A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE HARRIS COUNTY SUPPORTERS

OF GOVERNOR GEORGE C. WALLACE

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine whether (a) demographic characteristics, (b) political background characteristics, and/or (c) policy preferences could explain variations in political support for Wallace between 1968 and 1975. The primary data source for this study was a sample of former Wallace supporters in Harris County, Texas who were initially interviewed in 1968 and again in 1975. Additional data were obtained from the national surveys of the American electorate conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan.

The data generally indicated that the decline in support for Wallace between 1968 and 1975 could be attributed to the loss of college educated voters and those employed in more prestigious occupations. Respondents characterized by low feelings of relative deprivation were also more likely to prefer other candidates in 1975. Such demographic characteristics as age and sex had little explanatory value.

Independents were most likely to continue supporting Wallace, followed by Democrats and Republicans. Socialization patterns had little explanatory value, but evidence of past political activity was found to be negatively associated with continuing support for Wallace.

Respondents preferring less governmental enforcement of integration were more likely to continue supporting Wallace as were proponents of a strong, militaristic foreign policy stance, higher taxes for the wealthy, social welfare programs, and those expressing greater cynicism

toward Watergate related events. While the political and demographic characteristics of voters do affect levels of support, it was concluded that the success of the Wallace phenomenon was ultimately dependent upon a combination of favorable political and social circumstances.

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INTRODUCTION AND METHODS

In recent American electoral politics, the appeal of Governor
George C. Wallace stands out as a unique political phenomenon. Over
the past four presidential contests, Wallace has demonstrated an un-
paralleled ability to maintain a significant electoral following. He
captured a substantial number of votes in several of the 1964 and
1972 Democratic presidential primaries, received 13.5 million votes
as a third party candidate in 1968, and actively sought the Democratic
nomination for the presidency in 1976. These figures are particu-
larly interesting because they focus attention on Governor Wallace's
ability to maintain a substantial electoral following either within
the confines of the two-party system (i.e., the 1964, 1972, and 1976
presidential elections), or outside of it (e.g., the 1968 election).

The Wallace phenomenon has not suffered from a lack of attention,
either from social scientists or from political journalists. Unfor-
tunately, virtually all research efforts have centered on Governor
Wallace's third party bid for the presidency in 1968. The dynamics
of support -- i.e., what groups tend to support Wallace over time and
why -- have been largely unexplored. This study, albeit with limited
data, is intended as a partial corrective.

The major purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the
patterns of support for Governor George Wallace from 1968 to 1976.
This will be accomplished by examining, over time, the attitudes of
voters originally committed to Wallace. Of particular interest is

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the extent to which candidate loyalty is maintained or modified among persons of differing political, sociological, and demographic attributes. In this introductory chapter, the specific areas of investigation are discussed along with research setting, operationalization of variables, and sampling procedures. Also included is a discussion of the research design and the statistical techniques employed.

Research Objectives

This study will focus on three areas of investigation: (1) the relationships between the demographic and sociological characteristics of respondents and patterns of support for Wallace, (2) the relationship between political background characteristics and support for Wallace, and (3) the relationship between policy preferences and support for Wallace.

First, the impact of social status on political support for Governor Wallace is considered. Both static and dynamic indicators of status are employed in this study. Such factors as age, religious preference, and sex are constant but may retain an important residual influence on political beliefs and/or candidate loyalty. On the other hand, changing social circumstances produced by residential or occupational mobility and other factors may conceivably alter political beliefs. In addition to the standard socio-demographic variables, i.e., age, sex, occupation, religion, and the size of the community where the respondents were reared, two dynamic indices of status -- occupational mobility and relative deprivation change -- have been computed.

The second area of inquiry is an investigation of the effects of

policy preferences on political support. Two types of effects are considered. First, the stability of policy beliefs in economic, social welfare, and foreign policy issue areas is calculated for each individual. Patterns of support for Wallace among persons with stable policy beliefs would presumably differ from those with changing political views. Also considered are the reactions of Wallaceites to the political events. The Watergate crisis, President Nixon's visit to China, and the pardoning of Nixon by President Ford are incidents of sufficient importance to affect individual political beliefs and perceptions of various political leaders.

The final consideration involves the relationships between political factors and support. Two sets of factors are included. First, the impact of political behavior on candidate loyalty is considered. Relevant factors include political interest, prior experience in election campaigns or other political activities, and political knowledge. Also, the strength and direction of party identification in both 1968 and 1975 are examined.

Research Setting

The subjects of this study are individuals originally committed to the third party presidential candidacy of Governor George Wallace in 1968. The geographic orientation of this research is decidedly regional -- the responses of Wallace voters from the greater Houston area and from the eleven states of the confederacy are analyzed. This regional focus does not deny that Wallace's popularity was and is national in scope. It does, however, suggest that the main strength of his political support stems from his successful appeal to southern voters.

The primary analytical foci in this study are the Houston area voters who indicated an intention to support Governor Wallace in the 1968 election.[1] Additional data on southern voters were obtained from surveys conducted by the Center for Political Research of the University of Michigan in 1968 and 1972.[2] Any generalization presented on the basis of the results obtained from the Houston surveys would certainly gain additional plausibility from similar tendencies found among other southerners.

With the exception of a few sparsely populated counties in west Texas, the Houston area represents the westernmost finge of concentrated electoral strength for Governor Wallace in the United States. Voting patterns in the 1968 election indicate that east Texas counties, including those bordering Harris County to the north and the east, gave plurality of their votes to Governor Wallace. While the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, garnered a plurality of all votes east in Harris County, Wallace, nevertheless, captured a sizable proportion of the popular vote. His candidacy was well received in the northwestern and north central precincts of Harris County where his vote totals exceeded those obtained by candidates Nixon and Democrat Hubert Humphrey.

Of course, one cannot assume that Houston voters are necessarily representative of the larger universe of southern voters. Certain historical and cultural traditions are shared by Houstonians and southerners alike, but there are differences as well. The nature of these differences is illustrated by a brief comparison between the political environment of Houston and that of other southern locales.

States and cities (such as Houston) within the "peripheral South"

may be distinguished from the Deep South states (Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina) by a lesser emphasis on racial issues, particularly since World War II.[3]   In Texas, economic rather than racial issues have tended to dominate the political scene.[4] Since relatively few blacks reside in the "peripheral South," the social and political threats presented by a substantial bloc of newly enfranchised black voters are less evident.

Another distinguishing feature of urban areas within the peripheral South is the increasing electoral appeal of Republican party candidates.[5] This trend may, in large part, be attributed to the influx of business, white collar, and professional people opposed to the New Deal political philosophy that has dominated national politics since the 1930's. A glance at election results from past contests for national or statewide political offices indicates that Harris County (Houston) is indeed one of the most electorally congenial counties for Republican candidates throughout the South. Conversely, Republican gains in the Deep South have been relatively small, particularly in the "black belt" counties of the Deep South.[6]

Sampling Methods

The Houston sample consists of persons who attended the precinct conventions in May, 1968, and signed a petition to place Governor Wallace's name on the Texas ballot. In Texas, about 100,000 registered voters forewent participation in the party primaries to attend the American Independent Party convention. This figure includes approximately 19,000 voters in Harris County. This was the largest identifiable group indicating any intent to support Wallace's presidential candidacy. Additionally, this group could be easily identified

for sampling purposes since the names of those attending were a matter of public record. This groups was thus selected as an appropriate population for analysis.[7]

A sample of 206 persons was drawn from the population of Wallace supporters, and an attempt was made to interview this group. Of this group, contact was made with 128 individuals. Eighty-six interviews were completed for an overall response rate of 44 percent, or 67 percent of those contacted. The interviews were conducted the three-week period immediately preceding the 1968 presidential election, October 18 - November 5.

A follow-up questionnaire was administered to the same individuals during the spring and summer months of 1975. Most interviews were conducted by telephone (28), a lesser number were interviewed personally (20), and a very small number (4) responded to a mailed questionnaire. A total of 52 interviews were completed for a follow-up response rate of 60.5 percent.

The results of the second wave interview effort are presented in the following table.

Table 1. A Summary of Mortality Bias in the Second Wave of Interviews

	Number	% of Total
First Wave Respondents	86	100.0
Deceased	6	7.0
Completed Interviews	52	60.5
Individuals Contacted but Never Interviewed (Includes Those Who Delayed the Interview Several Times and Those Who Made Appointments but Did Not Keep Them)	8	9.3
Absolute Refusals	6	7.0
Moved or Could Not Be Located	14	16.3

Generally speaking, the follow-up response rate reported here compares favorably with other published studies with similar time lapse. A more critical question is whether the persons interviewed during the second wave reflect any serious biases with respect to the representation of various social, political, and demographic groups (see Table 2).

These figures generally indicate that the partisan and demographic characteristics of respondents interviewed during the second wave are not markedly different from the first wave casualties. When compared with the dropouts from the original study, the 1975 group slightly over-represents Republicans, Independents, the better educated, and persons employed in more prestigous occupations. Younger voters and Catholics are also disporportionately represented in the later survey.

The samples used by the Center for Political Research at the University of Michigan for the 1968 and 1972 election studies are a representative cross-section of voting age citizens living in private households in the contiguous United States. The sample consists of two parts. The first includes respondents chosen from the twelve largest metropolitan areas of the United States. The rest of the country was divided into 62 strata, each of which contained two or more primary sampling units. A primary sampling unit (consisting of a country of group of counties) was drawn from each stratum with probability proportional to its population (based on census figures). A total of 74 primary sampling units were drawn, and from each unit a selection procedure yielded a simple of private households. The selection of respondents from each household was accomplished by an objective procedure which allowed no substitutes. Not included within the sample were individuals living in group quarters (e.g., dormitories or barracks),

Table 2. Differences in Partisan and Demographic Characteristics
         of Respondents and Non-Respondents

	% of Persons Interviewed	% of Persons Not Interviewed
Sex		
Male	56%	59%
Female	44%	41%
Party Identification		
Republican	22%	17%
Independent	49%	40%
Democrat	29%	40%
Occupation Prestige		
Low	17%	13%
Medium	46%	60%
High	36%	27%
Education		
Grade School	17%	15%
High School	39%	65%
College	44%	21%
Religion		
Protestant	74%	76%
Catholic	7%	14%
Other	19%	11%
Age		
21-35	43%	39%
36-55	45%	36%
Over 55	12%	25%

institutional populations (e.g., prisons, homes for the elderly,
convents, etc), and persons with no place of residence. The sample is
representative of the four major regions of the United States (South,
North, East, and West) as well as the national electorate.[8]

This study includes only southern voters who reported voting for
Wallace in 1968. Similar criteria were employed to select respondents
from the 1972 CPR study, although voters had to rely on memory to
report their 1968 candidate choices. Since the proportion of Wallace
voters in the sample is roughly equivalent to the proportion of votes
garnered by Wallace in the 1968 election, it does not appear that
recall bias represents a serious problem. Since both surveys were
concerned with southern Wallace voters, one might expect similar pro-
portions of support to be drawn from social and demographic groups.
A comparative breakdown of the two samples is shown in Table 3.

The two samples are generally consistent, but there are some
striking dissimilarities. Nearly half of the 1972 Wallaceites are 35
years of age or less, while less than a third of the 1968 group fall
into this category. The 1972 respondents are also more frequently
employed in high prestige occupations and are better educated; this
may in part reflect the age differential assuming that contemporary
youth are more likely to finish high school than their predecessors.
The proportion of Republicans in the 1972 samples is also higher, a
fact that can probably be attributed to the absence of a major third
party bid by Governor Wallace and the successful courting of southern
voters by President Nixon.

The number of first wave interviews obtained in Harris County in
1968 is not sufficiently large to permit statistical inferences to the

Table 3. A Comparison of the Partisan and Demographic Characteristics
of Southern Wallace Voters in 1968 and 1972

	1968	1972
Sex		
Male	52%	47%
Female	48%	53%
Party		
Republican	6%	12%
Independent	40%	31%
Democrat	54%	57%
Occupational Prestige		
High	30%	40%
Medium	35%	34%
Low	35%	26%
Education		
Grade School	33%	24%
High School	45%	64%
College	22%	12%
Age		
21-35	28%	46%
36-55	42%	17%
56+	31%	37%
Religion		
Protestant	78%	77%
Fundamentalist	14%	13%
Catholic	8%	11%

larger population of Wallace sympathizers within the limits of acceptable sampling error. An additional problem is that certain social and demographic groups, i.e., younger voters, the better educated, etc., were overrepresented in the follow-up survey. The inclusion of CPR data from the 1968 and 1972 studies of the American electorate represents an attempt to compensate for these deficiencies.

If the attitudinal trends among Harris County Wallaceites are reinforced by those found within the southern electorate, the validity of these findings can be presented with greater confidence. Although the time span between the first and second wave of the Harris County sample (7 years) exceeds that of the CPR samples (4 years), both represent a substantial "cooling off" period from the acrimonious 1968 campaign.

However, the differential time span of the two surveys does present a problem of ascertaining the effects of Wallace's physical handicap on his political support base. Since the 1972 interviews were conducted five months after the attempted assassination of Wallace, it seems likely that his political support was inflated somewhat by public sympathy for his disability.[*] Conversely, by 1975, Wallace's handicap was clearly a political liability. In describing Wallace's failure to capture the 1976 Democratic presidential primaries in Florida and North Carolina, political commentators emphasized the importance of the so-called "wheel chair factor" which prevented him from engaging in the perpetual motion type of campaigning in which he had specialized

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[*] Gallup polls taken during February, 1972 and again in June, more than a month after the attempted assassination, showed a slight upsurge in popularity for Wallace among southern voters (20% in February to 27% in June).

before the shooting incident of May 15, 1972.[10]

Operationalization of Variables

The questionnaires administered to Houstonians in 1968 and 1975 yielded several types of information. Included were data pertaining to the social and political backgrounds of the respondents; scale items designed to tap attitudes and opinions toward governmental actors, policies, and institutions; self perception questions; and the level of political information. Both structured and unstructured questions were utilized, alghough the latter were used less extensively.[11] Similar kinds of information were gleaned from the CPR studies.

The dependent variable in this study is the level of political support for Governor George Wallace. The differing measures of political support utilized for Houston Wallaceites and southern followers of the Alabaman were necessitated by the absence of 1976 candidate preference questions in the 1972 CPA study.

In analyzing Houston supporters of Governor Wallace, the question of political support is closely tied to candidate preference in the 1968 and 1976 presidential elections and with the intensity of personal preference for Wallace in 1968. Two indices of support embracing the 1968 and 1976 presidential elections were calculated. The 1968 support index is derived from the following questions:

(1) As things look now, for whom do you intend to vote in the coming election?

(2) Right now, how strongly do you feel about your choice to vote for Wallace -- very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly at all?

If the respondent intended to vote for Wallace and felt at least

"fairly strongly" about the decision, a numerical value of 1 was as-
signed. If either or both of these conditions were not met, the re-
spondent was assigned a zero value. Individuals who did not respond to
either or both questions were excluded from the statistical analysis.

The 1976 support index is based on the responses of Houstonians to
the following questions?

(1) The following persons have been mentioned as possible pres-
idential candidates in 1976. Would you rank your top four
choices?

(2) If Governor Wallace leaves the Democratic party between now
and 1976, would you support his candidacy as the nominee of
a third party?

