

SOVIET POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TODAY

A STUDY OF THE CURRENT POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO IT

A THESIS

Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Political Science
University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

By
Percy Amamasi

July, 1981

Acknowledgement

I hereby express my hearty thanks to the chairman of my thesis committee, Dr. Joseph Nogee, for his directions, corrections and patience which made this thesis a reality. My thanks also go to Dr. Hugh Stephens, for his very vital suggestions that gave this paper a face-lift, and to Dr. Thomas DeGregori, for the numerous useful articles and data he made available to me and his corrections and interest in my efforts.

Finally, my thanks go to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. M.T. Amamasi, whose moral and material encouragement have made it possible for me to carry on my studies for this thesis without looking back.

Percy Amamasi.

An Abstract

Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Today

The current policy of the Soviet Union in sub-Saharan Africa, like those of many other nations, is a product of experience. Having realized the economic and strategic importance of the region, the Soviets tried to establish some influence and presence in that area of predominantly Western influence.

In the competition for influence that followed, the Soviets experienced a lot of disappointments which resulted mostly from their lack of proper understanding of the social and political dynamics that operated in the region. These disappointments, however, generated a lot of research and analysis of the African situation by Soviet Scholars. The outcome of their efforts was astonishing and by the early 1960s, the Soviets had abandoned their earlier policy that aimed at establishing communist states in sub-Saharan Africa through proletarian revolutions.

This study will examine the current policy of the Soviet Union, the circumstances that led to it, its objectives and achievements so far.

CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction	1
2. The Old Soviet Approach: Searching for Ideological Purity	4
Early Soviet Interest in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Evidences	4
Soviet African Policy Under Stalin: Little or No Change	7
Soviet Inactivity: Some Explanations	8
Overt Interest but Limited Information	11
The First Half of Khrushchev's Reign	13
3. The New Strategy, From Khrushchev to Brezhnev	18
Expanding Influence Through Economic Cooperation, Scholarship Programs and Military Aid	18
Cuba as a Model for Developing Nations	22
The "Revolutionary Democracy"	24
Economic Cooperation as a Variable Promoting Soviet Influence	26
Scholarship Award as a Variable Promoting Soviet Influence	33
Military Aid as a Variable Promoting Soviet Influence	37
4. The New Strategy: How Successful?	46
Soviet Policy Disasters in Sub-Saharan Africa	47
Soviet Analysts of the Brezhnevian Era	52
Some Soviet Policy Successes in Sub-Saharan Africa	55

The Nigerian Case: Slow Soviet Penetration	60
The Civil War in Nigeria	62
5. Conclusion	66

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The East-West competition for influence in sub-Saharan Africa, which has been joined by China, is part of the global search for allies and economic partners by the big powers. For the Soviets, who are new comers to this African region, where Western influence had been long established, it has not been an easy undertaking. The history of their penetration into the region has been punctuated with disappointments, disasters and retreats until recently.

The successes they have been able to record so far have depended to some extent on their readiness to accept failures, review past policy strategies, formulate new ones, and put them to test. During the early years of Soviet regime, Africa was not an important concern of Soviet foreign policy. The changes which led to an active role for the Soviet Union in the Third World generally began with N.S. Khrushchev and have continued through the administration of L. Brezhnev.¹

¹Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, Pergamon Press, 1981), Chapter 5.

Soviet policy goals in sub-Saharan Africa before the era of Khrushchev appeared to make unrealistic demands on the black people of the region. This unrealism derives from the fact that the Soviets hoped that a revolution of the proletariat would take place in a society, despite the absence of a working class or distinct peasantry. It was this misunderstanding of the political, social and economic forces that operated in sub-Saharan Africa that led to disappointments when their earlier expectations failed to materialize. However, the willingness of the Soviets during the era of Khrushchev, to review their policy in the region through extensive research and analysis of African situation seems to have helped them produce new policy strategies that seem to have proved more efficient than the past ones, despite some setbacks. This new policy deemphasized ideological objectives and permitted them to establish economic and military relationships with any black African regime, irrespective of the ideological beliefs of its leaders, as long as the risk involved in doing so was not great. Generally speaking, the new approach seems to be working for the Soviets in the region, since there has been a relative increase in their areas of influence.

This paper will examine the assumption that the current policy of the Soviet union in Sub-Saharan Africa is aimed at increasing her influence and protecting her economic interests in the region through military aid, cultural and economic cooperation. It will also attempt to show that in some countries this policy has succeeded in boosting Soviet influence. This means that it has proved more efficient than the past policies of the Soviet Union that aimed at establishing communist regimes or insisted on dealing with only "Socialist Progressive" regimes in the region.

Chapter 2 will examine the old policy of the Soviet Union and its shortcomings, while Chapter 3 will introduce the new policy of seeking greater influence through economic cooperation, academic awards and military aid. An attempt will be made in this chapter to show that through this policy based on the new concept of "national democracy," the Soviets have tried to increase their influence in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 4 will attempt to find out to what extent this policy has succeeded in the region, and Chapter 5 will conclude the paper.

CHAPTER 2

THE OLD SOVIET APPROACH: SEARCHING FOR
IDEOLOGICAL PURITY

Soviet policy in sub-Saharan Africa has evolved through a learning process that involved some disastrous experience, self-reexamination and inevitable adjustments to the realities of African situation. The Soviets have learned to distinguish the possible from the impossible and have abandoned their dream of proletarian revolutions founded on ideology and misunderstanding of the social and political forces that operated in the region.

Early Soviet Interest in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Evidences

Although the efforts of the Soviet Union to increase its influence in sub-Saharan Africa was limited during the 1920's, it cannot be assumed that the Soviets had no interests and aspirations for influence in the region. The truth is that the Bolsheviki were preoccupied with the domestic problems of nation building and consolidation of the new power they had acquired at home. Evidence exists that indicate Soviet interest and aspirations in Africa at that time. One example is found in the speech by a Bolshevik leader, Zinoviev, at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East which took place in 1923 in Baku,

where he declared:¹

A flame of genuine revolution will burn only when these 800 million people living in Asia join us, when the African Continent joins us, when we see that hundreds of millions of people are moving . . . I say, our task will be to fire a genuine sacred war against the English and French capitalists.

Earlier in 1919, M. Pavlovich, a pioneer of Soviet research in African affairs appointed by Lenin to organize an International Affairs Research Center² wrote:³

However, when we consider the future fate of the black race, now populating nearly three-quarters of the inhabited space of Africa, we must not forget that the Negroes cannot be exterminated, wiped off the earth as were the Siberian natives. . . . The Negroes will not leave Africa under the pressure of the white man. . . . The vitality of the black race guarantees that in spite of all the barriers created by the European dominators, the African Negroes, due to the influence of these things by which the capitalists and Militarist Europe tries to enslave definitely the whole black population, will eventually rise from their semisavage state and will join the genuine felicity of the higher civilization which until the present time has been showing only its darkest sides to the black continent.

¹Pravda, March 4, 1923. Cited in Milene Charles, The Soviet Union and Africa, (Lanham, Maryland, The University Press of America, 1980), p. 4.

²Milene Charles, op. cit., p. 6.

³Ibid., p. 168.

Other evidence of the early Soviet interest in sub-Saharan Africa was the translation into Zulu (a native language of the black South Africans) in 1930, of two chapters from the "Principles of Leninism." This translation was made by I. L. Snegirev who had learned the language from a black South African communist, Albert Nzula, who lived in Moscow. The translation was smuggled into South Africa for the readership of black workers who until then, were only encouraged to read the Zulu translation of the Holy Bible.⁴ Also, during the Italian-Ethiopian conflict of the mid 1930s, the Soviets joined Ethiopia at the League of Nations to call for sanctions against Italy, but later on chose to pay only lip service to Ethiopian territorial integrity.⁵

There is no doubt that Lenin himself did nurse the misguided dream of a proletarian revolution in Africa. In his analysis of Leninism, Alfred G. Meyer mentioned Lenin's belief that the modern class struggle was no longer limited to the capitalist societies of Europe, but was engulfing "Asian and African populations." This analysis based on Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage

⁴Revoliutsionnyi Vostok, 1934, no. 4 pp. 256-260. Cited in Milene Charles, op. cit., pp. 27 and 28.

⁵Milene Charles op cit., pp. 36 and 37.

of Capitalism," also states Lenin's belief that "whole colonies have come to be transformed into the world's proletariat and European nations into its capitalists."⁶

Soviet African Policy Under Stalin; Little or No change

During the era of Stalin, Soviet activities in Africa did not increase very much, even though a hope for a possible proletarian revolution remained, despite the absence of nationally organized working class groups. The following writing by Ivan Potekhin, one of the most influential Soviet Africanist of the time is an evidence of the continued Soviet belief in the possibility of a proletarian revolution during the Stalin era. In 1950 Potekhin wrote:⁷

Stalin's theory of colonial revolution proceeds from the fact that the solution of the colonial question, the liberation of the oppressed peoples from colonial slavery, is impossible without a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of imperialism.

⁶Alfred C. Meyer, Leninism. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 235.

⁷Ivan Potekhin, "Stalin's Theory of Colonial Revolution and the National Liberation Movement in Tropical and South Africa." Sovetskaiia Etnografiia, 1950, no. 1, cited in Arthur J. Klinghoffer, "The Soviet Union and Africa," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations, (Baltimore, Md., John Hopkins University Press, 1974) p. 53.

