

THE CONSTITUENCY BASIS OF LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT:

THE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1961

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A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of Political Science

University of Houston

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In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

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by

Thomas Howard Fowler

May 1970

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the roll call voting behavior of Texas legislators and their constituencies as a means of gaining insight into the broader currents of opinion and ideology as they occur in a setting of social and political change. It is proposed here that, although factional division within the state's Democratic Party has been traditionally viewed as forming around a cluster of liberal-conservative issues, it is more helpful to differentiate between economic and racial views in assessing patterns of political opinion conflict.

A variation of Guttman cumulative scale analysis performed on roll call responses of the Fifty-seventh Texas House of Representatives (1961 Regular Session) demonstrated a significant amount of overlap on racial and economic voting patterns. That is to say, the "liberal" in the legislature was not necessarily a friend of the cause of Negro civil rights, nor was the "conservative" always an adversary of the cause.

By differentiating the dimensions of economically based factionalism and civil rights liberalism-conservatism, a legislative opinion typology is constructed which relates the patterns of expressed legislative opinion to more broadly conceived patterns of political tradition and change. By examining the constituency characteristics of the groups of legislative opinion types, the sources of opinion conflict are identified and tentative conclusions are offered concerning the nature

and status of political change in the state.

The findings suggest that there is occurring in various regions of the state a developmental sequence of opinion conflict and change which casts its imprint on statewide political patterns through representative institutions. A traditional Populist-Elite conflict pattern typifies the politics of rural Central, urban and rural East Texas. An ideological Elite-Coalition conflict pattern is more typical of urban Central Texas. Meanwhile, along the Rio Grande (particularly in urban areas), where Southern tradition has never been strong, a modernizing pattern is noted in that conflict occurs along economic lines while liberal and conservative alike share a consensus of racial accomodation with respect to the Negro citizen. This "modern" conflict pattern has been termed Coalition-Bourbon after the two dominant opinion types in these areas.

Continued increasing urbanization, industrialization, minority concentration, and legislative reapportionment are several factors identified which augment the progression from "traditional" to "modern" patterns of conflict in the state.

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## CHAPTER I

### TEXAS POLITICS IN TRANSITION

In the context of the politics of the states of the old Confederacy, Texas is often singled out for its uniqueness.<sup>1</sup> In V. O. Key's 1949 analysis of southern politics he noted that "like other southern states, it [Texas] is a one-party state because in 1860 a substantial part of its population consisted of Negro slaves. Most of its people then lived in East Texas, and the land to the west was largely undeveloped. The changes of nine decades have weakened the heritage of southern traditionalism, revolutionized the economy, and made Texas more western than southern."<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Texas has shared the experiences of civil war, reconstruction, institutionalized racial segregation, and a tradition of one-party politics with other states of the Confederacy while coalescing with them at the national level to preserve "the southern way of life."<sup>3</sup>

It is no longer totally accurate to describe Texas as a one-party state. In recent years Republicanism has begun to root itself firmly in the state's politics.<sup>4</sup> However, as late as 1961, the state legislature was entirely Democratic and still provided an arena for the study of one-party political dominance. This being the case, the present research is more concerned with factionalism than with partisanship and, although the very real phenomenon of Republican growth must be taken into account, it is not a central concern of the thesis.

The view taken here is that Texas politics represents a special

case in the study of southern politics due to the social, economic, and cultural diversity which is to be found within the state. This diversity has given rise to a wide range of political opinion which cannot be explained solely in terms of factional ideology or class conflict but must also take into account an apparent transition from "traditional" to "modern" political styles which is occurring throughout the South.<sup>5</sup> "Modernization" in this context is not meant to portray any rigorously conceived process of political change. It is intended to convey a notion of political change in the direction of broadened participation and heightened social communication along with the dissolution of rigid institutional and attitudinal barriers to such change. Thus, pro-civil rights positions are referred to as "modern" as opposed to "traditional" anti-civil rights stances. Although this constitutes only a small segment of the parcel which should be included in any modernization concept, it is a most important segment in a body politic which is daily becoming more conscious of its racial and ethnic inequities.

The contention here is that, in addition to whatever recurring divisions may be observed in Texas politics, there is also occurring a widespread breakdown of the traditional patterns of southern political life, particularly with regard to the area of Negro participation. Such factors as federal intervention, the impact of mass communications, and the influx of population from outside the state have certainly worked as agents of change in addition to the effects of growing industrialization and urbanization within the state. With this in

mind, it is in order to survey briefly the prevailing factional and ideological currents within state Democratic party politics as they occur in the mid-twentieth century.

# I. DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN TEXAS

In the late forties, V. O. Key noted that "in Texas the vague outlines of a politics are emerging in which irrelevancies are pushed into the background and people divide broadly along liberal and conservative lines."<sup>6</sup> The impetus for this polarization, according to Key, was the New Deal and, hence, the factions which resulted divide essentially along economic lines. Clifton McCleskey has enumerated the key areas of conflict which are involved in the liberal-conservative factionalism as including questions of (1) taxation, (2) government spending, (3) welfare programs, (4) the role of government in the economy, (5) organized labor, (6) federalism and states' rights, and (7) Negro civil rights.<sup>7</sup> This listing is, of course, an abstraction of the basic components of ideological conflict in the state and, as McCleskey points out, omits the very important distinction which is often made between social and economic issues by state Democratic partisans.<sup>8</sup> For example, it is not uncommon in Texas politics to find people who hold liberal economic views but whose views on race and civil rights can only be interpreted as conservative. Donald Matthews and James Prothro, in their extensive study of Negroes and southern politics, claim that:

economic conservatism and racial prejudice do not tend to go together in the South. Among white Democrats in the South, in fact, economic liberals are much more likely to be strict segregationists

than are avowed opponents of "the welfare state." This has meant that those Democrats most likely to be repelled by the national party's vigorous championing of Negro rights were also most likely to be attracted by the Democratic party's concern for "the little man." Thus we find that white voters who explicitly complained that the Democratic party was "too good to Negroes" in 1961 actually voted six percentage points more heavily for John F. Kennedy than did the southern whites who made no such criticism of the party.<sup>9</sup>

The position taken here is that this distinction between social and economic issues deserves more than a passing mention in the study of Texas politics. Although the civil rights issue undoubtedly has economic overtones, it also seems plausible that the appearance of a significant amount of civil rights liberalism in the south could be interpreted as an indication that traditional southern folkways are being subverted by forces of modernization.<sup>10</sup> Such an interpretation would argue for the analysis of southern white political behavior in terms of at least two separate and distinct attitudinal variables. Basic factional ideology--that is, the aggregation of opinions and interests which serve to divide the Democratic party into two distinct systems of action characterized by high and frequently exercised internal cohesion--may well be determined along the lines of social class. However, in order to understand politics in the south one must eventually deal with the problem of racial traditions in the region; and when these traditions show signs of weakening or falling completely one can only conclude that the impact on the political system will be significant. The fact that white views on civil rights issues can and often do transcend factional lines in the Texas Democratic party casts doubt on the utility of viewing political conflict in Texas as proceeding between stereotyped liberal and conservative coalitions. From an analysis of

Texas politics which takes into account both factional affiliation and modernizing trends with regard to racial matters, there might emerge a set of patterns which are more easily related to others which have been observed in other political settings, both North and South of the Mason-Dixon Line.

## II. VARIETIES OF POLITICAL OPINION IN TEXAS POLITICS

In the conventional terminology of Texas political analysis, the present research involves the economic and civil rights dimensions of state Democratic party liberal-conservative factionalism. The economic dimension is viewed here as being the major dimension of the semi-organized and recurring factional division which has been observed in Texas politics and its roots are seen in a continuing conflict between socio-economic strata throughout the state. This is essentially the same impression as that which Key reported in his analysis of Texas political division in the late forties.<sup>11</sup> The civil rights dimension is viewed as constituting a separate and distinct line of political division although a great deal of coincidence occurs which gives the impression that the two dimensions represent very similar lines of political division while, in fact, they are independent. In effect, it is held here that opinion on civil rights for Negro citizens transcends the boundaries of economic factionalism and results from differential rates of political change and Negro participation in various areas of the state.

By dichotomizing these two conflict dimensions and overlapping

them, as in Figure I-1 below, four categories of political opinion emerge which can be examined for distinctive attributes of opinion-holders. Opinion is introduced here as a concept which, in its most general application, can encompass the activities implied by both factional affiliation and modernizing tendencies.

**FIGURE I-1: Four Types of Political Opinion which Occur in Texas Politics: Based on Factional Affiliation and Modernizing Tendencies.**

<u>Factional Affiliation (Indicator: position on economic issues)</u>	<u>Modernizing Tendencies (Indicator: support or opposition of Negro civil rights)</u>	
	<u>Traditional ("conservative")</u>	<u>Modernizing ("liberal")</u>
Liberal	Type I	Type III
Conservative	Type II	Type IV

This typology suggests that Texas politics can be analyzed in terms of four prevailing modes of political opinion. The usefulness of the typology rests with what it suggests about Texas politics in transition. It is expected that the modes of opinion, thus enumerated, can be profitably related to the more familiar forms which politics has taken both in Texas' past and the forms which it may take in the future based on patterns which have become familiar in other settings.

In historical perspective, the opinion mode of Type I might be associated with the Populist liberalism of the pre-New Deal era in

Texas politics. The style was rural demagoguery<sup>12</sup> and its chief ideological tenets were a deep concern for the welfare of "the little man" and the preservation of white supremacy. The style was personified in the Governor's Mansion by the Fergusons and later by W. Lee "Pappy" O'Daniel, although the latter eventually fell from grace by equivocating too much on the "gut" issues of welfare politics.<sup>13</sup> This was the politics of an economically underdeveloped, rural southern state and fairly typical of the politics of the south as a whole.

Continuing economic development in Texas and the advent of the New Deal in national politics brought about the "emergence of economic alignments"<sup>14</sup> which continued to provide the basis of party factionalism even into the sixties. The opinion consensus of Type II represents the political style which V. O. Key has most vividly described as follows:

A modified class politics seems to be evolving, not primarily because of an upthrust of the masses that compels men of substance to unite in self-defense, but because of the personal insecurity of men suddenly made rich who are fearful lest they lose their wealth. In 40 years a new-rich class has arisen from the exploitation of natural resources in a gold rush atmosphere. By their wits (and, sometimes, by the chance deposit in sons past of an oil pool under the family ranch) men have built huge fortunes from scratch. Imbued with faith in individual self-reliance and unschooled in social responsibilities of wealth, many of these men have been more sensitive than a Pennsylvania manufacturer to the policies of the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations.<sup>15</sup>

Typically, the new rich, the big rich, and the white collar classes have banded together to defend southern racial institutions in much the same terms as they have argued against federal activities in economic areas. Questions of civil rights are converted, with a deft sleight of hand, into questions of states' rights and local autonomy.



Their factional opponents at the state level consist of Populist (Type I) remnants and urban coalitions of labor, Latin, and Negro minorities (Type III discussed below).

These were the dominant styles in Texas politics at the time of Key's analysis in the late forties. But in the meantime other analysts have written of the emergence of a "new" southern politics emphasizing the changes occurring in a slowly modernizing south. The major ingredient in the new southern politics is an effective participant role for the Negro. As the traditions of Negro non-participation fell under the force of federal pressure, mass communications, immigration from non-southern states, and urbanization the Negro vote became a political force to be dealt with by white politicians. White paternalism, which had effectively controlled Negro voting in rural black belt areas, could hardly be exercised with a large amount of success in urban industrial settings. From these changes there have arisen new strategies, new styles, and new modes of opinion.

The urban liberal response to the conservative (Type II) consensus has been a coalition of labor, Mexican-American, and Negro minorities.<sup>16</sup> Identifying closely with national Democratic leadership, these groups are bound together by a common economic interest. Organized labor, however, tends to dominate the coalition in terms of its finances, candidates, and objectives.<sup>17</sup> One of the most obvious weaknesses of the coalition effort has been the inability to deliver labor votes for Negro candidates.<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, at the legislative level, the coalition has characteristically taken a liberal posture on

civil rights issues as a part of the coalition strategy.

Professors Harry Holloway and James Q. Wilson have criticized the urban coalition strategy from the standpoint of Negro political gain.<sup>19</sup> Wilson, in particular, suggests that a more natural ally for the urban Negro in the South is the white upper-middle class--in Wilson's terms, the Southern Bourbon. In speaking of the political accomplishments of Negroes in one southern area, Wilson writes:

This policy of accomodation apparently was in part the result of the attitude of the white business elite, part of which was sufficiently cosmopolitan to favor whatever degree of integration was necessary to avoid a "bad business climate" or unfavorable national repercussions. It was not, on the other hand, in favor of the liberal economic policies of the early labor-Negro coalition.<sup>20</sup>

This has not been a major strategy of Negro politics in Texas, but, as Wilson states, "Negroes, when they vote, can cause a startling change in the style, if not the substance, of Southern politics."<sup>21</sup> Even when there is no operating coalition between the Negro and the white business elite, there is still the possibility of white southerners exhibiting modernizing attitudes toward racial problems, particularly in those areas of the state where Negro-Latin-labor coalitions do not force the Bourbon into a defensive position on questions of labor and economics. In Texas legislative politics, this would amount to the manifestation of Type IV opinion.

It should be stressed that the "Bourbon" label is used for the simple reason that it coincides with a pattern of political activity which has a precedent in the literature of American politics. A survey of the literature of Texas politics reveals nothing of the occurrence of this pattern. However, a preliminary survey of the data

used in this study does reveal the limited presence of such a pattern. For convenience the Bourbon label will be used throughout even though subsequent investigation may prove it to be a misnomer.

The "types" discussed in the foregoing paragraphs represent, at this point, the result of hypothetical speculation about the contours of political conflict in Texas. Remaining to be tested is the assumption that opinion on social issues, such as the civil rights issue, does indeed diverge significantly from essentially economically-based factional alignment. Also yet to be seen is the nature of the conflict which might give rise to the various opinion combinations. Speculation was put forth in an attempt to offer some prior explanation as to how each opinion type might reasonably be expected to occur in terms of a politics of group interest. It is the purpose of this research to examine the broad outlines of political conflict in Texas against this backdrop of speculation. It should be stressed that everything, at this point, is extremely tentative.

These four types of opinion represent political styles which may be useful in analyzing Texas politics in transition. It is expected that, given the presence of valid indicators, traces of all these styles can still be found in the politics of the state. If the demographic correlates of these styles can be identified, then perhaps some clues can be given as to the future course of Texas and, more broadly, southern politics. The arena which is to be examined in the present research is that provided by the state legislature. This political body presents a unique opportunity for the observation of

opinion patterns and identification of their popular sources. This is, of course, a methodological assumption which begs justification.

### III. LEGISLATIVE VOTING AS OPINION PATTERN REFLECTION

This research rests on the assumption that legislative bodies act to a certain extent as channels for the communication and expression of constituency opinion. Although, in the cases of individual legislators and particular constituencies, this assumption may prove unsound, it is expected that in examining aggregates it can be demonstrated to hold true in a large majority of cases.

The research problem, then, is to search the voting records of the Fifty-seventh Regular Session of the Texas House of Representatives for reliable indicators of the two dimensions of conflict on which the foregoing typology is based. When this is accomplished, legislators can then be classified according to their positions on the two major conflict dimensions into one of the four categories of opinion. Having done this, the constituencies of these legislative types can be examined for characteristics which would lend support or doubt to the speculation about the patterns of opinion extant in Texas politics.

Implicit in the conceptualization and design of this project is a view of the legislative process which should be clearly specified at this point. Chapter II will attempt to establish the relationship between mass public opinion and public policy while focusing on legislative institutions as a system of communicative linkage.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>See, for example, V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 10 and Gilbert Shapiro, "Myrdal's Definitions of the 'South': A Methodological Note," American Sociological Review, 1948, pp. 619-21 and Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Incorporated, 1966), p. 169.

<sup>2</sup>Key, op. cit., p. 254.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 369 ff.

<sup>4</sup>Clifton McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), Chapter 4.

<sup>5</sup>Harry Holloway, "Negro Politics in the South: Two Cases from Texas Experience," unpublished paper presented to the Southwestern Social Science Convention in Dallas, Texas, March 23, 1967 and Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., pp. 261-3 and passim.

<sup>6</sup>Key, op. cit., p. 255.

<sup>7</sup>McCleskey, op. cit., pp. 82-5.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>9</sup>Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., pp. 398-9.

<sup>10</sup>Holloway, op. cit.

<sup>11</sup>Key, op. cit., ch. 12.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 270-1.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 255.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>See Harry Holloway's discussion of coalition strategy in Harris County, Texas. Holloway, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid. and James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in Politics," Daedalus, Fall, 1965, Vol. 94, pp. 949-73.

<sup>20</sup>Wilson, op. cit., p. 957.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 951.

## CHAPTER II

### A PERSPECTIVE ON LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS

Discussion of public opinion often loses persuasiveness as it deals with the crucial question of how public opinion and government are linked. The democratic theorist founds his doctrines on the assumption that an interplay occurs between mass opinion and government. When he seeks to delineate that interaction and to demonstrate the precise bearing of the opinions of private citizens on official decision, he encounters almost insurmountable obstacles. In despair he may conclude that the supposition that public opinion enjoys weight in public decision is myth and nothing more, albeit a myth that strengthens a regime so long as people believe it.

That governments pay heed to public opinion is, of course, more than a myth. Even a dictatorial regime cannot remain oblivious to mass opinion.<sup>1</sup>

--V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy

#### I. THE OPINION-POLICY CONVERSION PROCESS

##### IN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS

The relationship between "public opinion" and governmental policy has been one of the central concerns of modern political theory both normative and empirical. The literature of political science abounds with various attempts at defining "opinion" and "public opinion" in the context of political experience. The lack of consensus on these matters is, of course, largely a reflection of the lack of a comprehensive and widely accepted perspective on political life and processes, in general, and on the opinion-policy process in particular. Any attempt to assess, describe, and explain the relationship between public opinion and policy turns largely on what is admitted as opinion and this, in

turn, depends on how the study of politics is pursued.

Many definitions of opinion, public opinion, and political opinion, in turn, have been put forward by social scientists in attempting to delimit the boundaries of inquiry. Lane and Sears<sup>2</sup> cite the definition of opinion originally put forward by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley<sup>3</sup> which defines opinion as "an implicit verbal response or 'answer' that an individual gives in response to a particular stimulus situation in which some general 'question' is raised." Hennessy, in defining public opinion, calls it "the complex of beliefs expressed by a significant number of persons on an issue of public importance."<sup>4</sup> Nimmo and Unga attempt to bring more precision to the scope of inquiry by distinguishing the concept of political opinion which "refers to the distribution of sharpened and expressed personal attitudes in response to issues generated by social conflict of sufficient scope to stimulate regulatory activities affecting the entire community."<sup>5</sup> Key, on the other hand, has taken the very straightforward approach that public opinion refers to "those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed."<sup>6</sup>

In common usage "opinion" is only vaguely distinguished from other concepts such as interest, value, attitude and belief. The popular notion that public opinion is what is measured by public opinion polls is very likely the source of the quandary in which democratic theorists find themselves. The findings of sample surveys may very well give an accurate representation of the patterns and distributions of the opinions of a particular population at a certain



point in time. However, the opinions expressed in such survey responses are, perhaps, best viewed as "sharpened and expressed personal attitudes"<sup>7</sup> which may or may not be acted upon beyond the minimal level of activity stimulated by the questioning. Preferences which are not acted upon are obviously not as likely to influence policy as are those which are communicated; thus, it should come as no surprise when distortion occurs in the process of converting public opinion into government policy.

