistic picture of the

¹ Since this dissertation looks at historical action of presidents and at the time of the writing of this dissertation, all presidents have been male, the pronouns "he/him/his" will be associated with "the president." The author looks forward to a time when the makeup of the population of the officeholders of the presidency is more diverse and requires the use of different pronouns.

information environment in which presidents' function, the policy options they are presented with, and the end policy that is enacted on behalf of the administration.

1.1 History of the National Security Council

From the minute a president enters the arena as a candidate for his party's nomination to his final action on the last day of his term, presidents actively participate in expanding the political, social, and diplomatic landscape, breathing into the space inherited from the previous president. Policies which emanate from NSDs and RDs are a product of different inputs that a president and their NSC have to balance. While executive orders (EOs) can be seen as the implementation of policy within the limits set by a particular law, that may not necessarily be a complete reflection of the preferences of an administration in terms of the way the policy itself is structured. NSDs, and the RDs that support them, are documents of foreign policy that more fully encapsulate the unvarnished positions of an administration. Increased presidential agency and limited post hoc Congressional oversight of foreign policy actions give these directives and their policies the room they need to implement the truest form of a president's grand strategy for American foreign policy. While the contents of EOs are directed at agencies whose actions are felt on a daily level by Americans, the impact of a policy generated by an NSD is more outward looking and are relieved of the domestic pressures applied to EOs. This gives presidents a bit of coverage to move US foreign policy in a way that speaks to their ideological beliefs and personal preferences, without generally having to worry about electoral consequences. Presidential power manifests in the ability to use the institutions of government to move towards the implementation of policy goals which reflect the president's perspective of American identity and place in the international community.

The National Security Council Act of 1947 established the NSC's main role as the primary agency in charge of developing national security policy and providing information and

options to the president on how best the US should deal with national security threats and crisis events. The National Security Council was intended to “advise the President on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to facilitate interagency cooperation” (Aftergood 2009), providing coordinated information to the president and the policy making establishment in relation to national security issues facing the country. The politicization of foreign and national security made it more apparent that the role of the NSC was going to be one that changed along with the political environment and with whom was in the Oval Office. Threats to national security are defined by the president along with the members of the NSC, and therefore a clear understanding of how they arrive at that designation is needed.

NSDs and RDs tell the story of how the NSC does its job. These directives show the development and implementation of foreign and national security policy as one which takes cooperation from the many disparate departments that make up the executive branch. NSDs and RDs are meant to show not only how responsive foreign policy is to a given event and its surrounding environment, but also how that implemented policy is the product of the objectives and perspectives of the different departments who have a stake in that particular policy. More than any other type of memoranda, NSDs and RDs provide insight into the truest conversations and concerns that an administration has about the crises they face.

1.1.1 What is an NSD?

On a very basic level, National Security Directives (NSDs) establish “the bureaucratic rules of the road” (Gans 2019) that lay out whom the president looks to in all matters of national security and the standard operating procedures of the NSC. Part of the role of earlier NSDs, and later the major role of RDs, is to be a vehicle through which presidents and their National Security Advisors (NSAs) define the space in which policies are created and implemented and

identify what they see as a threat to the national security of the United States. This communication of action parameters and the rationale for action is one way to better understand the use of a president's agency in foreign and national security policy. These documents also play a vital role in facilitating transparency behind the actions of a democratic government and are useful in holding elected leaders accountable for the actions they take and who they look to for advice.

One reason that NSDs may not be as large a part of the foreign policy making process conversations is their inherently historical nature. Since a majority of the available NSDs are from administrations whose time in office immediately followed the creation of the National Security Council in 1947 and many NSDs and RDs are classified when they are written only to be declassified later, any conversation that includes these documents has an inherently historical quality. However, the information contained in NSDs can help place policy choices of the past in better context, allowing us to identify the rationale behind choices that worked well and those that didn't, with hindsight being 20/20. Additionally, it allows for the identification of the differences in the structure of the policymaking apparatus between presidents, a product of the personal preferences and previous expertise of the president. These organizational structures are then used as proxies to provide reasoning for the decisions made by that president.

Balancing domestic political goals and responsibilities with international political entanglements while staying true to their values, makes foreign policy a mine field for any president. Missing from this conversation is information on the progression of how policies actually develop. NSDs and RDs provide that information and the inclusion of these documents enables a more comprehensive discussion about presidents, their administrations, and their policy making processes. Diving into the population of National Security Directive presents a

story about presidential actions in spaces with limited micromanagement on the part of Congress. These documents give us insight into what information presidents ask, what are presented with, and what they, or those whom they empower, do with that information. These memoranda serve as a roadmap of foreign policy development and the power and scope of the National Security Council in driving the vehicle of American grand strategy.

1.1.2 Key Actors

Foreign policy is, generally, what the presidency was made for. To support the president in this part of their role, the executive branch employs career civil servants and political appointees in a variety of cabinet level departments and independent agencies. The role of these departments and agencies is to gather information pertinent to the events and crises that color the foreign policy landscape, present the president with options for how best to deal with these events, and to then implement the president's decisions.

Much in the same way presidents take the time to issue their first executive orders soon after taking the oath of office, a new president issues his first National Security Directive communicating who will populate the space in which he seeks advice. While the heads of various cabinet departments are Senate confirmed political appointees, there are still a number of potential members of the National Security Council that are straight political appointees. Among these straight political appointees is the National Security Advisor (NSA), who is the leader of the National Security Council and sits at the juncture between national security information and the president. At lower levels of the National Security Council, the staffers in charge of collecting and organizing information and who are responsible for the first pass creation of the NSDs issued by the National Security Council, are civil servants who work directly for the National Security Advisor or on loan from one of the many other cabinet level

departments and government agencies involved in creating and implementing national security policy.

1.1.3 NSC Changes Over Time

Each administration identifies their portion of the series of these documents in a unique way. President Harry Truman published the NSD on October 14, 1947 as NSC0001 entitled “The Position of the US with Respect to Italy”; giving the title NSC to these documents emphasizes their role as the outcome documents of the National Security Council. The designation of these directives as NSC carried on into the Eisenhower administration, but it wasn’t until President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961 that NSDs were given the name National Security Action Memorandums, a moniker that was continued by President Lyndon Johnson once he assumed the role of presidents in 1963. The continuity of the name of these memoranda and the fact that the memoranda produced by the Johnson administration did not start over with a number one, as would later be mirrored by the Ford administration upon assuming power after the resignation of President Nixon, sends a signal of the importance in both of these cases that the policies and ideas of the preceding administration would not reveal a major shift in policy but rather a small way for a president who assumed a role they never actually planned to assume to honor the national security calculus established by their predecessor. Both the Johnson and Ford administrations follow presidencies that were cut short, so the continuation of the name of these directives is not only a way to telegraph consistency in structure, but also consistency in policy preferences.

1.2 Congressional Oversight versus the NSC’s Role in Foreign and National Security Policy

Congress’s main role in the American system is to pass laws that govern the country. In the realm of domestic policy, the presidential role is secondary to the amount of power exerted

by Congress. The inverse is seen in foreign policy; congressional power is far more limited in the realm of foreign policy, relegated mainly to budgetary funding, confirming appointments, ratifying treaties, and issuing declarations of war, while the president retains a marked first mover advantage in defining the foreign policy space. Congressional oversight after an action is taken should be seen as negligible, but it is still secondary to the spaces in which the president and the NSC primarily operate within. Presidents and the members of their NSC are specifically responsible for creating and establishing policy preferences, monitoring events across the globe, and establishing strategies in response to those events. Presidents find that they have more at their disposal to make and implement most of their foreign policy preferences without needing the leave of Congress, while also not losing the support of voters.

The National Security Act of 1947 is the vehicle through which Congress provided the legal framework for presidents to craft foreign and national security policy. The NSC was established by this act in order to help the president carry out this task. As set forth in the law, the mandate of the NSC is vague, providing the required malleability to remain useful to the president and the presidency, regardless of the political environment. At the President's direction, the NSC is able to "assess and appraise risks to U.S. national security, consider policies, and then report or make recommendations to the President." (Aftergood 2009) NSDs and their later created companion, RDs, provide insight into who in the NSC was part of the conversations identifying risks, formulating policy responses (Gordon 2007), and how the president prioritized the needs of the different facets of American foreign policy when implementing proffered policy options. These documents act as a record of the advice given to presidents by the advisors who mean the most to the presidents as individuals, and also as the heads of the departments that are most responsible for identifying the place of the United States

of American in the international community and therefore have the largest impact of foreign policy. They give more insight into the feelings and level of comfort individual presidents have with wielding their vast, and sometimes ungainly, foreign policy power.

In the context of these directives, the policies which emanate from them are a product of the different inputs that a president and their NSC have to balance. While Executive Orders (EOs) can be seen as the implementation of policy within the legal limitations set by Congress, the policy options available to a president may not necessarily be a complete reflection of the preferences of an administration. NSDs, and the RDs that support them, on the other hand, are policy documents that more fully encapsulate the true policy positions of an administration. Increased presidential agency and limited post hoc Congressional oversight of foreign policy actions give these directives and their policies the room they need to implement the truest form of a president's grand strategy for American foreign policy. While EOs are directed at agencies whose actions are felt on a daily level by Americans, the audience of NSDs is more outward looking and therefore, generally speaking, do not have the same external pressures as EOs do. This gives presidents a bit of coverage to move US foreign policy in a way that speaks to their ideological beliefs and personal preferences. Presidential power manifests in the ability to use the institutions of government to move towards the implementation of policy goals which reflect the president's perspective of American identity.

1.3 Organization of the Dissertation

The following study is laid out as such: Chapter 2.0 relates the role of the National Security Council and then explains in detail the original dataset offered through this work. The National Security Directive and Review Directive dataset offered in this dissertation was created by organizing, scoping, and analyzing the population of available directives. Because of the classified nature of NSDs and RDs and their decline in use, these documents are seen as

historical relics with limited use to help us understand modern presidential behavior. However, the continued use of these directives, even in the face of their downturn in use, outweighs the historical nature of these documents is communicating their true strength.

Reviewing these documents has unveiled many critical junctures and near misses, and revealed that the stories of what we know as terminal foreign policy decisions are woefully incomplete without these directives. NSDs and RDs show the use of the president's foreign policy making power in the context of important events in US history as well as the steps that presidents took to set us on a path to where we are today. Any analysis of the foreign policy choices of an administration that does not take into account the contents of these directives is incomplete. Furthermore, these documents are available to future presidents, their National Security Advisors, and National Security Councils to be a source of policy ideas. Crises and events related to foreign policy and national security are perpetually in motion and starting from scratch in policy development can be tricky. Leveraging the work from previous administrations can be advantageous, as the population of these documents can serve as a resource to presidents and their administration to give them at least a framework in which to work.

Chapter 2.0 begins with a survey of role of the National Security Council and then offers an innovation to the field in the form of a usable, organized dataset of all available National Security Directives and Review Directives. One of the main issues with these directives is the field's underdeveloped understanding of their structure. The volume of available NSDs can be intimidating to sort through, making it difficult to see their true applicability and utility in understanding the development of American foreign and national security policy. The original dataset developed for this dissertation aims to provide a sense of order to help the field overcome these challenges and utilize these directives more effectively. Currently, there is no organization

to the population of these documents, outside of the lists of the declassified NSDs and RDs available through the presidential libraries and other internet sources, so it can be difficult to find an appropriate frame for their use.

Chapter 3.0 presents a survey of literature related to our understanding of presidential power and the institutional constraints placed on each president in their role as well as offers hypotheses relative to these veins in the literature that can benefit from the application of the developed dataset.

Chapter 4.0 presents explanations of the main theories used in this study to help illuminate how presidents do their job, from where they derive their power, the people they surround themselves with, and the options presidents have for organizing those people.

Chapter 5.0 presents an example of a way this dataset can be used to help us better understand American national security policy, foreign policy, and military policy development and implementation. In delving deeper into case studies focused on Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Allied Forces, we can better see how the population of NSDs and RDs can help us identify networks within presidential administrations and how these networks work to develop and implement policy. This study concludes with a revisitation of the data and dataset and offers some ideas about future work that would benefit from the use of the organization of this data.

2.0 The Population of National Security and Review Directives

Borne from the policy papers created by the National Security Council and “intended to implement and coordinate military policy, foreign policy, or anything else that is defined within the rubric of national security” (Cooper 2002), National Security Directives (NSDs) are tools of communication presidents can use to provide instructions, through their NSC, to the rest of their administration. NSDs allow the president to direct the actions of the different agencies that fall under the purview of the executive branch in relation to foreign and national security policy. Executive orders are the publicly accessible sibling of National Security Directives, and are therefore more widely studied. Using what we know about executive orders, we can begin to form a better understanding of how presidents use their foreign policy making powers through understand National Security Directives (NSDs) and Review Directives (RDs). The focus of this chapter is to present a deeper dive into NSDs and RDs and provide descriptive and methodological information about the contribution of this study, the organization of this population of documents into a useable dataset.

The major impediment to the lack of understanding of NSDs and RDs is the inability to see these directives as a population. Because a majority of these documents are relics of a time before administrations relied on digitizing communications and paperwork, these directives exist as scanned in copies of paper documents scattered across the various presidential libraries and agencies within the executive branch. As these documents are products of the National Security Council, administrations are under no obligation to make these available in a public forum. As such, each president has the ability to decide which directives and when are made public. Organization of these directives is important to get a holistic sense of how not only policies change but the process in which they are made changes as well.

Since 2009, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has created a website which takes these directives from the different places that they are housed, between presidential libraries and other places, and collocated them into one place. This allows scholars and researchers to overcome the major issue of not knowing the actual size of the population of issued NSDs and RDs. While the FAS provides the dates each of these directives are issued and identifies which of these directives are still classified, because there is no easily identifiable descriptive structure, it is difficult to move beyond seeing these documents as individual entities.

Using the list of NSDs and RDs created by the FAS, this dataset seeks to provide information to help scholars and researchers find the through lines of analysis within this population of directives. This level of analysis cannot be gleaned from the identification of the title of the NSD or RD but can only be drawn from a reading of the actual text of the directives themselves. The dataset presented through this study starts from the basis of treating these directives as distinct tools but expands to provide categorization to show the characteristics of these directives that supersede the administration that issue them. The level of detail associated with this dataset could only be achieved through a close text reading of each of the over 2500 NSDs and RDs available. The process of textual analysis and classification that this project uses is one that can be applied over and over again as more of these directives become declassified. Maintaining an up to date and as complete as possible dataset of these directives serves to help researchers and scholars understand not only policy development through the executive but also a sense of how different presidents influence each other and the role of the presidency at large.

2.1 National Security Directives (NSDs)

As Chief Executive of the United States, presidents use a variety of means to issue instructions to the various departments of the executive branch to create a structure that supports and implements the policy preferences of the administration. These administrative tools include

everything from simple proclamations, which have an external focus (Cooper 2002), to executive orders (Relyea 2003, Thunberg 2017) and National Security Directives. Executive Orders (EOs) are the more readily understood and studied examples of presidential directives. Presidents use EOs to reorganize the structure of the executive branch as well as to expand the powers given to the branch itself. (Mayer 1999) Using presidential directives, specifically executive orders, presidents can restructure and re-task different departments within the executive branch to implement laws in concordance with the policy preferences of the administration and provide their target departments with “more explicit directives or grant additional discretion.” (Thunberg 2017) Thunberg’s organization of the population of executive orders into “routine, hortatory, coercive, and catalytic” categories provide insight into the scope and effect of this tools of the presidency. Routine EO’s are used for purely administrative means. Executive orders categorized as coercive are seen as commands for action related to a specific task as required to implement a law. Hortatory EO’s “allow agencies to investigate policy areas and report to the president but does not allow the agency to act upon their recommendations” and are normally more prominent when bureaucrats are asked to project the impact of a law given a particular facet of implementation. The final EO category, catalytic presents implementing agencies and departments of the executive branch with the most leeway of autonomy in that these EOs communicate the general preferences of an administration but leave the minutia of implementation up to the agency itself. The importance of this categorization communicates the individuality of each of these orders and provides specificity in the way these orders are used. Fleishman and Aufses (1976) argue that the use of these orders reflect either the strength or weakness of the relationship an administration has with Congress. Gleiber and Shull (1992) find that administrations employ more executive orders when they are faced with an opposition

Congress. However, Krause and Cohen (1997) find that administrations are more likely to turn to executive orders when they have more legislative success. Some evidence points to an ideological correlation between the frequency of executive orders issued and the president; more ideologically conservative presidents have historically issued fewer orders than more ideologically liberal presidents (Mayer 1999). While EOs appear to circumvent the legislative branch at first glance, their use by presidents is counterbalanced by Congressional fiscal oversight of the executive departments and confirmation of any new departmental appointees. Executive orders themselves, in most cases, only have the full force and effect of the law within the confines of the executive branch; their organizational capabilities help the president institute policy that coincides with the preferences of the administration at large.

EOs are responsive directly to a specific law and draw their legitimacy from those bills; NSDs and RDs work to establish “regular order” (Gans 2019) but because the NSC is not directly involved in the implementation of policy, NSDs cannot be as precise as EOs. EO’s communicate actions that whole agencies are compelled to take whereas NSDs are directed to the members of the Principals of the NSC and communicate the framework to meet the broad objectives of national security. This difference in audience and the way that the audience is held to account to the letter of an EO versus an NSD makes a clear distinction regarding how these directives are used by the executive branch. Using the information in the dataset created in this study, the diversity of NSDs, in terms of their focus and their audience is highest during the Cold War era. This period in American history presents the environment best suited to showcase the applicability of these tools of the presidency across multiple facets of US national security and foreign policy. For example, Brent Scowcroft, acting for Henry Kissinger, (1974) issued NSDM 271 to the Ford administration’s representatives engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT) in order to communicate the negotiation positions of the United States. While it would be impossible for senior members of the Ford administration to be in the room with the negotiators, directives such as these provide US representatives with a general sense of what the US hoped to achieve through these negotiations. The language included in this directive extends to what negotiators “should” bring up or be considerate of during the process of the talks. This word choice shows that these directives both communicate administration preferences, vis a vis the bigger picture of these disarmament talks, while also providing guidance to the negotiators on the specific direction the administration wants these talks to take. EOs do not have the capacity to function as instructional documents relative to the national security actions taken within an administration; NSDs serve that function. Especially noticeable in cases related to negotiations, it is clear that these directives function as communiques as much as they are directives; a characteristic not shared by EOs.

National Security Directives also occupy a different policy space than EOs because of their classified nature but because they do not have the legal capacity to specify actions they also serve in the same vein as catalytic EOs. The policy recommendations and procedures included in NSDs reflect the perceptions and thoughts of experts within the administration. Presidents and their NSCs rely on committed agents, in the form of their cabinet level secretaries, to implement plans that align with the objectives set out through these directives without the need for coercion. NSDs have a varied focus, ranging from requests of information by the president, to orders to the military to guide action. NSDs serve as communiques of objectives within an administration and are protected, through their classified status, to a high degree from external scrutiny. The contents of these documents telegraphs who the president looks to and with his signature at the end of the document (Gordon 2010), what his preferences are.

2.1.1 NSDs and the NSC

Along with methods of communicating policy, these directives play a vital role in organizing the members of the National Security Council. Identifying the advisors that the president deems important enough to list as permanent members of this organization gives us a quick glance at not only who the president will be getting their information from, but also what departments the president views as being part of developing and implementing national security policy. NSD 1 (Bush 1989), issued at the beginning of George H.W. Bush's administration in 1989, follows in this tradition. This directive sets out both a Principals and Deputies committees, meant to distribute not only the workload but also speak to the new role of the NSC. As the Bush administration stepped up to the governing plate, the role of the NSC began to shift. Under the Reagan administration, the NSC was the main organ of action related to the Iran-Contra, but largely escaped mandated changes by the Tower Commission. (Gans 2019) Though the expected congressionally focused limitation of the NSC really never came to fruition, the Bush administration sought to be more strategic with their use of resources. Division for the labors associated with the national security portfolio between the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and the newly created Policy Coordinating Committees created an institution built on the back of different, yet interconnected network types. A brief description of each NSC committee is outlined in Table 2-1 below.

Table 2-1: NSC Committee Description

Committee	Responsibilities
Principals Committee	Composed of cabinet secretaries whose departments implement national security and foreign policy, functions as the direct advisory organization to the president.
Deputies Committee	Synthesizes information from The NSC Staff and further develops the language of the NSDs
NSC Staff	Functions as the preliminary level of research and policy development within the NSC

The Principals Committee functions as advisory body in the closest proximity to the president. This committee is populated by the heads of the cabinet departments whose function the president feels is most directly applicable to matters of national security and foreign policy. The Principals Committee is the “principal forum for consideration of national security policy” and works to “review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security policy” (Gans 2019), forms an action network (Kadushin 2012) which uses the goals and preferences communicated through NSDs to craft specific policies in their respective departments and agencies. The members of this committee change at the discretion of the president and represent the people whom the president most trusts for counsel. The department heads are then responsible for choosing their deputies, who in turn serve on the NSC Deputies Committee, and choose the members of their respective departments who will serve as part of the NSC Staff.