Soviet Inactivity: Some Explanations

The contents of the above extract lead one to wonder why the Soviet Union under Stalin failed to play a more active role in sub-Saharan Africa. Some explanations have been made by Scholars of Soviet foreign policy. Robert Legvold attributes this policy to Soviet "Keen awareness of its inability to influence African events" of the time, and Stalin's "complete insensitivity to the situation there."⁸ The most common explanation is that the situation in Europe tied the hands of the Soviets. The rise of Nazism in Germany and the threat which it posed to Soviet Union resulted in a change of relationships between the Soviet Union and the European colonial powers. Her decision to seek accommodation with Western Europe forced her to back down on colonial matters and de-emphasize the idea of a proletarian revolution in sub-Saharan Africa. In the immediate post war period, Stalin's primary concern was the expansion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe rather than in the colonial territories of his former allies.

Also, Stalin was suspicious of most black nationalist leaders whom he regarded as part of the "national bourgeoisie." He suspected that these nationalist leaders

⁸Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970) p. 12.

would be willing to cooperate with foreign and indigenous capitalists after their countries attain independence.

In Nigeria one of such "bourgeois nationalists" condemned by Soviet writers was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was hated by the British for his provocative and instigating writings. In one of Potekhin's analyses of African nationalist leadership after the Second World War, Dr. Azikiwe was compared to Ghandi of India, which at that time amounted to a condemnation in the Soviet Union. He condemned most African leaders for "negotiating" with the colonialists for their independence instead of leading their working class to revolution against the capitalists.⁹

Judging from Potekhin's writings it seems that the Soviets had very little knowledge about African societies and politics. The fact that they ever expected a proletarian revolution in sub-Saharan Africa is a good indication of their gross ignorance about the relationship between leadership and tribalism in black Africa. For almost all black nationalist leaders, their tribes have remained and still remain the main source of popular support, and conflicts between them have followed tribal lines. Some examples will make things clear here. It

⁹Milene Charles, op cit., p. 53.

is known that the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970 resulted from serious differences and misunderstandings between the Moslem Hausa-Fulani tribes of the north and the Christian Ibo tribe of the east. In Angola the war between the popular movement for the Liberation of Angola, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, if examined closely, was more or less a struggle for supremacy between the Mbundu, Bakongo and Ovimbundu tribes of Angola respectively. Finally, that President Idi Amin stayed so long in office despite his atrocities is correctly attributed to the fact that 90 percent of the armed Ugandan troops during his reign were his tribesmen. It took an outside force to remove him from office. On the strength of these arguments one can conclude that the Soviets were indulging in self-delusion when they contemplated a proletarian revolution in sub-Saharan Africa, since tribes instead of working class groups played a prime role in African politics and social life. Moreover, when serious political conflict arose, individual workers, who were very few, allied themselves with their tribes instead of national economic or social class groups, where they existed.

Overt Interest but Limited Information

The question is often raised: why did the Soviets have so little information in a region where they demonstrated such interest and aspirations, at least in their public pronouncements and writings? In answering this question there is a general agreement that Soviet misunderstanding of the social and political forces operating in sub-Saharan Africa resulted from lack of adequate research by their scholars on Africa. According to Milene Charles, Lenin did appoint Mikhail Pavlovich to organize a center for research on the Third World regions, but Pavlovich's interest was drawn to Asia where he had made earlier contacts. It was after World War I, when the Soviets realized the strategic importance of Africa that Pavlovich's research institute started its research on Africa, concentrating on Ethiopia and South Africa which the Soviets considered of greatest strategic importance.¹⁰ Robert Legvold on the other hand, explains that despite pronouncements, Soviet leaders and analysts until the dawn of independence in Africa "had been content to defer nearly complete responsibility for cadre formation, tactical decisions, and propaganda work in African colonial territories to West European Communist parties," since these parties had greater access to

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 6-10.

colonial politics. The result was that the Soviets learned very little "about African society until the first wave of independence."¹¹ Charles McLane suggests that this "absence of detailed studies of contemporary Africa undoubtedly handicapped Russian diplomats," and it was not until the reorganization of the Institute of Oriental Studies in 1957 and the founding of the African Institute in 1959 that any full-scale research work on Africa started. He attributes this late start partly to the "current policy of 'peaceful coexistence'" which prevented Moscow from showing "too keen an interest" in the French and British African colonies.¹² The policy which deemphasized the idea of "inevitability of war" between communism and capitalism, was adopted by Khrushchev when he recognized that the nature of international conflicts had been changed by the introduction of nuclear weapons.

Assuming that these points are valid, the reason becomes clear why the Soviets earlier on engaged in self-delusion by expecting a proletarian revolution in black Africa. Without a reasonable understanding of the African society, they engaged in a futile effort to

¹¹Robert Legvold, op cit., p. 34.

¹²Charles B. McLane, Soviet-African Relations. (London, Central Asian Research Institute, 1974) p. 18.

apply to the situation there, the Marxist "dialectic" explanation of European historical experience which had little resemblance to the African case. This misapplication of the Marxist concept was to be in the later years, the focus of Soviet critics of their own African policy. Although it was during the era of Khrushchev that the Soviets made a radical change in their African policy, it was not until after his first five years in office that such a serious change was contemplated.

The First Half of Khrushchev's Reign

As can be seen from the foregoing paragraphs, Soviet understanding of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa had been too minimal to permit any effective reversal of the inactivity that had characterized their policy in the region. But within the transition period between the death of Stalin in 1953 and the ascendance to power of Nikita Khrushchev in 1955, there was a new pressure for stepped up analyses of the situation in Third World countries. This pressure, spear-headed by the Academy of Sciences was able to make the study of the "crisis of the colonial systems" a policy priority by 1954 and the years that followed.¹³ This tremendous thirst for information resulted in the establishment of new research institutes

¹³Voprosy istorii, vol 10. (1954) pp. 170-172. Cited in Milene Charles op. cit., p. 69.

while the government sponsored trips to Third World countries and imported books from abroad. For the first time, a scholarly journal, Problemy Vostokovedeniia, renamed Narody Azii i Afriki, was introduced and dedicated to Africa.¹⁴ Nogee and Donaldson summarize this reawakening thus:¹⁵

By 1955 there was a reawakened appreciation in Moscow of the importance of the Third World as the vital "strategic reserve" of imperialism and as an arena with solid prospects of success (but at a lower risk than would be posed by a direct challenge in the "main arena" of confrontation).

However, despite this new surge of interest and aspirations that generated the intense search for information on the Third World, there did not seem to be a real change in the belief of Soviet leaders that proletarian revolutions were possible in sub-Saharan Africa and some other regions of the Third World. The speech by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. in February 1956 testifies to this argument. He said:¹⁶

Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard. Without this there can be no transition to socialism.

¹⁴Milene Charles op. cit., p. 69.

¹⁵Nogee and Donaldson, op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 133.

This fresh optimism which Khrushchev was demonstrating, derived from the fact that he sensed that since the liberation movement was opposed to Western "imperialism", the Communist East would gain from its success. Khrushchev foresaw a promising future in which the socialist bloc would provide the Third World a means of destroying the imperialist economic grip. This would generate "a class-conscious proletariat ready to respond to the political program of its communist vanguard"¹⁷

This continued application of the European-oriented Marxist theory to the Third World, especially African situation, was an obvious indication that it would take the Soviets some practical experiences to come to grips with the realities of sub-Saharan Africa, and it did. From the time Stalin rose to power until midway through the reign of Khrushchev no communist party came to power in any country of sub-Saharan Africa nor did any proletarian class evolve. In South Africa where the only strong communist party existed, the government banned it. The so-called "nationalist bourgeoisie" remained the leaders of independence struggles, supported by their tribes. These nationalist leaders, though attracted by the dynamic contents of Marxism, still remained unconvinced that independence would be achieved through a proletarian

¹⁷Ibid., p. 133.

revolution. Moreover the Soviets had divorced them by forecasting their replacement.

By the end of the 1950's it had become clear to the Soviets that their approach and model would not work in sub-Saharan Africa. Also, the increased research efforts by Soviet scholars supported by their government had begun to yield results as the figures below indicate:¹⁸

No. of Soviet Journals and Articles on Africa (1950-1960)

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Articles</u>	<u>No. of Journals</u>
1950	100	40
1956	400	80
1960	1000	140
<u>Total</u>	<u>1500</u>	<u>260</u>

These articles focused on new concepts and ideas on Africa. It appeared that Soviet analysts of the African situation were beginning to acquire some knowledge about the region and a review of policy seemed necessary. But it was not until 1960 that signs of possible policy change came through a statement by the Conference of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow. The nature of the new Soviet policy strategy, which will be discussed in the next chapter, revealed that the Soviets had accomplished a lot in their

¹⁸Ibid., p. 134.

Third World research and analysis efforts. It indicated that they were ready to compete for influence in an area of exclusively Western influence like sub-Saharan Africa. Roger Kanet discloses that Soviet writers had been able to distinguish between "state nationalism" and "tribal nationalism," which the imperialists used to destabilize the nationalist movements "in order to further their goals of continued domination."¹⁹ But no matter how sound this new strategy sounded, its effectiveness remained to be determined by its application. How it was applied in sub-Saharan Africa and its degree of success will be discussed in the chapters that follow.

¹⁹Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Attitudes Since Stalin," in Roger Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore MD., The John Hopkins University Press, 1974) p. 34.

CHAPTER 3

THE NEW STRATEGY, FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO BREZHNEV

Expanding influence through Economic Cooperation, Scholarship Programs and Military Aid

The last chapter discussed a new wave of research and analysis of the Third World situation by Soviet scholars who now appear to have realized the sterility of Stalin's policy. They seemed to have understood that political development of Africa must not necessarily follow the European trend due to the inherent differences between the Societies of Africa and Europe. Christopher Stevens summarizes the findings that resulted from all that research below:¹

Soviet analyses of social and economic conditions in Africa suggested to them that there were strong similarities between many of the Black Africa states; the main difference between them was the outlook of their leaders. In the hope that this outlook would change, the U.S.S.R. remained willing to develop cordial relations with most countries. ----The view was heard that the U.S.S.R. should pay more attention to the objective results of national bourgeois actions than to the subjective ideas that motivated them.