In order to deal with the distortion which inevitably occurs in democratic systems, Bernard Hennessy introduces the idea of effective opinion.<sup>8</sup> "Effective opinion appears to turn on the degree of participation, intensity of effort, and efficiency of organization among the various individuals and groups who constitute the involved public on any particular issue."<sup>9</sup> Effective opinion is the opinion on which public action is based. "In direct democracy, and at the legislative level in representative democracy, majority opinion is always effective opinion."<sup>10</sup> Hennessy, then, suggests that opinion is information which flows through a system by acts of communication and which is subject to modification until the time it is used as a basis of activity by political executive authority. This notion of opinion has certain implications for the study of the opinion-policy process which brings that enterprise into the purview of the cybernetic and communication models of the governmental process which are rapidly developing under the leadership of Karl Deutsch.<sup>11</sup>

Public opinion has most often been viewed as a demographic

characteristic of populations and its analysis has proceeded by describing the distribution of beliefs and preferences concerning public policy as they are held and expressed by aggregates of individuals constituting, in some sense, a public. Such studies, from the standpoint of cybernetic models of the political system, attempt to describe the parameters of one certain type of informational input variable. Beyond this, however, public opinion can be viewed in terms of its impact on public policy-making, i.e., in terms of effective public opinion.

Representative institutions are patterned such that public opinion may be viewed as "effective" at any of several stages of a communicative process. For example, a representative's vote in a legislative assembly may be interpreted as an expression of the effective opinion of his constituency. Similarly, a legislative action such as the passage of a bill or resolution may be interpreted as an expression of the effective opinion of the group of legislators constituting the assembly. Again, the executive, by virtue of constitutional veto power, has the choice of approving or disapproving legislative actions. Thus, executive disposition may be interpreted as an expression of the effective opinion of the legislature. Unquestionably, the legislative process is infinitely more complicated than the foregoing scheme implies (e.g., legislative override of executive veto), but it nevertheless sketches the broad outlines of a dynamic process and dramatizes the necessity of examining various stages of the process in order to establish the link between public

opinion and government.

## II. THE SYSTEM CONTEXT

Karl Deutsch suggests in The Nerves of Government "that it might be profitable to look upon government somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem of steering; and tries to show that steering is decisively a matter of communication."<sup>12</sup> Deutsch proposes a perspective wherein the political life of integrated communities is viewed as proceeding in the manner of a self-modifying communications network or, in other terms, a learning net. A community learns, as it were, by modifying its activities on the basis of the perceived consequences of past activity.<sup>13</sup> The critical importance of the feedback concept and its implications for the study of politics were alluded to much earlier by John Dewey when he wrote that, at this point, "we must ... introduce intelligence, or the observation of consequences as consequences, that is, in connection with the acts from which they proceed."<sup>14</sup> The "intelligence" that occurs in political communities is brought to bear in pursuing whatever purposes are intrinsic in the activities undertaken by communities as communities.<sup>15</sup>

One of the major distinguishing characteristics of democratic political systems is the great amount of information which must be processed before governments can legitimately act. Democratic doctrine requires that among this information should be messages about the preferences of most of the individuals who are affected by the actions of the government. The processing of this information--much of it being

conflicting--requires a set of regularized channels of communication which serve to focus opinion at various levels of combination until one effective opinion is arrived at upon which executive authorities may then act.

Key discusses four types of institutional arrangements which occur in the American context and function in such a way as to provide linkage between public opinion and government policy: political parties, elections, pressure groups, and representation.<sup>16</sup> The latter arrangement, representation, is of particular interest in the study of the opinion-policy process since the other three linking arrangements are for the most part comprised of activities directed toward gaining access to the formal channel which is the legislative arena.

### III. PATTERNS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND DISTORTION

Public opinion conflict occurs whenever the estimates of desirable public activity held by different persons imply activities which are perceived as being incompatible with one another. These conflicts must be resolved in order to arrive at an effective opinion on which to base government activity. Representative democratic procedures can be broadly conceived as a method of opinion conflict resolution which (1) is open to many internal sources of information, (2) provides channels for the communication of this information to acting authorities, and (3) provides an intermediate level in the "vertical" transmission of messages at which point horizontal communication can be more efficiently undertaken in an effort to resolve

opinion conflict before transmitting messages to acting authorities.<sup>17</sup>  
In essence, democratic procedure operates to develop "one public opinion" from many.

### Patterns of Communication

This process of arriving at one public opinion can proceed either by limiting access to the channels of communication according to some set of rules, thereby eliminating some opinions from the communications system, or by resolving opinion conflict through a process of mutual adjustment. The first alternative is of the nature of the tree-structured elimination tournament by which athletic championships are often decided. The latter alternative emphasizes face-to-face communication, bargaining, compromise, and persuasion. Representative democratic systems make use of a combination of these methods. Traditional democratic theory has argued that "pure" democracy cannot succeed if applied to communities which extend beyond a certain geographical scope. The implication is that, in order for pure democracy to be viable, there must be opportunity for face-to-face communication (or horizontal communication) and the mutual adjustment of conflicting opinion prior to vertical communication. Representative democracy attempts to overcome this limitation of popular control by instituting a pattern of communication which runs first horizontally, then vertically, again horizontally, and vertically once more to legitimate acting authorities. Vertical transmission is achieved by such devices as elections, referenda, and legislative voting and can

be characterized as competition for access to communication channels. Horizontal communication is achieved by such devices as campaigning, public discussion, mass media, and, where extensive face-to-face communication is possible, by simple exchange of words.

The legislative system can be analyzed in terms of this distinct pattern of communication by tracing the flow of opinion from the "grass roots," that is, the unorganized masses, through the channels of transmission until a public opinion is formed and acted upon. The levels of opinion flow and formation listed in the preceding paragraph represent fairly distinct conceptual stages which can be examined more closely while keeping in mind that the ongoing system operates with a great deal of interplay among the various stages of opinion formation with the feedback of information occurring constantly among all levels. It is to be remembered that the process of public opinion formation is a dynamic, continuing process which cannot be abstracted from the time dimension without sacrificing a good deal of its fit with political reality.

The first stage of the process outlined above is the stage of mass horizontal communication. In vast political systems such as that of the United States or its sub-systems (state governments), horizontal communication is limited by such factors as geographic size and also by the sheer physical impossibility of having every member of the political community communicate with every other. The problem of avoiding the "war of all against all" is perhaps a problem of providing for the "communication of all with all." This ideal situation can only

be roughly approximated by such means as are provided by the media of mass communications and in the political realm by campaigning activity and continuing public discussion. A great deal of the opinion conflict which is bound to occur in heterogeneous social settings is resolved at this level of the opinion-policy process to the extent that individuals modify their personal opinions about public affairs to the degree of forming groups and asserting interests.<sup>18</sup> It should be pointed out that some vertical transmission also occurs within this conceptual stage as groups select their leaders and vote on group policy. Mass horizontal communication serves to give some amount of organization to the field of opinion out of which some one public opinion is to be formed; however, intergroup opinion conflict remains unresolved.

Mass horizontal communication is not sufficient in expansive communities to provide for the opinion consensus on which governments can act. In order to establish more efficient and readily available means of horizontal communication, representatives are selected from the populace who then continue the discussion of public issues at a particular time and place. The selection of a single person to represent many persons' opinions is, of course, the first great source of distortion in the opinion-policy process. The nature and amount of the distortion which results from the selection of representatives is largely a function of (1) the formal rules of selection, suffrage, and the basis of representation, and (2) the state of opinion conflict within the constituency. In democratic systems selection is usually determined

by majority vote, suffrage is extended to all but a few adults, and the representative basis is populational apportionment. In actual practice there is a great deal of deviation from these norms which can only mean that the distortion which occurs as a result of the norms themselves is only made more difficult to trace.

More important, however, is the state of opinion conflict within the representative district. If there is general agreement of opinion within a constituency, then little information is lost in the vertical transmission process (i.e., representative election). On the other hand, if there is intense disagreement within a constituency, perhaps no more than a small plurality of the opinion information is transmitted vertically.

A constituency can be viewed as an opinion field which organizes itself to some extent through mass horizontal communication. A candidate's campaign for representative office serves to intensify this process of horizontal communication in order to further organize constituency opinion patterns--perhaps by partisan, issue, or ideological polarities. The election then selects one man as the embodiment of constituency opinion. That the elected representative is an incarnation of constituency opinion is hardly a defensible position; but the important fact remains, he communicates some opinion on the constituency's behalf.

A legislature, then, is a collection of men with opinions on public activity who appear in the legislative arena by virtue of having "won" in the competition for access to effective channels of further



horizontal and vertical communication. Opinion conflict which could not be resolved at the level of mass horizontal communication presents itself in a setting which permits organization and face-to-face communication which is impossible at the mass level. Through such communication much of the unresolved conflict is mitigated through processes of bargaining and compromise. Since all opinion conflict cannot be resolved by communication, then the questions of governmental activity are once again submitted to the rather arbitrary process of vertical transmission which proceeds typically by majority rule. Again, minority opinion is, for the most part, lost in the transmission to acting authorities and represents another source of opinion distortion. The messages which result from this process are the effective opinions on which acting authorities can proceed on behalf of the community as a whole with the greatest expectation that commands will be obeyed and efforts at socially co-ordinated activity will be successful. In a sense, the process of political communication results in a "best estimate" of what activities can be undertaken by a community as a community with the greatest chances of success. The process might be conceived in statistical terms as a maximum likelihood estimator. Success and continued legitimacy are never guaranteed, but they are more likely under some conditions than others. The method of representative democracy is one method of discovering what a community will submit to as a community.

### Patterns of Distortion

The foregoing abstraction of the opinion-policy process leaves much to be desired in terms of accounting for the opinion distortion which occurs en route to public activity. Nimmo and Ungs suggest that:

distortions occur because (1) expressed opinions are only imperfectly drawn samples of underlying attitudes and interests; (2) once expressed, opinions are funneled into a number of representative channels (including elections, newspaper editorials, party platforms, group stands, and a host of opinion surveys ranging from haphazard guesses to systematic samplings), where there is ample opportunity for misinterpreting the direction and intensity of these views; (3) it is not easy to distinguish between the opinions of indifferent majorities and intense minorities; and (4) once made public, there is no assurance that all opinions will be entertained or effective in policy formation. Hence, the opinion process is a selective one that considers many conflicts but ignores many others.<sup>19</sup>

All of these distorting factors certainly enter into the process outlined above. Of particular interest here are distortions which occur at the second level of horizontal communication, that is, at the legislative level. Past studies suggest and give evidence of the effects of several factors which, when taken into account, aid in the analysis of legislative systems. At least five distinct kinds of distortion occur at the legislative level of opinion communication.

First, a great deal of distortion is inherent in the recruitment process, that is, in the screening and selection of legislators from the candidates who present themselves in a given district. In addition to the distortion which comes about by majority rule, each legislator brings with him into the legislative arena certain unique characteristics which cannot be said to be "representative" of his constituency or even

the majority which elected him in any sense. One example of this type of distortion is the tendency in the American setting to recruit lawyers into legislative positions. But, beyond this, every legislator, even if he embodies every modal characteristic of his constituency, is a unique individual in terms of personality, socialization, and political predispositions. These factors are important both in determining the set of roles which a legislator will take within the arena and in determining many of the positions the legislator will take when he feels no clear-cut mandate or commitment on issues which appear in the arena. Any distortion which results from selecting a sample of one as representative of an entire population may be included in this category.

A second type of distortion, which may be termed structural, occurs by virtue of imposing media patterns on the messages themselves. Methods of apportionment and the practice of gerrymandering, for example, are very significant in determining what sorts of messages are communicated to the legislative level. The internal organization of the legislature can likewise have a distorting effect due to the stabilized patterns of communication which result from committee systems and assignments, legislative conventions such as seniority rules, and legislative party organization and discipline.

A third kind of distortion is that which occurs when access into the legislative arena is gained by non-electoral means. Lobbying and other pressure group activities fall into this category in addition to information which legislators gain from mass media,

public opinion polling, and constituency letters.

The fourth important source of opinion distortion is that which occurs by virtue of executive leadership. In the present context, executive leadership may be viewed as a feedback process which includes the transmission of information concerning the actual results of previous legislative policy and also opinion concerning future policy. Executive opinion is very often accorded a preferred status by legislators who defer to the "technical" competence and superior information of the executive.<sup>20</sup>

A fifth source of distortion is that which occurs in the process of face-to-face communication within the legislative arena. Individual legislators come into the arena bearing a variety of opinion messages. Communication within the legislature permits mutual adjustment and modification of individual messages so that a consensus may be approximated to the extent that one effective opinion can be put forward to acting authorities. The adjustment and modification which occurs at the legislative level would include such practices as log-rolling and compromise in addition to persuasion and the general tendency toward consensus among communicating parties.<sup>21</sup> The distortion referred to here is that which results from opinion conflict resolution.

These patterns of communication and distortion function to approximate a working consensus on day-to-day government activity. If there is anything which can be properly referred to as public opinion, then it is the outcome of this process. Given the number

of ways in which opinion may be distorted in this process and the amount of information lost in vertical transmission, it is at least possible that "the opinion" which evolves and is acted upon is an opinion which is held by only a minority of the population at large. In political communities where the legitimacy of governmental activity ostensibly depends on majority endorsement this would seem to present a constant source of danger to the continued functioning of the process itself. This argument overlooks an important dimension of opinion which militates against the conception of democracy as the mere counting of heads. Robert Dahl, in assessing the logical foundations of popular democracy, has argued that "by making 'most preferred' equivalent to 'preferred by the most' we deliberately bypassed a crucial problem: What if the minority prefers its alternative much more passionately than the majority prefers a contrary alternative; Does the majority principle still make sense?"<sup>22</sup> Dahl further suggests that, aside from the ethical implications of this question, the problem of intense minorities bears heavily on system stability.<sup>23</sup> The present view of the legislative system allows for a great deal of distortion to interfere between patterns of mass public opinion and authoritative public activity; in light of the question which Dahl poses, it would be a mistake to consider all such distortion to be "dysfunctional."<sup>24</sup>

Intensity is difficult to define in terms of precisely observable and measureable phenomena. For present purposes an opinion is viewed as being more or less intense in terms of (1) the persistency of attempts

at communication on the part of the opinion holder, (2) the tenacity with which the opinion holder maintains the propriety of his own opinion, and (3) the nature of the channels of communication which the opinion holder selects for the transmission of his opinion in terms of the perceived likelihood of success in further communication and eventual enactment. Thus the individual who communicates an opinion frequently, who shows little willingness to compromise it, and who seeks the most effective channels for its communication reflects the characteristics of holding an opinion intensely. In essence, the intensity dimension of opinion is viewed here as being observable by virtue of the intensity of communicative activity. Variable communicative intensity, of course, acts to distort aggregate preference patterns such as might be reflected in public opinion polls, an effect which may be considered functional from the standpoint of the stability of the process and the continued functioning of the network without need of major internal rearrangement.

### Summary

The foregoing sketch of the legislative system and its patterns of communication and distortion serves to provide a context for the study of the opinion-policy process, emphasizing the fidelity of formal communication channels. Some notable attempts have been made at measuring the gross distortion which occurs in the opinion-policy process by observing patterns of correspondence between constituency characteristics and legislative output in the form of recorded roll

call votes.<sup>25</sup> A major problem involved in such analyses arises from the lack of precise indicators of constituency opinion.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, the work of Duncan MacRae, Jr. gives evidence that legislative voting on various types of issues does correspond to a large degree with constituency social and economic characteristics.<sup>27</sup> MacRae's findings may be taken to indicate that legislative voting expresses opinions which are intimately related to the social and economic situation in which a constituency electorate finds itself. It is not necessary to impute attitudes or opinions to a constituency in order to study this relationship; rather, assuming that the legislative process is a communicative process, it is important in itself to discover the sources of certain patterns of opinion which are expressed in legislative bodies.

#### IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH IN TEXAS POLITICS

The foregoing sketch of the legislative system is put forward in an attempt to justify the study of gross political patterns by focusing on legislative institutions. In Texas, one might expect that this would be an extremely risky proposition since much evidence has been presented to support the claim that southern, one-party legislatures are peculiarly difficult to pin down to any single source of legislative responsibility or leadership cues. Nevertheless, from the present perspective it seems reasonable to expect a good deal of correspondence between constituency socio-economic situation and legislative voting even if the constituency factor cannot be viewed as determinate. This

correspondence should present itself in even sharper relief when more than one dimension of voting behavior is taken into account.

Thus, corresponding to the opinion typology presented in Chapter I (Figure I-1), a typology of legislative opinion is constructed on the basis of observed voting behavior and legislators are classified accordingly. Each category is then examined with an eye to discovering the constituency traits which might have given rise to the four opinion types. The observed patterns can then be assessed for the clarification which they lend to the study of Texas politics in a period of transition. Chapter III examines the indicators and techniques used in this exercise.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), P. 411.

<sup>2</sup>Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 6.

<sup>4</sup>Bernard C. Hennessy, Public Opinion (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 97-8.

<sup>5</sup>Dan D. Nimmo and Thomas D. Unga, American Political Patterns: Conflict and Consensus (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 140.

<sup>6</sup>Key, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>7</sup>Nimmo and Unga, op. cit., p. 140, wherein attitudes are conceived as "long term predispositions, vague in content and diffuse in structure, concerning matters of a general, abstract and inclusive nature." (P. 139)

<sup>8</sup>Hennessy, op. cit., pp. 122 ff.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>11</sup>See Deutsch's introduction to the second edition of his volume The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. vii-xxiii.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. xxvii.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>14</sup>John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946), p. 12.

<sup>15</sup>Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 91-3.

<sup>16</sup>Key, op. cit., Part V, pp. 411-531.

<sup>17</sup>Concerning the latter characteristic, see Deutsch's notions about the "decisive middle level of communication and decision." Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 154-7. Legislative systems can be viewed as an institutional crystallization of this "middle level" phenomenon.

<sup>18</sup>The terms "group" and "interest" are used here in the sense that Arthur F. Bentley uses them in The Process of Government (Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, Inc., 1949), pp. 211 ff. Bentley never ventures to define the terms except to regard as identities such phenomena as activity, group, and interest. For this reason he has been taken to task by some of his most ardent supporters (e.g., Peter Odegard, "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth," Western Political Quarterly, 11:689, September, 1958). One way to interpret Bentley's notion of group is simply as notation for an enclave of co-ordinated individual activity which occurs in the midst of an otherwise relatively chaotic social environment and which can be recognized and observed by virtue of the simple fact that the activity is patterned and not random.

<sup>19</sup>Nimmo and Unga, op. cit., pp. 159-60.

<sup>20</sup>See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Programs and Political Process," in Joseph R. Fiszman (editor), The American Political Arena (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 299-311.

<sup>21</sup>For alternative models of such processes see Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) and Theodore M. Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts," Psychological Review 60:393, 1953.

<sup>22</sup>Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 90.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>24</sup>See, for example, the treatment of log-rolling by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962).

<sup>25</sup>See Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); and Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review 57:45-56, 1963.

<sup>26</sup>Key, op. cit., p. 483.

<sup>27</sup>MacRae, op. cit. and "The Relation between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political Science Review 46:1046-55, 1952.

## CHAPTER III

### THE ANALYSIS OF TEXAS LEGISLATIVE POLITICS

It is the purpose of this chapter to develop the technical means by which the opinion typology of Chapter I can be meaningfully applied to members of the Texas House of Representatives. This calls for the discovery of valid and reliable indicators of the position of individual legislators on the two dimensions of opinion conflict on which the typology is based. To this end a series of recorded roll call responses to issues faced by the Fifty-seventh Regular Session have been analyzed and scales constructed which reflect fairly regular voting patterns within that 1961 session.

