

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS
AS VIEWED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS TO
THE REVUE DES DEUX MONDES
1855-1920

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History
University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Mary Patricia Abernethy

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This thesis is
dedicated to my friends

DR. CATHERINE LONG RANDOLPH

and

PETER PAUL PRANIS , JR.

PREFACE

This thesis was intended as a work of research in the field of history. Perhaps it is superfluous, then, to defend the use of a chronological organization of the material. Nonetheless, it should be noted that neither a topical nor a statistical method of analysis would have better suited the material. During the period of time covered by this thesis, certain changes occurred in the attitudes of contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes toward Russian affairs. These changes were closely linked to the sequence of events. Thus, it was felt that any organization of the material other than the traditional approach might obscure rather than illuminate such changes.

Some explanation, too, should be given for the long period of time covered by this thesis. The reason for choosing the date 1920 as the ending for this study should be clear; it was a meaningful date in the relationship between France and Russia. In that year, the Allies abandoned their attempt at intervention in Russia. The withdrawal of French troops from Soviet territory marked an end to the period of Franco-Russian relations which had begun in the 1890's with negotiations for an alliance between the two countries.

The reason for beginning this thesis with 1855 is not as obvious. Why should one begin with the last year of the Crimean War if one wishes to assess changes in attitudes occurring in the last decade or so of the century? The answer to this question lay in the need to establish some standard of comparison by which to judge these changes. It proved difficult to find such a standard in the quiet period of the 1880's, when very little was published in the Revue on Russian political, social, and economic affairs. The search for some such standard, then, stretched backward to the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) when the Revue published many articles on significant events within Russia. However, articles which appeared at this time contained strong indications that attitudes expressed by contributors had been formed during an earlier period, the era of Great Reforms which began in 1861 with the freeing of the serfs. Thus, the search ended with 1855, a time when reforms had not yet touched Russia. To contributors writing at this time, Russia seemed a distant, hostile state on the outer edge of European civilization. Moreover, Russia appeared to them as a state burdened with a repressive government possessing none of those qualities which might have redeemed it in the eyes of liberal Europeans. Thus, articles published from 1855-1861 became a standard of comparison for

articles written in later times.

Research for this thesis was undertaken on the assumption that the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 must have produced some effect on French attitudes toward Russia and its affairs. After all, the establishment of intimate ties between republican France and autocratic Russia was, at the time, a startling notion. How could the French, who lived in the only large European country to manage its affairs without the aid of a monarch, rationalize an alliance with the repressive and often brutal regime of the Romanovs?

In seeking an answer to this question, however, certain limits had to be imposed. Any study of French attitudes would, of necessity, be circumscribed by the research materials available to the writer. As well, opinions solicited for this study should reflect an identifiable segment of French opinion. To attempt anything more would stretch this brief study beyond its natural boundaries.

Such a source was readily at hand in the multitude of bound volumes representing the long and uninterrupted publishing life of the Revue des Deux Mondes. This venerable French journal was closely identified with the Orleanist outlook in nineteenth-century French political affairs.¹ In fact, the Revue's identification with this

¹The Orleanists were a French political group or

viewpoint persisted in some ways long past the actual demise of the Orleanist party in the 1870's. Thus,

party which arose out of the Revolution of 1789. This group took its name from the Orleans branch of the house of Bourbon, descendants of the Duke of Orleans, younger brother of Louis XIV.

In contrast to those royalists who supported the Bourbons, Orleanists tended toward a liberal philosophy. French liberals who supported royalism helped to place the Orleanist candidate, Louis Philippe, on the throne during the Revolution of 1830. In this change of dynasties, the monarch became "King of the French by the grace of God and the will of the people" rather than "King of France and Navarre" by divine right.

The Revolution of 1848 ended the July Monarchy but not Orleanism itself. During the Second Republic and Second Empire, Orleanists upheld the claims of Louis Philippe's grandson, Louis Philippe Albert, Count of Paris. After the abrupt end of the Second Empire in 1870, former Orleanist minister Louis Adolphe Thiers was instrumental in creating the Third Republic. This marked the effective end of the Orleanist party. Those who could not support a conservative republic gave their support to the Bourbon pretender. When the Count of Chambord, only direct male heir of this line, died in 1883, the remaining supporters of both the Bourbon and Orleanist lines accepted the Count of Paris.

Orleanism, however, had always meant much more than support for the Orleanist branch of the house of Bourbon. In their political activities, Orleanist supporters were often motivated by a set of political ideals rather than the cause of a particular monarch. This political philosophy could be said to have been a conservative form of liberalism. The Orleanist ideal of governing was often described as a preference for the juste milieu or golden mean in political affairs.

René Rémond argues that, far from dying out in the 1870's, Orleanism became a permanent part of the right wing in French political affairs. Thus, it continues to be a factor in French political life even today. R. Rémond, The Right Wing in France; from 1815 to de Gaulle, trans. by James M. Laux (Philadelphia, 1966), 221, et passim.

Orleanist political theory is discussed by Vincent E. Starzinger in his book Middlingness; Juste Milieu Political Theory in France and England, 1815-48 (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1965).

since the Revue was both an easily available source and one which displayed a well-known political attitude, this journal was chosen as the basis for the research done for this thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis surveys articles published in the Revue des Deux Mondes from 1855 to 1920 which touched on Russian political, social, or economic affairs. The purpose of such a study was to determine how contributors to the Revue viewed Russia, reacted to significant events in Russia in that period and, finally, whether the closer ties between France and Russia affected the attitudes of the contributors and editors of the Revue.

The attitudes exhibited by contributors during the period of reforms (1861-1881) contrasted sharply with those views which were expressed after 1888. One of the more impressive changes was one of mood; a pessimistic outlook during the earlier period gave way to a confidence in Russia's future as a modern state. An equally important change was the steadily growing support given to the tsarist government after 1888 by the Revue and its contributors in spite of the internal troubles which Russia experienced. Furthermore, the frequent demands for political reform in Russia which distinguished the writings of contributors during the earlier period almost ceased to be heard after 1888.

In that year, large-scale French investment in Russian bonds and securities began, a circumstance which

was related to changes in European diplomatic affairs. Subsequently, negotiations began for an alliance between France and Russia; the treaty was signed in 1894.

In order to estimate the influence of both French investments and the Franco-Russian Alliance on the attitudes of contributors toward Russia, it was necessary to establish a clear picture of earlier views. In this way, the contrast between views expressed during the period of Great Reforms, as they were called, and those of the later period became more evident.

The basis for this change was French economic and strategic interests. Proof of this came from contributors themselves; direct evidence supporting this explanation appeared frequently in articles published after 1888. As well, indirect evidence was supplied by the absence, in the Revue, of any mention of certain events, such as the depression after the turn of the century, which might have embarrassed the Russian government. Furthermore, other events, especially those surrounding the revolution of 1905, were referred to only after their significance had passed. In addition, the total number of articles on Russia declined during the decade of 1904-1913, even though news of significant events within Russia was not wanting.

Confirmation that French interests influenced the

views of contributors during the period after 1888 came with the rupture of those close ties with Russia which had been cultivated during this time. The reaction of the contributors and the editorial board of the Revue to this break was the voicing of an implacable opposition to the new Soviet government, as well as a nostalgic yearning for the more settled days of the tsarist regime and the Alliance.

This study, then, has attempted to provide evidence that the close relationship between France and Russia after 1888 had a discernible impact on opinions expressed by the contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes. After that date, political, social, and economic events within Russia were no longer a matter of simple interest or curiosity for contributors. Instead, Russian affairs were considered in the light of French economic and strategic concerns.

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INTRODUCTION

The historian interested in the changing relationships among the countries of Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often finds it of value to consider expressions of public opinion within each country. The circumstances leading to an important decision of state are often surrounded by a certain amount of public discussion and debate. Such discussion will not only reflect changes in governmental policies, but will, at times, anticipate them.

An important source of information on public opinion within a country is the public press. From this source, the historian gains an easily available written record of the opinions of contributors, editors, government officials, and public figures. Thus, the daily and weekly press, under conditions relatively free from outside influence, can provide a valuable account of the larger outlines of public attitudes. However, the subtleties of public opinion are generally found in the periodicals appearing less frequently, such as the reviews and journals published within a country.

For almost a century and a half, one such source has been the Revue des Deux Mondes, one of the most prom-

inent and influential periodicals published in France.¹

¹This periodical was originally owned by Prosper Mauroy and Ségur-Dupeyron, who called it La Revue des Deux Mondes, Recueil de la Politique, de l'Administration et des Moeurs. In January 1830, the Revue absorbed the Journal des Voyages, founded in 1818, and became the Revue des Deux Mondes, Journal des Voyages, de l'Administration, des Moeurs, etc. This unwieldy title was shortened in 1831 to Revue des Deux Mondes. This last alteration in title was the consequence of a change in ownership. The Paris printer Auffray bought the Revue from its original owners and installed his old school friend François Buloz as editor-in-chief. Auffray left the Revue at the end of 1831, but Buloz was able to find financial backing from the three Bonnaire brothers, Félix, Florestan, and Henri.

In 1841, the Bonnaire brothers had refused an offer made by François Guizot to buy the Revue so that it could be turned into an official organ of the Foreign Ministry. But another crisis for the Revue came in 1844, when differences between Buloz and his backers could not be resolved. Eventually, a solution was found when Buloz incorporated the Revue des Deux Mondes. Among the stockholders were several prominent Orleanists, including the duc Albert de Broglie and Louis Mathieu Molé. No further changes in the Revue's financial structure were necessary to give it financial stability. However, a change in its title occurred after the Second World War.

From 1940 to 1944, the Revue had continued to publish at Royat, inside Vichy France. After the Liberation, the journal was not able to retain its title and became La Revue, Littérature, Histoire, Arts, Sciences, des Deux Mondes. In 1956 it merged with Hommes et Mondes without any further change in name.

For information on the Revue des Deux Mondes see Le livre de centenaire; cent ans de vie française à la Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris, 1929). This book was published by the Revue des Deux Mondes on the occasion of its centennial. See also Charles de Mazade, "La fondateur de la Revue des Deux Mondes; François Buloz," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXI (1 June 1877), 481-512. Hereinafter cited as Revue. Consult also "Revue des Deux Mondes," Grand Larousse encyclopédique (Paris, 1964), IX, 243. Also useful are two brief sketches of the Revue by Louis Eugène Hatin in his Histoire politique et littéraire de la presse en France (Paris, 1861), and Bibliographie historique et critique de la presse périodique française (Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1965. Reprinted from the original Paris, 1865).

This position has been maintained by the journal by following the policy laid down by its founder, François Buloz, of seeking the finest work of the best writers (and especially young, new writers) of each period.² Hence, the list of contributors to the Revue during its long lifetime is almost a rollcall of the most prominent names among France's literary, academic, and intellectual communities. Among the more glittering names of the nineteenth century are those of the Romantic novelist George Sand, historian Hippolyte Taine, and France's great critic Sainte-Beuve.

²François Buloz (1804-1877) came from a small village in Savoie. For a short time, he attended the Louis-le-Grande school in Paris, but left to make a living by working in a chemical factory on the Sologne. From there he returned to Paris, and, subsequently, became a printer by day and a writer and translator by night. By hard work he advanced to proofreading and learned the publishing business. His marked ability in this field, along with his tenacity and energy, brought him an offer from his school friend Auffray to edit the Revue des Deux Mondes. From February 1831, when he became editor-in-chief, until his death in 1877, Buloz devoted almost the whole of his waking hours to publishing. His interest in the Revue was so great that he seemed to drive himself beyond the limits of human endurance, as when he insisted on acting as his own proofreader, never letting an issue go to press until he had carefully checked each page of proofs himself. In 1834, Buloz purchased the Revue de Paris (1829-1945), which had been founded by Véron. Buloz published it separately from his other Revue, which he considered his beloved "daughter."

Information on Buloz comes from an article written by his real daughter, Marie-Louise Pailleron, "François Buloz et les débuts de la Revue," Revue, LIV, 7 (1 Dec. 1929), 896-915; also from Charles de Mazade's memorial article for Buloz, ibid., XXI, 3 (1 June 1877), 481-512. Also used was Ferdinand Brunetière's sketch, "François Buloz," in La grande encyclopédie (Paris, 1886-1902), VIII, 427.

The Revue's strong influence on French life is suggested by two articles which appeared in the United States on the occasion of the centenary of the journal in 1929. In an article for the Yale Review, Albert Feuillerat wrote, "For a century it has been, so to speak, the midwife of the French mind. And at the same time, though it is typically French, as it never ceases to look beyond the frontiers of France, every nation can find in it its own image reflected in French eyes."³ Another centennial article, written by Léon Bassard and Pierre Crabitès, described the journal as "...more than a review. It is a French national institution. It is the mirror of the intellect of France; it is a monthly image of the Gallic soul."⁴

During the nineteenth century, the journal's great prestige and prominent position in the cultural and social life of France was due to the taste and ambition of François Buloz. Under his direction, the Revue reached its full development in the Second Empire as a journal of current events and literary brilliance, publishing articles on economics, geography, politics, important current events, and history, as well as French and foreign literature.

³"The Centenary of the Revue des Deux Mondes," The Yale Review, XIX, 3 (Mar. 1930), 648.

⁴"The Centenary of the Revue des Deux Mondes," The Nineteenth Century (And After), CVI (Nov. 1929), 710.

This substantial program has continued until the present day, an indication that François Buloz's policies left an ineradicable mark on the Revue des Deux Mondes.

As well, Buloz was responsible for the political orientation of the Revue. His own preference for constitutional monarchy led him to an Orleanist point of view.⁵

⁵To fully comprehend the motives of Orleanist supporters, it is necessary to understand the reasons for the direction which liberalism took in France after the restoration of the Bourbons (1814-1815). Memories of the Revolution and its excesses, as well as the tyranny of the Napoleonic period, were still fresh. Thus, French liberals were intent on avoiding despotism in any form, whether of the right or of the left.

For this reason, liberalism became a conservative philosophy in France. For instance, liberals remembered only too well Napoleon's manipulated plebiscites. Thus, they rejected universal suffrage as being a potential tool of despotism. They proposed, instead, a suffrage limited by high property qualifications. In this way, the natural elite of the country would be enabled to rule in the best interests of all the people. This identification of wealth with intelligence continued to be a strong feature of French liberal thought throughout the nineteenth century. In fact, it lingered well into the twentieth century in spite of the actual practice of universal (male) suffrage during the Third Republic.

An unequivocal statement of the idea that democracy degrades the quality of government can be found in an anonymous article published in the Revue in 1887. While the bulk of this article was directed to matters of French foreign policy, the first few pages are devoted to an attack on democratic government. See Chapter II, page 61.

Other aspects of liberal philosophy, as it was known in France, were an insistence on written guarantees of rights and support for local self-government. In their economic thought, most (but not all) French liberals joined with their fellow countrymen in resisting the concept of free trade.

For information on French liberalism, see Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, trans. by R.G. Collingwood (London, 1927), 158-210.

He knew many of the men who served the July Monarchy, as evidenced by the list of the Revue's stockholders after its incorporation in 1841. Moreover, during the 1840's, he formed a close and enduring friendship with Adolphe Thiers.⁶

Buloz's close association with prominent Orleanists, in fact, led to his dismissal from the post of Commissaire royal to the Comédie-française, a position which he had accepted in October 1838. His term of office was to be brief; after the revolution of 24 February 1848, one of the first official acts of the new Minister of the Interior, Ledru-Rollin, was to relieve Buloz of this position.

After 1848, the Revue became the voice of Orleanist opposition to the Second Republic (1848-1852) and the Second Empire (1852-1870). During the reign of Napoleon III, the journal was often threatened with closure or cen-

⁶Thiers was a well-known historian and journalist during the Restoration. He had a part in the establishment of the July Monarchy, and afterwards became one of the more prominent statesmen of this period, serving twice as prime minister (February-September 1837 and March-October 1840).

In contrast to countries such as the United States, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the French academic and intellectual communities have only periodically been estranged from the political life of France. An intimate connection between French intellectuals and the French government was especially pronounced during the July Monarchy. Of this association, Rémond said, "A kind of osmosis developed between politics and the University, between the ministries and the academies." The Right Wing in France, 115.

The University to which Rémond refers is not a particular school, but, rather, the French educational system.

sure because of its views, but it never ceased publication, continuing to act as an "asile de libéralisme" for the academic and intellectual world of France.⁷

After the fall of the Second Empire, however, Buloz ceased to advocate a constitutional monarchy for France. For the previous forty years Buloz had supported his old friend Thiers, and now he continued this friendship by endorsing Thiers's efforts to form a conservative republic.⁸

In his eulogy for Buloz in 1877, Charles de Mazade offered a definition of the Revue's political philosophy which also served as an explanation, after the fact, of this change in the Revue's political direction. The journal's liberalism, he said, could be described as an attachment to parliamentary institutions, regular guarantees of rights, humanitarianism, and a patriotism which did not favor any particular form of government or party.⁹

The policies established by Buloz were carried forward by his second son, Charles, who stepped into the

⁷Revue, XXI, 3 (1 June 1877), 487.

The number of subscriptions to the Revue grew very rapidly after the Revolution of 1848. When Buloz became editor in 1831, the journal had 350 subscribers. This had increased to 2500 by 1838. In 1851 the Revue had 5,000 subscribers, and by 1863, paid subscriptions had risen to 15,000. Ibid., 504.

⁸Ibid., 512.

⁹Ibid., 509.

position of editor when the father died in 1877. After Ferdinand Brunetière assumed the editorship in 1893, he revived François Buloz's strong, personal style of direction for the Revue. "Brunetière was as ardent a patriot as the departed master," Bassard and Crabitès wrote, "And he was just as stubborn, just as courageous, and just as much of a martinet as his great predecessor....He was, to be brief, a later edition -- not a revised and improved, but merely a later edition -- of Buloz."¹⁰

Moreover, in his own way, Brunetière continued the old juste milieu ideal which Buloz had pursued so relentlessly as editor of the Revue. Just as Buloz had refused to publish the increasingly radical works of George Sand in 1840, so now Brunetière rejected the writings of Emile Zola and others of the realist school. Instead, he published the writings of the neo-classicists. While, then, Brunetière continued to support the Third Republic, he held at bay the more democratic literary expressions of this period.¹¹

During the time from the late eighties when foreign affairs became a major concern for Frenchmen, the Revue had as its editor a man who had spent some years with the French Foreign Ministry. Marie François Charmes was a

¹⁰Nineteenth Century, CVI, 715.

¹¹Victor Giraud, "Ferdinand Brunetière," Le livre de centenaire, 418.

well-known journalist when he was offered the post of Assistant Director of the Political Department at the Quai d'Orsay. In 1885, he was appointed Director of this department. Charmes's working life, however, included many more activities than just his career with the Foreign Ministry. Like many Frenchmen of his day, he combined several careers at once. From 1881-1885 and again from 1889-1898, he served as Deputy from Cantal. As well, in 1893 he began writing political analyses of current events for the Revue des Deux Mondes. When he ended his career in public service in 1900, he concentrated again on his writing. After the death of Brunetière, Charmes became editor of the Revue, taking up this post in 1907.

The Revue would seem to have continued its political traditions with the choice of Charmes. It was once said of this man that "the spirit of Thiers had fallen on him."¹² After the death of Charmes, the Revue moved further to the right with the choice of René Doumic as its editor. Doumic was conservative in both his literary and political tastes. A fact which perhaps testifies to both of

¹²This quotation from Paul Adam was used by Bassard and Crabitès, Nineteenth Century, XVI, 716. Further information on Charmes (who was always called "Francis") can be found in Grande Larousse encyclopédique, II, 893; also see "Obituary of Eminent Persons Deceased in 1916," The Annual Register; a Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1916, New Series (London, 1917), 153.

these sentiments was his designation as secrétaire perpétuel of the Académie française in 1923.¹³

The editors of the Revue seem to have remained in that post until their final days. Upon Doumic's death in 1937, André Chaumeix became editor, serving throughout the Second World War and the postwar years. Like Doumic, Chaumeix had also been a writer of some note before his selection as editor.¹⁴

¹³Grande Larousse encyclopédique, IV, 211.

¹⁴Ibid., II, 913.

CHAPTER I

ATTITUDES TOWARD RUSSIAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 1855-1882

The period of 1855-1882 was significant for the later development of Russian political and social affairs. During the long reign of Alexander II (1855-1881), the Russian government attempted a wide program of reforms. These began on 19 February 1861 when the tsar emancipated the serfs, thereby earning for himself the title of "tsar liberator." Other reforms of a social and economic nature soon followed. While the pace of reforms slowed perceptibly during the 1870's, the open discontent which followed the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) forced the tsar to consider further changes. On the very day of his assassination by political radicals, Alexander II approved a tentative program for reforms which many hoped would lead to changes in the Russian political structure. These plans were abandoned by his successor, Alexander III, who turned to repressive measures. However, the initial reforms made in the 1860's and 1870's continued to influence Russian affairs.

Contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes during the period 1855-1882 did not always follow the actual

course of events within Russia. However, these events provided the general context for their discussions of Russian economic, political, and social affairs. It was only natural that contributors viewed the reign of Alexander II, in the years after 1861, as a period of reforms. For this reason, the emancipation of the serfs serves as the first dividing line for the material presented in this chapter. A second division occurs toward the end of the reign, when political unrest within Russia provided a new context for the discussion of Russian political and social affairs. Attitudes of contributors can thus be assigned to three chronological categories, the last two of which are overlapping to some extent. These are: those views expressed before the agrarian settlement in 1861, those attitudes revealed during a long middle period from 1861-1880 when the attention of contributors tended to focus on the program of reforms in Russia, and a later trend beginning in 1878 when contributor's views reflected the growing political unrest.

1855-1861

Until 1905, when Nicolas II granted a state Duma, the power of the Russian autocracy was absolute. Peter the Great described the tsar as an "autocratic monarch who has to give an account of his acts to no one on earth,

but has power and authority to rule his States and lands as a Christian sovereign according to his own will and judgment."¹

The initiative for changes and the entire authority for decisions rested with the tsar. The Council of State, established by Alexander I in 1810, was a consultative body which could not initiate legislation. While the Senate had been founded by Peter the Great in 1711 as a body with some administrative powers, under Nicolas I it became no more than a supreme court of appeal. The reign of Nicolas I (1825-1855) had also seen the decline of the provincial and district assemblies of nobles. After a decree of 1831, these assemblies were restricted to matters of internal organization within the noble class.

The ministers answered to the tsar directly and individually. Each ministry had its own bureaus in the provinces. Business which was not covered by printed instructions was forwarded to the minister for a decision. The provincial governors were representatives of the Minister of the Interior.²

¹Quoted by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace in his book Russia (New York, 1961), 7. This book has gone through numerous editions, with some revisions, since its first publication in London, 1877.

²In 1864, some administrative duties under the control of the governors were given to the newly created zemstvos, bodies of local self-government. Also, the judicial functions performed by the governors were discontinued

In this highly centralized system of administration, the ordinary police were under the Ministry of the Interior, and on a local level were supervised by the provincial governors. There was a separate system of police created by Nicolas I in 1826 which was administered from the Third Section of the Imperial Chancery. This was the notorious secret police force which dealt with a broad category of offenses which were considered political in nature. When the Third Section was placed under the Minister of the Interior in 1880, it lost none of its special character.³

As can be seen from this brief summary, the legacy of Nicolas I was a greatly strengthened autocratic power and a tradition of repression. In 1855, this system seemed impervious to change. Only later did some Russians and foreigners express hope for changes in the political and administrative structure of the Russian state.

Russia and France were still at war in 1855. The Russian army had just evacuated Sevastopol when, in the closing months of that year, the Revue des Deux Mondes

after the judicial reforms of 1864. These changes did not alter the essential nature of the autocracy.

³British historian Hugh Seton-Watson gives a brief description of the political and administrative structure of Russia in the first chapter of his book The Decline of Imperial Russia 1855-1914 (New York, 1952).

published a two part study on Russia by Auguste Picard.⁴

Picard's interest in Russia was focused on a strong disapproval of Russia's aggressive role in European affairs, both current and future, and on a blanket condemnation of Russia's autocracy as the cause of that country's backwardness and troublemaking. There was, he said, a forbidding pattern of Russian foreign conquest and internal repression for which the tsars of Russia were responsible.⁵

Russia, Picard said, was a country which was "sadly unique in the world."⁶ It was an "uncivilized" and static country which was highly resistant to change. The sterile and corrupt government was firmly entrenched behind its traditions of repressive control and deeply fearful of changes which might rob it of despotic power.⁷

While Picard did not expect any change in the political and administrative structure of Russia, he noted some signs of future social reform. The Russian govern-

⁴"Le gouvernement des tsars et la société russe; la Russie jusqu'à l'avènement des Romanof," Revue, XII, 2 (15 Nov. 1855), 865-894; "--; la Russie sous les Romanof," ibid., XIII, 2 (1 Dec. 1855), 1035-1064.