The analysis that chrystalized into these assumptions by

¹Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, (London, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1976), p. 21.

the Soviets was introduced for the first time by E.M. Zhukov in an article published in Pravda in 1960.² Zhukov stressed the inevitability of the national bourgeoisie leadership of the new nations at the early stages of their development. This concept which he called the "national democratic state" was announced at the Moscow Conference of Communist parties in November and December 1960.³

The National Democratic State

The concept of "the national democratic state" diffused the idea of a proletarian revolution guided by the Vanguard of the Communist Party, and introduced a new condition in which all classes in the society, "progressives" and "reactionaries" including the national bourgeoisie may lead a young nation toward socialism. It urged the encouragement of national leaders of all beliefs to execute "progressive" changes.

The essential features of a "national democracy," according to Boris Ponomarev, were that "it was ruled by the bourgeoisie and therefore often made reactionary

²Pravda, August 26, 1960. pp. 3-4. Cited in Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "The Soviet Union and Africa," in Roger Kanet, ed, op. cit. p. 57.

³Klinghoffer, in Kanet, ed, op. cit. p. 57.

moves such as suppressing Communists. However, in its foreign policy it was anti-imperialist and anticolonialist, while in its domestic policy it was broadly democratic."⁴ According to the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties of December 1960, the progressive forces in a developing country should seek a "state of national democracy":⁵

A state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory; a state which fights against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital; a state in which the people are ensured broad democratic rights and freedoms the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform and other domestic and social changes, and for participation in shaping government policy.

To ensure a steady progress of national democracies toward socialism, the Soviets backed up the concept with "the radicalization of African nationalist parties rather than the development of African Communist parties."⁶ This process involved the encouragement of individual communist to operate within the nationalist parties in

⁴Kommunist, no. 8 (May 1961) pp. 33-48. Cited in Christopher Stevens, op. cit., p. 21.

⁵Quoted in J. Noguee and R. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. (New York, Pergamon Press Inc. 1981) p. 135.

⁶Klinghoffer, in Kanet, ed., op. cit., p. 58.

order to push them to the left, and eventually convert their leaders into "scientific socialists." There is no doubt that the approach was experimented in Nigeria in the early 1960's. This experimentation will be examined in the next chapter when Nigeria comes under discussion.

In general, the concept of national democracy infused into Soviet policy in sub-Saharan Africa, some kind of flexibility that was inevitable, if the Soviets were to make any progress in their quest for influence in the region. It was a new flexibility that was going to make it possible for the Soviets to attempt to establish relations with all nations in the region, irrespective of the political orientations of their leaders since, according to Khrushchev himself, "there is no universal recipe suitable for all countries."⁷ This kind of confession, which is unusual for Soviet leaders, was a further confirmation that the Soviet Union was coming to terms with the realities of Third World politics, especially that of sub-Saharan Africa. The enthusiasm with which Soviet leaders accepted the new concept was reflected in the invitation they extended to the non-communist black African nations of Ghana, Guinea and Mali to the Twenty Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet

⁷New Times (supplement) no. 52 (1963) pp. 42 and 45.

Union (CPSU) in October 1961. It was the first time that non-Communist countries were invited to a CPSU Congress. The governments of these African invitees were described as "democratic" and "anti-imperialist" and their heads of state were awarded Lenin Peace Prizes. Sekou Toure in 1961, Kwame Nkrumah in 1962 and Modibo Keita in 1963,⁸ even though none of them was ranked equal to Cuba's Castro as a "progressive socialist."

Cuba as a Model for Developing Nations

When in 1961, Fidel Castro of Cuba declared for Marxist socialism following a period of strained relations with the United States, the Soviets became convinced beyond doubts that their new concept was on the right track. Castro, having completed the new ideological metamorphosis, was to become a model to be emulated by other leaders of the Third World. This was followed in 1962 with a classification of non-communist Third World countries into six categories depending on their closeness to the stage attained by Cuba. The categories were as follows:⁹

⁸Klinghoffer in Kanet, ed., op cit., p. 57.

⁹Mirovanya Ekonomika i Mezhdnarodnye Otnoshenie, No. 4 (April 1962) pp. 68-82. Cited in Thomas Perry Thorton, ed., The Third World in Soviet Perspective, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1964) pp. 276-304. Also in Stevens, op. cit., p. 21.

- (1) Countries where capitalist relations are almost absent, no feudal class exists, and the proletariat is evolving, e.g. Ghana, Guinea, Mali.
- (2) Countries where capitalist relations and the bourgeoisie are very weak but the feudalists are strong, e.g. Ethiopia.
- (3) Countries where pro-imperialist bourgeoisie are still in power, e.g. Pakistan.
- (4) Countries with less well-developed capitalist relations and a weaker ruling bourgeoisie which has to collaborate with feudal elements, e.g. Somalia, Nigeria.
- (5) Countries with fairly well-developed capitalist relations, eg. India.
- (6) Pro-imperialist ex-colonies in Africa where no feudal class exists, but imperialist influence is still very strong, e.g. Ivory Coast, Congo (Zaire)

One interesting thing about this classification of nations is that it brings to light one of the strong points of the Marxist ideology; its ability to define objectives, lay down the strategies and tactics for achieving them and provide the psychological dynamism necessary to get its adherents on the move. A close look at the above categories will reveal that a lot of emphasis was laid on leadership which agrees with the assertion by G. Mirskiy that at this stage emphasis must be laid on the idea of "revolution from above." Mirskiy explains that it was quite obvious that the proletariat in these countries

were too weak to sustain a revolution. Therefore, "The revolution could be led from above and with the support of the world socialist system could withstand colonialist counter-measures until the proletariat had matured."¹⁰

This reads like a de facto recognition of the fact that it was impossible to divorce the leaders of black Africa from their various tribes and replace them with "progressive socialist" leaders, and also seems to confirm the earlier argument that it was leadership and not societies that make the difference among African countries.

The "Revolutionary Democracy"

The process by which this "revolution from above" would materialize was implicit in the concept of "revolutionary democracy", the last rung on the ladder to socialism. Explaining the concept, A. Sobolev wrote:¹¹

If a revolutionary democrat or a member of the national bourgeoisie is willing to take one step forward, it is the duty of the Marxist to help him take two ... There is then the possibility that many revolutionary democrats will come over to the positions of scientific socialism, to the position of the working class.

¹⁰Afrika i Azia Segodnya, no. 2 (1966). p. 7. Cited in Christopher Stevens op. cit., p. 21.

¹¹World Marxist Review, 6, no. 2 (1963) pp. 41 and 42. in Klinghoffer, in Kanet, ed., op cit.; p. 58. Also in Nogee and Donaldson op. cit., p. 136.

As mentioned earlier, Castro in Soviet view, had completed this process and was often used as a yardstick for measuring other prospective leaders. He became a living proof that socialism could become a reality through revolutionary democracy as the CPSU Central Committee Journal, *Kommunist*, confirmed in the following reference to him:¹²

The experience of history shows that national leaders of revolutionary inclination can implement a general democratic program and lead their countries to socialism.

It appears the Soviets at this time were sure that they had found the key to succeed in sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Third World, as "proved" in the case of Castro's Cuba. They were therefore, ready to carry out the provisions of the "national democracy" concept which as mentioned earlier, permitted the establishment of relations with all countries in which the risk of doing so did not exceed the benefits. In effect, they were ready to commence their desperate bid for influence through economic cooperation and military aid. The adventurism would involve the displacement of Western nations where possible or sharing any prospective nation with them.

¹²*Kommunist*, No. 13 (1962) p. 108. Cited in Nogee and Donaldson, op. cit., p. 136.

Economic Cooperation As a Variable
Promoting Soviet Influence

While it is true that the Soviets have made some progress in promoting their influence through economic cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, it is easy to overestimate the success of that policy. Overestimation may occur when the growth of Soviet influence is attributed more to economic aid, which is on the decline, than to military aid, which is on the increase. Infact, the West is far ahead of the Soviet Union as the major source of economic aid, and the pro-Soviet countries in the region have sought greater economic cooperation with the West.

Generally, in their economic ventures, the Soviets consider economic and other risks such as the feasibility and lucrativeness of projects and the degree of Western or Chinese influence in a country. In Ghana for example, they purposely delayed and finally dropped plans for the construction of the Black Volta Dam which was scheduled for completion in 1966, despite Nkrumah's insistence that they go ahead. In another case, the Soviets dropped plans to construct a textile mill at Tamale, Ghana, because the Ghanaian government insisted on a plan that Soviet experts thought was not feasible.¹³ On the other hand, they have also built factories that have not proved lucrative. Examples are the meat and fish processing plants in Koreh and Kisimayo, Somalia, both of which have proved unprofitable

due to inadequate supply of meat and fish.¹⁴ These factors should have been considered when planning was in progress.

Nevertheless, Soviet economic activities in Africa have taken a great leap in the past two decades. In 1955 the total value of Soviet trade with Africa amounted to \$20.9 million, but had jumped to \$963 million by 1975. Also within the same period Soviet economic credits to Africa totalled \$1.8 billion, and in 1976, 42 percent of all new Soviet Third World aid commitments were devoted to Africa.¹⁵ But the figure has fallen to 5.4 percent since 1977, and the West has remained the major source of aid to the region. The main area of Soviet economic activities in sub-Sahara Africa has been trade, and the data below indicate that the Soviets have cooperated with most countries of the region.

¹³Christopher Stevens, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁴State Projecting Institute Report (Ghipromyaso) Project Report. (Moscow, 1962). Cited in Stevens, op. cit., p. 89.

¹⁵Roger E. Kanet and Boris Ipatov, "Soviet Aid and Trade in Africa" in Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen (ed.) Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations. (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1980) p. 18.