#### I. ROLL CALL ANALYSIS: A SEARCH FOR INDICATORS

If the legislative system is viewed as a system for the communication of political opinion (as it is in Chapter II), then one of the most important data to be considered in studying legislatures is the legislative vote. The individual legislator's vote represents the vertical transmission of an opinion which is the culmination of many influences and personal predispositions. Unfortunately, the meaning of a response to any given roll call issue does not present itself without a great deal of ambiguity. Legislators who vote alike on a given issue do not necessarily base their votes on identical preferences or reasoning. Each may view different features of a particular bill under consideration as salient and may therefore vote alike but for

different reasons. A given roll call response cannot, therefore, be considered a very reliable indicator of any particular dimension of political opinion without first examining it in the context of many other roll call responses.

Cumulative scaling techniques have been applied in the present research to a number of roll call votes which were recorded in the Fifty-seventh Regular Session of the Texas House of Representatives with an eye to isolating subsets of roll calls characterized by consistency of division over a series of responses.<sup>1</sup> If the previous speculation about the dimensions of political opinion in Texas is correct, then it would be expected that at least two separate scales would form around issues of civil rights and economics.

Members of the Texas House of Representatives had ample opportunity to express themselves on both types of issues in the 1961 Regular Session. The major issue was taxation, a question which was finally resolved in the last of three special sessions which were eventually called by Governor Price Daniel. The most dramatic moment of the regular session occurred when House Speaker James Turman cast a deciding vote at the eleventh hour to kill the Senate version of a sales tax measure which was considered too regressive by House liberals. The vote, including pairs, was 75-75 and time ran out on the regular session in a setting of maximum discord.

With regard to civil rights, only two explicitly related issues came before the House. One was House Simple Resolution No. 752 authored by W. T. Dungan of McKinney and signed by twenty-seven other

representatives which called for an expression of House opposition to civil rights legislation pending in the United States Congress. The other issue concerned House Bill No. 797 authored by Representative Lloyd C. Martin of Normangee which would have made the use of sit-in tactics a criminal offense in Texas. Neither issue passed the House although voting on preliminary motions and amendments was generally favorable to Martin's sit-in bill.

In order to study the problem at hand, a variation of Guttman scale analysis developed by Duncan MacRae has been used to identify roll call votes which meet certain operational requirements of unidimensionality.<sup>2</sup> The basic revision which MacRae imposes on traditional cumulative scaling methodology is the abandonment of the use of a pre-defined universe of content. That is to say, if group responses to the item which is being considered meet the requirements of scalability with other items, then they are included in the scale set without regard to the apparent "meaning" of the issues involved. MacRae argues as follows:

When cumulative scaling has been applied to legislative votes, the procedure has usually begun with the selection of a set of roll calls judged to deal with a given general issue. Scaling has been viewed as a procedure for selecting within this set. But the investigator is more liable to errors of judgement with roll calls than with questionnaire items; he may fail to group issues as the legislators did, or even ignore certain issues. Moreover, in searching for issues or attitudes he may overlook certain bloc divisions that were not easily identifiable by common content, but which could nevertheless be revealed by the same procedures.<sup>3</sup>

MacRae, therefore, proposes to modify the customary procedures of scale analysis in the following ways:

(1) Scalable roll calls are discovered by "empirical examination of pairwise relationships."

(2) Each possible pair of roll calls is evaluated for scalability in relation to a threshold value of Yule's Q-coefficient, and "errors" or departures from the scale model are thus weighted unequally. Because Q is a coefficient of association, the results are more comparable with those of factor and cluster analysis.

(3) It is no longer assumed that each scale need correspond to a single issue-continuum. Instead, the possibility of combination of issues by factional opposition is considered, and variations of issues among different ranges of  $p+$  (proportion of YEA responses) may be interpreted.

(4) A non-uniform distribution of  $p+$  in a scale cluster is taken as a useful datum revealing factional structure rather than simply an inconvenience in the selection of scale items.<sup>4</sup>

The present analysis does not adhere to MacRae's formulation of scaling procedure rigorously although it does follow his major outlines.

The procedure used here takes the following course:

(1) A matrix of the value of Q for each vote to each other is computed.<sup>5</sup>

(2) The proportion of YEA and NAY votes is computed for each roll call based on the number voting.

(3) A minimum value criteria for Q is arbitrarily established.

(4) Clusters of mutually scalar items are identified from the Q-matrix.

(5) Polarity (+ or -) is reversed for those votes which have consistently negative values of Q throughout the cluster matrix, since this pattern indicates that a NAY vote was in favor of the scale issue or vice versa.

(6) Items (roll calls) are ranked and arranged in descending order of  $p+$ .

(7) Legislators are ranked and arranged in descending order of p+ exhibited over the range of issues selected as scale sets.

(8) Responses of each legislator to each roll call can then be filled in to complete the configuration of the scale. However, this is not necessary and much time can be saved by simply assigning scale scores to legislators on the basis of their response patterns.

Since a great deal of computational labor is involved in deriving the original Q-matrix, a program was written in the MAD language for the IBM 7090. A printout copy of this program is included as Appendix I. The program computes the percentage of YEA and NAY votes (based on the number voting) on all roll calls, the percentage absent or abstaining, a matrix of the value of Q for each pair of roll calls, and a simplified integer matrix which gives Q=0 if the value does not meet the minimum scale criterion ( $\pm .75$  in this program).

Once the Q-matrix is obtained, clusters of roll calls which show high inter-correlation (greater than or equal to .8) are isolated to be used as scale sets. This work was done manually as was the procedure involved in deriving the scale configuration and the assigning of scale scores to individual legislators. This procedure, then, allows the researcher to scan a great number of roll calls and test them for their mutual scalability. Thus, the scales are derived from the data rather than imposed upon it.

Roll call responses to twenty-nine issues were recorded for all 150 members of the Texas House of Representatives.<sup>6</sup> Some were selected purposively, others haphazardly in order to include votes on various



types of issues. All votes taken on the civil rights related issues mentioned above were included in the sample as was the key vote on the sales tax issue. This accounted for a total of six roll calls leaving the other twenty-three to be selected indiscriminately from the many which were recorded throughout the regular session. Thus it was hoped that the votes selected would provide the core for a scale or scales to form around the issues of interest--economically based factionalism and opinions concerning Negro civil rights.

The analysis did yield two separate scales which could be identified as reflecting separate civil rights and economic dimensions. The five civil rights votes were mutually scalable and exclusive of all other roll call items. The sales tax vote, on the other hand, was found to be scalable with five other roll calls which appeared in the sample of twenty-nine. Of the six votes included in the economic scale, five were directly concerned with state revenue and a sixth with salaries, mileage, and per diem reimbursement of legislators. These scales are summarized in Tables III-1 and III-2. The roll calls are numbered consecutively through the two tables for easier identification in succeeding tables.

In order to derive these scales, the Q-matrix was examined for clusters of roll calls which consisted entirely of votes which showed inter-associations of .8 or greater. The matrix of values of Q for the eleven roll calls in the scales (Table III-3 below) shows clearly that the two sets of roll calls represent distinctly different patterns of legislative division.

TABLE III-1: ECONOMIC SCALE

TABLE III-1-a: Cumulative Scale Pertaining to Economic Issues.	
Issue Description:	Per Cent Taking Liberal Position
1) Motion to table amendment to H.B. 1 pertaining to salaries, mileage, and <u>per diem</u> of state legislators.	32 %
2) Motion to postpone consideration of H.B. 559 extending occupation tax to certain utilities.	47 %
3) Vote on amendment to coin-operated machines tax (H.B. 334--Governor's tax bill).	47 %
4) Motion for Call of the House during consideration of H.B. 470 pertaining to escheat bill amendments.	49 %
5) Vote to concur in Senate amendments to H.B. 334 establishing a state sales tax.	50 %
6) Vote to engross H.B. 331 pertaining to franchise tax.	53 %
Coefficient of reproducibility = .958	

TABLE III-1-b: Distribution of Legislators according to Scale Type.

Type	Number	Per Cent
I. (most conservative)	42	28.0 %
II.	16	10.7
III.	12	8.0
IV.	5	3.3
V.	2	1.3-
VI.	8	5.3
VII. (most liberal)	63	42.0
Not Classified	2	1.3
Total:	150	99.9 %

TABLE III-2: CIVIL RIGHTS SCALE

TABLE III-2-a: Cumulative Scale Pertaining to Civil Rights Issues.	
Issue Description:	Per Cent Taking Liberal Position
7) Motion to adopt committee amendments to H.B. 797 (sit-in bill)	32 %
8) Motion to suspend rules for second reading of H.B. 797	34 %
9) Motion to suspend rules and consider H.B. 797	36 %
10) Motion to suspend rules for third reading of H.B. 797	37 %
11) Motion to suspend rules and consider H.S.R. 752 (condemnation of civil rights legislation pending in United States Congress).	52 %
Coefficient of reproducibility = .973	

TABLE III-2-b: Distribution of Legislators according to Scale Type.		
Type	Number	Per Cent
I. (most conservative)	52	34.6 %
II.	34	22.7
III.	3	2.0
IV.	3	2.0
V.	9	6.0
VI. (most liberal)	37	24.7
Not Classified	12	8.0
Total	150	100.0 %

TABLE III-3: Matrix of Values of Yule's Q (Conditional Association) among Eleven Roll Call Votes.

		Economic						Civil Rights				
		1	6	4	2	3	5	11	8	7	10	9
Economic	1	-										
	6	9	-									
	4	9	9	-								
	2	9	9	9	-							
	3	-9	-9	-9	-9	-						
	5	-9	-9	-9	-9	9	-					
Civil Rights	11	-1	-3	-2	-2	2	2	-				
	8	-6	-7	-5	-5	6	5	8	-			
	7	-5	-5	-3	-3	5	4	8	9	-		
	10	-5	-5	-3	-4	5	3	8	9	9	-	
	9	-5	-5	-3	-4	5	4	9	9	9	9	-

Note: To simplify the matrix, values of Q have been multiplied by ten and the decimal omitted. Fractional parts have been truncated. Thus none of the integers in the matrix have gained in value by rounding. Arabic numeral row and column headings refer to the votes enumerated in Tables III-1-a and III-2-a.

The votes included in the economic scale showed consistent high association with all other votes in the sample except those dealing with the civil rights issues. Only six of these were included in the scale, however, because they were the only ones to meet the research requirement of statistical association ( $Q \geq .8$ ) in all paired cases. Nevertheless, the overall pattern indicates that the economic scale may be interpreted as the basis of a much broader legislative factionalism. Certainly a sample of only twenty-nine roll calls would not permit a conclusion that these were the only two conflict dimensions present in the voting of the Texas Fifty-seventh House of Representatives, but it is sufficient to yield reliable indicators of the two dimensions

of interest in the present study.

## II. A TYPOLOGY OF LEGISLATIVE OPINION

Chapter I maintained that political opinion in Texas in 1961 appeared in major configurations according to at least two important dimensions of conflict. These conflicts were characterized as occurring along the lines of economically based Democratic party factionalism and a less intense, although not unimportant, conflict between traditional and modernizing elements within the political system, specifically with regard to Negro civil rights. Chapter II argued that these opinion patterns would also manifest themselves at the legislative level of the opinion-policy process. Indicators of these two dimensions of conflict were discovered in an analysis of several recorded roll call votes taken in the Texas House of Representatives in 1961. One of the fundamental arguments of this research is that the two dimensions of conflict noted above constitute quite different lines of political cleavage although a significant amount of overlap occurs which makes them appear to be ideologically related.

The relationship between these two dimensions is clarified somewhat by cross-tabulating the scores of individual legislators on the two scales derived from the roll call analysis. Table III-4 demonstrates that a significant amount of deviation occurs from the pattern of high correlation that would be expected on the basis of an assumed ideological relationship between the two dimensions. Seventeen legislators scored at the extreme liberal end of the economic

TABLE III-4: Distribution of Legislators over Two Voting Scales.

		Classification of Legislator according to Votes Cast on Selected Civil Rights Issues							Total
Type:		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Non-Scale	
Classification of Legislators according to Votes Cast on Selected Economic Issues		(Conserv.)					(Liberal)		
(Conservative)	I	17	14	1	0	1	4	5	42
	II	5	2	1	1	0	5	2	16
	III	6	2	1	0	1	2	0	12
	IV	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	5
	V	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
	VI	2	3	0	1	1	1	0	8
(Liberal)	VII	17	12	0	1	5	24	4	63
Non-Scale		<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Total		52	34	3	3	9	37	12	150

scale while scoring at the extreme conservative end of the civil rights continuum. Conversely, ten legislators fall into the two most conservative categories on economic issues while scoring in the two most liberal groupings on civil rights related votes. Thus, twenty-seven legislators can be seen to deviate from the ideological pattern when considering only extreme cases.

It was suggested in Chapter I that it might be useful to view Texas politics in terms of four modal styles of political opinion based on the overlapping patterns formed by these two independent dimensions of conflict. Figure I-1 illustrated four opinion modes which have been documented in various analyses of Texas and southern politics. Figure III-1 presents a parallel typology of legislative opinion which would account for the ideological "deviants" noted above.

The distribution of legislators on both scales can be summarized as bi-modal at the extreme ends of the scales. In both cases a majority of the legislators have voted either consistently "conservative" or consistently "liberal" with only a minority of the members manifesting an "interval threshold" response pattern. Indeed, a great many of those classified in moderate response categories might have been placed at the extremes except for arbitrary decisions required of the researcher in dealing with absences and scale error.<sup>7</sup> Thus the scales reflect a tendency for most legislators to dichotomize the alternatives presented by the issue sets rather than adopting a stance based on some intermediate threshold. The typology presented in Figure III-1

dichotomizes the scales at the point nearest the median in order to distinguish the apparent opinion groupings on both dimensions of conflict. The cutting points are noted in Figure III-1. The four groupings which result from cross-classifying legislators according to their voting behavior on the two dimensions correspond with the opinion types discussed in Chapter I. They have been labeled for convenience with terms which relate to the earlier discussion of the modes of opinion characteristic of transitional Texas and southern politics. Thirteen members were not classified according to the typology scheme due either to excessive non-participation or scale error on one or both of the scales. The distribution of the 137 remaining members is presented in Table III-5. Appendix II lists all 150 members of the Fifty-seventh Texas House according to their placement in the opinion typology. Appendix II also gives the scale scores of all legislators.



FIGURE III-1: A Typology of Legislative Opinion Based on Civil Rights and Factional Voting Patterns.

Economic Factionalism	Position on Civil Rights Issues	
	"Conservative" (Scale Scores I - II)	"Liberal" (Scale Scores III - VI)
"Liberal" (Scale Scores V - VII)	Type I: Populist	Type III: Coalition Liberal
"Conservative" (Scale Scores I - IV)	Type II: Apprehensive Elite	Type IV: Southern Bourbon

TABLE III-5: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types.

Economic Factionalism	Position on Civil Rights Issues		Total
	"Conservative"	"Liberal"	
"Liberal"	35	34	69
"Conservative"	50	18	68
Total:	85	52	137

### III. LEGISLATOR AND CONSTITUENCY IN TEXAS POLITICS

One of the major expectations of this study concerns the relationship between legislative voting and constituency in Texas politics. It is expected that composite profiles of the constituencies of the four legislative opinion types will reflect a tendency for different types of legislators to find their bases of support in settings characterized by distinct social, economic, and political conditions.

For example, one might expect the Populist grouping to include a large number of legislators from rural East Texas where economic liberalism has traditionally flourished<sup>8</sup> along with resistance to the change of longstanding racial conventions.

A great many of the Coalition Liberals would be expected to come from the urban areas of the state, particularly those with a large concentration of ethnic minorities.

It is more difficult to predict the constituency characteristics of the Elite and Bourbon types. Earlier speculation suggested that the Elite type is the product of rapidly acquired wealth and influence on the part of a relatively small class of "new rich" and "big rich." The traditionalist orientation of this opinion type suggests that it is to be found primarily in East Texas. However, the constituency base of the Elite type might be expected to differ from that of the Populist type in a greater tendency to come from the urban areas of the region. On the other hand, they might be expected to differ from the Coalition

type in that their constituencies include a lesser concentration of ethnic minorities.

The Bourbon type is particularly problematic at this point. Chapter I suggested a parallel from the literature of American politics, but no documentation of the pattern's appearance in Texas politics. The Wilson thesis would suggest the appearance of this type to be most common in the large southern metropolis where economic considerations override a traditionally racist system on occasion and force concessions on a conservative and business-minded white elite. Further examination of the data should reveal whether this pattern occurs in Texas politics or if the Bourbon type finds its roots in an entirely different set of circumstances. In any case, the opinion type in question defies the "conventional wisdom" and the popular assumptions of Texas politics and bears a close examination in succeeding chapters.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The scaling methodology is developed in Samuel Stouffer, Louis Guttman, et. al., Measurement and Prediction (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1950). See especially chapter 3 by Louis Guttman. Application of the scaling technique to legislative roll call voting is discussed in Hugh Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different? An Application of Scale Analysis to Senate Voting Patterns," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (editors), Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), pp. 740-56. A general treatment of legislative roll call analysis with a chapter on cumulative scaling techniques is Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll Call Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

<sup>2</sup>Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," American Political Science Review 59:911, December, 1965. Also described in Anderson, et al., op. cit.

<sup>3</sup>MacRae, op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid. In this article MacRae compares the results obtained by the two scaling approaches (i.e., pre-defined vs. empirically defined universes of content) based on one of his earlier works, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol. 1, #3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

<sup>5</sup>Yule's Q is a measure of one way (or conditional) association between dichotomous variables. It is computed according to the formula  $Q = (ad - bc)/(ad + bc)$  where the letters a, b, c, and d represent the cell frequencies of the generalized fourfold table:

a	b	(a+b)
c	d	(c+d)
(a+c)	(b+d)	N

For the rationale and development of the Q-coefficient, see G. Udny Yule and M. G. Kendall, An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1950). For a discussion of the properties of the Q-coefficient, see John H. Mueller and Karl F. Schuessler, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961). Chapter 9, section 2 of Mueller and Schuessler illustrates the sensitivity and stability of Q and the effect of similar marginal distributions. For a probabilistic interpretation see L. A. Goodman and W. H. Kruskal,

"Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association 49:750.

<sup>6</sup>House Journal, Fifty-seventh Regular Session of the Texas House of Representatives, Austin, Texas, 1961.

<sup>7</sup>See Appendix II for a summary of the guidelines used in classifying legislators by scale type. These are basically the same as those used by MacRae. Briefly, when it was necessary to make an arbitrary decision on the scale placement of any legislator (e.g., when absence or error occurred at a possible cutting point), the rule was to always place the legislator in the category closest to the group median in order to keep extreme categories "pure."

<sup>8</sup>Clifton McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 108-10.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS AS POLITICAL INDICATORS

#### I. LEGISLATOR AND CONSTITUENCY: THE PROBLEM OF INDICATORS

Chapter II outlined in broad terms the conception of the opinion-policy process which underlies the subsequent chapters. In essence, it was argued that individual political opinion is expressed through a communication network which selects and distorts aggregate opinion patterns at various stages of transmission. On this basis it is expected that a high statistical relationship would occur between constituency aggregate opinion and legislative opinion expressed through roll call voting. However, the parameters of constituency opinion distributions can be estimated only by survey research methods treating each of many constituencies as a separate population--a proposition clearly beyond the scope and economic feasibility of this or perhaps any other political research.