Great Britain and France had joined Turkey in its war with Russia in March 1854. A year later, Nicolas I died and was succeeded by Alexander II. On 11 September 1855, Sevastopol was abandoned by the Russians; the Treaty of Paris, ending the hostilities, was signed on 30 March 1856.

⁵Ibid., XII, 2 (15 Nov. 1855), 867.

⁶Ibid., XIII, 2 (1 Dec. 1855), 1056.

⁷Ibid., 1035-1036.

ment, he said, was aware that social reform would be necessary after the Crimean War and Picard assumed that the necessary first step would be the abolition of serfdom.⁸

A few years after the publication of Picard's study, the anticipated emancipation of the serfs had become a topic of general interest in Europe. To some extent, this awareness of Russia's internal problems came from the writings of Russian political exiles such as Alexander Herzen, whose publication The Bell (Kolokol) reached even the tsar.⁹

Perhaps partly in response to the newer perspective provided by such political exiles, the Revue published a sensitive and sympathetic article by its literary critic

⁸Ibid., 1063.

⁹Two contributors to the Revue, Charles de Mazade and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, made frequent and sympathetic mention of Herzen's writings, while H. Delaveau reviewed one of his books and referred to Herzen as a well known source of political dissent.

Certain of Herzen's views had a lasting effect on the radical movement in Russia. His view of the Russian peasantry, expressed in The Russian People and Socialism (1852), was influential in establishing the rural commune or mir as the embodiment of all the virtues that he felt were missing in western bourgeois culture; a society that was drawn closer to the human scale than the organized masses of the West, and a society where man could be free to develop his potential without falling into the western trap of self-interest. E. Lampert, Studies in Rebellion (London, 1957), 247-248. An exceptionally fine work on Herzen is Edward Hallett Carr's biography, The Romantic Exiles: a Nineteenth-Century Portrait Gallery (London, 1933).

H. Delaveau on the place of literature as an outlet for political dissent in Russia.¹⁰

In exploring the nature of the underground dissent which had flourished under Nicolas I, Delaveau explained to his French readers the role which literature had come to play in Russia as an outlet for political and social expression. Literature, he stressed, had assumed an importance far beyond its aesthetic value, and the satiric novel in the hands of such writers as Nicolas Gogol, Ivan Turgenev, Nicolas Nekrasov, and Alexander Herzen became a vehicle for the voicing of bitter discontent.¹¹

Delaveau did not explore the possibilities for reforms; his interest was confined to the desire for change seen in the literature of Russia. However, he indicated a strong interest in preserving western influences in Russia and was disturbed by the anti-western feeling that occurred in much of Russian satiric literature, even in

¹⁰"Le roman satirique en Russie," Revue, XXV, 2 (15 Jan. 1860), 425-453.

¹¹Both the critics and the reading public in nineteenth-century Russia expected the Russian novel to contain large amounts of social comment. The reasons for this demand and its effects on the literature of Russia are explored in Prince D. S. Mirsky, A History of Russian Literature from the Earliest Times to the Death of Dostoyevsky (1881) (New York, 1927).

the work of writers considered Westerners.¹²

This attitude foreshadowed a trend found in articles published after 1861, when contributors insisted that Russia could not reach its full development as a country unless it adopted western institutions and culture. In fact, Delaveau's concluding remarks revealed the same arguments used by later writers. In a plaintive question, Delaveau asked why the "spirit of defiance vis-à-vis western societies" should be present at all. "The encouragement," he said, "of a sterile hatred for the foreigner will be the way to an incurable impotence."¹³

The subject of reforms appeared frequently in this article since the Russian novelists included in Delaveau's study often demanded administrative changes. Like Picard, however, Delaveau saw reforms, of whatever nature, only in the most speculative way. The interest of these con-

¹²The Westerners in Russia were those who desired, in varying degrees, that Russia adopt the culture of western Europe. Alexander Herzen was one of the best known of this group. The Slavophiles, on the other hand, were xenophobes. As was true elsewhere, the Romantic movement had merged with nationalism to produce an evangelic ultra-nationalism. Thus, from the Romantic movement in Russia emerged a group of intellectuals who rejected the political and religious institutions of the West, feeling that ancient Russian traditions were superior. The Slavophile movement was especially strong during the 1840's and 1850's, and was often at odds with the autocracy since the Slavophiles took a keen interest in such civil rights as freedom of speech.

¹³Revue, XXV, 2 (15 Jan. 1860), 453.

tributors was in Russia as it actually was. After 1861, writers concerned themselves not only with contemporary conditions in Russia but also with a future Russia transformed by reforms. It was this element more than any other which separated the writings of Picard and Delaveau from those which followed.

1861-1878

Both Picard and Delaveau were viewing what writers of this period would call "old Russia." A new era began for Russia with the eagerly awaited emancipation of the serfs on 19 February 1861. Plans for the abolition of serfdom originated in the reign of Nicolas I, but no steps for their implementation were taken before the Crimean War. When the disastrous course of that war and the humiliating peace which followed created an intense demand within Russia for change, the new tsar, Alexander II, responded with the Emancipation Act of 1861.¹⁴

¹⁴Not all were pleased with the effects of this Act. In an economic study of the Russian peasantry, G. T. Robinson sharply questioned the beneficial nature of the agrarian settlement of 1861. The peasant was not freed economically and his personal freedom was severely limited, Robinson pointed out. Besides paying money dues to his former landlord, the peasant paid heavy redemption dues and taxes on his too-small piece of land. Moreover, the peasant was still tied to the mir, which had become the tax-collecting agency in the countryside. Geroid Tanquary Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Régime; a History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant

Other reforms followed in 1864. In January, the role and structure of local and provincial government were strengthened by the creation of zemstvo assemblies and boards at district and provincial levels in thirty-four provinces within the western part of the Empire. These new institutions of local self-government, drawing their representatives predominately from the gentry, supervised the fulfillment of local needs, such as roads, education, public health, and food reserves.¹⁵

The most successful of Russia's reforms in the nineteenth century was inaugurated in November 1864 with the adoption of an entirely new legal system based on western (French) models. In spite of some later tampering with the legal system, the foundations remained essentially sound. Separation of courts and administration, adoption

Revolution of 1917 (New York, 1932).

For a complementary study of peasant problems before 1861, see Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia; from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N. J., 1961).

¹⁵This was intended as a purely administrative reform. However, the zemstvo was used as a limited outlet for the expression of political ideas by the liberal gentry. During the 1860's, the liberals showed disappointment with these local bodies because they were not truly autonomous, but by the 1870's, Russia's liberal gentry embraced the zemstvo enthusiastically, understanding that it gave them "a unique arena for 'non-political' politics." George Fischer, Russian Liberalism; from Gentry to Intelligentsia (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 14.

of the principle of equality before the law, trial by jury, and numerous other innovations provided a fundamental improvement in the quality of Russian life.¹⁶

Changes in the educational system and significant improvements in Russia's financial structure also occurred during the 1860's. Later, in 1870, urban government was improved along the lines of the zemstvo reforms. In 1874, in order to create a citizen's army, Russia's military service was reorganized. Military duty became obligatory for all classes and the length of service was shortened.

During the 1860's and 1870's when these innovations were being introduced to Russia, four contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes interested themselves in Russian political and social affairs. Both Charles de Mazade and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu wrote lengthy series on Russia and its reforms. C. Cailliatte reviewed a current work on Russia by William Hepworth Dixon, while Belgian economist Emile de Laveleye briefly noted Russian political and social affairs in an article devoted to another matter, panslavism.¹⁷

¹⁶This reform, which created "the free Russian lawyer and the democratic administration of justice" in Russia, was abrogated in November 1917. Samuel Kucherov, Courts, Lawyers, and Trials under the Last Three Tsars (New York, 1963), 314.

¹⁷Although there were a substantial number of articles in the Revue during the decade of the 1860's which touched

For all of these writers, the most important aspect of Russian internal affairs was the program of social reforms. The undertaking of reforms in a land of vast, and as yet undeveloped, potential excited their imagination. They approached the Great Reforms, as they were often called, with anticipation, impatience, and a certain fearfulness that at any moment Russia might stray from what they envisioned as the path of progress.

The words "reform" or "reforms" appeared repeatedly in the writings of these contributors. On further examination, however, it would appear that the "reforms" spoken of so freely by these authors were often a synonym for "changes." This was not, however, indiscriminate change, but change in a particular direction. Contributors wished Russia to transform itself into a modern state like those of western Europe. Their models for "reform" or change were western liberal institutions and traditions. To this end, they suggested the change or abandonment of native Russian political and social institutions. In brief, these writers exhibited an evangelical liberalism and a strong anti-Slavophilism.¹⁸

on Russian affairs, they were concerned principally with Russian literature or Russia's eastward expansion and settlement.

¹⁸It must be remembered that the political orientation of the Revue des Deux Mondes was Orleanist, an outlook which included such liberal doctrine as the support of parliamentary institutions and regular guarantees of rights.

Perhaps one reason for this evangelical note was the reasonable expectation of these contributors that their articles would be read in Russia. During this period, censored copies of the Revue were allowed to circulate in the larger cities of Russia, while uncensored copies were easily obtained by government officials. Contributors did not waste this opportunity to speak to their Russian readers, and, at times, their articles appear to have been written more for their Russian audience than for their French readers.¹⁹

Their zealous desire to westernize Russia led contributors to measure Russian performance against their own expectations. Inevitably, they were disappointed. When the expected transformation did not occur at a rapid pace, contributors responded by becoming pessimistic about the future of Russia. Moreover, they earnestly sought the causes for the disappointment of their high expectations, turning first to one reason, then to another.²⁰

¹⁹Leroy-Beaulieu observed the uneven results of Russian censorship on his visits to Russia. He described the wide circulation of the Revue des Deux Mondes in the cities of Russia in an article published in 1880. "L'empire des tsars et les Russes; la presse et la censure," Revue, XXXVII, 3 (1 Jan. 1880), 99-136. For biographical information on Leroy-Beaulieu, see Appendix to Chapter I, page 54.

²⁰See, for example, the articles by C. Cailliatte and Emile de Lavelaye which are discussed on pages 31-35. Articles written by Leroy-Beaulieu after 1878 also reflect concern for the slow pace of reforms and a consequent search for explanations. See pages 46-49.

Another characteristic shared by these writers should be noted. Contributors during this period saw social reforms in Russia as an opportunity for a thorough westernization of Russian political institutions. Thus, writers tended to equate "reforms" in the general sense with political reforms, while, at the same time, their articles were concerned with social reforms, especially the one of 1861. This tendency to mix together expectations of further reforms with the actual changes occurring in Russia was found even in the work of Leroy-Beaulieu. This writer was far more rigorous in his analysis of Russian political and social affairs than other contributors. However, he sometimes used discussions of social reforms to speak in a general way of the need for further "reforms," i.e., changes in Russia's political structure.

Not only were the writings of Leroy-Beaulieu more rigorous than others, but they provided the only systematic discussion of social reforms in Russia.²¹ Neither Calliatte nor de Laveleye discussed the full range of reforms; the former was interested principally in Russia's agrarian problems, while the latter wrote briefly of reforms in the most general way. While Charles de Mazade

²¹Articles contributed by Leroy-Beaulieu during this period are listed on page 55.

wrote a lengthy series of articles on the changes within Russia, his discussions were limited in large part to generalities or to considerations of changes in personnel within the highest level of the administration. He barely mentioned the judicial or educational changes, and confined himself largely to the history of local government in Russia when discussing the zemstvo reform.²²

Even though Leroy-Beaulieu discussed all of the reforms, he was particularly attracted to the study of Russia's peasantry. His comments on Russia's bureaucratic structure, for example, often emphasized the effects on the peasantry of this vast government machine.²³ Since, then, all contributors during the period 1861-1880 tended to concentrate their attention on the problems of the Russian

²²Since his observations on Russia were made without first-hand information, de Mazade necessarily relied on the heavily censored Russian periodicals for his news of the reforms. Perhaps this explains his limited discussion of reforms.

Louis-Jean-Charles-Robert de Mazade-Percin (1820-1893) studied law at Toulouse, then went to Paris in 1840 as an aspiring young poet. However, he was invited to work for the Revue des Deux Mondes by the critic Sainte-Beuve, and from 1845 until his death wrote an enormous number of articles on literature, history, and politics. M. de Mazade was a close friend of François Buloz, the Revue's founder and longtime editor. After Buloz's health began to fail in 1871, de Mazade often performed the duties of editor. Dictionnaire universel des contemporains (Paris, 1893), 1080; RdDM, Le livre du centenaire, 365-366.

²³See his article "L'empire des tsars et les Russes; l'administration; la commune rurale et le self-government des paysans," Revue, XXII, 3 (1 Aug. 1877), 721-752.

peasantry and the effects of the agrarian settlement of 1861, this section will be concerned principally with contributors's views on the agrarian reforms.

During the years 1862-1868, the Revue des Deux Mondes published a series of articles on Russia by Charles de Mazade which was noteworthy for several reasons.²⁴ For instance, one of the peculiarities of this series was that the author wrote at great length on the subject of reform, but said little of substance about them. M. de Mazade, however, was always entertaining; his vitriolic wit enlivened his long discussions of high government officials just as his elegant prose disguised the lack of solid information during his rambling discourses on "reforms."

Another feature of de Mazade's writing which had no exact parallel in articles by other authors was his subjective approach to the study of Russian affairs after 1863. The crushing of the Polish rebellion by the Russian

²⁴"La Russie sous l'empereur Alexandre II," ibid., XXXVII, 2 (15 Jan. 1862), 257-295; "--; II., la crise de l'autocratie et la société russe," XXXIX, 2 (15 June 1862), 769-803; "--; III., la société et le gouvernement russes depuis l'insurrection polonaise," LXII, 2 (15 Mar. 1866), 273-311; "--; deux ans de l'histoire intérieure de Russie, 1866-1867," LXXIV, 2 (1 Apr. 1868), 725-756; "--; la politique extérieure de la Russie et le panslavisme, 1866-1867," LXXV, 2 (15 May 1868), 405-438.

army in that year offended de Mazade's deepest feelings. Articles written after that time leave the reader with the impression that de Mazade was fighting a private war with official Russia, and was using the subject of reforms as an excuse to launch his attacks.²⁵

While de Mazade showed an open contempt for any government official with strongly conservative tendencies or Slavophile sympathies, the author reserved his most abusive remarks for a man who was influential in government circles but who was not himself an official. This was Mikhail N. Katkov, the ultrapatriotic editor and journalist of the Moscow Gazette. Katkov, the author said, "has become a sort of whirling dervish of patriotism, creating from an hallucination, with the aid of his vanity, a permanent and obligatory system [of Russification.] Beyond this obsession, he knows nothing; the West does not exist except as the home of a dangerous contagion."²⁶

²⁵The author had not shown a truly friendly attitude toward Russia even before 1863, but his articles had been far more objective in tone.

De Mazade supported the Polish rebellion of the 1860's, when Polish patriots attempted to gain complete independence from Russia. The subsequent surge of nationalistic feeling within Russia and the crushing of the rebellion in 1863 provoked some of de Mazade's most abrasive comments.

²⁶Ibid., LXII, 2 (15 Mar. 1866), 284.

Katkov earned de Mazade's wrath by spurring on the spirit of nationalism within Russia during the early 1860's, and by supporting the Russian government in its policy of

According to Katkov and other conservatives, de Mazade claimed, part of the 'dangerous contagion' from the West was the spirit of rebellion, which had been especially evident among Russia's peasants during the sixties. The French author argued that, on the contrary, rebellion among the peasants was "almost a national trait in Russia."²⁷ Furthermore, de Mazade disagreed with a favorite theory of the conservatives, that the rise in the number of peasant revolts from 1864-1867 was caused by a huge conspiracy led by exiled radicals. Instead, he asserted, this rise reflected the social dislocations which followed the Emancipation Act.²⁸

using force to put down the Polish rebellion.

The Moscow journalist and his opinions were mentioned frequently throughout the last three articles by de Mazade, but the author's bitterest appraisal of Katkov's influence occurred during discussions of Russian foreign affairs. Ibid., 281-286.

²⁷Ibid., 285.

²⁸Ibid., 285.

It did not occur to either the conservatives or to de Mazade to question the peasant settlement itself as the cause of unrest. Not very much was known about the effect of the agrarian reforms on the Russian countryside at the time this article was published. Some light was thrown on this question in 1869, when N. Flerovsky (Vasily Vasilevich Bervi) published his book The Situation of the Working Class in Russia. Flerovsky presented first-hand evidence that the mir had begun to disintegrate after the introduction of a money economy in the countryside, and that the Russian peasantry was rapidly becoming pauperized. The circulation of this book in Russia had an important effect on the intelligentsia and subsequently on the pace of revolutionary

De Mazade thus defended the only group in Russia (the peasantry) which he felt had benefited from the social reforms of the 1860's. With the exception of the emancipation of the serfs, reforms had failed, the author thought. This evaluation was not made on the basis of social reforms actually introduced into Russia but on de Mazade's own expectations of further reforms of a political nature. For example, he rejected the zemstvo reform as completely inadequate; indeed, almost worthless. The reason for this was that these administrative bodies had not evolved into political institutions. The "self-government" which had so excited the Russian gentry, de Mazade complained, had not created any truly democratic assemblies, and, moreover, the proposed national assembly was still far removed.²⁹

In seeking the causes for the failure of reforms, de Mazade indicated plainly that he felt anti-western attitudes to be at fault. He feared the continued strength of the reactionary forces in Russia after 1861, suggesting

activities. Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution; a History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth-Century Russia (New York, 1960, 1st pub. as Il Populismo Russo, Rome, 1952), 491.

Because of his Marxist views, Venturi was allowed to use the Russian archives, enhancing the value of this comprehensive and impartial study of nineteenth-century radicalism in Russia.

²⁹Revue, LXII, 2 (15 Mar. 1866), 305.

that certain members of the court, such as the Grand Duke Constantine, were a danger to reform.³⁰ Later, in 1868, the author felt that the flattery of the conservative press had opened another channel through which conservative advice could flow to a monarch too weak to withstand such blandishments. "Sensible of his popularity, flattered by the title of liberator which had been bestowed upon him continually since the emancipation of the peasants; and having, certainly, the love of Russia; [the tsar] could hardly view as his enemies those who proclaimed themselves Russians above all...."³¹

Furthermore, the author questioned the good intentions of the government in instituting reforms. One of the sources of such skepticism seems to have been his impatience at the slow pace of transformation in Russia. After charging that few reforms were actually begun or even supported once begun, de Mazade complained contemptuously that "everyone is liberal or says he is liberal, even the new chief of the secret police, General Potapof."³²

The conclusions drawn by de Mazade were in sharp contrast to those expressed in a book review contributed

³⁰Ibid., XXXIX, 2 (15 June 1863), 803.

³¹Ibid., 2 (1 Apr. 1868), 743.

³²Ibid., XXXIX, 2 (15 June 1863), 781. While this remark was made in 1863, it accurately reflected de Mazade's later opinions.

by C. Cailliatte in 1871.³³ Unlike de Mazade, Cailliatte did not view the tsar as too weak to withstand pressure from conservatives who wished to nullify reforms. Instead, he saw Alexander II as a ruler with an intelligent appreciation of his country's problems, and a man possessed of the determination to move Russia forward. This was evidenced, he thought, by the immediate assumption of work on a modern system of communications and transportation within the Empire upon his accession.³⁴

³³"L'etat social de la Russie depuis l'abolition de servage," *ibid.*, XCII, 2 (15 Apr. 1871), 609-639.

This was a review of William Hepworth Dixon's two volume work, Free Russia. While Dixon's work was cited just beneath the title of this article, as in a review, Cailliatte did not refer directly to Dixon until the last few pages, when he commented favorably on the fairness of Dixon's observations and used quotations from Dixon's work to buttress his own opinions.

At the time this article was published, France was still faced with the aftermath of its humiliating defeat by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. Peace terms had been ratified by the newly elected National Assembly on 1 March 1871, but partly in protest to this action, Paris had formed a revolutionary government on 28 March. It was not until 28 May that the Versailles government was able to put down the insurrection in Paris by force. The events of 1870-1871 had a decisive effect on the formation of French foreign policy during the Third Republic. For an account of the diplomacy surrounding the signing of a peace treaty and the execution of the treaty terms, see Robert I. Giesberg, The Treaty of Frankfort; a Study in Diplomatic History, September 1870-September 1873 (Philadelphia, 1966).

The editor of the Revue noted that Cailliatte had been an indirect victim of the Franco-Prussian War in that Cailliatte's grief at the disastrous course of the war had plunged him into a deep melancholy which ultimately shortened his life. Revue, XCII, 2(15 Apr. 1871), 609.

³⁴Revue, XCII, 2 (15 Apr. 1871), 626.

Not only did Cailliatte admire the reforming zeal of the tsar, but he refused to hold either the tsar or his administration responsible for the serious misunderstandings which led to peasant rebellions after the Emancipation Act. The peasants in their ignorance, he said, had expected unlimited freedom, while the government favored certain controls over all social classes. Thus, when the terms of the Emancipation Act became known, rebellions broke out in many provinces. Cailliatte placed the blame entirely on the peasants for this tragic sequence of events, much as Leroy-Beaulieu would do later.³⁵

Cailliatte was not satisfied with what he thought was the slow pace of reforms. After a sketchy evaluation of these reforms, Cailliatte concluded that Russia needed to discard the "Asiatic" elements in its political and economic structure and adopt a more thoroughly western approach. For example, the author felt that the failure of the agricultural reforms to achieve prosperity for the peasants could be traced to the retention of what he

³⁵Ibid., 627-630. G. T. Robinson thought that the peasantry had sufficient reason to rebel against this settlement. On this question he commented that "North and South, the scales were weighted against the peasant; he was coming forth from the Emancipation with limited rights and little land, but abundant obligations, and behind him was a history that showed him not always passive in his discontent." Rural Russia and the Old Regime, 88.

claimed was the traditional "Asiatic" element in Russian rural life, that is, the mir. "Far from being a safeguard for the liberty of its members," he said, "the Russian commune has been organized to facilitate tax collection. It is a fiscal creation [which is] more asiatic than European...agriculture is condemned by this system to perpetual immobility."³⁶

Furthermore, Cailliatte claimed that the autocracy remained "Asiatic." Despite great progress, the life of Russia's citizens was stifled under an arbitrary government which relied on police terrorism to command obedience. Even while praising the good works of Alexander II, the author asserted that the autocratic system itself was an element which held Russia back from realizing its potential as a prosperous, modern nation.

The author's proposed remedy was simple; "...liberty must infiltrate throughout all the ranks of society so that the regime of arbitrary power may be banished..."

³⁶Revue, XCII, 2 (15 Apr. 1871), 673. In this same period the Russian intelligentsia still favored the mir, although this institution was under attack by anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who had earlier shared his friend Herzen's enthusiasm for the Russian commune. However, Bakunin did not hesitate to appropriate the framework of the mir for his scheme of a "federal" society composed of small communities based upon the mir. E. Lampert, Studies in Rebellion (London, 1947), 147, 158.

Once this was done, Cailliatte declared, the people of Russia would progress by themselves and their country would achieve its real potential.³⁷

Cailliatte's assessment that the autocratic system was responsible for the slow progress of social reforms in Russia was echoed by Emile de Laveleye in an article published the same year.³⁸ De Laveleye asserted that Russia had not realized its potential for greatness because, until the present, an oppressive government placed too heavy a burden on its citizenry, forcing the people to become "inert, ignorant, poor, and servile..."³⁹

The solutions suggested by these two contributors to improve the pace of modernization were, however, quite different. Cailliatte saw both the problem and its solu-

³⁷Revue, XCII, 2 (15 Apr. 1871), 639.

³⁸"La nouvelle politique russe," ibid., XCVI, 2 (15 Nov. 1871), 379-414.

Emile Louis Victor de Laveleye (1822-1892) was a Belgian economist and writer who traveled widely in order to study at first hand the political, social, and economic questions of his day. After writing for Belgian journals of a liberal character, Laveleye began to contribute articles to the Revue des Deux Mondes. In 1863, he became professor of political economy at the University of Liège but still devoted much time to writing. Along with his friend William Gladstone, de Laveleye used his writings to promote sympathy among the governments of Europe for the cause of Bulgarian freedom from Turkish control. La grande encyclopédie, XXI, 1056-1057.

³⁹Revue, XCVI, 2 (15 Nov. 1871), 381.

tion in political terms, suggesting that the Russians would be stimulated to greater efforts by the introduction of political liberty. But for de Laveleye, the answer was a social and economic one; he wished to endow the Russians with "the spirit of enterprise found among the Yankees." That way, the author thought, the Russians would be able to overcome their other problems.⁴⁰ The author hastened to add, however, that the Russians were not inferior to the Anglo-Saxons, but were, rather, the victims of bad government and poor education.⁴¹

De Laveleye suggested that the disappointing results of social reforms in Russia placed restrictions on its foreign policy. Noting that Russia had ambitions in Asia and in the Balkans, he thought that such "ambitions of Russia are not in accord with the resources at its disposal today."⁴²

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., 382.