The Policy Coordinating Committees, made up of members of the general NSC Staff, were given individual geographic region areas or policy issue areas around which their members were to form informational networks (Kadushin 2012); each committee was tasked with “identifying and developing policy issues for consideration by the NSC, including the preparation of the necessary papers for such consideration.” Background information, associated research, and initial suggestions for policy preferences related to specific topics that were important to that particular region or issue area would then be escalated to the Deputies Committee, a “senior sub-cabinet” group responsible in their developmental network (Kadushin 2012), for the synthesis of the information and the creation of the first drafts of NSDs. In developing NSDs, the Deputies Committee can seek advice and input from people in other parts

of the administration. Including the points of view of political appointees and civil servants results in more refined policy options that take into account both strategic and political impacts.

As an institution, the NSC serves in the capacity of a clearinghouse, as the “principal forum for consideration of national security policy.” It is clear that a majority of the members of the principals committee are the same as that of Bush’s close circle of advisors, with all of them being political appointees who all had previous experience in similar roles in previous administrations. As an addendum to this NSD, NSD 1a (Scowcroft 1989) increased the role of the Deputies Committee from that of the support staff for the NSC, broadly tasked with “crisis management,” to that of “day to day crisis management, reporting to the NSC.” (Scowcroft 1989) By acting as a triage center for the NSC, the Deputies Committee raises its own profile in terms of the role that its developmental network plays in framing national security issues and their accompanying solutions. The contents of NSD 10 (Bush 1989b) works to add on superregional Policy Coordinating Committees that would involve cooperation and coordination between multiple Policy Coordinating Committees already in existence, speaking to the increasingly intertwined foreign policy space. This NSD is the first inclusion, in the declassified NSDs available, of a specific policy related to “counter-terrorism” as a necessary focus of the NSC. Additionally, NSD 10 also includes the expansion of issue areas that have Policy Coordinating Committees. This directive also adds committees focused on refugees, International Oceans, Environment, and Science Affairs, Emergency Preparedness and Mobilization Planning with the Director of FEMA as the chair, Nonproliferation Policy, Technology Transfer Policy, and National Security Telecommunications, whose specific focus was “improving the interoperability, security, survivability, and emergency availability of national security telecommunications.” (Bush 1989b) The expansion of these Policy

Coordinating Committees, and by extension the informational networks they form, was a result of the apparently impending collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States in a unipolar world. These committees and their networks were responsible for piecing through and organizing information in the face of a rapidly changing international system, necessitating the highly responsive inclusion of information to ensure that the developmental and action networks could act with agility. These networks are mostly all directed in their function, with the president acting as the hub; NSD 1a's text shows a network directed through an intermediary. (Kadushin 2012)

With the accession of Bill Clinton to the presidency in 1993, his tenure begins in the same vein as the Bush presidency with the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council (PDD/NSC) 2 (Clinton 1993) which establishes the structure of his NSC. One difference between the Clinton and the Bush administrations is the addition of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations and the president's Economic Advisor as members of the Principals Committee, which shows the responsiveness of NSC structure to the environment in which an administration functions. Bill Clinton prevails over the incumbent George H.W. Bush with a campaign focused on the struggling American economy and the challenges of a country trying to find its place in a unipolar world. The addition of the US representative to the United Nations and the president's primary economic advisor to the National Security Council communicates the president's awareness of the effect of international institutions and the economy, at large, have on the country and its security. The addition of these two positions to the NSC show how presidents can be responsive to the current political environment in not only the policies they implement but who they include when then seek advice. In 1992, the United States was still dealing with the emerges of independent former Soviet states PDD/NSC 2 shows

a president with an expanded principals committee, in relation to his immediate predecessor, as a reflection of Clinton's trepidation with the foreign policy part of his role as president. The Deputies Committee named in this directive is asked to make "periodic reviews" of standing policy. With this part of their job explicitly stated, the Clinton administration makes the internal review mechanism of the developmental network more codified. Additionally, this directive creates Interagency Working Groups which are more broadly structured and more broadly tasked than those of the Bush administration, though with the same underlying function as informational networks to support the Deputies and Principals Committees.

Further expansion of the NSC happened in 1994, with the issuance of PDD/NSC 29. This directive created an additional institution, the Security Policy Board, intended to further support the work of the NSC generally and also focused on expanding the role of the Deputies Committee. While the directive diversifies the portfolio of the Deputies Committee, it does so without allowing for an increase in the amount of personnel (Gans 2019) to assist Clinton in keeping his campaign promise to reduce the size of the national security establishment. Four principles are established to guide the Security Policy Board in its "formulation, evaluation, and oversight of our security policy: our security policies and services must realistically match the threats we face and must be sufficiently flexible to facilitate change as the threats evolve; our security policies and practices must be consistent and enable us to allocate scarce resources effectively; our security standards and procedures must result in the fair and equitable treatment of all Americans upon whom we rely to guard our nation's security; our security policies, practices, and procedures must provide the security we need at a price we can afford." (Gans 2019) This group is "directed to report to the President through the [NSA]" in a tangible of example of a hub and spoke network (Rogers, Castree, and Kitchin 2013) directed through an

intermediary whose “principal mechanism for reviewing and proposing NSC legislative initiatives and executive orders pertaining to US security policy, procedures and practices that do not fall under the statutory jurisdiction of the Secretary of State.” (Gans 2019) The diversity of issues facing the Clinton NSC seems to have necessitated the creation of this organization within the NSC to assist the president in finding a reasonable way for identifying threats to the US that may not necessarily have a foreign policy angle. Its interagency focus ensures that the NSC remains a developmental network, allowing for the synthesis of information coming from multiple information networks within the individual agencies. Further examples of expansions of the networks within the NSC come from PDD/NSCs 53 and 65. PDD/NSC 53 (Clinton 1997) adds the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs to the Principals Committee; this action may reflect a deepening of the relationship between the President and Vice President or it may also reflect a first step to increasing the portfolio of the Vice President Al Gore, as he positioned himself to be the successor to then President Clinton. The final substantive expansion of the NSC under President Clinton comes through PDD/NSC 65. This directive adds the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, and the Secretary of State for Arms Control as invitees to the Principals Committee. Additionally, the directive empowers each to designate a representative to serve on the Deputies Committee. (Clinton 1998) These new additions add specificity and nuance to the action and developmental networks of the respective committees. Expanding the purview of the NSC and reflecting the increased action in the world during the Clinton administration that necessitated the inclusion of these actors.

Offering testimony to committees in the House of Representatives during the impeachment trial of President Donald Trump, former NSC aide, Tim Morrison (Washington

Post 2019) was asked to explain the policy making process within the Trump administration with respect to the role that National Security Council plays. To help illuminate this, Mr. Morrison made reference to “National Security Presidential Memorandum-4” (Washington Post 2019) explaining that this document communicated the preference of the president to be offered policy choices to consider in response to a specific situation.

“GOLDMAN: And since there's been a little bit of dispute about what that means, can you explain how official U.S. policy is determined through the interagency process?”

MORRISON: We operate under what's known as NSPM-4 - National Security Presidential Memorandum - 4. It's available on the internet. That lays out how the president wants to be provided options for his decision.” (Washington Post 2019)

In an administration marked by actions that appear contrary to political norms, the use of National Security Directives, called National Security Presidential Memoranda by the Trump administration, is in line with policy making process choices that date all the way back to the Truman administration. While it is certainly not outside the purview of Congress to ask about NSDs that are declassified, the mention of this particular planning document to help provide the House of Representatives insight into the policy development process of the Trump White House supports the idea that organizational documents, such as NSDs, can be used to better understand who the president establishes as the gatekeepers of their information. The explicit inclusion of the NSD in the context of an impeachment hearing centered on how a president made policy decisions crystalizes the role of these documents but also buttresses the positions held in the 1989 and 1992 GAO reports. These directives are important governing documents, and their classified nature is a boon to presidents in their use of their executive powers.

Consistent within all of the structural NSDs from both the Bush and Clinton Administrations is the presence of a definable network to support the US national security apparatus. The complicated nature of national security issues necessitates an infrastructure of interwoven networks, each with its own focus intended to support the network that sits atop of it. As will be further explained in Chapter 4.0, each member of the informational networks supports a counterpart in the developmental network whose work support their counterpart in the action network. Using these associated networks helps those who craft and implement policy to not only gather as much information as possible in the most efficient manner but allow for the tailoring of that communication to meet the needs of the principals, and by extension the president, in a personalized way. The use of integrated networks within the NSC allows the final directives that emanate from this organization to be as thoroughly vetted as possible and most efficiently impactful.

2.2 Review Directives

Review Directives (RDs) are a companion directive set to the NSDs produced by the NSC. Review Directives serve as another space for presidents to exhibit a sense of vulnerability in their own lack of information or understanding related to a specific topic. Similar to NSDs, RDs identify the specific audience whom the president wants to hear input from. The diversity of this group of people and the consistency with which the president calls on specific people or their positions, indicates the direction that the president is moving in relation to the policymaking process. RDs represent true information networks and the Chapter 4.0 will discuss the link between the information networks of RDs and the action networks contained in NSDs.

The use of Review Directives (RDs) within the national security policy space begins with the Nixon Administration with the issuance of National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 1. Similar to NSDs, RDs have a defined audience. In the case of NSSM 1 (Kissinger 1969),

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger requests reports on behalf of the president from the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the CIA on the state of military action in Vietnam. NSSM 1 is issued the day after the inauguration and presents the president with the opportunity to get a full picture of the situation so as to create a “basis for making policy decisions.” NSSM 1 includes not only the list of the advisors from whom the president wants information but is also accompanied by specific questions that the president and his policy making advisors, such the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Ambassador to Saigon, have. These set of questions, and their specificity, present an example of ground floor information gathering at the beginning of a new administration. While there is a fair amount of variation in the depth of the requests included in RDs, the overall motivation seems to be information gathering and parsing.

2.3 Organizing NSDs and RDs: Development of the Dataset

To develop this dataset, a textual analysis of all available NSDs and RDs was undertaken. This dataset is novel in the field and serves as an attempt to provide some level of organization to a population of directives. As outlined in Figure 2-1 there have been in total, 2055 NSDs, including those still classified, identified from the Truman administration through the current Trump administration, along with 456 RDs identified from the Nixon administration through the current Trump administration. Currently, access to these files is contained in the ability to view the scanned documents provided by the presidential libraries of the issuing presidents. The limitation to understanding these directives is directly related to how they are made publicly available. With individual directives being published through presidential libraries and some even published in the Federal Register, outside of the normal expectation for documents that are supposed to be classified, understanding these directives as both a population and as individual entities is limited. This dataset organizes the material in such a way that the information

contained in the disparate documents is easy to see at a glance, as well as collocates these directives into an accessible database.




Figure 2-1: NSDs and RDs Issued Per Administration

Table 2-2: NSD Dataset Descriptors

Dataset Column	Description
NSD Number	Identification name abbreviation and number given to each directive by the issuing administration
Title	Title of the directive
Year	Year the directive was issues
Issued By	Name of the person whose signature is found on the directive
Title of Issuer	Title of the person who signed the directive
President	Name of president whose administration issued the directive
Party ID	Name of political party of the issuing administration
Category	Textual name of the category the directive falls under
Category Number (Cat Num)	Numerical identifier corresponding to the category the directive falls under
Country	Name of the country who is the focus/target of the directive
State Abbreviation (State Abbrv)	Abbreviation of the country name draw from the Correlates of War data
Country Code	Numerical identifier assigned to the country by the Correlates of War data
Region	Region of the world in which the target country is found
Region Identifier (RegionID)	Numerical identifier assigned to denote the global region of the target country
Comments	General notes included by the coder

Table 2-2 above relates the main column headings of the dataset. The information contained in these columns is a key contribution of this study; the organization of the population of declassified NSDs in such a manner that allows researchers to engage with this population in a more meaningful way. The dataset was hand coded to create a clearly organized database of information, and is intended to be continually updated in the future as documents, titles, or their contents are declassified. Because the focus of this organization process was a textual analysis, most of the variables are text variables, but where applicable, numerical dummy variables are created to give the dataset the flexibility to be utilized in both qualitative and quantitative research.

The dataset identifies the issuer of the NSD: the President or the National Security Advisor, the name of the president at time, the ideology of the president, the country that the NSD is focused on along with its abbreviation from the Correlates of War Index and its associated number, and the region the country is in. The following sections are focused on some of the individual variables that necessitate a more in-depth explanation of their associated content.

This data set includes links to all declassified NSDs from the Kennedy Administration to the current Trump administration. Though these directives began with the Truman Administration, the NSD did not become a refined and clearly articulated tool of policy until the National Security Council was revamped under the Kennedy Administration (Dwyer 2002).

2.3.1 NSD Number

Every administration in power after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 has issued some amount of NSDs during its time in office. One inconsistency within the population of available NSDs is the name these directives are given. The diversity of names given to these directives, as seen in Table 2-3, can make it difficult to think about them as population.

Table 2-3: Names of NSDs by Administration

President	Name Given to NSDs During Administration	Abbreviation
Truman	National Security Council	NSC
Eisenhower	National Security Council	NSC
Kennedy	National Security Action Memorandums	NSAM
Johnson	National Security Action Memorandums	NSAM
Nixon	National Security Decision Memorandums	NSDM
Ford	National Security Decision Memorandums	NSDM
Carter	Presidential Directives	PD
Reagan	National Security Decision Directives	NSDD
H.W. Bush	National Security Directives	NSD
Clinton	Presidential Decision Directives	PDD
W. Bush	National Security Presidential Directives	NSPD
Obama	Presidential Policy Directives	PPD
Trump	National Security Presidential Memoranda	NSPM

Because of the contents of these directives, it is very easy to see them as an extension of the policy preferences of only their issuing administrations, but by seeing them as a population, it provides an opportunity to delve deeper into patterns of policy between administrations at various levels. The NSD Number is given to the directive by the administration and communicates the name given to the series and a designated number associated with the directive. In most cases, even in the cases where the title or the contents of the NSD is still classified, the number of the NSD is accessible and, thus, is included in this dataset in order to maintain the most accurate and total population count of these directives.

2.3.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) and Space Policy Directives (SPD)

Included in the population of NSDs are the Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) in the George W. Bush administration and Space Policy Directives (SPD) in the Trump

administration. These two series are a specialized set of NSDs used to communicate policy relative to areas of importance drawn from events in the world around the administration. The HSPDs issued during the W. Bush administration begin with HSPD-1(G.W. Bush 2001) issued on October 29, 2001. This specialized NSD creates a homeland security focused organization analogous to the NSC. The contents of this directive mirrors initial NSDs of many administrations that serve as organizational documents, identifying who will be part of the president's advisory circle on matters related to homeland security. The date of issuance of this order places the creation of this directive series after September 11, 2001, meaning that the creation of this series of directives and the institutions created by them are responsive to the need for organization and centralization of information. This organization can be seen as a precursor institution to the Department of Homeland Security, but at this time, issuing an NSD like directive through the NSC allowed President Bush to create a more immediately responsive mechanism within his administration.

In keeping with a pattern distinct to the current Trump administration, the issuance of SPD-1 (Trump 2017b) and its subsequent publication in the Federal Register speak to the identification as policies related to outer space and space travel as an issue of national security, important enough merit distinct directives. SPD-1 serves to alter and specify the language related to the objectives associated with human space flight set forth by the Obama administration in "PPD-4: National Space Policy of the United States" (Obama 2010) to be more in line with the ethos of American leadership espoused by the administration. SPD-1 puts program objectives such as partnering with private space companies and embarking on missions to the moon and Mars (Trump 2017b) as a part of the national security strategy of the United States, bringing NASA and the work that it does into the NSC. One stark difference between the

HSPD and SPD series, is the way that they are used as internal policy communication or to go public. The choice to publicize the SPD series speaks to the general nature of the current Trump administration to go public with their actions while the HSPD series remained unpublished in the federal register, maintaining the norm of NSC directives to remain in house.

As with all the topics included in the NSDs and RDs, the decision to identify them as of importance to national security lies with the president. By creating these specialized series of directives, the respective presidents are able to further specify the work of the NSC and expand the list of topics that are dealt with through unilateral action. These series are reflective of not only these issues as important enough to merit the agility that can be taken through the NSC, but also issues that are important enough for the president to have a direct hand in their development and instruction of the implementation of these policies. This choice may be a function of the topic, one being linked to state campaign promises versus one created to fill a hole in policy focus which contributed to a terrorist event, but it does show that the specialized series can function as any other NSDs and should be included when thinking about NSDs as a whole population.

2.3.3 Issued By

Differentiation between presidencies in relation to NSDs and RDs comes in the form of who issues the memoranda. Because NSDs and RDs house policy development within the national security apparatus, NSDs and RDs are usually issued by the president, the National Security Advisor (NSA) or a high-ranking member of the National Security Council staff, on behalf of the president or NSA. Variation in issuance is apparent between presidencies; Presidents Kennedy, Ford, and Carter exhibit variation in who issues NSDs with some memos signed off on by the presidents directly while others are issued by the president's National

Security Advisor. Beginning with the Reagan Administration, presidents issue these memos more consistently, rather than relying on advisors to do so.

2.3.4 Party Identification of Issuing President

The *partyid* variable is also a dummy variable that codes for the party the issuing president belongs to. In the data set, a Democratic president is coded as a 0 and a Republican president is coded as a 1. The association of a 0 or a 1 is meant to extend the utility of this dataset in future works

2.3.5 Category Title and Category Number (Cat Num)

The data set uses textual analysis to organize the available NSDs into four categories, outlined below in Table 2-4.

Table 2-4: NSD Categories

Category Number	Category Title	Description
Category 1	Note	Directives intended to relay general information to the NSC
Category 2	Information Request	Directives communicate specific questions or concerns of the President or NSA
Category 3	Policy Communication	Directive communicates the policy of the US related to diplomatic, economic, or social policy
Category 4	Military Policy	Directive communicates actions involving the deployment or relocation of military assets

To organize each document into each of the four categories, patterns of words, phrases, or sentiments were accounted for. The categories are labeled 1-4, based on what the document itself, calls for. The numerical identifiers of the categories are a dummy variable to allow the data to be easily applied to statistical analysis. This categorization of NSDs, summarized in Table 2-4, provides a mechanism for organizing the diverse topics NSDs can cover (Gordon 2007), better allowing future research to see the use of specific types of NSDs at specific points of US national security policy. To presume that Category 1 documents are simply notes that communicate meeting minutes or a piece of information that needs to be committed to paper to be referred to later. An example of a Category 1 NSD would be NSAM 21 (Bundy 1961), issued

by President Kennedy's National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, which communicates notes on a conversation he had with the president in regards to some specific ideas related to a foreign aid bill that was making its way through Congress at that time. NSDs organized into this category include words such as "reminder," "noted," or "wish to call attention to..." and are generally brief. While it might be argued that these communications might not necessarily rise to the level of importance to even be included in the population of National Security Directives, what they do show is a commitment to the process of communication within the NSC. These notes were intended for the main members of the NSC and using this method of communication serves to flesh out the entirety of the policy making process of the NSC. Directives such as these are related to the classified material the NSC focuses on, allowing these notes to be assigned the same level of classification as any other NSD in an administration provides a level of protection for the president and his National Security Advisor to communicate without any encumbrances.

Category 2 directives are Information Requests, made either by the president or his National Security Advisor on his behalf, are mainly for clarification based on proposed policy options or serve to direct the track of reports emanating from the NSC and the main stakeholders relative to an issue or an established policy. Many of these directives, such as President Johnson's 1964 NSAM 321 (Johnson 1964) directive to the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, The Director for Emergency Planning, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Special Assistance for Science and Technology, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to prepare a detailed report on the state of the United States' nuclear stockpile. A request for further clarification of information relative to this report the utility of the classified requirement of these directives. Especially at the height of the Cold War, the necessity to maintain not only a full understanding of our own nuclear

capabilities, but also a detailed examination of its vulnerabilities and the cost of its maintenance is information that the US could not afford to be made public. NSDs which request information from the members of the NSC includes instructions such as “direct a study,” “request a study,” or “develop a plan.” The end of the Reagan administration is also the beginning of a period of presidents choosing not to use NSDs for this purpose. In the following five administrations, spanning presidents of both parties, no NSDs issued meet the requirements to be coded as Information Requests until current President Donald Trump issues National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 3 on January 28, 2017 (Trump 2017a) requesting that a plan be developed to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).²

A Category 3 NSD is a complete policy communication that can include everything from negotiation instructions to economic aid advice to recommendations for legislation that the president would like to see pass Congress in relation to that particular country. An example of a Category 3 NSD would be National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 188 (Kissinger, 1972), issued by Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor to President Nixon, that provides negotiation guidance in relation to how the US should approach changes to private claims being negotiated with the People’s Republic of China. As noted earlier, the National Security Council is not in a position to implement the policies it creates. NSDs which fall into this third category serve to communicate the policies recommended by the members of the NSC. Even though the

² It is important to note, in the case of NSPM 3, that this directive includes specific language directing the publication of this directive in the Federal Register. The publishing of NSPM 3 is an example of the president using these directives to go public relative to a promise made while a candidate for president (Trump 2016) to formulate a plan to eliminate ISIS. Using an NSD to make this plan public, could be a way for the Trump administration to convey a sense of importance related to this issue, making it overtly clear that ISIS represents a threat to national security, but also using the NSD as a mechanism for engaging with the public on a topic that was, and continues to be, highly salient.

contents of these directives are an amalgamation of the policy options and advice from the same people and agency to whom this directive is addressed, Category 3 NSDs represent a formalization of the policy position of an administration. Distinctly, these directives are more focused on the objectives of the United States relative to its soft power.