An alternative strategy lies in inferring the political interests and attitudes of a constituency from available socio-demographic data. V. O. Key has pointed out the liabilities of imputing attitudes and opinions to a constituency on the basis of aggregate social and economic indicators but admits it as the only feasible alternative to the problem posed by statistical sampling requirements.<sup>1</sup> The present research makes use of such information as is available for Texas legislative districts. However, attitudes, interests, and opinions are not imputed to constituencies on the basis

of these indicators. The problem here is not to check the degree of congruence of legislative and constituency opinion but rather to discover some of the social, economic, and political conditions which permit certain legislative voting patterns to occur. Thus the relationship between constituency traits and legislative opinion is conceived not as a determinate one, but simply as an important one. The basic assumption involved in the present research is, when clearly defined, quite different from that which Key discusses. In short, it is assumed here that opinions can be imputed to a constituency on the basis of how their representatives vote, but not without a great deal of error due to factors of opinion distortion and selection. Thus, by examining the modal characteristics of the constituencies of groupings of like-voting representatives, tentative conclusions can be drawn concerning the population characteristics most likely to yield legislators exhibiting particular observed voting patterns. Perhaps this kind of analysis will yield some meaningful, albeit vague, impressions of the patterns of political opinion extant in the state of Texas.

## II. CONSTITUENCY INDICATORS

Most of the constituency population statistics used herein were derived from data collected in 1960 by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. Members of the Fifty-seventh Texas House were elected in 1960, thus the census data describe constituency populations accurately as they stood during the year of election and meeting of the Regular Session in 1961.

Based on available census data the following statistics were

derived for each of 105 state legislative districts:

- (1) the per cent of families earning less than \$3,000 in 1959;<sup>2</sup>
- (2) the per cent of families earning more than \$10,000 in 1959;<sup>3</sup>
- (3) the per cent of the total district population classified by the Bureau of the Census as non-white;<sup>4</sup>
- (4) the per cent of the total district population with Spanish surnames;<sup>5</sup> and,
- (5) the per cent of the total district population classified by the researcher as white Anglo-American.<sup>6</sup>

In addition, districts were classified according to the degree of urbanization as either urban or rural.<sup>7</sup>

A rough indicator of constituency opinion on the question of Negro civil rights is included based on the number of segregationist votes cast in a state Democratic primary referendum on July 28, 1956. Specifically, the indicator of district civil rights sentiment is expressed as the percentage of those voting who endorsed Referendum No. 1, a proposition calling for state legislation exempting any child from compulsory attendance at integrated schools. These data were available for all counties except Bexar, Kleberg, and Uvalde where the county party organizations refused to carry the propositions on the ballot. Statewide the issue carried by slightly better than seventy-seven per cent with only Webb and Castro counties giving the proposition less than majority support.<sup>8</sup> Although this voting occurred four years before the election of the Fifty-seventh Legislature, the results remain the best available indicator of popular sentiment on the question



of racial desegregation in Texas' counties and legislative districts.

In order to check for possible relationships between district gubernatorial voting and legislative voting, the per cent of those voting in each district who voted for the incumbent Governor, Price Daniel, was computed from 1960 First Democratic Primary Returns.<sup>9</sup> Daniel, often described as moderate to liberal, was opposed in this race by Jack Cox, a conservative Democrat who later ran a close race as a Republican gubernatorial candidate against John Connally in the 1962 General Election. Daniel, however, won re-nomination in 1960 with approximately fifty-nine per cent of the statewide vote and won even more handily in the General Election.

Districts were also classified according to their regional location within the state. East Texas districts include those in the northern portion of the Coastal Plains, including the Pine Belt and the Post Oak Belt. Central Texas includes districts lying in the North Central Plains and portions of the west Texas Hill Country while the Panhandle category takes in the Great Plains districts within the large, northern, rectangular area. The region designated as Rio Grande Valley includes legislative districts lying in the Trans-Pecos area, a large portion of Edwards Plateau, and the southern part of the Coastal Plains including the coastal prairies, the Rio Grande plain, and the lower valley.<sup>10</sup> This particular regional classification was designed with the specific purpose in mind of abstracting contiguous sets of counties with roughly similar cultural traditions and ethnic composition. Of particular interest in the present research are the East Texas and Rio

Grande Valley categories as they contain the highest concentrations of, respectively, Negro and Mexican-American minorities to be found in the state.

All of the district characteristics described in this chapter are presented in tabular form in Appendix III for all 105 Texas representative districts.

### III. LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTING AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONSTITUENCY ATTRIBUTES

In the present context, constituency attributes are viewed as characteristics of the individual legislator. The legislative process, as discussed in Chapter II, gives a great deal of emphasis to the "representative" aspect of the legislator's role in political life. Whether these constituency attributes are better viewed as controlling, in the sense of legislative responsibility and mandate, or simply as environmental setting which tends to produce certain opinion patterns as a matter of course is a question which must go unanswered by the present inquiry. However, the present perspective on the legislative system does suggest that a high degree of correlation should occur between certain constituency attributes and recurrent patterns of legislative voting. Thus, regardless of the dynamics of the process, some degree of "representativeness" is expected to be manifest in legislative voting. The subsequent analysis then may view a particular legislator as being characterized by a constituency composed of twenty per cent non-whites just as he may be characterized as a teacher or

lawyer in his occupation outside politics. In short, the constituency is a major individual variable which the legislator carries with him into the legislative arena.

In order to derive the populational parameters of Texas legislative districts it is necessary to perform extensive computations on census data since the reports do not offer a legislative district breakdown of the population. However, under the 1951 apportionment county units were preserved as the basis of representation pursuant to legislative interpretation of Article 3, Sections 26 and 26a of the Texas Constitution which implies, but does not explicitly state, that county units are to be preserved.<sup>11</sup> It was possible then to weight and combine county statistics, available in the Statistical Abstract's County and City Data Book, 1962, to derive comparable and accurate descriptive statistics for legislative districts. These data are included as Appendix III.

Under the 1951 apportionment, the Texas House of Representatives was composed of three types of districts: single-member, multi-member, and flotorial. Single-member districts constituted a large majority of the districts. Most of the large urban counties, however, consisted of multi-member districts with the county being allotted upwards of eight representatives (the high case being Harris County) with all legislators being elected by the county at large using the place system of balloting to guarantee majority election. Thus, all legislators from the same multi-member district carried with them into the legislature the same formal constituency attributes. The third type, a curious device known

as the flotorial district, had its basis in the constitutional provision that "...when any one county has more than sufficient population to be entitled to one or more Representatives, such Representative or Representatives shall be apportioned to such county, and for any surplus of population it may be joined in a representative district with any other contiguous county or counties."<sup>12</sup> The flotorial district imposes inequitable representation on the unfortunate "contiguous county or counties" and was declared unconstitutional by a three judge federal court in the follow-up case to Kilgarlin v. Martin in 1966.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, the flotorial district was in use at the time of the convening of the Fifty-seventh legislature with five such districts being represented.

In the cases of all three types of districts, the computation of constituency characteristics proceeded in a similar fashion. Where a single county comprised a district in and of itself, the county census data was taken directly from the County and City Data Book. Where more than one county comprised a district, county percentages were weighted by the total county population (the total number of families in the case of family income statistics) and combined to derive district percentages. Flotorial districts presented no special problem in this respect and in most cases resulted in only slight adjustments of the statistics derived for the major county in the district. The same method of computation was used for the derivation of the district percentages in the 1956 segregation referendum and the 1960 gubernatorial primary. Each legislator was then characterized by the

attributes of the formal constituency which he represented. The three types of districts mentioned above resulted in sets of legislators with unique constituencies (those from single-member districts), some sharing identical constituencies (those from the same multi-member district), and some with overlapping constituencies (those representing flatorial districts). Thus, it is stressed that the distributions of legislators and legislative opinion types which follow should in no way be interpreted as describing the population of Texas or even the composite of legislative districts. They refer only to the constituency attributes of 150 legislative seats as they stood in 1960 and, when viewed in the composite, reflect the error of legislative malapportionment which was great in the Fifty-seventh Texas House of Representatives.

#### IV. IDENTICAL CONSTITUENCIES: A PRELIMINARY TEST OF ASSUMPTIONS

The sixteen multi-member districts in the Fifty-seventh legislature offer a unique opportunity to estimate the soundness of assuming a relationship between legislative voting and constituency. Stated in absolute terms, this assumption would lead to the conclusion that legislators with identical constituencies would have identical voting records in the legislature. Even when taking opinion distortion into account, it seems reasonable to expect, at the very least, a tendency toward agreement among legislators sharing a constituency. Table IV-1 gives a crude estimate of the soundness of this assumption as it applied to the Texas House during the Fifty-seventh Regular Session.

TABLE IV-1: Comparison of Legislators with Identical Constituencies.

<u>District (County)</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total Seats</u>
1 (Bowie)	2	-	-	-	-	2
9 (Jefferson)	1	1	1	-	1	4
21 (Galveston)	-	-	1	1	-	2
22 (Harris)	1	3	1	1	2	8
36 (Nueces)	-	-	2	1	-	3
38 (Hidalgo)	-	1	1	1	-	3
39 (Cameron)	-	-	1	1	-	2
51 (Dallas)	-	6	-	-	1	7
53 (McLennan)	1	2	-	-	-	3
60 (Tarrant)	1	2	4	-	-	7
63 (Bell)	1	1	-	-	-	2
65 (Travis)	-	-	2	1	-	3
68 (Bexar)	-	1	6	-	-	7
81 (Wichita)	1	1	-	-	-	2
97 (Lubbock)	-	1	-	1	-	2
105 (El Paso)	-	-	3	1	-	4

These distributions seem to indicate that division within district delegations is the rule rather than the exception. Only Bowie (Texarkana) and Dallas county sent delegations which presented a united front on both issue dimensions. Bexar county (San Antonio) sent six members who voted with the Coalition grouping and one who voted the Elite pattern. Similarly, El Paso sent a delegation of four out of which three voted with the Coalition grouping. Excepting these cases, however, multi-member constituencies found themselves being represented in the state legislature by a broad range of opinion with Harris county, for example, sending at least one of each opinion type into the arena.

James R. Jensen, in discussing the rationale offered for the use of the place system in legislative districting, states that "one can argue that it is justifiable because representatives, being elected by the same 'majority' in the county, tend to be all of one political hue. Thus, if the Democratic 'conservatives' are in a majority in the county, the legislative delegation would tend to be all 'conservative.' Being of the same political outlook, they can face the House of Representatives with a 'united front' and secure, as is said, more for the county than they could if they were of differing political views."<sup>14</sup> The argument can hardly be supported by the data reported in Table IV-1.

Table IV-1 can also be interpreted in terms of intra-delegation conflict on separate dimensions of conflict. The Lubbock county delegation, for example, sent two members--one Elite and one Bourbon--indicating agreement on the economic dimension but disagreement on the civil rights dimension. Cameron county (Brownsville), on the other hand, sent two delegates who voted similarly on the civil rights dimension but who apparently had conflicting views on state economic policies. Of the sixteen multi-member districts, thirteen sent delegations which included conflicting views on economic questions while only six included legislators with differing views on Negro civil rights. This finding accords with those of Miller and Stokes<sup>15</sup> who demonstrate that correspondence between constituency attitude and legislative roll call voting behavior varies with the type of issue. A particularly high correlation occurred on constituency attitudes

and Congressional voting on civil rights issues, thus indicating a high degree of constituency "control" or "influence" on this particular set of issues. In a multi-member district this phenomenon would be reflected in a higher degree of delegation cohesion on civil rights questions than on other issue dimensions, a condition which is manifest in Table IV-1 concerning legislative voting in Texas.

The amount of intra-delegation conflict reported here serves as a cautionary note and an indication of the need to re-emphasize certain aspects of the legislative system heretofore mentioned only briefly or in passing. One factor, and possibly the most important, is the fact that a legislator's constituency--as it affects the legislator's voting behavior--is whatever the legislator perceives it to be. This study views the constituency in terms of its formal boundaries and populational characteristics. The legislator can have little if any systematic knowledge of who constituted the majority which elected him or who will constitute the electorate in a bid for re-election. Thus he is left to his own devices--his subjective impressions of his district--to guide him in his voting to the extent that constituency approval is an important motivating factor for him. Further, there are perhaps constituencies other than the population and electorate constituencies which motivate individual legislative voting behavior. Extensive lobbying by a great number of pressure groups undoubtedly has great impact in the Texas legislature. Another factor which works against a higher degree of intra-delegation agreement is the low visibility of the legislative office, particularly



in multi-member districts where the voter has a number of legislators to claim as his representatives. Under these circumstances the individual constituent cannot easily identify with, communicate with, or hold responsible the individual legislator.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the place system of balloting lengthens the ballot and places greater demands on the voter if he is to gain adequate information to cast an issue or ideologically-motivated vote. Thus personal appeal and local popularity probably have greater electoral impact in the multi-member districts than if these same districts were sectioned into a number of single-member districts.

If the foregoing data seem to vitiate the very foundations of this inquiry, it should be pointed out that the multi-member districts examined here are for the most part composed of metropolitan areas with heterogeneous population composition and are, therefore, more likely to find large amounts of support for a variety of opinion types. This fact, along with the dispersion of responsibility which occurs by virtue of the long ballot and multiple representation, provide optimal conditions for the survival of a variety of opinion types from the electoral competition. There is a possibility that the state's single-member districts--a group which largely excludes metropolitan districts--would give an entirely different impression of constituency influence and legislative responsibility if an equivalent test were possible.

One other important point comes out of Table IV-1 which bears on previous speculation. That is the apparent compatibility of the

Bourbon and Coalition opinion types. Chapter I suggested that the Bourbon would find his base of support in districts lacking the ethnic composition necessary for a strong liberal coalition to be successful. In fact, Bourbon and Coalition opinion types are found in combination in seven of the sixteen delegations under consideration here--the most frequent combination of opinion types occurring in conflicting delegations. The Bourbon voter in the Texas House of Representatives is obviously quite different from the white Bourbon described by James Q. Wilson in his work on Negro politics.<sup>17</sup> This category of legislators, then, deserves a closer analysis and an attempt to better define the constituency characteristics coinciding with such a voting pattern in the legislature.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 483.

<sup>2</sup>U. S. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1962 (A Statistical Abstract Supplement). U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., 1962, Table 2, pp. 342-81.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>U. S. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Census of the Population: 1950. Subject Reports: Persons of Spanish Surname. Final Report PC(2)-1B. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1963, pp. 197-8.

<sup>6</sup>Derived by subtracting the non-white and Spanish surname percentages from 100% for each district.

<sup>7</sup>An urban legislative district is defined as any legislative district which includes the title central city or cities of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by the Census Bureau in 1960. For example, District 9 is composed of Jefferson County which includes both Beaumont and Port Arthur of the Beaumont-Port Arthur SMSA. Thus, District 9 is classified as urban while Orange County (District 8) is not even though it is part of the Beaumont-Port Arthur SMSA as defined in 1960. This procedure excludes outlying urbanized areas from the urban classification and has a slight effect of grouping suburban areas with the rural areas of the state.

<sup>8</sup>Texas Almanac: 1958 (Dallas, Texas: A. H. Belo Corporation, 1958), p. 456.

<sup>9</sup>Texas Almanac: 1961-1962 (Dallas, Texas: A. H. Belo Corporation, 1961), pp. 480-3.

<sup>10</sup>See ibid., pp. 44-51 for maps and description of Texas physiographic regions.

<sup>11</sup>The 1965 Redistricting Act which came about as a result of a federal court order handed down in Kilgarlin et al. v. Martin et al. (Civil Action No. 63-H-390, U. S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division) saw the first use of multiple districts within a county in Texas. Harris county, with nineteen legislators under the new apportionment guidelines, was divided into three multi-member House districts with six, six, and seven places.

<sup>12</sup>Constitution of the State of Texas, Article 3, Section 26. See Vernon's Annotated Texas Constitution or any edition of the Texas Almanac.

<sup>13</sup>Clifton McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 136. See James R. Jensen, Legislative Apportionment in Texas, Social Studies, vol. 2 (Houston: Public Affairs Research Center /University of Houston/, 1964), pp. 31-44 for a discussion of the districting system and some its political implications.

<sup>14</sup>Jensen, op. cit., p. 37. He also notes (p. 37n): "At this writing the Harris County Democratic delegation is divided between 'conservatives' and 'liberals.'" Jensen is clearly suspicious of the argument and only reports it as one of a series of arguments used for and against the place system.

<sup>15</sup>Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review 57:45-56.

<sup>16</sup>Jensen, op. cit., pp. 38-9.

<sup>17</sup>James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in Politics," Daedalus 94:949-73, Fall, 1965.

## CHAPTER V

### MODES OF OPINION IN TEXAS LEGISLATIVE POLITICS: FOUR PROFILES

This analysis will examine the distribution of four legislative opinion types according to the several variables indicated in the preceding chapter. The object of this analysis is to provide a profile of the four opinion types, highlighting those variables which appear to be associated with certain legislative voting patterns.

#### I. LEGISLATORS' OCCUPATION

Before examining the members of the legislature from the standpoint of their constituencies, it is in order to take a brief look at one personal characteristic of the House members for which data were available.<sup>1</sup> The non-political occupation of the legislator may well color his political perspective, both in terms of his ideological preferences and his interpretation of the legislative role, and hence affect his voting. Table V-1 shows that two-thirds of the legislators in the Bourbon category were lawyers by profession while lawyers constituted only forty-one per cent (62) of the total legislative membership. Populists--in slightly disproportionate numbers--tended to come from agricultural and teaching occupations to the relative exclusion of the legal profession. The occupational distribution of Populists probably reflects the regional and urban-rural distribution of their constituencies as demonstrated later in Tables V-2 and V-3 respectively. The preponderance of lawyers in the Bourbon category is

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TABLE V-1: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Occupation Outside Politics.

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<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lawyer	11	17	15	12	7	62
Business	10	16	11	4	2	43
Farm/Ranch	6	5	4	2	1	18
Teaching	5	4	3	0	1	13
Student	2	6	0	0	1	9
Miscellaneous	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
Total:	35	50	34	18	13	150

SOURCE: Texas Almanac: 1961-1962 (Dallas, Texas: A. H. Belo Corporation, 1961), p. 459.

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puzzling, although this may indicate that the lawyer is less hesitant than others to assume a stance on civil rights--perhaps under the pressure of constituency preference--which factional ideologues would consider inconsistent with conservative voting on economic issues. No conclusion is in order, however, based on the present data.

## II. REGION

Some specific expectations concerning the regional distribution of legislative opinion types were expressed in Chapter I. In brief, it was expected that East Texas would provide the base of support for a good portion of the Populists while the Bourbon type would come

predominantly from districts in the Central and Panhandle areas of the state, areas with a relatively sparse concentration of ethnic minorities. The latter expectation, of course, hinged on the assumption that the Bourbon voter in the legislature represented something of a progressive, modernizing elite which would be more inclined to express favorable sentiments toward the issue of Negro civil rights when not confronted with a strong challenge to his views on economic policy from the labor-dominated liberal coalition. The earlier examination of legislators with identical constituencies, however, demonstrated a high incidence of Coalition-Bourbon coexistence within multi-member district delegations. Table V-2 further challenges the previous speculation concerning the nature of the Bourbon voter in the Texas legislature while offering some support to expectations concerning the Populist type.

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TABLE V-2: Regional Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types.

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<u>Region<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
East	20	23	6	2	4	55
Central	10	18	8	4	4	44
Panhandle	3	4	2	2	4	15
Rio Grande Valley	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>36</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

<sup>a</sup>See text (Chapter IV) for regional definitions.

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Table V-2 indicates that better than half of the Populists represent East Texas districts while over half of the Coalition and Bourbon voters find their base of support in the Rio Grande Valley area of the state. The Elite voting category includes large contingents of legislators from both East and Central Texas and the largest share of members from the relatively small Panhandle grouping.