⁴²Ibid., 414.

The author hoped that Russia would not use force of arms in Asia or the Balkans to realize its aspirations of national grandeur. However, in 1877-1878, Russia pursued a war with Turkey in which ambitions to dominate the Balkan peninsula played a part. After Austria and Great Britain objected to the extreme settlement which Russia had imposed on a defeated Turkey in the Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878, an international conference was called, which met at Berlin in the summer of 1878. Faced with the possibility of a general European war, Russia relinquished most of its gains in the Balkans. For a study of this two year period, see George Hoover Rupp,

The author, then, raised the question of Russian military aggressiveness. Clearly, however, it was not a major influence on his views of Russian internal affairs, as it had been for Picard and de Mazade.

A fresh perspective on the question of the effectiveness of the social reforms in Russia was introduced in 1873 by Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, with the first of a lengthy series of articles on Russian affairs which appeared irregularly in the Revue from 1873 to 1880.⁴³

A Wavering Friendship; Russia and Austria, 1876-1878 (Cambridge, Mass., 1941).

While de Laveleye, in his article for the Revue of 1871, touched on Russia's territorial ambitions, the bulk of his article was devoted to a discussion of panslavism, principally based on information supplied by General Ratislav Andreyevich Fadeyev, well-known Russian advocate of Slavic nationalism. Panslavism, an element in the creation of enthusiasm among the Russian people for the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, was defined by Hans Kohn as being "a movement in which nationalist elements were mingled with supra-national and often imperialist trends, ...a product of the political awakening of the intellectuals in central and eastern Europe, which was brought about by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars." H. Kohn, Panslavism, its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, 1953), 1.

The Revue des Deux Mondes published several articles in the late 1860's and the 1870's on the related topics of panslavism and Russian foreign policy in the Balkans. See: Julian Klaczko, "Le congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste," LXXI, 2 (1 Sept. 1867), 132-181; Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les réformes de la Turquie - la politique russe et le panslavisme," XVIII, 3 (1 Dec. 1876), 508-537; A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Le préliminaires de la guerre turco-russe," XXI, 3 (1 May 1877), 198-213; G. Valbert, "La guerre russo-turque en 1828 et en 1877," XXIV, 3 (1 Nov. 1877), 212-222; Paul Merruau, "La marine russe et la flotte turque dans la Mer-Noire," XXVI, 3 (15 Mar. 1878), 304-331.

⁴³For a list of these articles see Appendix to Chapter I, page 55.

Unlike many of the contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes who preceded him, Leroy-Beaulieu assumed an optimistic attitude toward the social reforms of the 1860's; he saw them as a viable mechanism for the eventual conversion of Russia into a modern state. The chaos and inconsistencies noted by Charles de Mazade as well as the frustratingly slow pace of change deplored by Cailliatte and de Laveleye became, for Leroy-Beaulieu, the inconveniences of an exciting period of innovations. The social reforms of the 1860's, the author felt, were the sound foundation for Russia's eventual transformation.

Leroy-Beaulieu brashly asserted in his first article that "Old Russia, the Russia of which we had some sort of knowledge, has perished with the abolition of serfdom. New Russia is a child whose features are not yet fixed, or, better still, a youth at the critical age when face, voice, and character are in the act of being moulded for life."⁴⁴ By 1876, the author was confidently predicting that the reforms begun in 1861 would eventually effect a complete transformation of Russian life. The changes would be gradual, but inexorable, he explained, and would last well into the twentieth century.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Revue, CVI, 2 (1 Aug. 1873), 738.

⁴⁵Ibid., XVI, 3 (1 Aug. 1876), 648.

His belief in the inevitability of the process of change within Russia did not lessen the author's interest in hurrying the intermediate steps to a complete transformation, and, so, during the 1870's he frequently suggested ways for Russia to bring closer its ultimate goal of modernization. In fact, the marked didacticism of contributors to the Revue on social and political affairs within Russia, and the tendency to write for a Russian, as well as a French, audience, was perhaps strongest in the writings of Leroy-Beaulieu. In the early 1870's, however, his intention was more to instruct his French readers on the nature of the Russian land and peoples, since, as he said, "Like ancient Greece, modern Europe forms one family."⁴⁶

While the author sometimes appeared to temper his criticisms of Imperial Russia, his desire that his fellow Frenchmen should know a nation for which he had a deep regard did not lead Leroy-Beaulieu to simplify Russia's problems. He never glossed over the ugly realities of the average citizen's daily struggles with his government, and throughout this series of articles he revealed a thorough-going contempt for the Russian bureaucracy. While he thought that the institution by the government of such measures as emancipation and the judicial and zemstvo

⁴⁶Ibid., CVI, 2 (15 Aug. 1873), 737.

reforms had effected a noticeable and far-reaching change in the conditions of Russian life, he also thought that at every turn, Russia's citizenry was burdened by the censors, police, and petty bureaucrats of the tsar's administration. Absolutism, he said, had encouraged a stifling and ineffective bureaucracy whose only function was to meddle in everything.⁴⁷

He was especially concerned with the effects of the ever-growing bureaucracy on the Russian countryside. The imperial administration, with its insatiable demands for record-keeping, was, he said, disrupting the unlettered Russian village by giving the scrivener a large measure of control over community life.⁴⁸ This was a threat, the author felt, to the traditional egalitarianism of the Russian agricultural communes, which he called "small democracies in an autocratic state."⁴⁹

Unlike Cailliatte, who had viewed the mir as a burden on Russian agriculture, Leroy-Beaulieu found much to admire in these rural communes, and thought it possible

⁴⁷Ibid., XXIV, 3 (15 Dec. 1877), 829.

Leroy-Beaulieu wrote at some length on the judicial reforms in Russia, especially as they concerned the peasantry. The new system of courts, he said, "deserve no less than the zemstvos to be considered as one of the cornerstones of the new Russia." Ibid., XXIX, 3 (15 Oct. 1878), 891.

⁴⁸Ibid., XXII, 3 (1 Aug. 1877), 735.

⁴⁹Ibid., 730.

that "the method of property holding of primitive ages could be adapted to modern needs." Who is to say, he asked, "that all peoples must pass exactly by the same steps?"⁵⁰

Despite his sympathetic attitude toward the Russian peasant and his peculiar institutions, Leroy-Beaulieu did not accept the opinion held by many of the Russian intelligentsia that the peasants were entitled to land without compensation, or that the heavy redemption dues were the primary cause of economic dislocation and stresses among the peasantry following the reforms. Rather, Leroy-Beaulieu thought that the mujik's distrust, ignorance, and stubbornness prevented him from taking advantage of the reforms. Like Cailliatte, Leroy-Beaulieu felt that the peasant's expectations had been too high. The Russian villager, the author said, had only the haziest notion of the meaning of liberty and expected it to be the "wonder-working fairy whose wand was to perform a magical transformation in the izba."⁵¹

Leroy-Beaulieu's own hopes for a transformation in

⁵⁰Ibid., XVIII, 3 (15 Aug. 1878), 286-287. These views were probably influenced by the writings of Alexander Herzen and other Russian Populists of this period. Herzen was mentioned several times in this series of articles.

⁵¹Ibid., XVI, 3 (1 Aug. 1876), 669. Izba was a small peasant hut.

Russian life were on a grander scale. Like other contributors, he wanted Russia to fit itself into the nineteenth-century western European image of a prosperous and progressive society. Besides strongly urging that Russia take immediate steps towards transforming its autocracy into a constitutional monarchy, the author advised Imperial Russia to create a bourgeoisie in the French sense so that rapid social and economic progress could be made.⁵²

The author's faith in Russian progress toward this goal of complete westernization remained intact during the decade of the 1870's. However, during the last few years of this decade his writing began to show a growing concern over the slowing pace of reforms. Even as he praised Russia's social reforms, he was forced to find explanations and excuses for the "desultory and fragmentary manner in which the numerous reforms of Alexander II have been understood and carried out."⁵³

The lack of steady resolve in implementing present reforms as well as the lack of definite plans for future political reforms were not the only threats to Leroy-Beaulieu's vision of a westernized Russia. In fact, the real danger came from an altogether different direction than the government of Russia. Before the end of this

⁵²Ibid., XIV, 3 (1 Apr. 1876), 555.

⁵³Ibid., XVIII, 3 (15 Aug. 1878), 819.

series of articles in 1880, revolutionary groups within Russia were discussing actions which would keep Leroy-Beaulieu's dream of a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government for Russia from becoming a probability during the nineteenth century. In 1881, these revolutionary-terrorist activities culminated in the assassination of Alexander II, thus diverting the course which Russian history seemed to have been following since 1861.

1878-1882

Even before the period of the Great Reforms, the Russian citizen's resistance to the arbitrary rule of his government was a subject of some interest for contributors to the Revue. Delaveau, for instance, devoted an article to the discussion of underground political dissent in Russia under Nicolas I. Other contributors noted another avenue of resistance; de Mazade, Cailliatte, and Leroy-Beaulieu each wrote about the peasant revolts of the 1860's. Moreover, de Mazade, in the first article of his series on Russia, explored in some detail the possibility of revolution. He presented a carefully drawn argument on the imminent danger of a large scale revolution in Russia unless further reforms were made.⁵⁴ The possibility of revolution at that time proved ephemeral, how-

⁵⁴Ibid., XXXVII, 2 (15 Jan. 1862), 257-295.

ever, and de Mazade did not raise the question again.

While Leroy-Beaulieu mentioned Russia's small radical groups during the 1870's, he appeared to have done so with some reluctance. The author admired the humanitarian spirit behind the activities of these young radicals, but he thoroughly rejected their socialist doctrines, calling the nihilist outlook "that repulsive monster, which is not without resemblance to some of the saddest births of the western spirit."⁵⁵

During 1878, the problem of resistance to governmental authority became a serious one. Early in that year, an independent act of violence, the assassination of the military governor of St. Petersburg, heralded the beginning of a series of organized acts of political terrorism in Russia which were aimed principally at the tsar. These terrorist attacks occurred concurrently with a period of general unrest within Russia, since the young Russian radicals were not alone in their dissatisfaction with the government. The older and more respectable citizens of Russia showed the same exasperated and rebellious spirit. Evidences of this widespread dissatisfaction were provided by G. Valbert in two articles published during

⁵⁵Ibid., CVII, 2 (15 Oct. 1873), 891.

the late 1870's.⁵⁶

The first of these articles, in 1878, was based on Valbert's coverage, as a reporter for the Revue des Deux Mondes, of the sensational trial and acquittal of Vera Zasulich, the youthful radical whose act of violence had preceded the wave of terrorism of the late 1870's.⁵⁷ However, Valbert was less interested in the youthful defendant and her offense than in the importance of the trial

⁵⁶G. Valbert was a pseudonym for Victor Cherbuliez (1829-1899), nephew of the Swiss economist Antoine Elisée Cherbuliez. Valbert was a novelist and critic as well as a journalist. He published several books on literary criticism during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Webster's Biographical Dictionary (Springfield, Mass., 1966), 296.

In these two articles, as well as in his later writings, Valbert wrote more as a journalist than as a political analyst or commentator, seldom delving too deeply into the complexities of Russian life or the background of Russia's problems. Consequently, his writing seemed less reflective than that of earlier contributors. At the same time, however, he seemed more detached or objective. Later writers, such as Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé and Art Roë, also adopted a more impersonal style in their discussions of Russian affairs. This trend probably owed much to changing literary and intellectual fashions, as the hearty expression of opinion which sometimes characterized nineteenth-century writing was giving way to a more restrained style.

⁵⁷"Le procès de Vera Zassoulitch," Revue, XXVII, 3 (1 May 1878), 216-227. The use of the lash had been abolished for many offenses in Russia in 1864, but General Theodore Trepov, military governor of St. Petersburg, had ordered the whipping of a student, a political prisoner, after the young man had committed a minor infraction of prison rules. Vera Zasulich heard of the incident and made her way to St. Petersburg, where she shot and wounded General Trepov. Her trial became a world-wide sensation; she was acquitted by a jury.

as an expression of the popular wish that a "reign of law" be substituted for the "omnipotence of the police."⁵⁸

Again, in 1879, Valbert focused on general feelings of discontent within Russia rather than specifically on terrorism, explaining to his French readers that a series of terrorist acts by armed underground groups was merely the symptom of a strange and new malaise affecting Russia.⁵⁹ It was Russia's diplomatic losses at the Congress of Berlin, Valbert said, which had caused a wave of disillusionment to sweep over Russia at the end of the decade. The result had been to produce a dangerous national sickness, which the author referred to as "moral anarchy."⁶⁰

Russia's new inner tensions could not be absorbed, the author thought, without extensive and prompt repairs to its political and financial structure. Only rapid completion of social reforms already begun and the addition of political reforms would quieten the revolutionaries,

⁵⁸Ibid., 222.

⁵⁹"La situation intérieure en Russie," Ibid., XXX, 3 (1 June 1879), 700-712. Valbert never examined the spontaneous act of terrorism performed by Vera Zasulich or the later attacks on officials by organized groups as part of a general pattern of revolutionary activities in Russia. Twentieth-century authors, on the other hand, have assigned to these terrorist attacks a place in the larger radical movement. See, for instance, Franco Venturi, The Roots of Revolution.

⁶⁰Revue, XXX, 3 (1 June 1879), 700-701.

Valbert insisted.⁶¹ The author strongly implied that if the Russian government did not begin these reforms voluntarily, then it would be forced to do so under revolutionary conditions.⁶²

In 1880, Leroy-Beaulieu also called for immediate political reforms, but at the same time he refused to acknowledge that the need for them was a valid excuse for revolutionary-terrorist activities. The whole tenor of two articles on the current crisis, the last of his long series of the 1870's, indicated that Leroy-Beaulieu was opposed to open revolt of any kind.⁶³

All fears of a revolt, however, proved groundless. The assassination of the tsar did not signal the beginning of revolution, and the surviving members of the terrorist group which had succeeded in murdering Alexander II were driven underground or into exile.⁶⁴ Indeed, instead of revolution or even further reforms, the murder of the tsar

⁶¹Ibid., 710-711.

Immediate and extensive currency reforms were also necessary, Valbert thought, to stabilize the value of Russia's depreciated paper money so that Russian prestige abroad could be restored. See Chapter IV of this work.

⁶²Ibid., 712.

⁶³Ibid., XXXVII, 3 (15 Feb. 1880), 761-789; XXXIX, 3 (15 June 1880), 796-827.

⁶⁴This was "Will of the People," a splinter group of the older Populist movement.

produced only a period of severe repression. In large measure, the terrorist attacks by young radicals in the years 1878-1881 as well as the death of the tsar were responsible for the severity of the regime initiated by the new tsar, Alexander III. In his determination to restore order, he set aside his father's plans for further reforms and turned to the traditional remedy of repressive measures.⁶⁵ Hopes for political reforms faded rapidly as political dissent of all shades was suppressed.

In a memorial to Alexander II, Leroy-Beaulieu indicated that his faith in the inevitability of progress within Russia was badly strained during the last few years of that tsar's reign. Alexander II, he said, was incapable of providing clear direction from the top in domestic affairs. Consequently, the program of reforms had

⁶⁵Minister of the Interior Michael Loris-Melikov had submitted a proposal to Alexander II which would have permitted limited public participation in the planning of financial and administrative reforms. The tsar had signed the proposal on the day of his death. The ironic timing of the tsar's assassination was lamented by Leroy-Beaulieu in his memorial for Alexander II. It was, he said, "the saddest thing among many sorrows." "L'empereur Alexandre II et la mission du nouveau tsar," Ibid., XLIV, 3 (1 Apr. 1881), 666.

Alexander III's adoption of a policy of repression rather than reforms was made clear in a manifesto of 11 May 1881. The new tsar was greatly influenced in this decision by Constantine Pobedonostsev, his former tutor and since 1880 the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod. After the manifesto of May, Loris-Melikov resigned his office.

faltered when doubts and obstructions began. Alexander's well-known devotion to his country, the author said, was no substitute for the tsar's lack of imagination in envisioning the future or his lack of perseverance in striving toward such a vision.⁶⁶

With a hope which seems highly unrealistic in retrospect, Leroy-Beaulieu turned to the new tsar as an instrument for the establishment of broad political reform in Russia. "As his father was destined to free the serfs," the author said, "[Alexander III] is manifestly called to inaugurate political freedom."⁶⁷

The new and darker mood which was evident in Leroy-Beaulieu's memorial to Alexander II appeared again in 1882.⁶⁸ In evaluating the first year of the reign of Alexander III, the author pointed to the Russian bureaucracy, his familiar target of the 1870's, as the saboteur of social and political reform in Russia. Alexander III, the author believed, was a competent ruler and much better

⁶⁶Ibid., 665.

⁶⁷Ibid., 668.

⁶⁸"La Russie sous le tsar Alexandre III; les réformes nécessaires," ibid., LI, 3 (15 May 1882), 375-404.

This was the last study of Russian affairs by Leroy-Beaulieu to be published in the Revue before 1887, when he began his series on the religions of Russia.

equipped than his predecessors to manage the bureaucracy, yet he doubted that the new emperor would be able to effect desperately needed administrative reforms so long as the vast empire remained under the control of one man, who, in turn, must depend upon a self-serving bureaucracy.⁶⁹ Instead, the author said, Alexander III "will remain powerless against administrative abuses." He predicted that "the bureaucracy, the veritable sovereign of the empire, will continue to govern in its own interest, to the detriment of the throne and the country."⁷⁰

Leroy-Beaulieu's somber conclusion was that time was running out for Russia. That country faced unpleasant, and disastrous, consequences, he thought, unless the range of political participation allowed its citizenry was broadened.⁷¹ To curb the avaricious and corrupt bureaucracy, he insisted, Russia must have a comprehensive system of representative government at the national level, preferably one which enhanced the powers of local and provincial assemblies.⁷²

Events in Russia, then, had modified Leroy-Beaulieu's earlier views. Alone among contributors to the Revue, he had voiced the optimistic assumption that the social re-

⁶⁹Ibid., 395.

⁷¹Ibid., 404.

⁷⁰Ibid., 397.

⁷²Ibid., 401-404.

forms of the 1860's were the catalyst for an inevitable process of change within Russia. During the last years of the reign of Alexander II, this faith was badly shaken, and after the death of this tsar, it seemed to disappear. At the same time, however, Leroy-Beaulieu never abandoned hope for the possibility of reform in Russia.

From the time when plans for the emancipation of the serfs began to assume a definite shape, contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes had been absorbed with both the possibilities and the problems of Russia's internal changes. Most of these writers saw social reform in Russia as an opportunity for a thorough westernization of Russian institutions and culture within the foreseeable future. While Leroy-Beaulieu seemed to see the immensity of the task of transformation within Russia and allowed for a long period of time before its final accomplishment, even he expected a complete transformation within half a century.

When they could not, however, find evidence that this expected transformation was occurring at a rapid pace, contributors became pessimistic about the future of Russia and turned to a search for the causes underlying the disappointment of their high expectations. A multitude of reasons for the slow pace of reforms in Russia was uncovered by contributors between 1861 and 1882. They

found, variously, that the weaknesses of the tsar, the obstructionist attitude of the Russian bureaucracy, the aggressive conservatism of certain individuals and groups close to the government, the autocratic system of government itself, or the lack of some vital element in the Russian character were either the sole or a contributory cause of Russia's inability to transform itself into a modern state.

One contributor lost hope altogether; in his later articles Charles de Mazade indicated that Europe should not take the Russian program of reforms too seriously, since most of it appeared to be mere window-dressing. De Mazade's attitudes toward Russia's internal affairs appeared to be influenced by his view of Russia as an aggressive threat to European peace. Like Auguste Picard, De Mazade saw foreign policy as the central issue in Russian affairs. Both authors viewed Russia as the uncouth bully of Europe; this attitude was not shared by later contributors to the Revue, perhaps because Russia had turned its later military ambitions toward Asia and the Balkans. De Mazade's disillusionment was so complete that he rejected any thought of a Franco-Russian alliance (a topic of general discussion in France after the tsar's visit to Paris in 1867) until such time as Russia would

no longer menace European security.⁷³

One issue which drew much attention from contributors to the Revue was the Russian citizen's resistance to the arbitrary rule of his government. Beyond a general consensus that a non-violent solution should be sought for Russia's problems, contributors expressed a variety of opinions on the merits of a rebellious spirit among the Russians. The sternest reaction to the more extreme forms of dissent came from Leroy-Beaulieu, who opposed all revolutionary activity. Perhaps the most neutral response was shown by Valbert, who openly sympathized with the legal expression of dissent in the Vera Zasulich trial, but who voiced no personal opinions on the merits of the political terrorism of the late 1870's. Three contributors, however, saw the possibility of more serious forms of resistance if certain reforms were not made, thus providing some measure of agreement among contributors on this issue.⁷⁴

After 1861, contributors had spent much reforming zeal on the task of changing Russia from a country which was "sadly unique in the world," in Picard's phrase, into a modern, western state. However, the plea made by

⁷³Ibid., LXXV, 2 (15 May 1868), 438.

⁷⁴These were de Mazade, Valbert, and Leroy-Beaulieu.

Leroy-Beaulieu in 1882 for representative assemblies in Russia marked the end of the discussion of Russian social and political reforms as a major topic of interest for the Revue des Deux Mondes. As well, it brought to an end, until the Revolution of 1905, the strong interest shown by contributors in the problems arising from resistance to government policies or actions.

After the accession of Alexander III, there was a decline in significant political and social news coming from Russia. This change was reflected in the Revue des Deux Mondes by a lessened attention to Russian affairs. From 1882 until 1888, the Revue published articles principally on Russian religion, art, music, and literature. When, in 1888, the journal once more interested itself in Russian political and social affairs, the dominant issues no longer came solely from Russian domestic events, but, rather, from the anticipated new relationship between France and Russia.

APPENDIX

Articles written by Leroy-Beaulieu during this period were based on his own observations during extensive travels in Russia. As well, the author had many acquaintances among the Russian intelligentsia.

As a boy, Leroy-Beaulieu (1842-1913) traveled extensively with his mother throughout Italy, where he developed a taste for the study of foreign peoples. He went to Russia at some time during his late twenties to collect documents on the political and economic organization of the slavic nations. At the request of the Revue's editor, François Buloz, Leroy-Beaulieu drew upon his experiences and observations from this journey to Russia to prepare a series of articles.

These articles, together with some others on Nicolas Milutin (which appeared in 1880-1881 and which were later published as a book under the title Un homme d'état russe (Nicolas Milutin) d'après sa correspondance inédite, étude sur la Russie et la Pologne pendant la règne d'Alexandre II, 1855-1872 (Paris, 1884) established the author as France's most renowned authority on Russian affairs at the end of the nineteenth century. His reputation as an expert on Russia was great enough for his opinion to be sought on the proposed Franco-Russian Alliance in the late 1880's. (See Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 177.) Leroy-Beaulieu subsequently published his appraisal of the suggested alliance in his book La France, la Russie et l'Europe (Paris, 1888).

Leroy-Beaulieu devoted much of his time to subjects other than Russia, thus becoming a major contributor to the Revue des Deux Mondes in several fields. Between 1872 and 1911, he produced a monumental number of articles on religion, Balkan affairs, and social and economic themes. René-Pinon, a colleague of Leroy-Beaulieu on the Revue said of Leroy-Beaulieu's work that its unifying theme, amid the diversity of its topics, was a search for justice. "Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu," Revue, XVIII, 6 (1 Nov. 1913), 91.

Throughout his long career, Leroy-Beaulieu never associated himself with any particular party or faction. His political ideology could be characterized as nineteenth-

century bourgeoisie liberalism, but the famous writer and teacher was never a doctrinaire liberal. Instead, he was "the adversary of all blocs; his conceptions were so sweeping and so lofty that they permitted him to include among his enthusiasms seemingly contradictory ideas." Ibid., 94.

Leroy-Beaulieu's immense reputation was built not only on his writing, but also on his long academic career. In 1881, he took the chair of contemporary history and eastern affairs at the Ecole libre des sciences politiques, becoming director of that institution after the death of Albert Sorel in 1906. In 1887, he was elected a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. La grande encyclopédie (Paris), XXII, 78-79.