Soviet Trade with Selected Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa,¹⁶
1960 to 1976 (in millions of U.S. dollars)

Import Total	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
	39.0	65.9	140.8	142.3	93.9	112	198.1	306.4	281.9
Angola	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.2
Cameroon	0.2	0.1	7.7	4.1	3.9	4.7	14.9	45.8	44.8
Congo (Br.)	-	-	0.8	0.7	1.2	3.5	2.6	3.2	3.7
Equatorial									
Guinea	-	-	-	0.1	-	4.2	-	2.0	1.7
Ghana	20.4	30.7	44.2	7.7	37.2	37.8	32.5	61.1	85.5
Guinea	3.9	3.6	3.3	5.6	6.8	2.6	6.5	19.0	35.6
Ivory Coast	2.8	5.1	1.7	12.4	4.4	8.4	25.9	25.7	19.6
Kenya	-	0.7	0.4	2.4	0.8	-	0.8	4.0	1.3
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.7	0.4
Mali	-	2.6	1.9	2.8	1.4	0.7	0.9	1.1	0.8
Nigeria	5.5	5.8	22.6	45.6	24.0	39.0	92.9	110.9	35.4
Senegal	-	-	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	1.6
Somalia	-	-	0.4	2.0	3.5	1.5	2.6	5.7	6.3
Sudan	5.8	12.4	49.9	52.2	1.3	-	3.2	10.4	19.3
Tanzania	-	1.7	0.8	1.8	1.0	3.4	3.7	7.8	3.7
Togo	-	0.6	3.1	4.9	4.7	-	-	-	2.1
Uganda	-	-	3.1	-	0.8	3.2	6.3	6.2	-
Ethiopia	-	2.6	0.9	N.A.	2.5	3.0	4.8	2.8	0.9
Export Total	14.8	84.5	92.4	115.2	127.1	127.6	185.4	159.4	169.9
Angola	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.6
Cameroon	-	0.1	0.7	1.6	1.1	0.9	1.3	2.5	4.4
Congo (Br.)	-	2.7	0.9	4.7	0.4	1.6	2.6	2.4	3.3
Equatorial									
Guinea	-	-	-	1.0	0.1	-	-	0.7	1.7
Ahana	1.6	34.6	11.0	14.1	11.1	13.1	33.4	14.1	22.5
Guinea	5.2	9.7	12.4	34.7	54.3	56.3	56.4	29.6	26.0
Ivory Coast	-	0.3	0.4	1.3	2.1	5.3	11.4	17.4	12.8
Kenya	-	1.0	1.6	1.3	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.1
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.4	3.4	4.5
Mali	-	9.8	5.2	2.6	1.3	3.6	5.5	7.7	6.5
Nigeria	-	3.2	12.1	17.4	10.9	14.8	28.4	32.0	31.8
Senegal	-	-	1.3	1.0	1.7	6.6	21.5	4.2	0.5
Somalia	-	6.9	3.1	6.1	14.2	15.5	22.2	29.3	24.9
Sudan	6.5	7.2	36.1	22.3	20.7	3.4	5.0	6.2	6.0
Tanzania	-	0.4	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.8	3.0	3.4	1.6
Togo	-	0.8	1.3	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.2	3.7	3.9
Ethiopia	1.5	7.8	1.4	1.4	1.9	2.2	3.4	4.2	4.8
Uganda	-	-	1.2	4.3	4.1	1.2	12.0	1.8	2.0

¹⁶Ministerstvo Vneshnei Torgovli, Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR (Moscow: "Statistika, 1960-76). Cited in Weinstein and Henriksen, *op. cit.* pp. 26-28.

Comparison of Import/Export Totals
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Import Total	39.0	65.9	140.8	142.3	93.9	112	198.1	306.4	281.9
Export Total	14.8	84.6	92.4	115.2	127.1	127.6	185.4	159.4	169.9

From the figures above it can be seen that Soviet trade with sub-Saharan Africa is no longer limited to the so called "progressive" countries. A pro-Western country like Ivory Coast has had more trade with Soviet Union than Uganda which was friendly with the Soviets during the period under examination. It can also be seen that the overthrow of the pro-Soviet Nkrumah regime of Ghana in 1966 did not disrupt the trade between the two countries, an indication that the Soviets are prepared to cooperate with any kind of regime in the region. The steep rise in Nigeria-Soviet trade after 1970 (the end of the Nigerian Civil War) indicates an increased Soviet influence following her aid to the winning federal faction during the war. The Nigerian case will be discussed in full in the next chapter.

Another way of looking at Soviet-African trade is by comparing commodities that are traded as the figures below show.

Commodities Imported and Exported by the U.S.S.R. from¹⁷
and to Africa, 1960 and 1975 (in Millions of Rubles)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1975</u>
Import Total	181.4	864.7
Raw material for fabrics	114.2	152.6
Food		
Fuel, minerals, non-ferrous metals	33.1	331.7
Industrial and half-finished products	-	222.8
<hr/>		
	<u>1960</u>	1975
Export Total	89.8	574.9
Machines, equipments, means of transport	26.3	166.1
Metal, (ferrous and non-ferrous)	7.4	43.0
Fuel	21.0	107.8
Timber, cellulose and paper products	14.2	87.7
Food	4.1	42.3
Consumer goods	2.9	9.2

The steep rise here from 1960 to 1975 is also spectacular but the interesting figures and those for food, and machine and equipments. From the figures on food, it can be seen that Soviet imports made a steep rise from 33.1 million rubles to 331.7 million rubles, which may indicate

¹⁷SSSR: Strany Afriki, Institute Afriki, Moscow, (1977) pp. 257 and 261. Cited in Milene Charles, op. cit., p. 109.

a probable attempt to reduce their dependence on the West for food. As for the high figures of machines and equipments, they seem to reflect Soviet interest in getting involved in highly visible projects such as energy development and heavy industry which may serve some propaganda purposes. Moreover such projects call for the presence of a large number of Soviet technicians in the recipient country, another way of making thier presence felt. Projects in this category represented 75 percent of all Soviet assistance through 1971.¹⁸ They also prefer to cooperate with the public rather than private sector, which gets them in close touch with government officials.

The figures below show how such visible projects compare with other projects in which the Soviets are involved.

¹⁸Roger Kanet and Boris Ipatov, "Soviet Aid and Trade in Africa," in Weinstein and Henriksen, op. cit., p. 22.

Types of Projects Supported by Soviet Economic
Assistances in Africa Through 1971

Type of Project	Percentage of Assistance
Energy and heavy industry	75.1
Agricultural Production	9.7
Transport and Communication	1.6
Geological Prospecting	9.0
Education, health, recreational and cultural facilities	7.2
Housing Conditions	0.7
Other	0.3

Anyone who understands the economic situation in most of Africa will agree that agriculture, transport, communication, education, health and housing should have been given priority over heavy industry and there is little doubt that the Soviets knew it. While it is true that some African leaders like Nkrumah of Ghana did insist on prestige projects as heavy industries, it is also true that the Soviet Union has used such projects to boost her influence and establish her presence since, as mentioned earlier, that category of projects requires the presence of numerous Soviet technicians and also the training of African personnel in the Soviet Union. As a result of this, the number of Soviet personnel in Africa

has leaped ahead of those in most regions of the Third World. The figures below confirm this argument.

U.S.S.R. Economic Technicians in Less Developed ¹⁹ Countries. 1970 to 1975						
Region	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Africa	4010	4200	3760	4590	6000	5930
East Asia	100	150	25	25	10	25
Latin America	35	75	190	185	300	330
Near East and South Asia combined	6455	6600	7225	8295	8375	11500

The upward trend of the number of Soviet economic technicians in Africa reflected above may indicate a growing importance of the continent to the Soviets.

Scholarship Award as a Variable Promoting Soviet Influence

One other tactic applied by the Soviets in boosting their influence in sub-Saharan Africa is the use of scholarship awards to increase the number of Soviet-oriented members of the intelligentsia and labor unions. A detailed discussion on how this tactic works will also be examined in Chapter 4 when Soviet penetration of Nigeria is brought under focus. In the meantime the

¹⁹C.I.A. Bulletin, Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the free World, 1975. (July 1976) p. 8.

figure below show the number of students from different sub-Saharan African countries studying in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

Academic Students from Selected Black African
Countries Being Trained in the Soviet
Union and other Communist Countries
as of December 1975²⁰

Africa total	14,895
Angola	300
Burundi	145
Cameroon	180
Chad	190
Congo (Brazzaville)	885
Ethiopia	920
Ghana	315
Ivory Coast	30
Kenya	300
Mali	585
Malagasy	425
Nigeria	1140
Senegal	215
Sierra Leone	415
Somalia	600
Sudan	1575
Tanzania	655
Uganda	290
Upper Volta	215
Zaire	525
Zambia	295

It will be noted here that of all the Scholarships listed above, the Soviet union accounts for two-thirds²¹, and Soviet awards do not only cover tuition and boarding, but also include transport fare from home country and a

²⁰Ibid., p. 10.

²¹Ibid., p. 9.

monthly payment for other expenditures. The effectiveness of this strategy in increasing the number of Soviet sympathizers can only be appreciated in countries like Sudan, Nigeria and Congo (Brazzaville) who are the highest recipients of the awards, and where Soviet educated graduates are moving into influential positions in the government. There is a sharp contrast of experience when a Soviet educated student compares himself with an average Western educated student who pays outrageous tuition and living expenses. When the figure above are closely examined, it will be seen that Soviet academic awards like her economic cooperation, is not limited to any particular type of countries. The countries range from the pro-Western Kenya, Senegal and Zaire to the neutral ones like Nigeria and Cameroons, to the pro-Soviet Angola, Congo (Brazzaville) and Somalia at the time under discussion. It is therefore, a regionwide effort to boost influence. A look at the regional grouping of these awards in the Third World will show how much priority the Soviets have given to Africa.