The distributions in Table V-2 reflect a notable tendency which recurs throughout the analysis and which should be carefully noted at this point. Assuming that the economic-taxation scale used in this analysis reflects the conventionally-labeled liberal and conservative Democratic party factions, the regional variable loses much of its distinguishing power when applied to full factional groupings without regard to civil rights voting. For example, the liberal faction of the legislature would include Populist and Coalition voting types while the conservative faction would combine the Elite and Bourbon groupings. In both cases this amounts to combining two groups from largely different kinds of districts thereby cancelling most of the constituency differences which might obtain between factional groupings. In a word, it begins to appear that civil rights voting in the legislature is closely related to constituency while voting on economic issues proceeds independently of constituency. This may seem rather anomalous since the major issues of Texas politics revolve around some very intense and divisive conflicts which are essentially economic in nature while civil rights was only a peripheral concern of the state legislature in 1961. Civil rights, nevertheless, is a highly charged emotional issue in the state



and those in elective office who break with traditional southern unanimity usually have their constituents in mind as they do it.

The overwhelming tendencies toward anti-civil rights sentiments among East Texas legislators and toward pro-civil rights sentiments among Valley representatives is not too surprising. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that better than one-fourth of the Valley legislators exhibited the Bourbon voting pattern--a fact which challenges the stereotype of Valley liberalism as ethnic-based economic radicalism.

### III. URBANIZATION

Table V-3 presents the distribution of legislative opinion types according to the district urbanization variable. On the basis of speculation in Chapter I, Coalition Liberals would be expected to come predominantly from urban metropolitan areas and Populists from rural areas of the state. No firm expectations have been advanced concerning the Elite and Bourbon types; whatever expectations were originally held concerning the Bourbon voter in the legislature have been fairly well dissipated under the weight of the data reviewed up to this point.

Table V-3 illustrates the essential accuracy of the prior thinking concerning the Populist and Coalition types with a large number of the Populists coming from rural districts and Coalition voters coming from the urbanized areas of the state. Contrasted against the distributions which might have been expected on the basis of the marginal totals in Table V-3, neither Elite nor Bourbon voters in the legislature show any significant tendencies in terms of their

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TABLE V-3: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Urban/Rural Characteristics of Constituency.

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	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
Urban <sup>a</sup>	7	21	24	10	5	67
Rural <sup>a</sup>	<u>28</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>83</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

.. <sup>a</sup>See Chapter IV, fn 7 for definition of these terms.

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district urbanization characteristics, although Bourbons tend to come slightly more often from urban districts.

The distribution of legislators in Table V-3 reflects a high degree of association between district urbanization and pro-civil rights voting in the legislature. This positive association provides some support for the previous assumption that urbanization contributes to the dissolution of traditional southern racial conventions. This appears to occur quite independently of the basic factional affiliation (i.e., roll call responses to taxation and other economic issues) of the individual legislators in the Texas House.

#### IV. FAMILY INCOME

Two indicators of district family income are used in this study in an attempt to measure the possible different effects of high proportions of either high or low income groupings in legislative

districts. The first indicator to be examined is the proportion of families in the legislator's district earning less than \$3,000 in 1959. As Table V-4 illustrates, Texas House districts showed a great deal of variation in terms of personal income structure.

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TABLE V-4: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Per Cent of Families in Constituency Earning Less than \$3,000 in 1959.

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<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
10-19.9%	3	14	6	2	6	31
20-29.9	6	9	16	10	1	42
30-39.9	11	7	3	2	3	26
40-49.9	6	13	4	3	2	28
50% and +	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>23</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Census of Population: 1960. County and City Data Book.

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Overall, the figures in Table V-4 reflect the tendencies for Populists to represent districts with a high proportion of low income families and for Coalition and Bourbon voters to represent districts with a relatively low percentage of low income families. The Elite grouping, on the other hand, draws most heavily from districts with either extremely high or extremely low numbers of low income families.

As an indicator of the number of high income families in the legislator's district, the percentage of families earning in excess of

\$10,000 in 1959 was used. Table V-5 shows the distribution of opinion types according to this economic indicator and reflects essentially the same features as does the low income variable, indicating perhaps that none of the four opinion types results from a peculiar state of economic imbalance within legislative districts. In fact, a quick scanning of the data revealed that only four single-member districts were above the median of all legislative seats in terms of the percentage of both high and low income groupings within the district. The four legislators from these districts included three of the four opinion types and one not classified.

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TABLE V-5: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Per Cent of Families in District Earning More than \$10,000 in 1959.

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<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
0 - 9.9%	26	28	12	7	5	78
10% and +	<u>9</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>72</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

SOURCE: County and City Data Book, 1962. U. S. Bureau of the Census.

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The overall impression gained from the income data is that Populists, for the most part, represent low income districts; civil rights liberals (Coalition and Bourbon) represent relatively high income districts; and Elite voters in the legislature represent districts characterized by a wide range of economic conditions. This

is perhaps largely a reflection of the urban-rural distribution .  
(Table V-3) and the higher income levels in the metropolitan areas of the state.

## V. DISTRICT ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Texas, as a political unit, provides a unique geographic intersection of two of the country's more significant ethnic minorities. Negroes comprise a large portion of the population in the eastern third of the state while Mexican-Americans are heavily concentrated in the area to the North of the Rio Grande from El Paso in the West to Victoria on the Gulf Coast. According to the 1960 census, 12.4 per cent of the total state population was non-white and 14.8 per cent had Spanish surnames. For the most part these two minorities are to be found in areas of heavy concentration relative to the white Anglo population, but seldom do they coincide in the same area.<sup>2</sup>

Both the Negro and the Mexican-American are normally associated with liberal politics in the state; nevertheless, the relationship between minority concentration and legislative voting is at best problematic. Variable participation,<sup>3</sup> white domination and control of minority electors in some counties,<sup>4</sup> and the possibility of a negative association between white sympathies and minority concentration<sup>5</sup> all work to exclude the political opinions of these minorities from the opinion-policy process. Thus the pattern of opinion which reaches the legislative level cannot be assumed to reflect anything of the distribution of ethnic minorities in the state. Perhaps this analysis

can help to clarify that relationship. Table V-6 gives the distribution of legislative opinion types according to the percentage of constituency population classified non-white in 1960.

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TABLE V-6: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Per Cent of District Population Non-White, 1960.

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<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Totals</u>
0 - 9.9%	12	14	21	15	7	69
10-19.9	10	16	8	1	2	37
20-29.9	11	17	5	2	4	39
30% and +	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

SOURCE: County and City Data Book, 1962. U. S. Bureau of the Census.

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Districts with less than ten per cent non-white population show a notable tendency toward Coalition and Bourbon categories while those with a higher proportion of non-whites tend toward the Populist and Elite types. Thus there appears to be a strong negative association between the proportion of non-whites in the constituency and sympathy for civil rights expressed in the legislature--an association which is not too surprising in view of the distortional factors cited above.

The Spanish surname population of the legislator's district presents an entirely different picture. Table V-7 indicates a strong positive association between Latin American concentration and pro-civil rights voting in the legislature.

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TABLE V-7: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Per Cent of District Population with Spanish Surname, 1960.

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<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Totals</u>
0 - 9.9%	31	40	12	3	11	97
10-19.9	2	7	4	6	1	20
20-29.9	0	0	1	2	0	3
30% and +	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>30</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

SOURCE: Subject Reports: Spanish Surname Population. U. S. Bureau of the Census.

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. An overwhelming majority of both Elite and Populist legislators come from districts with less than ten per cent Spanish surname population while Coalition and Bourbon voters come much more heavily from districts of high Latin American concentration. However, since the median percentage of Spanish surname population for all legislative seats is only 5.2 per cent, it is helpful to look at the number of legislators of each opinion type who come from districts which are above the median in that respect. Viewed in this manner 28.6 per cent (10 of 35) of the Populists, 34.0 per cent (17 of 50) of the Elite voters, 76.5 per cent (26 of 34) of the Coalition type, and all eighteen of the Bourbons come from districts which are above the legislative median in Spanish surname population. The constituency Spanish surname population then seems closely related to legislative

voting patterns, particularly with regard to the civil rights dimension of conflict.

Another interesting facet of the ethnic variable is concerned with the percentage composition of white Anglo-Americans in the legislator's constituency. For the present study these statistics have been derived by subtracting the sum of non-white and Spanish surname percentages from the total district population. Thus, the indicator of white Anglo-American population in each district is actually the residual population which remains after accounting for the other two major ethnic groups. By viewing the white Anglo variable from the perspective of total ethnic minority strength, then, an idea can be gained of the combined impact of the Negro and the Mexican-American on legislative voting. Based on the above findings (Tables V-6 and V-7) it is difficult to predict just what the effect might be of controlling for the combined strength of the two minorities. Two previously-noted factors confuse the picture. For one thing, legislators from districts which have high Spanish surname concentration and those with large non-white minorities show opposite voting tendencies with regard to civil rights issues. Secondly, the dispersion of the two minority populations throughout the state is vastly different both in terms of the areas of concentration and in the strength of concentration. The Spanish surname population of Texas is largely concentrated in the region designated herein as the Rio Grande Valley while the non-white population finds its greatest concentration in the East Texas region. Further, the non-white population is more evenly dispersed and constitutes a



majority in only a few of the state's counties and in none of its legislative districts. On the other hand, the Spanish surname population constitutes a clear majority in seven legislative districts represented by ten seats in the House of Representatives. These factors must be considered while examining Table V-8.

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TABLE V-8: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Per Cent of District Population Classified as White Anglo-American, 1960.<sup>a</sup>

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<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
0-49.9%	1	2	5	2	0	10
50-59.9	0	3	12	3	1	19
60-69.9	6	6	2	4	0	18
70-79.9	11	18	6	3	4	42
80-89.9	11	17	7	6	5	46
90-100	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>15</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

<sup>a</sup>Derived by subtracting sum of non-white and Spanish surname population from total district population.

SOURCE: County and City Data Book, 1962 and Subject Reports: Spanish Surname Population. U. S. Bureau of the Census.

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In view of the factors mentioned above it is difficult to interpret Table V-8 strictly in terms of a white Anglo majority vis-à-vis an inclusive category of combined ethnic minorities. Nonetheless, high Anglo dominance is apparent in the districts

represented by both Populist and Elite legislators while Coalition voters come primarily from districts with relatively few Anglos. In fact, exactly half of the Coalition voters come from districts with less than sixty per cent Anglo composition, a characteristic which describes fewer than one-fifth of all legislative seat constituencies.

The distribution of Bourbon voters is particularly interesting because of its variance from the Coalition distribution. Up to this point in the analysis, the Coalition and Bourbon voters have yielded fairly similar distributions on most constituency variables. However, it now appears that one of the major distinctions of the Bourbon voter (vis-à-vis the Coalition voter) is a surprisingly large Anglo constituency combined with a relatively large Mexican-American concentration. In terms of constituency white Anglo population, the Bourbon legislators seem to have more in common with the Elite legislators than they do with the Coalition grouping.

Chapter I emphasized the role of the Negro in Texas politics. A certain amount of speculation was put forth concerning patterns of opinion in the state and the breaking down of southern racial tradition. It was assumed that the Negro participant was beginning to show signs of political effectiveness and that this success could be shown to have taken place according to some well known patterns which can be categorically referred to as ethnic politics. The data, however, have cast a great deal of doubt on this line of thinking. It can only be concluded that, if there is "ethnic politics" in Texas, it is the Mexican-American and not the Negro who practices the strategy successfully. An overall

assessment of the data must conclude that Mexican-American concentration makes the big difference on "the" ethnic issue--civil rights. In fact, it was demonstrated that Negro concentration is negatively associated with legislative support of civil rights questions.

In summation, the ethnic composition of districts represented by Elite and Populist voters in the legislature is in accord with preliminary expectations reflecting a traditional southern situation of white versus black with the white most often victorious. Coalition and Bourbon districts, however, tend to reflect the conflict between the Anglo and the Mexican-American. The Coalition voters typically come from districts characterized by high ethnic concentration, particularly Mexican-American and sometimes Negro. The effective strength of the Coalition consensus, however, appears to lie with the Mexican-American population when viewed strictly from the standpoint of ethnic strength. Nevertheless, there are significant deviations of representatives from heavily Latin districts in the direction of the Bourbon consensus. Soukup, Holloway, and McCleskey have observed that:

...a good many leaders of the Spanish-speaking people are unimpressed by the economic doctrines associated with present-day liberalism. A sizable number of the "old-line" Latin American leaders--probably more than in the case of the Negro community--are engaged in running business enterprises. Such individuals often share the Anglo businessman's skepticism of government economic controls and welfare spending. At the very least, they are likely to behave so as not to antagonize predominantly conservative civic leaders who oppose the welfare state.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, the typology label, Bourbon, which has been borrowed from James Q. Wilson,<sup>7</sup> is perhaps not so inappropriate after all. The situation of Anglo majority versus ethnic minority appears to be much the same as

that which Wilson describes, but with the major exception that the minority is Latin rather than Negro.

The question of Negro political efficacy, however, has gone unanswered. The overall negative association of constituency Negro concentration and civil rights voting in the legislature is deceptive in that it reflects the anti-civil rights sentiments of rural areas where Negroes are in greatest concentration relative to the Anglo population and also the pro-civil rights sentiments of the areas of greatest Mexican-American concentration where Negro concentration is typically sparse. However, if Texas politics is in a state of transition with regard to racial traditions and Negro political effectiveness, as this thesis suggests, then the first steps in this direction would probably be manifest in the metropolitan areas of the state. If it can be shown that increased Negro voting strength in metropolitan constituencies--particularly those with few Mexican-Americans--corresponds with favorable legislative voting on civil rights issues, then the thesis of modernization need not be rejected entirely.

In the 1961 legislature, sixty-seven House members were elected from the districts classified herein as urban. Of these, twenty-six came from districts which were comprised of better than ten per cent Spanish surname population. If in 1961 the Negro was beginning to influence legislative politics, then the remaining forty-one metropolitan legislators should show increasing civil rights sympathy with increasing Negro concentration in the constituency. Table V-9 shows how these forty-one legislators distribute by their voting behavior and

the degree of non-white concentration in their districts.

TABLE V-9: Distribution of Legislators from Metropolitan Districts with Less than Ten Per Cent Spanish Surname Population according to Opinion Type and Per Cent District Population Non-White.

<u>Per Cent Non-White</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
0-9.9%	1	3	1	0	1	6
10-19.9	2	10	4	0	1	17
20-29.9	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>18</u>
Totals:	7	19	8	2	5	41

Table V-9 indicates a slight tendency toward more favorable legislative representation for the Negro in those metropolitan districts with higher Negro concentration. Regardless of the strength of the association, it is noteworthy that it is at least a positive association--a reversal of the pattern which typifies the state at large and probably most of the rural South. A transition toward a new and effective participant role for the Negro does appear to be taking place in Texas politics, although it had not proceeded in 1961 to the extent that the speculation in Chapter I suggested.

#### VI. CONSTITUENCY OPINION: THE QUESTION OF NEGRO CIVIL RIGHTS

The indicator of constituency civil rights opinion used here is crude at best. Aside from the fact that it describes conditions which prevailed four years prior to the meeting of the Fifty-seventh Legislature, it has certain advantages which make it useful for present

purposes. First, even though dated, the returns of the 1956 segregation referendum reflect certain regional and cultural patterns which are likely to remain fairly stable over short periods of time even though absolute figures may change dramatically.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, by using the results of a Democratic primary referendum, many of the same distortional factors have affected both the expressed opinion of the constituency and the choice of legislators in each district. Constituency opinion, as expressed in a voting referendum, is more likely to be politically relevant than the distribution of opinion which might be uncovered by

TABLE V-10: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Per Cent of District Vote Favoring Segregation in July 28, 1956 Democratic Primary Referendum.

Per Cent Segregationist Vote of Total Votes Cast	Populist	Elite	Coalition	Bourbon	N-C	Total
90-100%	3	6	0	0	0	9
80-89.9	22	20	8	0	3	53
70-79.9	9	21	6	5	6	47
60-69.9	1	1	5	8	4	19
0-59.9	0	1	9	5	0	15
No Vote <sup>a</sup>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

<sup>a</sup>County Executive Committees in Uvalde, Kleberg, and Bexar refused to carry the issue on the primary ballot. However, only the seven Bexar County legislators were not classified by district vote. Uvalde and Kleberg representatives were classified on the basis of returns from other counties in their districts.

SOURCE: Texas Almanac: 1958 (Dallas: A. H. Belo Corp., 1958), p. 456.

sampling the entire eligible electorate since the latter method does not take into account variable voter participation.

It can be seen from Table V-10 that only four of the eighty-five legislators who opposed civil rights legislation (Populist and Elite) came from districts which gave less than seventy per cent support to the segregationist proposal in the 1956 referendum. On the other hand, Coalition and Bourbon voters came primarily from districts in the lower ranges of segregationist voting. The high correspondence between expressed constituency sentiment and legislative voting points up the emotional significance of the civil rights issue in state politics and the apparent precision with which the individual legislator perceives electoral mandate. The most notable discrepancy from the overall pattern occurs in the Coalition column with fourteen of these legislators coming from districts which gave better than seventy per cent majorities to the segregationist proposal. As mentioned earlier, Holloway<sup>9</sup> has suggested that the Negro, while lending faithful support to the coalition cause, seldom receives reciprocal support from labor's rank and file at the ballot box. Nevertheless, legislators who come into office with coalition backing are generally committed to support civil rights legislation or run the risk of alienating a significant element of their political base. Thus, while the typology label "Coalition" refers only to legislative voting behavior, the data in Table V-10 suggest that at least some of the legislators in this category were responding to certain legislative issues as though they were responsible to some actual organized or semi-organized coalition of interests.

## VII. DISTRICT GUBERNATORIAL SUPPORT

This section examines the distribution of legislative voting types according to the degree of support given to the incumbent governor, Price Daniel, in the 1960 Democratic primary by the legislators' constituencies. In terms of conventional political ideology, Daniel is difficult to categorize. However, from the standpoint of the scale analysis used in this study, he can be easily identified with the liberal side of the economic scale division since his administration was committed to oppose the general sales tax. Further, his opposition in 1960 was provided by a conservative Democrat who would later run for the governorship under the Republican banner. To the extent that the Texas electorate votes along ideological lines, the choice was relatively clear-cut. Thus, it was thought that legislative support of the governor's tax program might coincide with constituency support of the governor in the primary. If this were the case, those districts which gave Daniel his largest majorities would be those most likely to send Populist and Coalition legislators to the House of Representatives. The assumption of an issue-oriented electorate in Texas politics, however, may prove unwarranted.

As can be seen from the marginal distribution in Table V-11, Daniel encountered only a mild challenge in the person of Jack Cox. Cox carried only seven legislative districts having a total of eight seats in the House. Had Daniel's opposition been stronger, the primary election more hotly contested, and the issues more clearly defined, there might have been a clearer relationship between district



TABLE V-11: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to Per Cent of District Vote for Price Daniel in First Democratic Primary, 1960 (opposed by Jack Cox).

Per Cent Vote for Daniel	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
30-49.9%	1	4	1	1	1	8
50-59.9	16	18	11	10	4	59
60-79.9	<u>18</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>83</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

SCURCE: Texas Almanac: 1961-1962 (Dallas, Texas: A. H. Belo Corp., 1961), pp. 480-3.

gubernatorial voting and legislative support of the governor's tax program. When the four voting types are divided at the median for all constituencies (60.3%) into groups coming from districts giving either high or low support to the governor, the two types of districts yield distributions of legislative voting types which are not different beyond a .20 level of probability.<sup>10</sup> (See Table V-12.)