NOTE: In chronological order, the articles in Leroy-Beaulieu's series on Russia were: "La Russie et les Russes; la nature russe, le tchernoziom, les steppes et la population," CVI, 2 (15 Aug. 1873), 737-778. (After the first article, the series changed name.) "L'empire des tsars et les Russes; les races et la nationalité; les Finnois, les Tatars, les Slaves," CVII, 2 (15 Sept. 1873), 241-285; "--; le climat, le tempérament et le caractère national, paysages et portraits," CVII, 2 (15 Oct. 1873), 860-901; "--; l'histoire et les élémens de la civilisation; l'ancienne et la nouvelle Russie," I, 3 (15 Jan. 1874), 342-375; "--; l'église russe -I- l'orthodoxie orientale et la culte grec en Russie," II, 3 (1 Mar. 1874), 123-157; "--; l'église russe -II- le patriarcat et la saint-synode, la tolérance religieuse et la situation des différens cultes," III, 3 (1 May 1874), 5-41; "--; l'église russe -III- la caste sacerdotale et la réforme ecclésiastique, le clergé noir et le clergé blanc, moines et papes," III, 3 (15 June 1874), 799-836; "--; le raskol et les sectes en Russie, les Vieux-Croyans," VI, 3 (1 Nov. 1874), 5-34; "--; le raskol et les sectes; les deux branches du schisme, Popovtsy et Bezpopovtsy," IX, 3 (1 May 1875), 38-79; "--; les sectes excentriques, les mystiques, les hommes de Dieu, les sauteurs, les blanches-colombes et les protestans indigènes," IX, 3 (1 June 1875), 586-632; "--; les classes sociales; les villes, les mechtchané, les marchands et la bourgeoisie," XIV, 3 (1 Apr. 1876), 522-555; "--; les classes sociales; le paysan, la famille patriarcale et le communisme agraire," XVIII, 3 (15 Nov. 1876), 241-288; "--; les finances, le budget, le régime fiscal et la revenue," XVIII, 3 (15 Dec. 1876), 834-866; "--; les finances; les dépenses, la dette et la papier-monnaie," XIX, 3 (1 Jan. 1877), 125-160; "--; le système militaire et l'armée," XXI, 3 (15 June 1877), 721-751; "--; l'administration; la commune rurale

et le self-government des paysans," XXII, 3 (1 Aug. 1877), 721-752; "--; l'administration; la centralization, la bureaucratie et la police," XXIV, 3 (15 Dec. 1877), 804-836; "--; le self-government en Russie; les états provinciaux et la régime représentatif dans l'administration locale," XXVIII, 3 (15 July 1878), 384-420; "--; le self-government en Russie; les villes et les municipalités," XXVIII, 3 (15 Aug. 1878), 803-835; "--; la réforme judiciaire; le droit écrit et le droit coutumier, la justice des paysans et les tribunaux corporatifs," XXIX, 3 (15 Oct. 1878), 890-921; "--; la réforme judiciaire; les deux magistratures les juges élus et les juges inamovibles," XXX, 3 (15 Dec. 1878), 842-876; "--; la réforme judiciaire; la justice criminelle, le jury, les procès politiques et les recentes mesures de exception," XXXIII, 3 (15 May 1879), 278-311; "--; la réforme judiciaire; la pénalité - les châtimens corporels, la peine de mort, la déportation," XXXV, 3 (1 Sept. 1879), 176-211; "--; la presse et la censure," XXXVII, 3 (1 Jan. 1880), 99-136; "--; le parti révolutionnaire et le nihilisme," XXXVII, 3 (15 Feb. 1880), 761-789; "--; la crise actuelle et les réformes politiques," XXXIX, 3 (15 June 1880), 796-827.

This series of articles appeared in book form as the first two volumes of a three volume work entitled: L'empire des tsars et les Russes (Paris, 1882-1889) and was published in English as The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians (New York, 1893-1896), trans. by Z. A. Regozin. The English edition is considerably revised. Also, Regozin gave a rather free translation to many passages.

The third volume of this work included a later series of articles on religion in Russia by Leroy-Beaulieu which was published in the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1887-1889.

CHAPTER II

ATTITUDES TOWARD RUSSIAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 1888-1914

In the period from the Franco-Prussian War until the First World War, relations between European countries became complicated almost beyond belief. The tangle of alliances and agreements typical of this period was the result of the defeat of France in 1870 and the creation of a strong German state in central Europe. The old balance of power was upset by this turn-about and, consequently, Europe entered a period when each state sought not only its own security but aggrandizement at the expense of its neighbors.

France's position in this disorderly struggle for power was not a happy one. The war had left the nation with a weak government and uncertain finances. In these circumstances, exaggerated fears of a sudden attack by Germany, designed to reduce France to permanent second-class status in Europe, dominated French foreign policy.¹

France's strategic need for an ally in the rear of

¹William Leonard Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance 1890-1894 (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), 5.

Germany could be met solely by Russia during this period. Conditions were not ripe for an alliance between these powers, however, until after 1887. Before this time, a natural understanding, backed by diplomatic ties, had existed between Germany and Russia. Not only did the conservative monarchs of these countries share a common outlook on the great political questions of their day, but the economic interests of Russia and Germany were not in conflict. The relationship between these two states, in fact, was marked by a certain warmth and easiness.

After 1887, however, a series of German blunders severely damaged this relationship, and set the stage for a Franco-Russian alliance. The Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was discontinued by William II, while at the same time the kaiser appeared to draw closer to Great Britain, the hostile rival of Russia in the Far East and the Mediterranean. Fear of a possible Anglo-German alliance forced the tsar to consider an alliance with France, a country also in serious conflict with Britain in the Mediterranean at that time.

Furthermore, after 1890, Russia had an immediate reason for reaching an agreement with France; an urgent need for money, which, because of special circumstances, only the French could meet. The need for foreign capital became apparent when, in 1890, there were indications

that severe droughts would bring about massive crop failures and famine in Russia very shortly. Without foreign money, Russia would be forced to spend its gold reserves during the coming crisis. Large-scale loans, however, could not be obtained from the hostile English. As well, the Berlin bond market had been closed to the Russian government in 1889 on the initiative of William II. However, the Paris money market had welcomed Russian issues since 1888. Circumstances, then, dictated that the tsarist government, in its efforts to avoid financial catastrophe, should seek foreign capital from France.

A diplomatic agreement between France and Russia was reached in 1890 and, after several intermediate steps, the Franco-Russian Alliance was completed by the signing of a military convention between France and Russia in December 1893-January 1894.

As noted in the preceeding chapter, the articles published in the Revue des Deux Mondes after 1888 were marked by certain differences from the earlier period; the emphasis now shifted from a consideration of the earlier reforms to an emphasis upon relationships with Russia. A few exceptions should be noted, however, especially the continuing articles by Leroy-Beaulieu which showed a deep interest in political and social changes within Russia. As well, a secondary topic of interest

during this period was the consideration of Russian political views. However, the majority of the contributors concerned with Russian political affairs after 1888 dwelt, first, upon the possibilities of a Franco-Russian alliance and, later, upon its terms and consequences.²

The initial response of the Revue to the question

²A standard work in English on the Alliance is W. L. Langer's The Franco-Russian Alliance. See also his European Alliances and Alignments (New York, 1931). For a valuable, although hostile, study of the Franco-Russian Alliance, see Georges Michon, L'alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917 (Paris, 1927). This book was translated into English by Norman Thomas and published under the title The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891-1917 (London, 1929). Michon gives material on the formation of French public opinion during the period of the Alliance. See also E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914 (New York, 1931).

According to W. L. Langer, diplomatic and strategic reasons underlay the determination of the French government to create an artificially strong market in Paris for Russian securities, particularly government bonds. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 397-398. Close links between investment banks in Paris, the French government, its departments and officials, as well as the general press, made possible an astonishing level of French investments in Russian government bonds and industrial securities. Thus, by 1914, one out of every three Russian government bonds in circulation and 14 per cent of all Russian joint-stock securities were owned by French investors. This investment amounted to between eleven and twelve billion francs worth of Russian securities, with over nine billion the "direct or indirect obligation of the Russian government." Herbert Feis, Europe: The World's Banker 1870-1914; an Account of European Foreign Investment and the Connection of World Finance with Diplomacy Before the War (New Haven, Conn., 1930), 217-218.

Feis gives a very good treatment of the influence of the French government on French foreign investment in Chapters II and V. Chapter X is a concise account of the Franco-Russian Alliance and its impact on international finance.

of such an alliance appeared in the form of an anonymous article devoted largely to a discussion of the arguments being presented against diplomatic ties between France and Russia.³ The author thought that the autocratic government of Russia would make an uncomfortable ally for republican France considering the differences in their respective systems of government. Quite apart from this drawback, he noted some of their incompatible strategic interests. For instance, although Russia might have little interest in preserving the Austrian Empire, for France this would be a matter of great importance.⁴

While Alexander III was given high praise by the

³This article began with a brief digression into French domestic politics in which the imminent prospect of a popular government in France, composed of a union of republican groups, was viewed as a threat to French security. It was feared that a radical government would reduce the strength of the army and frustrate France's foreign policy by creating anxieties in other nations regarding the spread of revolutionary ideas. "La France, la Russie et l'Europe," Revue, LXXXV, 3 (15 Feb. 1888), 903-904.

Internal evidence suggests that Leroy-Beaulieu assisted in the writing of this article. Not only are there similarities of style, but many of Leroy-Beaulieu's ideas on Russian affairs are incorporated into the article. Also, his authorship of at least part of this article is suggested by the publication of his book La France, la Russie et l'Europe in the same year. Langer called this book "One of the most penetrating studies of French policy and the problem of French relations to Russia." The Franco-Russian Alliance, 432.

⁴Revue, LXXXV, 3 (15 Feb. 1888), 918.

author, who referred to him as a man of honor, restraint, and wisdom, he conceded that an alliance between the two countries should not depend on "one human life, especially on the life of a Russian emperor."⁵ The author's reluctance to rely on the Russian emperor was based on his belief that no tsar, not even Alexander III, could exercise effective control over the corrupt and inefficient Russian bureaucracy. And it was this bureaucracy, the author noted, which would be responsible for the mobilization of the army in the event of war.⁶

However, in spite of this attitude, the article closed with a favorable approach; the author conceded that such an alliance, by re-establishing the balance of power in Europe, might aid in keeping Europe at peace. Insofar as the proposed alliance contained a promise of peace, then France could make use of it, since peace alone could guarantee that France would continue as a great power.⁷

After this anonymous article, there were no further articles in the Revue with a direct bearing on current Russian political or diplomatic affairs until 1894. However, the years between 1888 and 1894 were not entirely

⁵Ibid., 921.

⁶Ibid., 923-925.

⁷Ibid., 928.

without some indication of the Revue's interest in Russian political affairs and the current negotiations between France and Russia. In 1889, for instance, after the death of Loris-Melikov, the Revue published a long obituary written by Eugene-Melchoir de Vogüé.⁸ The writer, who had been in St. Petersburg at the time of Loris-Melikov's "dictatorship of the heart," dwelt at great length on the contrast between the great power which Loris-Melikov had held during his brief "dictatorship" and the sad obscurity of his last years. It was a pity, the author thought, that Loris-Melikov had left no permanent imprint on Russian political life.⁹ However, the author of this nostalgic article refrained from expressing any direct opinions on current Russian affairs.

Two historical studies on Russia published during the period 1888-1894 seemed to indicate an interest by

⁸"Loris-Mélikof: notes d'histoire contemporaine," ibid., XCII, 3 (1 Mar. 1889), 43-66. Comte de Vogüé (1848-1910) served in the French diplomatic service and was at St. Petersburg from 1871-1882. During this time in Petersburg, he began contributing articles to the Revue des Deux Mondes and after his return to France became a frequent contributor. He was among the first to draw attention to the works of Dostoevsky and his successors, both in the Revue and in his many books of literary criticism. From 1893-1898, de Vogüé served as deputy for Ardèche. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed. (Cambridge, Eng., 1911), XXVIII, 172.

⁹Revue, XCII, 3 (1 Mar. 1889), 58. See Chapter I, page 47.

the Revue in the current diplomatic negotiations between France and Russia. The first of these was concerned with the Franco-Russian alliance under the First Empire.¹⁰ The second, also of a diplomatic turn, was a study of Russia's entry into the European concert of nations during the reign of Catherine II.¹¹ Neither of these articles indicated any clear policy of the Revue with regard to the current alliance negotiations between France and Russia, but in 1894, after the Alliance had become a reality, it published a defense of the new Alliance by Etienne Lamy.¹²

Lamy used his review of Leo Tolstoy's book, The Christian Spirit and Patriotism as the occasion for his statement of support for the new Franco-Russian Alliance. Tolstoy's assertion that the Alliance prepared the two

¹⁰G. Valbert, "L'alliance franco-russe sous le premier empire," Ibid., CIV, 3 (1 Mar. 1891), 203-214.

¹¹Arthur Desjardins, "Comment la Russie prit sa place en Europe," Ibid., CXIX, 3 (15 Oct. 1893), 756-798.

¹²"A propos d'alliance russe," Ibid., CXXIV, 4 (1 Aug. 1894), 602-617. Lamy was a former member of the National Assembly (1871-1881) who broke with left groups over the question of support for the church. Webster's Biographical Dictionary, 167.

In 1894 a wave of anarchist violence which later culminated in the assassination of the French president, Sadi Carnot (June, 1894), drew from Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé a brief account of the events surrounding the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. "Un regard en arrière; les terroristes russes," Revue, CXXII, 4 (1 Mar. 1894), 190-205.

countries for war, not peace, was answered by Lamy with the political argument that power alignments were guarantors of peace. "Vast alliances," he said, "restrain the individual caprices of peoples, long alliances are the beginning of federations, and federations are the surest guarantee of peace." The Franco-Russian Alliance, Lamy insisted, was such an aid to peace since it "re-established the equilibrium" in Europe.¹³

While Lamy's sophistry did not answer the moral questions posed by Tolstoy, his article served to indicate the Revue's support of the Alliance. A further indication of the Revue's attitude came in 1896, when Leroy-Beaulieu (who had written nothing on Russian political affairs for the Revue des Deux Mondes for several years) published an article on the anticipated visit to Paris of the new tsar, Nicolas II.¹⁴ In some ways, this

¹³Revue, CXXIV, 4 (1 Aug. 1894), 617.

¹⁴"Le voyage du tsar," ibid., CXXXVII, 4 (1 Oct. 1896), 541-569.

The coronation of the new tsar was described in a series of articles on Russia written by Art Roë during 1896-1897, while the author was traveling through Russia. While indicating an interest in both the Russian sovereign and in his army, these articles were mostly travel notes and contained very little commentary on political or social subjects. "Impressions de Russie: souvenirs du couronnement," ibid., CXXXVIII, 4 (1 Dec. 1896), 587-614; "--: notes sur Moscou," CXXXIX, 4 (15 Jan. 1897), 352-377; "--: la semaine sainte à Kief," CXL, 4 (15 Apr. 1897), 762-792.

article is quite different from his earlier studies of Russia. The air of academic wisdom which sometimes marked his earlier work had temporarily evaporated in the face of France's new relationship with Russia.

A certain uneasiness underlay the apparent pride with which the author regarded the Russian autocrat's coming visit to republican France; however, he gave the impression that he felt this visit was of compelling importance for France. It would be the first time, he said, that a monarchy would treat with France without the employment of royal pomp and ceremony. The tsar's visit and the new alliance, he felt, confounded Bismarck's hope of isolating republican France in a monarchical Europe.¹⁵ France, he said, was "happy to find again her place [in the European concert of nations] despite her revolutions and her form of government."¹⁶

It was evident, however, that the once confident expert on Russian affairs became uncertain when he tried to refute criticisms of the Alliance by leaders of the Triple Alliance. "It is an ally, not a protector, that we receive," he declared, "and it is as equal to equal that we must treat with the tsar....it is not true that France is resigned to the role of a satellite...."¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid., CXXXVII, 4 (1 Oct. 1896), 542.

¹⁶Ibid., 547.

¹⁷Ibid., 567.

Leroy-Beaulieu's confidence had returned the following year, when he explored the socio-economic transformation occurring in Russia after the introduction of industrialization.¹⁸ In contrast to the articles of 1881 and 1882, in which he had offered gloomy predictions of revolution or stagnation for Russia if further reforms did not follow, Leroy-Beaulieu now was highly optimistic. His mood seemed a continuation and expansion of his earlier outlook of the 1870's, when he had asserted that Russia's progress toward a better future was inevitable. "Thus, there is a modification, without revolution and without rude shocks," he said, "of the inner structure and social conditions of the immense empire [which comes] from the slow and continuous action of economic agents."¹⁹

Leroy-Beaulieu envisioned a happy new task for the emperor. The autocrat of Russia, he said, possessed

¹⁸"Les transformations sociales de la Russie contemporaine," Ibid., CXLII, 4 (1 Aug. 1897), 481-506. This article is discussed at greater length in Chapter IV.

The rapid industrialization of Russia during the 1890's under the guidance of Russia's great finance minister Sergei Witte has been studied by Theodore H. Von Laue, in Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1963). Von Laue also has translated a valuable document from this period: "A Secret Memorandum of Sergei Witte on the Industrialization of Imperial Russia," The Journal of Modern History, XXVI, 1 (Mar. 1954), 60-74.

¹⁹Revue, CXLII, 4 (1 Aug. 1897), 501.

great power, far greater, in fact, than other heads of state. It would be possible then, the author felt, for the tsar to exercise his extraordinary powers in a beneficial way by assuming the role of "arbitrator" between opposing economic and social groups within Russia. In this way, Russia would avoid the conflicts between classes which had been characteristic of western society during its period of industrialization.²⁰ The author added that by taking up such a task, the autocrat could justify the need for an autocracy in the eyes of his 130 million subjects, thus hinting that autocracy was, perhaps, not the most suitable system of government for Russia.²¹

The following year, G. Valbert discussed this same question in his review of some newly published essays by Constantine Pobedonostsev.²² While Valbert gave Pobedonostsev's essays a courteous and impartial review as philosophical literature, he felt moved to dispute the Ober-Procurator's thesis that man is happiest, as in ancient Egypt, when his decisions are made for him. Valbert argued that while "one would certainly never accuse Egypt

²⁰Ibid., 506.

²¹Ibid., 506.

²²"Études d'un homme d'état russe sur la société moderne," ibid., CXLIX, 4 (1 Sept. 1898), 216-227.

of having invented universal suffrage, parliaments, and the separation of church and state," there was much evidence that Egypt suffered greatly from terrible misery and violence.²³ This disagreement with Pobedonostsev's ideas, however, was not enlarged upon by the author, who indeed refrained from criticizing the Russian autocracy directly or suggesting that Russia liberalize her political institutions. The same quality of restraint was shown in an article appearing in 1900, when another contributor to the Revue, Teodore de Wyzewa, criticized certain policies of the Russian autocracy without expanding on his views.

While, during the years of the great Russian reforms, there had been a sense of compelling interest in current Russian political affairs in many of the articles on Russia published in the Revue des Deux Mondes, those that appeared in the 1890's showed a relative absence of immediate or deep concern with Russian political affairs. An example of this new remoteness or detachment from Russian political matters was de Wyzewa's review of Peter Kropotkin's memoirs. De Wyzewa seemed to view Russia's problems with political dissent as an absorbing topic of

²³Ibid., 226.

study rather than a political reality.²⁴

Kropotkin's experience, de Wyzewa felt, was an excellent example of the folly shown by the Russian autocracy in silencing liberal dissent by repressive measures. The conversion of Kropotkin to anarchism during his imprisonment showed, the author said, that by suppressing liberal dissent, the Russian government only created radicalism. "Prison, deportation, exile; here you have, certainly, the three great schools of Russian nihilism," he argued.²⁵

The author, however, went no further in his commentary on Russian political affairs than this analysis of

²⁴"Revue étrangères: l'apostolat d'un nihiliste russe," *ibid.*, CLVIII, 4 (15 Mar. 1900), 457-468. Review of Peter Kropotkin's *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (London, 1900). First pub. in the *Atlantic Monthly* (1898-1899).

Teodore de Wyzewa (Wyzewski) was a Polish musicologist who had settled in Paris in 1889. He began a career in journalism with the publication of articles in *Le Figaro* on the socialist movement outside France. In 1890 he became a literary critic for the *Revue des Deux Mondes* as well as for *Le Temps*. He is best known for his monumental work *W.A. Mozart, sa vie musicale, de l'enfance à la pleine maturité*. *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians* (New York, 1955), Appendices, IX, 377-378.

²⁵*Revue*, CLVIII, 4 (15 Mar. 1900), 465. Prince Peter Kropotkin, noted geographer and geologist, was a Russian radical whose ideals were inspired by Mikhail Bakunin. During the ten years in which Kropotkin was imprisoned in the Peter and Paul fortress (1874-1884), he became an anarchist and after his escape spent his time in attempts to spread anarchist doctrines.

the origins of Russian radicalism, but devoted the bulk of his article to the Prince and his memoirs. In fact, for some time before the publication of this review, commentary on Russian political affairs by contributors to the Revue had been only incidental to the subject of a given article.²⁶

The diminishing attention to political commentary on Russia continued after 1900. During the period 1900-1916, the Revue published only an occasional article in which one could discern any commentary by a contributor on Russian internal political affairs; there was even a failure to take note of certain major political events in Russia until their significance had passed.²⁷

²⁶The number of articles devoted entirely to social or political affairs in Russia from 1888-1913 was small, while the number of articles which contained some commentary, however brief, was not as great as in the first period 1855-1882.

Moreover, during the decade 1904-1913, there was a decline in the total number of articles on Russia appearing in the Revue; only 28, in contrast to 49 published during the preceeding ten years. (From 1914 through 1920, a total of 34 articles appeared).

²⁷In an article on Russian manipulation of the French daily and weekly press during 1904-1906, James William Long has asserted that the tsarist government paid large subsidies to the French press at the insistence of the French government and high officials of the Paris stock exchange (Chambre syndicale des agents de change). Two and a half million francs were distributed by the shadowy figure M. Lenoir, who acted "under the close guidance of Minister of Finance [Maurice] Rouvier." J.W. Long, "Russian Manipulation of the French Press, 1904-1906," Slavic Review, XXXI, 2 (June 1972), 352.

The Revue des Deux Mondes was not mentioned in this

For example, from 1904-1906, when the Russian autocracy was threatened with possible extinction or alteration, no articles concerned with internal Russian political affairs appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes. Such significant contemporary events as Russia's urban revolution, widespread peasant revolt, and the government's first experiment in representative government, found no relevant discussion in the Revue.²⁸ On the other hand, the Russo-Japanese War was given full attention. The unexpectedly strong challenge to Imperial Russia from the small and little known Asian nation caused contributors to the Revue to feel that western European civilization as well as French national security was in jeopardy from the Asians.²⁹

article, which was concerned principally with the daily press in France. However, from the pattern already established by the Revue, it is doubtful that Russian money was necessary to buy the silence of the Revue. More likely, the journal was embarrassed at the turn of events in Russia during 1904-1906; its silence seems more an indication of real support for the Alliance than an indication of Russian subsidies.

²⁸For an account of the 1905 Revolution, see Sidney Harcave, The Russian Revolution of 1905 (New York, 1970) and Donald W. Treadgold, Lenin and His Rivals; the Struggle for Russia's Future, 1890-1906 (New York, 1955). Treadgold's political analysis was shallow and his treatment of the Bolsheviks revives memories of the Cold War.

For the revolt in the countryside 1906-1907, see G.R. Robinson, Rural Russia Under the Old Regime.

²⁹There were five articles in this group: a survey of European and American opinion of the two protagonists

With their attention thus diverted, contributors of articles on the subject of the Russo-Japanese War showed little interest in the serious social and political impact which the war had upon Russia. There was, however, some commentary on the Russians and the Franco-Russian Alliance in an article on European opinion of the war which was written by René-Pinon.³⁰

The work of this author, both in his article on European opinion in 1904 and in later articles, rather than following in the tradition of Charles de Mazade and

(René-Pinon, "La guerre russo-japonaise et l'opinion européenne," Revue, XXI, 5 (1 May 1904), 186-219); a comparison of the financial positions of Japan and Russia during the first months of the war (Raphael-Georges Levy, "Finances de guerre; Russie et Japon," Ibid., XXII, 5 (1 July 1904), 113-138); a discussion of the new "yellow peril" confronting Europe and America (René-Pinon, "Après la chute de Port-Arthur," Ibid., XXVII, 5 (1 June 1905), 545-565; an anonymous chronicle of the total loss of the Russian fleet at sea, "La bataille de Tsoushima," Ibid., XXVIII, 5 (1 Aug. 1905), 519-547; and an analysis of Russia's complete defeat on land (General de Négrier, "Quelques enseignements de la guerre russo-japonaise," Ibid., XXXI, 5 (15 Jan. 1906), 295-333.

For information on the Russo-Japanese War, see B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, 1892-1906, trans. by Susan W. Jones (Ann Arbor, 1952).

³⁰"La guerre russo-japonaise et l'opinion européenne," Revue, XXI, 5 (1 May 1904). Pinon (b. 1870), a major contributor in the early twentieth century, wrote the obituary for the Revue's long-time Russian expert, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu ("Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu," Ibid., XVIII, 6 (1 Nov. 1913), 74-108. Pinon published several books on late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European diplomatic and political history. He became a professor at l'Ecole des sciences politiques in 1913. Enciclopedia universal ilustrada (Barcelona, 1933), Apendice, VIII, 481.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, resembled rather the studies of G. Valbert and É-M de Vogüé by its milder and less penetrating analysis of Russian affairs. The most important consideration for Pinon, whose knowledge of Russia seemed limited, was the success of the Franco-Russian Alliance and its relationship to the question of French national security.