A numerical value of 1 was assigned to respondents willing to
back Wallace in either situation; all others were coded as zero.[11]

Since the 1972 CPR questionnaire did not include any questions
pertaining to candidate preference in 1976, support Wallace had to
be operationalized in a different way. The only measure of support
available in both the 1968 and 1972 studies is the thermometer scale.
In this measure, one's subjective feelings toward individual political
leaders (e.g., Wallace) are assessed by rating each candidate on a
scale ranging from 0^0 (hostility), to 50^0 (indifference), to 100^0
(strong attraction). This measure is not strictly comparable to the
support index utilized in the Houston sample, but its inclusion in
this is justified by the close relationship found between subjective
candidate ratings and actual voting patterns by other researchers.[12]

As previously mentioned, both static and dynamic independent var-
iables are employed in this study. Changing policy preferences, party
identification, occupational mobility, and relative deprivation are

the dynamic variables. For each of these variables, items or questions
from the 1968 questionnaire were repeated in the follow-up survey.
Indices are then computed to indicate the stability of attitudes and/
or group memberships for each individual, and the direction of change
when it occurs. Using dynamic independent variables to explain chang-
ing patterns of support for Wallace is appropriate for Houstonians only,
since the persons interviewed in the 1972 and 1968 CPR studies are not
the same.

Indices have been calculated for each of thirteen policy items
covering such areas as social welfare, civil rights, economic and fiscal
matters, and foreign affairs.[13] For each policy item, respondents were
asked whether they favored increased governmental activity, less govern-
mental activity, or maintenance of the status quo. Persons reporting
consistent policy preferences have been coded as zero. If the individual
favored an increase in governmental activity in 1975 from 1968, a score
of +1 was assigned. Similarly, a score of -1 was assigned to re-
spondents favoring less governmental action.

An index has been computed to incorporate changes in the strength
and direction of party identification. Because of the small number of
cases, the classification scheme for party identification has been
reached from seven categories (strong Democrat, weak Democrat, inde-
pendent leaning Democrat, Independent, independent leaning Republican,
weak Republican, strong Republican), to three (Democrat, Independent,
Republican). Independents leaning toward the Democratic and Republican
parties are classified as Independents. Individuals changing in the
direction of the Democratic party, i.e., from Independent to Democrat,
from Republican to Independent, or from Republican to Democrat are

assigned a score of -1.

Those changing in the direction of the Republicans are coded as +1, and stable party identifiers are coded as zero.

The relative deprivation change index involves the computation of indices in 1968 and 1975 before the net attitudinal change can be observed. Each index is based on the following questions:

(1) In the current American situation, do you feel that white Americans are receiving less than a fair change, a fair chance, or better than a fair chance?

(2) In the current American situation, do you feel that blacks are receiving less than a fair chance, a fair chance, or better than a fair chance?

Since, as expected, all respondents are white, it was assumed that an individual would feel "relatively deprived" if blacks were perceived as gaining an unfair advantage. The relative deprivation change index is calculated for each individual by subtracting the 1968 score from the 1975 score. A respondent who perceived equal opportunities for blacks and whites in 1968, but who felt in 1975 that blacks had gained a relatively greater advantage than whites would be assigned a score of -1, thus indicating an increase in feelings of relative deprivation. If, however, the individual perceives in 1975 that opportunities for both races are equal after having felt that blacks were receiving an undue advantage in 1968, we assume that a decline in relative deprivation has taken place, and the respondent is assigned a score of -1. Stable responses are coded as zero.

The occupational mobility index considers the movement of respondents since 1968 into either more prestigious occupations (upward social mobility) or less prestigious ones (downward social mobility).

For both 1968 and 1975, respondents were assigned to one of three ranks
of occupational prestige.[14] The breakdown of respondent occupation
into the appropriate category of occupational prestige is as follows:

(1) high prestige -- professionals, managers, self employed
    businessmen.

(2) medium prestige -- clerical and sales, skilled workers,
    craftsmen.

(3) low prestige -- farmers, semi-skilled workers, service
    workers, unskilled laborers.

Persons who moved in an upwardly mobile direction from 1968 to
1975 were coded as +1, while downwardly mobile respondents were assigned
a score of -1. Those who remained at the same, or similar, position
were coded as 0. Housewives were recoded to reflect the occupation
of the head of the household. Unemployed or retired respondents were
assigned to their former occupation.

Research Design

The panel technique is the analytic device employed to guide this
study. According to Charles Y. Glock, the panel method, "involves re-
cruiting a sample of individuals representing the universe to be
studied and interviewing these people at two or more points in time on
the problems under consideration."[15] One such problem, which is of
central concern here, is that of attitude change. Why, e.g., do some
groups continue to support Wallace for president in 1976 while others
have since switched to other candidates? The panel technique is a
potentially useful way of dealing with change. It does this by exam-
ining the effects of a stimulus in producing change or by specifying
the conditions which produce differential changes in attitudes or
behavior among various groups in a population.[16]

Panel analysis is both nonexperimental and descriptive, empha-
sizing the interrelationships of many changing variables.[17] In
experimental research, the research design focuses on before-after
data obtained from subjects in a laboratory setting. The researchers
decide which subjects will be exposed to what stimuli. In panel
studies, on the other hand, the researchers have no control over the
indiviudals in the study, nor do they manipulate any stimuli.[18]

Other techniques, such as the examination of successive cross-
sectional surveys, may also provide insights into political change,
but the panel method has two advantages. The latter technique per-
mits the analysis of turnover (individual changes), whereas only net
change can be ascertained from a comparison of successive cross-sec-
tional surveys. For example, a comparison of the hypothetical distri-
bution of registered Democrats and Republicans in the 1964 and 1968
presidential elections might indicate that the proportion of registered
Democrats had increased by 4 percent (net change). But this could in-
dicate that 17 percent of the electorate had shifted from Republican
to Democrat, while 13 percent had shifted in the opposite direction.
Reliance on cross-sectional technqiues in this instance would present
a misleading image of partisan stability.

A second advantage of panels is that individual changes can be
objectively identified. If a set of attitudes reported for an
individual in a second wave interview is significantly different from
the initial responses, he or she can be classified as a changer.
Cross-sectional surveys, on the other hand, must rely on the respondent's
memory to identify change, thereby increasing the risk of distortion
or error.[19]

The central concept of panel analysis is the turnover table, i.e., the crosstabulation of a variable at time one with itself at time two. If a variable contains three possible response categories, a 3 x 3 turnover table will be produced, summarizing the responses of individuals at both points in time. A hypothetical turnover table demonstrating the stability of political knowledge over time is shown in Figure 1. The level of political knowledge for "C" respondents shown within the diagonal cells has remained constant over time. The "I" respondents found in the cells to the right of the diagonal represent persons whose political   knowledge had increased. Similarly, the "D" respondents found in the cells to the left of the diagonal were found to be less knowledgeable about politics in the second interview. In short, the stable respondents or "stayers" are found in the diagonal cells of a symmetrical (i.e., an equal number of rows and columns) turnover table; whereas, those respondents found outside the diagonal have shifted their position.

Qualifiers in panel analysis refer to independent variables which further distinguish movers from stayers on the basis of some characteristic.[21] Qualifiers thus include political, social, situational, and demographic characteristics which would affect the attitude changes of individuals. Qualifiers may be categorized as changing or constant. Constant qualifiers may be further classified in terms of precedence. Such characteristics as sex or religious affiliation which occur before the initial interview are termed antecedent qualifiers. Characteristics or events which take place during the interim period between the first and second interviews are referred to as an intervening qualifiers. The main purpose of qualifiers is to specify the set of

Time Two

		Low	Medium	High
	Low	C	I	I
Time One	Medium	D	C	I
	High	D	D	C

Figure 1. Hypothetical Distribution of Political Knowledge

circumstances or conditions under which change takes place.

The statistical measure of association employed for the Houston sample is percentage change. According to Hubert Blalock, percentage differences constitute a useful way to illustrate the degree of relationships between two variables, particularly when they are dichotomous.[22] Since the dependent variables in this study have only two categories (support or nonsupport for Wallace in 1976) and all independent variables are eigher dichotomous or trichotomous, the use of percentage differences is appropriate.

<u>Summary</u>

The purpose of this study is to analyze the sociological, political, demographic, and issue-based factors associated with changing support for Governor Wallace in the South. The primary data source consists of a two-wave panel of Harris County Wallace voters interviewed initially in 1968 and again in 1975. Additional data summarizing the attitudes of southern Wallace voters were obtained from the 1968 and 1972 studies of the national electorate conducted by the Center for Political Research at the University of Michigan.

Indices of political support for Wallace were calculated for each data set. A single index summarizing changes in support was deemed appropriate for the Harris County sample since the same indiv-

iduals were interviewed at both points in time. Separate indices of support were calculated for the 1968 and 1972 surveys of southern Wallace voters. For the Harris County survey, additional indices measuring changing policy preferences, partisan change, occupational mobility, and changes in feelings of relative deprivation were calculated.

The statistical relationships between the demographic, political, sociological, and issue-based indicators and support for Wallace were analyzed using percentage change as the measure of association. The availability of panel data in the Harris County survey permitted furhter analysis of the shifting bases of Wallace support through the identification and classification of individual changers.

End Notes

[1]The 1968 Houston data were collected by Henry Allee and Stephen Davis for thesis purposes. The use of these materials for this study is gratefully acknowledged.

[2]I would like to express my gratitude to the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research for making this data available.

[3]This distinction is adopted from V.O. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

[4]James E. Anderson et al., Texas Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 28.

[5]Donald S. Strong, "Further Reflections on Southern Politics," Journal of Politics (May 1971), p. 252.

[6]The tendency holds true in Texas as well as the deep southern states, see, e.g., Robert D. Wrinkle and Jerry Polinard, "Populism and Dissent: The Wallace Vote in Texas," Social Science Quarterly (September 1973), pp. 306-320.

[7]The following description of the sampling procedures used in the 1968 Harris County sample is drawn from the original research. See Henry Allee, "The American Independent Party in Harris County, Texas," Master's thesis, University of HOuston, 1969, pp. 41-44.

[8]John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Kendra B. Mead, Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor, Mich.,: Institute for Social Research, 1968), pp. 4-5.

[9]Arthur Miller, "Political trust and Political Cynicism," American Political Science Review (September 1974), pp. 926-955.

[10]For a convenient summary of the pros and cons of structural versus unstructured questions, consult Charles Backstom and Gerald Hursh, Survey Research (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1963), pp. 72-76.

[11]While recognizing the desirability of presenting a greater range of values, this option was precluded by an insufficient number of cases.

[12]J. Michael Ross, Reeve D. Vannemann, and Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Patterns of Support for George Wallace," Journal of Social Issues (forthcoming).

[13]These policy items were adopted from Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," American Political Science Review (June 1960), pp. 406-429.

[14]Richard W. Boyd, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection," American Political Science Review (September 1969), pp. 513-514.

[15]Charles Y. Glock, "Some Applications of the Panel Method to the Study of Change," in The Language of Social Research, ed. by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), pp. 242-250.

[16]Beranrd Levenson, "Panel Studies," in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 8 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 371-378.

[17]Ibid., p. 371. Sophisticated statistical techniques have been developed and refined which permit causal inferences to be drawn from panel data; see, e.g., T. W. Anderson, "Probability Models for Analyzing Time Changes in Attitudes," in Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences, ed. by Paul F. Lazarsfeld (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 17-66; Leo Goodman, "Statistical Methods for the Mover-Stayer Models for the Interpretation of Attitude and Behavior Change" (doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1955); Frederick M. Lord, "Elementary Models for Measuring Change," in Problems in Measuring Change, ed. by Chester Harris (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 21-38; Donald C. Pelz and Frank Andrews, "Detecting Causal Priorities in Panel Study Data," American Sociological Review (December 1964), pp. 836-848; David Heise, "Causal Inference from Panel Data," in Sociological Methodology 1970, ed. by Edgar F. Borgatta (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970), pp. 2-27; Douglas Dobson and Duane A. Meeter, "Alternative Markov Models for Describing Change in Party Identification," American Journal of Political Science (August 1974), pp. 487-500; and Paul A. Beck, "Models for Analyzing Panel Data," Political Methodology, Vol. II, Number 4 (1975), pp. 357-377. Unfortunately, the technique mentioned herein require a greater N than is available in the present study.

[18]One might argue that the presence of absence of a treatment effect could be ascertained by the researcher through a series of questions thus permitting the classification of respondents into exposed and nonexposed groups. The main problem with this argument is that the use of retrospective questions violates the central conception of panel analysis because of the unknown effects of selective recall.

[19]Nathan Goldfarb, Longitudinal Statistical Analysis (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 37-39.

[20]The "mover-stayer" terminology is adopted from Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

[21]A useful discussion of qualifiers in panel analysis is found by consulting Seymour Lipset, Paul Lazarsfeld, Allen Barton, and Juan Linz, "The Psychology of Voting," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by

Gardner Lindzey (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 1124-1170.

[22]Hubert Blalock, <u>Social Statistics</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 228.

CHAPTER II

THE WALLACE PHENOMENON IN PERSPECTIVE:

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Two approaches have been utilized by various writers to explain
the remarkable persistence of Wallace as a major factor in national
presidential politics. Some, in seeking to answer this question, have
emphasized the personal drive and tenacity of the Alabaman,[1] However,
this approach does not explain the continuing electoral support received
by Wallace. Other political figures, e.g., Harold Stassen, have demon-
strated great tenacity in seeking the presidency but have not met with
corresponding electoral success.

A second approach to dealing with the Wallace phenomenon focuses
on the supporters attracted to the Governor in his national presidential
campaigns. A number of studies offer alternative explanations center-
ing upon the social status or political background factors of Wallace
supporters, or political issues associated with support for Wallace in
the 1968 presidential election. This chapter reviews the available
scholarly literature on Wallace supporters. These studies, as pre-
viously noted, provide little analysis on the dynamics of political sup-
port for Wallace. However, they do provide a useful starting point for
generating hypotheses about the supportive tendencies of various
groups. We begin by examining studies which probe the social bases
of Wallace supporters.

The Social Bases of Wallace Supporters

An examination of the social bases of Governor Wallace's political

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appeal reveals three styles of analysis. A few studies have been
content to simply analyze the sociological and demographic bases of
his electoral support. Such studies are occasionally accompanied by
attempts to categorize Wallace supporters as members of the so-called
"radical right." A second group of studies utilizes aggregate data
to defend or refute earlier attempts to place the Wallace phenomenon
within a more general theoretical perspective. The "black belt" and
"urban populist" explanations are examples of this type. Thirdly, a
number of relative deprivation and status descrepancy theories have
been advanced to account for the Wallace phenomenon. Common to each of
these theories is that fear of declining social status lead individuals
to support Wallace. That is to say that perceived external threats to
established socio-political institutions or the perception of increasing
social, legal or economic benefits received by members of an "out-
group" at the expense of one's own group identification resulted in
individuals being attracted to the Governor.

Most of the literature pertaining to the "radical right" in the
United States describes the followers and ideological proclivities of
such individuals as Father Coughlin, Gerald L. K. Smith, Senator Joseph
McCarthy, and of such groups as the John Birch Society, the Ku Klux
Klan, the Christian Crusade, the Daughters of the American Revolution.[2]
To automatically categorize Wallace supporters as "radical rightists"
would be misleading, but there are characteristics of his political
bases of support which bear some resemblance to other political leaders
identified as radical right.