A Category 4 NSD contains a specific call for military action and are the closest that NSDs come to functioning as EOs in terms of directing the implementation of policy. These NSDs are placed in their own category because of the level of implementation detail they communicate versus Category 3 NSDs. While these NSDs cannot communicate specifics in how the Department of Defense undertakes military actions, these NSDs can provide the implementing departments with more specific objectives that a president wants to see. In Chapter 5.0, two specific crises faced by the United States, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Forces are given to exemplify the contents and the effect of this category of NSD. Presidents, in their role of Commander in Chief, are given the room to act independently and react as situations arise through the use of the military, within the boundaries of the War Powers Act. Within Category 4 NSDs, we can see how exactly different presidents work within and push against those limitations.

The categorization of NSDs into a usable matrix could also be expanded upon with the inclusion of secondary, policy focused labels in future work. Gordon (2007) presents information in her work that looks at the content focus of the NSDs included in her study. Her categories present a different method of understanding the space of available NSDs than the categories proposed here. The categories in this dataset focus on the function of the directive itself, whereas Gordon's categories focus on the policy niche that the directives fit into. Future amendments to this dataset would benefit from the inclusion, as both text and numerical

variables, of Gordon's categories. Though this would be generally applicable, but especially in the context of Category 3 NSDs, adding Gordon's categories, of "guidance for negotiations,...national security organization,...management, control, and coordination,...setting or reviewing policy for countries and regions,...shaping intelligence assessments and research requirements,...development of basic national security doctrine,...economic policy,...military doctrine and warfare coordination,...arms sales and transfers,...establishing positions on international issues,...management and control of nuclear weapons and power,...public diplomacy and psychological warfare,...convert and low-intensity operations,...science and technology,...[and] homeland security and civil defense" will help define that population of available NSDs better and provide future research with yet another avenue to home in on the place these directives have in the policy making space.

2.3.6 Country, State Abbreviation (State Abbrv), and Country Code

The text variable *Country* is intended to identify the country that is at the focus of the NSD. While there are NSDs focused on internal US policies, most of the available NSDs are outward facing, focusing on countries whose actions or decisions affect the national security of the United States. As these documents serve as communication of US policy, one of the most important pieces of information they can offer is the understanding of what specific state's actions affect the national security of the United States. Identifying the state that is the target of a particular policy of the United States helps refine the understanding of the policy calculus employed in the decision-making process. Multiple NSDs issued in reference to a specific country during a set time period would indicate the period in which a particular country was a high national security priority for an administration. The State Abbreviation and Country Code are both taken from the Correlates of War dataset. In order to make this data as functional as possible for all sorts of research it was necessary to include both text and numerical identifiers

for the countries that are the focus of these directives. The abbreviations and codes assigned to the countries of the world by the Correlates of War provide a reputable, widely used avenue to accomplish this goal.

2.3.7 Region and Region Identifier (RegionID)

Region codes originate from the country codes and were made necessary because some NSDs focus on policies for entire regions while others focus on specific countries; the *RegionID* variable is a dummy variable that provides the region name with a numerical identifier. While most of the directives in the dataset are focused on communications of policy towards individual countries, some NSDs are also created to generate regional policies or studies. The need for a categorization for these regionally focused directives necessitated the creation and inclusion of these two variables. Countries in North America are coded as NA/1, countries in the South American/Caribbean region are coded as SA/Carr/2, countries in Europe (including Russia) are coded as EU/3, countries in Africa are coded as AF/4, and countries in Asia are coded as AS/5. In cases where a directive focuses on countries in multiple regions of the world, the text identifiers for each of the countries is utilized, but no numerical identifier is included. In future versions of the dataset, adding a unique numerical identifier may be necessary to make the whole dataset more usable.

2.3.8 Review Directive Dataset

Table 2-5 provides the column headings and a brief description of the content of each of the columns in the dataset.

Table 2-5: RD Dataset Descriptors

Dataset Column	Description
RD Number	Identification name abbreviation and number given to each Review Directive by the issuing administration
Title	Title of the directive
Date	Full date of when the directive was issued
Day Issued	Specific day the directive was issued, drawn from Date
Month Issued	Specific month the directive was issued, drawn from Date
Year Issued	Specific Year the directive was issued, drawn from Date

Table 2-5: RD Dataset Descriptors

Dataset Column	Description
Issued By	Name of person whose signature is found on the directive
Directed to 1- 28	Titles of the specific members of the administration requested to provide information
President	Name of president whose administration issued the directive
Party ID	Name of political party of the issuing administration
Country	Name of the country who is the focus/target of the directive
State Abbreviation (State Abbrv)	Abbreviation of the country name draw from the Correlates of War data
Country Code	Numerical identifier assigned to the country by the Correlates of War data
Region	Region of the world in which the target country is found
Region ID	Numerical identifier assigned to denote the global region of the target country
Comments	General notes included by the coder

Review Directives function in a space similar to Category 2 NSDs: Information Requests.

Both RDs and Category 2 NSDs allow presidents and their NSA's to ask questions and pull on threads in policy recommendations that are presented as options in response to an event or crisis. The need for the creation of the RDs, while Category 2 NSDs are still in use, during the Nixon administration seemed to be another way to provide an opportunity for the president and his NSA to mete out details about a situation that would result in the creation of reports from the members of the president's cabinet. NSDs which serve as information requests, become more about clarification than information gathering once RDs are implemented and become more part of the policy development process rather than serving to get the initial lay of the land. For example, a consistent issue of foreign and national security policy which faced the Nixon administration was the military action in Vietnam. During the first year of the administration, RDs were issued by then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger with the intent of gathering information about the status of US engagement in Vietnam, both in the past and what could be done for the future. As a Category 2 NSD, NSA Kissinger issued NSDM 63 (Kissinger 1970) to the Secretaries of State, Defense, the CIA, the US Information Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more information about the work being done to develop and implement Psychological Warfare operations in Vietnam. While the RDs related to Vietnam request the

information the administration needed to get a sense of what their policy stance should be, NSDM 63 is an example of a very narrow program which the administration was interested in finding out more information about its progress. A topic such as the development and potential deployment of operations of psychological warfare is a prime example of a topic of NSDs that benefit from their classified nature; it is quite clear that a tactic such as this was developed to give the United States an edge in a conflict that had become costly and protracted and maintaining secrecy around it was vital to its success on the battlefield. The narrowness of this Category 2 NSD presents a sharp contrast to the broadness of the Vietnam related RDs during this time.

Review Directives follow the same template as NSDs, in that they are given a different name within every administration, as seen in Table 2-6. The inclusion of the “RD Number” variable in the dataset allows for a list of the abbreviated names and the issued number of the RD within each administration from Nixon to the current Trump administration.

Table 2-6: Names of RDs by Administration

President	Name Given to RDs During Administration	Abbreviation
Nixon	National Security Study Memorandums	NSSM
Ford	National Security Study Memorandums	NSSM
Carter	Presidential Review Memorandums	PRM
Reagan	National Security Study Directives	NSSD
Bush	National Security Reviews	NSR
Clinton	Presidential Review Directives	PRD
GW Bush	No distinction between NSDs and RDs	NSPD
Obama	Presidential Study Directives	PSD
Trump	No distinction between NSDs and RDs	NSPM

While the RD portion of the dataset is similarly organized as that of the NSD portion, because of the nature of these directives, there are some differences in the information used to organize them that might be important to future research. One difference between the NSD and

RD dataset is the breakdown of the date on which the RD was issued. Identifying the specific day, month, and year an RD was issued is important because some presidents will issue multiple RDs on the same day. For example, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 were issued on January 21, 1969, the day after the inauguration of President Nixon, by the president's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, as means of understanding the lay of the land about issues deemed of great importance for national security ranging from "NSSM 1-The Situation in Vietnam" (Kissinger 1969) to "NSSM 7-US International Monetary Policy," (Kissinger 1969b) communicating the range of ongoing situations that faced the Nixon administration on the first day on the job. Similarly to the NSDs, RDs are issued by a few people, mainly either the president or their NSA, making it necessary that a distinction be made on the issuer.

A purposeful inclusion in the RD dataset not found in the NSD dataset is the specific identification of the members of the president's administration who were required to provide information, communicated through the *Directed To* variables. In Chapter 4.0, the identification of networks within a president's administration used to provide information to the president will be discussed. As will be discussed in Chapter 3.0, the role of the president's advisors, those who sit both on the president's Principals Committee and those who are outside of the NSC can influence the way that policies are developed (Whipple 2017, Dickinson 2009) and implemented, especially in the case of the advisors who were political appointees, based on perspectives they bring to their roles.

Taking the time to individually identify the members of the audience of the Review Directives can provide future researchers the opportunity to delve more deeply into the roles of advisors and perhaps even identify a pattern in who different presidents look to in a more regular

manner and what their influence might have had on the actions taken by that administration.

Similar to the NSD dataset, specific information from the RDs on the target state, the president and their party ID, and comments about the contents of the RDs rounds out this dataset.

2.4 NSD and RD Information Flow

Figure 2-2, Figure 2-3, and Figure 2-4 are offered as generalized pathways of the flow of information related to NSDs and RDs.




Figure 2-2: RDs and Category 1, 2 NSDs Flow of Communication




Figure 2-3: RDs and Category 1, 2 NSDs Flow of Communication, Response

Figure 2-2 visualizes the pathway in which presidents can ask for more information through an RD or Category 2 NSD or share a note through the issuance of a Category 1 NSD. Emanating from the president, an RD or a Category 2 NSD is addressed to members of the Principals Committee or other senior members of the administration. The questions included in the RD are then assigned to the different NSC members based on what department might be best suited to respond to a question. In some cases, the president takes care of this part of the division of labor by addressing questions to specific members and their department. The questions are then sent to the NSC Staff, through the Deputies Committee, for responses to be formulated.

Figure 2-3 follows up the issuance of an RD or Category 1 or 2 NSD with some sort of a response, such as a memo or white paper. Responses to questions from the president or the NSA are developed initially by the NSC staff and then passed on to the Deputies Committee for any additions to the response they may feel necessary. The response is then sent to the Principals Committee, which takes into account information contributed by member of their respective cabinets who have expertise in the RD or NSD topic. Once the Principals Committee finalizes the text of the response, it is sent to the president.




Figure 2-4: Category 3, 4 NSDs Policy Implementation Flow

Figure 2-4 provides a visualization of the pathway of issuance for completed Category 3 and 4 NSDs. Completed Category 3 and 4 NSDs follow the same path of development as seen in Figure 2-3. Once a president issues a Category 3 or 4 NSD, the text of the NSD is returned to the NSC through its Principals Committee, who then take it to their respective departments for implementation.

2.5 Decline in the Use of NSDs and RDs

The historical use of NSDs has been one as a repository and a paper trail. The initial reliance on NSDs as a way to pass notes, ask someone to do something, tell someone what they are expected to do, and to communicate firm policy decisions is a lot to ask of so singular a tool. The reality is that because this was the primary avenue of corralling the sprawling foreign policy infrastructure, it was the tool of choice to be implemented. As telecommunications technology developed (Gans 2020), the NSD began to be a vehicle of mundane communications. The noticeable drop in Notes, Information Requests, and Policy Communications seen after the Reagan administration, as shown in Figure 2-5, is a byproduct of the shift.




Figure 2-5: NSD Categories by President

Table 2-7: Count of NSDs by Category

Count of NSDs Per Category						
President	Note	Info Req	Policy Comm	Military Pol	Still Classified	Grand Total
Kennedy	49	77	84	62		
Johnson	14	23	31	32	1	101
Nixon	22	18	99	123	2	264
Ford	5	5	19	53	2	84
Carter	8	3	16	35	1	63
Reagan	21	15	94	165		295
H.W. Bush	5		33	31	18	87
Clinton	6		24	18	30	78
W. Bush	5		26	16	35	82
Obama	1		12	1	30	44
Trump	1	2	9	2	3	17
Grand Total	137	143	447	538	122	1387

Table 2-8: Percent (%) Change of NSDs Issued by Administration

	Compared to 2nd Admin (%)											
		Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Ford	Carter	Reagan	H.W. Bush	Clinton	W. Bush	Obama	Trump
First Admin (%)	Kennedy	100	269	103	324	432	92	313	349	332	618	1600
	Johnson	37	100	38	120	160	34	116	129	123	230	594
	Nixon	97	261	100	314	419	89	303	338	322	600	1553
	Ford	31	83	32	100	133	28	97	108	102	191	494
	Carter	23	62	24	75	100	21	72	81	77	143	371
	Reagan	108	292	112	351	468	100	339	378	360	670	1735
	H.W. Bush	32	86	33	104	138	29	100	112	106	198	512
	Clinton	29	77	30	93	124	26	90	100	95	177	459
	W. Bush	30	81	31	98	130	28	94	105	100	186	482
	Obama	16	44	17	52	70	15	51	56	54	100	259
	Trump	6	17	6	20	27	6	20	22	21	39	100
	<- Preceding Proceeding->											

As seen in Table 2-7, more recent administrations issue fewer NSDs as compared to past administrations. The peak of NSD issuance occurs during the Reagan administration and begins

to decline with the George H.W. Bush administration. During the 8 years of President Reagan's term his administration issued a total of 295 NSDs, as seen in Table 2-8, 108% more than the NSDs issued during the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy's 272 NSDs represent a sizable amount of the total NSD population issued, which is surprising given his abbreviated time in office. In comparing the percentages of NSDs issued by more recent presidents, there is a marked decline.

In the space of the NSC, Klijn and Koppenjan's (2012) expectation that an increasingly "mediatized" environment makes institutions more aware of potential risks will yield networks that follow a path that leads to more "efficiency and transparency, with network governance-like provisions enhancing interaction and commitment" is seen in the publication of many, though not all, Trump administration NSDs. The pressure for increased transparency with government action of all types presents another reason for the creation of this dataset. It remains to be seen if the choice to publish more of these directives directly to the Federal Register marks a shift in the secrecy surrounding these documents or if this administration's decision is an outlier.

Nevertheless, providing a usable method for understanding the whole population of available NSDs is an opportunity for increasing our understanding of the NSC, presidential national security, presidential foreign policy making, as well as an opportunity for more immediate oversight of presidential actions.

National Security Directives and the actions both coordinated by and of the NSC provide a meditation on the power of the executive in the arena of foreign policy. Reading through and thinking on the progression of policy communicated through these documents shows the ways in which the executive, through the NSC and the NSA, identifies situations that merit the level of scrutiny of the issuance of a Review or Decision Directive, seeks council, and acts upon new

information. The paper trail of the process created by the historical NSDs presents the modern use of NSDs in an even more stark light. The insight gained toward reading through in chronological order the NSDs related to the negotiations around the START treaties during the Reagan administration, for example, show the agility and the responsiveness of the executive, empowering negotiators to respond in the room in a way that meets with the president's ideas for the optimal position of the United States. The shift presented by later administrations of moving away from the documents for the use of Information Requests or Notes, presents challenges not only for those who study the policy making process but for democratic institutions as a whole. By choosing to rely on emails to take the place of the lower level NSDs, there is general loss of institutional memory about the policy making process within administrations. There are obvious benefits to the use of modern telecommunications, but there is also an inherent loss of transparency within that choice. The presumption that future presidents and their administrations will request, sift through, and organize the steps of policy making that a past administration undertook is a truly implausible expectation, but that inadvertently affects the way that we as researchers access that information as well, adding to the gap between the findings of academics and the actors within the policy making process.

National Security Directives are more than just anachronisms of days gone by; they are a vital part in helping us understand how we got to where we are.

In undertaking the work to weed through the population of these directives, future researchers and policy makers will be able to see patterns of decision making emerge, to help them consider their own ideas and steps within the policy making process relative to situations presented to them. We know that while actors, circumstances, and minute details may change, state decisions usually bear some level of similarity to each other. NSDs and RDs are useful tools to see what

solutions administrations of the past tried in specific situations. There is always a risk that administrations will make the same mistakes as the past, but these documents at least present a starting point for information. Still, knowing the process undertaken in the past, seeing the thought process of policy making, and bearing witness to the responsiveness of decision makers is an important part of understanding our government and ourselves.

Even those these directives were and continue to be available, their focus has shifted, which makes it look like their use is in decline (Gans 2020). The rise of rapid telecommunication and the shift in how quickly events in the world change have worked to show that these documents serve only to constrain modern presidents, rather than allow them a sense of agility. Shifting the focus of NSDs to increased Policy Communications and Military Policy directives, and the merging, or lack of differentiation, between review directives and Category 2 decision directives supports the idea of the NSC moving towards acting only on what is the grand strategy focus of US foreign policy. NSDs as a whole starts out helping us understand organization and ends with helping us understand national interest as identified by each administration.

2.6 NSD and RD Conclusion

Understanding the complex nature of the foreign and national security policy making process helps us understand how presidents take their broad constitutional powers and apply them to actions that speak to their own vision for the United States. NSDs and RDs are key to understanding what information presidents feel like they need, what information they get, who they get it from, and what they do with it. The classified nature of these documents creates a space for presidents and their advisors to work through their options and preferences related to a foreign policy decision with limited scrutiny. In a policy development sense, this is a positive because it allows for more frank conversations where presidents and their advisors can voice their true preferences with relatively low costs. The NSC, in the case of these directives, is

responsible for gathering information from the disparate departments who might be seen as stakeholders relative to a specific issue, analyzing and synthesizing that information, and then converting it into usable policy and its accompanying objectives. The scope of the population of NSDs and RDs show just this, which is why including these directives in understanding how presidents arrive at their preferences and decisions is key. To leave these documents out of the conversation, is to purposefully ignore a trove of information that is the communication of the true preferences of an administration.

The dataset offered by this study is its most substantive offering. As with all datasets, there are many parts that require constant updating, especially as NSDs and RDs are declassified or made available by the respective presidential libraries. Focusing on this population of directives and offering way to make sense of them, and drive utility from them is important in the larger conversation of understanding presidents, their advisors and how they develop foreign and national security policy. Use of this dataset in the future, and the proposed example in Chapter 5.0 will provide a rounding out of the policy making process that has been lacking as of now.

3.0 Literature Review and Preliminary Testable Hypotheses

National Security Directives (NSDs) were initially created to serve as a means through which a president could communicate (Dwyer 2002, Relyea 2003, Gordon 2007, Gordon 2010) their thoughts on an issue, request information, further embodied in the later created Review Directives (RDs), and share their broad national security and foreign policy objectives with the members of their administration responsible for implementing said policy. President Lyndon Johnson describe these directives as “a formal notification to the head of a department or other government agency informing him of a presidential decision in the field of national security affairs and generally requiring follow-up action by the department or agency addressed.” (Cooper 2002) With the creation of the National Security Council through the National Security Act of 1947, these directives initially “developed as a vehicle for discussion at [National Security Council] meetings, originated from the council’s members, executive secretaries, and support staff, most coming from the Departments of State and Defense.” (Relyea 2003)

National Security Directives (NSDs) and Review Directives (RDs) support the institutionalization of presidential power in foreign policy by providing definition of the NSC’s role in the national security and foreign policy making process. The decisions an administration makes in relation to national security and foreign policy must consider electoral pressures, interbranch pressures, international pressures, and public opinion. Presidents look to the NSC as either advisors or as main policy actors and use to communicate preferences and the broad objectives they would like to see in US policy related to issues of national security. With the introduction of Review Directives during the Nixon administration, it became clearer to see what the experience and the thought processes that the presidents as individual brought into the role. The contents NSDs communicate not only the way that each president saw the presidency as an institution that is both responsive as events arise but also how each president can build a legacy

for themselves in the way they use the tools of foreign policy and military policy available to them. NSDs chart the diverse pathway of American foreign policy as well as developing a long-standing place for the NSC.

Much in the same way executive orders sketch the scope, depth, and breadth of the abilities of the departments that make up the cabinet and communicate the way that presidents see to the enforcement of laws, NSDs and RDs suit the same purpose for the arenas of national security and foreign policy. The language of NSDs and RDs denote a sense of trust between presidents and their NSC in that these directives show presidents and their advisors at their most vulnerable point in the policy making process. Asking questions, analyzing response, and synthesizing that information into coherent policy is a task that forces presidents to rely on other people; understand who is giving the president answers is as important as the answers given. We know little about how president's use NSDs to navigate complex institutional barriers, but through the use of the dataset developed in this study, researchers will have more information to include in models to better identify presidential motivation and responses to each president's sense of the extent of their own power within the foreign policy space.

Because of the classified nature of these directives, it is challenging to see their utility in real time. In considering the historical directives, the population has not been presented in an organized, meaningful way. Organization of this population is key to draw attention to the depth of the content included in these directives and to help future researchers to fill in specific gaps, or provide specific support to arguments and theories, as might be needed. From Gordon's work on this topic, the subject of NSDs is a good indicator of how long something will take to declassify. The issue this poses is that while the NSD number may be available to researchers, the titles themselves might not be available, so it can be difficult to assess completely the scope of topics a

president's NSDs might cover. By classifying these documents, the executive branch is offered protection from Congressional oversight, an issue presented by the GAO in 1989 (Kelley 1989) and 1992 (Kelley 1992), making it difficult for anyone, including researchers, to use these documents as a starting point to build a deeper understanding of the NSC and the national security powers of the president. A second impediment to understanding the breadth of actions originating from NSDs is that the presidents themselves are in charge of setting the length of time for when these documents will be released. This is a "significant testimony to the ability of the president to act unilaterally with the acquiescence of Congress and the courts" (Gordon 2010) since neither of the other two branches of government have been able to successfully mandate declassification. Innovations like the Freedom of Information Act create the opportunity for access to these directives, but their existence as documents of national security mean that there is still a great deal of reticence to allow their publication. While the Obama administration altered access to these documents through the creation of the National Declassification Center, there is still no expectation of regular reclassification. Allowing NSDs to remain classified and allowing presidents to maintain control over what is classified and what isn't further supports secrecy and classification as part of the institution of the presidency.