In an article published in 1904, Pinon combined a discussion of the defense of Russia and the Alliance with an attack on the French socialists. Pinon insisted that the socialist view of Russia was distorted; it was untrue, he said, that Russia was a reactionary and obscurantist country while Japan embodied progress, civilization, and freedom.³¹ Although this socialist view of Russia and Japan had, the author said, gained general support in the United States and Europe during the early months of the war, he was pleased to report that international opinion had changed under the threat of a "yellow peril."³²

Such unflattering views of Russia, then current in the European and American press, illustrated Russia's isolated position in European affairs before the alliance with France, Pinon claimed. "Before the spontaneous manifestations of two peoples, the French and the Russian, had

³¹Revue, XXI, 5 (1 May 1904), 218.

³²Ibid.

created links capable of surviving," he said, "...Russia had no sure friends other than the Slavs."³³ Pinon noted that the campaign to discredit the Russians in France, which he hinted was a socialist propaganda effort, had not dulled the admiration of the French for the courage and heroism of the Russians in battle.³⁴

While Pinon was examining tsarist Russia's public image in Europe and America, events within Russia, in response to mounting social and political tensions, were already rushing toward a major revolution. Revolts in the urban centers, as well as widespread rebellion in the countryside, forced Nicolas II in October 1905 to grant Russia a national representative Duma in order to keep his throne. By June 1907, however, the tsar's government felt strong enough to counterattack and to undermine the new-found strength of the Duma by altering the electoral laws under which its members were chosen.

³³Ibid., 199.

³⁴Ibid., 216. In later years Pinon buttressed his support of the Franco-Russian Alliance by maintaining that during the last part of the nineteenth century the fate of France had depended on the actions of the tsar. For instance, Pinon wrote that Alexander II could have mitigated the effects of the Franco-Prussian War if he had wished to do so. Moreover, Pinon was convinced that it was only the intervention of the tsar during war scare of 1875 which had put an end to Bismarck's bellicose actions and saved France from another German invasion. See "France et Allemagne, 1870-1898," ibid., VIII, 6 (1 Mar. 1912), 102; also his discussions of foreign affairs in the Revue's centennial publication, Le livre de centenaire.

After the danger to the autocracy was past, in 1907, the Revue published an article in which the recent upheavals in Russia were discussed. However, the main interest of the article lay in another direction; the threat to Russia in the return to reaction. The growing threat to the Duma from the more conservative election law of 16 June 1907 caused the Revue's aging Russian authority, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, to publish his last analysis of Russia's political prospects.³⁵

The writer was deeply disturbed that conservative Russians in high places had returned to the old policies once advocated by Constantine Pobedonostsev and Mikhail Katkov. This new law, Leroy-Beaulieu warned, might destroy the progress already made in Russia by turning her back to the old ways of religious and social discrimination.³⁶

³⁵"Entre deux rives; la Russie devant la troisième douma," Revue, XLI, 5 (15 Sept. 1907), 361-399. Russia's struggle to graft a representative political body on to an autocratic government can be followed in Thomas Riha, A Russian European, Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics (Notre Dame, 1969). Despite its many drawbacks, this book is useful for the information it contains. Riha included a legislative history of the Russian Duma with an emphasis on the issues most directly of concern for Paul (Pavel Nicolaevich) Miliukov, the most important leader of the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) party in Russia. For a study of the electoral law of 1907, see Alfred Levin, "June 3, 1907: Action and Reaction," in Essays in Russian History. A Collection Dedicated to George Vernadsky, ed. Alan D. Ferguson and Alfred Levin (Hamden, Conn., 1964), 231-273.

³⁶Revue, XLI, 5 (15 Sept. 1907), 378-381.

Almost as important to the writer as the possible damage to Russia's new representative institution was the damage visited on his sense of historic drama by the new election law. The edict of toleration of April 1905, together with the constitutional manifesto of 17 October of that same year, were, for Leroy-Beaulieu, "...a sort of historic law. Russia had been called at the time, by the Emperor Nicolas II, to religious and political liberty."³⁷

Leroy-Beaulieu had been a guest at the opening of the First Duma on 3 April 1906. In this article he recalled the long lines of exotically dressed peasant delegates who were greeted by the tsar that day. The writer seemed almost overcome with pride and emotion at the memory of the "fiery and dedicated" first Duma, saying that it was one of the greatest events he had ever witnessed.³⁸

It was no longer possible to restore Russia to the

³⁷Ibid., 388.

³⁸Ibid., 365. Sir Bernard Pares, who also was present at the birth of the First Duma, was more objective in his description of this event. Of the audience before the emperor in the Winter Palace, Pares said, "The peasant members were shocked by the display of wealth, in the shape of jewels, which the great ladies wore at such a critical moment...[The emperor] made a very good little speech to them, full of spirit but simply of a general character; he said nothing at all about the nature of their work, and they then had to go on foot to the palace assigned to them..." My Russian Memoirs (London, 1931), 103-104.

old ways, Leroy-Beaulieu warned. If the tsar continued to listen to bad advice, which counseled the destruction of representative institutions, then the tsar courted the possibility of revolt.³⁹

The writer, however, ended his article with an optimistic prediction that the coming elections would result in an Octobrist majority, with the Cadets as an oppositional left.⁴⁰ Whatever the composition of the Third Duma, the author said, its true importance lay in its continued existence as a legislative body in autocratic Russia.⁴¹

Despite the determined optimism with which he viewed the coming Duma, and his earlier assumption of an evolutionary process of change for Russia, the author left a strong impression of disquietude about the recent turn of events in Russia. In part, this came from the author's appraisal of Russia's monarch as the source of many problems for that country. He said of Nicolas II

³⁹Revue, XLI, 5 (15 Sept. 1907), 363.

⁴⁰Ibid., 399. The Octobrists were those Russians who were satisfied with the limited powers granted to the Duma by the manifesto of 17 October 1905. Opposing them were the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats), who desired to create the new Duma in the image of the British Parliament and to extend social and economic liberalism to Russia.

⁴¹Ibid., 399.

that he was "a tsar more timorous than despotic, who feels it his duty to keep for his successors and for the crown the integrity of the rights received from his ancestors and consecrated at the Kremlin by holy unction."⁴² This evaluation of the tsar was shared by other contributors after the monarchy had fallen in 1917 at the end of a period of increasing administrative paralysis.

The few articles written by Leroy-Beaulieu which considered Russia's political and social affairs during the period 1888-1914 stood in sharp contrast to most of the other articles on Russia appearing in the Revue at the same time. Because of the range of his knowledge as well as the depth of his interest in Russia's future, the writing of Leroy-Beaulieu served to make the articles written by younger men, such as Pinon, appear thin and meagre by comparison. However, an article published in 1908 by the economist Georges d'Avenel, and which began with a short survey of Russian political life, was a more serious effort at an analysis of political affairs than the majority during this period.⁴³

D'Avenel's picture of Russian political life was quite different from the one presented by Leroy-Beaulieu.

⁴²Ibid., 380.

⁴³"La fortune de la Russie," Ibid., XLIV, 5 (15 Apr. 1908), 769-807. See also Chapter IV, page 137.

The latter, perhaps influenced by his life-long dream of a constitutional government for Russia, had seen the major elements of Russian political life as the government and the Duma, with provincial "self-government" as a potentially effective element in Russian affairs. By contrast, d'Avenel saw the Russian political world divided by two extremes: the "imperial power and the revolution"; basing his opinion on the widespread terrorism which had continued after 1905, and which was so evident to a traveler newly arrived in Russia, he was perhaps more aware of recent internal developments in Russia than was Leroy-Beaulieu.⁴⁴

Of the two extremes which he saw as polarizing Russian political affairs, d'Avenel's sympathies lay with the emperor. Unlike Leroy-Beaulieu, who had implied that the tsar was guided by his advisors in reaching decisions regarding social and political transformations within Russia, d'Avenel assumed that the tsar possessed for himself the willingness and the intention of effecting further reforms in Russia. The author also assumed that new reforms should be on a vast scale, saying that the tsar "must execute a work much less easy than that of Peter the Great in destroying the Strelitz[y], Alexander I in

⁴⁴Ibid., 780.

repulsing Napoleon with the aid of a thermometer, or Alexander II in abolishing servitude."⁴⁵ As for Nicolas's irresolution when it came time to accomplish such a vast task, d'Avenel would only admit that to be a minor problem. "The sovereign who must accomplish these labors of Hercules," he said, "...has a right to some indulgence when he hesitates..."⁴⁶

D'Avenel's information on reform was based on more solid knowledge than was his opinion of the tsar. In his evaluation of Russia's economic conditions, the author insisted that painful reforms must be made, saying that "...civilization, which [the peasant] must absorb in a huge dose, will perhaps give him indigestion." However, civilizing the peasant was vital, since Russian agriculture must quadruple its efforts.⁴⁷

The complete social transformation advocated by d'Avenel was also of some interest for contributor A. A. de Mokeevsky in 1912. In an article on economic affairs, Mokeevsky assured his French readers that a total transformation of Russian society had already begun in Russia with the institution of agrarian reforms in the years 1907-1911.⁴⁸ The peasantry, he said, "the life force of

⁴⁵Ibid., 772.

⁴⁶Ibid., 773.

⁴⁷Ibid., 807.

⁴⁸"La réforme agraire en Russie," Ibid., VII, 6 (15 Jan. 1912), 419-444.

the nation," had been released from its dependency on the mir, and "a new era begins for Russia."⁴⁹ France had a natural interest in these agrarian reforms and their consequences, Mokeevsky said, since France was "linked by friendship and alliance" with Russia.⁵⁰

This study by Mokeevsky was one of the few during the period 1888-1914 to direct itself to the question of reform in Russia. This was a distinct change from the preceding period, when reforms had been a major concern to the contributors to the Revue. Moreover, a familiar theme during the era of great reforms, resistance within Russia to the arbitrary rule of the government, was given very little attention in the later period, despite the Revolution of 1905 and the rebellions in the countryside in 1905-1907. Indeed, only two articles took note of revolution in Russia as a viable threat to the internal peace of that country: Leroy-Beaulieu's article of 1907 on the new electoral law of that year,⁵¹ and Georges d'Avenel's study of Russian economic conditions in 1908.⁵²

In a way, nothing could illustrate the contrast between the two periods more clearly than these two articles. Leroy-Beaulieu's attack on reactionary forces

⁴⁹Ibid., 444.

⁵¹See page 76.

⁵⁰Ibid., 419.

⁵²See page 79.

within Russia seemed anachronistic; many of the issues and attitudes which were typical of articles published during the period of reforms were revived by this author as he sought to defend the Duma. The attitudes displayed by d'Avenel, on the other hand, more nearly reflected the general tenor of many articles published during the later period. D'Avenel's praise of Nicolas II despite that tsar's obvious faults, his implied support of repressive government policies and, as well, his almost brusque dismissal of peasant problems: taken together, these indicated an altogether different perspective on Russian political and social affairs than the one most prevalent during the years of reforms.

All indications point to the Franco-Russian Alliance as a major factor in forming these newer attitudes. In fact, one may perhaps conclude from the evidence presented here that, in addition to influencing the views of individual contributors, the existence of the Alliance altered the editorial views of the Revue des Deux Mondes. The journal's omissions were significant; not only were current events of great importance not reported, but, with the exception of Leroy-Beaulieu's last article, views of Russia which might be detrimental to continued French support of the Alliance were given no space in the Revue.

Indeed, the Revue might be said to be following a

policy of prudence during the period 1888-1914. That is, during periods when the French government was re-examining its policy in regard to Russia, the journal, by its silence, discreetly supported the government.

For instance, the period 1912-1914 was a time of some indecision in French diplomatic affairs. The extent to which France might support its ally, Russia, in a conflict between Russia and Austria in the Balkans became of increasing concern during these two years as international tensions mounted. If France supported Russian actions in the Balkans, then Germany would surely support her ally, Austria, in the same conflict. To avoid a general European war, then, France would have to calculate her support of Russia with precision. Moreover, French statesmen were not given a completely free hand in these decisions, for French internal affairs were deeply affected during this time by the possibility of war. The question of French preparations for a possible war with Germany became one of the key issues in French elections. The clearly pacifist mood of the country, despite noisy nationalist demonstrations, could not be ignored by the government.

The response of the Revue des Deux Mondes to this period of indecision in French affairs was not surprising. After Mokeevsky's article of 15 January 1912, the Revue

published no articles which commented on political, social, or even economic affairs within Russia until after the beginning of the First World War.⁵³

Two earlier periods, 1890-1894 and 1904-1906, were also crucial times for the Franco-Russian relationship. During each of these, the response of the Revue could be interpreted as lending support to the government. During the first period, as France moved toward an alliance with Russia, the Revue indicated an interest in such an alliance, but it did not make its own policy clear until after the signing of a military convention in 1894. This display of prudence was repeated again in 1904-1906.

The circumstances in this period were quite different. With the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, France's traditional enemy had become its new and powerful friend. This new agreement, however, was threatened when Russia embarked on its imperialist adventure in the Far East in 1904. Russian ambitions came into direct conflict with British interests in the Far East. Thus, France felt herself forced into the position of choosing between Britain and Russia. A serious re-appraisal of the Franco-Russian relationship followed. Only in 1906,

⁵³On 1 November 1914 the Revue published an article on Russian economic affairs by Raphaël-Georges Levy. See Chapter IV, page 140.

when Russia agreed to establish friendlier relations with Great Britain, did Franco-Russian relations return to normal.⁵⁴ It is possible to speculate, then, that the silence of the Revue on the political upheavals within Russia during 1905-1906 may have been evidence of a prudent wish to wait for the outcome of French diplomatic pressures on Russia before discussing the instability of the tsarist government.

On three occasions, then, the Revue responded to a period of uncertainty in Franco-Russian affairs with partial or complete silence on matters affecting the relationship between the two countries. This may have been due, at least in part, to the Revue's sensitivity to government policies. If this were indeed the case, then the cause for such an attitude was, most probably, a concern for French national security.⁵⁵

⁵⁴A formal agreement between Great Britain and Russia was signed on 21 August 1907. See Chapter III, page 119 for a further discussion of French policy toward Russia during this period.

Russia's investments in the Far East before 1904, one of the elements in the Anglo-Russian conflict, are discussed in Theodore von Laue's book, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia.

⁵⁵While it should be mentioned, in a discussion of the Revue's attitude toward Russia after 1888, that two of the contributors to the journal were later accused of complicity in an especially scandalous episode of the recurrent Russian bribery of the French press, the probability that the editorial policies of the Revue des Deux Mondes were set by the Russian treasury seems remote,

After the beginning of the First World War, there was no longer any question but that the demands of French national security influenced the attitudes of French contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes. As Chapter III will show, the interest of these contributors during the war years was centered on Russia's role as a wartime ally of France.

since the Revue's support of the Alliance was well established long before Russian subsidies became a major influence on the French press.

From December 1923 until March 1924, the French communist publication l'Humanité published the correspondence of one A. Raffalovich, a financial agent of the tsarist government, which purported to show the extent of bribery in the French government and press from 1912-1914. These documents indicated that Alexander Iswolsky (Russian ambassador to Paris from 1910 until 1917) was deeply involved in the new wave of bribery. As well, they were used to charge Raymond Poincaré (prime minister of France in 1912, and elected to the presidency in 1913) with direct involvement in the bribery.

For a discussion of Poincaré's part in the bribery before the elections of 1913, see Gordon Wright, Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency (Stanford, Calif., 1942), 52-55. Wright concluded that Poincaré was aware of the corruption, but not an active participant in it; furthermore, Wright thought that Poincaré's support was too widespread for his election to be "bought with Russian gold." Ibid., 55.

Iswolsky published his memoirs in the Revue in 1919-1920 (See Chapter III), while Raymond Poincaré became a regular contributor to the Revue after 1920.

CHAPTER III

ATTITUDES TOWARD RUSSIAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 1914-1920

The long dreaded general war began in August 1914. After a rapid German attack through neutral Belgium into northern France, it became apparent that the war in the west would be fought on French soil. However, France was not prepared to face such a formidable enemy alone; the Germans had a population of 66 millions against France's 39 millions. As well, the Germans possessed a well-organized military machine, while France had made only incomplete preparations for war. This imbalance was corrected in some measure by the appearance on the continent of the British Expeditionary Force, but the combined British and French armies were not strong enough to drive Germany from French territory. In these circumstances, the war on the eastern front became crucial.

The importance of Russian participation in the war was demonstrated shortly after hostilities began, during the battle to preserve Paris from capture by the Germans. The German defeat at the battle of the Marne (September 6-12) owed much to a Russian offensive in East Prussia, which drew off two German army corps destined for the Marne.

This Russian offensive, in fact, had been undertaken at the insistence of the French, who would continue to exert a steady pressure on Russia throughout the war to launch further attacks on Germany.¹

Russian continuation in the war, then, was of strategic and military importance for France. This fact was reflected in articles on Russian affairs appearing in the Revue des Deux Mondes during the war. From 1914 until 1917, the most important consideration of contributors on Russian political and social affairs was Russia's willingness and ability to maintain its war effort. After the February Revolution, the question of French national security was still an influence on contributors; the fear of losing Russia as an ally affected their attitudes toward the political upheavals in Russia.

1914-1917

Over the whole period 1914-1920, thirty-four articles concerned with Russian affairs appeared in the Revue. Per-

¹The French diplomatic pressures on Russia during the war were described by Maurice Paléologue, French ambassador to Russia at the time, in his diary. This was published as An Ambassador's Memoirs, trans. by F. A. Holt (London, 1923-1925). Paléologue's gossipy account must be treated with caution, since it was revised by the author before publication. Nonetheless, this is a valuable source on Franco-Russian relations during the war.

haps considering the nature of the times it is not surprising that the majority of these were brief reports filed by war correspondents (Throughout the war, the Revue published news reports from its correspondents on the several fronts.). From 1914 until the 1917 February Revolution, reports by correspondents did not contain commentary on political and social events within Russia. However, during this time two articles of regular length appeared in which there were discussions of Russian political and social affairs.

When hostilities began in August 1914, there had been no articles on Russian affairs published in the Revue for over a year. Interestingly, once France and Russia became wartime allies, the journal published an article on the economic and financial situation of Russia in which the political and social climate were touched on secondarily.² Economist Raphaël-Georges Levy indicated that France had no need to fear that its ally's war effort would be disrupted by internal instability. The Russian people, he said, were fully united in their fight against

²Raphaël-Georges Levy, "La situation économique et financière de la Russie," Revue, XXIV, 6 (1 Nov. 1914), 30-50. Levy (1853-1933), a French economist, made a special study of financial problems and published many books on this subject. Webster's Biographical Dictionary, 894. See Chapter IV, page 140.

the Germans and the Austrians; there were no signs of the political and social malaise of 1904, when "revolutionary movement...accompanied and followed the battle against Japan..."³ Not only had the differences between political parties been set aside, he asserted, but the revolutionaries were joining the army.⁴

The very real upsurge of patriotism and national spirit suggested by Levy in this article was, however, not fully utilized by the Russian government in its attempts to mobilize Russia's resources for war. Initially ignoring the help of municipal and private organizations, the tsar's administration, cursed by poor leadership, floundered in its efforts to supply the front lines.⁵

By 1916 the breakdown in the Russian administrative machinery had placed in doubt that country's ability to continue the war. An article by Jacques Bainville, published by the Revue in August of that year, sought to calm France's apprehensions that she might soon lose her

³Revue., XXIV, 6 (1 Nov. 1914), 31.

⁴Ibid.

⁵For an account of the deteriorating Russian war effort, see Paul P. Gronsky, "The Effects of the War upon the Central Government of Russia," The War and the Russian Government (New Haven, Conn., 1929) (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Division of Economics and History, Economic and Social History of the World War; Russian Series, IV), 32-42.

ally on the eastern front.⁶

Bainville spent four months in Russia. However, with this article as evidence, one might argue that he never visited Russia at all. His misleading interpretation of the situation within Russia can be explained only by the urgent need to raise French morale as the senseless slaughter continued on the western front.⁷

Bainville reported that Russia needed only time to correct the drop in production and the chaotic state of transportation which were slowing its war effort. Rumors that treason was the root of the problem were untrue, he said, and insisted that the real reason for the confused state of Russia's war efforts was the unexpectedness of the German attack in 1914, which had caught Russia unprepared.⁸

⁶"Quatre mois en Russie pendant la guerre," Revue, XXXIV, 6 (15 Aug. 1916), 778-814. Bainville (1879-1936) was a French journalist and historical writer who, under the influence of Charles Maurras, helped to found the modern royalist movement and l'Action française. He predicted the First World War in his book Le coup d'Agadir et la guerre d'orient (Paris, 1913) and in 1920 published Les conséquences politiques de la paix (Paris, 1920) in which he deplored the serious errors of imposing a hard peace on Germany and of creating weak new states to replace the old Hapsburg Empire. Grand Larousse encyclopédique (Paris, 1960), I, 843.

⁷1916 was the year of the German offensive at Verdun and the Allied counter-offensive on the Somme. Between them, German and Allied armies lost a million men in these battles.

⁸Revue, XXXIV, 6 (15 Aug. 1916), 790-791.

Bainville also discussed rumors that there was a lessening support within Russia for the continuation of the war. While the Russian Social Democrats, he acknowledged, were actively spreading anti-war propaganda, the author asserted that the opinions of such a small, extreme group was not of major importance. These "Zimmerwaldians," as he called them, were led to adopt a pro-German policy by their adherence to the doctrines of a German national, Karl Marx, he said.⁹ But, Bainville pointed out, the pro-German sympathies of the Marxists were not shared by the tsar, who continued to be staunch in his conduct of the war. In a highly optimistic appraisal of the influence of Nicolas II during 1916, Bainville asserted that the tsar's "resolute will animated the departments of the State and spreads to the far reaches of the nation. It is, for Russia in war, one of its greatest forces, one of its securities."¹⁰

There were other factors which were of benefit to Russia in its war effort, the author felt, such as the cooperative spirit of the Duma. Except for the extremes of right and left, all parties had set aside their parti-

⁹Ibid., 806. In September 1915, international socialists who opposed the war held a congress at Zimmerwald, Switzerland. Among the Russian Marxists who attended was V. I. Lenin.

¹⁰Ibid., 805.

san differences for the common good, Bainville stressed.

"The spirit of moderation...manifested among the most distinguished men who represent liberal ideas is, assuredly, one of the things which strikes us most vividly."¹¹

This contributor saw the Franco-Russian Alliance as a further element which could benefit the Russian government's pro-war policy. He argued that mutual interests and convenience did not alone determine the strength of

¹¹Ibid., 799.

This is a misinterpretation of the activities within the Duma at this time. During 1915, the state Duma of Russia began to understand that the government itself was a threat to the successful conclusion of the war. Under the leadership of Paul Miliukov, a moderate coalition of all parties except the extreme right and left was formed. This Progressive Bloc asked for the formation of a government which would enjoy the full confidence of the nation; in effect, demanding the replacement of the tsar's reactionary cabinet. Miliukov was aware that if the Bloc failed to change the government, there was a possibility that the country would turn to a revolutionary solution.

This attempt to influence the tsar's choice of ministers failed badly; instead, Nicolas turned increasingly to his wife for advice on ministerial appointments. Throughout most of 1916, the Bloc continued its opposition to the government, but without forcing the issues to another open conflict.

In November 1916, Miliukov took the offensive again with his famous "stupidity or treason" speech before the Duma. Miliukov's aim was to free the government from the influence of the camarilla surrounding the empress. Others, however, saw it as a herald of the revolution. The effect of this speech on the Duma was indicative of the response aroused throughout Russia. Miliukov wrote in his memoirs, "It was as though a pus-filled sack had burst, such was the impression. The basic evil known to all and waiting for a public exposure was placed out in the open for all to see." P. Miliukov, Political Memoirs 1905-1917, trans. by Carl Goldberg (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1967), 377.

the Alliance, since cultural ties, dating back more than a century to the time when the Russian elite had adopted French customs and the French language, permanently linked the two countries.¹² Furthermore, the war had crystalized nationalistic feelings, Bainville thought, and this strong impulse, coupled with more traditional forces, would give Russia the endurance to win.¹³

As these articles by Bainville and Levy have shown, Russia was viewed principally as a wartime ally during the first years of the war, when the question of its contribution to the war effort was uppermost in the minds of contributors. After the February Revolution in 1917, however, discussions of Russian affairs became more complex. Contributors to the Revue were still concerned with French national security, but at the same time, they attempted to come to terms with the brisk pace of political and social change within Russia.

1917-1920

During the year in which Russia experienced two revolutions, France also showed signs of an internal crisis. The crisis appeared in both the army and among the civilian population. During the military campaign of April-

¹²Revue, XXXIV, 6 (15 Aug. 1916), 812-813.

¹³Ibid., 814.