While district gubernatorial voting shows only a slight relationship to legislative voting, it is important to note that the economic rather than the civil rights dimension shows the highest correspondence to the district vote for Daniel. There is a slight tendency for economic liberals (Populist and Coalition), when taken together, to come from districts which were above the median in support of Daniel and for economic conservatives (Elite and Bourbon) to come from low support districts.

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TABLE V-12: Distribution of Legislators Coming from Districts High and Low in Support of Daniel, by Legislative Voting Type.

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<u>Voting Type</u>	<u>High Support (60.4% and more)</u>	<u>Low Support (60.3% and less)</u>	<u>Total</u>
Populist	17	18	35
Elite	22	28	50
Coalition	22	12	34
Bourbon	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>18</u>
Totals:	68	69	137
	$\chi^2 = 4.54$	$df = 3$	$.30 > p > .20$

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#### VIII. SUMMARY PROFILE

Table V-13 gives a summary profile of the four legislative opinion types examined herein. Occupational, regional, and urbanization variables are presented in the form of percentage distributions for each legislative type and for all legislative seats combined. District income, ethnic composition, and voting information are summarized according to median percentages for each legislative opinion type and the combined median for all legislative seats. Chapter VI will summarize the findings concerning the relationship between legislative voting and constituency in Texas legislative politics.

TABLE V-13: Comparative Profile of Legislative Opinion Types

	<u>Populist</u> <u>(N = 35)</u>	<u>Elite</u> <u>(N=50)</u>	<u>Coalition</u> <u>(N = 34)</u>	<u>Bourbon</u> <u>(N=18)</u>	<u>All Seats<sup>a</sup></u> <u>(N=150)</u>
<b>Legislators' Occupation:</b>					
Lawyer	31.4%	34.0%	44.1%	66.7%	41.3%
Business	28.6	32.0	32.4	22.2	28.7
Farming/Ranching	17.1	10.0	11.8	11.1	12.0
Others	22.8	24.0	11.7	0.0	18.0
Total:	<u>99.9%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<b>Regional Location of Legislators' Districts:</b>					
East Texas	57.1%	46.0%	17.6%	11.1%	36.7%
Central and Panhandle Texas	37.2	44.0	29.4	33.3	39.3
Rio Grande Valley	5.7	10.0	52.9	55.6	24.0
Total:	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>99.9%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<b>Urban-Rural Distribution of Districts:</b>					
Urban	20.0%	42.0%	70.6%	55.6%	44.6%
Rural	80.0	58.0	29.4	44.4	55.4
Total:	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<b>Annual Family Income (1959):</b>					
Median per cent earning less than \$3,000	36.6%	31.7%	27.2%	28.4%	31.2%
Median per cent earning more than \$10,000	6.6%	8.9%	11.0%	10.8%	9.4%
<b>Ethnic Composition of Legislators' Districts:</b>					
Median per cent non-white	14.3%	15.4%	6.9%	4.6%	11.1%
Median per cent Spanish surname	2.7%	3.4%	29.8%	20.5%	5.2%
Median per cent white Anglo-American	79.6%	76.4%	60.9%	69.7%	74.9%
Median Per Cent Segregationist Vote (1956 ref.):	82.9%	80.4% <sup>b</sup>	69.3% <sup>c</sup>	65.4%	79.6% <sup>d</sup>
Median Per Cent Voting for Daniel (1960 primary):	60.2%	60.0%	62.3%	58.8%	60.3%

<sup>a</sup>Includes thirteen unclassified legislators.

<sup>b</sup>Does not include one Bexar County representative.

<sup>c</sup>Does not include six Bexar County representatives.

<sup>d</sup>Does not include seven Bexar County representatives.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Texas Almanac: 1961-1962 (Dallas, Texas: A. H. Belo Corporation, 1961), p. 459. The "business category in Table V-1 includes most occupations not falling into other explicit categories, for example, banking, retailing, advertizing, manufacturing, and oil and gas production. The miscellaneous category includes three housewives, a retired military officer, and one professional football player.

<sup>2</sup>Clifton McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), pp. 2-4.

<sup>3</sup>Donald R. Matthews and James M. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966), parts I and II.

<sup>4</sup>Harry Holloway, "Negro Politics in the American South: Two Cases from Texas Experience," unpublished paper presented to the Southwestern Social Science Convention in Dallas, Texas, March 23, 1967. See also James R. Soukup, Clifton McCleskey, and Harry Holloway, Party and Factional Division in Texas (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1964), p. 127 concerning the Latin-American voter.

<sup>5</sup>Werner F. Grunbaum, "Desegregation in Texas: Voting and Action Patterns," Public Opinion Quarterly 28:604-14, Winter, 1964. Grunbaum found that, in the segregated counties of the state, desegregation voting correlated negatively with the Negro ratio.

<sup>6</sup>Soukup, et al., on cit., pp. 135-6.

<sup>7</sup>Supra, p. 9, which cites James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in Politics," Daedalus 94:949-73, Fall, 1965.

<sup>8</sup>Grunbaum, op. cit.

<sup>9</sup>Holloway, op. cit.

<sup>10</sup>Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Incorporated, 1956), pp. 179-84. The extension of the median technique used here is based on the chi-square statistic. It is used here simply as a measure of the deviation of the two distributions and not strictly as a test in the experimental sense.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE CONSTITUENCY BASES OF EXPRESSED OPINION IN THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE

It was the purpose of the previous chapter to discover whatever relationships may exist between legislative opinion as expressed through recorded roll call votes and characteristics of the legislators' constituencies. The following is a review of each legislative opinion type and the modal characteristics of the formal constituencies of each. The constituency descriptions will point out the typical characteristics with the conviction that modal differences among the four legislative types point in the direction of real and meaningful differences of political relevance. In essence, an attempt will be made to describe in broadest outlines four sub-cultures of opinion and politics which co-exist in the state and which find confluence and expression in the state house.

#### I. POPULIST

Included in the Populist category are those legislators who voted with the liberal faction on economic issues but who cast conservative votes on issues of Negro civil rights. The Populist label was chosen because of its approximation of traditional agrarian liberalism which the two positions indicate. Thirty-five members of the Fifty-seventh Texas House fell into this category on the basis of their expressed opinion on roll call votes.

The Populist voter in the Fifty-seventh legislature typically came from a district in East Texas and the district could most often be characterized as rural. Fifteen of the thirty-five legislators in this category were accurately described by both of these characteristics. The next greatest contribution of Populists came from the rural districts of the combined Central and Panhandle region with a total of eleven.<sup>1</sup> Taken separately, better than half of the Populists came from East Texas districts and better than three-fourths came from rural districts.

Annual family income was typically much lower in the Populist district than in those represented by other types of voters in the legislature. The figures given in Table V-13 indicate that in the typical district represented by the Populist voter, over thirty-five per cent of the families earned less than \$3,000 in 1959 and fewer than seven per cent earned better than \$10,000.

In terms of ethnic composition, the Populist districts included a high concentration of non-white population; but the Anglo population, which typically constituted close to eighty per cent of the total district population, was in a position to remain dominant. There were few Latin-Americans in the Populist districts to offset the traditions of the rural South as they seem to have done in other areas of the state. All of these factors seemed to combine in a high percentage of segregationist voting on the part of the district electorate. Populist districts were, on the average, higher in expressed segregationist sentiment than those of any other legislative type. Meanwhile,

Populist districts gave about average support to the incumbent governor in the 1960 Democratic primary.

The Populist voter in the legislature, then, generally found his constituency base in districts which conformed quite closely to the southern, agrarian pattern of liberal welfare politics. Typically from rural, low income districts with a high concentration of Negroes and a high percentage of segregationist sentiment, the Populist legislators came from districts which share much of the tradition of the Deep South. Geographically, the majority of the Populists came from the Eastern third of the state, a region much more in harmony with the Old Confederacy by culture and heritage than any other in the state.

## II. ELITE

The Elite legislator was labeled after the description by V. O. Key of a type of ideological conservatism which is rooted both in southern traditionalism and opposition to the welfare state on the part of the new rich. These legislators voted in opposition to civil rights causes and opposed the governor's tax program while favoring a regressive general sales tax. The Elite category included fifty of the 150 House members, the most numerous of the four legislative voting types.

This group, like the Populists, included as its largest contingent a number of legislators from rural East Texas. However, where fifteen of the Elite voters came from these districts, there were also twelve from urban districts in the Central and Panhandle regions

of the state. Elite legislators came almost equally from East Texas and the combined Central and Panhandle region. The urban-rural distribution of Elite districts shows them to conform quite closely with the distribution of all legislative seats although with a slight rural tendency.

Annual family income in the Elite district was typical and significantly higher than in the Populist districts on both income indicators. The ethnic distribution in Elite districts was much like that of the Populist districts with the exception that both minorities were to be found in slightly higher concentration in the Elite districts. Still, the number of Mexican-Americans was not significant and the white Anglo typically held a better than seventy-five per cent population majority.

Segregationist voting was high, but not as high as in the Populist districts and support for Daniel was slightly lower than that given by Populist districts or by the districts of all legislative seats combined.

Where the Populist and Elite legislators shared similar voting behavior on civil rights issues, they differed on the economic issues facing the legislature, a pattern which suggests that the Elite legislator represented a modification of traditional Southern politics based on widespread economic prosperity. Although annual family income is not extremely high in the districts represented by Elite legislators, it is high enough to suggest a level of urban and semi-rural comfort in the Texas heartland and the more prosperous parts of



the East. Along with the desertion of welfare liberalism on the part of the Elite districts has come an erosion of the traditional racist solidarity as reflected by a substantially lower level of segregationist voting on the referendum issue than was noted in the Populist districts. Whether this is a result of the softening of white attitudes or a result of higher Negro participation in the Elite districts, it is at least an indication that change is underway in the direction of liberalized political communication. Nevertheless, in 1956 segregationist opinion was still holding sway in these districts by a large margin.

### III. COALITION

The Coalition label was used to describe the voting pattern which endorsed legislation favorable to Negro civil rights and also endorsed liberal economic and taxation proposals. The Coalition voter in the legislature took positions which have been conventionally identified with metropolitan coalitions of labor, Negroes, and Latins in Texas politics. This category included thirty-four legislators.

Better than half of these legislators came from districts in the Rio Grande Valley region of the state and over seventy per cent came from districts classified as urban. Combining these two modal characteristics it happens that fourteen of the Coalition voters came from urban Rio Grande districts. The next largest contingent was the seven legislators from urban Central and Panhandle districts.

Family income in Coalition districts appears to be higher than in districts represented by any other voting type, perhaps a reflection

of the higher pay scales and cost of living in the metropolitan areas of the state.

It was in the districts represented by Coalition voters that ethnic minorities showed their greatest combined strength vis-à-vis white Anglo majorities. The typical Coalition district had a Spanish surname population which constituted close to thirty per cent of the total district population. The non-white population was typically much lower but not negligible at approximately seven per cent of the district total. The combined concentration of both minorities (In the case of a few districts they constituted majorities.) most often left the Anglo majority at a relatively small sixty to sixty-five per cent.

The typical Coalition district gave less than seventy per cent support to the segregationist proposal in the 1956 Democratic primary. In addition, of the seven legislators from Bexar county (San Antonio), where the Democratic Executive Committee refused to carry the item on the ballot, six were classified as Coalition on the basis of their voting record in the House. Compared with statewide figures, the support for traditional southern racial institutions by Coalition constituencies was far below normal. In terms of gubernatorial support, Coalition districts gave the incumbent governor higher support than did those represented by any other voting type.

Thus it is readily apparent that in terms of the socio-economic, geographic, and attitudinal variables examined the Coalition constituencies differ radically from the Populist and Elite constituencies reviewed earlier. The Coalition voting pattern does correspond to a

high degree with a constituency situation which one would expect to produce a liberal coalition in Texas politics. The metropolitan flavor and the high concentration of black and, particularly, brown minorities in these districts combine to make a liberal coalition a strategic possibility. These are also the same areas of the state where organized labor finds its greatest concentration. The voting strength of labor is only moderate at best across the state and the strategy of coalition with racial and ethnic minorities in urban areas offers the unions an opportunity to voice its liberal economic policies at the state level. Thus labor leadership is often induced to support civil rights positions in order to maintain ethnic electoral support. At the same time, labor rank-and-file may be holding and expressing quite different opinions as is indicated by the eight Coalition legislators who publicly supported civil rights causes on roll call votes but whose districts voted better than eighty per cent for the segregationist proposals in the 1956 referendum.

#### IV. BOURBON

The Bourbon label was used to identify those legislators voting with the conservative faction on matters of economics and taxation while favoring liberal civil rights legislation. The label was suggested by James Q. Wilson's observations on Negro politics. According to Wilson, some white conservatives might be inclined to support civil rights legislation in order to maintain a good business climate in the community, an inclination which is strengthened by the

promise of drawing ethnic minorities away from the labor-dominated liberal camp. Wilson argues, in addition, that members of the upper and upper-middle classes are more likely to hold favorable attitudes toward ethnic minorities and their social and political participation than are members of the white working classes. Although the pattern which emerges in the present study bears little surface resemblance to that which Wilson describes, it seems plausible that the underlying strategy is the same with the exception that the strategy is being initiated by the white elite rather than the black politician.

Wilson is, of course, concerned with strategies to maximize Negro political effectiveness in the South and proposes that possibly the most promising strategy for the Negro is for him to ally himself with the white elite (or Bourbon) to exclude the "redneck" from power. However, the pattern which emerges in Texas is quite different. The threat to the white elite is a potentially radical and very large Mexican-American concentration in the southern and southwestern regions of the state rather than blacks or the white working class. Consequently the white elite, or Bourbon as they have been labeled here, chooses to co-opt the blacks into a conservative coalition in an effort to stave off potential Latin majorities. The summary profile of the Bourbon districts which follows supports this general line of reasoning although it does not entirely substantiate it.

The Bourbon voter was a relatively rare breed in the Fifty-seventh Texas House with only eighteen of 150 legislators qualifying for the label under the criteria used in this study. Two-thirds of

these were lawyers by profession. A majority of the Bourbon legislators were from districts in the Rio Grande Valley region of the state. Rural Rio Grande districts provided one-third of the Bourbon total with six. The only two East Texas legislators who exhibited the Bourbon voting pattern came from urban districts, perhaps according to the pattern which Wilson discussed. Overall, a majority of the Bourbon voters came from urban districts. The urban skew is clear in the case of the Bourbon legislator but not so pronounced as it is with the Coalition voter.

Bourbon legislators' districts were above the legislative median in annual family income but not quite up to the levels of the Coalition districts.

One of the major differences between the Bourbon and Coalition districts lies in their ethnic make-up. In the typical Bourbon district, the Anglo population constitutes almost seventy per cent of the district total and the Spanish surname population in the neighborhood of twenty per cent. Thus, in the Bourbon district the Anglo population is nearly ten per cent higher and the Latin population nearly ten per cent lower, on the average, than in the Coalition districts.

Despite the lower level of minority concentration, all eighteen Bourbon legislators came from districts below the legislative median in segregationist voting. In fact, Bourbon legislators were the only legislative voting type to come from districts where the median Anglo population percentage exceeded the median segregationist vote in 1956. At the same time, Bourbon districts were the lowest of all in support

of the "liberal" incumbent governor in the 1960 primary.

On the basis of the constituency variables analyzed, it would be extremely difficult to distinguish a potential Bourbon district from a potential Coalition district. It is plausible to speculate, however, that one of the big distinctions might be a lack of large forces of organized labor in the Bourbon districts and, hence, the lack of a nucleus for a liberal coalition and the feasibility of the Bourbon strategy. Whatever the rationale behind the Bourbon's liberal stance on civil rights issues, it did accord with a relatively low percentage of segregationist voting in the 1956 referendum, a fact which can be looked upon either as dictating legislative voting or as simply permitting the Bourbon strategy with low risk for the legislator. In either case, it appears that the Bourbon voter in the legislature represented quite a different political sub-culture than did the Coalition voter in the Fifty-seventh Texas House.

#### V. CONTOURS OF LEGISLATIVE OPINION CONFLICT

Generally speaking, opinion conflict in the Texas House of Representatives in 1961 revolved primarily around issues of an economic nature. Members of the House split themselves into approximately equal groupings of liberals and conservatives with the major issue being the governor's revenue proposals and a counter-proposal by the conservative faction. However, the liberal-conservative factionalism which the tax fight brought into play was not the only grouping of legislators which occurred during the session. Several questions which

were tangential to the issue of Negro civil rights and the tactics of the movement were voted upon during the session and the breakdown of the legislators was somewhat different than the division which occurred on the major issue facing the house. Considerable overlap occurred producing four distinctive types of voting behavior. Indeed the majority of the legislators fell into the two categories which have been traditionally considered to be consistent with one another, that is, either liberal or conservative on both issues. However, a considerable number crossed over the lines of conventional legislative factionalism to register agreement on civil rights issues with those whom they normally opposed. Fifty-two of 150 legislators fell into these two crossover categories.

An examination of the constituencies of the four legislative types brought to light major differences between constituencies which elected civil rights liberals and conservatives. Differences between constituencies which elected economic liberals and conservatives were more subtle, for the most part, and more difficult to pinpoint. The effect of combining the civil rights liberals and conservatives into their two economic factional blocs was to offset and destroy most of the differences which registered between the economic liberal and conservative groupings on constituency variables.

Thus, it might be reasonable to conclude that basic factional alignment in Texas legislative politics has little to do with the constituency socio-economic situation while legislative voting behavior on civil rights is highly related to constituency variables. However,

it is more likely that other more imaginative variables and subtle indicators would have yielded a greater differentiation between the two basic factions in terms of their constituencies. Nevertheless, economic conflict in the state is far-reaching and pervasive if not as highly charged and salient for the individual voter as is the civil rights issue. Consequently, few districts in the state are ever insured to one faction or the other. Although the legislative seat is a low visibility public office which normally inspires very little public involvement in campaign discussion, it is nevertheless a highly sought political prize and important to those engaged in the economic and social conflicts of society. Hence, there are usually challengers and there are always winners, albeit they often appear to survive in a pattern of ideological randomness.

That this is not the case, however, is supported by the differences among the four groups which obtained on the constituencies' support of Daniel in the 1960 primary election. Of all the variables analyzed, this was the only one which distinguished between the liberal and conservative economic factions in the legislature to any significant degree. In most cases, where the constituency gave higher than average support to the incumbent governor, the "liberal" in the race, the legislators elected from that district also voted with the liberal faction on revenue issues. Even though the correlation is probably heightened because of the fact that they were chosen in the same primary election, it nevertheless indicates that the recruitment process is somewhat more meaningful to the voter than the mere random



selection of a voice in Austin.

Constituency differences between civil rights liberals and conservatives were clear-cut and stood out in sharp relief. In brief, civil rights liberals in the legislature tended to come from other than the East Texas region, were for the most part from urban districts with high income and a large concentration of Mexican-Americans and, ironically, small concentrations of blacks. Civil rights conservatives tended to come from rural East Texas, from low income areas inhabited by very large concentrations of Negroes. The conflict here is very obviously one between the traditional and modernizing influences in the state.

In summation, the four types of opinion relate to certain patterns which have some precedent in the literature of American politics. The urban coalitions, the elite conservatives, and the agrarian populists all conformed to a certain degree with expectations based on the history and culture of the state. While the Bourbon legislator was more difficult to relate to the politics of the state in a meaningful manner, the investigation at least demonstrated that the pattern exists in the state in significant numbers and that the combination of opinions is not necessarily inconsistent with political reality.