The main contribution of this study is the organization of the population of NSDs and RDs into a format that could facilitate future research. The lack of scholarly work around NSDs and RDs in the field is a byproduct of what is missing from the field; identified by Dwyer (2002), started in Gordon's work, and what is offered through the dataset in this study is a way to view at the population of NSDs in an organized manner in order to see their use in the broader picture of the foreign and national security policy making process, contributing to the lack of scholarly work about NSDs in general. While the National Security Act of 1947 established the

National Security Council and sketched out the role that Congress envisioned for this organization, presidents are given a great deal of leeway as to how the NSC actually functions. These directives provide both policy prescriptions as well as give insight into how those policies develop within the NSC. Conceptualizing the basis of the president's power to have a particular policy position and then act on it brings an understanding the importance and role of these directives. Without considering the basis of presidential power, especially in foreign policy, these directives cannot be regarded usable tools through which an administration might implement their policy preferences.

3.1 Presidential Power

Within this space, the question of whether the power of the presidency comes from the structure or the inhabitant, is central to our understanding of the presidency as an institution. Neustadt argues that presidential power comes from through bargaining with other institutions. Success in bargaining, thereby enhancing the power of the president and adding to the developmental power of the institution, but that the power of the institution is influence, in and of itself, "power through persuasion by bargaining with them." (Neustadt 1960) Neustadt's theory of presidential power is used in this study to present a counter look to the unitary theory. Neustadt's theory of power being based in the personality speaks more to Preston's (2001) work on the different types of presidents.

Yoo argues that there are broad formal powers, in that whatever the president does, that Congress does not expressly push back on is part of the president's power. Neustadt says the powers are limited and defined, but can be extended through bargaining- in both cases the source of power is the Constitution, but power extension is where the argument these two ideas diverge. Because NSDs are classified, they support Yoo's (2010) of the unilateral ability to act in the realm of national security and foreign policy. Burke (2016) identifies types of power, such as

symbolic, ambition, loyalty, charismatic, expertise and knowledge based, rational persuasion, manipulative, dominant, coercive, and agenda, which better encompasses the variety of power that the office has, due to its scope, and the by linking the fundamental arguments of Yoo and Neustadt. Yoo's stance on presidential power is viewed through the lens of a compliant, copartisan congress who made the active choice not to push back of expansions of the institution of the presidency during the George W. Bush administration. The Bush administration expanded presidential power by creating new norms of behavior through their increase in the implementation of their policy preferences through unilateral action. Because the presidency is a developmental institution, in that what the previous president does lays the foundation for where the next president starts, all presidents that come after President Bush are at a structural advantage than the presidents that come before them. It certainly does not mean that every proceeding president will take advantage of shifting norms, but it certainly leaves the space open for that choice. In this way, the NSDs and RDs of past presidencies present future presidencies with some sort of a jumping off point, allowing them not to reinvent the wheel of national security and foreign policy if they don't want to. The candor and frankness communicated through these directives presents the truest form of an administration's rationale for action. The actions taken by an administration's departments at the behest of the president and the NSC are a tangible representation of Yoo's ideas about presidential power springing from the unilateral actions of a president.

The overall literature is split on if the domestic political environment has a definitive influence on the president's policy choices. What presidents really have is more agency, unilaterally as Yoo (2010) would argue, to steer foreign policy more than domestic policy to align with their broader sense of what the US is, where it might go, and how it might get there.

President are seen as the more responsible party in solving all problems, foreign and domestic, which makes Americans believe that presidents have more power (Fisher 2002) than they actually do. In dealing with the public and Congress, presidents implement some form of the poliheuristic decision making theory (Christensen and Redd 2004) which helps the president sort through policy options using basic elements and then analyzing the remaining policy options based on what could maximizing political benefits while minimizing political costs. Presidents experience audience costs (Fearon 1994), which manifest as negative electoral outcomes, for implementing policies that voters consider to be counter to their preferences. Presidents are less likely (Lindsey and Hobbs 2015) to spend time on foreign affairs closer to elections because domestic issues are more salient to voters. Even though presidents choose not to bring some international issues into their campaigns, it does not mean that incumbent presidents forego their foreign policy role. Presidents, distracted by the domestic focus of campaigns, usually experience less than optimal diplomatic outcomes (Lindsey and Hobbs 2015) for the United States, should low level policy situations emerge. One limitation associated with this argument is that they authors do not consider the president's term as an intervening factor. More analysis is needed to understand if presidential reelection concerns carry the same weight in a president's policy considerations as those surrounding the potential reelection of the party.

Considering the room that these directives give presidents to act independently of Congress, it begs the question of when do presidents issue more NSDs and RDs. In line with the arguments of Yoo, presidents should be able to act unilaterally whenever they see fit.

Hypothesis: *Presidents will issue more NSDs at the beginning of their terms in office.*

The temporal element of this hypothesis is predicated on the expectation that a president will use their position as a newly elected leader to do more initially to force the national security and the foreign policy apparatuses to tack towards their preferences. The strength of their position as the winner of an election provides them with the political cover to eschew the Neustadian expectation of using their personality to bargain their way toward building the environment they want and do more to establish the NSC and the scope of its actions through imposition.

Using the dataset developed for this study, a table was created to organize the number of NSDs issued by president, by category number, and by year, as seen in Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 in 7.2 Appendix: NSD Tables. The NSDs included in the table are both classified and unclassified, which presents a problem in determining in what year exactly some of these NSDs were issued. Out of the available set of 1387, 55 still remain classified, bringing the total number of the NSDs used in validating this hypothesis to 1332.

As seen in Table 7-1 and Table 7-2, the presidents included, from Kennedy to Trump, issue the highest number of directives in their administration in the first or second year of their term. In two term presidents, such as Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, the bulk of the NSDs come in their first term. While the data may show a higher number of NSDs early in a term or in a first term, it is not possible to determine that the motivation for the issuance was because a president is presumed to have more power early and in a first term, when they enter office on the back of an election victory. To assume that presidents issue more NSDs simply ‘because they can’ undercuts the utility of these directives as documents of response; NSDs are issued as national security and foreign policy threats arise. However, it would be reasonable to assume that the higher number of NSDs initially in a president’s term is reflective

of the issuance of NSDs focused on organizing the NSC to reflect the preferences and policy priorities of the new president.

Because of the function of review directives, the weight of these directives as acts of unilateral action are not applicable. These directives will and will continue to be exercises in fact finding, presidents don't have to worry about potential repercussions for asking the questions that they need to in order to get a better understanding of the environment they are functioning in.

Hypothesis: *Presidents issue more RDs in the first year of their term.*

RDs function as directives through which a president can compel their advisors to provide information and context relative to identified events or threats in foreign policy and national security. A new president can use his first few months in office to get a sense of the state of the country they are inheriting from their predecessor. Even though presidents-elect and presidential candidates have access to the presidential level of security briefings, the documents of policy and process within an administration may not be available to them until they actually step foot in the West Wing.

Using the dataset created through this study, Table 7-3 shows that newly elected presidents, from Nixon to Obama, use their first year in office to issue more RDs than in the years that come after that. President Nixon was the first president to issue RDs and issued 85 in his first year alone with the rest of his abbreviated term seeing the issuance of fewer RDs per year. Of the presidents included in this dataset, President Nixon issues the most RDs, a total of 206, over the course of his term, as compared to the following presidents who issue fewer. President Ford is a noticeable outlier in the presidents who issued RDs during their tenure in

office. During his term in office following President Nixon's resignation, President Ford's first year in office is marked by the lowest issuance of RDs, only 8, for the entirety of his term.

The policy choices that presidents make through the NSDs and RDs they issue are examples of how presidents can use their powers in the realm of foreign and national security policy without having to gain Congressional support. The ability of a president to act unilaterally in the face of an imminent or identified threat allows the institution of the presidency to hold on its power to deftly respond to a situation as it arises. The choice of when to issue an NSD or an RD is generally one that is responsive to event and not directly related a specific time in their presidency.

3.2 Congress

A president's choice to use force is as much influenced by the international environment as by the domestic environment. While the Constitution places the power to declare war squarely in the hands of Congress, the president is given the responsibility to setting and implementing foreign policy. In his role as Commander in Chief (Corwin 1957), the president can utilize his power over the military in times of declared war or in time of emergency. Vagueness associated with the declaration of states of emergency presents the president with an opportunity to direct military action when they see fit. Ostrom and Job (1986) argue that a president would be moved to employ military force when "the situation involved a perceived current threat to the territorial security of the U.S., its current allies, major clients, or proxy states; the situation posed a perceived danger to U.S. government, military, or diplomatic personnel; to significant numbers of U.S. citizens, or to U.S. assets; events were perceived as having led, or likely to lead to advances by ideologically committed opponents of the U.S. (i.e., communists or 'extreme leftists' broadly defined) be they states, regimes, or regime contenders; events were perceived as likely to lead to losses of U.S. influence in regions perceived as within

the U.S. sphere of influence, especially viewed as Central and South America; events involved inter-state military conflict of potential consequences; in human and strategic terms; or events, because of civil disorder, threatened destruction of a substantial number of persons.” Military deployments outside of instances of declared war are more an example of executive power (Howell and Pevehouse 2005) than of congressional authority over foreign policy.

Because these directives are a tool of a National Security Council over which Congress has very little control over, NSDs represent a path for presidents to make end runs around Congress and implement policies that could force Congress’s hand to act in a manner counter to their preferences, asserting a facet of the unilateral powers (Gordon 2007) of the president in foreign policy. This is, unsurprisingly, troubling to Congress as it represents an expansion of executive power that can be potentially problematic for separation of powers and checks and balances between two institutions of the US government. In 1989, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued “The Use of Presidential Directives to Make and Implement US Policy,” a study commissioned to look at how exactly NSDs were used by the executive branch since their inception in 1947. Updated in 1992 both of these studies relay that these documents are used to “...[establish] policy, [direct] the implementation of policy, and [authorize] the commitment of government resources.” (Kelley 1989, 1992) These documents generally differ from executive orders because “NSDs embody foreign and military policy-making guidance...are classified, are usually directed only to NSC and the most senior executive branch officials, and do not appear to be used under statutory authority conferred by Congress and thus do not have the force and effect of law.” (Kelley 1989) This difference communicates a general understanding that the executive branch is within its rights to keep these documents classified but the GAO advises that there should be, at the very least, notification of some kind given to Congress regarding the

contents of these documents, mainly because they can dictate the use of funds given to the executive branch for use in policy implementation. In 1988, “The Presidential Directives and Record Accountability Act” was introduced onto the floor of the House to rectify the lapse in communication with Congress noted by the use of these directives and hearings on the bill were heard in August of 1988, but it appears to have died in committee. (Brooks 1988) In the 1992 update to this report, the need for at the very least Congressional committee communication is again stressed but it appears that no further action was taken to pressure the administration to provide information, even unclassified versions of these directives, related to these actions.

NSDs and RDs tell an interesting story about unilateralism and its institutionalization within the presidency. The creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947 was an important step in expanding presidential powers and providing a means through which a president can create and implement policy in an insulated environment. The NSC, itself is part of the Executive Office of the President, taking it out of the stream of executive agencies and departments that would normally have to submit to even the most minimal amount of oversight from Congress. As such, NSDs, RDs, and even the person who sits in the role of National Security Advisor (NSA) all exist without the direct oversight of Congress. Giving control over the processes used to identify and respond to threats to national security gives presidents the ability to respond quickly and decisively, as is owed to the position through its Commander in Chief powers, further institutionalizing the greater level of unilateralism presidents have in foreign policy, generally, and in national security policy, specifically. Using the National Security Act of 1947 to permanently expand the portfolio of the president to explicitly include national security and only include limited comments about the oversight that Congress would

have of the president in this realm, established the environment into which NSDs would be introduced and applied.

National security is, through the room given to presidents by Congress, whatever the president says: if there is an NSD, it means the president is stating the relevant issue is part of national security. (Gordon 2007) Furthermore, if there is an NSD, it is part not only of national security policy but it is clear that the inciting incident presents a threat to national security. It is also clear that since presidents are not required to brief congress on NSDs, or even make them available to congressmembers, that power of the president, vis a vis national security, is entrenched. The National Security Strategy, a report to Congress mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987 (“National Security Strategy 1987” 2012) communicates to Congress “prioritized objectives and indicating which elements of national power (“ways and means”) are to be used to meet them, it can provide guidance to departments and agencies to use in their internal processes for budgeting planning and executing, and organizing, training, and equipping personnel,...clearly linking goals and the approaches designed to meet them, national security strategy can provide the executive branch a key tool for justifying requested resources to Congress. By laying out a detailed strategic vision, it can help inform public audiences both at home and abroad about U.S. government intent.” (Dale 2008) argues that “Congress can continue to shape the role that strategy documents play in the national security system through legislative requirements regarding the types of strategic documents required, their primary and contributing authors, their contents, their relationships with other strategic documents, their deadlines for delivery, and their form of delivery (classified or unclassified).” Within the population of available NSDs, there are only two references specifically to “national security strategy”: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 32 and 238, both from the Reagan

administration. Within these NSDs there is no mention of the “National Security Strategy”, as it pertains to the congressionally required report, indicating that NSDs and the National Security Strategy are distinct documents. As the NSC’s main function is to be the originator of national security analysis, there is an expectation that the report and the directives would be linked, but that is not the case.

Instances where the president chooses to commit American forces can be an opportunity to divert the attention of citizens (Mitchell and Prins 2004, Fordham 1998) from periods of drastic domestic changes, such as an economic crisis. Use of force by democracies is limited due to the requirements of transparency) the electorate places on the government, however democratic leaders are still able to engage US armed forces in action to divert the attention of the public from poor domestic conditions. Domestic difficulties (Ostrom and Job 1986) color a president’s decision to use force more than international considerations.

The presidential congressional relationship is as susceptible to turmoil in foreign policy as in domestic policy. Presidents receive different levels of support based on their ideology (Prins and Marshall 2001) and the issue area the policy is concerned with; congress members are more likely to support Republican presidents in foreign policy areas than Democratic presidents, but this finding is not seen in terms of trade policy. While the authors account for ideology in terms of the House, they leave out the Senate in their analysis. This is problematic because constitutionally the Senate has more power in terms foreign policy than the House. The authors also take into account the role that the president’s approval has on support for a policy and find that it matters with foreign policy but not defense policy. This study lacks a clear analysis on why the difference exists but in considering past studies, the foreign policy issues may be more salient than defense policy issues. It would be interesting to understand more

about how the authors differentiate between foreign and defense policy issues, just to make sure there is not a high level of correlation between these two.

Congressional action to provide statutory constraints, such as with the War Powers Act, is proof of the interagency power struggle. At issue between Congress and the President is a deeper level of disagreement. The author argues that decisions made with a small group, away from the public forum may be better. Issues that are higher on the president's agenda, meaning that they are more likely to go to the public to garner support, are more likely to be dealt with in line with the president's wishes.

Public opinion and congressional support for presidential policies are linked. All elected officials fall to the mercy of public support at some point in their political lives. In this case, congress can use public opinion as a yard stick to determine how they should approach a president's foreign policy decisions when the opportunity arises. Actions that incur the ire of the public can be used by an opposition Congress to punish the president on their proposed domestic agenda while currying public favor for their own party. Presidents benefit from considering the public and Congress as they apply a poliheuristic decision making model to their foreign policy preferences.

The presidential working relationship with Congress is one that generally sets the tone for the success of an administration's policy portfolio. Especially in the realm of domestic policy, presidents require congressional support to bring any of their plans to fruition. Including NSDs and RDs in conversations about foreign and national security policy, it is clear that presidents are given vehicles, by Congress, to act quickly and decisively, but it does beg the question of whether the relationship a president has with Congress influences their propensity to issue NSDs. As noted earlier, while NSDs, specifically, do not have the same level of impact to

direct the actions of government entities as executive orders do, they are still directives that provide guidelines for the action undertaken by government agencies to implement the policy preferences of a president. Executive orders provide a certain level of unilateral action, though perhaps not as much as an NSD, on the part of presidents, and are usually employed to alter the implementation of a law to align with the preferences of an administration without the executive waiting on Congress to change the text of the law so that it more closely meets the objectives that an administration wants.

Hypothesis: *Presidents, in instances of divided government will issue more NSDs.*

Presumably, presidents will need to invoke unilateral powers more when faced with Congressional blockading the implementation of their policy preferences. Using administrative tools, such as presidential signing statements, proclamations, or executive orders, presidents can make an end run around a less than obliging Congress to take their policy ideas and put them into action. Issuing an NSD provides a firmer foundation for presidential unilateral actions and their consistent use serves as to further institutionalize these directives as policy documents and the NSC as part of the foreign and national security policy process.

To test this hypothesis, a table was created using the dataset developed in this project to compare the number of NSDs issued per year when the government of the United States was either unified or divided. Unified government was defined as any point between the years of 1961 to 2018, the years associated with NSDs included in the current iteration of the dataset, where the White House, the Senate, and the House of Representatives were all ideologically similar; there was either a Democrat or Republican in the White House and majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives was of the same party as the president. From the years

1961 to 2018, the United States experienced 28 years of unified government. For example, in the year 2009, President Obama, a Democrat, took office with a Democratic majority in both the House of Representatives and Senate. From the years 1961 to 2018, the United States experienced 36 years of divided government in which there was a difference in the political ideology among the President, the House of Representatives, and the Senate. For example, in the year 1996, President Clinton, a Democrat, was faced with a Republican majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Under the definition of divided government in this test, 1996 is considered the same as 1981, the first year of Republican president Ronald Reagan's first term, experienced divided government with a Republican president, a Republican majority in the Senate, but a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives.

Performing a simple count of the NSDs issued between 1961 and 2018, excluding classified NSDs that did not have a year of their issuance available, 835 NSDs were issued during years of divided government and 618 NSDs were issued during years of unified government. Based on a simple count, it would seem that the hypothesis is correct, that presidents take more unilateral actions, characterized in this case by the issuing of an NSD, in times of divided government. It should be cautioned that a test of this kind may not be as fully explanatory as may be supposed. Future research, using the information included in this dataset as a jumping off point, will need to take into account whether or not there was an ongoing or identified threat to national security or foreign policy during a specific period of unified or divided government. Because the issuance of an NSD is predicated by an issue of national security or foreign policy, it may make show a more clear and powerful correlation between the issuance of an NSD and the unified or divided nature of the government at that time.

Another feature of the dataset that would be useful in determining the category of NSD

is issued during times of unified or divided government, particularly when there is an identified threat or crisis which requires a foreign or national security policy response. The preliminary test included in this section of the study looked at the total number of NSDs issued, without taking into account whether those NSDs were Notes, Information Requests, Policy Communications, or directives of Military Policy. Future research may benefit from applying the category numbers to periods when a crisis intersects with unified or divided government to see if there are more policy focused NSDs issued, which would support the idea that especially in divided government presidents are take more unilateral actions, as opposed to information seeking NSDs. This work would have to also account for the downturn in the use of Category 2- Information Requests beginning during the Nixon administration and take into account the number RDs issued as well.

3.3 Influence of Advisors on Policy

NSDs and RDs provide insight into the policy making process within administration by helping to explain how policies move from idea to implementation as well as identifying nodes of power within the policy making process. By clearly identifying nodes of power, in this case the issuer of the NSD or RD, we can get a better sense of when factors exogenous to the actual policy making process impact terminal policy decisions. Through the identification of nodes of power, we are able to better identify who presidents look to and trust and how these nodes of power change in line with presidential types. (Preston 2001) Presidents who are adept at policy will, themselves, be the nodes of power; presidents who are not will more often choose someone else. Identifying nodes of power and relating it to presidential type is important to identify the networks that emerge in the policy making apparatus, clarifying who presidents look to for information and support. As the presidency expands in its scope of responsibility, the role of unelected advisors and civil servants becomes more important.

Presidents have the ability to set up their administrations to help meet their policy objectives. The relationships created and galvanized through the process of running for office and then running a government influence the way that presidents govern. Each administration (Paul 2008) enacts decisions that forms a foundation for future administrations to build off of. Policies implemented by one administration affect the trajectory of American foreign policy in general and the environment in which those decisions are made. As the issues that the US faces change, presidents must look to the process and institutions established by their predecessors as a way forward. Changes that a president makes to the structure of his administration can act as a template for future presidents, other governmental institutions, and the American people; the actions of one presidency establishes an expected pattern of behavior for the ones that come after. Standard operating systems in government rarely truly exist, but the action of one administration can create a framework that can be implemented by other administrations. Presidential decisions on the appropriate way to progress (Paul 2008) are as much influenced by their own preferences and the outcomes possible given the issue, dependent upon the social and political environment of the time. Presidents, like all elected officials, must walk the line between actions that benefit the state and actions that will get them reelected.

A president's "management of the federal bureaucracy" (Lowery 2000) is the barometer for the president's leadership style, in both foreign and domestic policy, because their choice of structure provides insight into their level of comfort with a particular policy sphere. Presidents use the knowledge and information of their advisors to create policy and communicate those policies to people. Even though it is important to take into consideration the fact that the presidency is an elected office, the president must retain "hierarchical control", in order to push his policy agenda.