Perhaps the most consistent correlate of rightist political views
is membership within a fundamentalist Protestant sect. Several writers

have suggested that the rigidity of the fundamentalist religious doctrines go hand in hand with the espousal of authoritarian political attitudes. According to Raymond Wolfinger et al., there are several aspects of fundamentalist beliefs which are compatible with radical right interpretations of history including:

> (1) Belief in the literalness and purity of Biblical teachings makes fundamentalists resistant to change. (2) They are affronted by moral relativism, increasingly lenient sexual mores, the decline of parental authority, and other symptoms of the secular modern world. (3) The fundamentalist sees the world as strictly divided into the save and the damned, the forces of good and the forces of evil. (4) The danger to the faithful is from the corrosion of faith by individious doctrines -- a danger from within. This argument is given added credence by the revivalist style and trappings of many "anti-communist leaders."[3]

Available empirical evidence, though limited, indicates that fundamentalist Protestants are more likely than Catholics or Jews (as well as other Protestant denominations) to support conservative political movements. In a secondary analysis of Gallup poll data, Lipset found that Baptists were more likely to support such conservative political spokesmen as Father Coughlin and Senator Joseph McCarthy than were other Protestant groups. Positive evaluations of the John Birch Society occurred much more frequently among fundamentalist Protestants than other religious groups.[4] Other studies further document the relationship between fundamentalist views and rightist political views.[5] According to David Sears, these trends persist even when social status is controlled.[6]

There is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that Wallace received disporportionate electoral support in 1968 from fundamentalist Protestants.[7] In large part, however, Wallace's political appeal to this group was confined to southern states. In the North, Wallace enjoyed greater success (relatively speaking) among Catholic voters.[8]

The radical right literature contains numerous references to the socioeconomic background of its followers. In general, research indicates that persons characterized by low status and educational attainment are more likely to voice approval of rightist political figures. According to Seymour Lipset and Carl Raab, the socioeconomic patterns of support for Wallace were similar to those found among followers of Father Coughlin and Senator Joseph McCarthy. Each attained greater popularity among the working class and less educated individuals.[9]

On the other hand, there are studies which present evidence contradicting the view that socioeconomic status is negatively associated with right wing political attitudes. Raymong Wolfinger et al., in studying followers of the Christian Crusade in Oakland, found that participants tended to be more affluent and better educated than a control sample of San Francisco Bay residents.[10] Other studies concentrating on the backgrounds of persons belonging to the John Birch Society have reached similar conclusions.[11] The discrepancy in these findings may in part reflect a class-related bias within differing levels of political activity. There is considerable evidence to indicate that participants in social or political groups are generally more affluent and better educated than nonparticipants. It, therefore, does not seem surprising that the studies of public support for Senator Joseph McCarthy, Father Coughlin, and Governor Wallace would find lower levels of income and education than studies examining the membership of radical right organizations, since the former included nonparticipants as well as participants.

Unfortunately, few sociological studies of Wallace supporters

have examined the dynamics of his political appeal -- i.e,, which social
and demographic groups are most likely to continue supporting Wallace
across time? Studies examining the stability of support for Wallace
among various demographic groupings have focused on the 1968 campaign
rather than the distribution of support across elections, Within the
1968 election, there were differential rates of attrition among differ-
ing SES groups originally expressing support for Wallace. Seymour
Lipset and Earl Raab indicated that Wallace successfully retained a
higher proportion of his middle class supporters (52%) than working
class supporters (42%) in the North. In the South this pattern was re-
versed. Approximately 90 percent of Wallace's working class support-
ers voted for him in November compared with 61 percent of his middle
class supporters.[12] It is unclear whether the direction of these
trends would be applicable to longer periods of time, J, M, Ross et al.,
report that Wallace's public popularity between 1964 and 1970 remained
fairly constant, but they do not provide any further breakdown by
levels of income, education, or occupation.[13]

     To summarize, the demographic characteristics of persons iden-
tified as Wallace supporters and of persons expressing approval of
radical right political spokesmen and groups are in several respects
quite similar. Both Wallace and the radical right tend to be viewed
quite favorably by members of the Southern Baptist Church and funda-
mentalist Christian sects, lower status workers, and less educated
persons.

Aggregate-Proximity Style

     The "aggregate-proximity" style incorporates attempts to employ
either the "black belt" or "populist" explanations of the Wallace

phenomenon. These approaches are similar in two ways. Both assume that physical proximity to blacks increases the likelihood that whites will be attracted to Wallace. And both employ aggregate social indicators, i.e., census data, to measure trends of support.

The "black belt" thesis advanced by V. O. Key in Southern Politics states that southern counties with a high proportion of blacks are likely to be characterized by increasing fear and resentment among whites, thus resulting in a tendency for racial issues to become more salient.[14] Robert Schoenberger and David Segal attempted to test the validity of Key's thesis by examining the 1968 Wallace vote and the relative percentage of blacks within a sample of southern congressional districts; their hypothesis was confirmed.[15] Additional evidence which corroborates these findings for deep southern states is provided by James L. Sundquist.[16] The relevance of this concept for individual southern states -- i.e., Alabama and Texas -- has also been demonstrated.[17]

A more recent study by Black and Black illustrates the continuing effectiveness of racial appeals in Alabama politics. The authors examined the county vote for Wallace's 1970 gubernatorial campaign for both the first primary election (which Wallace lost) and the run-off. The intensification of racial rhetoric injected by Wallace following the primary election resulted in a dramatic increase in his support among whites within the black belt counties thus contributing to a narrow victory.[18]

Other writers have mentioned Wallace's "populist" appeal which comes in two varieties. Both urban and rural styles of populism combine a fear of social changes (with strong racial overtones) with a

general hostility toward the federal government, intellectuals, and

urban cosmopolitan liberalism. Within the cities, the skilled

laborers generally fall into this category; according to Walter Burnham,

these people have neither the material resources nor the psychological

security to confront social pressures as members of the more affluent

sectors of society do. From his analysis of voting returns in Philadel-

phia and Baltimore during the 1968 election, Burnham concluded that a

large proportion of working class individuals who, under other circum-

stances normally supported Democratic presidential candidates instead

voted for Wallace.[19] An ecological analysis of 1968 precinct results

in Cleveland, Gary, and Boston by Pettigrew et al., revealed a similar

tendency among union members, blue collar workers, and high school

graduates to favor Wallace's candidacy relative to their demographic

counterparts.[20] Like their northern counterparts, manual and skilled

workers in southern cities are more likely to support Governor Wallace.

Studies of urban areas in Texas, Alabama, and Louisiana were consistent

with this trend.[21] On the other hand, the 1968 electoral results

clearly indicate that Wallace successfully projected a type of popu-

list appeal to rural areas in the South. The nature of his appeal has

been outlined by Lipset and Raab:

> Wallace court to gain the votes of many relatively undeprivileged
> whites who had benefitted from the welfare state, but were upset
> by pressures toward integration, who were concerned about law and
> order, and who reacted strongly to changes in moral values . . .
> He attempted to do this by directing his campaign against a net-
> work of "establishment" intrusions and failures: civil rights
> legislation which imposed integration; weakness which permitted a
> breakdown in law and order, crime in the streets, and riots;
> the fear of central governmental power generally.[22]

While Wallace received greater electoral support from rural areas in

the South, his northern appeal was largely confined to the larger

cities. Rural and small town conservatives generally preferred to vote for Nixon outside the South.

Status Change

Perhaps the most common sociological explanation of the Wallace phenomenon centers upon status changes. The varieties of status change which are discussed in this section include status discrepancy and relative deprivation. Both terms are essentially dealing with a sense of personal frustration stemming from a perceived loss of status and both are sensitive to fluctuations in social and/or economic conditions.

Status discrepancy refers to inconsistencies in levels of income, education, and occupational prestige; e.g., an uneducated gravedigger who annually receives $35,000 from previous investments is discrepant with respect to income. According to James McEvoy, such inconsistencies are logcially consistent with ultraconservative political outlook because, "the right is the organized and visible segment of the society that is most radical in attacking the established political and social power structures within the system while at the same time affirming the importance of individualism and the legitimacy of hoarding one's money for oneself. Persons lacking status-congruity are presumed to harbor resentments against the established elite sectors of society whose existence shows them up as pretenders or phonies."[23]

Available evidence concerning the explanatory strength of status discrepancy theory is mixed. Recent reviews of the sociological literature by McEvoy[24] and by John Robinson and Jerrold Rusk[25] suggest that status discrepancy is of limited value in accounting for political behavior. Conversely, a number of recent studies of Wallace supporters

have successfully employed status discrepancy theory to explain political

activity. Laurence Hynson found that members of the American Independent

Party were more likely than mainstream political participants to

possess inconsistent status characteristics.[26] Studies by Thomas Pet-

tigrew and Stanley Eitzen, reach similar conclusions.[27]

Relative deprivation derives largely from perceiving that groups

regarded as lower in status and skills are unfairly gaining in their

position. Based on interviews with whites in Gary Indiana, Pettigrew,

and others, demonstrated that relative deprivation was by far the most

powerful social psychological indicator of support for Wallace, even

when controls for all the important demographic variables were intro-

duced.[28] In a similar vein, Lipset and Raab argue that social move-

ment of the Wallace variety occurs during times of change; such move-

ments typically appeal to groups who feel that they have just been,

or about to be, deprived of something important. Loyalty to a political

party is strained since the traditional party structure seems unable to

meet their needs. The major concern of these groups is "to reaffirm

the values and norms that once established the dissenting group's im-

portance in the prestige order of the society."[29] According to McEvoy,

racist sentiments within the Wallace movement may be interpreted as

a desire to maintain an increasingly threatened traditional status-de-

ference pattern upon which southerners and the white urban working

classes have depended on as one important component of their prestige.[30]

Still other writers have attributed Wallace's popularity to a

sort of traditional nativist appeal in which he represents the dis-

appearing small town America with its attendant emphasis on a strong

moral code, old fashioned patriotism, and religious fundamentalism,

This aspect of status change is very similar to earlier descriptions of social strain by Daniel Bell which presumably led to the adaptation of political views congenial to the radical right. The threatened groups are the same -- e.g., persons most threatened by status loss include the independent physician, small town lawyer, the farm owner, and the small businessman.[31] A status politics model was developed by Harold Grasmick using a scale of traditionalism-modernism to measure the sociopolitical attitudes of rural North Carolinians. The data revealed a strong association between traditionalism and Wallace support, and he concluded that the southern Wallace movement could be interpreted as a response by individuals attached to an agrarian culture to the status threat posed by the culture of modernism.[32] Lipset and Raab have viewed the 1968 Wallace movement in a similar fashion, emphasizing the close connection between religious fundamentalism and a traditional life style. When social change shifts the position of that way of life -- and the position of that way of life -- and the position of those who bear it -- traditional religious belief becomes the major organizing force behind the subsequent development of backlash political ideology.[33]

Political Background Factors

The aloofness exhibited by Wallace toward the policy priorities of the national Democratic party plus his third party candidacy in the 1968 presidential election have established his reputation as a political maverick. The political antecedents of his popular appeal are therefore of considerable interest. Questions involving the strength and direction of party identification, political interest and knowledge, political activity, and political socialization proccesses are considered

here.

A plethora of voting studies suggest that party identification is an important determinant of individual voting behavior.[34] Governor Wallace, however, drew a disporportionate share of electoral support from Independents in 1968. Nationwide, Wallace received the votes of 22 percent of those identifying themselves as Independents compared with 11 percent of the Democratic party identifiers and 6 percent of the Republican party identifiers. A glance at the voting trends among Democrats and Republicans reveals significant regional differences. In the South, Democrats (37%) were considerably more likely to vote for Wallace than Republicans (10%). In the North, however, Republican party identifiers favored Wallace by a slightly greater margin than the Democrats.[35]

One should not necessarily conclude from these findings that party identification is of little or no importance in explaining Wallace's political appeal. For many southerners, Wallace was perceived as a mainstream Democrat. A study by William Schneider indicated that negative evaluations of President Johnson's performance in economic affairs and the Vietnam war among southern whites raised the Wallace vote while having no impact on the Republican votes. He concluded that Wallace was, in effect, the opposition candidate for many southern whites.[36]

There are few published studies which examine the political background of Wallace supporters beyond partisan affiliation. In general, Wallace supporters are depicted as individuals with little interest in politics or prior political acitvity. Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab report that Wallace received considerable support from persons who did not vote in 1964. Nearly half of the southern 1964 nonvoters who

who voted in 1968 chose Wallace.[37] A study of Democratic delegates at the 1972 state convention in Texas by Marianne Jameson indicated that those preferring Wallace were less likely than Humphrey delegates or McGovern delegates to have participated in a number of political activities such as contributing money to a political candidate, attending a rally, etc. Wallace delegates were also less likely than Humphrey delegates (but more likely than McGovern delegates) to have been reared by parents interested in politics and politically active.[38]

There results, though limited, suggest that the socialization patterns and past political activities of Wallace supporters would resemble those of persons with like sociological characteristics.

Issues and Support for Wallace

In this section, the relationship between political issues and public support for Wallace is examined. Two questions are considered here. First, what are the issue positions that differentiate Wallace from other national candidates? Do these vary by region or by socio-economic status? And secondly, does a relationship between issue position and votes for Wallace indicate general support for his policy preferences or a more generalized frustration with the inability or unwillingness of either major party to take a strong stand on one or more controversial issues?

A number of issue areas including race and civil rights, federal spending and welfare politices, law and order, and foreign policy (Vietnam) clearly illustrate the policy differences that separate Wallace supporters from supporters of Humphrey and Nixon during the 1968 presidential election. Within the general area of race relations and

and federal civil rights policies, Wallace was perceived by the general
electorate as the most conservative candidate on this issue. According-
ing to Lipset and Raab, e.g., 44 percent of Wallace's followers (com-
pared with 22% and 24% for Nixon and Humphrey respectively) agreed with
the statement that Negroes in this country were "making too much pro-
gress."[39] A study by Thomas Pettigrew,[40] and others, revealed that
Wallace supporters were more likely than Nixon supporters or Humphrey
supporters to believe that Negroes are less intelligent than whites
and were more willing to discriminate against Negroes in housing,
schools, and face-to-face contact. Samuel Kirkpatrick and Melvin Jones
examined the direction and intensity of policy preferences associated
with each candidate; they found that cleavage values between Hum-
phrey and Wallace on the issue of school integration were considerable.
To a lesser degree these cleavage values also existed between Nixon
and Wallace. In both instances, however, Wallace supporters were signif-
icantly less likely to voice approval for integrated schools.[41] A
similar type of analysis conducted by William Schneider indicated
that Wallace drew votes from both Republicans and Democrats in all parts
of the country because of his anti-civil rights stance.[42]

While Wallace supporters in general were found to be more hostile
toward civil rights policies, this tendency varied according to social
class and region (South vs. non-South). A reanalysis of the 1968
Survey Research Center data by Richard Hamilton revealed that working
class Wallace supporters were more likely than middle class Wallace
supporters to favor federal policies designed to promote equal job
opportunities, equal housing, and school integration.[43] In a study
of northern Wallace supporters, J. M. Ross et al., found that among

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respondents who agreed that the Johnson Administration was pushing integration too fast, Nixon rather than Wallace was the preferred candidate. Among southerners, however, Wallace remained the chief beneficiary of racial discontent.[44]

Within the area of social welfare policies, a somewhat different pattern emerges. Wallace backers were less likely than Humphrey supporters to favor governmental welfare measures (such as medical care, housing, or education), but were generally more liberal on this issue than Nixon supporters. In general, southern Wallace backers were less receptive to social welfare policies than were their northern counterparts. And in both regions, the working class Wallaceites were more likely to favor these programs.[45]

Another issue which prompted differing appeals from the major presidential candidates was "law and order." Lipset and Raab suggest that this issue may overlap considerably with racial protest and civil rights activities, especially in the South. Wallace supporters were more likely than Nixon or Humphrey backers to indicate disapproval of protest demonstrations.[46] Pettigrew et al., found that Wallace supporters were more likely to perceive an unsafe hostile environment; e.g., these respondents were relatively more likely to believe that Communists and other outsiders were responsible for race riots, that buses without a policeman are not safe, and that safety on the streets was the most important issue facing the nation.[47] While Wallace was clearly identified as the chief spokesman for "law and order" in the 1968 presidential campaign, the majority of all candidate groups, including Humphrey and Nixon supporters, did not approve of protest activities. These results were not altered by controls for social

class or region.