May 1917 - yet another in a series of mismanaged French offensives - the army began to mutiny. Among the civilian population, disillusioned by the death toll of over a million men since 1914, talk of a negotiated peace began to spread. Marshall Philippe Pétain restored discipline to the army, but civilian morale continued to fall. Disclosures that German spies had spread defeatist propaganda did not alter the fact that the people of France were genuinely weary of the meaningless loss of life on the battlefield. The Union Sacrée began to crumble; the French socialists left the government, and for the first time since the beginning of the war, industrial strikes appeared.¹⁴

Amid mounting talk of a negotiated peace with Germany, president of the Republic Raymond Poincaré asked Georges Clemenceau to form a government (13 November). The old "tiger" silenced all opposition to the original French aim of total victory over Germany. His methods of discouraging opposition could not stand close scrutiny; how-

¹⁴At the outbreak of war, President Raymond Poincaré called for a temporary truce among normally antagonistic factions and groups within France. This Union Sacrée was overwhelmingly successful during the initial stages of the war; political, social, and economic groups laid aside their natural differences in order to unite in a common effort to defend France from the German invaders.

ever, he gave France the temporary unity necessary to continue the war.¹⁵

If the French people had wavered in their endorsement of complete victory as a war aim, the French government showed no signs of it in its policy toward Russia. After the fall of the Russian monarchy, the French government stubbornly insisted that revolutionary Russia honor the treaty obligations of tsarist Russia. This meant that Russia would be forced to stay in the war even though its people, burdened with losses even more staggering than the French, were heartily sick of war. To some degree, French stubbornness on the issue of war complicated Russian internal affairs during the period between the February and October Revolutions. The Provisional Government of revolutionary Russia was never able to reconcile French (and Allied) demands for continuation of the war with the realities of Russia's internal situation. Moreover, French intransigence, as well as Allied misunderstanding of the Russian situation, was an element in the blundering attempt at Allied military intervention in 1918-1920.¹⁶

¹⁵For a discussion of French internal affairs during the war years, see Alfred Cobban, A History of Modern France, Vol. II: From the First Empire to the Fourth Republic 1799-1945 (London, 1961).

¹⁶For information on the relations between revolutionary Russia and the Allies see Robert D. Warth's book, The Allies and the Russian Revolution: from the Fall of the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (Durham, N.C., 1954); also, George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston, 1961).

On the issue of war, the attitude of contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes of articles concerned with Russian political and social affairs during this period was clear; there was not a trace of defeatist sentiment among them. Rather, they showed a staunch support of the original Allied aim of complete victory over Germany. Since the Bolsheviks consistently opposed the war, it is not surprising that contributors, as well as the Revue itself, opposed the establishment in revolutionary Russia of a Bolshevik regime.

In 1916, Bainville wished to reassure the French that their Russian ally stood firm. To this end, he wrote an optimistic article which glossed over the unpleasant truth that the political and social situation in Russia was deteriorating rapidly. With complete aplomb, he reversed himself eight months later in an article which responded to the February Revolution (8-11 March) and the fall of the monarchy (15 March).¹⁷

Russia, he said, clearly had been on the verge of a revolution during his last visit the year before. Imperial Russia's state of political and social instability was

¹⁷"Comment est née la révolution russe," Revue, XXXVIII, 6 (15 Apr. 1917), 869-893.

so pronounced at that time that even a visitor was able to sense it, although Nicolas II, incredibly, had not.¹⁸ In his condition of self-imposed isolation, the "weak sovereign, an autocrat submitting to all the influences of his deplorable entourage..." had alienated not only the masses but the conservative forces supporting his throne, thus acting, the author felt, as the agent of his own destruction.¹⁹

Furthermore, in contrast to his earlier opinions, Bainville assigned the Duma a share of the responsibility for Russia's political crisis. Although Bainville had applauded the Progressive Bloc's moderation and spirit of cooperation in 1916, less than a year later he cited the intransigence of the Bloc, under the leadership of Paul Miliukov, as a factor in the tsar's refusal to work with the Duma.²⁰

A further element contributing to the Revolution, Bainville thought, was the corruption and unpatriotic spirit of the bureaucracy. The tsar's weakness left a vacuum at the center of government which administrators were quick to exploit for their own benefit. The Russian bureaucracy (many of Baltic German origins), he charged,

¹⁸ Ibid., 870.

¹⁹ Ibid., 873.

²⁰ Ibid., 876.

For the program of the Bloc see Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy; a Study of the Evidence (London, 1939), 271-273.

was not interested in the war effort, but preferred to spend its energies in a power struggle which worsened the anarchy at the top.²¹

Bainville saw the current power struggle in Russia as a battle between the bureaucracy and the Duma.²² In consecrating itself to the war effort, the Duma, he thought, had engaged the bureaucracy in a duel, and the future political direction of Russia would depend, in part, on the outcome of this battle for power. Consequently, the support given to the war effort by the Russian liberals, and which Bainville had praised highly in 1916, now assumed a different significance for the author. "In reality," he said, "...Russian liberalism has engaged its future in the war. It joins its fortunes to the victory...If the war ends badly, it is not only the Slavic idea and the patriotism of the Duma which will suffer. It will be the Duma itself which is struck [down]."²³

²¹Revue, XXXVIII, 6 (15 Apr. 1917), 881-885.

²²Bainville continued to use the term Duma to describe the Provisional Government, which had been formed in March 1917 from among members of the Progressive Bloc. According to historian R. D. Warth, this was a common misconception at the time. Moreover, the press of western Europe, and, to some extent, the Allied governments, saw the Revolution as "a kind of anti-German revolt brought about for patriotic reasons under the auspices of the Duma." Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution, 27.

²³Revue, XXXVIII, 6 (15 Apr. 1917), 879.

While Bainville understood, then, that the coming political struggles in Russia would center on the issue of the war, he did not move beyond a consideration of the relative strengths of the institutions of the Old Regime in his analysis of revolutionary Russia. This narrow view was enlarged by later writers, some of whom were witnesses to the events of 1917 and beyond, and who were thus better able to indicate the broader revolutionary changes occurring throughout the whole of Russian society. Even so, rather than emphasizing the deeper reasons for events, later writers would, like Bainville, restrict themselves to a study of the immediate causes for political and social changes within Russia.

So long as the course of events within Russia resembled patterns familiar to western Europe, writers for the Revue were able to accept swift and sometimes violent change. However, they stopped short at supporting a full socialist revolution, channeling their fear of an uncharted and unwelcome phenomenon into a hostility toward Lenin and the Bolsheviks, accompanied often by a nostalgic glance backwards to the time of the tsars and the Alliance.

The trend, however, was to accept most political changes short of actual control by the Bolsheviks; this attitude can be followed in three of the reports sent from Russia during 1917 by Marylie Markovitch, who had

been the war correspondent for the Revue on the Russian front since 1915.²⁴

In the article published in July, the author portrayed the respected and admired "man of Europe," Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul Miliukov, as a forceful leader in the Provisional Government of Russia in contrast to his most vocal opponent, Vladimir I. Lenin (Ulianov), who, in turn, was pictured as a pro-German leader of an anarchistic and dangerous faction of the Social Democratic movement which called itself the "Bolche-wiki" (majority).²⁵

²⁴This series included five articles: "Une semaine de révolution à Pétrougrade," Ibid., XXXIX, 6 (15 May 1917), 414-446; "Lendemain de révolution à Pétrougrade," XL, 6 (1 July 1917), 180-210; "Scènes de la révolution russe, III, la Russie au bord de l'abîme," XL, 6 (1 Aug. 1917), 666-696; "--; IV, Vers l'offensive," XLI, 6 (1 Sept. 1917), 96-124; "--; V, Korniloff contre Kerensky," XLI, 6 (1 Oct. 1917), 645-662. Each of these reports from Russia had been written several months before their publication in the Revue.

Markovitch gave a brief description of the period of national rejoicing after the February Revolution when happy crowds drifted through city streets listening to bands playing the Marseillaise and to street debates over the future of Russia. XL, 6 (1 July 1917), 181-182; XL, 6 (1 Aug. 1917), 670-671. In his book describing the October Revolution, John Reed noted the speech-making which characterized the period between revolutions in 1917. "For months in Petrograd, and all over Russia," Reed said, "every street-corner was a public tribune. In railway trains, street-cars, always the spurting up of impromptu debate, everywhere..." Ten Days That Shook the World (New York, 1967. Orig. pub. N. Y., 1919), 15. This edition includes an introduction by V. I. Lenin, from the 1922 edition, and a preface by N. K. Krupskaya from a 1923 Russian edition.

²⁵Revue, "Lendemain de révolution à Pétrougrade,"

The author's enthusiasm for Miliukov had cooled perceptibly, however, by the time the succeeding article was published in August. She solicited a telephone interview with Vodovozoff, a member of the Trudoviki (Toilers) element in the Provisional Government, to ask for his opinion of Miliukov. Vodovozoff was emphatic in his rejection of Miliukov's policy of continuing the war, saying "the last word belongs to the people!"²⁶

Then, in the September installment of this series, the author merely remarked that some crowds still cheered for Miliukov, while others called for Lenin. Her closest attention, however, was given to another political rivalry, the growing struggle for popular support between Alexander Kerensky and Lenin.²⁷

XL, 6 (1 July 1917), 202-203.

Lenin had become something of a celebrity after his return to Petrograd in April 1917 and the issuance of his "April Theses." He made frequent appearances on his balcony to show himself to the crowds which gathered. Markovitch went to see this new ("and without doubt ephemeral?") spectacle and found Lenin to be sans majesté but very elegantly dressed. Ibid., 208.

²⁶Ibid., "Scènes de la révolution russe, III, la Russie au bord de l'abîme," XL, 6 (1 Aug. 1917), 670.

By this time, the Allied governments preferred Alexander Kerensky, who also proposed to continue the war. Paul Miliukov's own feelings about his rise and fall can be learned from his Political Memoirs, 427-455.

²⁷Revue, "Scènes de la révolution russe, IV, Vers l'offensive," XLI, 6 (1 Sept. 1917), 121-122.

Kerensky had been the only member of a revolutionary party to serve in the Provisional Government immediately

Markovitch was an observer at a "congress of workers' deputies," where she witnessed a debate between the two political leaders. Lenin's radical program seemed to incense the author as much as his proposal to withdraw Russia from the war, an action which would leave France without a strong ally on the eastern front. In reporting this debate, the writer's preference for the less radical leader was plainly expressed. Rejecting Lenin, with his barbed and destructive rhetoric, as being representative of the revolution, Markovitch asserted that it was clear that Kerensky was the embodiment of the people as he went to the tribune "with the firm attitude of a battler for truth."²⁸

As was indicated by these three articles, Markovitch's acceptance of the leftward course of the revolution was limited. While, after the event, the author accepted strong socialist participation in the government which had succeeded Nicolas II, she showed a firm resistance to the more radical program of the Bolsheviks. This

after its formation on 15 March. A former leader of the Trudoviki, Kerensky had become a Social Revolutionary by March. By the time Markovitch's article was written, Kerensky had been joined in the government by several other Social Revolutionaries and some Mensheviks.

²⁸Ibid., 122.

same attitude was expressed again in 1919, not only by contributors to the Revue, but by the journal itself, in an editorial note appearing in November of that year.²⁹

Possibly as a harbinger of its statement of editorial policy two months later, the Revue had published in September 1919 a short article by Francis Mury on a nineteenth-century socialist state in Manchuria, the Republic of Chetonga, in which Mury showed some degree of acceptance for a socialist state, but stoutly refused to accept a Bolshevik regime in Russia.³⁰

Mury admired the republic established by the Khongonses, but was most emphatic in his opinion that Chetonga

²⁹The Revue did not continue with its reports from the eastern front or from Petrograd after Markovitch's series. However, in October 1918 the Revue published a journal kept by war correspondent L. Grondijs as he followed the various anti-Bolshevik Russian armies in the south after the Bolshevik revolution of 7 November 1917 (25 October, O.S.). "La Russie en feu (journal d'un correspondant de guerre)," Ibid., XLVII, 6 (15 Oct. 1918), 777-812.

On 23 December 1917, France and Britain signed a secret convention which divided Russia into "spheres of influence." The French zone included Bessarabia, the Ukraine, and the Crimea. Two divisions of French troops were sent in 1918 to occupy the French "zone." These troops helped to blockade the Soviet coastline from October 1919 to January 1920, as well as providing some aid for anti-Bolshevik forces. The French force was withdrawn in 1920.

³⁰La première république bolcheviste," Ibid., LIII, 6 (1 Sept. 1919), 167-181. Mury had traveled in China and Manchuria, returning in 1905 to Paris, where he delivered a series of lectures at the Sorbonne on the Republic of Chetonga. Ibid., 168.

was far superior to the abominable Bolshevik experiment in Russia. "Lenin and Trotsky must fail because they have wished to violate human nature," he prophesied.³¹

Two months after Mury's article appeared in the Revue, the journal made its own position quite public in an editorial note preceding an analysis of the political and economic condition of Bolshevik Russia by Baron Boris E. Nolde, a former professor at the University of Petrograd and a well-known jurist, who had served the Provisional Government as Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs.³² The editorial stated:

Under the Pressure of the armies of Youdenitch, Denikine and Koltchak, one had hoped for the quick fall of Bolshevism. It is still to be explained how this monstrous regime has been able to establish itself and endure in Russia. The author of this article, the first study, we believe, which has been published on this subject, reveals, through testimony from a witness, the reality that hides under the falseness of formulas.³³

In the article which followed this editorial statement, it was soon clear, that, like Mury, Nolde believed

³¹Ibid., 167.

³²"Le règne de Lenine," Ibid., LIV, 6 (15 Nov. 1919), 277-313. While serving under Kerensky, Nolde helped to draft the decree on the Ukraine of August 1917 which recognized the national principle but which sought to keep the Ukraine under the direction of the Petrograd government. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union; Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 64-65. Nolde (1876-1948) came from Imperial Russia's landed gentry.

³³Revue, LIV, 6 (15 Nov. 1919), 277.

that the Bolshevik program was unrealistic. The whole inner structure of Russia was being torn apart, Nolde thought, to satisfy Lenin's wish to impose a rigid formula on that country. But, in order to create his utopia, the Bolshevik leader had usurped all power in Russia behind a facade of democratic slogans.³⁴

To create this utopia, Nolde pointed out, the Bolsheviks had replaced the experienced men of the administration with a horde of misfits. He described the Bolshevik bureaucrats as "...ignoramuses, almost illiterate, placed at the head of most serious affairs; [men who] look to destroy the administrative structure and replace it by a system of abuses, vexations and extortions."³⁵

While the author warned that Lenin's insistence on theoretic solutions was pulling Russia towards destruction, he gave some hope that it could escape such an unhappy fate. Nolde was certain that the artificial and rapacious Bolshevik government, which held its power only by terrorism and force, could not last. The civil war then in progress, he was convinced, would result in the overthrow of a bad government and bring true democracy.³⁶

³⁴Ibid., 292.

³⁵Ibid., 294. Nolde's opinion of Leon Trotsky (Bronstein) was equally unflattering; he referred to him as an ambitious man and a vulgar political-climber (arri-viste). Ibid., 293.

³⁶Ibid., 313.

Like Markovitch, Nolde made a sharp distinction between the Bolsheviks and other socialist groups in Russia. In attacking the doctrines and actions of the Bolsheviks, he asserted that Bolshevism did not truly belong in the international socialist movement. Not only was it a "phenomenon eminently national and local," but its ruthless methods set it apart.³⁷ On the other hand, Nolde said, the Mensheviks, the other wing of the Social Democratic movement in Russia, were an example of pure Marxist socialism. The Mensheviks, he explained, became hostile to Lenin over the question of substituting a peasant revolt in Russia for the worker's revolt projected by Marx. Finding it "repugnant to substitute a jacquerie for a social revolution..." the Mensheviks split with Lenin and his followers over his unorthodox proposal.³⁸

While the author never clarified his views on the degree of revolutionary change he would find acceptable for Russia under a different regime, his service in the Provisional Government showed his willingness to accept strong socialist participation in the government of Russia. Markovitch, Mury, and Nolde each in turn, then, indicated a limited acceptance of socialism, but a flat rejection of the Bolsheviks.

As was demonstrated by the editorial note which

³⁷Ibid., 267.

³⁸Ibid., 284.

preceded Nolde's article, as well as by the choice of topics and contributors after the February Revolution, the Revue des Deux Mondes was unable to reconcile itself to a Russian state controlled by the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic movement. Just as he had marked the beginning of a new period in Russian affairs, so also the appearance of Lenin and the Bolsheviks marked the beginning of a new attitude toward Russia for the Revue des Deux Mondes.

Another reflection of this changed attitude was the publication, beginning in 1918, of articles which looked backward to a time when Russia seemed more familiar and less hostile to France.

In a three part study, Ernest Daudet traced the slowly changing attitude of Alexander III toward closer diplomatic ties with France.³⁹ Daudet's underlying assumption in this series was that the Franco-Russian Alliance was a desirable goal for French diplomacy to pursue. For instance, he thought that the dissolution of the

³⁹"L'avènement d'Alexandre III et ses premiers rapports avec la République Française, 1881-1886, notes et souvenirs," Ibid., XLVIII, 6 (15 Nov. 1918), 372-401; "Le règne d'Alexandre III, mission Laboulaye, 1886-1891, notes et souvenirs," LI, 6 (15 May 1919), 396-421; "Les dernières années d'Alexandre III, 1890-1894, notes et souvenirs," LI, 6 (15 June 1919), 888-906.

Daudet (1837-1921) wrote both historical studies and historical novels, usually choosing a nineteenth-century subject. Grande Larousse encyclopédique, III, 799.

League of Three Emperors was beneficial, since it was from this time that "Europe entered a new phase, where Russia could play an independent role and France retake its rights as a great power."⁴⁰ For Daudet, the alliance between France and Russia seemed a natural outcome of the new European situation after 1889.

However, the writer understood that the weakest point of the Franco-Russian Alliance had been Nicolas II. That tsar had needed to make radical reforms in order to keep his throne, Daudet said. Unhappily, Nicolas never really understood this, and the great hopes inspired by his accession were never realized.⁴¹

Daudet, then, joined other contributors in regretting the failings of Nicolas II, and like many of those writing after 1917, felt that Nicolas bore the responsibility for his own downfall. No critique of the unfortunate tsar, however, carried the same poignancy as the tribute paid to Nicolas after his death by Her Majesty Queen Marie of Rumania.⁴²

⁴⁰Revue, LI, 6 (15 May 1919), 410.

⁴¹Ibid., LI, 6 (15 June 1919), 906.

⁴²"Le tsar Nicolas II; un martyr de la grande tragédie moderne," Ibid., LIII, 6 (1 Sept. 1919), 5-23. Maria Alexandra Victoria of Saxe-Coburg (1875-1938) married Ferdinand, who became king of Rumania in 1914. Queen Marie was influential in Rumanian government policy making. During the German occupation of Rumania in 1917-1918, she won

Queen Marie mourned not just his death, but the unfulfilled promise of his life, censuring the murdered tsar for his personal incompetence at playing the role of autocrat in twentieth-century Russia. Nicolas wished to go backward when the rest of the world was going forward, she said. "That is the tragic element; there [was] the secret of his defeat, his fault, his very great fault."⁴³

Nicolas's incompetence was seen from a different perspective by Alexander Iswolsky in his unfinished memoirs which were published in the Revue des Deux Mondes during 1919-1920.⁴⁴ Iswolsky had entered Imperial Russia's diplomatic service in 1875 and served as the Russian

the admiration and respect of her countrymen for her courageous work with the Red Cross. Webster's Biographical Dictionary, 972.

⁴³Revue, LIII, 6 (1 Sept. 1919), 7.

⁴⁴"Souvenirs de mon ministère, I., la première douma (1906)," Ibid., LI, 6 (1 June 1919), 481-521; "--; II., après la première douma - attentats terroristes," LII, 6 (1 July 1919), 100-131; "--; III., Nicolas II et Guillaume II," LIV, 6 (1 Nov. 1919), 39-63; "--; IV., Nicolas II," LV, 6 (1 Jan. 1920), 46-77. Later published in English under the title The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky; Formerly Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to France, Ed. and trans. by Charles Louis Seeger (London, 1922).

The daughter of Iswolsky's sometime political rival, Count Sergei Y. Witte, also published memoirs in the Revue during 1919. Vera Narischkine-Witte was the author of a two part survey of her wartime experiences in Russia. "Perdue dans la révolution russe," Revue, L, 6 (15 Apr. 1919), 836-862; LI, 6 (1 May 1919), 136-168.

Minister for Foreign Affairs during the period of the first three Dumas (1906-1912). In his capacity as diplomat and cabinet member, Iswolsky found the tsar's vacillating nature to be a serious handicap in the conduct of business and Nicolas's willingness to absorb bad advice a grave burden in the formation of Russian foreign policy.

Iswolsky began his memoirs with a defense of Nicolas against charges then current in the French press that the tsar in 1905 had acted as a "traitor" to the Franco-Russian Alliance during the course of a private meeting with William II at Bjorkoe.⁴⁵ By carefully assembling his documents and letters, Iswolsky sought to prove that the tsar was innocent of intentions to destroy the Franco-Russian Alliance when he signed the secret agreement with the kaiser.⁴⁶ Quite unintentionally, perhaps, Iswolsky

⁴⁵When the two monarchs met privately at Bjorkoe, the tsar's wily cousin persuaded Nicolas to sign a secret agreement aimed at England. Later, advisors pointed out to Nicolas that the secret agreement was in conflict with the Franco-Russian Alliance, thus causing Nicolas to repudiate the document signed at Bjorkoe. Pierre Renouvin, Le XIX^e siècle; de 1871 à 1914; l'apogée de l'Europe (Paris, 1955), 220.

⁴⁶Revue, LIV, 6 (1 Nov. 1919), 49-50. A small part of the material on Bjorkoe had already been published in the Revue des Deux Mondes the year before in a short article which relied on information furnished by Iswolsky to Le Temps to refute charges that Nicolas knowingly became a "traitor" to the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1905. The Paris New York Herald Tribune earlier had brought the Bjorkoe negotiations to public attention by its publication

went beyond the mere quashing of charges of treason brought against Nicolas; in his zeal to prove the villiany of William II, the author testified to the full measure of the tsar's gullibility and ignorance.⁴⁷

Although Iswolsky assigned to Nicolas a share in the responsibility for Russia's faltering progress through the early years of the twentieth century, the Russian diplomat and minister was not tempted to make Nicolas the sole cause of governmental confusion in Imperial Russia. In an article in this same series which dealt with the first Duma, much of Iswolsky's criticism was reserved for the immovable conservatives who served Nicolas as advisors and officials and the equally intractable and inexperienced liberals of the Duma.⁴⁸ In fact, it seemed to have been Iswolsky's exasperation at the more obvious

on 4 September 1917 of private telegrams exchanged between the kaiser and the tsar. A. Nekludow, "Souvenirs diplomatiques, auteur de entrevue de Bjoerkoe," Ibid., XLIV, 6 (1 Mar. 1918), 127-144.

⁴⁷Iswolsky had no desire to show the tsar as a fool or a simpleton. The author had great respect for the tsar's deep religious feelings, his sensitivity and gentleness, and his devotion to his father's wishes, even though these same qualities led Nicolas to accept poor advice. See Iswolsky's analysis of Nicolas in "Souvenirs de mon ministère, IV., Nicolas II," Ibid., LV, 6 (1 Jan. 1920), passim. The author thought that much of Nicolas's ineptness at governing was explained by his poor education. Ibid., 50.

⁴⁸Ibid., LI, 6 (1 June 1919), 481-521.

stupidities of the Russian governmental system, rather than his liberal tendencies, which inspired his attempt "to bridge the gap between the Government and the Duma" while a member of Russia's first cabinet in 1906.⁴⁹

The author's recollections of his government service in Russia were not noticeably covered with a nostalgic haze, but in his memories of the tsar and the imperial family, Iswolsky's sense of loss and nostalgia for past times became quite pronounced. He painted a tender portrait of the emperor which was sympathetic of weaknesses and cherished his best qualities. Even the tsar's weaknesses had their usefulness, Iswolsky said, for if Nicolas had been a strong emperor, then the crisis of 1905 would have ended in catastrophe. When Nicolas succumbed to revolutionary pressures and granted a charter in October, 1905, he saved his throne. But in 1917, Iswolsky claimed, the tsar bent in the wrong direction, falling under the influence of reactionary forces which hoped to re-establish full autocratic power in Russia. "Under the guidance of the reactionary party, [Nicolas] perished because he tried to combat the forces which could not be withstood."⁵⁰

Iswolsky's view that the tsar was the agent of his

⁴⁹Ibid., 513. Iswolsky came from Russia's liberal gentry.

⁵⁰Ibid., LV, 6 (1 Jan. 1920), 74.

own destruction was the judgment of all contributors to the Revue who commented on the fall of the monarchy between 1917 and 1920. There is a broadening of perspective, however, between the views of Bainville and those of Iswolsky. Bainville, who wrote very soon after the actual events, centered his attention on Nicolas as an element in the February Revolution, and saw only that, under the conditions of general unrest in Russia, Nicolas had lost too much support to be able to retain his throne. Daudet saw more than this; in an opinion that was reminiscent of views expressed by contributors during the time of Russia's great reforms in the nineteenth century, he suggested that Nicolas had brought about his own downfall by not satisfying wide demands for reforms. Both Queen Marie and Iswolsky, however, went much further. Nicolas, each said, had flown in the face of powerful social forces with his untimely efforts to re-establish full autocratic rule in Russia.