Additionally, presidents must take control of their bureaucracies (Mayer 1999) and use their infrastructure to implement their unilateral actions. Haney (2005) argues that policy advisors not only take into account the context of a situation when they provide insight and counsel to the president, but also consider the political implications of an action. Many of the theories that attempt to explain the way presidents make policy (Haney 2005) do not always match with the environmental realities presidents face once in office. This is because there is a paucity of information which communicates the president's true preferences in a given situation. The complexity and minutia of the decision-making process form the basis of the more generalizable "ad hoc" decision making theories while "sequential and dynamic decision-making frameworks" (Kuperman and Ozkececi-Turner 2006) are tied to the type of decision-making environment the administration establishes. Christensen and Redd (2004) find that "when multiple military advisors gave political evaluations of the use of force, this was sufficient to lead decision makers to discount the negative political evaluation(s) of this option." The individuals that make up a president's cabinet and policy making apparatus can use their position and relationship with the president to provide legitimacy for their advice. These advisors are there to provide context and clarity (Garrison 2001) to dynamic, multidimensional foreign policy situations. These authors place a high level of importance on the role that organizational structures have on the larger policy making process. The individuals who are placed within an administration's decision-making units are people just like any others: they have ambitions and agendas of their own and must jockey for time with the president. The way that issues are framed by bureaucrats are as much in response to the situation as to their own ideas. Competing goals between advisors could present presidents with biased information that may take advantage of presidents who implement a more collegial decision-making process.

Not all parts of a bureaucracy may be included in the policy making process. Departments that deal with higher level policy areas rather than “missionary institutions” (Drezner 2000) are more likely to play a role in policy making. Ideas that come out of the bureaucracy make these department vital to an administration.

The policymaking process is affected to different extent, based on the type of president in the context of that particular intervention, by who is the central node of power and who is included in the decision-making process. NSDs and RDs provide information on both of those points and should be included in discussions about foreign policy making and policy development. Through the organization of the population of NSDs and RDs, it will be possible to fill in the gaps of how decisions to intervene develop, who was involved in the development, and better gauge the role of the exogenous factors of the policy making process. While some work exists on the flow of information within an administration, a large part of the conversation is missing without the inclusion of National Security Directives and Review Directives. Being exorcised from electoral pressures, the advisors to the president can think strategically given mainly the context provided by the information they have compiled; NSDs and RDs provide insight into this environment. The illumination of the pathways created by the information, advice, and policy options provided by the NSC and from the president to other departments via the NSC can provide a sense of the institutionalization of foreign policy making.

Managing the bottleneck in an administration requires the support of advisors who a president can delegate tasks to and trust that they will be done in line with the larger preferences of an administration. The bureaucracy that supports a president is made up of a mixture of career civil servants and political appointees, with the roles focused on policy implementation being overwhelmingly being filled by the latter. As the president becomes responsible for more issues,

they are required to negotiate with different institutions or people, each with their own preferences, in order to get the required work accomplished. As this environment becomes more diverse and crowded, presidents incur more transaction costs related to the policy options they intend to pursue. The increase in transaction costs brought on by negotiating with institutions outside of the White House, lead presidents to invest more in “institutionalizing their own in-house sources of bargaining expertise.” (Dickinson 2009) These expert sources, a president’s advisors, shape the presidency (Whipple 2017) through the decisions that are made as a result of the information that makes it to the president’s desk.

How a president seeks to structure his advisory environment has an effect on what information and policy options are presented. George (1980) presents the three options for administration structure: hierarchal, collegial, and competitive. A hierarchal structure sets a clearly delineated pathway for the flow of information that can be useful for a presidency in which a vast portfolio is institutionalized. A hierarchal structure implements the standard model (Walcott and Hull 2005) which can bring order to the chaos that can sometimes reign over a large group of advisors each vying for their personal preference to be translated into policy. A hierarchal structure presumes the president sits at its head, meaning that the choices of policy options presented to the president are more limited. While this model could help president solve his issue with the limited time they have to devote to creating policy solutions, this particular structure may not solve a president’s need for complete information. Both the collegial and competitive models create an opportunity for a president to be a part of the conversation. While this may not be the most efficient way a president might spend their time, it does help them overcome any information problems a president might face. Primary involvement of a president in the policy development stage in these two models, and not just the policy adoption stage as

would be expected in a hierarchical model, allows the final implemented policy to be more cohesive with a president's most true broad view for policy.

One way to use these directives is to identify these nodes of power in a presidency. These directives illuminate how policy solutions change to fit information as its presented to the nodes of power (Agranoff 2007) within the policy making structure. Identifying nodes of power is important because these individuals act as the filters for information which presidents use to make decisions in all aspects of their job. The role of the nodes of power identified through NSDs and RDs will be viewed, in this study, through the lens of decisions made by the United States to intervene in conflicts in foreign countries.

The path of information and decisions that proceed from NSC staffers, to the Deputies Committee, and finally to the Principals Committee is a true embodiment of presidents using their advisors to tailor the information they see relative to a specific policy option and allows them to use their policy making and implementation powers more efficiently. Even though the use of NSDs and RDs has declined since the 1990s, they still remain a part of the national security and foreign policy, now as a method of communication for the grand strategy preferences of an administration.

In domestic versus foreign policy, presidents are able to get a clearer assessment of the distinct components that make up the calculus of the decision-making process. Accounting for the true domestic policy preferences of copartisans and members of the opposition party is easier, ensuring that the policies that are being formulated and implemented are in sync. Obfuscation in domestic policy does not provide as many real benefits as it does in foreign policy. The environment of incomplete information that foreign policy functions in allows for countries to withhold true preferences to gain benefits in negotiations. Presidential advisors play

a greater role in helping presidents parse the motivations of other countries. Using their experience and their own intuition, individuals that make up the president's administration provide not only policy options, but their own impressions of the message other countries are sending. By focusing on the main actors within the foreign policy making infrastructure, it is easier to understand the impact of advisors in an environment that is more insulated.

Reimagining administration structures as networks will help us better understand the actual impact of the flow of information through presidential advisors.

While some work exists on the flow of information, within an administration, a large part of the conversation is missing without the inclusion of National Security Directives and Review Directives. NSDs and RDs provide insight into a vacuum where these pressures do not exist. Being exorcised from electoral pressures, the advisors to the president can think strategically given mainly the context provided by the information they have compiled.

The increasing institutionalization of the presidency and its subsequent expansion in size, creates the perception of an expansion of power. While the Constitution creates clear boundaries for the presidency, Congress can allow the president to take a more activist role in the law-making process by either creating legislation that does not give specific instructions to the executive branch or by not pushing back against administrations in actions they take that might appear expansionist. Constant expansion creates an environment of entropy that requires subsequent administrations to make choices on whether to build on the expansion of previous administration or make a sharp U-turn into scaling back on the size of the executive branch. Because of this expansion, the classical administration categories limit our understanding of the internal mechanics of the policy making process in the executive branch. Identification of networks within administrations, and the evolution and amendment of those networks throughout

the policy making process, helps explain the how presidents manage the sprawling quality of the executive branch.

The literature stated above communicates the field's current understanding of where a president's power comes from and what considerations are required when making policy decisions. Because a president has more agency in foreign policy to act and react to situations as they arise, partially because these situations require quick, decisive action, the way that presidents receive information, as well as the considerations they must weigh, is important.

As presidents begin their term in office, they are able to use the tools of the office to organize their administration in a way that supports their policy agenda. The advisors a president chooses to implement, in both Senate confirmed and non-Senate confirmed positions, can tell a great deal about what type of information and support a president might need and who precisely he might look to for that information. The NSC is an institution not directly subject to the oversight of the Senate. The National Security Advisor is appointed by the president, but is also not subject to a Senate confirmation. This lack of oversight or vetting by the Senate makes it even more meaningful to identify who the president looks to for advice.

Hypothesis: *As head of the National Security Council, presidents will rely mainly on their National Security Advisor for information.*

Within the population of NSDs and RDs, the RD is the more used directive through which the president can request information. While Category 2 NSDs also serve this same purpose, the RD has quickly supplanted them as the main vehicle used by presidents to ask specific questions related to the issues that face them. The dataset developed in this study creates separate organizational systems for NSDs and RDs. For RDs, each available directive is organized to include a list of the people to whom the directive is issued. As stated in Chapter

2.0, the targets of the directive are the particular advisors that a president wishes to hear from. The people included in RDs are the people who a president requires a response from, vis a vis a specific question included in the RD. The advisors chosen to be part of the RD may be members of the NSC's Principals or other committees, or they may be other officials outside of the NSC whose expertise or point of view might be useful to a president in regard to a specific matter.

The portion of the dataset focused on RDs runs from the Nixon to Obama administration. The George W. Bush and Trump Administrations are absent from this part of the dataset because these two presidents chose to use their NSD series as the only means of communication from the NSC. To determine who specifically a president issues an RD to, the total population of RDs was organized by president and each target is mentioned in either the body of the RD or in the "To" section of the RD's heading was separated out. Then a count of the titles of the listed advisors was done, per president, and the frequency of their inclusion in the population of RDs for that president was counted.

As reported in Table 3-1, the NSA is not a person specifically listed as a recipient of an RD. In some cases, such as in the Nixon administration, the NSA, Henry Kissinger, was the person issuing the RD and would therefore not be included in the list of whom the presidents directed an RD towards. Over the course of the Nixon administration, 206 total RDs were issued, the most out of all the RD issuing presidents. Based on the table below, President Nixon looks mostly toward his Secretaries of State and Defense, and his Director of the CIA for issued RD responses. The NSA is rarely if ever included in the list of advisors to whom these RDs are issued because as head of the NSC, the NSA would have to sign off on every RD or NSD that is a product of this organization. At the other end of the spectrum, the Obama administration's

consistent request of information for a fairly stable group of people should not be negated by the number of RDs addressed to these individuals. As with the population of NSDs from the Obama administration, many of these RDs remain classified and therefore the targets could be not determined. In such a case, it would be misguided to rush to a conclusion that the Obama administration eschewed the use of RDs to a greater extent than previous administrations. In other words, Obama chose to keep his own counsel more often than not. The Obama administration has followed the general pattern of a reduced use of both RDs and NSDs seen since the George H.W. Bush administration.

Table 3-1: Excerpt of Advisors by Administration

Advisor	Nixon	Ford	Carter	Reagan	HW Bush	Clinton	Obama
Dir CIA	165	35	44	19	18	12	
Sec Def	194	41		17	20	13	3
Sec Treasury	42			18	11		3
Sec State	180	16	40	30	20	13	3
Dep Sec State		27					
VP			43		20	12	3
Chair JCS			39		19	11	3
NSC Staff				17			
Asst NSA					17		
Dir OMB						10	3
Attn Gen							3
CoS							3
Counsel to Pres							3
Dir Natl Intel							3
Sec HHS							3

Who a president looks to for advice is certainly an incredibly important part of the policy making process. The utility of the RD series of directives is that it is a more effective tool for communicating the questions a president or their NSA might have as to help them determine the logical policies implementation given a particular situation. Future research could use the data in this dataset to cross reference the issuance of an RD with the president's daily schedule to determine if the number of meetings which included any of the people that appear in the dataset

precede an RD. Including any meeting minutes in a study might also be a useful way to see if the content of a conversation was important enough to make it into the text of an RD or NSD, signaling the president's willingness to include a particular part of a policy position on the advice of a specific advisor. Being able to show this across multiple RDs and NSDs would indicate who a president relies on more, giving that person greater access to the ear of the president in such a capacity as to directly impact foreign and national security policy.

4.0 Theory

The focus of this chapter is to develop the theoretical infrastructure needed to provide context to an original theory about the utility and function of NSDs and RDs. Generally speaking, the ability to develop a broad theory related to these documents suffers from concerns related to the small size of the population of these directives. However, as long as the National Security Council remains part of the national security environment in the United States, National Security and Review Directives will continue to be a product of this organization. An expectation of this continued presence creates an opportunity for a theory of their purpose and a furthering of the understanding of their true utility within the foreign and national security policy making space and the role that they play in expanding the institutionalization of the American presidency.

4.1.1 Institutionalism Theory

Within any system, an organization requires stability and value to be considered an institution (Ragsdale and Theis 1997) and is thus imbued with certain level of autonomy that allows it the adaptability it needs to further entrench itself within an organization. The presidency becomes an institution (Burke 2016) when it begins to take a more active role in policy making. Moving from being a responsive organization to having a first mover advantage in an established place vis a vis the other two branches. Presidents are seen as the more responsible party for solving all problems, foreign and domestic, which makes the public in general believe that presidents have more real power (Fisher 2002) than they actually have. What presidents really have is more agency, to act more independently, even unilaterally, to steer foreign policy more than domestic policy to align with their broader sense of what the US is, where it might go, and how it might get there. The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 regularized (Dickinson and Lebo 2007) and institutionalized the president as the primary

arbiter in identifying and reacting to national security threats. This task requires the president to give more time to information gathering and analysis; to assist presidents in this effort the National Security Council was created.

4.1.2 Executive Bottleneck Theory

As different roles are added to the portfolio of the presidency, expanding the parts of governing in which its participation is institutionalized, the expectation is that each administration will find a way to manage the crush of work that faces it on a daily basis. How presidents decide to portion out their days is dependent on the issues they face and the way that their administration is structured. Executive Bottleneck Theory (Lindsey and Hobbs 2015) posits that a president's time is valuable so it is very important to consider how it is allocated; to effectively manage their time and ensure that issues that need a large part of their attention are prominently placed, presidents rely heavily on and receive support from the bureaucracy. A president's role in foreign policy is to be an able diplomat for the national interest, direct the actions of a sprawling bureaucracy, and issue terminal decisions. The bottleneck is created because of the president's constitutional power as the final decision maker (Lindsey and Hobbs 2015) and manager of the bureaucracy. As information comes to them, they have to sort through it and prioritize it for themselves. Presidents who have a close relationship with their bureaucracy may be able to reduce the bottleneck by making it clear what their priorities are, while presidents who have less control over their bureaucracy might not be able to negotiate their own policy preferences effectively. In situations where presidents are managed by their bureaucrats, this bottleneck effect may be more apparent. These authors argue that in the case of foreign policy, the president's expertise, approach, and interest in this policy area affects the way they relate and manage the environment around them. The increased agency that presidents have

in the realm of foreign policy places extra weight on the decisions that they make when it comes to how they manage their policy support structures.

The executive bottleneck theory provides the rationale for seeking to identify networks within the policy making apparatus. NSDs and RDs are an excellent vehicle in which to look for these structures and apply the works of Agronoff and Koliba et al from the public administration space. Close working relationships with his advisors present the president with multiple opportunities to make decisions influenced by bureaucrats. The environment that a president establishes helps a president apply the agency they are given in the realm of foreign policy in a manner that reflects their personality, temperament, and interest in this policy space. Different administrations' policy choices are as much a reflection of the individual wishes of the president as their ability to organize and analyze the information they are given.

4.1.3 Presidents and their Advisors

Managing the bottleneck in an administration requires the support of advisors who can be delegated tasks, trusting they will be done in line with the larger preferences of an administration. The bureaucracy that supports a president is made up of a mixture of career civil servants and political appointees, with the roles focused on policy implementation being overwhelmingly being filled by the latter. Because of the number of issues the president is responsible for, both in terms of information reporting as well as providing clear direction on, they find themselves requiring to negotiate with various institutions or people who may have differing preferences. As this environment becomes more diverse and crowded, presidents incur more transaction costs related to the policy options they intend to pursue. The increase in transaction costs brought on by negotiating with institutions outside of the White House, lead presidents to invest more in "institutionalizing their own in-house sources of bargaining expertise." (Dickinson 2009) These expert sources, a president's advisors, shape the presidency

(Whipple 2017) through the decisions that are made as a result of the information that makes it to the president's desk.

In domestic versus foreign policy, presidents are able to get a clearer assessment of the distinct components that make up the calculus of the decision-making process. Accounting for the true domestic policy preferences of copartisans and members of the opposition party is easier, ensuring that the policies that are being formulated and implemented are in sync. Obfuscation in domestic policy does not provide as many real benefits as it does in foreign policy. The environment of incomplete information that foreign policy functions in allows for countries to withhold true preferences to gain benefits in negotiations. Presidential advisors play a greater role in helping presidents parse the motivations of other countries. Using their experience and their own intuition, individuals that make up the president's administration provide not only policy options but also their own impressions of the message other countries are sending. By focusing on the main actors within the foreign policy making infrastructure, it is easier to understand the impact of advisors in an environment that is more insulated. Reimagining administration structures as networks will help us better understand the actual impact of the flow of information through presidential advisors.

While some work exists on the flow of information within an administration, a large part of the conversation is missing without the inclusion of National Security Directives and Review Directives. NSDs and RDs provide insight into a vacuum where these pressures do not exist. Being exorcised from electoral pressures, foreign and national security policy advisors to the president can think strategically given mainly the context provided by the information they have compiled.

The increasing institutionalization of the presidency and its subsequent expansion in size, creates the perception of an expansion of power. While the Constitution creates clear boundaries for the presidency, Congress can allow the president to take a more activist role in the law-making process by either creating legislation that does not give specific instructions to the executive branch or by not pushing back against administrations in actions they take that might appear expansionist. Constant expansion creates an environment of entropy that requires subsequent administrations to make choices on whether to build on the expansion of previous administration or scale back on the size of the executive branch. Because of this expansion, the classical administration categories limit our understanding of the internal mechanics of the policy making process in the executive branch. Identification of networks within administrations and the evolution and amendment of those networks throughout the policy making process, helps explain the how presidents manage the sprawling quality of the executive branch.

4.1.4 Types of Administration Structures

An administration's structure is the organization of the staff who provide support for the president. White House staff is made up of career civil servants as well as political appointees brought by the president to serve during the duration of their term. Presidents (George 1980) look to their advisors for information, emotional support, political analysis, and to take functional action. Presidential advisors perform many different functions; advisors can serve as information gatherers, analysts, sounding boards, or even the primary creators of policy. Each advisor brings with them a certain expertise that can be utilized to help the president meet their objectives within their highly diversified job. Identifying and analyzing administration structure illuminates the environment through which presidents receive information.

George (1980) identifies 3 distinct types of administration structures: hierarchal, competitive, and collegial, summarized in Table 4-1 below. In a hierarchal system, directives

flow from the president to advisors, creating policy proposals that are more focused. Policy development in a system such as this works to create a more succinct and parsimonious discussion of policy option. A hierarchal structure implements the standard model (Walcott and Hull 2005) which can bring order to the chaos that can sometimes reign over a large group of advisors each vying for their personal preference to be translated into policy. A hierarchal structure presumes the president sits at its head, meaning that the choices of policy options presented to the president are more limited. While this model could help president solve their issue with the limited time they have to devote to creating policy solutions, this particular structure may not solve a president's need for complete information. The second type of structure is the competitive system, which is linear like the hierarchal system, but the order of the flow of information and the people who were relied upon by the president to generate the information cycle in and out as they seek support for the policy they are making. The final structure, collegial, creates more of an egalitarian environment in which the president is a part of the analysis and synthesis of the policy making process. Presidents seek to create the environment in which policy options are battled around and consensus is sought before policies are enacted.

Table 4-1: Administration Organizational Types (George 1980)

Type	Summary of Characteristic	Presidential Examples
Formalistic (Hierarchal)	"Orderly policy making structure, well defined procedures, hierarchical lines of communication,...structured staff system"	Truman Eisenhower Nixon
Competitive	"Encourages open expression of diverse opinions, analysis, and advice..."	F. Roosevelt
Collegial	"Group works together to identify, analyze, and solve policy problems in ways that incorporate and synthesize divergent points of view..."	Kennedy

Both the collegial and competitive models create an opportunity for a president to be a part of the conversation. While this may not be the most efficient way a president might spend

his time, it does help the president overcome any information problems he might face. Primary involvement of a president in the policy development stage in these two models, and not just the policy adoption stage as would be expected in a hierarchical model, allows the final implemented policy to be more cohesive with a president's most true broad view for policy.

4.1.5 Administration Organization

The classic definitions of types of administration structures proposed and championed by George (1980) reflect a thinking locked into a time when the presidency was delegated very little and was only activated to its full potential in specific temporal circumstances. Authority delegated to the executive branch by the Constitution creates a defined area of action.

Agranoff (2007) argues that institutions need networks in order to function. Networks emerge as societies become more focused on the use of generated knowledge, as government becomes more focused on creating partnerships with private organizations, and as investigation into possible policy solutions actually reveals gaps in the knowledge of the participants. Complexity in institutions is response to changes in the environment in which the institutions exist. As the United States' role in the international community increased, the president was called upon to take on more responsibilities. This delegation of more power to the office, through acts of Congress, Supreme Court decisions, or demands by the public, created the foundations of the increased institutionalization of the presidency. Adaption breeds a requirement of agility and a more efficient use of the intellectual and human capital contained in them in order to create a structure that can survive the rapids of change the institution is exposed to. Agility behooves internal flexibility and spurs on collaboration, within a clear chain of command. As the executive branch has developed in its place and power, so too should our thinking of what it looks like. To limit the descriptions of how a president structures the executive branch to a hierarchical, competitive, or collegial environment prevents us from holistically understanding the way the

branch has implemented the slate of powers that it has accumulated over time. Perceiving the branch as different types of network set up to support a president with inherent strengths and weaknesses, helps us understand how the individual who becomes president works to put their own stamp on the policy space the powers of the branch creates.