Finally, differing responses of the three presidential candidates to the Vietnam war were very much apparent during the 1968 election. Wallace voters were considerably more likely than either Nixon or Humphrey supporters to favor a more aggressive Vietnam policy and to classify themselves as "hawks" rather than "doves."[48] A careful analysis of the differential impact of the Vietnam war on voting patterns indicates that among southern respondents who felt United States involvement in Vietnam was a "mistake," Wallace was clearly the beneficiary. Disenchantment with Johnson's war policies resulted in a slight gain by Wallace among southern Democrats. On the other hand, northern respondents who felt United States involvement in Vietnam was a mistake, tended to prefer Nixon.[49]

In direct contrast to Nixon and Humphrey who were largely perceived in a partisan light by the electorate, Wallace was clearly seen as an issue-oriented candidate. Phillip Converse et al., indicated that all Wallace voters were characterized by strong discontents in at least one of the three major issues of the 1968 presidential campaign -- crime, race, and Vietnam -- and most were angry about more than one.[50] Other studies have similarly indicated that not only were these issues most salient to Wallace supporters, but his position on them was clearly understood.[51]

William Schneider attempted to assess the impact of various issues on candidate choice in the 1968 election. He found that the bulk of the "protest vote" stemming from public dissatisfaction with the Johnson Administration positions on civil rights and Vietnam was absorbed by Wallace rather than Nixon.[52] A major implication of these studies

is that candidates of neither major party were willing or able to take
positions on policies of considerable importance to many Americans.
St. Angelo and Dobson suggest that the Wallace candidacy represented a
general estrangement from the political system for many, due in large
part to federal initiation and implementation of racial policies during
the previous decade.[53] An analysis of trends in discontent from 1958
to 1972 by Arthur Miller et al., indicates that:

> The late 1960s and early 1970s were a period of increased pol-
> itical estrangement in the United States. Furthermore, the rela-
> tively greater increase in political distrust after 1964 would
> tend to support the contention that attitudes toward the govern-
> ment change in a cumulative manner with prior negative perceptions
> reinforcing the disfavor with which later undesired governmental
> actions may be received,thereby creating a spiral of discontent.[54]

Scholars thus agree that Wallace successfully tapped the issue concerns
of the voting public. But more importantly, the nature of this appeal
was essentially negative. Voters did not favorably respond to Wallace
because of their enthusiasm for his policy programs.

He successfully appealed to voters who were dissatisfied not only
with federal civil rights policies but with the unwillingness of either
political party to provide a satisfactory alternative.

Summary

The literature pertaining to the social and demographic character-
istics, political background, and issue preferences of Wallace sup-
porters may be summarized as follows:

(1) Persons characterized by low occupation prestige and low ed-
ucation are more likely to support Governor Wallace.

(2) Protestants are more likely to support Governor Wallace than
Catholics, particularly in the South. Wallace is also more popular

with members of the funadmentalist Christian sects, although in absol-
ute numbers they account for but a small proportion of his overall
support base.

(3) Independents are more likely than either Democrats or Repub-
licans to evince support for Wallace. Among party identifiers, Demo-
crats are more prone to support Wallace, particularly in the South.

(4) Within the South, Wallace drew disporportionate electoral
strength from small towns and rural areas. Wallace's strength in rural
southern counties containing a high proportion of blacks is generally con-
sistent with the "black belt" hypothesis advanced by V. 0. Key. His
northern support, on the other hand, was largely confined to working
class enclaves in the industrial cities.

(5) Persons supporting Wallace are more likely to express feel-
ings of relative deprivation.

(6) The issues of greatest concern to Wallace voters during
the 1968 election were crime in the streets, race, and Vietnam. Wal-
lace supporters were especially dissatisfied with outward signs of
public disorders; e.g., their dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war
was primarily linked with their disdain for the war protesters rather
than the political wisdom of the war, per se.

(7) Wallace supporters tend to manifest a blend of social conser-
vatism and economic liberalism on many policy issues. They are gen-
erally hostile to policies relating to civil rights or integration but
are more supportive of federal programs designed to benefit the work-
ing class.

With these general findings in mind, we are now ready to examine
our data to test how well these general propositions hold up when

Wallace supporters are examined over time.

End Notes

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[29]McEvoy, p. 149.

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CHAPTER III

SOCIOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

AND SUPPORT FOR WALLACE

The relationships between sociological and demographic factors and
support are examined in this chapter. The first section deals with the
effects of demographic and associational characteristics -- i.e, sex.
age, religious preference, and union membership -- on support. In
the latter part of the chapter, the impact of status variables on sup-
port is considered. It is expected that support for Wallace is affected
by such social attributes as occupational prestige, education, and rela-
tive deprivation. In using occupational prestige and relative depri-
vation as indicators of support, the more recent (1975) measures are
employed, since these variables were deemed to be more susceptible to
change over time. The original (1968) scores are utilized for the
other sociodemographic variables. Finally, the effects of occupational
mobility and relative deprivation changes on support are analyzed.

Operationalization of Support

We begin by briefly reiterating the operationalization of political
support for Governor Wallace and its tabular presentation in this and
subsequent chapters. For the Harris County sample, the 1968 support
index taps the voting intentions of the respondent for the 1968 pres-
idential contest. Those who selected Wallace as the preferred can-
didate are classified as supporters. A similar procedure is employed
for the 1975 support index. Respondents were classified as supporters
if they indicated a willingness to vote for Wallace in 1976 either as

the Democratic candidate or as the nominee of a third party.

The operationalization of support for Wallace among southern voters in 1968 and 1972 is based on the proportion of respondents who ranked Wallace highly on the thermometer scale. Separate support indices were calculated for both 1968 and 1972. Changes in support among southern voters are thus demonstrated by comparing the proportions of 1968 supporters with the 1972 figures.

Variations in Support for Wallace

An analysis of the general patterns of support for Wallace between 1968 and 1975 seems appropriate before examining the effects of demographic characteristics. The overview provides a useful frame of reference from which we can observe the impact of demographic, political, and policy variables on individual support for Wallace. Both aggregate and individual changes in support are analyzed.

Table 4 summarizes the aggregate changes in support for Wallace between 1968 and 1975. The data indicate that support for Wallace increased somewhat between 1968 and 1972 but declined considerably by 1975. Among southern respondents who reported voting for Wallace in 1968, the gain in support between 1968 and 1972 may seem surprising. This can likely be attributed to a variety of factors. For some voters, increased support for Wallace may have been associated with the increasing respectability of his political views. This point is exemplified by the efforts of President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew to co-opt former Wallace supporters by cleverly manipulating the race issue. Other voters may have been reassured by Wallace's toned-down campaign rhetoric and his decision to seek the presidency in 1972 within the confines of the Democratic party. It also seems likely

Table 4. Aggregate Changes in Support for Wallace

					Wallace Supporters			
	1968		1972		1975		Percent Differences	
	%	N	%	N	%	N		
Harris County	79	(52)	__	__	50	(52)	-29	
South	66	(65)	79	(112)	__	__	+13	

that Wallace benefitted somewhat from voters expressing sympathy for his paralytic condition. Finally, the emergence of the busing issue in the early stages of the 1972 presidential campaign was an important con-tributing factor to Wallace's Democratic primary victories in Michigan and in Maryland.

The subsequent decline in support for Wallace among Harris County respondents was particularly pronounced among those who did not vote for the Governor in 1968 (see Table 5). Former Wallace voters were five times more likely to support his candidacy for the presidency in 1976, although a substantial minority of former Wallace backers with-drew their support. As Table 4 indicates, the Harris County sample was evenly split between supporters and nonsupporters by 1975, a decline of almost 30% from 1968. The remainder of this study seeks to identify the major factors associated with this decline in support.

Demographic Characteristics and Support for Wallace

The relationships between demographic variables and support for

Table 5.   Changing Patterns of Support for Wallace among Harris County
           Respondents: 1968 - 1975

| | Support for Wallace (1975) | | |
	Supported	Did Not Support	Totals
Support for Wallace (1975)			
Supported	42%	37%	79%
Did Not Support	8%	13%	21%
Totals	50%	50%	100%
	(N=52)		

Wallace are presented in Tables 6 and 7. As Table 6 indicates, the relationship between sex and support for Wallace is slight but consistent. In 1968 there was virtually no difference between men and women in levels of support, but by 1975, the data indicate that men were more likely to continue supporting Wallace.

Similar results are obtained when male-female differences among southern voters are examined. In both 1968 and 1972, men were slightly more likely to support Wallace, although the differences were quite small. These findings are consistent with other studies which have found a greater preponderance of males among Wallace supporters.[1] This tendency, according to Thomas F. Pettigrew, apparently from the "greater susceptibility of men to authoritarian candidate who symbolizes protest."

No clear pattern emerges when the relationship between age and

Table 6. Demographic Patterns of Support for Wallace among Harris County Residents: 1968 to 1975

	Wallace Supporters (1968)	Wallace Supporters (1975)	Percent Change
Sex			
Male	79%[a]	55%	-24%
Female	78%	43%	-35%
Age			
21-35	82%	50%[b]	-32%
36-55	70%	48%	-22%
Over 55	100%	50%	-50%
Religion			
Protestants	86%	55%	-31%
Catholics	100%	100%	--
Fundamentalists	33%	22%	-11%
Union Membership			
Members	92%	75%	-17%
Non-members	76%	42%	-34%
		(N=52)	

[a] Percentages are based on the proportion of respondents within each category supporting Wallace.

[b] Age as of 1968.

support for Wallace is examined. Voters over the age of 55 were more supportive than either middle-aged or younger voters in 1968. This held true for southerners as well as Harris County voters. But this tendency did not persist over time, either in Harris County or the South. In Harris County all age groups were equally likely to continue supporting Wallace in 1975. Among southern voters in 1972, however, there was a negative relationship between age and support, i.e., increasing age was associated with declining levels of support. The range of support among different age groups in 1972 was considerably less than that found in 1968. Approximately eighty-six percent of younger voters gave Wallace high ratings compared with 73 percent of the oldest age group as Table 7 indicates.

These findings are contrary to expectations. The oft-mentioned propensity of younger voters to favor Wallace's candidacy is reflected in neither the Harris County figures nor the 1968 CPR figures.

One possible explanation for this discrepancy lies in the differing appeals made by Wallace and perceived by varying age groups. The sizable youth vote received by Wallace in 1968 may have reflected frustration with the Vietnam policies of the Johnson Administration rather than candidate appeal. This type of appeal would probably be less salient to older age groups attracted by either Wallace's style or his resistance to Federal civil rights programs.

Mixed results were also obtained when the relationship between religious affiliation and support was examined. Perhaps the most striking feature of both samples is the overwhelming preponderance of Protestants. A smaller proportion of respondents are classified as Christians belonging to the more fundamentalist sects, while Catholics

Table 7. Demographic Patterns of Support among Southern Voters: 1968 and 1972

	Wallace Supporters (1968)	Wallace Supporters (1975)	Percent Change
Sex			
Male	69%	81%	+12%
Female	64%	78%	+14%
Age			
21-35	57%	86%	+29%
36-55	62%	76%	+14%
Over 55	78%	73%	- 5%
Religion			
Protestants	62%	82%	+20%
Catholics	80%	50%	-30%
Fundamentalists	78%	92%	+14%
Union Membership			
Members	83%	83%	--
Non-members	62%	75%	+13%
	(N=65)	(N=112)	

Data Source: Center for Political Research, University of Michigan. It sould be re-emphasized that these samples consist of southern voters who voted for Wallace in 1968, not all southern voters.

constitute a tiny minority. The dearth of Catholics in these samples precludes meaningful comparisons, thus emphasis is placed on the differences between Protestants and Fundamentalists.

As Table 6 illustrates, the differing levels of support among Portestants and Fundamentalist Christians in Harris County were substantial and contrary to expectations. Protestants were considerably more supportive of Wallace in 1968 than the Fundamentalists, and this tendency was equally pronounced in 1975.

Conversely, the expected relationship between religious affiliation and support for Wallace held true for southerners, as Table 7 demonstrates. In both 1968 and 1972 Fundamentalists were more likely to support Wallace than Protestants. These latter findings are consistent with other studies positing a link between religious Fundamentalism and right wing political behavior.[3]

A consistent trend is more readily apparent when the relationship between union membership and support for Wallace is examined (see Tables 6 and 7). The data clearly indicate that union members in Harris County and throughout the South are more likely to remain supportive of Wallace than nonmembers. This is consistent with other studies which have found union membership to be positively associated with support for Wallace.[4]

Social Status and Wallace Support

In this section both objective and subjective indicators of social status are utilized. Educational background, occupational prestige, and occupational mobility are the objective measures employed here. Relative deprivation and relative deprivation change are the

subjective indicators of social status.

We begin by examining the relationships between objective indicators of social status displayed in Tables 8 and 9. The relationship between education and support for Wallace follows a curvilinear pattern among Harris County respondents. Those who attended or finished college were somewhat more supportive of the Alabaman than the grade schoolers but were considerably less supportive than the high school attenders. This held true for 1975 as well as 1968. The decline in levels of support for Wallace between 1968 and 1975 was relatively slight among high school attenders but was considerably more precipitous among grade schoolers and collegians.

When the impact of educational differences on support is examined among southerners, a somewhat different pattern emerges. There is a consistently negative relationship between education and support for Wallace in both 1968 and 1972; i.e., those with less education are more apt to be supportive.

In general, the data for both Harris County and the South indicate that high schoolers are more consistently supportive of Wallace than respondents with a college background. Grade schoolers, however, are less predictable. The lesser propensity of Harris Country grade schoolers to continue supporting Wallace than their southern counterparts may in part reflect sampling differences stemming from changing perceptions of Wallace between 1972 and 1975. Less educated backers of Governor Wallace attracted by his harangues against Federal civil rights programs and governmental centralization may have been dismayed with Wallace's less strident, more accommodating tone adopted after the attempted assassination.

Table 8. Social Status and Support for Wallace among Harris County Residents: 1968 and 1975

	Wallace Supporters (1968)	Wallace Supporters (1975)	Percent Change
Education			
Grade School	67%	33%	-34%
High School	85%	70%	-15%
College	78%	39%	-39%
Occupation Prestige			
Low	100%	67%	--[a]
Medium	78%	63%	--
High	68%	28%	--
Relative Deprivation			
Low	60%	36%	--
Medium	80%	55%	--
High	93%	75%	--
	(N=52)		

[a]Calculation of percentages is inappropriate because of occupation mobility.

Table 9. Social Status and Support for Wallace among Southern Voters: 1968 and 1972

	Wallace Supporters (1968)	Wallace Supporters (1975)
Education		
Grade School	81%	89%
High School	61%	78%
College	54%	71%
Occupational Prestige		
Low	71%	85%
Medium	68%	77%
High	50%	77%
	(N = 65)	(N = 112)

Data Source: Center for Political Research, University of Michigan.