No contributor, however, ventured to suggest that the monarchy might have fallen even had a different monarch sat on the throne during the last decades of Romanov rule in Russia. Even the broadest interpretation did not include the possibility that revolutionary forces in Russia were strong enough to overthrow the monarchy without the active, if unintentional, aid of the monarch

himself. While both Queen Marie and Iswolsky saw the sweep of new social forces through Russia as certain, neither saw the fall of the Romanovs as inevitable.

Somewhat the same attitude can be seen in the opinions expressed by contributors as they viewed the events which followed the fall of the tsar. As some contributors had not seen the fate of the Romanovs as inevitable, neither did others see the continuing leftward course of the revolution as unavoidable, or in this instance, even desirable. This attitude prevailed despite the awareness of contributors that the Russian revolutionary movements of the twentieth century contained socialist and populist elements.

Of course, some of the contributors mentioned were often very close to events and, consequently, their writings revealed a sense of immediacy and a lack of perspective. This was most evident when they sought causes for recent events within Russia; few of them were able to offer more than the most immediate reasons for the events they described. It should not be expected, then, that they would view events with the broader perspective of the theorist or historian.

However, there were certain factors beyond the mere press of time or the closeness of events which influenced contributor's views that the revolution could,

and should, be controlled. For instance, there was a strong desire by some to see the energies released by the massive social upheaval within Russia directed into channels familiar in the west. Thus, contributors expressed a fear of the unfamiliar solutions offered by the Bolsheviks, or, like Mury and Nolde, charged the Bolshevik program with being contrary to human nature.⁵¹

Another explanation for the hostility shown by French contributors, as well as the Revue itself, toward a truly radical government in Russia is that the French felt that their own interests would be jeopardized by such developments. Not only would French investments be lost by full socialization of Russian industry, but a Russian withdrawal from the war might affect French national security.

As the evidence presented in this chapter has shown, French contributors were deeply influenced by the fear of losing Russia as an ally in wartime. This caused them to oppose elements in Russia which might diminish the Russian war effort. Bainville, for instance, attacked the Baltic German element of the bureaucracy for what he felt was its lack of patriotism.⁵² However, the deepest

⁵¹Ibid., LIII, 6 (1 Sept. 1919), 167; LIV, 6 (15 Nov. 1919), 300.

⁵²See page 100.

antagonism of contributors was aroused by the left wing of the Russian Social Democratic movement. While all socialist groups opposed the war in principle, only this extreme left-wing group consistently opposed Russia's participation in the First World War.⁵³ For this reason, the group which Bainville called, simply, "Marxists," and which Markovitch later identified as "Bolche-wiki" was bitterly attacked by French contributors from 1916 onward.

And, indeed, French fears that a Bolshevik regime would mean the withdrawal of Russia from the war were not unfounded. On 8 November 1917 (26 October, 1917, O.S.), Lenin read to the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets a decree on peace which called for an immediate armistice among all belligerents and a negotiated peace. Moreover, the decree annulled all secret treaties to which Russia had been a party and promised to begin publication of these immediately. The Soviet government began unilateral negotiations with Germany, and on 3 March 1918 (18 February, 1918, O.S.), the Soviet-German Treaty of

⁵³Many radical members of the Duma abstained from voting war credits in August 1914. Only the Bolsheviks, however, refused to lend tacit support to Russia's participation in the war. As a result of their uncompromising stand, five Bolshevik deputies were exiled to Siberia in November 1914. R. D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution, 4.

Brest-Litovsk was signed.⁵⁴

Of great consequence, too, for the future of Franco-Russian relations was the Soviet repudiation of all foreign debts owed by the preceding Russian governments as well as the nationalization of all foreign property.

These actions were to have a serious effect on the French economy in the postwar years, since the size of the French investment was so large. Before 1914, something like eighty percent of the Russian state debt was owed to France. Besides this, there was a sizeable French investment in private industry in Russia. After 1914, the Russian debt owed to France had been expanded by the granting of credits to the Russian governments for war-time purchases.⁵⁵

With the establishment of the Soviet government in Russia, then, relations between France and Russia were so changed that the Franco-Russian Alliance could not survive.⁵⁶ During the decades of its existence, the

⁵⁴After the successful Bolshevik coup of 7 November 1917 (25 October 1917, O.S.), the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, "proclaimed the transfer of all power throughout Russia to Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies." Edward Hallett Carr, A History of Soviet Russia, Vol. I: The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London, 1950), 109.

⁵⁵G. F. Kennan, Russia and the West, 190-191.

⁵⁶It would be an understatement to say that Franco-

Alliance had exerted a strong influence on the views of contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes on political and social affairs. It was not unnatural, then, that the rupture in the relationship between France and Russia during the First World War and the end of the Franco-Russian Alliance would mark a change in the attitudes of contributors to events in Russia.

Russian relations were badly strained in the years following the establishment of a Soviet government in Russia. The Allies were in a virtual state of war with the Soviet government during 1918-1920. After the intervention ended, relations between Soviet Russia and the west were still far from normal. Allied, and especially French, insistence on coupling the question of debts and claims with that of recognition for the Soviet government prevented full diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia until 1923. In that year, what Kennan called the "log-jam of resistance to the formal acceptance of Soviet Russia as a member of the international community" was broken by Great Britain. With the exception of the United States, other major powers followed Britain in recognizing the Soviet government. Ibid., 218.

CHAPTER IV
ATTITUDES TOWARD RUSSIAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
1855-1920

Economic affairs received far less attention from contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes during the decades between 1855 and 1920 than did the political or social dimensions of Russian life. There were in this period, nonetheless, several serious essays on Russian economic affairs, as well as passing references in other articles which were devoted principally to other subjects.

As was seen in earlier chapters, the opening of the French money market to the Russian government and the subsequent Franco-Russian Alliance marked a turning point in the attitudes of contributors toward Russian affairs. This pattern also can be seen in articles concerned with Russian economic affairs. For this reason, the advent of large-scale French investments in Russian bonds and securities in 1888 separates the articles dealt with in this chapter into two parts. During the earlier period (1855-1888), Russia was viewed as a remote country whose economic and financial problems had no direct bearing on French affairs. However, during the later period (1888-1914), contributors were strongly influenced by close economic and diplomatic ties between France and Russia.

There was another reason why the last decade or so of the century provided a meaningful dividing line. That was, that during the 1890's, Russia committed itself to a program of rapid industrialization under the firm guidance of its Finance Minister, Sergei Iulevich Witte (1892-1903). This new emphasis, known as the "Witte system," had far-ranging consequences for the future of Russia's economic and social structure.

Under Witte, Russia achieved convertibility of the ruble (1897) and greatly expanded its industrial base. By the end of the Witte period, Russia had surpassed France in pig iron production and stood fifth in world production of steel. The newer industries in southern Russia, which concentrated on chemicals and metals, were among the most productive in the world.¹ This advance in heavy industry was stimulated by the accelerated pace of railway construction during this period. The Russian rail network increased by 46 percent in the decade 1892-1902, a figure which included the Trans-Siberian Railroad.²

Such great advances in industrialization and railway building had a discernible impact on the opinions of

¹T. H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia, 267-268.

²This line was begun in 1892 and reached virtual completion in October 1901. Regular through traffic was established in the summer of 1903. Ibid., 232-234.

contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes. They were interested not only in the increase in Russian productive capacity and financial stability, but also in the socio-economic effects of these changes.

When, after 1914, war and revolution brought another change in Russian economic development, that change was of less importance for a survey of opinions from contributors to the Revue, since greater attention was now given to political events. In fact, only one article concerned with Russian economic affairs appeared in the Revue in the period after 1914. This article, written by Baron Boris E. Nolde, served rather as an epilogue for the period which had begun with the reforms of the early 1860's.

1855-1888

For only two brief moments was the attention of contributors drawn to Russian economic affairs during this period. The first was during the years 1862-1864, when the effects of the new financial reforms in Russia were beginning to be felt in that country.³ The second occurred when articles were published in the Revue on the Russo-Turkish War showing a concern for the effects of that war on Russia's financial structure.

³State Bank founded (May 1860); first published budget (1861); unified budget made mandatory (1863); Office of State Control instituted (1862).

In both of these brief "clusters" of articles, contributors shared a common attitude toward Russia; they viewed Russia as an economically underdeveloped country, characterized by great inequities in its socio-economic structure. Among these appraisals of Russia's economy, the viewpoint expressed by Louis Wolowski was notable for its succinctness. "In a word," he wrote, "Russia is poor."⁴

This stern assessment drew angry rebuttals from the Revue's Russian readers in the form of letters to the journal. To answer these critics Wolowski wrote another, briefer, article in which he upheld his earlier opinion.⁵

⁴"Les finances de la Russie," Revue, XLIX, 2 (15 Jan. 1864), 436.

Louis François Michel Raymond Wolowski (1810-1876) was born in Warsaw and educated in Paris. After returning to Warsaw to take part in the revolution of 1830, he was sent back to Paris as secretary to the legation established there by the provisional Polish government. After the suppression of the Polish rebellion Wolowski stayed on in Paris and was naturalized as a French citizen in 1834. He served as a member of the National Assembly from 1848 until 1851 and again from 1871 until his election as senator in 1876.

During his career as an economist, Wolowski established the first Crédit Foncier in France in 1852; in 1864 he became professor of political economics at the Conservatoire as the successor to J. A. Blanqui. His economic views were noteworthy for their strong emphasis on free trade and their ardent support of bimetallism. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., XXVIII, 777.

⁵"Les finances de la Russie," Ibid., L, 2 (1 Mar. 1864), 244-256.

It was understandable, Wolowski said, that Russian pride would rebel against his phrase "Russia is poor." Yet, in all truth, Russia was poor, and the very excuses made for such problems as the overabundance of paper money, the scarcity of roads and lack of credit facilities, only pointed to that country's poverty. "...One need not be pessimistic," he said, "to experience a small, agreeable surprise in the presence of these rudimentary...[beginnings of financial maturity], which denote a society hardly out of its barbaric swaddling clothes: all that creates the strength of the West is unknown there, [where] all technology (rouages) is of a primitive crudeness."⁶

All four of the contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes (Wolowski, Valbert, Leroy-Beaulieu, de Mazade) who concerned themselves with Russian economic affairs during this first period, understood that Russia needed to increase its industrial base in order to take its place among truly modern states. During the early 1860's, both Charles de Mazade and Wolowski were pleased with the establishment in 1860 of a state bank, a crucial first step they thought, in unlocking investment capital for Russian industry. The State Bank had replaced a system of private banks, which de Mazade called "...that strange or-

⁶Ibid., 252-253.

ganization of banks which resembled a pump; sucking in the public wealth in order to immobilize it."⁷ Until the reform of 1860, Wolowski said, money had flowed into these private banks only to form an ever-increasing, but stagnant, reservoir of capital. Because of the lack of investment opportunity, money could not be put to work through the capitalization of industry or commerce. Consequently, capital in Russia had a propensity "'to become disabled,'" Wolowski explained.⁸

Since little had been accomplished toward lifting Russia out of the pre-industrial age by the last half of the 1870's, G. Valbert felt it proper to complain that the "development of productive forces is the first necessity" for Russia.⁹ New productive capacity, however, depended on investment capital. During this period, Russia still lacked such capital despite a taxing policy which favored the rich. This policy, Leroy-Beaulieu explained, was

⁷"La Russie sous l'empereur Alexander II - La crise de l'autocratie et la société Russe," Ibid., XXXIX, 2 (15 June 1862), 790.

⁸Ibid., XLIX, 2 (15 Jan. 1864), 446. Wolowski added that this phrase was a quotation from Jacques Lafitte. (Lafitte was an Orleanist banker deeply involved in the overthrow of Charles X in 1830 and the leading figure in the first government under the regime of Louis-Philippe.)

⁹"La situation intérieure en Russie," Ibid., XXX, 3 (1 June 1879), 711.

always defended in Russia with the argument that the country needed to protect its potential for economic growth by supporting the small group of rich Russians. In practice, the author contended, this meant the maintenance of the rich in Russia at the expense of the poor without, however, any resulting benefit to the economy.

Leroy-Beaulieu especially deplored some of the methods by which the tax burden was placed on the poor in Russia. One of these was the use of the notorious tax on "souls," a head tax on male peasants. Even worse, he thought, was the imposition of an indirect levy on alcoholic beverages. This was, in essence, a tax on the poor, he claimed. Since this tax accounted for two-fifths of the state's total revenues, then the disagreeable truth was that Russian financial stability, and, hence, its economic growth, depended on the drinking capacity of the poor. Russia's inequitable tax system, however, had reached its limits, Leroy-Beaulieu warned, since little more could be squeezed from the peasantry, which formed the great bulk of the population.¹⁰

¹⁰"Les finances I. Le budget, le régime fiscal et le revenu," *Ibid.*, XVIII, 3 (1 Dec. 1876), 851.

Revenue was raised from indirect taxes on a number of consumer items such as salt, matches, alcohol, tobacco, and kerosene. Under Finance Minister Nikolai Khristianovich Bunge (1882-1886) the tax on salt was discontinued and the "soul tax" abolished. At the request of Alexander III, Finance Minister Sergei Witte (1892-1903) established a

The most compelling economic question for these four contributors was whether Russia would adopt the correct remedies for its financial weaknesses. Since the eighteenth century, Russia had used an abundant production of paper money to cover state deficits, and especially those created by warfare. Because of this past record, Russian willingness to forego such an easy solution to its financial problems was greeted with skepticism by contributors to the Revue. Despite a lack of confidence in Russia's willingness to adopt serious taxing and monetary reforms, the contributors vigorously insisted on Russian self-control in monetary policies. For example, Wolowski declared, "...Russia must completely renounce using the multiplication of paper money as a financial resource of government."¹¹

state monopoly on the sale of alcoholic beverages. The original purpose of this monopoly was to control drunkenness, but it also worked to increase government revenues. The state monopoly was abolished by Nicolas II in 1914.

¹¹ Ibid., XLIX, 2 (15 Jan. 1864), 447.

Finance Minister Mikhail Khristoforovich Reutern (1862-1878) attempted to re-establish the convertibility of the ruble, which had been suspended since 1858. This experiment ended in failure; in November 1863 convertibility was once more suspended. It was not until 1897 that Russian paper currency once again became exchangeable for bullion.

During the period Reutern served as Finance Minister, the revenues of the Russian government never covered expenditures. Consequently, he borrowed heavily, both from domestic lenders and from abroad, to meet the deficit. From 1866-1875, for instance, Russia accumulated

Later, during Russia's preparations for war with Turkey in the 1870's, Leroy-Beaulieu was stirred to denounce Russia's "ingrained habit" of using paper money as a forced loan during times of crisis. He feared that this tradition would reassert itself in the coming conflict, thus destroying two decades of patient work in establishing financial stability within Russia. It would be far better, Leroy-Beaulieu thought, for Russia to forego its ambitions in the Balkans rather than risk financial disaster. The financial chaos resulting from a war with Turkey, he warned, might retard the economic growth of the country by ten or even fifteen years.¹²

Such fears of Russian financial irresponsibility were not unfounded; Russia turned to the production of

a foreign debt of one billion rubles. While such loans allowed Russia to keep its bullion reserves intact, at the same time they opened the way for the "increasing influence of foreign creditors over Russia's finances." T. H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia, 16.

Reutern knew that Russia, if it were to continue obtaining foreign loans, must keep up some appearance of financial solidity. To this end, he began the practice of dividing the budget into two parts, one for regular and one for extraordinary expenses. In this way, he could disguise the deficit.

Wolowski, in his article in the Revue, implied that the budget figures prepared by Reutern might not be entirely correct. As well, he deplored Reutern's use of loans to cover the state deficit. Revue, XLIX, 2 (15 Jan. 1864), 452.

¹²"Les finances II. Les dépenses, la dette et le papier-monnaie," Ibid., XIX, 3 (1 Jan. 1877), 160.

paper money during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 as one means of financing that war. This fresh example of Russian monetary waywardness evoked a strong response from G. Valbert, who deplored the depreciation of Russia's "billions of paper rubles" and the almost total curtailment of Russia's foreign credit. Valbert called for immediate financial reform, adding a note of urgency by linking the monetary crisis to the current political crisis within Russia.¹³

On this gloomy note of political crisis and financial chaos, the Revue des Deux Mondes ended its attention to Russian economic affairs until the decade of the 1890's. Dissatisfaction with Russia's response to its economic and financial problems, then, characterized articles appearing in the Revue from 1862, when Charles de Mazade wrote, "Financial reforms in Russia! This is, in effect, a grand phrase which has always resounded as a fanfare to inaugurate the latest loan negotiated in Europe."¹⁴ Such dissatisfaction prompted contributors to direct many of their observations and suggestions to their Russian readers, in the hope of influencing some change in Russia's financial attitudes. Both of these characteristics dis-

¹³Ibid., XXX, 3 (1 June 1879), 710-711. See above
page 45.

¹⁴Ibid., XXXIX, 2 (15 June 1862), 789.

appeared during the 1890's as contributors revealed a greater confidence in Russia's ability to manage its own economic affairs.

1888-1914

After 1887, when Bismarck closed the Berlin bond market to the Russian government, Paris became the principal market for large Russian issues. Later, the French government was to use this circumstance as a lever to move the Russian government toward a formal alliance.

This came about when an internal economic crisis in Russia in 1891-1892 threatened to drain that country of its gold reserves, thus delaying, once again, the convertibility of the ruble. The gold reserves had been augmented by Finance Minister Ivan Alekseevich Vyshnegradskii (1887-1892) through his program of maintaining a favorable balance of trade. He offset the import costs of machinery and manufactured goods by raising the level of exports, principally of grains and sugar. However, the increase in grain exports was artificial; that is, the peasants had been forced to sell all of their grain, even the reserves needed for seed, in order to make up the larger shipments to foreign markets. This government policy led to catastrophe when a widespread crop failure was followed by famine and cholera.

Efforts made by the Russian government during this crisis to protect the Russian gold reserves met with little success. When Russia attempted to secure an emergency loan in Paris, the banking house of Rothchild refused to participate in the issue. The reason given by the Rothchilds for this action was the recent expulsion of the Jews from Moscow and St. Petersburg. In its turn, the French government, hoping to exert pressure on Alexander III, refrained from using its influence to secure the loan. Consequently, the loan failed. This demonstration of Russian economic vulnerability was not wasted on Alexander III who promptly accelerated negotiations for an alliance with France.¹⁵

In Russia, the economic crisis caused a change at the Ministry of Finance. Vyshnegradskii was replaced by Sergei Witte, who, after a long career in railroading, had served briefly as Minister of Communications. With this change, a new era began in the development of the Russian economy.

Historian T. H. Von Laue said of Witte that he "designed the first modern experiment in speeding up the economic development of a backward country."¹⁶

¹⁵See W. L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 179; also T. H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia, 30-32.

¹⁶Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia, 119.

The "Witte system" was based on Witte's conviction that Russia could best develop its natural resources through the encouragement of heavy industry and railroad building. He was certain that this program would give Russia a solid industrial foundation from which prosperity would spread throughout the whole of Russian society. Other elements in this "system" were a reliance on private initiative (sometimes more honored in the breach than in practice), deficit financing, and high protective tariffs.¹⁷

In articles on Russian economic affairs published during the Witte period, contributors to the Revue were more interested in the results of the "Witte system" than in its originator. Rather than discussing Witte's contributions to the re-making of the Russian economy, writers for the Revue sought to describe either the evidences of economic progress or the socio-economic changes occurring in Russia.

Such seeming neglect of so important a figure in Russian economic affairs was probably not intentional.¹⁸

¹⁷The Tariff of 1891 had given Russia the highest tariffs of any place in the world at the time. This measure was part of Vyshnegradskii's program of establishing a favorable balance of trade.

¹⁸Witte was not entirely neglected. Both Raphaël-Georges Levy and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu quoted passages from Witte's budget reports. Levy, "Les finances russes; le budget et le rouble," Revue, CXXX, 4 (1 July 1895), 61; Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les transformations sociales de la Russie contemporaine," CXLII, 4 (1 Aug. 1879), 486.

Rather, inattention to Witte himself was possibly connected with certain changes which characterized the writings of contributors in this new period. After 1888, contributors directed themselves more toward their readers in France. This was especially true of discussions on Russian industrialization, which tended to reflect a concern for French investment interests in Russia. Thus, the details of Russian mining, manufacturing, and railroad construction, as well as improvements in Russia's finances, were given close scrutiny.¹⁹ France's strategic and military requirements, too, were of some influence on contributors, who lent support to the Franco-Russian Alliance with reassuring evidences of Russian economic and financial soundness.

However, there were certain exceptions to this general trend of emphasizing French interests. Some contributors studied matters which had only an indirect bearing on French investments or national security. For example, at any early date attention centered on the socio-economic consequences of Russia's effort to become a modern indus-

¹⁹Some articles appear to have been written especially for the French investor in Russian bonds and securities. This tendency can be seen in Levy's article cited above and in another by the same author, "Finances de guerre, Russie et Japon," Ibid., XXII, 5 (1 July 1904), 113-138. As well, an article by Georges d'Avenel included much information of interest to the French investor. "La fortune de la Russie," Ibid., XLIV, 5 (15 Apr. 1908), 769-807.

trial state. In this connection, and not surprisingly, contributors dealt with the role of the peasant in this new society. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and T. Bentzon contributed articles in which they revealed a deep concern for the well-being of the ordinary Russian as he made his transition from the role of a rural peasant to that of an urban worker.²⁰

The construction of new factories, mines, and railroads, Bentzon said, had begun the process of changing a vast agricultural society into a modern industrial state. The very quality of life in Russia was changing since railroads had made close neighbors of people who lived in remote areas, while factory work in the winter was being replaced by permanent employment in industries protected by a high tariff wall. The day was coming, the author thought, when no one would have time to observe the traditional work schedule of working in the factories for part of the year and cultivating the fields during the other months.²¹

Both Leroy-Beaulieu and Bentzon believed that the mir was disappearing from rural Russia. This change, they felt, was not an unmixed blessing for the peasant since

²⁰Leroy-Beaulieu, Ibid., CXLII, 4 (1 Aug. 1897), 481-506; Bentzon, "En Russie; industries de village," Ibid., XIII, 5 (15 Feb. 1903), 878-905.

²¹Ibid., XIII, 5 (15 Feb. 1903), 879.

the rural commune had always afforded some measure of social and economic protection for him. Without the commune, these writers feared, the Russian peasant would be exposed to the full horrors of rapid and indiscriminate urbanization and industrialization.

The possibility of some solutions to the problems of protecting the welfare of industrial workers in Russia were suggested by both Leroy-Beaulieu and Bentzon. For instance, Leroy-Beaulieu thought that a paternalistic program of regulations already begun by the Russian government might offer protection to the worker if this program were further expanded.²² Bentzon, on the other hand, would have retained some features of the old rural life in order to provide a cushion against the poverty and isolation of urban living. The traditional village folk industries, he felt, should be encouraged to continue in order to enrich peasant life, both psychologically and financially.²³

After Bentzon's article appeared in 1903, the perspective on peasant problems in Russia underwent a decided change in the Revue. Interest in the Russian peasant continued, but it was transmuted from sympathy with his plight to an aggressive support of the Russian government's

²²Ibid., CXLII, 4 (1 Aug. 1897), 498.

²³Ibid., XIII, 5 (15 Feb. 1903), 898.

policies which aimed at a rapid dissolution of the mir.²⁴

The agrarian program of Peter Stolypin, while Minister of the Interior, was designed to replace the old Russian system of communal agriculture with small, independent homesteads.²⁵ Agrarian commissions established by the government began the task of surveying and re-partitioning communal lands into individual plots even before the peasant rebellions of 1905-1907 were fully repressed.

In an article published by the Revue in 1908, the views on peasant problems expressed by M. le vicomte Georges d'Avenel provided a sharp contrast with the earlier ideas

²⁴In 1902, Witte had advocated the abolition of the mir. However, he was unable to obtain approval for agrarian reforms since his plan was opposed by V. K. Plehve, then Minister of the Interior, and Nicolas II. Witte's reason for this proposal was the increasing impoverishment of the peasantry, which, in turn, had affected Russian economic development. The stagnation of rural markets was one of the factors in the industrial depression which began in Russia in 1898. By 1900, Russian industry was suffering badly from over-production. Several large firms went into bankruptcy. Russia's economy was not to recover completely from the effects of this setback until after the Revolution of 1905.

None of the contributors to the Revue made any mention of this depression.

²⁵Stolypin was Minister of the Interior in 1906. He also served as Prime Minister from 1906-1911.