The increasing institutionalization of the presidency and its subsequent expansion in size, creates the perception of an expansion of power. While the Constitution creates clear boundaries for the presidency, Congress can allow the president to take a more activist role in the law-making process by either creating legislation that does not give specific instructions to the executive branch or by not pushing back against administrations in actions they take that might appear expansionist. Constant expansion creates an environment of entropy that requires subsequent administrations to make choices on whether to build on the expansion of previous administration or make a sharp U-turn into scaling back on the size of the executive branch. Because of this expansion, the classical administration categories limit our understanding of the internal mechanics of the policy making process in the executive branch. Identification of networks within administrations, and the evolution and amendment of those networks throughout the policy making process, helps explain the how presidents manage the sprawling quality of the executive branch.

4.2 Networks and Governance Network Theory

Networks (Agranoff 2007) are defined as organizational structures for facilitating cooperation to create solutions to problems through relationships (Kadushin 2012) developed between participants. At the heart of any presidential administration is need for an organized, structured flow of information and expertise to and from the president, who is always the final decision maker. George's work helps us get a sense of how a president sees themselves in relation to their advisors, but the constant, regardless of how a president organizes the

administrative ecosystem around them, is that a president's bureaucratic apparatus creates a small social network. The ever-expanding portfolio of the presidency creates the perfect environment through which these networks can be created and institutionalized. New presidents use the experiences and actions of their predecessors to use as templates, which can be further molded to meet their preferences in terms of who they are, what policy areas are of priority to them, and how they plan to navigate the role of the White House vis a vis the external political environment.

Interactions between individual parts of any network (Lazer 2011) work to keep the other parts in check. Each member of the network is identified as a node and all nodes in a network have some sort of relationship to one another that give the network as a whole a distinct character. Kadushin (2012) presents four different types of relationships, seen in Table 4-2 below, found within networks: simple, directed, symmetric, and through an intermediary.

Table 4-2 - Types of Relationships Found Within Networks (Kadushin 2012)

Relationship Type	Description
Simple	Nodes are found in the same space but do not necessarily interact
Directed	One node affects another node
Symmetric	Both nodes affect each other in a reciprocal manner
Relationship Through an Intermediary	One node affects a third node through a mutual related second node.

In a simple relationship the two nodes share an experience without necessarily interacting with one another or in any way engaging with each other. In this case, the perceptions of one node does not necessarily have an effect on the perceptions of the other; the relationship exists completely on the basis of proximity. Directed, symmetric, and relationships through an intermediary possess a directional flow and are motivated by some sort of underlying tie. Between the two nodes which make up the dyad, in a directed relationship, the impact of Node 1 on Node 2 is a one way street; Node 2 seems accepting of the information or instructions from Node 1 on the basis of a sense of respect. Symmetric relationships are characterized by a sense

of reciprocity between the nodes. Kadushin presents a nuanced view of the tie that holds the nodes together as one that can either be egalitarian, meaning the parties are on some sort of level playing field in terms of power, or there is some level of power imbalance, in that one node is in a position superior to the other such as a “boss and employee” (Kadushin 2012), but the flow of information and response moves both ways between the nodes. The last type of relationship is one in which Node 2 is the midpoint between Node 1 and a new actor, Node 3. The flow of information mirrors that of a directed relationship but passes through Node 2 to get to Node 3. Agranoff (2007) presents four different types of networks that can be implemented in public administration spaces: informational, developmental, outreach, and action, as outlined in Table 4-3 below. These definitions identify network types as they broadly apply to public administration spaces. Organizing networks into specific types is a better way to understand what the role of the people involved in the network is. Agranoff’s network types describe the network itself, as well as the space in which it is found, while also taking into account the different relationships that can be found within it and explaining how the members of the network work together to reach an end goal.

Table 4-3: Types of Networks (Agranoff 2007)

Network Type	Description
Informational	Partners come together exclusively to exchange agency policies and program, technologies, and potential solutions. Taking any action is entirely up to the agencies on a voluntary basis.
Developmental	Partner information and technical exchange are combined with education and members service that increase member capacity in order to implement solutions within home agencies
Outreach	Partners come together to exchange information and technologies, sequence programming, exchange resource opportunities, pool client contacts, and enhance access opportunities that lead to new programming avenues. Implementation of designed programs takes place within an array of public and private agencies
Action	Partners come together to make interagency adjustments, formally adopt collaborative courses of action, and/or deliver services along with exchanges of information and technologies.

The informational network (Agranoff 2007) is a network that functions more as a brainstorming or think-tank environment, whose end goal is gathering and synthesizing information. Review Directives create informational networks because their content focuses on the communication of the specific questions a president has relative to the main issue. As referred to in the Chapter 2.0 of this study, Review Directives are issued by the NSC to the cabinet officials, or principles, whose departments house the expertise needed by the president relative to a specific event. Networks found in the Review Directives deviate from Agranoff's definition of informational networks in that there is no real option for the targets of the RD but to respond with the information requested. This has more to do with the symmetry (Kadushin 2012) of the relationship between the nodes, the issuer and the target NSC principals. The reciprocity inherent in this informational network is made tangible through the use of the Review Directive and the resulting white paper from the department which provides answers to the president's questions. In cases where the RD is issued by the NSA on behalf of the president, the network is still an informational one, but the relationship established is one through an intermediary. Informational networks are also created through the use of Category 2 NSDs Information Requests, as defined in Table 2-4.

Category 2 NSDs and RDs share common language in that they both make specific requests of the target actors; what differentiates them is the scope and the order in which they are issued. RDs are issued when an administration is attempting to get the lay of the land or is in the initial process of formulating a policy position or identifying so the questions the issuer asks of the other actors are broad questions, in a historical as well as a contemporary sense; the target actors responses are representative of the situation relative to the country or the specific issue in question. Category 2 NSDs are much narrower and more tailored in their requests, focusing on

questions that are related to specific policy options that have come up either in past NSC meetings or through the responses to RDs.

Similarly to informational networks, developmental networks (Agranoff 2007) provide an opportunity for all nodes in a network to exchange ideas. Developmental networks participants are drawn from a wider group and place more of an emphasis on the implementation of ideas generated from the sharing of information. Distinct from informational networks, there is much less room for participating nodes and their associated institutions to implement ideas generated by the network. The NSC, as a whole, functions as a developmental network; the totality of the content that is produced by any smaller network within the NSC and in NSC meetings themselves, identify its function as a developmental network. Requests made by the president or the NSA through RDs and Category 2 NSDs, notes about specific topics circulated through the use of Category 1 NSDs, and the responsive changes to policy options made throughout issued Category 3 or 4 NSDs shows the work of the NSC as constantly evolving. The changing environment of foreign policy is reflected throughout the published NSDs and RDs and helps us characterize the NSC itself, as a machine in perpetual motion, driven by the policy priorities of the president and NSA. The diversity of the set of published NSDs and RDs is a tangible example of the work that emanates from a developmental network such as this. The diversity of parties in a developmental network mirrors the type of relationships between the nodes as seen in informational networks. The preferences of the bureaucrat coupled with how the presidents sees themselves in relation to their advisors communicates the types of relationships that populate the network. In the case of the developmental network found within the NSC specifically, and the foreign policy making apparatus, generally speaking, a diversity of relationships, ranging from simple to those through an intermediary are found.

Agranoff's (2007) third type of network is an organizational network. Differing from the informational and developmental, the organizational network edges more toward the policy implementation and policy evaluation phases of the policy making process. More coordination between implementing actors is the hallmark of this particular type of network, requiring greater levels of communication. Effective communication is best maintained through a network with institutionalized relationships. While this type of network is seen in Category 3 and 4 NSDs, this network is more clearly identifiable in Executive Orders (EOs). As referred to in section 2.1, the role of the EO is to specifically engage parts of a presidential administration in order to implement policies that align with the goals of an administration but still within the limits of the laws passed by Congress. Implementation of a law or program at the behest of the administration, through an EO, is an example of an organizational network in the executive branch. EOs are directed, narrowly, to the specific agencies under whose purview implementation of a falls. Partnerships between public departments and private organizations, a hallmark of an organizational network, allow for an efficient and diffuse implementation of these programs. Similarly to EOs, Category 3 and 4 NSDs engage with tight organizational networks to ensure a president's policy preferences are implemented. The limited size of this network also affects who is looked to when evaluating the efficacy of a policy. The makeup of organizational networks in EOs and NSDs differ in the inclusion of private organizations; NSDs do not include private actors in their implementation of policy, but rather keep implementation relegated to intra-administration actors. With the focus of EOs to be most towards the implementation of domestic policy and NSDs more focused on the implementation of foreign and national security policy, the presence organizational networks are more prevalent in relation to EOs because of the inclusion of private actors. However, the characteristic of the inclusions of multiple agencies in

the implementation of policy still makes the case for the Category 3 and 4 NSDs to be implemented through some form of organizational network. The relationships between the actors in this network are instructed through directives that are focused on implementation of a policy option, but symmetric in the context of feedback on the implementation, something which is necessary to the policy making process.

Agranoff's (2007) final network category, action networks, is the most applicable to Category 3 and 4 NSDs and does more to clearly define the function of the NSC at large. Within the action network used to implement the policy options communicated through Category 3 and 4 NSDs, the president, or their NSA, gives the acting agencies narrowly tailored directives for action that provide limited room for deviation. Even those these networks as seen in Category 3 and 4 NSDs are driven by either directed relationships or relationships through an intermediary, implementation of the stated policy does not deviate from the objectives related through the NSD. The action networks created by these Category 3 and 4 NSDs are intentionally created to ensure that the extensive knowledge and expertise of the network's members is focus of the directive itself. The issuance of a Category 3 Policy Communication or a Category 4 Military Policy NSD is associated with the physical deployment of a component of either hard or soft power that fits into the larger construct of a president's big picture policy preferences. As opposed to the collaboration with private organizations seen in the outreach network, action networks present directions for collaboration between government entities whose actions are intended to work in concert to obtain the end policy objective that fits inside a specific legal framework. Action networks put a similar emphasis on compliance as the outreach network in which it is not expressly required, but is inherent, given the environment that especially Category 4 NSDs are distributed in. Where the EOs relative to outreach networks have the backing of

Congressional requirements to act, and the EO is directed to the specific departments whose expertise alone can implement a law in the way the president and the administration prefer, Category 3 and 4 NSDs issued in relation to an ongoing or imminent crisis are accompanied with the same focused implementation and instructions.

Governance Network Theory (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012), and its extensions in the New Public Governance and New Public Management paradigms, posits that networks are made up of actors and all networks have some level of “interdependency” (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012) with a “variety of...interactions and complexity”. The repetitive interaction between actors results in the “institutionalization” of their relationships and all networks require management and guidance due to their inherent complexity. This complexity is driven by the actors themselves and exacerbated by their relative level of autonomy. As each actor vies for their solution or preferences to make the leap from idea to implemented policy, more management is needed of the network. In the case of the NSC, the management strategy implemented is the use of NSDs and RDs as a vehicle for directing policy development through the organization. Even though the dataset shows that there is a tapering off of their use, any institution that is created by even the most minimal reliance on NSDs and RDs, even in cases where the president chooses not to create a separate RD set but rather utilizes NSDs as RDs, shows that the need for some sort of consistent management structure is needed and is utilized when it comes to the official communication of policy.

When considering the policy making process, it is important to not only consider the end product of the process but also the intermediary steps that affect the look and feel of the policy outcome. Understanding and identifying the networks present in the NSC and the composition of those networks helps us understand how presidents get their information and how policy

outcomes are presented to them. The expected omniscience of presidents in all policy spaces puts a great deal of pressure on the president, specifically, and their administration, at large. Ordering the space around the president through the establishment of networks helps them cut through the chaos and entertain viable, meaningful, impactful policy options that can serve to support American grand strategy.

4.3 Example Study Theory

Regardless of the choice of a president's organizational structure in their administration at large, the structure of the work of the NSC is a consistent embodiment of the hub and spoke (Rogers, Castree, and Kitchin 2013) network model, as seen through NSDs and RDs. The relationship between the hub and spokes within the confines of NSDs and RDs can be characterized as either symmetric or through an intermediary (Kadushin 2012) and its inherent reciprocity is couched in the perceptions of the president's relationship with their advisors (George 1980), in general, and their relationship, in this specific case, with their National Security Advisor. The hub and spoke models another means of showing the place for George's theory of how presidents organize their administrations. A hub and spoke model is the most appropriate way to visualize what the information and developmental networks created through RDs and NSDs, respectively, because of the position of the president in relation to his advisors. Hub and spoke networks are characterized by short pathways that flow through a central entity. In this case, the hub, either the president or the NSA, seeks information directly from a group of advisors, the nodes at the end of each of the spokes. Looking at NSDs or RDs, individually, it is difficult to determine if there is one person or a few people that a president goes to consistently, but looking at these directives over time can help illuminate patterns. The important thing to remember is that these directives are another piece of information that is needed in order to make broad sense of foreign and national security policy. These directives fill in gaps but should not be

treated as the complete story. Because presidents have so much more agency in foreign policy than in domestic policy, presidents are expected to be inherently hierarchal; using NSDs shows that there is more nuance to understanding how presidents order the world around them.

Delineation of the relationship being either symmetric or through an intermediary is decided by who populates the hub position in the network. Because of the nature of the NSC itself, the expectation is that the president or the National Security Advisor (NSA), or someone deputized thereof, will always form the hub of this network. The NSA acts as the final bureaucratic gatekeeper in the relaying of national security information to the president, acting as the intermediary when they are the hub. The nature of the symmetric relationship between the President and the agency principles that make up the spokes of this network is such that the precedence afforded to each of the respective positions makes the management of this network relatively straightforward. A future extension of this work would be to build out the networks that support this main hub and spoke network to identify who specifically is involved with how information is compiled and transmitted within each of these departments.

Network complexity, in the context of foreign and national security policy making and the NSC, can be illuminated through the viewing of NSDs and RDs. The decision to issue an NSD or an RD allows the NSC to identify a specific crisis or broad policy area that is of national interest at a given time. The actors that form the nodes of the network, who is designated to be the hub, and who makes up the spokes, communicate the level to which presidents involve themselves in the policy making process as well as who they rely on for information. This reliance can be driven by the personal relationships the president may have with the NSC principles or by the expertise that these individuals bring to the table.

Presidential advisors are as much nodes as the president themselves within these networks and can serve as the gatekeepers for information within the network. Information is filtered through the different nodes before it actually gets to the president, coloring the context of all the issues that are brought to the president's attention. Presidents seek advisors to support their "cognitive needs...[for] emotional support..." (George 1980) to understand the context of situations or policy options, and in order to garner more political legitimacy, as is expected in democratic governments. Smaller groups are better suited for decisions of great weight and import, or those that need more streamlined processes to move toward an actionable policy solution. While larger groups provide the benefit of more eyes on a particular issue or an increase in the creativity of thought applied to a problem, there is an increased risk of free riders or the chance that the solutions offered may not be as viable due to increased competition between group members for their idea to win the day.

Still, the role of advisors, especially as it pertains to providing context, is an important support system for any president. This dissemination of information looks different depending on the structure of the president's administration. In a hierarchical and competitive structure, presidents receive information in a more filtered way than in a collegial structure. Receiving information in the most complete way requires less nodes, in that, the more nodes information goes through, the more distilled the information is. Each node represents a level of analysis but the timing of the receipt of information plays an important role in the impact that each node can have on terminal policy outcomes. Presidents who rely on their advisors to receive and process information before passing it onto the president himself, allows for the analysis provided by advisors to be received directly by the president. In collegial structures, it is more likely that information is presented and analyzed by the group in its entirety, including the president and

their advisors, simultaneously. This allows presidents to have more of a role in the development of not only the analysis of the information but also on formulating next steps and developing the way the information and policy outcomes are going to be communicated.

5.0 Example Study

Networks that emerge within an administration are responsive and work to meet the needs of the president and their administration; they must work to ensure that presidents are made “aware of relevant policy problems and receive germane timely advice on the range of options which might be utilized to solve or mitigate those problems.” (Rudalevige 2003). Hess (2002) argues that Kennedy administration marked the beginning of purposeful organization of the presidency. Hess thinks the expansion of the infrastructure of the White House was because of Kennedy’s “lack of interest in organizational maintenance, the energy and impatience of his White House staff, and his conception of the presidential office as the moving force of government.” (Hess 2002) This thinking seems to run counter to George’s (1980) characterization of the Kennedy administration as the prototypical collegial structure managed by an eager and engaged leader.

National Security Directives (NSDs) and Review Directives (RDs) are the main way that we can understand the functioning of the National Security Council (NSC) and the part that they play in the foreign and national security policy making process as a sort of clearinghouse for the many issues and crises presidents deal with during their time in office. The novelty that this dataset provides in the organization of the population of National Security Directives and Review Directives necessitates an example of their use in the field. While this data has opaquely included in work on the NSC and the executive branch at large (Cooper 2002, Relyea 2003, Dwyer 2002, Gordon 2007, Gordon 2010, Gans 2019), there is a dearth of actual use of these documents to illuminate their role or effect on the policy making process. As referred to in the explanation of the dataset in Chapter 2.0, NSDs and RDs are snapshots of the discussion within the policy making process, meant to move an administration from the initial point of identifying a problem, ensuring it is important enough to capture the attention of the NSC, and reaching the

end goal of directing either a soft or hard policy response in relation to it. In domestic policy, versus foreign policy, presidents are able to get a clearer assessment of the distinct components that make up the calculus of the decision-making process. Accounting for the true domestic policy preferences of copartisans and members of the opposition party is easier, necessitating the development of a system of ensuring that the policies that are being formulated and implemented by the executive branch are in sync with other institutions. Withholding information does not endow comparative advantage the way it does in foreign policy. In foreign policy, an environment of incomplete information allows countries to withhold true preferences to gain benefits in negotiations. Presidential advisors play a greater role in helping presidents parse the motivations of other countries and develop responses to the actions they take, as well as help craft policies that meet the needs of the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Using their experience and their own intuition, individuals that make up the president's administration provide not only policy options, but their own impressions of the message other countries are sending. With the main actors being limited to the president and a small group of advisors, there are less influencing factors on the thoughts, responses, or actions undertaken within the foreign policy realm, therefore it provides are greater insight into a presidential administration and its priorities. Reimagining administration structures as networks will help us better understand the actual impact of the flow of information through presidential advisors.

The purpose of this chapter is to engage in a sample study utilizing the dataset of NSDs and RDs. The chapter begins with an overview of the literature surrounding the options presidents have in relating to their advisors and, through that, the way they structure their administrations. This is followed by an explanation of network types and Governance Network Theory. The literature on networks is then applied to case studies of the National Security

Council of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, with a specific focus on the role that the networks played in the actions taken by the respective administrations during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Freedom.

5.1 Case Studies - Operations Desert Storm and Allied Forces in NSDs and RDs

Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton use of National Security and Review Directives represents a major shift in comparison to preceding administrations, namely in the decline of their use. While this could be a function of the duration of the H.W. Bush administration being half of that of the immediately preceding Reagan administration, the reduction in the use of NSDs marks a shift in the role of the NSC. Fresh off of its involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal (1985-1987), the general expectation within Washington was that the “NSC would be, if not dissolved, then certainly disempowered.” (Gans 2019) With the rise of easier communications, the NSC was able to do more in a smaller space and was actually given the room to be more of an impactful body on foreign policy. The reduction in the number of NSDs in the proceeding administrations tells a story not of the NSC losing its influence but rather one of increased influence through telecommunications efficiency. The NSC, at the Principals and Deputies levels, had “such respected managers and Bush’s cabinet-level leaders trusted each other, but also because the post-Iran-Contra common law rules kept...the NSC in check.” (Gans 2019) The work of the NSC becomes more focused on grand strategy, leading to the use of NSDs in a more efficient way. The shift of these directives away from being documents of mundane communication requires the buy in of the whole network of advisors agreeing to take a more active role in the policy making space.

United States actions in Operations Desert Storm (August 1990- March 1991) and Allied Forces (March 1999-June 1999) can be considered preliminary case studies to understand how the arrangement of a president’s administration and the interests of the United States intersect to

affect foreign policy. Analyzing the policy making processes of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, in these two cases, presents an opportunity to look at the development of policy that culminates in the same final outcome: US military presence in a foreign country.

Preston (2001) proposes a matrix aimed at identifying types of presidents. Delineating and categorizing presidents into different types creates a better understanding of the motivations and strengths of the president, helping to understand a bit more about their approach to dealing with specific policy areas. To sort presidents within this matrix, Preston takes into account the individual personality of each of the presidents, the way they have shown leadership in past experiences, the extent to which an individual guards their own power and sense of agency, how comfortable an individual is with managing multidimensional issues, and the individual policy experience and expertise to create his nomenclature for presidential typology.

Preston's organizational matrix, included below in Table 5-1, allows for presidents to have different organization structures when looking at foreign or domestic policy. This difference shows that the individual expertise influences the way that a president structures their advisory environment. In this view, administration structure is responsive to the individual rather than the event being dealt with. While the makeup and size of the group a president relies on for information may change as different experts are brought in to manage incoming information, the organizational structure and associated nodes of power (Agranoff 2007) will remain responsive to the needs of the president based on their own expertise and comfort with foreign policy.