In both 1968 and 1975, the relationship between occupational prestige and support for Wallace among Harris County respondents is somewhat negative; i.e., greater occupational prestige was associated with declining levels of support. The decline in support between 1968 and 1975 was especially pronounced among respondents with prestigious occupations, as Table 9 indicates. Similar results were found among southern voters although the range of support was narrower.

The dynamic aspects of occupational prestige must be considered as well; a seven-year lag between two interviews increases the likelihood of respondent movement up and down the occupational hierarchy. This movement is displayed in Table 10. It indicates that nine Harris County respondents (17.3%) were employed in less prestigious positions than in 1968, four (7.7%) had moved upward, and thirty-nine (75%) remained at the same level. The less fortunate respondents were most likely to support Wallace in 1975, followed closely by those experiencing no changes in occupational prestige. Those characterized by upward social mobility were least likely to remain faithful (see Table 10). This trend is generally consistent with expectations; previous studies have demonstrated an empirical link between upward social mobility and an increased preference for Republican candidates.[5] Presumably, former Wallace supporters moving up the occupational ladder would view Republican conservatives in a more favorable light.

We now turn to a more subjective indicator of social status -- relative deprivation. Feelings of relative deprivation refer to an increased tendency among whites to perceive opportunities gained by blacks as greater than one's own, due to unfair advantages. This

Table 10. Occupational Mobility and Support for Wallace in 1975 among Harris County Residents

	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
Occupation Mobility		
Declining Occupational Status	56%	(9)
No Change	54%	(39)
Rising Occupational Status	--	(4)

taps the extent to which attitudes toward an out-group can represent a threat to an individual's own status.[6] On the other hand, the poltical motivations attributed to objective social indicators are varied and complex. Since Governor Wallace's public identity has largely centered on racial issues, we might expect that the subjective dimensions of social status would more clearly delineate Wallace supporters from nonsupporters than education or occupational prestige.

The data presented in Table 8 lend support to this hypothesis. Among Harris County respondents there is a positive relationship between relative deprivation and support for Wallace; i.e., a tendency to feel socially uneasy because of the gains made by blacks is associated with a marked tendency to prefer Wallace.

This attitudinal tendency is especially pronounced when examined over time (see Table 11). Responses to items measuring relative deprivation in 1968 were compared with identical measures elicited

Table 11. Changes in Relative Deprivation and Support for Wallace
in 1975

	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
Relative Deprivation		
Decrease	33%	(3)
No Change	37%	(27)
Increase	67%	(12)

from Harris County respondents in 1975. Those whose feelings of rela-tive deprivation remained consistent were considerably less likely to continue supporting Wallace than respondents reporting more intense feelings of relative deprivation.

Discussion

The trends in support for Wallace among socioeconomic groups re-ported in this chapter are generally consistent with his strength in the 1968 election, although levels of support among various age groups and Fundamentalist Christian sects were not consistent with our ex-pectations. Men, members of labor unions, and less educated voters were found to be consistently supportive of Wallace in Harris County and throughout the South. Wallace also demonstrated considerable strength among working class and middle class voters. High status followers, on the other hand, were less likely to remain loyal to Wallace. Respondents with some college and/or employed in professional or managerial occupations were least likely to continue supporting

Wallace. And finally, Governor Wallace gained considerable support
from Harris County voters who reported strong or increased feelings of
relative deprivation.

A few differences between the 1968 and 1972 CPR samples and the
Harris County sample bear mention here. While the trends in support
among various groups were generally consistent, the between group
fluctuation was considerably greater among southern voters. This
can probably be attributed to the greater heterogeneity of the southern
sample; e.g., the difference in psychological meaning attached to a
working class occupation probably varies more across southern states
than within Harris County.

Secondly, the level of 1972 support among southerners is higher
among all groups than in 1968, but it does not seem likely that this
increase can be wholly attributed to Wallace's greater popularity.
On the one hand, Wallace undoubtedly attracted greater support in
1972 by running for president as a Democrat -- thereby improving
his stature as a serious national candidate. On the other hand, it
seems likely that two factors may have served to artificially in-
flate the 1972 support figure somewhat. The respondents in the 1972
CPR sample selected themselves by reporting that they had voted for
Wallace in 1968. Since research on post-election surveys indicates
that the proportion of respondents claiming to have supported the
victorious candidate is generally higher, we might expect a slight
recall bias.[7] A likely effect of this bias would be a slight over-
representation of the more committed Wallace voter. Higher ratings
for Wallace stemming from feelings of sympathy must also be considered.
Since the 1972 interviews were conducted within five months of the

attempted assassination, it seems likely that Wallace gained higher ratings from some who were expressing feelings of concern and sympathy rather than actual candidate preference.[8]

End Notes

[1]Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racially Separate or Together? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 234.

[2]Ibid., p. 234.

[3]Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 451-452.

[4]Irving Crespi, "Structural Sources of the George Wallace Constituency," Social Science Quarterly (June 1971), pp. 122-132.

[5]James A. Barber, Social Mobility and Voting Behavior (New York: Aldine, 1970), pp. 143-145.

[6]A person can feel threatened as a member of an economic group or as a racial group. See, e.g., Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racially Separate or Together? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 243-248.

[7]Charles Backstrom and Gerald Hursh, Survey Research (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 27-28.

[8]Herbert Weisberg and Jerrold Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," American Political Science Review (December 1970), p. 1170.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

AND SUPPORT FOR WALLACE

The relationships between political characertistics and support for Wallace are examined in this chapter. The first section is concerned with the political backgrounds of Wallace supporters. The extent to which respondent levels of partisanship and political interest, and/or political activity, are congruent with those of their parents is discussed. The effects of these socialization patterns are then analyzed to determine if candidate loyalty is affected by acceptance or rejection of parental values.

The second section deals with partisan orientations and political activity. The initial concern is the effect of current party identification upon candidate loyalty. Attention then shifts to the dynamics of party identification. Harris County respondents are the primary focus here since the panel permits the analysis of turnover. How much change has actually taken place between 1968 and 1975? What is the direction of these changes; i.e., do a higher proportion of respondents currently identify themselves as Democrats or Independents than in 1968? The effects of these partisan changes on continuing support for Wallace are then discussed. Finally, the impact of political acitivites, past and present, on support is analyzed.

Patterns of Political Socialization

The absence of any socialization literature dealing with the supporters of Wallace or of third party movements in general leaves few

empirical guidelines. One of the important socialization effects stems from psychological meaning attached to party identification by voters. It is assumed that the strength and direction of respondents' party identification, at least partially, reflects the partisan pro-clivities of their parents. The retention of parental party ties pre-sumably serves to depress the likelihood of support for Wallace, par-ticularly if he is perceived as an Independent.[*]

The similarity of respondent-parent partisan perferences is displayed in Table 12. The Democrats were quite cohesive; the level of partisan agreement between respondents and parents ranged from a low of 85 percent to a high of 100 percent (see Table 12). Republicans, on the other hand, were considerably more likely to have been reared by parents identifying with the Democratic party, as were Independents. Few Republicans or Independents were reared by parents with like par-tisan tendencies, thus reflecting the predominance of the Democratic party in the South.

The effects of party socialization patterns on support for Wal-lace are summarized in Table 13. The data indicate that southern voters holding partisan views similar to those held by their parents were consistently less likely to support Wallace, although the differ-ences between socialized and nonsocialized respondents is not large. In Harris County, the nonsocialized respondents were also more likely to support Wallace in 1968, but by 1975, this tendency was no longer evident. In large part this can be attributed to the decline

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[*]It should be noted that William Schneider argues that the op-posite is true; i.e., many southern voters supported Wallace in 1968 because they felt that he was the only true Democrat in the presidential contest despite his A.I.P. label.

Table 12. Parental Party Identification by Respondent Party Identification

Respondents	Parents		
	Democrat	Republican	Independent[a]
	%	%	%
Harris County (1968)			
Democrats	100	64	65
Republicans	--	27	17
Independents	--	9	17
Totals	100	100	99[b]
	(13)	(11)	(23)
South (1968)			
Democrats	90	75	64
Republicans	8	25	21
Independents	3	--	14
Totals	101	100	99
	(40)	(4)	(28)
South (1972)			
Democrats	93	46	71
Republicans	6	46	25
Independents	2	8	4
Totals	101	100	100
	(55)	(13)	(28)
Harris County (1975)			
Democrats	85	67	70
Republicans	--	33	20
Independents	15	--	11
Totals	100	100	100
	(11)	(3)	(33)

[a]Parental Independents include those who consistently supported neither the Democrats nor the Republicans.

[b]Percentages do not total to 100% due to rounding.

Table 13. Parental Transmission of Party Identification by Support for Wallace

	Wallace Supporters			
	Harris Co. (1968)	South* (1968)	South* (1972)	Harris Co. (1975)
Transmission of Party Ties				
Same Party	74%	63%	76%	50%
Different Party	82%	70%	83%	49%
	(N=52)	(N=65)	(N=112)	(N=52)

*Data Source: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

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in both Republican and Democratic party identifiers and the concomitant growth in the proportion of respondents identifying themselves as Independents.

To what extent is the inclination toward political activity or one's interest in politics adopted from parental political activities? As Table 14 indicates, a higher proportion of politically active respondents than inactive respondents were reared by parents who engaged in similar activity. The tendency for parents to transmit an interest in politics to their children is even more pronounced, as Table 14 indicates, Southern voters evincing an interest in politics were substantially more likely than uninterested respondents to have been reared by parents who were interested in politics.

The impact of these socialization patterns on continuing support for Wallace is displayed in Table 15. Harris County respondents socialized into political activity were less likely to evince support for the

Table 14. Parental Transmission of Political Interest and Activity in 1968

| | Parental Political Activity | | | | Parental Interest in Politics | | | |
	Active	Inactive	Totals	N	Low	High	Totals	N
Respondent Political Activity (Harris Co.)								
Active	63%	38%	101%[a]	(8)	---	---	---	---
Inactive	51%	39%	100%	(41)	---	---	---	---
Respondent Political Interest (South)								
Low	---	---	---	---	69%	31%	100%	(13)
High	---	---	---	---	27%	73%	100%	(63)

[a]Percentages do not total to 100% due to rounding.

Alabaman in both 1968 and 1975, although the differences are small.
Respondents characterized by inconsistent socialization patterns (i.e.,
active parents-inactive offspring, or vice versa) were initially less
supportive than those socialized into either political activity or in-
activity. But by 1975, a greater proportion of respondents in the
nonsocialized category expressed support for Wallace than either the
actives or the inactives. As Table 15 suggests, respondents in the non-
socialized group were least likely to withdraw their support for
Wallace between 1968 and 1975.

A more consistent pattern is found among southern voters (see
Table 15). Politically uninterested respondents reared by like-minded
parents were most supportive of Wallace in 1968. Conversely, those
respondents who adopted an interest in politics from their parents
were considerably less supportive.

To summarize, the transmission of partisan ties and political
activity and/or interest in politics is associated with declining levels
of support for Wallace. This is particularly true for respondents
whose parents were interested in politics or were politically active.
Since political activity is typically associated with intensity of
party identification, it seems likely that these voters eventually
became uncomfortable with Wallace's third party stance.

The Impact of Party Identification

Earlier studies centering on the social and political character-
istics of voters supporting Wallace in 1968 have generally emphasized
the importance of issues rather than partisanship as an explanation of
electoral strength.[1] Professor Phillip Converse, et al, found that

Table 15. The Effects of Political Interest and Activity on Support for Wallace.

	Support for Wallace				
	1968			1975	
	%	N		%	N
Parental Transmission of Political Activity (Harris County)					
Both active	80%	(5)		40%	(5)
Mixed	70%	(27)		57%	(28)
Both inactive	91%	(20)		42%	(19)
Parental Transmission of Interest in Politics (South)					
Both interested	59%	(7)		---	----
Mixed	74%	(19)		---	----
Both uninterested	86%	(39)		---	----

partisanship was strongly related to affective feelings toward Demo-
crat Hubert Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon, but was unrelated
to support for Governor Wallace, running as an Independent.[2] Seymour
Lipset and Earl Raab indicate that Wallace received a considerably lar-
ger share of the vote among Independents (22%) than among Democrats
(11%) or Republicans (6%).[3] After the 1968 election, however,
Wallace again chose to seek the Democratic nomination. This raises
the question as to whether Wallace continues to be perceived and eval-
uated in a relatively nonpartisan light, or whether his return to the
Democratic party resulted in an alteration of his support based along
partisan lines. Initially, this question will be dealt with by compar-
ing the partisan tendencies of those supporting Wallace in 1968
with more recent data. Are southern voters in 1972, or Harris County
voters in 1975, more likely to evaluate Governor Wallace in a partisan
way than in 1968? Next, the dynamics of partisan change and its im-
pact on continuing support for Wallace is examined in greater detail.

The relationships between party identification and support for
Wallace are summarized in Table 16. Among Harris County voters in
1968, the Republicans were considerably less likely than either the
Democrats or the Independents to express support for Wallace. Indepen-
dents were somewhat more supportive of Wallace than the Democrats.
Among southern voters, Independents were somewhat more supportive of
Wallace than either Democrats or Republicans. Among partisan voters,
Democrats and Republicans were equally likely to support Wallace (see
Table 16). These findings are thus consistent with earlier research
attributing little explanatory power to partisanship as an indicator
or support.[4]

Table 16. Party Identification by Support for Wallace

| | Wallace Supporters | | | |
Party Identification	Harris Co. (1968)	South* (1968)	South* (1972)	Harris Co. (1975)
Democrats	80%	65%	75%	46%
Republicans	55%	80%	85%	33%
Independents	88%	65%	86%	53%
	(N=52)	(N=65)	(N=112)	(N=52)

*Data Source: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan,

Table 17. Partisan Change in Harris County, 1968-1975

Party Identification	Direction of Change							
	No Change		Democrats		Independents		Republicans	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Democrats	53%	(8)	---	----	47%	(7)	---	----
Republicans	18%	(2)	9%	(1)	73%	(8)	---	----
Independents	80%	(20)	16%	(4)	---	----	4%	(1)

When patterns of support for Wallace in 1972 and 1975 are examined, a somewhat different picture emerges, as Table 16 indicates. In the 1972 sample southern Democrats are somewhat less supportive of Wallace than either Republicans[5] or Independents, with the latter groups reporting equal levels of support. A similar trend was found among Harris County respondents. Democrats were considerably less supportive of Wallace than either Republicans or Independents. Again, both Republicans and Independents were equally supportive. At first glance this trend seems somewhat surprising. Before speculating on this matter, however, let us first examine the dynamics of party identification.

Changes in party identification are displayed in Tables 17 and 18. Aggregate change was obtained by subtracting the proportion of the total sample held by each party at time one from the corresponding proportion at time two (see Table 18). The data indicate that trends in party identification in both Harris County and the South are quite similar. As Table 18 indicates, the proportion of both Democrats and Republicans declined over time although the tendency was

Table 18. Aggregate Change in Party Identification

Party Identification	Percent Differences	
	Harris County (1968-1975)	South (1968-1972)
Democrats	- 3.9	- 2.8
Republicans	-15.7	- 6.1
Independents	+19.6	+ 8.9

particularly pronounced among the Republicans. Independents were the chief beneficiary of this trend, increasing their ranks by 20 percent in Harris County, and 9 percent in the South.

A question not answered by these aggregate figures is whether such change is essentially unidirectional or whether these net changes are actually concealing a greater amount of partisan switching. An examination of the Harris County data reveals that considerable partisan change in several directions has occurred (see Table 17). Partisan fluctuation was especially pronounced among the Republicans. Only three respondents who identified themselves as Republicans in 1968 were so identified in 1975. The vast majority of former Republicans (73%) switched to the Independents. Only one former Republican (9%) made his way into the Democratic camp.