The peasant reform of 1906 was a series of laws; the establishment of Land Organization Commissions (17 March), liberalization of peasant rights (18 October), and regulations on the tenure and re-allocation of peasant allotment lands (22 November). This last law was extended in 1911, making re-partition possible without the request of individual members of a commune.

expressed by Leroy-Beaulieu and Bentzon. Rather than concerning himself with the social effects of industrialization, d'Avenel fixed his attention on the improvement of Russia's productive capacity. Both industry and agriculture, he asserted, suffered from sharing the same pool of workers. To continue this tradition would be to continue that "special Russian species of half ploughman, half worker, always theoretically attached to the land even while resident in the cities, and who, thus, absents himself from fields and factory to the detriment of agriculture and industry."²⁶

The source of this detrimental division of the work year appeared to be the village commune, d'Avenel thought, and he firmly supported the government's new agrarian program. While admitting that this reform was meeting some resistance from the peasant, he explained that such obstructionism was a characteristic of primitive peoples. "Everywhere, primitive men have, by a sort of animal instinct, fought long against individual property; everywhere, one sees them defend themselves and drive it back." But, he argued, civilization had imposed individual ownership on such groups because "civilization was not possible without it."²⁷ However, Russia's "colossal and unprece-

²⁶ Ibid., XLIV, 5 (15 Apr. 1908), 801.

²⁷ Ibid., 799.

dented effort" to change the organization of its agriculture could only benefit that country, he insisted.²⁸

Economist A. A. Mokeevsky, in an article published in 1912, was more interested in the agricultural consequences of the new form. His attack on the mir, however, was as vigorous as that of d'Avenel. So long as the old commune continued to exist, Mokeevsky warned, it would act as a damper on Russian agricultural progress since it conserved the old methods of tilling the soil and "destroyed all attempts at innovation."²⁹ Mokeevsky reminded his readers that on 19 February 1861 the Russian peasant has been given his freedom but this act had not led to the prosperity and well-being of the peasant since he was still tied to the commune. "The present reform," he wrote, "is the crowning of the work undertaken, a half-century ago, at the moment of emancipation..."³⁰

Stolypin's agrarian reforms were seen in the same light by Raphaël-Georges Levy in 1914. When Alexander II distributed lands to the freed serfs in 1861, Levy said, he left the land undivided; Nicolas II, the present tsar,

²⁸Ibid., 801.

²⁹"La réforme agraire en Russie," Ibid., VII, 6 (15 Jan. 1912), 425.

³⁰Ibid., 420.

had realized the "second part of the reform" by dividing the collective lands into individual lots.³¹ Levy was pleased, too, that the Russian treasury had benefited from the distribution of a portion of the state lands to the peasants who traditionally tilled them. This kind of transaction, he felt, had added eight million roubles to the treasury by 1912, and this sum, in turn, had been sent to the reserve fund to aid in the implementation of the agrarian reform.³²

Contributors to the Revue, then, gave strong support to twentieth-century agrarian reforms in Russia. Mokeevsky, especially, presented detailed and convincing argument for the advantages of individual ownership of land in Russia. However, this support for the government position entailed a break with such earlier writers as Leroy-Beaulieu and Bentzon, who understood peasant problems in terms of the burdens placed on the rural population by socio-economic changes. In a sense, the contributors after 1903 ignored the problems created by such changes in order to concentrate on the long-range benefits to be gained by the Russian economy.

While there were some differences in outlook in

³¹"La situation économique et financière de la Russie," Ibid., XXIV, 6 (1 Nov. 1914), 41.

³²Ibid., 41.

regard to changes occurring in agrarian affairs, it is important to note that they had far greater areas of agreement in terms of the Russian economy as a whole. An outspoken confidence in the ability of the Russian government to overcome the old obstacles to economic progress now replaced the former uneasiness with which contributors had viewed Russian economic affairs during the 1860's and 1870's. Both Leroy-Beaulieu and Bentzon, for instance, clearly expected industrialization to continue as a permanent feature of Russian economic affairs. Leroy-Beaulieu contended that "However artificial its origins, the industrial evolution of Russia is an historic fact which will endure."³³ The future of industry in Russia was secure, he thought, because it was "a systematic effort, pursued with constancy by a strong and persevering power."³⁴

The confidence thus shown in Russia's economic future did not falter even in the face of industrial unrest and systematic political assassinations which occurred in 1905-1907. In 1908, d'Avenel insisted that the "smoke of the bombs" obscured the progress Russia had made in its economic affairs. Indeed, he claimed that the very cause of the political crisis then occurring in

³³Ibid., CXLII, 4 (1 Aug. 1897), 486.

³⁴Ibid., 485.

Russia was the economic growth which that country had achieved. In underdeveloped Russia, just as in rich and prosperous France, "The worker, once he is treated better, becomes intractable."³⁵

As these examples show, Russia's program of rapid industrialization was an important source for the new confidence displayed by contributors to the Revue. Other factors, however, were also at work; the Franco-Russian Alliance and heavy French investments in Russia were influential in forming the views of contributors during this period.³⁶ These latter influences can be seen in an

³⁵Ibid., XLIV, 5 (15 Apr. 1908), 806.

Information on the economic development of Russia during the period 1905-1914 can be found in Margaret Miller's book, The Economic Development of Russia 1905-1914; with Special Reference to Trade, Industry, and Finance (London, 1967. Orig. pub. London, 1926).

³⁶For information on French investments in Russian private enterprise, see Olga Crisp, "French Investments in Russian Joint-Stock Companies, 1894-1914," Business History, II, 1 (June 1960), 75-90; also "Some Problems of French Investment in Russian Joint-Stock Companies, 1894-1914," The Slavonic and East European Review, XXXV, 84 (Dec. 1956), 223-240. A book which is of some value in understanding the connections between foreign investments and Russian industrial growth is John P. McKay's Pioneers for Profit; Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization 1885-1913 (Chicago, 1970).

Herbert Feis gives some information on the French investor in his Europe; The World's Banker 1870-1914. After the 1860's, the typical French investor came from the petite bourgeoisie. This investor preferred to put his savings into bonds sold by foreign governments because of the steady (if often low) interest rates.

French banking practices are discussed by Rondo E. Cameron in his France and the Economic Development of Europe 1800-1914 (Princeton, 1961).

article by Raphaël-Georges Levy published in 1895. By that year, Levy said, France had become the chief creditor of "our friends of the North," with six or seven milliards (billions) of francs invested in Russian bonds and securities.³⁷ In his view, French capital was being used by Russia to accelerate the exploitation of its natural resources. From 1892, nine French companies, with over sixteen million francs of working capital, had been authorized to begin mining and other enterprises inside Russia.³⁸ Thus, French money was not being used exclusively as a passive form of investment in revenue-producing bonds and securities.

Furthermore, a considerable portion of French capital formerly invested in Russian government bonds had been re-invested in the expanding system of railroads, and this, Levy felt, would, in turn, create future wealth for Russia. He was especially struck by the potential benefits to Russia of the Trans-Siberian Railway, then under construction. "The achievement of this grandiose work," Levy thought, "...will mark a step in the conquest of the globe for civilization."³⁹

In 1908, d'Avenel also saw Russia's productive use

³⁷"Les finances Russes, le budget et le rouble," Revue, CXXX, 4 (1 July 1895), 59.

³⁸Ibid., 60.

³⁹Ibid., 76.

of French investment capital as a reassuring feature of Russian economic affairs. Like Levy, he emphasized Russia's progress in building railroads, being especially impressed by the 44,000 kilometers of rail lines laid in Russia by 1908.⁴⁰

At the time d'Avenel published his article on Russian economic affairs, such reassuring statistics were of great importance for the French investor. His savings were threatened by the prolonged political and financial crisis which had shaken Russia in 1905-1907. While little news of these events had filtered into the daily and weekly press of France at the time of their occurrence, enough information had been published to cause public speculation on the future of the monarchy in Russia, and, hence, of French investments.⁴¹

Quite possibly, though, most Frenchmen never understood the intimate ties between French diplomacy and the Russian crisis. After the Russian revolution of 1905, when the Russian government found itself on the brink of bankruptcy, the French government seized the opportunity to gain its own diplomatic goals. By offering to aid Russia in procuring a massive loan of 2,250 billion francs

⁴⁰Ibid., XLIV, 5 (15 Apr. 1908), 780.

⁴¹See Chapter II, page 79.

from a consortium of French, British, Austrian, Dutch, and Russian banks, France acquired a lever to use in her diplomatic affairs. With this weapon, France forced Russia to establish friendlier relations with Great Britain. France was thus relieved of the necessity to choose between her ally Russia and her new friend Great Britain. A secondary, but no less important, consideration for the French government in the assistance it gave Russia in the matter of this loan was the protection it would provide for the six billion francs of French savings which had been invested in Russian securities from 1888 to 1904.⁴²

Perhaps for similar reasons, d'Avenel, in 1908, omitted any reference to Russia's most recent financial difficulties, other than by an indirect reference to the 1906 loan. Although French bankers had taken the largest share of this loan, contracting for over 1,200,000,000 francs, d'Avenel's treatment of this event was surprisingly casual. While discussing the size of the Russian national debt, which in 1908 had climbed to 9,800,000,000 rubles, he remarked that two billion of this sum had been to the total debt because of the recent war with Japan.⁴³

⁴²For a concise treatment of the events surrounding the 1906 loan to Russia, see Olga Crisp, "The Russian Liberals and the 1906 Anglo-French Loan to Russia," The Slavonic and East European Review (London), XXXIX, 93 (June 1961), 497-511.

⁴³Revue, XLIV, 5 (15 Apr. 1908), 779.

While making no mention of the recent period of grave financial instability for Russia, he did not ignore France's particular interest in Russian economic affairs. These were of special importance to French citizens, he said, because Frenchmen "occupied the first rank among the holders of Russian securities abroad."⁴⁴ The French, he added, held nine billions in Russian securities while ten billion more were divided among Germany, England, Holland, and other countries. Meanwhile, interest payments received by French investors from the Russian treasury had risen to 335 million francs a year by 1908.⁴⁵

In essence, d'Avenel expressed faith in Russian economic progress after 1905 in spite of the many difficulties facing that country. Furthermore, he indicated a sharp awareness of the relationship between French investments and Russian industrial progress. These same qualities were demonstrated with even greater clarity in economist Levy's discussions of Russia's new monetary stability, the traditional stumbling block in Russian economic affairs.

Levy noted that since 1888 Russia had struggled to stabilize its currency in order to back the paper ruble with specie. He expected Russia to achieve a metal standard in the near future.⁴⁶ This event, he wrote, would

⁴⁴Ibid., 780.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶It was achieved in 1897.

be "the crowning of the work of financial restoration undertaken in 1888, pursued with such success by Alexander III and Nicolas II; France has aided and followed this development with an interest that needs no explanation."⁴⁷

However, Levy feared the possibility that Russia might return to the production of paper money during some future time of crisis, since the Russian financial structure offered no restraints on the power of the autocracy to produce unlimited amounts of money.⁴⁸ By 1904, Levy was pleased that the Russian government had not turned to this expedient during the Russo-Japanese War. Instead, Russia had looked to the Paris money market, securing from French bankers a five-year loan of 800 million francs at five percent. In this way, Levy said, Russia had protected its gold reserves.⁴⁹

Levy's confidence in Russia's management of its monetary affairs rose even higher in 1914, just after the beginning of the First World War, when he asserted that the Russian treasury had been a model of responsible financial behavior, with treasury officials keeping the

⁴⁷Ibid., CXXX, 4 (1 July 1895), 92.

⁴⁸Ibid., 88.

⁴⁹Ibid., "Finances de guerre, Russie et Japon," XXII, 5 (1 July 1904), 125.

amount of notes in circulation well below the level of funds deposited in the State Bank. While the total amount of paper money had risen over the past months, Levy thought that it was still within the bounds of safety. The ruble, he emphasized, would still be based on gold when the European money markets were able to reopen.⁵⁰ In summing up Russia's monetary situation, Levy was moved to say that Russian "gold reserves are equal to those of the Bank of France; the solidity of the Russian banknote is comparable to that of the French note."⁵¹

Levy was equally enthusiastic when he surveyed the current soundness and future strength of the Russian economy as a whole. His general conclusions, in fact, might serve as an example of the pitfalls waiting for those who attempt economic prediction. "The impression that comes from this examination of the Russian economic situation," he wrote, "is most cheering. One could compare it to the impression made by its armies - numerous, calm, unyieldingwe can envision the financial future, on the banks of the Neva, with as much serenity as the military future. The economic armament of our allies cedes nothing to that of its troops."⁵²

⁵⁰Ibid., XIV, 6 (1 Nov. 1914), 38.

⁵¹Ibid., 49.

⁵²Ibid.

This article by Levy was the last study on tsarist economic affairs to be published by the Revue des Deux Mondes. In 1919, after war, revolution, and civil war had created an entirely new context for Russian economic affairs, the Revue published a bitter appraisal by Baron Boris E. Nolde of Russia's new political and economic situation.⁵³

Nolde had personal reasons for his dismay at the recent turn of events in rural Russia, since he came from a gentry family with extensive rural holdings. His family was stripped of its land as a result of the resolution adopted by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 8 November 1917 (26 October, O. S.); all land was nationalized and plans instituted for its distribution among the peasants. Lenin's land law, Nolde declared, was "an invitation to pillage from a man who knows nothing about legislation....his decree is a revolutionary action pure and simple."⁵⁴ Russia was an agricultural country, Nolde explained, so that the results of the land law were especially "terrible." Not only did the law destroy production, but it created chaos, since it "set millions of men into motion."⁵⁵

⁵³"La règne de Lénine," Ibid., LIV, 6 (15 Nov. 1919), 277-313.

⁵⁴Ibid., 289.

⁵⁵Ibid., 290.

The nationalization of industry was another source of the chaos through which Russia was passing Nolde asserted. Nationalization had created a scarcity of goods, workers, merchants and managers. On the other hand, there was a sharp increase in the number of functionaries in the government bureaus. "The spirit of organization has never been the strength of the Russian character," Nolde declared, and the Bolshevik efforts to turn the whole country into a gigantic commune was not only against Russian nature, but against human nature.⁵⁶ Since each factory depended on production in other branches of industry, production in Russia was at a standstill, with workers returning to their villages. The men who remained in the cities, Nolde said, became communist officials or joined the Red Army.⁵⁷ As a consequence of this breakdown in production and distribution, clandestine commerce flourished with the "bagman" becoming the symbol of Russian commercial life.⁵⁸

Nolde, a dispossessed Russian, could not, of course, view Russia with the confidence and optimism which characterized opinions of French contributors to the Revue from 1888-1914. However, of considerable interest was

⁵⁶Ibid., 300.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., 302.

his explanation for the survival of the Bolshevik experiment in Russia. "In other countries," he wrote, "two years of applied Bolshevism would be economically impossible; catastrophe would follow in about two months. What makes the ultra-Marxist experience possible with us is the backward state of our economic development."⁵⁹

It should be noted that any real assessment of Nolde's judgment of the state of Russia's economy cannot be made. Evidence for the period after 1917 must remain inconclusive, since the time sequence for this thesis imposes certain limitations. Thus, consideration of the Communist plans for industrialization following the October Revolution -- which were understandably delayed by the effect of the Civil War and the Allied Intervention until after 1921 -- is a matter which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, Nolde's underlying assumptions on the state of Russia's economy before the Revolutions of 1917 are of some interest for this thesis. His depressing view of the progress made by Russia in its effort to become a modern, industrialized state throws into sharp relief the optimism of earlier contributors.

As early as 1897, Leroy-Beaulieu presented Russia as a country already past the pre-industrial level, where

⁵⁹Ibid., 303.

a steady program of industrialization had created permanent socio-economic changes. Other contributors, such as Bentzon and d'Avenel, continued this trend in the twentieth century. Nor were such French attitudes entirely due to the influence of French investments in Russia; contributors presented page after page of facts to show Russia's progress toward its goal of modernization. Furthermore, contributors were aware of the shortcomings of Russia's program of industrialization. Indeed, there were many comments throughout their articles on the need for greater exertions.

Nolde, however, saw Russia's economy in a different light; it was so primitive that the Bolshevik experiment could not damage it. By placing Russia outside that group of countries in which the cessation of industrial production and commercial traffic would cause irreparable harm, Nolde unintentionally undermined one of the bases of that confidence so freely exhibited by contributors during the period 1888-1914.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This inquiry would appear to have borne fruit. From the evidence presented here, one could say that the establishment of closer economic and diplomatic ties between France and Russia had a discernable impact on attitudes of contributors to the Revue des Deux Mondes toward Russian economic, social, and political affairs. As well, the reaction of contributors to the disruption of those ties after 1917 was illuminating. Their horrified response was a graphic demonstration of the importance attached to this relationship during the preceding years.

On point after point, the attitudes exhibited by contributors during the years of the Franco-Russian Alliance marked a break with previous viewpoints. Among the more important changes was a lessening attention to political reform in Russia. By contrast, during the era of Great Reforms, contributors had often been attracted to the possibilities of political transformation. Indeed, the very introduction of social reforms had been seized upon as an opportunity to advocate the creation in Russia of a governmental structure incorporating western

liberal ideals.

However, the advocacy of a program of political reforms all but disappeared after 1881. While, before the First World War, there were occasional mild protests against the more obvious absurdities of the autocratic system, in general, contributors did not call for changes in the governmental structure of Russia. The outstanding exception to the muted discussion of Russian political reforms was an article by Leroy-Beaulieu in 1907 in which he stoutly defended Russia's new representative body, the Duma, from governmental efforts to undermine that institution.¹

On yet another point, the opinions expressed in Leroy-Beaulieu's almost anachronistic article contrasted with those of other contributors during this period. Since 1888, the writings of most contributors had shown a steadily growing support for the Russian government. This change had become well-established by 1907. Thus, Leroy-Beaulieu's severe chastisement of the tsarist regime in that year seemed a throwback to earlier periods, when contributors had often been at odds with the policies and actions of the Russian government. In fact, the whole tenor of the article by Leroy-Beaulieu revived memories

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Entre deux rives; la Russie devant la troisième douma," Revue, XLI, 5 (15 Sept. 1907).

of the abuse heaped upon government officials and institutions by some of the earlier writers.

Perhaps the most noticeable change in contributor's attitudes after 1888 was the adoption of an optimistic view of Russian domestic affairs. The cynicism and severe disappointment shown by earlier contributors gave way to an optimism that sometimes belied the actual situation in Russia. For example, even amid the "smoke of the bombs" in the revolutionary period after 1905, contributors were able to see a bright future for tsarist Russia.² While this cheerful view of tsarist affairs continued until 1917, it reached its apogee in 1914 with an article by Raphaël-Georges Levy in which he described in glowing terms the soundness of the Russian economy, the Russian army, and the Russian spirit of unity.³

Besides these changes in the views of contributors, one other difference should be noted. After 1888, the Revue itself appears to have developed a newer policy toward the reporting of political, social, and economic events within Russia. This fresh treatment of Russian affairs could be described as the avoidance of any news

²G. d'Avenel, "La fortune de la Russie," Ibid., XLIV, 5 (15 Apr. 1908), 806.

³R.G. Levy, "La situation économique et financière de la Russie," Ibid., XVIV, 6 (1 Nov. 1914).

which might place the tsarist government in an unfavorable light. There are indications of this new policy in both the frequency and content of articles on Russia published after 1888.

Just as in the time of Great Reforms, after 1888 there were abundant opportunities for the discussion of Russian affairs. Yet, the number of articles which touched on Russian political, social, and economic events was not as great as in the earlier period. As well, there was a sharp decline during the decade 1904 through 1913 of articles concerned with any aspect of Russian life. During the preceeding ten years, the Revue had published 49 articles on Russia; from 1904-1913, only 28 appeared. When one considers that in the years 1914-1920 the Revue published a total of 34 articles on Russian affairs, the decline in the decade after 1904 appears as an indication of a definite policy.

Of even more importance was the Revue's silence on certain events within Russia. Neither the terrible famine of 1891-1892 nor the depression of the first years of the new century were mentioned in articles appearing in the Revue. As well, the political turmoil of the years 1905-1907 was discussed only after the significance of these events had passed. This partial or complete silence on matters which might embarrass the Russian government

probably denotes a policy of support for the tsarist regime. The impression that this was indeed an expression of a policy, rather than being merely coincidental, is strengthened when one considers the increasing number of articles which either defended the tsarist government or gave praise to its actions and policies.

The reasons for such a policy are not hard to find. Contributors themselves pointed to the increasing level of French investments in Russia. Moreover, contributor's concern for French national security was evident. Not only can it be seen in the passing remarks made by some contributors but also in the content of certain articles, especially those published during the period of the Russo-Japanese War and during the first years of the First World War.

Further confirmation that French interests were the basis for the Revue's policy toward Russian affairs throughout the years of the Franco-Russian Alliance came in the period after 1917. The threatened rupture of the Alliance produced another change in the attitudes of contributors. As well, after the break occurred, the journal itself published a statement of its own revised policy toward Russia.

This newer attitude was one of hostility toward any great changes, either in Russia's internal affairs or in the relationship between France and Russia. Not only

contributors but the Revue des Deux Mondes was implacably opposed to a Bolshevik regime in Russia. The actual seizure of power by this group and the subsequent actions taken by the Soviet government aroused a furious protest within the Revue.

Certainly we can see in these attitudes strong evidence that the Revue's policy toward Russia in the years 1917-1920 had its source in the protection of French interests. However, this does not mean that other feelings were not present in the attitudes assumed during these years. The strong hostility toward the Bolsheviks and the actions of the Soviet government might perhaps be evidence of a mere wish for the more settled times before 1917 or the expression of an ideological conflict with Communist doctrine. While these feelings may have played an important part in the formation of views on Russian affairs, the more probable explanation is the damage to French interests. The Soviet withdrawal from the war as well as the loss of French investments in Russia after the confiscation of foreign properties and the repudiation of foreign debts by the Soviets created a deep cleavage between the two countries. Such a serious rupture of normal relations could not be overlooked by a distinguished French journal.

It can be seen, then, that French economic and

strategic interests influenced the policy of the Revue des Deux Mondes toward Russian political and economic affairs during the whole period 1888-1920. Furthermore, attitudes of contributors toward Russian affairs appear to have been deeply influenced by these same considerations. Thus, the advent of large-scale investments of French capital in Russian bonds and securities and the beginning of negotiations for a Franco-Russian Alliance may be seen as a turning point for the Revue and its contributors. After this time, changes occurring in the policies of the journal or in the views of contributors were closely connected to the new relationship between France and Russia.

Interestingly, after that bond was broken, there was evidence of a reversion to the attitudes displayed by contributors during the period 1855-1861. At that time, Russia was considered a remote and barbaric state which had little in common with the advanced countries of western Europe. This Russian isolation from the western European community of nations returned after the October Revolution. And, in turn, this new situation was reflected in the articles published by the Revue.

To understand the parallel with attitudes expressed in the earlier time, one has only to look at the similar-

ties between the views of Baron Nolde on the nature of the new Russian government and the opinions of the Russian government held by Auguste Picard in 1855. In that year, Picard saw the tsars as ruthless men who acquired and kept power in Russia by means of brutal repression.⁴ In 1919, Nolde viewed Lenin and the Bolsheviks as despoilers of the Russian state, political opportunists who seized power through a cynical application of propaganda and force and kept this power through terrorist methods.⁵ In this one respect, then, the Revue des Deux Mondes had come full circle from 1855.

⁴A. Picard, "Le gouvernement des tsars et la société russe; la Russie sous les Romanof," ibid., XIII, 2 (1 Dec. 1855).

⁵B. Nolde, "Le règne de Lenine," ibid., LIV, 6 (15 Nov. 1919).

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Sources for a study of French attitudes toward other countries are varied. Police reports, especially those from the period of the Second Empire, the daily press, periodicals, diplomatic and consular reports, and memoirs have all been used for such studies. The Revue des Deux Mondes was chosen for this purpose both because of its reputation as a journal of intellectual and literary merit and because of its accessibility.

The reputation of the Revue was first built on the journal's publication of the literature of the Romantic period. This literary emphasis can still be seen in the Revue, which continues to publish the writings of French and foreign authors.

However, from the beginning of its publishing history, the Revue also has shown a strong interest in the geographic, social, economic, cultural, and political affairs of foreign peoples. The Revue, then, is a valuable source of information for studies such as this one, which seek to explore general trends in French attitudes toward other countries.

The memoirs cited in this study were used to illuminate certain events in Russia rather than to

illustrate French public opinion. Unfortunately, Georges M. Paléologue's diaries of the time he spent as French ambassador to St. Petersburg are of limited use, since he edited them before publication. Of far higher quality are the memoirs of Sir Bernard Pares and Paul N. Miliukov, both of which give many details of political affairs in tsarist Russia. John Reed's memoirs are perhaps the finest example of personal journalism published during this century. His book gives an unparalleled sense of drama and immediacy to the crucial events surrounding the Bolshevik coup of 1917.

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