Table 5-1: Presidential Need for Control and Involvement in the Policy Process (Preston 2001)

Need for Power (Desire for Control)	Prior Policy Experience/Expertise in Substantive Area (General Interest Level or Desire for Involvement in Policy)	
High	High- Director	Low- Magistrate

Table 5-1: Presidential Need for Control and Involvement in the Policy Process (Preston 2001)

Need for Power (Desire for Control)	Prior Policy Experience/Expertise in Substantive Area (General Interest Level or Desire for Involvement in Policy)	
	Activist presidential style	Relegative, less-activist presidential style
	Decision making centralized within a tight circle	Decision making centralized within a tight circle
	Preference for direct personal control over final policy decisions	Preference for direct personal control over final policy decisions
	Preference for direct personal involvement throughout the policy process (agenda-setting, formulation, deliberation, decision, and implementation)	Preference for direct personal involvement throughout the policy process (agenda-setting, formulation, deliberation, decision, and implementation)
	Preference for hierarchical advisory structures designed to enhance personal control (i.e., dominance of formal channels for decision making, advise, and access)	Preference for hierarchical advisory structures designed to enhance personal control (i.e., dominance of formal channels for decision making, advise, and access)
	Tendency to advocate own policy views, frame issues, and set specific policy guidelines	Tendency to set general policy guidelines but delegate policy formulation and implementation tasks to subordinates
	Tendency for leader to rely more upon own policy judgements than those of expert advisors.	Tendency for leader to rely more upon the views of expert advisors than upon own policy judgements
	Inner Circle Decision Rule: Leader's own policy preferences dominate policy process. Final policy decisions reflect these preferences	Inner Circle Decision Rule: Leader's own policy preferences dominate, but heavily influences by expert advice. Leader adjudicate between competing policy options presented by advisors.
	Examples of high need for power and high prior policy experience leaders: Kennedy and Eisenhower: Foreign Policy, Johnson and Truman: Domestic Policy	Examples of high need for power and low prior policy experience leaders: Kennedy and Eisenhower: Domestic policy, Johnson and Truman: Foreign Policy
Need for Power (Desire for Control)	Prior Policy Experience/Expertise in Substantive Area (General Interest Level or Desire for Involvement in Policy)	
	High- Administrator	Low- Magistrate
	Activist presidential style	Relegative presidential style
	Decision making less centralized and more collegial. Leader requires less personal direct control over policy process and subordinates.	Decision making less centralized and more collegial. Leader requires little or no direct personal control or involvement in the policy process.
	Preference for informal, less hierarchical advisory structures	Preference for informal, less hierarchical advisory structures

Table 5-1: Presidential Need for Control and Involvement in the Policy Process (Preston 2001)

Need for Power (Desire for Control)	Prior Policy Experience/Expertise in Substantive Area (General Interest Level or Desire for Involvement in Policy)	
Low	designed to enhance participation by subordinates.	designed to enhance participation by subordinates.
	Tendency to actively advocate own policy views, frame issues, and set specific policy guidelines	Tendency to delegate policy formulation and implementation tasks to subordinates
	Tendency for leader to rely more upon own policy judgements than those of expert advisors in the group	Tendency to rely upon (and adopt) views of expert advisors when making final policy decisions
	Inner Circle Decision Rule: Leader's own policy preferences shape nature of general policy approach, but willing to compromise on policy specifics to gain consensus. ("majority rule" pattern)	Inner Circle Decision Rule: Advisory group outputs reflects dominant views expressed by either expert advisors or the majority of group members
	Examples of low need for power and high prior policy experience leaders: Clinton: Domestic Policy, Bush: Foreign Policy	Examples of low need for power and low prior policy experience leaders: Clinton: Foreign Policy, Bush: Domestic Policy

Individuals with a high level of policy experience in the particular issue area and strong need for power and control are identified as a “Director” (Preston 2001), while those with a low need for control are identified as an “Administrator.” Individuals with less policy experience but a high need for power are identified as a “Magistrate”, while those with a low need for power are identified as a “Delegator.” This set of categories uses the president’s interest and experience in the specific policy area as a means of differentiating leaders. Additionally, Preston creates a companion matrix that takes into account a president’s ability to see the context of the situations they face. Presidents who are highly aware of context and have a high need, or desire, for information, are identified as a “Navigator” while those who have a low need for information are identified as a “Sentinel.” Presidents who are less attentive to the environment in which policy decisions are implemented and have a high need for information are identified as an “Observer”,

while those who have a low need for information are identified as a “Maverick.” Preston identifies examples of presidents that fit into each of these categories and allows for

The type of president helps determine their preferences for how information is presented to them; the role that advisors play in an administration is tied to the needs of the president. Some presidents, those with a high level of expertise, choose a more active role in the policy making, creating a more free-flowing space for policy development (George 1980). Depending upon how the president views the structure and utility of the bureaucracy, the president molds the bureaucracy to meet their policy needs. While some bureaucratic restructuring may create a more collegial environment, a hierarchal or competitive environment is intended to put the president more in the driver’s seat. Presidents, in their role as final decision maker, must consider all the information available to them before acting. Restructuring the bureaucracy into a chain of command, so to speak, allows for the creation of processes that can be activated in the event of a crisis. When time is of the essence, these processes can allow information to flow quickly and comprehensively in order to provide a president with as much information as they may require.

On the other hand, structuring the bureaucracy in a more hierarchal way may be prohibitive in the event a link in this chain of command is weak. With every new president, it may be necessary to undertake a reformatting of the processes. Lowery’s argument provides room for presidents to consider what they want their administration to look like. This will most likely mean that each new president will have to undertake restructuring early in their presidency. While this will provide information on the type of president an individual may be, it may not be the best in terms of responsiveness to crises. Since presidents do not know the types

of crises they may be dealt, amending the way the bureaucracy functions may make it more effective in a certain type of crisis, but less effective to a crisis later on.

Preston applies the label of “Administrator-Navigator” to President H.W. Bush. In this category of presidential types, the president is characterized as someone who is actively involved in the actual policy making process, sharing their personal preferences with their policy making team and guide the process towards making a policy in line with those preferences, but will inevitably seek to gain the support of their advisors and allow subordinates to actually implement policy. These presidents choose to keep their interactions with advisors informal. President Bill Clinton is characterized by Preston as the administrative foil for President Bush; where President Bush was adept in foreign policy, President Clinton’s prowess lay in domestic policy and understanding how the policy choices play in the domestic arena along with the political implications they would create. President Clinton is identified as a “Delegator-Observer”(Preston 2001) who wanted to be involved in the process of making policy and required a great deal of information, more than what would be normally expected, in order to make policy.

5.1.1 Operation Desert Shield/Storm as Seen Through NSC Actions

Networks identified through the available NSDs and RDs reflect the action networks, those whose main responsibility would be implementing the policy communicated through these directives. What is conspicuously missing are the members of the developmental networks, whose responsibility it was to gather the information requested and craft the language of the policy preferences. These networks, in both the H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, are found in the Deputies Committee. A necessary future addition to the dataset used in this study would be information on who precisely made up the Deputies Committees. The motivations, perspectives, and experience of these members are most directly seen in the text of NSDs, but it

is the audience in the action network, the departments who implement policy, that makes these documents true directives.

President Bush's experience lay in the arena of foreign policy. Utilizing his past roles as Ambassador to the United Nations and China, and as Director of the CIA, President Bush had ample opportunities to hone his foreign policy prowess; he entered into the presidency with a singular knowledge of the information gathering and analysis apparatus of the United States. These skills allowed him to be highly involved in foreign policy, creating sufficiently detailed policy that was easily implemented by his carefully chosen staff. President Bush's "core group" was internally known as the "gang of eight" (Preston 2001, Gans 2019) which included the Vice President, the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the CIA Director, the Chief of Staff and either the Deputy Secretary of State (Preston 2001) or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gans 2019) in addition to the president. While the president used his version of the gang of eight as a kitchen cabinet of sorts to help him make the official issuance of directives, he mostly kept to himself (Gans 2019), so as not to prejudice the opinions coming out of the NSC, giving his principals the chance to present their true preferences without trying to tailor them to the preferences of the president.

To develop the US response that became Operation Desert Storm, beginning with the plans for Operation Desert Shield, meetings were held at length with this group, and therefore eschewed the more formal process of requesting and receiving information, such as National Security Directives. The short length of time between NSDs focused on Iraq show the pace at which the situation escalated and the necessity for a response that used avenues outside of the NSD route. The path that a National Security Directive takes can be seen as cumbersome, limiting the agility of an administration's response in a crisis. The NSDs from the H.W. Bush

administration related to the Gulf War show that the NSC acts as a clearinghouse, identifying what the specific threat to American national security looks like, and outlining the broad objective the administration would like to see in order to alleviate that threat to national security. In doing so, the Bush administration's NSC still left policy implementation to the agencies that are specifically listed as part of the established action networks, and the relevant policy coordinating committees to follow up with those agencies, having them report back as changes to implemented policy were needed.

To delve more deeply into how exactly the policy was created, and to understand to what extent the president's preferences were embodied in the final policy, it would be necessary to obtain meeting memos and transcripts, which are available through the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. The International Militarized Intervention dataset (Kisangani and Pickering 2008) denotes US interest in relation to Iraq as economic, strategic, and territorial; protection of United States oil interest present the basis for economic interests in the area as any conflict in the region could cause a disruption in the flow of oil trade from the area. The alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia can be seen as the impetus for any strategic interests that might exist. Territorial interests that the United States had in relation to this conflict focused on the maintenance of the recognized borders of Kuwait. In his remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in October of 1990 (Bush 1990), President Bush characterized Iraqi actions against Kuwait as "a menace not only to one region's security but to the entire world's vision of our future."

The end of the Iran-Iraq War left the US concerned about a potential power vacuum in the area and how the changes in the area might impact the US medium to long term relationship with both countries. To gain a better understanding of the lay of the land in this post war time,

President Bush issues National Security Review (NSR) 10 in his series of Review Directives (RDs). This directive lays out the specific questions the president has in two parts- the first, a general assessment of the post war landscape and the second, questions which require specific policy prescriptions as answers. (Bush 1989) As with NSDs, this NSR is directed towards the action network of the Principals Committee. In understanding the setup of the Bush NSC, the general understanding is that the Principals Committee would look to its Deputies Committee and Policy Coordinating Committees to provide responses to the questions included.

President Bush's questions in NSR 10 focus on changes to any "political, economic, and strategic interests" (Bush 1989) in the post war environment and identifies the members of the informational network created through this RD, seen in Figure 5-1.




Figure 5-1: NSR 10: US Policy Toward Persian Gulf³

These broad areas of interest lead to more specific questions which shows the level of detail the president requests in the proposed policy solutions. From an energy standpoint,

³ Reference 7.1 Appendix: Description of Visualizations of NSD and RD Networks for details on color coding and how to read this figure.

President Bush's questions focus on the impact to America and its allies' access to oil in the Persian Gulf region, especially in terms of how pipeline locations lay on top of the "strategic map of the region." (Bush 1989)

Specific requests were also made for information of the weapons still deployed by both Iran and Iraq and the potential threat this posed to the US and its regional allies and interests. Concerns also existed related to the US and its relationship with Iran and Iraq, respectively, and between Iran and Iraq. How might the NSC expect Iran and Iraq, individually and jointly, to behave in terms of maintaining or undermining regional stability? US military presence and interests were also of concern to the President; the NSR requests information regarding the long term requirements of the US military in the region as well as the potential interest for US arms sales to Iraq only along with the amount of sales they would bring in for the US.

A consistent facet of foreign policy during the post Iran-Iraq war time frame was the potential of the Soviet Union to extend its sphere of influence to fill space left by the damaged institutions of both Iraq and Iran. Because of the declining power of the Soviet Union at the time, the focus was to see if there was an opportunity for the US to "affect" (Bush 1989) the way that the Soviets view the environment of the region. Specifically, the President muses if it might be possible for the US to encourage the Soviets to have a "constructive role" (Bush 1989) in the rebuilding of the countries. The use of the term "constructive" presents an interesting word choice of the administration; to think that they Bush administration could conceive of a situation in which the US and the Soviet Union could undertake mutually beneficial policy reflects the shift in relations between President Bush and Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev that underlies the broader changes in Soviet power. The specific word usage could simply be a matter of chance, but these documents on the whole communicate a general sense of purpose that makes it seem

likely that President Bush wanted the NSC to use this environment as a chance to affect future plans for Soviet-US relations. Keeping in the vein of planning for the future, President Bush asks for advice from his NSC “under what circumstances should the US get involved in Iran/Iraq reconstruction” (Bush 1989) as well as what the US could do to “reduce or redistribute its energy dependence” on Gulf State sources, both of which are noted through UN Security Council Resolution 598.

In response to this request for information, the NSC Principals Committee produces NSD 26 (Bush 1989) on October 2, 1989 with the members of this network are seen in Figure 5-2.




Figure 5-2: NSD 26: US Policy Towards the Persian Gulf, Category 4 – Military Policy³

In this recommendation, the Principals urge the president to be guided by the notion that the “access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area is vital to US national security.” (Bush 1989) The willingness communicated by the Principals to commit US

military assets in the effort to protect and support those interests unknowingly formed the basis of action on the part of the US related to Operation Desert Shield. Gans (2019) notes that most of the “planning sort” of documents related to Operation Desert Shield emerged from the developmental networks of the Deputies Committee. The remarkable level of direction emanating from the deputies committee, and the level to which the Principals, the members of the president’s administration who are specifically listed as the audience of this directive, listened to and followed their advice and policy proposals, shows a deep level of trust and comradery vital during a crisis situation. The Principals Committee’s policy prescriptions urge the State Department to remain the lead department for all things related to Iran and that the relationship remain as it was before the war started, until Iran makes substantive overtures that signal a willingness for normalization. In terms of Iraqi relations, the NSC supported providing Iraq military assistance outside of the avenue of arms sales, but was amenable to allowing arms sales so long as the request was a legitimate one, and that it does not pose a threat to Israel.

Additionally, NSD 26 gave the defense department the leeway it needed to move carrier groups into the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean to fill in any “gaps” (Bush 1989). However the NSD did not feel the situation, at that point, merited a major deployment of US forces, cautioning that if the situation turned towards that direction, there would be a requirement for interagency coordination. In order to keep Iraq in line with US preferences in their long-term reestablishment of institutions, and in exchanged for a cessation of meddling in Lebanon⁴, NSC 26 supports the use of economic and political aid, with sanctions kept on the table, if Iraq moves contrary to American interests. While the president’s questions in NSR 10 (Bush 1989) communicate a certain level of openness to changing the terms of the relationship between the

⁴ Lebanon is included in NSC 26, but the interaction between Lebanon and Iraq is not a focus of this study.

US and the USSR, NSD 26 (Bush 1989) moves US preferences into a path of maintenance, encouraging the joining of regional security pacts aimed at countering the Soviet Union and broadly staying the course of US-Soviet relations.

Issued August 20, 1990, NSD 45 marks the first official statement of military policy specifically related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, issued about two weeks after the invasion. This members of the developmental network formed by this NSD is visualized in Figure 5-3.




Figure 5-3: NSD 45: US Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Category 4-Military Policy³

Created at the request of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Bush 1990), the NSD lays out the objectives driving the rationale for US involvement as the “immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait...restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government...commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf...[and] protection of American citizens abroad.” The administration uses this document to show support for UN Security Council resolutions 660 and 662 and communicates a willingness to put together a

military coalition to help move Iraq out of Kuwait, to uphold a UN mandate, and to protect Saudi Arabia from any aggression by Iraq.

Domestically, the NSD calls for the freezing of all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and to ask the other oil producing countries to increase their outputs in order to prevent a substantial oil disruption. Speaking to the president's interest in NSR 2 related to a change in Soviet-US cooperation in the context of this event, NSD 45 (Bush 1990) is supportive of Soviet inclusion in the military coalition intended to repel Iraq only if the request for their inclusion comes from Saudi Arabia. The scale and the lack of a conception of the duration of this proposed military action necessitates a letter to Congress, making them aware of the president's intent to commit troops in a situation that may expand past the limitations of the War Powers Act.

President Bush's administration does not issue another NSD until January 15, 1991 regarding Iraqi action in Kuwait. Using the mandate of the UN Security Council resolutions which call upon member nations to act under the obligation of Article 51 of the UN Charter (Bush 1991) and at the behest of the developmental network created through NSD 54, visualized in Figure 5-4, the US formally commits troops to push Iraq out of Kuwait.




Figure 5-4: NSD 54: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, Category 4- Military Policy³

The grand strategy objectives of US action in Iraq remain the same as they did in NSD 45 and the short term objectives include, “defend[ing] Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states against attack...preclude[ing] Iraqi launch of ballistic missiles against neighboring states and friendly forces...destroy[ing] Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities...destroy[ing] Iraq’s command, control, and communications capabilities...eliminat[ing] the Republican Guard as an effective fighting force; and conduct[ing] operations designed to drive Iraq’s forces from Kuwait, break the will of Iraqi forces, discourage Iraqi use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, encourage defection of Iraqi forces, and weaken Iraqi popular support for the current government.” (Bush 1990) In addition to functioning as a formal authorization of military action, this NSD serves as the establishment of the parameters within which American forces will function while on the group in Kuwait. Most notably in this document is the forcefulness of the language, as noted above, that is being used as a means of communicating the leadership position

the US holds in this coalition and that the executive branch feels empowered to act as such because they have the support of Congress.

In looking at NSDs 26, 45, and 54, the policies implemented by the action networks of the Principal's Committee, directed by the president, are consistent and also moderately developmental in respect to one another. The implemented policies show a reasonable, acceptable, and fully vetted increase in hostilities, proportional to the actions of Iraq and the existing support of the both the international and domestic communities. The scope of the actions undertaken by US forces during Operation Desert Storm, and their adherence to the mandates that were set for them, show a president with policy creation networks supportive of the limits the president was willing to set for their armed forces.

5.1.2 Operation Allied Forces as Seen Through NSD Actions

The informal structure of the Clinton Administration mirrored that of the Bush Administration, with the added input of a network of outside experts and advisors, in addition to the networks within the administration that helped President Clinton gather and process information. The response of the Clinton Administration to the crisis in Bosnia can be viewed as an example within an administration functioning in a political environment rife with limitations and push back. Most of the policy in relation to Bosnia was crafted by the NSC (Preston 2001) and presented to the president in more or less a fully formed plan with Secretary of State Warren Christopher as the main direct advisor to the president during this time. The dispersion of the foreign policy making process, as well as the multiple advisory inputs from both inside and outside of the White House coupled with President Clinton's inexperience in the foreign policy sphere lead to a prolonged and meandering foreign policy implementation.

By the beginning of Operation Allied Forces 1999, the United States had already taken a path of lower level actions over the course of two years. Preston notes time and again that

Clinton was motivated by feedback from others and was sensitive to the way that his foreign policy decisions played out in the domestic media. While the President was able to be swayed by his advisors, particularly Secretary of State Warren Christopher, to employ a policy of inaction initially. However, when information about the violence and possible war crimes being perpetrated by the Serbs made its way into the US media, the president felt pressured to take action. The characterization of “Clinton’s lack of active participation [in the policy making process] led to delegation of policy formulation to lower levels of the bureaucracy and led to bureaucratic conflict between departmental actors” (Preston 2001) effectively stymying the US response to the violence. This highlights that it was not the bureaucratic networks that limit action but the hesitancy that comes with a president who might not have entered the office with substantial foreign policy experience.

The administration was still in the policy formulation phase when Serbian forces bombed a marketplace in Sarajevo in August of 1995. That action pushed the administration to coordinate the disparate policy options and take military action in the form of air strikes as part of a larger coalition of countries. United States involvement in Operation Allied Forces (Kisangani and Pickering 2008) conformed to the strategic, humanitarian, and territorial interests of the United States at the time, with the focus of the implemented policy being to support coalition-based action through the auspices of NATO, the regional security pact.

The actions of Serbs in Bosnia were so salient in the minds of Americans, and the world, that actions related to it became a campaign promise of the then candidate Bill Clinton. Focusing on the emerging humanitarian crisis set against the breakup of a former Soviet state, the Clinton administration set out to create a menu of policy options that met the needs of a United States

that was both the winner the protracted Cold War but also ones that did not have the political or social appetite to engage in a full scale military options in the vein of the Gulf War.

Through Presidential Review Directive/National Security Council (PRD/NSC) 1, the Clinton administration's version of Review Directives (RDs), National Security Advisor (NSA) Anthony Lake wanted to encourage the newly convened National Security Council (NSC) "to think big about how to realize a peaceful endgame in Bosnia" (Gans 2019). Though this was to support the campaign commitments of President Clinton, the NSC was also limited by some of those same campaign commitments, including the reduction of the size of the NSC staff. Represented in Figure 5-5, PRD/NSC1 identifies the informational network NSA Lake relied on to answer the litany of questions asked on behalf of the president.




Figure 5-5: PRD/NSC 1: US Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia³

Directed to a larger, more diverse NSC than that of the Bush administration, this RD reflects the starting point of an administration led by a president with less tangible foreign policy

experience and is also the successor to an administration who chose not to take substantial steps to intervene in a conflict as they had done in Kuwait.

When the Clinton administration started work, the situation in Bosnia had already become an active protracted conflict that required the US to make a quick decision on the role they would play. Under Lake's direction (Lake 1993) the NSC was given the objective "to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward the former Yugoslavia." (Lake 1993) The established goals were "ensuring delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in Bosnia-Herzegovina...stopping further Serbian aggression...Rolling back Serbian conquests to date...doling out punishments to Serbia for their actions...strengthen the Vance/Owen negotiating track" (meaning the Vance Owen peace plan)...reaffirmation of the Bush Administrations' Christmas demarche." (Lake 1993) While this PRD/NSC refers to actions by the Bush administration, there is not a Bush era NSD specifically related to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, or if there is one, it remains classified. This PRD/NSC is, similarly to those of the Bush administration, has questions split into two sections: the first focused on the gathering of information to provide the president with a real time report of what is actually going on in Bosnia, and the second portion is devoted to specific policy options, and their feasibility, that the president was interested in exploring.