Academic Students from Five Major Regions of the
Third World Studying in Soviet Union and other
Communist Countries 1975 ²²

Africa	14,895
East Asia	335
Latin America	2,940
Near East and South Asia	9,105

As can be seen from above, the number of African student exceeds that of other regions added together. However, despite the high figures reflected in the data above, academic awards have remained a supplementary, though effective tool for spreading Soviet influence. Until recently, economic cooperation had been the major independent variables sustaining Soviet influence in the Third World, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The benefits derived from it had been so substantial that Premier Kosygin, at the Twenty Fourth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1971 declared:²³

Our trade and economic cooperation with many (Third World countries) are entering a stage at which one can begin to speak of a stably founded, mutually advantageous economic relations. Our cooperation with them is based on the principles of equality and respect for mutual interests

²²Ibid, p. 10.

²³Pravda, April 7, 1971, p. 6. Cited in Nogee and Donaldson op. cit., p. 147.

Currently, the major independent variable that is contributing toward the spread and consolidation of Soviet influence in sub-Saharan Africa is its military aid to both the independent countries in the region and those fighting for their independence. This variable is discussed below:

Military Aid As A Variable Promoting Soviet Influence

According to the "national democracy" concept, a national democratic state is the state which, among other things, "Fights against imperialism and its military blocks, against military bases on its territory; a state which fights against new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital." This concept, as explained earlier, formed the basis for Soviet policy in sub-Saharan Africa and the Third World from the early sixties. From its contents here, it is clear that the concept is aimed at undermining "Western alliance systems and the capitalist economics and to offset Chinese competition,"²⁴ which is in harmony with the primary foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union - the global expansion of her influence and presence in strategic areas of the Third World.

²⁴Joseph Smaldone "Soviet and Chinese Military Aid and Arms Transfers to Africa," in Weinstein and Henriksen, op. cit., p. 77.

Like her economic cooperation, Soviet military aid to sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized with opportunism and "designed to tip the global balance of power decisively against the West."²⁵ On the other hand the Soviets have been more careful in determining who gets the arms. Despite this cautiousness, deliveries have been escalated since 1967. By 1967 Soviet Arms transfers to Africa amounted to \$300 million (excluding Egypt). Out of this, sub-Saharan Africa received arms worth \$80 million. But between 1967 and 1976, African countries received Soviet weapons worth \$4.4 billion.²⁶ It is obvious though, that arms sent to Egypt during the 1973 Middle East war and those sent into the Angolan and Nigerian wars must have boosted the figures, yet the number of African recipients jumped from 13 to 21, 12 of whom depended on the Soviets for one-half of their weaponry.²⁷ The figures below show a breakdown into countries of Soviet arms transfer to selected sub-Saharan African countries.

²⁵Ibid., p. 77.

²⁶ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976. pp. 157-159. Cited in Weinstein and Henriksen op. cit., pp. 79 and 72.

²⁷Ibid.

Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan African
Countries, 1967-76 (in millions of U.S. Dollars)²⁸

Recipient Country	1967-76
Angola	315
Chad	5
Congo Brazzaville	10
Equatorial Guinea	5
Guinea	50
Mali	25
Mozambique	15
Nigeria	70
Sudan	65
Somalia	181
Tanzania	30
Uganda	65
Zambia	10
Benin	1
Malagasy	1
Guinea Bissau	5
Total	853

It will be noted that the figures above do not include the weapons sent to the liberation movements in Rhodesia and Namibia.

This incremental transfer of arms to sub-Saharan African nations has been such an important input into the regional policy of the Soviet Union there that by 1969, she had overtaken all Western rivals. The figures below confirm this:

²⁸U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-76, Publication 98, (Washington D.C. July 1978), table VII pp. 158-159.

Black Africa's Sources of Major Weapons,
by Suppliers (1955-69)²⁹

	<u>1955-59</u>		<u>1960-64</u>		<u>1965-69</u>	
France	\$	million/ann.%	\$	million/ann.%	\$	million/annual%
U.S.A.	1	10	7	21.9	5	13.2
U.K.	8	80	7	21.9	6	15.8
France	-	-	4	12.5	6	15.8
U.S.S.R.	-	-	5	15.6	8	21.1
Others	<u>1</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>28.1</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>34.7</u>
Total	10	100	32	100	38	100

The sharp increase in Soviet arms supply reflected in the data above may be attributed to the increased Soviet aid to the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Rhodesia and Namibia, and to Nigeria during the civil war in that country.

Another way of looking at the increase in Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa is by examining the change in arms acquisition styles of the region between 1961 and 1976, as shown in the tables below.

²⁹Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Arms Trade with the Third World*, p. 858. Cited in Christopher Stevens *op. cit.*, p. 185.

Sub-Saharan
African Arms-Acquisition Styles, 1961-1971³⁰

Sole Suppliers (100%)		Predominant Supplier (50%)		Multiple Supplier (50%)		
WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST	CROSS-BLOC
Dahomey (fr.)	Mali (USSR)	Cameroon (fr.)	Congo (USSR)	Niger	-	Ghana
Gabon (fr.)	-	Chad (fr.)	Guinea (USSR)	Zambia	-	Nigeria
Malawi (U.K.)	-	Ethiopia (U.S.)	Somalia (USSR)	-	-	Sudan
Senegal (fr.)	-	Ivory Coast (fr.)	Tanzania (PRC)	-	-	Uganda
Central African Empire (fr.)	-	Kenya (U.K.)	-			
		Liberia (U.S.)	-			
		Malagasy (fr.)	-			
		Togo (Fr)	-			
		Zaire (U.S.)	-			

1967-1976						
Liberia (U.S.)	Equitor. Guinea (USSR)	Benin (fr.)	Angola (USSR)	Ivory Coast	-	Burundi
-	Gambia (PRC)	Central African	Guinea (USSR)	Niger	-	Cameroon
-	Guinea Bissau (USSR)	Empire (fr.)	Mali (USSR)	Togo	-	Chad
-		Ethiopia (U.S.)	Mozambique (USSR)	-	-	Congo
		Gabon (fr.)	Somalia (USSR)	-	-	Ghana
		Kenya (U.K.)	Sudan (USSR)	-	-	Malagasy
		Senegal (fr.)	Tanzania (PRC)	-	-	Malawi
		Tunisia (U.S.)	Uganda (USSR)	-	-	Nigeria
		Upper Volta (fr.)	-	-	-	Rwanda
				-	-	Zaire
				-	-	Zambia

³⁰U.S., ACDA op. cit., cited in Weinstein and Henriksen, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

Note: Many countries that fall under the Eastern bloc still acquire some arms from the West through cross-block ties. It should be noted in the above data that both Somalia and Ethiopia have since reversed their alignments. data in general show how the Soviet Union has gained clients during the latter period mainly from the cross-bloc and how the West has lost to the cross-bloc recipients, indicating that the Soviets have made some progress in their search for weapon clients in sub-Saharan Africa.

One implication of this escalation of Soviet arms deliveries to the region is that they go hand-in-hand with some increase in the number of their military advisers and technicians who help to establish Soviet presence and influence in the recipient countries. They also call for the training of African military personnel in the Soviet Union, just like Soviet economic cooperation. The data below confirm this assertion.

Soviet Military Advisers in Selected Countries
of sub-Saharan Africa (1976-77)³¹

Country	1976-1977
Angalo	550
Congo (Brazzaville)	400
Equitorial Guinea	200
Ethiopia	-
Guinea	110
Guinea Bissau	-
Mali	30-40
Mozambique	200-250
Nigeria	50
Somalia	2,500-5000
Total	4,040-6,600

Military Personnel from Selected Countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa Trained in U.S.S.R. 1955-1975.³²

	1955-75	1955-76
Africa Total	9,575	17,650
Burundi	75	75
Congo (Brazzaville)	325	350
Ghana	175	175
Guinea	850	850
Guinea-Bissau	100	100
Mali	200	350
Mozambique	200	300
Nigeria	475	550
Somalia	2375	2400
Sudan	300	325
Tanzania	875	1425
Uganda	650	700
Zambia	25	75

³¹U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "The Soviet Union and the Third World," Issue Brief on IB 77101 (Wash. D.C., December 12, 1977), Table III p. 11.

³²C.I.A. Bulletin, Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975, 1977 and 1978. (July 1975) p. 31, (August 1977) p. 6 and (November 1978) p. 4.

It will again be noted in the above sets of data that Ethiopia and Somalia have since switched positions. It will also be noted that Angola which is not in the latter set of data, now has a lot of Soviet advisers. Cuban troops in sub-Saharan Africa and client troops being trained in Cuba, though not taken into account, are known to serve Soviet interest since they help put Soviet weapons into effective use.

The data in this chapter, demonstrate that the Soviets have taken long and positive strides to increase their influence and presence in sub-Saharan Africa, displacing the nations of the West as the major source of weapons, and sharing the trade and other economic activities with them in an area formerly of predominant Western influence. Weinstein and Henriksen outline the objectives of these Soviet strategies as tools of foreign policy as follows:³³

- (1) To establish and extend Soviet presence, political access, and influence, particularly in states of importance to certain global issues, and in states which control strategic resources, territories, facilities or lines of communication.
- (2) To break Western arms-supplies monopolies, prevent the reintroduction of Western arms-supply monopolies and prevent the introduction of Western military power.
- (3) To undermine or neutralize Western influence, strategic interests and alliances.

³³Weinstein and Henriksen op. cit., pp. 78-79.