Considerable partisan change within the Democratic party was also evident. Approximately 53 percent of the 1968 Democratic group remained loyal, while the remaining 47 percent switched to the Independents. None switched to the Republican party.

The Independents were considerably more stable as a group than either the Democrats or Republicans. Eighty percent of the Harris County respondents reporting themselves as Independents in 1968 remained in this category. Only one respondent (4%) turned to the Republican party, while the remaining switchers (16%) became Democrats. In short, there was considerable movement away from the Republican party between 1968 and 1975 with no corresponding influx of recruits from either the Democrats or the Independents, thereby solidifying their position as the minority party. The Democrats, on the other hand, lost nearly half of their members to the Independents, although they

successfully attracted a lesser number of Independents to their ranks.
The Independents were therefore the prime beneficiary of these trends
since there was virtually no movement of Democrats to the Republican
party or vice versa.

In analyzing these changes, we direct attention to two important
qualifications. First, a substantial majority of respondents (62%) did
not change their party identification between 1968 and 1975. The
changers thus represent a relatively small proportion of the electorate.
Secondly, it is necessary to re-emphasize the fact that our survey of
Harris County voters was not a representative cross-section of the com-
munity, but of people wishing to place Governor Wallace's name on the
presidential ballot in 1968.

The implications of these changes for Wallace support are summar-
ized in Tables 19 and 20. Continuing support for Wallace varies con-
siderably between those standing firm with their partisan choice (stand-
patters) and those who have changed (switchers). As Table 19 indi-
cates, the switchers are somewhat more likely to evince continuing
support for Wallace than are standpatters. This tendency is especially
pronounced among respondents who have switched their party allegiance

Table 19. Partisan Chance by Support For Wallace in 1975 (Harris Co.)

Partisan Change	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
Standpatters	45%	(31)
Switchers	53%	(19)

from Democrat to Independent (see Table 20). Republican-to-Independent switchers, on the other hand, are least likely to express support for Wallace in 1975.

Table 20. The Direction of Partisan Change by Support for Wallace in 1975 (Harris County)

Direction of Partisan Change	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
Independent-to-Democrat	50%	(4)
Democrat-to-Independent	86%	(7)
Republican-to-Independent	25%	(8)

The data thus indicate that Democrats are less likely than the Independents to continue supporting Wallace, despite the fact that Wallace rejoined the Democratic party. This holds true for those who switched from Independent to Democrat as well as standpat Democrats. These findings suggest that partisanship continues to play a relatively minor role in respondents' evaluation of Wallace. It seems likely that the interplay between partisanship and ideological considerations can best explain the Democratic defections from Wallace supporters.

This assertion is strengthened by a series of crosstabulations between party, ideological stance, and support. All Republicans classified themselves as conservatives compared with 67% of the Democrats and 69% of the Independents. Among conservative voters, Republicans (67%) and Independents (76%) were somewhat more supportive than Democrats (63%), although the differences are not large. The

key difference lies in the analysis of moderate to liberal voters (N=15).

Only 25% of the liberal Democrats remained loyal to Wallace compared

with 55% for the Independents. The latter group was apparently swayed

by Wallace's brand of neo-populism. These Democrats, on the other

hand, presumably felt more comfortable with leaders of the national

Democratic party. For this small group of Democrats, partisanship

retains a certain residue of psychological impact.

The next section is devoted to the impact of political activity

on support for Wallace. For purposes of this analysis political

activity includes all forms of active political participation, other than

talking about politics. The relationship between recent political

activity and support for Wallace is summarized in Table 21. The data

indicate that those who participate in politics are less likely to con-

tinue supporting Wallace than those who do not. This is generally

consistent with previous research linking support for Wallace with pol-

itical inactivity.

Table 21. Recent Political Activity by Support for Wallace in 1975
        (Harris County)

Recent Political Activity	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
Active	46%	(11)
Inactive	51%	(39)

If we examine prior political behavior as well as recent partici-

pation, a similar pattern emerges (see Table 22). Those who have

never engaged in political activity or who have been politically in-active since 1968 remain highly supportive of Wallace. On the other hand, respondents who have been continuously involved in political activity or who have recently participated in political activities are less supportive. In short, the data indicate that political activity is inversely related to support for Wallace.

Table 22. Support for Wallace in 1975 by Changing Levels of Political Activity (Harris County)

Political Activity	Support	
	%	N
Previous Political Activity	80%	(5)
Never Active	64%	(36)
Recent Political Activity	56%	(9)
Continuous Political Activity	50%	(2)

Conclusion

The major findings of this chapter may be summarized as follows:

(1) There is a slight negative relationship between party social-ization and support for Wallace.

(2) Socialization of interest in politics is negatively associated with support for Wallace.

(3) Socialization of political activity is negatively associated with continuing support for Wallace.

(4) Independents are most likely to remain supportive of Gover-nor Wallace. Among southern voters, Republicans were slightly less

likely than Independents to remain supportive while the Democrats were least likely to remain faithful. In Harris County, Republicans were least likely to continue supporting Wallace.

(5) Partisan loyalists are less likely than switchers to evince support for Wallace. Democrat-to-Independent swithcers are most likely to continue supporting Wallace, followed by Independent-to-Democrat switchers. Republican-to-Independent switchers are the least supportive group.

(6) Recent political activity is negatively associated with continuing support for Wallace.

End Notes

[1]Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rush, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review (December 1969), pp. 1083-1105.

[2]Ibid., p. 1094.

[3]Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (New York: Harper and Row), p. 423.

[4]Herbert Weisberg and Jerrold Rush, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," American Political Science Review (December 1970), p. 1170.

[5]Although the percentage reported for Harris County Republicans in 1975 fits the trend, this finding should be viewed with caution since only three were counted.

[6]Lipset and Raab, p. 396.

CHAPTER V

POLICY PREFERENCES AND SUPPORT FOR WALLACE

The effects of policy preferences upon support for Wallace are examined in this chapter. The major question dealt with in the first section is whether individual preferences for increasing or decreasing levels of governmental activity in various policy areas are likely to be translated into policy support for Wallace.[1] Since voter responses to policy issues in both 1968 and 1975 are available, the effects of changing policy preferences on the continuation of supportive attitudes toward the Governor are analyzed. The policy areas examined within this section include integration, taxation of varying income groups, social welfare, and foreign affairs.

The impact of important political events on support for Wallace in 1975 is analyzed in the second section. The major concern is the extent to which support is affected by such foreign policy events as former President Nixon's visit to China, or by such domestic events as the pardoning of Nixon by President Ford.

One further point bears mention. The analytical focus of this chapter is restricted to Harris County voters. Policy questions included in the 1968 survey of southern voters by the Center for Political Research at the University of Michigan were not repeated for the 1972 survey. Where appropriate, the findings of other studies probing the policy preferences of Wallace supporters will be cited to either buttress or question the validity of our results. We begin by examining the impact of domestic policy preferences on continuing

support for Wallace,

Domestic Policy Preferences and
Support for Wallace

A brief reiteration of the issue preferences found among Wallace supporters in previous studies (see Chapter II) leads us to expect a blend of social conservatism and economic liberalism on many policy issues. Those supporting the Governor were generally hostile to policies relating to civil rights or integration, but were more supportive of Federal programs designed to benefit the working class,

The relationships between domenstic policy attitudes and support for Wallace are displayed in Tables 23 through 26. The expectation that respondents opposed to integration would remain more supportive of the Alabaman is generally borne out by those data (see Table 23), In both 1968 and 1975, respondents favoring a decrease in governmental enforcement of integration were more likely to support Wallace than those who favored keeping things the same, Support for Wallace was surprisingly high among proponents of increased governmental enforcement of integration in 1975, However, this finding should be interpreted with caution given the paucity of respondents (N = 4) within this category. If we combine the categories of respondents favoring either the present level of integration or an increase, two trends become evident. First, those opposing governmental enforcement of integration remain more supportive of Wallace than its proponents, Secondly, the overwhelming majority of respondents prefer that the government not enforce integration at all,

There are few studies which have examined public attitudes toward Wallace since 1968. But a pair of studies analyzing the Governor's

Table 23. Attitudes toward Governmental Enforcement of Integration by Support for Wallace: 1968 and 1975

	Wallace Supporters			
	Harris County (1968)		Harris County (1975)	
	%	N	%	N
Attitudes toward Enforcement				
Decrease	87%	(30)	57%	(35)
Keep the Same	75%	(16)	29%	(7)
Increase	---	----	75%	(4)

1970 gubernatorial campaign in Alabama[2] and Wallace delegates to the
National Democratic Convention in 1972 from Texas[3] reinforce the view
that Wallace continues to be perceived as hostile to civil rights.

Table 24 summarizes the relationships between attitudes toward
Federal taxation of various income groups and support for Wallace. In
both 1968 and 1975, proponents of increased taxation for the wealthy
are clearly more supportive of Wallace than those favoring the same level
of taxation or decrease, while virtually no one favors increased taxes
for individuals in the middle or lower income levels.

The data indicate that changing attitudes toward the taxation of
middle income individuals were reflected in differing patterns of
support between 1968 and 1975. Respondents favoring a decrease in taxes
for middle income families were initially more likely to support Wal-
lace than those who preferred to keep taxes at the (then) current
level. However, by 1975 this pattern was reversed. Respondents fav-
oring fewer taxes for middle income individuals were somewhat less
likely to favor Wallace.

Harris County voters favoring a decrease in taxes for low income
groups were most supportive of the Alabaman in both 1968 and 1975, but
this tendency was clearly more pronounced in the latter survey. The
figures generally indicate that respondents favoring a more equitable
distribution of the tax burden (i.e., more taxes for the wealthy,
fewer taxes for the poor) were consistently more supportive of the
Governor.

The data presented in Table 25 summarize the relationships be-
tween Federal spending on aid to education and public housing and con-
tinuing support for Wallace. In 1968 there was a very slight tendency

Table 24. Attitudes toward Taxation by Support for Wallace: 1968 and 1975.

	Wallace Supporters			
	Harris County (1968)		Harris County (1975)	
	%	N	%	N
Attitudes toward Taxation				
Tax on Large Incomes				
Decrease	79%	(14)	39%	(13)
Keep the Same	64%	(11)	44%	(9)
Increase	95%	(20)	55%	(29)
Tax on Middle Incomes				
Decrease	90%	(29)	46%	(24)
Keep the Same	72%	(18)	54%	(24)
Increase	---	----	---	(1)
Tax on Small Incomes				
Decrease	83%	(40)	57%	(30)
Keep the Same	80%	(5)	40%	(18)
Increase	100%	(1)	---	(1)

Table 25. Attitudes Toward Federal Spending on Education and Housing by Support for Wallace: 1968 and 1975

| | Wallace Supporters | | | |
| | Harris County (1968) | | Harris County (1975) | |
	%	N	%	N
Aid to Education				
Decrease	83%	(23)	44%	(25)
Keep the Same	83%	(6)	83%	(6)
Increase	89%	(18)	50%	(16)
Public Housing and Slum Clearance				
Decrease	91%	(32)	44%	(27)
Keep the Same	71%	(7)	55%	(11)
Increase	78%	(9)	70%	(10)

for those favoring greater Federal spending on aid to education to evince

support for Wallace. This tendency became more pronounced by 1975,

particularly among respondents who favored maintaining the same level of

Federal spending on aid to education.

An examination of the relationship between Federal spending on

public housing and support for Wallace reveals a more distinct trend.

In 1968, opponents of governmental spending for public housing were

clearly more likely to support Wallace than its proponents, but by

1975 this trend was reversed. The data indicate that voter preference

for increased spending on public housing and slum clearance was positively

associated with support for Wallace in 1975. In short, the data in-

dicate that between 1968 and 1975, Harris County voters becoming more

favorably inclined toward similar or increased governmental expendi-

tures for these social programs were also more likely to continue

supporting Wallace.

Mixed results are obtained when the effects of attitudes toward

social welfare policies on support for Wallace are examined (see Table

26). Based on the preceding analysis, we expected to find that pre-

ference for increased minimum wages and social security benefits would

be accompanied by a corresponding increase in support for Wallace.

The relationship between respondent attitudes toward minimum wages and

support for Wallace displayed in Table 26 is consistent with this

view. Proponents of current or increased minimum wage levels were

slightly less likely to support Wallace in 1968 than those favoring a

decrease in minimum wages. But by 1975, a reversal in policy prefer-

ence and supportive tendencies had occurred; i.e., voters favoring

higher minimum wages were more likely to support the Governor.

Table 26. Attitudes toward Social Welfare Policies by Support for Wallace: 1968 and 1975

	Wallace Supporters			
	Harris County (1968)		Harris County (1975)	
	%	N	%	N
Social Welfare Policies				
Social Security Benefits				
Decrease	83%	(6)	55%	(11)
Keep the Same	73%	(11)	44%	(9)
Increase	90%	(30)	56%	(27)
Minimum Wages				
Decrease	100%	(6)	25%	(8)
Keep the Same	83%	(18)	54%	(13)
Increase	83%	(23)	58%	(26)

The relationship between attitudes toward social security bene-
fits and support for Wallace does not fit this pattern. In 1968 voters
favoring a decrease in social security benefits were more supportive of
Wallace than those who favored maintenance of the existing level of
benefits, but were less supportive than proponents of increased bene-
fits. Respondents favoring a decrease in social security benefits
and those preferring an increase were equally likely to support Wal-
lace in 1975, as Table 26 indicates.

How can we explain the absence of a relationship between preferred
levels of social security benefits and support for Wallace? One pos-
sible explanation directs attention to the nature of the policy in
question. The benefits derived from such social programs as public
housing, aid to education, or even minimum wages, are not readily
perceptible to many individuals. For many, it is difficult to place
a tangible value on these programs; for others, recognition that these
policies differentially benefit some groups more than others is the
decisive factor. Conversely, the benefits received from social
security directly accrue to most Americans on an individual basis.
Most believe that the social security program is administered impar-
tially. Another reason for the program's popularity lies in the wide-
ly shared belief that individuals are receiving the fruits of previous
labors; consequently, social security does not connote "welfare."
For these reasons it seems probable that social security, unlike
other social programs, is perceived in relatively nonpolitical terms
and would not affect one's attitudes toward Governor Wallace.

To summarize, the data linking domestic policy preferences to
support for Wallace over time are generally consistent with our ex-

pectations. Attitudes toward governmental enforcement of integration
were negatively associated with support for Wallace. An examination
of governmental policy attitudes toward taxation of varying income
groups and social programs suggests that Wallace benefitted politically
from an undercurrent of populism. Voters favoring a lesser tax burden
for low income groups and a similar or increased level of Federal
expenditures for social programs were more likely to evince continuing
support for Wallace.

Foreign Policy Attitudes and Support For Wallace

Within the literature Wallace supporters are consistently portrayed
as advocates of an "America first" foreign policy and an aggressive mil-
itary posture (see Chapter II). As Table 27 indicates, respondents
favoring a decrease in both foreign aid and United States reliance on
the United Nations were considerably more supportive of Wallace than
those preferring greater Federal involvement. This tendency held true
for 1975 as well as 1968.

Respondent evaluation of political candidates are likely shaped
not only by the direction and intensity of one's policy preferences,
but by their perception of important political events and specific
policy decisions. In the next section, the impact of political
events and specific policy decisions upon support for Wallace in 1975
is analyzed.