A distinction of this RD that is mirrored in other RDs and even NSDs of the Clinton administration, is that each question is directed at a specific principal on the NSD. President Clinton's NSC was populated by individuals valued for their relationship with the president, their expertise in a particular area, or both. In directing policy questions at these specific people, it is clear that the president wanted the specific point of view these individuals brought to the table

along with the input of specific deputies, and those in the corresponding departments Interagency Working Groups, the Clinton administration's version of Policy Coordinating Committees.

In depth questions such as those posed in this RD benefit from having a large number of eyes on their answers, however so many cooks could lead to a great deal of confusion for a president who may not have the innate skills and experience to weed through the information and craft a policy that is emblematic of their view of foreign policy. It is interesting, and also potentially problematic, that in the set of available NSDs from the Clinton era, there is no NSD that communicates the implementation, through the action network of the Principals Committee, of the response to the questions of PRD/NSC 1. There is a distinct possibility that the NSD is still classified, but there is also a likelihood that the situation on the ground in Bosnia changed so rapidly and that the UN stepped up as an international organization to encourage the international community as a whole to make a concerted effort to manage this situation.

As US involvement became more complicated at the beginning of the Clinton administration, NSA Anthony Lake issues PRD/NSC 13 (1993) requesting input from the Principals, their associated Deputies, and Interagency Working Groups regarding coalition based peacekeeping operations. This RD, whose informational network is visualized in Figure 5-6, acknowledges the primacy of the United Nations in developing and implementing large-scale peacekeeping and enforcement actions (Lake 1993).




Figure 5-6: PRD/NSC 13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations³

However, the NSD makes clear that the Clinton administration also wanted understand the considerations the members of the Principals Committee would take into account before recommending the inclusion of US forces and assets. From the questions Lake asks, it appears as if the NSA is working towards shifting away from unilateral interventions and is instead focusing on multilateral peacekeeping operations as an institutionalized action of US policy that would have broad NSC support. In the information requested by Lake, he asks the Principals Committee to provide a complete scope of information about past US involvement in multilateral peacekeeping actions and the role that peacekeeping, generally, has had in US foreign policy. (Lake 1993) In addition to asking about information about the UN processes around peacekeeping operations, Lake asks for information about the role regional organizations in peacekeeping efforts. (Lake 1993) Information from the developmental and informational networks related to the Departments of Defense and State, along with those same networks, as they exist, to support the US Representative to the UN seem to be assigned most of the work in

relation to these questions. However, it is clear that the costs, both monetary and political, associated with undertaking involvement in multilateral peacekeeping operations is prominent in Lake's mind, as it reflects a substantial concern of the president.

Within the set of available Clinton-era NSDs, there are 3 documents, Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council (PDD/NSC 25, 56 and 71) that show the development of US policy relative to the thoughts governing US involvement in multilateral peacekeeping operations. Related to these efforts, the inclusion of the US Representative to the UN, Ambassador Madeline Albright, as a member of the Principals Committee was based on the relationship between the ambassador and the president, but it becomes an impactful and important move in considering the language included in the series of NSDs. Considering the environment in which the Clinton administration began, taking into account the end of the Cold War, the focus on taking part in multilateral peacekeeping efforts seems to have been the only acceptable long term option for the Clinton administration to undertake, which were to the benefit of the international community, without negative effects to the American population, and without violence against American troops during US action in Mogadishu in October of 1993. Facing a hostile Congress and a domestic population embroiled in the effects of an economic downturn, it would be a strategic choice for the Clinton administration to play to the US's role as an active member of the international community, leading from within the superstructure of an established coalition.

Issued May 4, 1994, Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council (PDD/NSC) 25 (Clinton 1994) is the first available NSD to reflect the transition from the informational gathering/policy formulation phase called for by Presidential Review Directive/National Security Council (PRD/NSC) 1 and 13 of the Clinton administration's policy

related to the inclusion of the United States in Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations.

Represented visually in Figure 5-7, the network included in this NSD works to formalize the thinking initiated in PRD/NSC 13, that the United Nations should be seen as an “important instrument” (Clinton 1994) in the all partnerships created to ensure peace.




Figure 5-7: PDD/NSC 25: US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Category 4- Military Policy³

However, in a surprisingly hawkish turn, the administration cautions that while the US should partner with the UN, the US should not rely on the UN to be a substitute for “fighting and winning our own wars, nor can we allow it to reduce our capability to meet that imperative.” (Clinton 1994) There are conflicting statements in this document, as this language is adjacent in sentiments discussing direct participation in UN sanctioned actions. This juxtaposition speaks to Preston’s (2012) comments about discord between advisors along with their support networks, which undermine the efficacy of Clinton era policies; the specific inclusion of this language may have been a decision made either by NSA Lake or President Clinton to placate department heads to get to the consensus the president sought on this matter.

Generally speaking, the purpose of PDD/NSC 25 is to ensure that “peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and the establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations will become part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy” (Clinton 1994) but making it clear that the general expectation of actions related to this policy will happen under the auspices of large multinational forces, such as NATO. With the US positioning itself as a member of a larger force, the NSD explicitly states that the US will not relinquish command authority of its forces (Clinton 1994) except under very specific circumstances and will work to support the United Nations to plan for congressionally forced reduction in the monetary donation of the United States to peacekeeping operations. The inclusion of this potential “out” for American forces presents a way for the Clinton administration to address larger pressures of being a good member of the global community but not at the expense of American primacy in the system. While NSDs are not usually this overtly responsive to the machinations of the external political environment, in this case because Congress already stated that it would cut the amount of money allocated in the breakdown of the US UN dues, the president and the NSC were forced to take this into consideration when crafting their policies.

The inclusion of the UN ambassador in the network communicates the perception that the UN is an extension of US foreign policy and that the UN has a role in US national security. Ambassador Albright’s role in the development of PDD/NSC 25, 56 and 71 which emphasize the willingness of the US to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations, ensure that the policies of the Clinton administration were tailored to influence the international community at large, resulting in the acceptance of the international community that action must be taken in Bosnia.

An interesting addition to the NSC through PDD/NSC 25 is the creation of the Peacekeeping Core Group, which acts at the same level as the Deputies Committee. (Clinton 1994) The Peacekeeping Core Group is led by representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, who would be responsible for determining which situations met the standards for US involvement and would monitor ongoing US force operations.

Including this developmental network in the larger scheme of the NSC shows movement by the Clinton administration to include multilateral peacekeeping operations as an area of ongoing concern, and show a deliberate investment of the United States in multilateral peacekeeping efforts, in more than just a minimal way to keep a campaign promise. This directive gives the sense that the administration is well aware that trying to the US a leader in peace keeping operations will not be received well by Congress, and will likely cause significant pushback.

The benefits of the diversity of the members of the network that makes up the NSC is on full display in this plan. The policy recommendations offered through these directives help President Clinton's administration be more focused on peacekeeping needs creativity, but it also needs likeminded advisors. The choice of the president's advisors, and the general agreement that those advisors share the president's vision for US foreign policy is important. NSDs in general show an administration that speaks with a unified voice, and the pervasiveness of the policy preferences and the consistency of those preferences really drives that point home in this case. Consistency in soft power policy preferences is almost as impressive, if not more impressive, as the consistency in the hard power policy recommendations. This shows that the members of the network understand the environment in which they are functioning, and they are

all on the same team to do what it takes to meet the administration's broad policy objectives within the parameters they are given.

Building off of the foundation set by PDD/NSC 25, PDD/NSC 56 (Clinton 1997) increases the networks associated with peacekeeping operations to include developmental networks that consider the wide range of policy responses, diplomatic, military, economic, and political, that can accompany an identified threat to US national security. "Complex contingency operations" (Clinton 1997) present a realization and adaptation on the part of the United States that the protracted conflicts of the post-Cold War era require more holistic responses than were previously assumed. In order to keep more consistent track of these varied conflicts, the Clinton administration creates an Executive Committee (ExCom) of members of the Deputies Committee to "identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response...develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction...accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation...intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on...integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level...and rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions." (Clinton 1997) The tasks assigned to this group identify them as a developmental network responsible for gathering and synthesizing information and then applying that to the creation of reasonable policy options to be scrutinized by the larger Deputies Committee before being passed on to the Principals Committee.

ExCom is tasked, via this NSD, to create a Political-Military Implementation Plan (Clinton 1997) that will act as a standard operating procedure for managing protracted conflicts

by the action network of the Principals Committee. To support the Principals Committee in closing the loop and considering the efficacy of the implemented policies, the ExCom is also tasked with creating and disseminating “after action reports” (Clinton 1997) to the NSC. The emphasis on using each action undertaken by American forces as a learning opportunity speaks to the focus on implementing policies that are effective but also efficient in the use of resources. Part of Clinton’s campaign promises was an assurance to voters that the administration would be good stewards of the resources available to them, including a reduction of the size of the national security complex. Even though the administration realized when it came into office that the size of these networks had been overstated (Gans 2019), the domestic economic situation of the United States the Clinton administration inherited left it looking for avenues to cinch the belts of institutions across government, and the NSC was no exception. PDD/NSC 56 calls for an expansion of the job description of the Deputies Committee and its associated developmental network counterparts, with a slimmer staff. Pictured in Figure 5-8, the application of the prescribed political- military implementation plan is seen in the actions the US took in its role supporting broader NATO actions in Operation Allied Forces. Coupling intense bombing runs with a “boots on the ground” response to maintain peace in Bosnia is a direct application of this plan.




Figure 5-8: PDD/NSC 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations, Category 4- Military Policy³

The final directive in the series related to multilateral peacekeeping and complex contingency operations was issued on February 24, 2000. Following the end of actions related to Operation Allied Forces, PDD/NSC 71 is a tangible example of the work of the ExCom, created through PDD/NSC 56, being implemented as functional policy. One of the lessons learned through the after-action reports of Operation Allied Forces was that defunct or ineffective local law enforcement institutions complicate the success of peacekeeping operations.

Visually represented in Figure 5-9, the intent of PDD/NSC 71 was to provide a pathway for “the Executive Branch...[to] improve its capabilities to participate in rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems by implementing the directives...in this document.” (Clinton 2000) The main vehicle through which the Principals were expected to act was to support other organizations who share this same outlook and goal.




Figure 5-9: PDD/NSC 71: Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations, Category 4-Military Policy³

Specifically enumerated in this directive was the organization CIVPOL, a group sponsored by the UN and other countries who contributed members to this organization. During the aftermath of Operation Allied Forces, in relation to the political aspect of the political-military implementation plan, American and other coalition military forces were used as the institution responsible for working with local forces to establish long term sustainable criminal justice systems to support the continuation of the work done by the peacekeepers.

The ExCom of PDD/NSC 56 realized that the training of military members and officers was not one that was focused on civilian policing tactics (Clinton 2000) so they might not be the most effective in supporting civilian police forces attempting to reestablish themselves in the aftermath of broad scale conflict. Participating in and supporting CIVPOL was deemed to be in

the national security interests of the US (Clinton 2000) but because the administration could “only advocate, rather than direct, specific policies and process of international organizations, this directive outlines general policy objectives.” (Clinton 2000) The NSC sought to encourage “democratic civilian policing models as the basis for rebuilding and training indigenous police forces, and that is what we hope to build in recovering societies.” (Clinton 2000) The NSC also encouraged CIVPOL officers be given the same protection and beholden to the same rules of engagement as peacekeepers. (Clinton 2000) This was to ensure that native populations perceive them as neutral parties rather than invasion forces, which had the potential to undo any of the good will built by the peacekeepers that preceded them.

In a link back to the content of PDD/NSC 25 which communicated the rationale for US support of an expansion of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the US wanted to UN to take the lead in terms of reestablishing viable, legitimate criminal justice systems to ensure that the systems would appear to continue being supported by the international community as a whole rather than be seen as the political objectives of one specific country. PDD/NSC 71 is an example of an application of the work undertaken by the developmental networks expanded on through PDD/NSC 56. Without the analysis and policy options provided by the Deputies Committee and ExCom, the Principals Committee would be hard pressed to provide then President Clinton with options as to how the United States could use the environment following Operation Allied Forces as an opportunity to expand US influence in a way that might be acceptable to the president’s domestic audience.

The Clinton NSC’s focus on policy-based support for multilateral peacekeeping operations, as seen in PDD/NSCs 25, 56, and 71 they tell a story not only about a president who was hesitant to get into a large-scale conflict but of an NSC that was trying to balance the

preferences of its numerous members with the realities of the political environment. Comparing the policy options included in PDD/NSC 25 versus PDD/NSC 56 versus PDD/NSC 71, it is clear that the administration overall policy becomes more refined as it interacts with the different contributing networks and remains responsive to the options available to it at the time of the implementation of these documents. Preston's (2001) critique of the seemingly lethargic nature of the Clinton administration may be a misplaced critique of the intricacies of the process required for an NSD coming into being.

It is certainly a reasonable expectation that a president with very little foreign policy experience would have a difficult time knowing where to put pressure on the networks to force them to develop policy in an expedient manner. It is also possible that the circumstances of these events, in the context of a packed domestic policy agenda, may have limited the bandwidth the president had to devote to these topics, leading him to rely more on his advisors with very little time to consider who was actually doing the leading. If there is truth in Preston's assessment of disagreement between the networks, the extended length of time between the three NSDs in this series would be plausible. It may also be the case that the NSDs themselves are instruments of a time when global situations did not move with the speed as those of the 1990's. While there are no apparent or available NSDs related to the involvement of the US in Operation Allied Forces, the contents of PDD/NSC 25 and 56 set the parameters that were used to judge whether or not the US had an avenue to be involved in the conflict in Bosnia. Based on the lack of Category 4-Military Policy NSDs as seen during Operation Desert Storm, it is clear that the situation in Bosnia and the leadership of NATO command allowed the US to relegate command of US forces in Bosnia to NATO and so required no issuance of military policy on behalf of the Clinton administration.

5.2 Example Study Conclusion

From these two cases, it can be noted that the individual personalities of a president impact not only their decisions, but the process in which those decisions were made. Both Presidents Bush and Clinton were keenly aware of their strengths, and played to them when making foreign policy. The foreign policy acumen of President Bush contributed to a more direct involvement during the intermediary phases of the policy making process. President Clinton's domestic political acumen allowed him to have input on the implications of the policy implementation phase, ensuring that the decisions in the realm of foreign policy would not adversely impact his successes on the domestic front. Choosing to employ advisors more adept than he in the realm of foreign policy, he was able to trust that the policy proposals being presented to him were sound.

Both presidents enjoyed a collegial and communicative relationship with their advisors, establishing a high level of comfort when it came to talking about all phases of the policy making process. Taking longer impacts the ability of a president to ramp up their response to a crisis. In the case of the Clinton administration, by the time that the president made a decision on the US policy towards the events in Bosnia, there was no choice but to commence with military action. In the case of the Bush White House, the constant involvement of the president allowed the United States to pursue different avenues of intervention before turning to military action. President Clinton allowed cabinet secretaries and bureaucrats to gather and synthesize information, culminating in the construction of fully formed policy options, which were presented to the president for his final decision; President Bush's constant and holistic involvement in the foreign policy making process led to more policies being implemented.

It is also clear that that shift of the use of National Security Directives began during the Bush administration, moving NSDs from an instrument of incremental documentation of policy

development to being used in the context of grand strategy. The expansion of the action networks of the Principals Committee, which necessitated expansion of the developmental networks of the Deputies Committee, along with the informational networks of issue areas and regionally focused committees, speaks to the increasingly complicated situation the US found itself as the winner of the Cold War. The shift in focus of NSDs between the Bush and Clinton administrations, specifically on creating the framework necessary for participation in a coalition, speaks to a larger shift in the US and the international community towards action through cooperation as the preferred mode of international problem solving.

While the use of NSDs alone limits the ability to identify specific actions taken by their supported developmental and informational networks, these documents, when compared with one another, broadly show the changes in policy can take over time. It is clear that these changes are responsive to the external environment, foreign and domestic, as well as the members of the networks that shepherd the idea through the policy making process.

The role of the president in these documents starts with the decisions of who to designate as part of the Principals Committee and ends with their sign off on the issued NSD. In the Bush and Clinton examples, even though the presidents were of different types (Preston 2001) and were functioning in different political climates, the consistency of the place of the NSC in the policy making process is clear. Because the NSC is not subject to the scrutiny of the Senate and its role on a daily basis is typically not newsworthy, its actions and its role in the policy making process remains relatively unknown. NSDs and RDs show that the NSC is really a vast web of networks working in concert to help presidents manage the disparate threats to national security that face the US on a daily basis. President Bush's more traditional use of NSDs to form a very organized, meticulous network to create impactful policy is as explanatory as the choice

of President Clinton to find a way to connect the policies of the US NSC with that of the UN by including the US Representative to the UN as part of the NSC Principals Committee. Both examples provide a level of insight into how administrations prioritize foreign and national security policy and how they structure administration to support those priorities. American policies focused on the protection of itself and its interest is the result of the cooperation of the informational, development, and action networks that support and make up the NSC and those networks are a consistent characteristic of the executive branch, regardless of who is in office.

6.0 Conclusion

The purpose of this project was to create an organized dataset of the population of National Security Directives, both Decision Directives and Review Directives, to allow for broader insights into the structure and function of presidential administrations in the realm of foreign and national security policy. There are certainly limitations to the structure proposed in this study but ordering the world of these documents is a first step in understanding the role of the National Security Council within the White House and the foreign policy space at large. While there is some framework for its structure set through the National Security Act of 1947, each president and their National Security Advisor are empowered to form the intricacies of the institution to meet their needs and preferences. In the realm of foreign policy, agility is a necessary component of success.

The proposed dataset should be viewed as a mechanism to understand the story of how the presidency has institutionalized, and the role of advisors and the true power of the bureaucracy have in the context of policy making and implementation. The value of this dataset is that it creates the opportunity to understand how the national security apparatus in the United States has created a focused niche for itself and how the NSC has gone from the central originator of national security policy to an organization with an even closer, more focused relationship with the president. The decline in the use of NSDs and RDs, as covered in Chapter 2.0, is not so much a story in a loss of utility of the documents themselves, but more a story about how government creates to new pathways and means of adapting to the changing world around it. NSDs and RDs have become documents of grand strategy, which increases the profile of both, national security and the NSC, from one mainly focused on crisis management to that of an organization tasked with positioning the United States in a broader sense with much longer time horizons.

Future research using National Security Directives would be best served by adding them to the part of the larger policy making conversation. These documents function as entities unto themselves and are seen as constraining, limiting, and inefficient due to the arcane nature of their structuring, but taken as a whole provide insight on how presidents have developed the Head of State and Commander in Chief roles of the office. More often than not, research focuses on the end product of executive action, the invasion, the treaty, or the lack of action, but not on the process in which an administration reached that end product. On the whole, the study of foreign policy decision making would be well served by the inclusion of the thoughts, ideas, preferences, and options included in these documents. With the field's intense focus on providing a solid seat for itself by utilizing predictive quantitative models and proposing highly explanatory theories, some of the original qualitative, narrative analysis of how decisions are actually made is lost. These documents provide us with an opportunity to see the value not only in the policy development process, but also in contemplating the road not taken.

The insight provided by these documents is not limited to just the policy development process, but also the importance of the people involved play in that development. Presidential advisors such as Kissinger and Brzezinski were unique in their knowledge and their abilities; the networks of the NSC and the place the NSC holds in the foreign and national security policy making apparatus presents an opportunity to harness the skills of this caliber of presidential advisor. The obvious distance between policy makers and political scientists is best seen in who populates the halls of the policy making institutions. Diligent, gifted, committed civil servants who are chosen through a rigorous selection process serve hand in hand with transient political appointees, but the targets of these documents are laundry list of members of Washington circles who may not be the best experienced or informed relative to their respective agencies. As such,

engaging in research that adds NSDs and RDs to the white papers and internal communiques of the departments whose heads make up the NSC Principals Committee, may yield even more information about the method in which policy is developed and implemented by different administrations.

7.0 Appendix

7.1 Appendix: Description of Visualizations of NSD and RD Networks

The diagrams included throughout the Example Study in Chapter 5.0 are meant to provide a graphic representation of the hub and spoke models embodied in the informational networks established by RDs and the developmental networks found in the NSDs. The center circle in these diagrams indicates the hub of the network and the smaller circles surrounding the hubs represents the spokes. Each diagram includes directional arrows to indicate the flow of information within that network. In the diagrams representing RDs, Bush NSRs or Clinton PRD/NSCs, information flows from the advisors via the spokes to the president or NSA in the hub. RDs, themselves, are not the vehicles through which this information flows, but rather function as documents whose intent is to gather information. The end goal of all RDs is to increase the knowledge of a president vis a vis a specific topic.

In the diagrams representing NSDs, Bush NSDs and Clinton PDD/NSCs, the foreign and national security policy objectives included therein flow from the central hub to the members of the NSC who in turn have a stake in the implementation of those preferences. The circle sizes related to the spokes were chosen for legibility and clarity and are not meant to be indicative of the importance of the advisor named. Future work can be to do to adapt the size of these spokes to denote advisors who had a greater influence than others on the president in question.

Differences in the color of the circle associated with spokes in some of the diagrams, specifically those in green, denote additions to the network which are different from the preceding directive. Items in blue are either in-line with the preceding directive, or are new, as there was no previous directive.