Chapter I suggested that the four modes of opinion under investigation might be related to long-range patterns of change which have occurred in the substance of Texas politics over the period of the twentieth century and which continue into the present. Although

the present research design provides only a static view of this presumed developmental process at one point in time, it is still possible to speculate about future change on the basis of these findings.

The four opinion modes were initially described as occurring within a chronological sequence with one mode dominating the politics of the state for a period then yielding to another as economic and social change have altered the political setting. The process might be pictured as working in the following manner.

Beginning with Populist dominance of state politics in the first part of the twentieth century, the Elite opinion complex can be seen as a reaction brought about by economic boom to Populist economic liberalism. The Elite complex challenged Populist politics solely on economic policy while continuing to share a consensus on the traditions of southern racism. Meanwhile, the same economic development which had brought the Elite to prominence was promoting accelerated urbanization and industrialization and creating the conditions which would make inroads into southern tradition. The urban centers of the state provided a concentration of organized labor and minority groups which formed the basis of liberal urban coalitions, a strategy which necessitated the abandonment of traditional southern views on race. The Elite-Coalition conflict pattern made for a neat ideological package of liberal-conservative polarization and even into the seventies continued to provide the most popular characterization of Democratic Party factionalism. In due course, however, the Elite faction of the

Democratic Party has seen the necessity of adopting a more socially responsible and responsive position on racial matters--a necessity brought about by the increasing effectiveness and success of the Coalition Democrats and further by the challenge of an urbane, sophisticated Republicanism at the state level. Republicanism in Texas, to be sure, has not rushed to embrace liberal social doctrine but it has at least sought to build for itself an image of concern for fundamental social justice. One could speculate that the same forces of opinion which led to the rise of the Republican Party in Texas during the 1960's were reflected in the Democratic legislative party in 1961 by the Bourbon grouping. In the transitional sequence this, in effect, moved the focus of opinion conflict from the Elite-Coalition competition to a modernizing Coalition-Bourbon competition in some parts of the state. The Coalition-Bourbon conflict was still rooted in essentially economic differences but it shared the conviction that the expression of traditional racial folkways derived no political benefit in the heterogeneous urban setting.

If this is a fair description of the course of political change in Texas, it is likely that it has occurred at differential rates throughout the state featuring various of the three modes of conflict in different regions and urban-rural settings. It is for this reason that elements of all four opinion modes were still to be found in the legislature in 1961 and, presumably, all three modes of opinion conflict combinations.

Of the six possible opinion conflict combinations, three are

emphasized because of their relationship to a chronological sequence of political change. For the sake of convenience, Populist-Elite, Elite-Coalition, and Coalition-Bourbon conflict are labeled, respectively, traditional, ideological, and modern. Each of these conflict patterns involves the basic conflict of economic interests but reflects a transition from provincial traditionalism to a new politics rooted in social and cultural change. Sets of legislative districts can be viewed in terms of the predominance of one or the other of these modes of conflict by noting the two most numerous legislative opinion types in the set. Since some of the greatest differences among voting types occurred along regional and urban-rural lines it is interesting to combine these two characteristics and observe the distribution of legislative opinion types for evidence of modal patterns of conflict.

Table VI-1 shows the distribution of legislative voting types according to region and urbanization of district. Urban-rural regional entries are listed in approximate order of relative standing with respect to the traditional-modern continuum.

TABLE VI-1: Distribution of Legislative Voting Types according to Region and Urbanization of Constituency District.

<u>Urban-Rural Region</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
Rural East Texas	15	15	3	0	1	34
Rural Central & Pan.	11	10	3	2	6	32
Urban East Texas	5	8	3	2	3	21
Urban Central & Pan.	2	12	7	4	2	27
Rural Rio Grande	2	4	4	6	1	17
Urban Rio Grande	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>19</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

On the basis of the distributions in Table VI-1, conflict patterns in various types of districts may be described as follows:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Description of Conflict Pattern</u>
Rural East Texas	Traditional Populist-Elite conflict
Rural Central and Panhandle	Traditional Populist-Elite conflict with modernizing tendencies
Urban East Texas	Traditional Populist-Elite conflict with modernizing tendencies
Urban Central and Panhandle	Ideological Elite-Coalition conflict
Rural Rio Grande	Ideological Elite-Coalition conflict with strong modernizing tendencies
Urban Rio Grande	Modern Coalition-Bourbon conflict

While the above schema probably represents an attempt to generalize far beyond the permissible limits of the data, it nevertheless summarizes in an impressionistic manner the contours of political ethos as they vary geographically and with urbanization throughout the state. It is doubtful, for example, that all of the political regions mentioned above have experienced the process of change in the same manner. However, it does show how each of the regions compares against a generalized notion of statewide political change and it weighs the contribution of each to the generalized pattern. The present design does not allow for hard conclusions concerning change; this would require data from various sessions of the legislature taken over a long span of time. Speculation about political change is put forth here in order to give some context to the present study and to suggest organizing concepts for future studies of Texas legislative politics. Further, there are certain more or less "mechanical" aspects of the legislative system, as outlined in Chapter II, which make it possible to assess the impact that future institutional changes could have on the transmission of public opinion to the level of government action via the legislative process. The concluding section takes a look at the implications of one such institutional change which was to take place during the decade--legislative reapportionment.

## VI. REAPPORTIONMENT: INSTITUTIONAL STIMULUS TO POLITICAL CHANGE

The Fifty-seventh Texas Legislature convened under the apportionment of 1951, an arrangement which left much to be desired in terms of equality of representation even when it was first applied. By 1961, only thirty-two of 150 legislative seats conformed with the accepted limitation of 15% variation from "ideal size."<sup>2</sup> The legislature reapportioned itself in the 1961 session in keeping with a state constitutional requirement and again in 1965 and 1967 in response to federal court decisions.<sup>3</sup> The extensive malapportionment which existed in the 1961 session gave representational advantage to certain opinion types and areas of the state which was certain to erode under subsequent apportionments. Table VI-2 compares the four legislative opinion types in terms of the apportionment status of their districts as it applied in 1961. For this examination each legislative seat has been characterized as over-represented, properly apportioned, or under-represented in terms of the 15% variation criterion. With a total state population of 9,579,677 in 1960, the ideal district on the basis of 150 legislative seats was 63,865.<sup>4</sup> Using the 15% variation standard, the permissible range of deviation was from 54,285 to 73,445 constituents per legislator. Districts apportioned for less than 54,285 total population per legislator have been classified as over-represented, those apportioned within the permissible range have been classified as properly represented, while those allotting one seat to more than 73,445 total population have been classified as under-represented.

TABLE VI-2: Distribution of Legislative Opinion Types according to the Status of Apportionment as Applied to Constituency District.

<u>Apportionment Status of District in 1961</u>	<u>Populist</u>	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Coalition</u>	<u>Bourbon</u>	<u>N-C</u>	<u>Total</u>
Under-represented	2	15	17	4	4	42
Properly represented	6	4	10	9	3	32
Over-represented	<u>27</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>76</u>
Totals:	35	50	34	18	13	150

Table VI-2 indicates that the apportionment scheme in effect at the time of the Fifty-seventh session gave advantage to the expression of traditional Populist-Elite conflict at the expense of Elite-Coalition ideological conflict. It is impossible to project the impact that subsequent reapportionment would have on the contours of expressed opinion in the legislature, but it can be seen that Populist and Elite opinion were greatly inflated while Coalition opinion was substantially deflated by the 1951 apportionment as applied in 1961. One would assume that an equitable reapportionment would have the effect of promoting change in the direction hypothesized in the preceding section.

The geographic distribution of malapportionment in 1961 also supports this conclusion. Rural East Texas and rural central and panhandle districts were greatly over-represented in the Fifty-seventh legislature while urban Rio Grande and urban central and panhandle districts were heavily under-represented. Thus, the advantage of reapportionment in the past decade lay heavily on the side of



modernization in state politics if not in its liberalization.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The Central and Panhandle regions are viewed in combination for the rest of the analysis since the Panhandle region, as earlier defined, includes so few legislators. In any case, the data reveal little in the way of significant differences between the two groups of legislators and their constituencies.

<sup>2</sup>The "ideal" district population is computed by dividing total state population by the number of legislative seats. A series of lower federal court cases in the sixties showed general agreement on allowing as much as 15% variation from "ideal size" in each district of an acceptably apportioned legislature. See William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, Congress and the States (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), chapter 3 for a summary of recent litigation pertaining to legislative apportionment.

<sup>3</sup>Kilgarlin v. Martin, U. S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Civil Action No. 63-H-390. See Clifton McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), third edition, chapter 5.

<sup>4</sup>James R. Jensen, Legislative Apportionment in Texas, Social Studies, vol. 2 (Houston: Public Affairs Research Center /University of Houston, 1964), pp. 169-70.

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## APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX I

### A SIMPLE MAD PROGRAM FOR DERIVING THE Q-MATRIX

This program computes the percentage of YEA and NAY votes (based on the number voting) on all roll calls, the percentage absent or abstaining, a matrix of the value of Q for each pair of roll calls, and a simplified integer matrix which gives  $Q=0$  if it does not meet scale criterion ( $\pm .75$  in this program). The programming is straightforward and simple for the most part, although the problem of storing Q presented some challenge. One should pay particular attention to the Q subscripts (X and Y) in following the flow chart in order to understand how Q is being stored. Only the section of the program which computes and stores Q is included in the flow diagram. Essentially, the program compiles and stores a fourfold table for each pair of roll calls (AA, BB, CC, and DD in integer mode), computes the value of Q for each table, and stores the value in the corresponding cell of the Q-matrix.

The Q-matrix program begins in the upper left-hand corner of the flow chart with the assignment X 2. Prior to reaching this point in the program, the following things must be done:

- (1) Declare integer mode for variables VOTE, COUNT, I, J, K, AA, BB, CC, DD, X, Y, and N.
- (2) Set N equal to the number of roll calls being analyzed.
- (3) Set COUNT equal to the number of legislators. This is done in the data reading loop.


(4) Dimension variables: VOTE (COUNT + 1) \* N  
Q N \* N

(5) Read variable VOTE (roll call responses) into a COUNT x N matrix. Code vote responses as follows:

YEA	1
NAY	2
Absent or abstaining	0

Note also that the program computes only the portion of the matrix below the diagonal and fills out the upper portion by assignment. A printout of the complete program follows the flow diagram.





R Q-MATRIX FOR 29 ROLL-CALLS IN THE  
R 57TH REGULAR SESSION TEXAS HOUSE OF REPS  
R

R DIMENSION REP(200),VOTE(200\*29),Q(29\*29),SUMY(29),SUMN(29),  
1PCTYES(29),PCTNO(29),PCTABS(29),SUMABS(29),QO(29\*29)  
INTEGER REP,VOTE,COUNT,I,J,K,AA,BB,CC,DD,X,Y,N,QO  
N=29

COUNT=1

EXECUTE ZERO. (SUMY(1)...SUMY(N),SUMN(1)...SUMN(N),SUMABS(1)  
1..SUMABS(N).)

BEULAH READ FORMAT \$I3,29I1\*3,REP(COUNT),VOTE(COUNT,1)...VOTE(COUNT  
129)

WHENEVER REP(COUNT).E.999,TRANSFER TO AGATHA

THROUGH GAMMA, FOR I=1,1,I.G.N

WHENEVER VOTE(COUNT,I).E.1

SUMY(I)=SUMY(I)+1.

OR WHENEVER VOTE(COUNT,I).E.2

SUMN(I)=SUMN(I)+1.

OTHERWISE

SUMABS(I)=SUMABS(I)+1.

END OF CONDITIONAL

GAMMA CONTINUE

COUNT=COUNT+1

TRANSFER TO BEULAH

AGATHA COUNT=COUNT-1

PRINT COMMENT \$8 COUNT IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF LEGISLATORS  
15

PRINT RESULTS COUNT

R PRINT COMMENT \$4FOLLOWING ARE THE PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWNS FOR  
1ACH ROLL-CALLS  
PRINT COMMENT \$ PCTYES AND PCTNO ARE BASED ON THE NUMBER VOT  
INGS

THROUGH ETA, FOR I=1,1,I.G.N

PCTNO(I)=SUMN(I)/(SUMN(I)+SUMY(I))

PCTYES(I)=SUMY(I)/(SUMN(I)+SUMY(I))

PCTABS(I)=SUMABS(I)/COUNT

PRINT RESULTS PCTYES(I),PCTNO(I),PCTABS(I)

ETA CONTINUE

R

X=2

Y=1

THROUGH ALPHA, FOR I=1,1,I.G.N-1

THROUGH ALPHA, FOR J=I+1,1,J.G.N

AA=0

BB=0

CC=0

DD=0

THROUGH BETA, FOR K=1,1,K.G.COUNT

WHENEVER VOTE(K,I).E.1 AND VOTE(K,J).E.1

AA=AA+1

OR WHENEVER VOTE(K,I).E.1 AND VOTE(K,J).E.2

BB=BB+1

OR WHENEVER VOTE(K,I).E.2 AND VOTE(K,J).E.1

```

      CC=CC+1
      OR WHENEVER VOTE(K,I).E.2 .AND. VOTE(K,J).E.2
      DD=DD+1
      OTHERWISE
      CONTINUE
      END OF CONDITIONAL
BETA  CONTINUE
      A=AA
      B=BE
      C=CC
      D=DD
      Q(X,Y)=((A*D)-(B*C))/((A*D)+(B*C))
      Q(Y,X)=Q(X,Y)
      X=X+1
      WHENEVER X.G.N
      Y=Y+1
      X=Y+1
      END OF CONDITIONAL
ALPHA CONTINUE
      THROUGH DELTA, FOR X=1,1,X.G.N
      Q(X,X)=1.
DELTA CONTINUE
R
      PRINT COMMENT $IFOLLOWING IS A MATRIX OF THE VALUES OF Q (YU
      1E1S) FOR EACH VOTE TO EACH OTHERS
      PRINT COMMENT $8      S
      PRINT RESULTS Q(1,1)...Q(29,29)
      PRINT COMMENT $IFOLLOWING IS A SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE ABOVE
      1E MATRIX. ALL ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN MULTIPLIED BY 100 EXCEPT TH
      2SE NOT MEETING SCALES
      PRINT COMMENT $ CRITERIA (.ABS. Q .GE. .75). THESE HAVE BEEN
      1ERGED TO SIMPLIFY READING.$
      THROUGH KAPPA, FOR I=1,1,I.G.N-1
      THROUGH IOTA, FOR J=I+1,1,J.G.N
      WHENEVER .ABS. Q(I,J) .L. .75
      QQ(I,J)=0
      OTHERWISE
      QQ(I,J)=Q(I,J)*100
      END OF CONDITIONAL
      QQ(J,I)=QQ(I,J)
IOTA  CONTINUE
      QQ(I,I)=100
KAPPA CONTINUE
      QQ(N,N)=100
      PRINT RESULTS QQ(1,1)...QQ(N,N)
      END OF PROGRAM

SDATA
00122111212221221212112121111111
00211111222111222221111211111111
0031122211111112111121112212222
00422121122221221122112121111111
999

```

## APPENDIX II

### THE CLASSIFICATION OF LEGISLATORS ACCORDING TO OPINION TYPE

The following is a listing of the members of the Texas House of Representatives (1961) according to their voting patterns on two dimensions of political conflict. Each opinion type is presented separately; legislators are listed in alphabetical order within each category. The legislator's district and his scores on both scales are included in the listing. Scale scores may be interpreted as the number of "liberal" votes cast in each scale set. This interpretation is only roughly accurate since some scores have been adjusted due to non-voting or scale error. Excessive non-participation by any legislator (casting no vote on half or more of the scale issues) was cause for classification as non-scalable. Scale errors and absences were handled by "correcting" any one vote which would make the legislator's responses conform to the scale pattern. In cases where such correction could be made in more than one way, the correction was made toward the group median in order to keep extreme scores relatively free of arbitrary inclusions.

#### Type I: Populist

<u>Legislator</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Scale Scores</u>	
		<u>Economic</u>	<u>Civil Rights</u>
Bailey, Scott	76	6	0
Bass, R. W. (Bob)	1-2	6	1
Cannon, Joe B.	55	6	0
Chapman, Joe N.	11	6	0
Cole, Criss	22-7	5	1
Cole, James	25	5	1
Collins, Sam F.	7	6	0
Cotten, James M.	72	6	1
Dewey, B. H., Jr.	44	6	1
Dungan, W. T.	50	6	0

## Type I: Populist (continued)

<u>Legislator</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Scale Scores</u>	
		<u>Economic</u>	<u>Civil Rights</u>
Fletcher, Henry A.	66	6	1
Glass, W. W.	17	6	0
Haynes, Clyde	8	6	1
Hinson, George T.	12	6	0
Hollowell, Bill	26	6	0
Hughes, Charles E.	48	6	0
Jamison, Alonzo W. Jr.	59	6	0
Kilpatrick, Rufus U.	9-1	6	1
Leaverton, H. A.	62	6	1
McCoppin, George W.	1-1	5	0
McIlhenny, Grainger W.	87	6	0
Markgraf, Jim	41	6	0
Niemeyer, H. O.	79	6	0
Pearcy, C. M.	63-2	6	1
Petty, O. R.	98	4	1
Pieratt, W. H.	57	6	0
Richards, George H.	28	5	0
Roberts, Ronald	54	6	0
Shannon, Tommy	60-5	5	1
Stewart, Vernon J.	81-1	6	1
Ward, J. D.	61	6	1
Watson, Murray Jr.	53-3	6	0
Wells, H. G.	89	6	0
Wilson, Charles H.	18	6	1
Yezak, Herman	56	6	1

## Type II: Apprehensive Elite

<u>Legislator</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Scale Scores</u>	
		<u>Economic</u>	<u>Civil Rights</u>
Adams, J. Collier	97-2	0	0
Adams, James V.	3	3	0
Allen, John	13	0	0
Atwell, Ben	51-2	0	0
Banfield, Mrs. Myra	30	0	0
Bell, Marshall O.	68-5	0	1
Boysen, Stanley	47	0	1
Burgess, Steve	6	2	1
Connell, Jack Jr.	81-2	1	1
Cook, George H.	103	0	1
Cowen, Warren C.	60-7	0	0
Cowles, Nelson	4	1	0
Crain, Jack	71	0	1
Crews, David	29	0	1
Curington, Paul W.	42	0	1

<u>Legislator</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Scale Scores</u>	
		<u>Economic</u>	<u>Civil Rights</u>
Ehrle, Will	88	0	0
Fairchild, Robert	5	1	0
Garrison, Don	22-4	0	1
Gibbens, Wayne	75	0	1
Grover, Henry S.	22-3	0	0
Huebner, John A.	32	0	1
James, Tom	51-4	1	0
Jarvis, Ben E.	14	0	1
Johnson, Robert E.	51-6	0	0
Johnson, J. E.	63-1	2	0
Jones, William M.	51-3	0	0
Koliba, Homer Sr.	46	1	0
Lary, Yale	60-1	2	1
Latimer, Truett	84	0	1
Lewis, Ben	51-5	2	0
McGregor, Frank B.	53-2	2	0
Martin, Lloyd C.	43	0	0
Miller, W. H.	22-5	0	0
Mutscher, Gus	45	3	0
Oliver, W. T.	9-2	0	0
Parsons, Sam H.	16	0	0
Perston, George	10	3	0
Price, Rayford	27	3	0
Ratcliff, Joe	51-1	0	0
Read, David	101	1	0
Roberts, Wesley	99	0	1
Schram, C. H.	64	2	0
Slider, James L.	2	0	0
Spilman, Wade F.	38-2	0	1
Thurman, Leon	85	0	0
Thurmond, Roger	100	0	1
Townsend, James T.	74	2	0
Tunnell, Byron M.	15f	0	0
Walker, Billy H.	20	1	1
Woods, Jack	53-1	2	0