Political Events and Support for Wallace

An analysis of the relationships between political events and
support does not enable us to establish a "trend" as with attitudes
toward general policy preferences. However, we recognize that specific

Table 27. Attitudes toward Foreign Affairs by Support for Wallace: 1968 and 1975

	Wallace Supporters			
	Harris County (1968)		Harris County (1975)	
	%	N	%	N
Foreign Affairs				
United States' Reliance on the United Nations				
Decrease	84%	(37)	57%	(35)
Keep the Same	67%	(6)	13%	(8)
Increase	100%	(1)	40%	(5)
Foreign Aid				
Decrease	83%	(48)	52%	(42)
Keep the Same	100%	(1)	17%	(6)
Increase	---	----	100%	(1)

events can affect candidate evaluation independently or indirectly
by shaping or altering individual attitudes toward policies identi-
fied with a candidate. We expect that the direction of these rela-
tionships will be generally consistent with prior studies linking re-
lated policy attitudes with support for the Governor.

One of the more significant political events occurring between
1968 and 1975 was the Watergate scandal. Since earlier studies have
consistently found high levels of political cynicism toward national
political institutions among persons supporting Wallace,[4] we would
expect that his followers would similarly manifest greater dissatis-
faction and/or cynicism toward Watergate-related events. The data
presented in Table 28 partially substantiate this view. Voters who
agreed that the corruption in the Watergate scandal was typical of
most politicians were more supportive of Governor Wallace in 1975 than
those taking the opposite viewpoint. Similarly, those who believed
that President Nixon should have resigned were somewhat more likely
to support Wallace.

On the other hand, respondents favoring the pardon of Nixon by
President Ford were more supportive of Wallace than those who were
either undecided or who disagreed with the pardon. One possibility is
that the pardon of Nixon was perceived as necessary to maintain the
dignity of the presidency, thereby avoiding the negative consequences
of a long and highly publicized trial. However, this explanation
does not consider the high level of cynicism toward political leaders
and institutions that was evident long before the Watergate crisis.
A more plausible explanation centers attention upon the personal pop-
ularity of Nixon in the South. In The Irony of Democracy, Thomas

Table 28.   Attitudes toward Watergate-Related Events by Support for
            Wallace in 1975.

Watergate-Related Events	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
Watergate Corruption is Typical of Most Politicians		
Agree	57%	(28)
Disagree	48%	(21)
Undecided	---	(2)
President Ford's Pardon of former President Nixon		
Should have pardoned	55%	(20)
Should not have pardoned	46%	(24)
Undecided	50%	(8)
President Nixon's Resignation		
Should have resigned	50%	(42)
Should not have resigned	40%	(5)
Undecided	100%	(2)

Dye and Harmon Zeigler attribute Nixon's popularity in this region to

the implementation of his "Southern strategy":

> (Nixon) vigorously opposed bussing, a major Wallace rallying
> point, sought to subvert the desegragation guidelines adopted
> by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and nom-
> inated two Southerners to the Supreme Court. Although Nixon
> was unsuccessful in many such efforts, the symbolic gratifica-
> tion to the South was apparent -- increased support for Nixon
> in Congress, in Nixon's success in the 1972 elections, and in
> his higher popularity in public opinion polls in the South.[5]

Appreciation for these "gestures," however, unsuccessful, may

partially explain the greater support found among Wallace followers

for President Ford's pardon of Nixon.

Wallace's identification with an aggressive foreign policy stance

leads us to expect a like reaction toward foreign policy events from

his supporters. The data presented in Table 29 are generally consis-

tent with this view. Support for Wallace in 1975 is more pronounced

among those opposing President Ford's amnesty plan for draft evaders

and among those favoring military support for the Israelis.

The relationship between attitudes toward the United States' in-

volvement in Vietnam and support for Wallace is more complex. Al-

though the overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that the initial

military involvement of the United States in Vietnam was appropriate,

they were somewhat less supportive of Wallace than those who disagreed

with this position. This question is obviously subject to a myriad of

interpretations. One possibility is that dissatisfaction with the

initial military involvement in Vietnam is not based on the respondents'

reluctance to commit American troops overseas but with a more retro-

spective appraisal of the negative consequences of the war. Knowledge

that the obligation of the United States to provide military aid to

Table 29. Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Decisions by Support for
            Wallace in 1975.

Foreign Policy Decisions	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
President Ford's Amensty Plan		
Favors	29%	(7)
Does not favor	54%	(37)
Undecided	60%	(5)
United State' Military Involvement in Vietnam		
Should have become involved	50%	(34)
Should not have become involved	63%	(8)
Undecided	---	(3)
United States' Military Support for Israel		
Favors	57%	(21)
Does not favor	43%	(14)
Undecided	46%	(13)

South Vietnam was fulfilled did not compensate for the perceived decline in patriotism and respect for military leaders resulting from the war and the failure of American political leaders to more vigorously press for a military victory in Vietnam.

Table 30 indicates, voters favoring a tougher foreign policy stance toward communist countries were more likely to express support for Wallace in 1975. Those favoring the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia and Red China were somewhat less supportive of Wallace as were voters supporting President Nixon's visit to China. Respondents who did not approve of trade with communist countries were considerably more supportive of Wallace than those who did.

In short, the effects of voter attitudes toward political events and policies upon support for Wallace in 1975 were generally consistent with our expectations. Support for Wallace was more pronounced among those taking a more cynical view toward Watergate-related decisions and among voters advocating a tougher foreign policy stance.

Summary

The findings reported in this chapter may be summarized as follows:

(1) There is a negative relationship between governmental enforcement of integration and continuing support for Wallace.

(2) Harris County voters favoring increased taxes for the wealthy and fewer taxes for the poor are more likely to express continuing support for Wallace.

(3) There is a positive relationship between greater acceptance of Federal social programs between 1968 and 1975; i.e., aid to education and public housing, and continuing support for Wallace.

Table 30. Attitudes toward United States' Relations with Communist Countries by Support for Wallace in 1975.

United States' Relations with Communist Countries	Wallace Supporters	
	%	N
President Nixon's Visit to China		
Should have visited	46%	(22)
Should not have visited	57%	(23)
Undecided	33%	(6)
Friendly Relattions with China		
Favors	46%	(37)
Does not favor	50%	(10)
Undecided	67%	(3)
Friendly Relations with Russia		
Favors	46%	(37)
Does not favor	56%	(9)
Undecided	50%	(4)
Trade with Communist Countries		
Favors	35%	(17)
Does not favor	56%	(27)
Undecided	50%	(4)

(4) There is a positive relationship between greater acceptance of increased minimum wages and continuing support for Wallace.

(5) Attitudes toward social security benefits are unrelated to continuing support for Wallace.

(6) Opponents of foreign aid and United States' reliance on the United Nations are more likely to continue supporting Wallace.

(7) Voters who agreed that Watergate-style corruption was typical of most politicians were more supportive of Wallace in 1975.

(8) Voters who agreed that President Ford should have pardoned Nixon were more likely to support Wallace in 1975.

(9) Those who agreed that President Nixon should have resigned were more likely to support Wallace in 1975.

(10) Those who opposed President Ford's decision to grant partial amnesty to draft evaders were more likely to support Wallace in 1975.

(11) Those who agreed that the United States should not have become militarily involved in Vietnam were more likely to support Wallace in 1975.

(12) Voters favoring military support for Israel were more supportive of Wallace in 1975.

(13) Those who did not favor the maintenance of friendly relations with communist countries (including trade) were more likely to support Wallace in 1975.

End Notes

[1]The questions designed to tap attitudes toward perferred levels of governmental activity were adopted from Herbert McCloskey, "Issues Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," American Political Science Review (June 1960), pp. 406-427.

[2]Earl Black and Merle Black, "The Demographic Basis of Wallace Support in Alabama," American Political Quarterly (July 1973), pp. 279-302.

[3]Marianne M. Jameson, "Political Style Among Political Activists in Texas" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Houston, 1974).

[4]See especially Douglas St. Angelo and Douglas Dobson, "Candidates, Issues and Political Estrangement," American Politics Quarterly (January 1975), pp. 45-59; and Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racially Separate or Together? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 231-251.

[5]Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press 1975), pp. 170-171.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine patterns of support between 1968 and 1975 for the presidential candidacy of Governor George C. Wallace. Three sets of variables were employed to explain variations in patterns of support -- demographic and socioeconomic factors, political background factors, and individual policy preferences. These variables were chosen largely because previous studies had usefully employed these indicators to analyze the political support received by Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. However, unlike other studies, this research sought to consider the time dimension in examining Wallace's support base.

The major substantive findings are summarized in the first three sections of this chapter. In the final section, the political impact of Governor Wallace's career on American electoral politics is discussed. We begin by reviewing the effects of demographic and socioeconomic factors on continuing support for Wallace.

Socioeconomic Factors and
Support for Wallace

In examining the impact of demographic variables and socioeconomic variables on continuing support for Wallace, we found that demographic variables had little explanatory power. Age was not consistently related to support in Harris County or among Southerners. Religious affiliation, to a lesser extent, also failed to provide an adequate explanation of continuing support for the Governor. Southerners identifying themselves as members of fundamentalists Christian sects were

somewhat more likely than Baptists to express support for Wallace in both 1968 and 1972. Conversely, there was little support for the Alabaman among Harris County Fundamentalists in either 1968 or 1975. Only sex was consistently related to support for Wallace, although the differences were not large. Men were somewhat more supportive of Wallace in both surveys.

Socioeconomic factors, on the other hand, provided a more satisfactory explanation of continuing support for the Governor. This was particularly true for members of labor unions who were consistently more supportive of Wallace than nonmembers. Wallace also benefitted from the support of those with less education and respondents employed in less prestigious occupations.

The importance of status as an explanatory variable becomes especially evident when a subjective indicator of status -- relative deprivation -- is employed. Harris County voters who felt that blacks were receiving relatively greater opportunities to succeed than whites were considerably more likely to support Wallace in both 1968 and 1975. Changes in attitudes or socioeocnomic standing between 1968 and 1975 were also important. Increased feelings of relative deprivation and declining occupational prestige were both associated with continuing support Wallace in 1975.

These findings generally indicate that socioeconomic variables were of greater importance in explaining patterns of support for Wallace than demographic factors. They also substantiate the explanatory value of both social and economic factors.

Political Background Factors and Support for Wallace

Political background factors were not strongly related to con-
tinuing support for Wallace. This becomes especially apparent when
patterns of socialization are examined. Respondents socialized into
a greater interest in politics, or political activity, were somewhat
less supportive of Wallace than less active respondents, or those
with inconsistent socialization patterns. Voters retaining parental
party identification were similarly less likely to support Wallace in
1968. But among southern voters in 1972 and Harris County voters in
1975, there was virtually no difference in levels of support for Wal-
lace between respondents identifying with the same political party as
their paretns and those who did not. These findings suggest that the
assertion of independence from parental party ties in 1968 was a tem-
porary phenomenon for many southern voters. For some, a process of
rationalization whereby Wallace was perceived as the only "true" Demo-
crat in the presidential contest was convincing.[1]

An examination of the effects of partisanship on support for Wal-
lace reveals both similarities and differences between Harris County
voters and the southern electorate. Respondents identifying themselves
as Independents were most likely to consistently express support for
Wallace in both samples. But Republicans were the least supportive
group among Harris County voters, while Democrats were least likely
to support Wallace in the South. An examination of partisan change
in Harris County between 1968 and 1975 indicates that Democrat-to-
Independent switchers were most supportive of Wallace in 1975 fol-
lowed by Independent-to-Democrat switchers. Those shifting party alleg-
iance from Republican to Independent were the least supportive group.
In short, these findings further corroborate earlier studies finding

greater support for Wallace among Independents.

We also found that political activity in both 1968 and 1975 was negatively associated with support for Wallace in Harris County.

Policy Preferences and Support for Wallace

Our results were generally consistent with the expectation that a mix of social conservatism and economic liberalism on policy issues would typify Wallace supporters in Harris County. Voters opposing governmental enforcement of integration were more supportive of the Governor in both 1968 and 1975. Proponents of Higher taxes for high income groups were more likely to consistently express support for Wallace, as were voters favoring a lesser tax burden on the lower income group.

The relationships between attitudes toward Federal social programs (except for social security benefits) and support for Wallace underwent a shift between 1968 and 1975. There was an increasing tendency for proponents of similar or increased government activity on behalf of aid to education, public housing, and minimum wages to support Wallace.

Wallace supporters were strongly united on foreign policy issues. Opponents of increased American reliance on the United Nations and foreign aid were consistently and overwhelmingly more supportive of the Governor than voters favoring these policies.

Attitudes toward current events and specific governmental de- cisions were generally consistent with one's policy preferences. On Watergate-related issues support for Wallace was generally found among those expressing greater cynicism toward politicians and among those who felt sympathy for former President Nixon. Voters who agreed that

the persons convicted of Watergate crimes were typical of most poli-
ticians were more likely to support Wallace in 1975 as were those
favoring President Nixon's decision to resign and his subsequent par-
don by President Ford.

As expected, Wallace supporters generally favored a tougher for-
eign policy stance. Opponents of President Ford's decision to grant
partial amnesty to draft evaders were more supportive of the Governor
in 1975 as were those who expressed disagreement with the initial de-
cision for the United States to become militarily involved in Vietnam.
Greater support for Wallace was also found among those who opposed
President Nixon's visit to China in 1971 and United States trade with
Communist countries. Voters favoring military aid to Israwl were also
more supportive of Wallace in 1975 than those who preferred otherwise,
or were undecided.

These findings indicate that Wallace supporters were consistently
opposed to governmental efforts to enforce integration but took an
increasingly liberal stance on Federal social programs. They also
preferred a tough foreign policy and a less cordial approach to rela-
tions with Communist nations.

<div align="center">

Governor Wallace and American
Electoral Politics
</div>

Having presented the major findings of the study, an evaluation of
Wallace's impact on American politics seems appropriate. This section
analyzes the Wallace phenomenon from two perspectives -- the individual
voter and the two-party system. We begin by examining the social
psychological factors underlying the political appeal of the Governor.
Why were voters attracted to Wallace? What political and/or cultural

circumstances served to enhance his appeal as a presidential candidate? Secondly, how was the two-party system in the United States affected by his presidential campaigns?

There seems little doubt that Wallace benefitted politically from the political and social climate prevailing in the middle 1960's and continuing well into the 1970's. The decline in public confidence toward political leaders and institutions has been thoroughly documented by attitudinal studies and public opinion polls.[2] In a study conducted for the United States Senate's Committee on Government Operations, Louis Harris presented figures which indicated that the proportion of the public expressing "a great deal of confidence" in the executive branch of the Federal Government declined from 41 percent to 19 percent between 1966 and 1973.[3]

Other studies conducted by Thomas Pettigrew and by Douglas St. Angelo and Douglas Dobson indicate that political cynicism and political alienation was particularly pronounced among supporters of Governor Wallace.[4] According to Walter Dean Burnham, public discontent stemmed from a variety of factors:

> Many of these liberal elites . . . occupy a sufficiently
> exalted position in the political structure to ensure that
> the direct social costs of combined racial and class inte-
> gration in the metropolitan area will be borne by those elements
> of the white population that are both economically and cul-
> turally least able to bear them. The results has been the
> repudiation of these elite by the rank and file who supported
> them from Presidents Franklin Roosevelt to John Kennedy.
> To all these pressures must be added the direct costs of the
> Vietnam war's speed-up of cultural conflict in the white pop-
> ulation over issues involving definitions of patriotism, life
> styles, work and leisure, and other primordial values.[5]

Wallace attracted voters disenchanted with changing social and political conditions in part because of his initial willingness to

to forego immediate electoral success in lieu of the articulation of protest. Opposition to the enforcement of Federal civil rights policies in the South was clearly the cornerstone of Wallace's public prounouncements, although he carefully omitted any direct references to racial groups.[6] Appeals to the "average worker," anti-intellectualism, and anti-elitism also contributed to his effectiveness as a symbol of discontent.