- (4) To extend the Soviet defense perimeter and the capability to project power afar, in support of global interests.
- (5) To enhance the internal security, defense capability and regime stability of allies and clients.
- (6) To support diplomatic efforts in regional conflicts by maintaining or tipping local military balances.
- (7) To support insurgencies and wars of national liberation consistent with Soviet ideology, either directly or by proxy through third parties,
- (8) To encourage domestic Communist movements
- (9) To promote Soviet leadership in the Communist world while preempting or reducing Chinese influence.

Assuming that all the objectives outlined above are correct, an attempt will be made in the next chapter to find out how successful the overall Soviet policy in sub-Saharan Africa has been. To get an insight into this, increases in Soviet influence since 1961 will be reviewed along with her losses. But before looking at the achievements of the overall Soviet policy in the region, it is important to note that the Soviet Union had some advantages over the West when it entered the African scene. In the first place, Russia did not participate in the black slave trade. Also, it did not recognize any African territory and had no investments in the white-ruled territories of southern Africa. If these advantages are considered, the Soviets would be expected to do better than they have done so far.

CHAPTER 4

THE NEW STRATEGY: HOW SUCCESSFUL?

Between the late 1950s and early 1960s when most sub-Saharan African nations attained independence from West European colonial powers, mainly France and Britain, many vacuums of influence were created which attracted Soviet attention. It was within this period that the Soviets formulated and accepted their new "national democracy" concept. There are many reasons why they may have justified their increased attention to Africa. In the first place there was a weakening relationship between them and their allies in the Middle East because of the issue of local communists. Charles McLane adds that Soviet position at the U.N. had been precarious due to the voting pattern of members. It was therefore, natural that "Africa with its large number of states on the threshold of independence was the logical place to turn," because the "new African states could replace allies in the Middle East . . . and guarantee the Russians greater leverage at the United Nations."¹ Also the chinese appeared to be making moves in Africa,

¹Charles B. McLane, Soviet-African Relations, (London, Central Asian Research Center, 1974) p. 8.

extending economic assistance to African countries beginning from 1956. This assistance approached \$2.4 billion distributed to 35 African countries by 1977.² So the Soviets were in a hurry to check the growth of Chinese influence in the region.

The left turn made by Cuba's Castro convinced the Soviets that positive changes were beginning to take place in the Third World, and Africa was more ripe than any other region. They therefore, started an unpredictable adventure into Africa. Despite their new strategies which employed the tools of various kinds of aid discussed above, what seemed like a triumphant beginning for the Soviets in black Africa turned out to be policy disasters in the 1960s.

SOVIET POLICY DISASTERS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Congo (Zaire)

The earliest disaster experienced by the Soviets was in the Congo (Zaire). While the discussion here will not get into the details of the Congo crises, it will be mentioned that it was the highest point of East-West competition for influence in black Africa before the Angolan crises. As far as Khrushchev was concerned, the

²U.S., C.I.A., Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Third World, 1977, ER 78-10478U (Wash. D.C., 1978) p. 5-6.

Congo crises was an "imperialist plot" by Belgium, France, Britain, West Germany and United States. He condemned the U.N. Security council which the United States had turned into an instrument for "keeping freedom-loving peoples in Colonial bondage."³ Although the Soviets lost in the Congo Crises, Charles McLane argues that the crisis crystalized a bond of friendship between Soviet Union and Ghana, which gave Moscow "for several years, the most successful alliance with a Third World State." He even suspects that the Soviets "tailored their policies"⁴ to suit that of Nkrumah.

Ghana

Khrushchev may have gained an ally in Ghana and awarded him the Lenin Peace Prize in 1962, but Nkrumah's glory eroded with the economy of his country. The fall of Nkrumah has been partly attributed to his inordinate ambition which drove him into many expensive prestige projects like the nuclear reactor and the Black Volta Dam which crippled his economy, despite millions of dollars worth of Soviet credits. During the last year of Nkrumah, the Soviets reduced their economic aid but increased

³Pravda, August 1, 1960. Cited in McLane op. cit., p. 166.

⁴Charles McLane, op. cit., p. 50.

their spending for Ghana's internal Security. Several members of Nkrumah's personal guard were trained by the Soviets in internal security tactics and a lot of Soviet military advisers were concentrated in the capital city. But on the day of the coup, Soviet personnel made no effort to save the day. This may be interpreted to mean that the Soviets were ready to forget about Nkrumah and cooperate with the new military regime. However, things did not work out that way. The calendar below outlines the course of events that followed Nkrumah's overthrow.⁵

- (1) Feb 1966 - All Soviet and Chinese technicians were expelled from Ghana. Soviet embassy staff members were cut back. All aid projects were suspended and Soviet specialist left Ghana. All cultural exchanges were suspended and Ghanaian University graduates in U.S.S.R. stayed back.
- (2) Feb 1967 - All Soviet fishing trawlers in Ghana were returned to USSR.
- (3) June 1967 - Soviet news correspondents were expelled from Ghana.
- (4) Oct 1968 - Soviet fishing vessels were detained in Ghana. (crews released February)
- (5) August 1971- Soviet diplomat expelled from Ghana.

Mali

While the events outlined above represent the second foreign policy disaster for the Soviet Union in sub-Saharan

⁵Ibid., pp. 58 and 59.

Africa, it was not the last. In Mali the pro-Soviet government of Modibo Keita was overthrown but relations with the Soviet Union were not hurt as much as in Ghana. In fact Soviet influence was reduced but economic, diplomatic and cultural relations remained normal as the calendar of events below indicates.⁶

- (1) November 1968: Modibo Keita overthrown.
- (2) December 1968: Mali's Foreign Minister heads goodwill delegation in Moscow.
- (3) June 1969: Soviet gifts of medical supplies received in Mali.
- (4) August 1969: Mali's defense minister in U.S.S.R.
- (5) September 1969: Soviets complete cement factory at Diema.
- (6) February 1970: Mali's foreign minister in U.S.S.R. on holidays.
- (7) April 1970: Government military delegation in Moscow for Lenin's centenary.
- (8) May 1970: New technical assistance agreement with Moscow signed.

From the events in the above calendar it can be argued that the military government in Mali did learn some lessons from what happened in Ghana where the military regime expelled all Soviet and Chinese technicians and military personnel, and crippled the Ghanaian industry and military that had been designed by these two countries.

⁶Ibid., pp. 94 and 95.

Those who made the Ghanaian counter coup in 1972 realized this mistake and resumed full relations with the Soviet Union and China in all areas. The overthrow of Keita was therefore, not a total disaster for the Soviet Union.

Somalia

One recent foreign policy disaster for the Soviets in sub-Saharan Africa was in Somalia where they lost several hundred miles of the strategic Indian Ocean. However in many arguments, scholars have referred to what happened in the horn of Africa as a "transfer"⁷ of the Soviets from Somalia to Ethiopia and often try to offset the loss of Somalia with the gain of Ethiopia. It will be added however, that the present dominance of Soviet influence in Ethiopia had been made possible by circumstances of internal and external wars which are beyond the control of Ethiopia's Mengistu. Things may not remain the same when normalcy returns to the area.

Zimbabwe

Probably the most painful experience of the Soviets was in Zimbabwe where they made several years of arms commitment to Joshua Nkomo's liberation movement and came out losers in the end. For the first time in southern

⁷Peter Jay, "Regionalism As Geopolitics," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1979) p. 500.

Africa, a black government was established that was hostile to the Soviet Union and disallowed it to establish diplomatic relations. Soviet setbacks in Zimbabwe is of great significance because Mugabe is one Marxist in black Africa who has become Anti-Soviet. The explanation is apparently simple. The outcome of events in Zimbabwe reflects the increasing Chinese challenge to the growth of Soviet influence in the Third World. The Soviets had backed the wrong horse and lost.

In Tanzania and Zambia where the Chinese have established a strong influence, the Soviets cannot be said to have suffered any disasters. They have only preferred to maintain a low profile in each of those countries rather than lose the little influence they have. Relations between the governments and the Soviets have remained cordial, and economic cooperation between them reasonable. In general, the Soviets have suffered some diplomatic setbacks in sub-Saharan Africa. But these setbacks seem to have led to a better understanding of the African situation by Soviet analysts who have contributed immensely to the modifications and changes in their country's policies.

Soviet Analysts of the Brezhnevian Era

During the era of President Leonid Brezhnev a new school of analysts emerged that drew inferences from

Soviet African disasters to condemn the earlier optimists, some of whom had heralded the military takeovers in Africa at the outset. One of such optimists, V. Sidenko had prematurely argued that army officers too could be "revolutionary democrats" and develop "progressive" programs.⁸ But not too long after, another analyst lamented the army's "conversion into a bureaucratic corporation of bourgeois outlook."⁹

Disappointed and disillusioned, these new pessimists did not spare the earlier optimists and called for more patience and pessimism. In 1965, A.A. Iskenderov cautioned that:¹⁰

Insufficient consideration of internal factors sometimes lead to obliteration of the differences between the progressive-ness of one or another measure and its socialist content. Social economic measures (nationalization, agrarian reforms, etc) may be very progressive and radical, but it is well known that their implementation does not automatically lead to socialism.

Another analyst, Fyodor Burlatsky, following the same line of criticism, wrote within two months that:¹¹

⁸Krasnaya Zvezda, (February 8, 1966). Cited in McLane, op. cit., p. 11.

⁹Narrody Azii i Afriki, no 6 (November-December 1968) p. 14. Cited in McLane, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁰Pravda, June 4, 1965 p. 3. Cited in Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 230.

¹¹Pravda, August 15, 1965, p. 3. Cited in Legvold, op. cit., p. 230.

It is natural that the urgent needs should arise for a clearer definition of all shades of contemporary socialism, and the line between proletarian trends should be drawn more clearly.