## Type III: Coalition Liberals

<u>Legislator</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Scale Scores</u>	
		<u>Economic</u>	<u>Civil Rights</u>
Alaniz, John C.	68-7	0	5
Barlow, James E.	60-6	6	5
Barry, V. E. (Red)	68-4	4	5
Bridges, Ronald W.	30-1	6	5
Caldwell, Neil	23	6	3
Carroll, Max D.	91	6	5
Gladden, Don	60-2	6	5
Green, Howard	60-6	5	3
Guffey, Lloyd M.	31	6	5
Hale, L. Delitt	36-3	6	5
Haring, Paul	34	6	5
Harrington, D. Roy	9-3	6	5
Isacks, Aud (Miss)	105-1	6	5
Johnson, Jake	68-1	6	5
Jones, Chie	65-2	6	5
Kennard, Don	60-3	6	4
Korloth, Tony	49f	6	5
Lack, Emmett	19	6	4
Longoria, Raul L.	38-1	6	5
McGregor, Malcolm	105-4	6	5
Millen, Bob	70	6	5
Murray, Manton J.	39-1	6	4
Rapp, Bill	40f	6	4
Richardson, George	60-4	6	4
Rosas, Mauro	105-3	6	5
Sandahl, Charles Jr.	65-3	5	4
Smith, Stanford	68-3	6	5
Spears, Franklin S.	68-2	6	5
Springer, Ted	94f	6	5
Stewart, Inco	21-1	5	5
Struve, Don	69	6	5
Trevino, Vidal	80	6	5
Wheatley, J. C.	83	6	5
Whitfield, J. C. Jr.	22-8	6	5

## Type IV: Bourbon

<u>Legislator</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Scale Scores</u>	
		<u>Economic</u>	<u>Civil Rights</u>
Bartram, Raymond A.	67	0	2
Blaine, John E.	105-2	1	2
Eutler, Jerry	58	0	5
Cory, R. H.	33	2	4
de la Garza, Eligio II	38-3	0	5
Floyd, Paul	22-1	0	5
Foraman, Wilson	65-1	1	5
Glusing, Ben A.	37f	2	5
Harding, Forrest A.	92	2	2
LaValle, Pete	21-2	2	5
Moore, J. W.	77	1	5
Nugent, James D.	78	1	3
Peeler, Travis	30-2	1	5
Pipkin, Maurice S.	39-2	1	5
Quilliam, Reed	97-1	1	5
Rosson, Remel B.	90	3	4
Slack, Richard C.	104	0	4
Snelson, W. D.	102	0	5

## Unclassifiable

<u>Legislator</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Scale Scores</u>	
		<u>Economic</u>	<u>Civil Rights</u>
Andrews, Tom	35	0	Non-scale
Ballum, Charles L.	80	6	Non-scale
Barnes, Ben	73	0	Non-scale
Buchanan, J. W.	95	6	Non-scale
Duff, Virginia (Hias)	52	Non-scale	0
Eckhardt, Bob	22-2	6	Non-scale
Heatly, W. S. Jr.	82	0	Non-scale
Hughes, Robert H.	51-7	0	Non-scale
Osborn, Jesse H.	96	1	Non-scale
Shipley, Donald	23-6	0	Non-scale
Smith, Will L.	9-4	6	Non-scale
Turnan, James A.	24	Non-scale	Non-scale
Wilson, J. Edgar	93	1	Non-scale



### APPENDIX III

#### DESCRIPTIVE PROFILES OF TEXAS LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (HOUSE):

##### 1951 APPORTIONMENT; 1960 CENSUS

- Part 1: Gives district number, the number of seats allotted to district under 1951 apportionment, the county or counties lying in the district, regional classification, and urban-rural classification.
- Part 2: Gives district number, the per cent of families with income less than \$3,000 in 1959, the per cent of families with income greater than \$10,000 in 1959, the per cent of the total population classified non-white in the 1960 census, the per cent of the total population with Spanish surname (1960 census), the per cent of the total district population classified as white Anglo-American (i.e., the per cent of the total district population not classified as non-white or Spanish surnamed by 1960 census), the per cent of those voting who voted in favor of school segregation in 1956 Democratic primary referendum, and the per cent of those voting who voted for the incumbent, Price Daniel, in the 1960 first Democratic gubernatorial primary (vs. Jack Cox).

APPENDIX III (Part 1): Texas Legislative (House) Districts with County Composition and Regional and Urbanization Classification.

<u>District</u>	<u>No. of Seats</u>	<u>Counties in District</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Extent of Urbanization</u>
1	2	Bowie	East	Urban
2	1	Cass, Marion, Morrison	East	Rural
3	1	Red River, Titus, Camp	East	Rural
4	1	Harrison	East	Rural
5	1	Panola, Shelby	East	Rural
6	1	Nacogdoches, San Augustine, Sabine	East	Rural
7	1	Tyler, Jasper, Newton	East	Rural
8	1	Orange	East	Rural
9	4	Jefferson	East	Urban
10	1	Lamar	East	Rural
11	1	Delta, Hopkins, Franklin	East	Rural
12	1	Wood, Upshur	East	Rural
13	1	Gregg	East	Rural
14	1	Smith	East	Urban
15F	1	Smith, Gregg	East	Urban
16	1	Rusk	East	Rural
17	1	Cherokee	East	Rural
18	1	Trinity, Angelina	East	Rural
19	1	Polk, Hardin, San Jacinto	East	Rural
20	1	Liberty, Chambers	East	Rural
21	2	Galveston	East	Urban
22	8	Harris	East	Urban

23	1	Brazoria	East	Rural
24	1	Fannin	East	Rural
25	1	Hunt	East	Rural
26	1	Van Zandt, Henderson, Rains	East	Rural
27	1	Anderson	East	Rural
28	1	Houston, Walker	East	Rural
29	1	Grimes, Montgomery	East	Rural
30	1	Waller, Fort Bend	East	Rural
31	1	Wharton	East	Rural
32	1	Jackson, Matagorda	Rio	Rural
33	1	Victoria, Calhoun	Rio	Rural
34	1	De Witt, Goliad	Rio	Rural
35	1	San Patricio, Aransas, Refugio	Rio	Rural
36	3	Nueces	Rio	Urban
37F	1	Nueces, Kleberg, Kenedy	Rio	Urban
38	3	Hidalgo	Rio	Rural
39	2	Cameron	Rio	Urban
40F	1	Cameron, Willacy	Rio	Urban
41	1	Rockwall, Kaufman	East	Rural
42	1	Navarro	Central	Rural
43	1	Freestone, Madison, Leon	East	Rural
44	1	Brazos	East	Rural
45	1	Washington, Austin	East	Rural
46	1	Fayette, Colorado	East	Rural
47	1	Lavaca, Gonzales	Rio	Rural

48	1	Grayson	Central	Rural
49F	1	Grayson, Cooke	Central	Rural
50	1	Collin	Central	Rural
51	7	Dallas	Central	Urban
52	1	Ellis	Central	Rural
53	3	McLennan	East	Urban
54	1	Hill	East	Rural
55	1	Limestone, Falls	East	Rural
56	1	Milam, Robertson	East	Rural
57	1	Burleson, Bastrop, Lee	East	Rural
58	1	Wilson, Karnes, Pee	Rio	Rural
59	1	Denton	Central	Rural
60	7	Tarrant	Central	Urban
61	1	Somervell, Johnson, Hood	Central	Rural
62	1	Hamilton, Coryell, Bosque, Erath	Central	Rural
63	2	Bell	Central	Rural
64	1	Williamson	Central	Rural
65	3	Travis	Central	Urban
66	1	Caldwell, Blanco, Hays	Rio	Rural
67	1	Guadalupe, Kendall, Comal	Rio	Rural
68	7	Bexar	Rio	Urban
69	1	Atascosa, McMullen, La Salle, Live Oak, Frio	Rio	Rural
70	1	Jim Wells, Jim Hogg, Starr, Brooks, Duval	Rio	Rural
71	1	Montague, Clay, Archer	Central	Rural

72	1	Jack, Wise, Parker	Central	Rural
73	1	Comanche, Mills, Brown	Central	Rural
74	1	San Saba, Lampasas, Llano, Burnet Gillespie, McCulloch	Central	Rural
75	1	Palo Pinto, Stephens, Young	Central	Rural
76	1	Shackelford, Callahan, Eastland	Central	Rural
77	1	Coleman, Runnels, Concho, Coke	Central	Rural
78	1	Crockett, Schleicher, Mason, <del>Stonewall</del> Menard, Sutton, Kimble, Edwards, Bandera, Real, Kerr	Rio	Rural
79	1	Uvalde, Medina, Dimmit, Zavala	Rio	Rural
80	1	Webb, Zapata	Rio	Urban
81	2	Wichita	Central	Urban
82	1	Wilbarger, Hardeman, Foard, Cottle	Central	Rural
83	1	Throckmorton, Haskell, Knox, Baylor	Central	Rural
84	1	Taylor	Central	Urban
85	1	Stonewall, Dickens, Jones, King	Central	Rural
86	1	Hutchinson, Ochiltree, Roberts, Lipscomb, Hemphill	Panh.	Rural
87	1	Collingsworth, Wheeler, Gray	Panh.	Rural
88	1	Donley, Motley, Hall, Childress	Panh.	Rural
89	1	Briscoe, Swisher, Floyd, Hale	Panh.	Rural
90	1	Borden, Scurry, Crosby, Kent, Garza	Panh.	Rural
91	1	Fisher, Nolan, Mitchell	Panh.	Rural
92	1	Tom Green	Central	Urban
93	1	Potter	Panh.	Urban

94F	1	Potter, Armstrong, Randall, Carson	Panh.	Urban
95	1	Oldham, Sherman, Hartley, Moore, Hansford, Dallan	Panh.	Rural
96	1	Deaf Smith, Parmer, Castro Bailey, Lamb	Panh.	Rural
97	2	Lubbock	Panh.	Urban
98	1	Cochran, Hockley, Yoakum, Terry	Panh.	Rural
99	1	Dawson, Gaines, Andrews, Lynn	Panh.	Rural
100	1	Brewster, Terrell, Val Verde, Kinney, Maverick	Rio	Rural
101	1	Martin, Howard, Glasscock, Irion, Sterling, Reagan	Panh.	Rural
102	1	Midland, Crane, Upton, Pecos	Central	Urban
103	1	Winkler, Ector	Central	Urban
104	1	Hudspeth, Culberson, Loving, Ward, Reeves, Jeff Davis, Presidio	Rio	Rural
105	4	El Paso	Rio	Urban

APPENDIX III (Part 2): Profile of Texas Legislative (House) Constituencies--1960

(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)
District	Per Cent Families with Income less than \$3,000 (1959)	Per Cent Families with Income more than \$10,000 (1959)	Per Cent Non-White	Per Cent Spanish Surname	Per Cent White Anglo	Per Cent Voting For Segregation Referendum (1956)	Per Cent Voting For Daniel (1960)
1	36.6	0.3	24.0	1.1	74.9	82.9	63.8
2	44.6	5.8	33.1	0.6	66.3	90.0	70.0
3	49.2	4.5	24.2	0.4	75.4	90.5	61.7
4	42.5	6.4	43.4	0.5	56.1	85.4	69.5
5	52.9	4.0	23.0	0.4	71.6	93.1	56.3
6	54.4	3.9	28.9	1.4	69.7	92.1	56.7
7	50.3	4.1	26.0	0.6	73.4	92.2	60.2
8	20.5	10.1	10.0	2.6	87.4	86.3	60.5
9	20.0	13.8	23.4	2.7	73.9	81.7	64.6
10	48.0	4.8	18.8	0.7	80.5	87.4	65.5
11	52.5	4.6	12.1	1.0	86.9	90.7	62.1
12	43.9	6.4	21.0	0.2	78.8	91.5	65.2
13	28.2	10.9	22.9	0.4	78.7	90.0	54.5
14	31.1	10.9	27.1	0.7	72.2	85.7	58.3
15F	29.8	10.9	25.2	0.6	74.2	87.1	56.9

<u>(A)</u>	<u>(B)</u>	<u>(C)</u>	<u>(D)</u>	<u>(E)</u>	<u>(F)</u>	<u>(G)</u>	<u>(H)</u>
16	40.2	6.8	29.1	0.3	70.6	90.4	50.2
17	50.5	5.2	25.8	1.5	72.7	84.6	59.6
18	38.4	7.2	19.3	1.1	79.6	85.5	52.6
19	44.6	5.7	26.1	1.0	72.9	86.5	60.8
20	39.0	8.0	23.2	1.0	75.8	84.9	57.8
21	23.2	11.8	21.4	8.5	70.1	64.4	61.4
22	18.1	17.6	20.1	6.0	73.9	73.6	85.2
23	20.3	12.0	12.0	6.8	81.2	79.6	62.3
24	53.4	3.1	10.5	1.1	88.4	75.0	66.5
25	39.1	6.8	16.4	0.6	83.0	88.9	63.7
26	50.7	4.5	14.3	0.5	85.2	85.9	64.7
27	42.8	5.0	29.7	1.4	68.9	87.4	61.6
28	59.7	5.4	35.5	2.7	61.8	80.8	55.8
29	48.2	5.8	27.8	2.4	69.8	88.6	56.5
30	40.5	7.9	27.8	19.6	52.6	81.5	63.5
31	43.0	8.0	20.5	14.8	64.7	76.1	65.7
32	37.1	8.2	17.7	13.8	68.5	79.2	58.7
33	29.7	9.4	7.6	23.7	68.7	63.6	59.5



<u>(A)</u>	<u>(B)</u>	<u>(C)</u>	<u>(D)</u>	<u>(E)</u>	<u>(F)</u>	<u>(G)</u>	<u>(H)</u>
34	55.4	4.6	13.1	22.3	64.6	70.0	57.3
35	40.1	8.8	3.4	43.0	53.6	66.0	53.0
36	28.4	12.0	4.7	38.1	57.2	53.4	62.3
37F	29.2	11.7	4.0	30.7	50.7	53.0	62.6
38	53.9	6.5	0.4	71.4	28.2	58.9	58.8
39	47.2	6.9	0.8	64.0	35.2	56.1	54.3
40F	47.7	7.1	0.8	64.5	34.7	58.1	55.3
41	43.1	6.0	29.0	1.5	69.5	87.2	61.7
42	47.0	5.8	24.9	1.7	73.4	76.4	61.2
43	60.9	4.2	37.5	0.4	62.1	86.7	62.2
44	36.0	9.4	21.1	8.0	70.9	75.7	61.3
45	54.5	4.3	27.6	1.0	71.4	85.5	63.2
46	52.7	4.7	19.2	4.1	76.7	88.8	61.8
47	56.6	4.4	14.2	11.9	73.9	81.8	61.6
48	32.7	6.7	8.9	1.3	89.3	83.9	66.0
49F	32.5	7.0	7.7	1.8	90.5	83.6	65.6
50	36.3	7.1	10.8	2.7	86.5	88.0	60.5
51	16.3	19.1	14.7	3.4	81.9	79.8	60.0
52	39.3	5.4	23.7	5.1	71.2	86.1	63.9

<u>(A)</u>	<u>(B)</u>	<u>(C)</u>	<u>(D)</u>	<u>(E)</u>	<u>(F)</u>	<u>(G)</u>	<u>(H)</u>
53	29.8	9.3	16.1	5.2	71.7	80.7	67.5
54	53.7	3.3	15.6	3.6	80.8	88.8	64.3
55	58.2	4.0	30.6	5.3	64.1	83.9	59.1
56	53.4	4.6	27.5	6.1	66.4	80.0	59.3
57	56.2	3.2	29.5	7.6	62.9	86.6	56.3
58	46.5	6.3	2.5	36.7	60.8	62.9	56.7
59	28.0	10.1	6.3	1.9	91.8	82.6	59.3
60	18.7	14.0	11.1	3.6	85.3	83.7	52.4
61	32.4	0.0	4.1	1.7	94.2	87.2	57.9
62	48.0	4.0	3.3	2.7	94.0	80.3	55.2
63	31.9	6.8	12.1	6.7	81.2	79.6	63.6
64	46.6	4.6	14.0	15.1	70.9	83.0	55.9
65	24.8	13.3	12.8	12.3	74.9	66.4	63.6
66	46.7	7.6	9.4	30.3	60.3	73.8	56.4
67	35.6	6.9	6.9	23.7	69.4	61.6	56.2
68	27.2	11.0	6.9	37.4	55.7	—	67.7
69	50.2	6.5	0.6	49.3	50.1	66.3	57.3
70	51.2	5.9	0.5	68.1	31.4	61.0	62.0
71	35.3	6.4	0.4	1.0	98.6	74.2	53.5
72	35.1	6.4	1.5	1.6	96.9	80.6	52.0

<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>	<u>(3)</u>	<u>(4)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(6)</u>	<u>(7)</u>	<u>(8)</u>
73	47.2	6.3	1.9	4.1	94.0	73.2	43.1
74	43.3	5.3	1.8	8.0	90.2	73.8	52.5
75	31.6	7.2	3.4	2.7	93.9	81.7	42.1
76	42.3	5.3	1.5	3.2	95.3	78.6	34.7
77	41.8	6.0	2.1	9.4	88.5	77.8	49.1
78	36.7	9.4	2.3	17.3	80.4	70.1	50.7
79	48.9	5.4	0.8	53.3	45.9	65.7	63.3
80	51.6	5.4	0.4	79.6	20.0	24.6	62.6
81	19.8	12.3	7.4	2.2	89.1	74.2	53.0
82	37.6	7.2	9.8	4.3	85.4	83.9	56.4
83	39.7	6.8	5.4	7.5	87.1	83.2	47.9
84	21.0	12.3	4.7	5.0	90.3	78.0	46.2
85	36.4	8.5	5.6	7.4	87.0	73.3	49.9
86	12.4	14.1	1.6	1.2	97.2	69.9	60.4
87	21.7	11.1	3.9	1.0	95.1	76.8	55.8
88	40.0	6.1	8.6	3.4	86.0	80.2	58.7
89	31.0	13.6	5.6	15.6	76.8	73.9	57.1
90	25.9	11.2	4.5	11.8	83.7	67.8	58.8
91	31.2	7.2	5.2	12.4	82.4	79.6	50.6

<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>	<u>(3)</u>	<u>(4)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(6)</u>	<u>(7)</u>	<u>(8)</u>
92	28.4	10.4	5.0	13.7	81.3	69.0	53.5
93	16.1	13.4	6.9	3.2	89.9	73.4	58.4
94	15.3	15.0	5.1	2.8	92.1	72.3	57.7
95	16.4	14.7	0.4	2.9	96.7	64.5	63.2
96	32.2	12.8	4.7	15.2	80.1	68.4	52.5
97	20.0	14.6	8.0	10.9	81.1	73.1	63.1
98	25.2	12.2	4.2	14.4	81.4	77.2	54.4
99	23.9	12.4	4.3	14.7	81.0	75.7	53.9
100	42.6	9.4	2.1	53.7	44.2	65.2	70.0
101	19.4	13.6	4.3	11.1	84.6	76.1	61.4
102	14.3	21.1	7.6	10.0	82.4	69.0	51.7
103	13.8	14.1	5.1	7.6	87.3	72.4	44.6
104	26.2	10.2	2.3	31.8	65.9	75.6	50.0
105	22.1	12.7	3.3	43.6	53.1	52.4	66.4