Whites opposing changes in race relations, Federal interference, and with changes in religious morality, were likely motivated in part by a fear of declining social stature. These sentiments, coupled with the political events of the early 1960's, coincide with Richard Hofstadter's characterization of "status politics." The author suggests that status politics is apt to be expressed through vindictiveness, sour memories, and the search for scapegoats rather than realistic proposals for legislative action.[7]

This approach is at least partially substantiated by the rising popularity of Governor Wallace and the John Birch Society during the early and middle 1960s. His campaign appeals emphasized the failures of existing policy elites rather than alternative policy programs; the "Eastern establishment," the intellectuals, and the Washington bureaucrats became the major scapegoats. Presumably, the groups whose status was most threatened by the gains of the disadvantaged groups would be most likely to support Wallace under these circumstances.

Our findings, and those of other studies, tend to support this expectation. Wallace initially received much of his support from people employed in less prestigious occupations, although his appeal to middle class voters has been consistently underestimated.[8] He did

particularly well among members of labor unions, a group whose economic status has changed from "have not" to at least marginal "have." Wallace's popularity among workers, according to Everett C. Ladd, can be explained in terms of opposition to equalitarian change since "demands for such change frequently seek to extend benefits to blacks."[9] Ladd suggests that the former antagonism between working class whites and middle class whites has been replaced by a rift pitting the white lower and lower-middle strata against the black underclass.[10]

The shift from protest candidate to a serious presidential candidate in 1972 and 1976 was marked by an attempt by Wallace to portray a more "centrist" image. He rejoined the Democratic party. His campaign rhetoric becomes less strident. Attempts by the Republicans and Democrats alike to "co-opt" the Wallace constituency in part lent greater respectability to his political views; President Nixon's "southern strategy" was a blatant example of this. And Governor Wallace sought to gain greater public acceptance of his foreign policy views by conferring with European political leaders in the earlier stages of the 1976 campaign.

Wallace's impact on electoral politics in the 1972 and 1976 presidential campaigns is reflected in the successful cooptation of his major campaign themes by the winning candidates. While Nixon's southern success in 1972 was undoubtedly enhanced by the ineptitude of the Democratic presidential candidate, Senator George McGovern, he neverless, demonstrated a remarkable votegetting ability in the South. This was due in large part to his willingness to accent such major Wallace themes as opposition to bussing while striving to place a Southerner on the Supreme Court.

While Republican Candidates Nixon and Reagan actively pursued the votes of former Wallace supporters in the South, it should be pointed out that this "southern strategy" met with a notable lack of success in the 1976 presidential election. An overwhelming majority of southern counties and states which supported Wallace in the 1968 election were carried by Democrat Jimmy Carter in the 1976 election. A cursory inspection of the Harris County precinct returns for both elections reveals a similar trend at the local level.[*]

In 1976 virtually all presidential candidates "borrowed" the populist themes popularized by Wallace in earlier campaigns. Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Jimmy Carter repeatedly praised the common sense and wisdom of the average voter while emphasizing their credentials as "Washington outsiders" thus capitalizing on the unpopularity of the federal establishment.

The preservatist nature of past Wallace campaigns, i.e., the cry for the maintenance of traditional social and religious values, was also evident in the 1976 presidential campaign. Both Reagan and Carter emphasized the need for greater efficiency in government and called for a reorganization of the executive branch. Carter's well publicized religious beliefs also provided symbolic reassurance to many Americans disturbed about changing views toward social morality.

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[*] Presidential election returns from the 1968 election were compared with the 1976 figures in thirteen racially homogeneous Harris County precincts which had given plurality support to Wallace in 1968. In a three way race with Democrat Hubert Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon, Wallace received on the average, 41% of the vote. All precincts were carried handily by Carter in his 1976 contest with Republican Gerald Ford (mean winning percentage = 64%).

Wallace and the American Two-Party System

The operation of the party system in the United States was af-
fected by pressures toward realignment prompted by Wallace's third party
bid for the presidency in 1968. The concept of critical realignment
deals not only with changing political agenda and policies but with
the coalitional bases of political parties. According to Walter Dean
Burnham:

> Critical elections are marked by short sharp reorganizations
> of the mass coalitional bases of the major parties which
> occur at periodic intervals on the national level; are often
> preceded by major third party revolts which reveal the incap-
> city of "politics as usual" to integrate political demand;
> are closely associated with abnormal stress in the socio-
> economic system; are marked by ideological polarizations and
> issue-distances between the parties which are exceptionally
> large by normal standards; and have durable consequences as
> constituent acts which determine the outer boundaries of
> policy in general.[11]

In explaining the effects of the Wallace phenomenon on the party
system, the conceptual value of realignment lies in its specifica-
tion of the conditions in which a political candidate not in the
mainstream of political life can gain popularity. Political parties
originally became differentiated with a particular set of issues;
e.g., social welfare policies. These differences are generally min-
imized during political campaigns for purposes of electoral advan-
tage. According to Herbert Weisberg and Jerrold Rusk, during normal
political time periods of "weak ideological focus" the issues which
divide the parties are relatively fixed, and party identification
provides a useful set of cues for voter evaluation of candidates.[12]
However, during the periods of "strong idological focus" new
issues emerge and party leaders, fearing a loss of support, tend to
avoid a direct policy stance. Other candidates may seize the oppor-
tunity and gain a measure of popularity by directly confronting

the issue. If a third party movement makes a noticeable dent into the normal vote of the major parties and the issues which gave rise to the movement remain salient, the major parties will change their stance on the issues. If the consequence is changing party loyalties among various groups, a realignment is likely to ensue.[13]

The political events and issues of the 1960s and early 1970s, coupled with the rising political appeal of Governor Wallace, are generally consistent with this scenario, although more recent trends indicate that the prospective realignment did not occur. The decline in public support for political leaders and institutions beginning in the early 1960s was accompanied by a corresponding increase in the incidence of split ticket voting and the proportion of voters identifying themselves as Independents. Of particular concern are the Democrats-turned-Independents, a tendency more pronounced in the South than other regions. The growth of independent political attitudes in the South, according to James Sundquist, "is entirely among those opposed to government action to enforce school integration, or without an opinion."[14] Our data consistently found greater support for Wallace among Independents than among Democrats and Republicans.

The period beginning with the 1964 presidential election and extending through the early 1970's can be characterized as one of "strong ideological focus." In the 1968 presidential campaign, Wallace accentuated issues avoided by Republicans and Democrats alike, thus contributing to further public disenchantment with the major political parties. The racial issue, crime, and Vietnam, collectively referred to an the Social Issue,[15] cut across the existing line of party cleavage thus blurring the distinction between the major

parties. The continuing salience of race (as manifested by the bussing

issue) helped Wallace to garner a considerable number of votes in the

1972 Democratic primaries (including victories in Michigan and some

of the border states) before his campaign was cut short by the attempted

assassination.

The possibility of a realigning election in 1976 prompted by the

race issue and Wallace's continuing presence was attenuated by several

factors. First, the absence of race-related issues lessened the impact

of Wallace's candidacy. The possible emergence of intraparty conflict

among the Democrats over delegate selection procedures and minority

quotas was painstakingly avoided by the national Democratic party

organization and state organizations wishing to forget the mistakes

of previous campaigns. Secondly. Wallace's effectiveness as a cam-

paigner was seriously damaged by his handicap as well as the continu-

ing flow of news stories alluding to the Governor's ill health and con-

stant pain. Thirdly, the possibility that Wallace's support base

would be coopted by the Republicans did not materialize. As Sund-

quist has indicated, attempts by southern Republicans to capitalize

on the popularity of President Nixon and Vice President Agnew have

had little success.[16] Instead, Sundquist's suggestion that the New

Deal party system might be reinvigorated is in large part supported by

the outcome of the 1976 presidential campaign. Once again, the recon-

struction of the New Deal Democratic coalition of blacks, members of

labor unions, southerners, etc., was recreated, while the traditional

Democrat-Republican split on economic issues (inflation vs. unemploy-

ment) was one of the major campaign issues.

Suggestions for Further Research

There are two areas of research that seems especially deserving of
further study. One concerns the Wallace phenomenon within the context
of third party politics and realigning pressures. Professor David
Maxmanian suggests that at least four factors must be present before a
significant third party vote can be assured. These include a "severe
national conflict over a few very important issues, a period of 'crisis
politics'; division of the electorate on one or more the these issues
into at least one intense and estranged minority and a broad majority;
rejection or avoidance of the position of the minority by both major
parties, causing alienation of the minority; and a politician or polit-
ical group willing to exploit the situation by initiating a new party."
Furthermore, these conditions are cumulative.

This set of conditions provides a useful reminder of the importance
of socio-political factors in permitting the emergence of an important
third party movement of the Wallace variety. An extension of this line
or research might shed light on Professor Burnham's contention that
declining partisan attachments may lessen the ability of the party sys-
tem to realign. Did Wallace's candidacy effectively reinforce or esca-
late the trend among many Americans, particularly southerners, to
become Independents, rather than remain Democrats or Republicans?
Could this "tendency" help to explain the reduced effectiveness of
subsequent partisan attempts to coopt members of the estranged third
party, e.g., the failure of the "southern strategy"?

Another line of research directs attention to the varied sources
of Wallace's political appeal. Racial factors were perhaps the most
important determinant of Wallace's early support in presidential pol-

itics, but Wallace also benefitted from his militaristic foreign pol-
icy stance, his persistent anti-elitism, and his reaffirmation of moral
values and traditionalism.   In particular, we might examine some of the
factors associated with continuing support for Wallace during elections
in which racial issues and/or appeals were not predominate, i.e., the
1976 presidential election.   An interesting spinoff would involve a
comparison of the 1976 voting patterns of former southern Wallace
voters in black belt counties vs. non-black belt counties, using a com-
bination of aggregate and survey data.   Is geographic proximity to
Blacks, per se, a sufficient condition to insure a vote for the candi-
date taking a more conservative posture on racial issues?   Or would
other Wallace themes, e.g., anti-elitism or economic populism, assume
greater importance?

End Notes

[1]William Schneider, "Issues, Voting, and Cleavages," _American Behavioral Scientist_ (September, 1974), p. 143.

[2]See, e.g., Richard Dawson, _Public Opinion During a Period of Disarray_ (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Walter Dean Burnham, _Critical Elections_ (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970).

[3]"Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government," U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (December 3, 1973), p. 33.

[4]Thomas F. Pettigrew, _Racially Separate or Together?_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 241-252; Douglas St. Angelo and Douglas Dobson, "Candidates, Issues, and Political Estrangement," _American Politics Quarterly_ (January, 1975), pp. 45-59.

[5]Walter Dean Burnham, "American Politics in the 1970's," in _The American Party Systems_, edited by William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 343.

[6]Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab, _The Politics of Unreason_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 383.

[7]Richard Hofstadter, _The Paranoid Style in American Politics_ (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 53.

[8]J. M. Ross, Reeve Vanneman, and Thomas Pettigrew, "Patterns of Support for George Wallace," _Journal of Social Issues_ (forthcoming).

[9]Everett C. Ladd, _American Political Parties_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), p. 251.

[10]Ibid., p. 251.

[11]Burnham, Critical Elections, p. 28.

[12]Herbert Weisberg and Jerrold Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," _American Political Science Review_ (December 1970), p. 1170.

[13]Ibid., p. 1171.

[14]James L. Sundquist, _Dynamics of the American Party System_ (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1973), p. 346.

[15]Richard Scammon and Benjamin Wattenberg, _The Real Majority_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 369.

[16]Sundquist, pp. 362-366.

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APPENDIX

First, I'd like to ask you some questions about party identification.

1. How would you describe your political party identification? Would you say you were a strong Democrat, a weak Democrat, a strong Republican, a weak Republican, or an Independent? SD ___ WD ___ SR ___ WR ___ I ___

If Independent, would you say you leaned more toward the Democratic or the Republican party? Democratic ___ Republican ___ Neither ___

2. Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a conservative, a moderate, or a liberal? C ___ M ___ L ___

Now, I'd like to ask you some questions about your opinions toward current events and issues in the U.S.:

3. Several persons in the Republican party organization committed illegal acts in the Watergate affair. Do you believe this is typical of politicians in general? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

4. Do you feel that President Ford's decision to pardon former President Nixon was in the best interests of the U.S.? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___ don't know ___

5. Did you feel that President Nixon's resignation was in the best interest of the U.S.? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___ don't know ___

6. Did you feel that President Ford's decision to grant conditional amnesty to those opposed to the Vietnam War was in the best interest of the U.S.? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___ don't know ___

In the next series of questions, we want to know whether you favor an increase or decrease in certain governmental activities.

7. Do you favor an increase or decrease in the enforcement of integration? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

8. Do you favor an increase or decrease in tax on large incomes? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

9. Do you favor an increase or decrease in tax on middle incomes? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

10. Do you favor an increase or decrease in tax on small incomes? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

11. Do you favor an increase or decrease in federal aid to education? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

12. Do you favor an increase or decrease in federal spending on
public housing and slum clearance? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

13. Do you favor an increase or decrease in Social Security bene-
fits? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

14. Do you favor an increase or decrease in minimum wages?
decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

15. In the present situation, which of the following groups do you
feel is getting less than a fair chance, a fair chance, or better than
a fair chance?

Groups	Less than Fair Chance	Fair Chance	Better than Fair Chance	Don't Know
A. White Americans	___	___	___	___
B. Negroes	___	___	___	___

Next, I'd like to ask you some questions about foreign affairs:

16. Do you favor an increase or decrease in U.S. reliance on the
United Nations? decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

17. Do you favor an increase or decrease in foreign aid?
decrease ___ same ___ increase ___

18. Do you feel that the United States' support of Israel is
justified? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

19. Do you feel that President Nixon's visit to Red China was in the
best interests of the U.S,? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

20. Do you feel that the U.S. should maintain friendly relations
with Russia? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

21. Do you feel that the U.S. should maintain friendly relations
with Red China? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

22. Do you feel that increased trade with communist countries ought
to be encouraged? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

23. In looking back at the past decade, do you feel that U.S. military
involvement in Vietnam was a mistake? yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

Next, I'd like to ask you some questions about your political activities:

24. Did you vote in the 1972 election? yes ___ no ___ DK ___

25. For whom did you vote? Nixon ___ McGovern ___ Schmitz ___ Other ___

26. Since 1968, have you worked or taken part in any political
campaigns? yes ___ no ___

If yes, what were they? _____

27. Did you vote in the 1968 election? yes ___ no ___ DK ___

28. For whom did you vote? HHH ___ RMN ___ GCW ___ Other ___

29. The following persons have been mentioned as possible presidential candidates in 1976. Would you rank your top four choices?

Sen. Kennedy ___   Sen. Bentsen ___   Pres. Ford ___
Sen. Baker ___   Gov. Wallace ___   Sen. Jackson ___
Sen. Percy ___   Gov. Reagan ___   Gov. Rockefeller ___

30. If Gov. Wallace leaves the Democratic Party between now and 1976, would you support his candidacy as the nominee of a third party?
yes ___ no ___ undecided ___

31. Do you feel Gov. Wallace's personal handicap would prevent him from effectively performing the duties of the presidency?
yes ___ no ___ undecided ___