Opinions like the ones above which strongly resented optimism with respect to the triumph of socialism in Africa, since they were published in government controlled publications, obviously represented the general feelings within the government circles. But private analysts were not left out in that whirlwind of criticism. Author and economist N.I. Gavrilow expressed his own opinion in the following words:¹²

The failures and setbacks of some African countries who have tried too rapidly to introduce measures of a socialist character show that it is impossible to introduce socialism by decree The advance to socialism requires planned, systematic work, and gradual creation of the economic and social base for the new social system.

Perhaps, the most objective opinion of all, from the Marxist point of view, can be found in the writings of N.A. Simoniia. He argued that "capitalism must be allowed to exist so that a proletarian class can be created,," and condemned Soviet over-optimism in expecting an early evolution of socialist states in Africa. African nations, he said, are still in a stage of "bourgeois democratic

¹²Mizan, VIII, (October 1965) p. 6. Cited in Legvold op. cit., p. 231.

revolution."¹³ These opinions which indicate the extent of disappointment felt by Soviet analysts also show that the Soviet Union was more ready than ever to emphasize the new policy of flexibility in the Third World. This appears to have helped the Soviets record some successes in spreading their influence through a new lowered profile under Brezhnev.

SOME SOVIET POLICY SUCCESSES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The new policy of flexibility deemphasized the idea of creating socialist regimes through proletarian revolutions and concentrated on spreading Soviet influence through cultural and economic cooperation, and military aid to the nations of the Third World. Therefore, any evaluation of Soviet successes in sub-Saharan Africa must be made within that context. In other words, evaluation should examine how much penetration Soviet influence has made in the region rather than how many "progressive socialist" regimes the Soviets have created.

It will be mentioned beforehand that the data in Chapter 3 have gone a long way revealing the scope of Soviet influence in sub-Saharan Africa. The remaining

¹³Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6 1966 pp 3-21. Cited in Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "The Soviet Union and Africa", in Roger Kanet, ed, The Soviet Union and Developing Nations. (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1974) p. 60.

part of this paper therefore, will not get into much details of any particular country except Nigeria which will be used to illustrate the penetration strategy of Soviet influence.

It is a difficult task trying to weigh the influence of the big powers in all countries of sub-Saharan Africa. All the same, the countries of the region do show varying degrees of Western, Soviet or Chinese influence. But most countries of that region today can be better described as cross-bloc or neutral countries. Therefore, one way of examining how far Soviet influence has grown is by looking at the countries of the region from the early 1960s, to 1980 and comparing the levels of influence of the West, the Soviets and China in each country. Three categories will emerge from this comparison as the tables below indicate. Countries that were still under colonial rule will be regarded as under the influence of the European countries ruling them.

Levels of Western, Soviet and Chinese Influence in
Sub-Saharan Africa 1961 and 1980¹⁴

1961				
(High West)		(High Soviet)	(Cross-bloc)	
Mozambique	Angola	Rwanda	Ghana	Ethiopia ^W
Guinea Bissau	Zaire	Zimbabwe	Guinea	
Congo (Br)	Nigeria	Zambia	Mali	
Equa. Guinea	Gambia	Gabon		
Ivory Coast	Sudan	Kenya		
Cent. Afr. Rep.	Senegal	Uganda		
Botswana	Liberia	Tanzania		
Burundi	Benin	Niger		
Cameroon	Togo	Malawi		
Sierra Leone	Somalia	Chad		
Upper Volta	Malagasy			

1980				
High West	High Soviet	Cross-Bloc		
Zaire	Angola	Mali ^o	Gabon ^W	Congo (Br.) ^S
Kenya	Mozambique	Niger ^W	Uganda ^W	Botswana ^W
Somalia	Guinea	Rwanda ^W	Tanzania ^C	Equa. Guinea ^o
Swaziland	Ethiopia	Zambia ^W	Nigeria ^o	Cent. Afr. Rep. ^o
Lesotho	Guinea Biss.	Zimbabwe ^C	Togo ^W	Ivory Coast ^W
		Chad ^W	Benin ^W	Upper volta ^W
		Cameroon ^W	Liberia ^o	Sierra Leone ^W
		Burundi ^W	Sudan ^o	Malagasy ^W
		Gambia ^W	Senegal ^W	Malawi ^W

¹⁴This table was compiled from the tables on Soviet military, economic and cultural relations with African states cited by Charles McLane *op. cit.*, pp. 180-185. and from Warren Weinstein and Thomas Henriksen *op. cit.*, pp. 87 and 88. The years beyond the scope of the sources have their judgement based on current news events.

Note: Eight of the countries in the upper table were under colonial rule by 1961 and therefore, under the influence of their European rulers. But the current instead of the pre-independence name of each country has been used in

both tables, where the country changed its name after independence. The cross-bloc countries do show some form of tilt and have been marked with some alphabetical symbols to denote whether they tilt toward one bloc or another even though they are considered to be in the cross-bloc. These symbols may be interpreted as follows: w=tilting toward the west, s = tilting toward the Soviets, c = tilting toward China, o = almost neutral. Most countries in the "high Soviet" category do have some Western influence, which are minimal. Finally, crossbloc countries are those with nearly equal degree of Chinese, Western and Soviet influence but display some noticeable tilt toward one bloc, and "high" represents high level of influence (Soviet or Western).

From the tables above, it can be seen that many countries of sub-Saharan Africa have moved from the category of high level of Western influence in 1961 to the cross-bloc category, in which majority of them still remain tilted to the west. Also the Soviets who had only three countries under their strong influence in 1961, had the number increased to five by 1980, while losing Ghana and Mali to the cross-block where most of the countries preferred to remain by 1980. It would be a serious mistake to assume that the Soviets alone with their new strategy, were responsible for this mass movement of countries from

the West to the cross-block. Three major factors are probably responsible for that shift. First and foremost, there is the reluctance on the part of black African leaders to concede any bit of their newly won independence to any new foreign influence. The experience of colonialism still haunts them, and this their attitude is a potential limitation that all big powers must face that want allies in black Africa.

Even when the leaders of independent black African nations allow some degree of foreign influence, they do so out of the desperate need for economic or military assistance for internal harmony and external security. Some countries in the second table under high Western or Soviet influence may have this excuse to be there, especially Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya and Somalia.

The second reason for that movement may be related to the situation in southern Africa, which by chance, has brought Soviet policy in that sub-region in agreement with that of the O.A.U. and most black African nations. African nations have come to see apartheid as a greater threat than communism.¹⁵ But rather than embrace the

¹⁵Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, *After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa*, (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), p. 41.

Soviets, they have preferred to remain neutral, since they see the West as unhostile toward apartheid South Africa. The third reason may be to the new Soviet strategy of increasing its influence through economic cooperation and military aid. The data in Chapter three are self-explanatory in relation to that. Further understanding of Soviet penetration of black Africa, using its new strategy may be realized by examining the Nigerian case.

The Nigerian Case: Slow Soviet Penetration

With one quarter of the total African population and being the richest and most powerful nation of black Africa, Nigeria holds an attraction for the Soviets that cannot be overemphasized. The Soviets started in Nigeria, after independence, by awarding scholarships to young Nigerians to study in the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Those awards were of two kinds. One was for high school graduates to study regular university courses and was awarded through the Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers Party. The second type was awarded to trade unionists who often spent only nine months studying trade unionism, and returned home to play very active roles in different trade unions. By 1971, the number of Nigerian students studying in the Soviet Union alone was 1,000¹⁶ and

¹⁶Christopher A. Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa. (London, The MacMillan Press, 1976) p. 152.

by 1972 Nigerian students were pursuing over 150 different courses in twenty Soviet cities.¹⁷ The strategy started in 1962,¹⁸ and by 1964 almost half of all district headquarters of the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC) were staffed with communist-trained trade unionists. In a city like Port-Harcourt, the NTUC and the Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (NSWFP) shared the same staff and office accommodation. It was like a communist takeover of trade unionism in Nigeria.

Later in 1968, the Soviet and Nigerian governments signed an agreement on mutual recognition of academic qualifications,¹⁹ and from then on, Soviet trained Nigerian graduates began to hold some important positions in the government.

However, while this Soviet strategy did not turn Nigeria into a communist state, nor was it aimed a such, it did help increase Soviet influence in a conservative Nigeria. Many events which foolow indicate some improvements in Nigerian - Soviet relations:²⁰

¹⁷Charles B. McLane, Soviet African Relations (London, The Central Asian Research Center, 1974) p. 106. citing Radio Moscow, 8/7/72.

¹⁸Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p. 107.

¹⁹Christopher Stevens, op. cit., p. 152.

²⁰McLane, op. cit., p. 108.

1. In January 1964, a Supreme Soviet delegation visited Nigeria
2. In September of the same year, a Lagos City delegation made a return visit to the U.S.S.R. (Lagos is the Capital)
3. In June 1965, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Malik visited Nigeria.
4. In December of the same year a CPSU delegation visited Nigeria for the first NSWFP Congress.
5. In March 1966, a NSWFP delegation attended the Twenty Third Congress of the CPSU.
6. In January 1967, Soviet steel experts visited Nigeria for the development of the Nigerian steel industry.
7. In April the same year, an agreement was signed with the Soviet Union for the construction of a University Teaching Hospital in Enugu, Nigeria.

The above events represent only a small fraction of the several others that indicate the increased contacts between the two countries. What actually makes them significant is the fact that such contacts had been unusual in the past. They appeared to indicate that the new Soviet strategy was succeeding in Nigeria.

The Civil War in Nigeria

It was the Nigerian civil war that offered the Soviets ample opportunity to establish their presence in that country. With the U.S. opting for neutrality and Britain reluctant to provide adequate military aid to the Federal Nigerian government, the Soviets capitalized on

this unique opportunity and armed Nigeria to the teeth in her war against the secessionist Biafrans, even though they considered the Biafrans more "progressive."²¹ Furthermore, most of the trade unionists and students trained by the Soviets were from Biafra, and the NSWFP which was pro-Soviet was strongest in Biafra (Eastern Nigeria before then). One may therefore, argue that the new Soviet policy laid more emphasis on national interest than "progressiveness." The Soviets may have reasoned that as long as the Biafrans were not backed militarily by any powerful nation, the likelihood that the secession would succeed was remote. Moreover, any Soviet aid to the Biafrans would attract U.S. intervention on the side of the more likely winner.

Among the weapons the Soviets made available to Nigeria were twelve Delphin L-29s, ten MIG-17s and six MIG-15s channelled through Poland and Czechslovakia.²² when the Czechs considered the suspension of arms transfer to Nigeria, the Soviets themselves took over and sent 24 more MIG-17s, two MIG-19s, four Sukoi Su-7s and five

²¹L. Afonin, Za rubezhom, no. 16, 1967. Cited in McLane, op. cit., p. 105.

²²Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Trade With the Third World, p. 858. Cited in Stevens, op. cit., p. 185.

Illushin-28 bombers.²³ As Nigeria lacked pilots to fly these planes, the Soviets acquired enough pilots from a then friendly Egypt to fly them while Nigerian pilots were being trained.

There is no doubt that this policy paid off greatly, for at the end of the war, the Nigerian Ambassador to Moscow was quoted as saying that "the sky is the limit" for future Soviet - Nigerian economic and technical cooperation.²⁴ Of course he was serious, as the items below confirm.²⁵

1. In February 1970, sales and repair shops for Soviet -made cars were opened in Lagos for the first time in Nigerian history (following the influx of Soviet cars - the Lada and Moskvich)
2. In April, a Nigerian Trade Union delegation attended the Lenin Centenary in U.S.S.R. for the first time.
3. In May a Soviet Naval squadron called at Lagos port (on a friendly visit)
4. In June a Tass News Agency team visited Nigeria to survey for clients.
5. In April 1971, the Soviet Justice Minister attended a meeting of the Nigerian - Soviet friendship society in Lagos.
6. In September of the same year, the Nigerian Minister (Commissioner) of Communication was in Moscow for talks on space satellite.

²³Stevens, op. cit., p. 185.

²⁴Daily Times of Nigeria, January 21, 1970. p. 3.

²⁵Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p. 111.

Considering the events itemed above, if Soviet policy goal in Nigeria was not to establish a communist government, then one may conclude that it has been relatively successful. They have at least, contributed in changing Nigeria from a strongly pro-Western country that it was immediately after independence to a relatively neutral country of the present day.

Putting together now, the Nigerian case and all the arguments and data above one may assume with some degree of confidence that the current policy of the Soviet Union in sub-Saharan Africa, despite some disasters, has been able to achieve some of its goals.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union, a new-comer to sub-Saharan Africa, started with the daydream of creating communist regimes in the region through proletarian revolution but soon learned to distinguish between the possible and the impossible. This was due to its scholars and analysts of African affairs and the research efforts of several Soviet Third World research institutes.

Khrushchev's reversal of the sterile policy of Stalin was a new positive beginning. His uncontrolled adventurism in the Third World, while it met with many disasters did provide the Soviets with some precedents to learn from. Their determination to compete with the West for influence in sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Third World crystallized a new concept of "national democracy" which threw some new dynamism into Soviet African policy. This dynamism lay in the flexibility that characterized the new policy. A flexibility that helped change Soviet image in Africa and made it easy for her to buy the friendship of black Africa through economic cooperation, military aid and academic awards.

The West cannot claim to have been taken by surprise.

It was their policy toward the liberation of white-ruled areas of black Africa that catalyzed the spread of Soviet influence. Probably, the Soviets deliberately designed their policy on African liberation to coincide with that of the O.A.U. to a great extent. Moreover, the colonized is bound to resent his colonizer for a while after gaining his freedom. Soviet policy which is characterized with opportunism did not let this advantage slip through the fingers. Today they can talk of their allies in black Africa, and many African nations have moved to neutral positions.

One conclusion is clear. The Soviets have contributed to preventing some colonial sources of raw materials of Western Europe from being transformed into "independent" cheap sources of raw materials, and extra-lucrative markets for the finished goods of the West. They have shared and gained from their trade with sub-Saharan Africa. They have also established their influence and presence at varying levels in many countries of black Africa, not necessarily by completely displacing the West, for the West still has more influence in the region. What counts is that the Soviets started with no influence at all.

However, the question now is: where do the Soviets go from here, backward or forward? One important factor

will answer this question; and that is what happens in Namibia and South Africa. All that Western alarm on the global spread of communism has generally received deaf ears in black Africa. It is not because black Africans are adherents of communism, but rather because, as mentioned earlier, black Africans and their leaders see apartheid as a greater threat to them than communism. Despite Soviet strong opposition to minority governments in southern Africa, no African nation has turned communist. Another conclusion is finally clear here. As long as black Africans feel threatened by apartheid and white minority regimes, and as long as the Soviets continue to provide the means to combat them, it is difficult to see how Soviet influence can decline in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact it is no overstatement to say that the Soviets would like the situation to remain the way it is because it justifies their presence and will help them consolidate their present footholds in sub-Saharan Africa and begin a new drive for expansion of their influence. But if majority rule is achieved in Namibia and South Africa by means other than military, the Soviets might face the difficult task of justifying their continued presence and active role in southern Africa, since their relations with the countries of that sub-region have been based more on military aid than economic cooperation. Any forecast

of Soviet reaction to such a situation would only be a guess work. However, a peaceful solution is more likely in Namibia than in South Africa. South Africa will be a hard nut to crack, and will probably sustain Soviet influence in black Africa longer than the West would like. In the meantime, the Soviet Union does not seem to mind the good economic relations between the West and its allies in sub-Saharan Africa, since the unfortunate situation in southern Africa gives enough leverage to its influence there. After all it saves the Soviets the trouble of giving endless economic aid to those countries like they give to Cuba.

Bibliography

Books:

1. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).
2. Milene Charles, The Soviet Union and Africa, (Lanham, Md.: The University Press of America, 1980).
3. Warren Weinstein and Thamas H. Henriksen, ed., Soviet and Chinese aid to African Nations. (New York: Praeger Pub., 1980).
4. Roger E. Kanet, ed, The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations. (Baltimore, Md: John Hopkins University Press, 1974).
5. Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).
6. Charles B. McLane, Soviet African Relations. (London: Asian Research Institute, 1974).
7. Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1976).
8. Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
9. Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, ed, Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975).
10. Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968).
11. Richard F. Rosser, An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
12. Joseph L. Nogee, ed, Man State and Society in the Soviet Union. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).
13. Thomas P. Thorton, ed., The Third World in Soviet Perspective. (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).
14. Robert H. Donaldson, The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failures. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980).
15. John D. Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

16. Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy. (Baltimore, Md., John Hopkins Press, 1969).
17. Robert E. Harkavy, Arms Trade and International Systems. (Camb., Mass.: Ballinger, 1975).
18. Uri Ra'anan, The U.S.S.R. Arms the Third World. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969).
19. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World. (New York: Praeger, 1975).
20. Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa. (New York: Praeger, 1969).
21. C.G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy. (Glasgow: Macelhose, 1972).
22. A. Iskenderov, Africa: Politics, Economy and Ideology. (Moscow, 1972).
23. Z. Brezezinski, ed, Africa and the Communist World. (Stanford, Ca., 1963).
24. Arthur J. Klinghoffer, Soviet Perspective on African Socialism. (Madison, Wisconsin, 1969).
25. Glen Alden Smith, Soviet Foreign Trade: Organization, Operation and Policy 1918-1971. (New York, 1973).
26. James Richard Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid. (New York, 1969).
27. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West. (New York: The New American Library, 1960).
28. Eric P. Hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron Jr. ed, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. (New York: Aldine Pub. Co., 1980).

Journals and Documents:

1. Revoliutsionnyi Vostok, 1934, no.4, pp.256-260.
2. Ivan Potekhin, "Stalin's Theory of Colonial Revolution and the National Liberation Movement in Tropical and South Africa" Sovetskaiia, 1950, no.1.
3. Voprosy Istorii, vol. 10, 1954, pp.170-172.

4. Pravda, August 26, 1960, pp.3-4. Also, see various dates.
5. Kommunist, no. 8, May 1961, pp.34-48 and various dates.
6. New Times, (Supplement), no.52 (1963) pp.42 & 45 and other issues.
7. Narody Azii i Afriki, no.6, (November - December 1968) p. 14 and various volumes.
8. Mizan, VII (October 1965) p.6 and various volumes.
9. SSSR i strany Afriki, Institute Afriki Moscow (1977) pp.257 & 261.
10. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) The Arms Trade with the Third World. Various Years.
11. U.S., CIA Bulletin, Communist Aid to the Developing Nations of the Third World. 1975 - 1979.
12. U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. Various years
13. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy? 95th Congress, 1st Session 1977. Committee Print pp.2 & 4. Also, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, p.36.
14. U.S., Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Communist Economic Offensive Through 1964, Research Memo.RSB-65, August 4, 1965, p.6.
15. ACDA, International Transfer of Conventional Arms, table II p.A9 and table III, pp.A11-A14.
16. Foreign Affairs, (Fall 1979), pp.486-514.
17. African Affairs, (Journal of the Royal African Society) Vol. 75, pp137-151.
18. AF Press Clips, (Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, April 17, 1981, XVI No.16.
19. African Research Bulletin, March 1976, pp.3961-3971.
20. African Contemporary Records, 1975-1979, Various pages.
21. Daily Times of Nigeria, January 21, 1970, p.3
22. International Affairs, (London).
23. International Affairs, (Moscow).
24. Financial Times of London. Various dates.