

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1922

A Thesis

Presented to

**the Faculty of the Department of History
University of Houston**

In Partial Fulfillment

**of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts**

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Len Hunt Tucker

June, 1954

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ABSTRACT

The Washington Conference of 1922 was the first general conference of World Powers ever held in the United States. It marked our participation in international affairs as a world Power of the first rank. Its aims were two-fold: to bring about a limitation of armaments on the part of the principal Allied and Associated Powers; and to solve Pacific and Far Eastern problems by a concerted effort on the part of nine nations, including the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, China, The Netherlands, and Portugal. Actually, then, the Conference had two parts, the Arms Parley, and the Pacific and Far Eastern Conference. The Conference began with high hopes and great anticipation; and, immediately the audacious American proposal was presented, to the astonishment of the delegates. This plan provided for a ten year naval holiday and the limitation of capital ship tonnage in the 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 ratio, with the United States and Great Britain occupying the higher position of parity, Italy and France assuming the lower position of parity, and Japan taking the "3" position. Then the delegates settled down to a vast welter of statements, claims, negotiations, concessions, demands, and adjustments. For twelve weeks, the meeting continued; but on February 6, 1922, the Conference closed, having produced seven treaties. The three most

important treaties were: the Five Power Naval Treaty, signed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, limitating naval armament; the Four Power Pact providing mutual guarantees on the part of the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan to respect their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific, and providing for conferences in case questions should arise; and the Nine Power Pact, signed by the United States, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal, relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China. The Four Power Pact was accompanied by a Declaration in regard to Mandated Islands, and a Supplementary Treaty defining the term "insular possessions and dominions". The Nine Powers signed the Chinese Tariff Treaty; the Five Powers signed a treaty in regard to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare. In addition, agreements were reached on the Shantung question and the Yap question at this time.

The purpose of this thesis, then, has been to relate the story of the Conference, including in that story a brief discussion of previous efforts to limit armaments and the ominous circumstances leading up to the calling of the Conference; a short survey of the personnel, procedure, and program of the Conference; and finally, after discussing the work of the Conference in detail, to present an evaluation of the Conference, both from a contemporary standpoint and from the vantage point of the present time.

Much time has been spent searching for material.

Official records, Senate Documents and the Congressional Record have been perused; contemporary books and periodicals of the period have been studied; newspaper files have been read with care. In this thirty-second year (1954) since the Conference, it has been possible to view its events and circumstances more objectively than the writers in the days immediately following the Conference were able to do.

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CHAPTER I

The Background of the Conference

The Washington Conference of 1921-1922 was the first general conference of World Powers ever held in the United States, but the idea of limiting armaments did not originate with the United States alone, nor at this particular time.¹ "The Truce of God" (1025, A. D.) represents one of the first historical attempts to get along with smaller armaments and less fighting. Its terms affected individuals, families, and similar small units of the population, all of whom, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Europe, were accustomed to go armed to the teeth. The "Truce" provided that the general feuds should end between Saturday evening and Monday morning.²

According to Haydn's Dictionary of Dates,

The clergy strongly exerted their influence for this purpose. A synod at Rousillon, 1027, decreed that none should attack his enemy between Saturday evening and Monday morning. Similar regulations were adopted in England, 1042, although sometimes Friday and Wednesday were chosen for the time. The Truce of God was confirmed by many Councils of the Church.

Even though a high degree of armament continued among small groups for many centuries, the limitation of

¹Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922), p. vii.

²"Truce of God", Encyclopaedia Britannica, (Chicago: The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, Ltd. 1940), Vol. 22, p. 506.

armaments idea was thus introduced.³

Less successful was the attempt made on the "Field of the cloth of Gold", the name given to the place between Guines and Andres, France, where Henry VII of England met Frances I of France in June, 1520. The notables wore medales consisting largely of the figure of a lamb as a token of peace, and the meeting was planned to inaugurate an era of peace and Christian brotherhood. Thomas Wolsey, British Cardinal and statesman, made the elaborate arrangements for the meeting of the two monarchs and their great retinues. This meeting, which lasted from the seventh to the twenty-fourth of June, made a great impression on their contemporaries, but its political results were small.⁴

As early as 1713, Charles Irenes de Saint-Pierre, French religious and political leader, formed a plan for the federation of states which would make it possible for the members of the federation to decrease their military expenses.⁵

The Congress of Vienna, of 1814-15, included programs for the limitation of armament in its agenda but none of the

³"Former Conferences That Failed--and Succeeded", The Literary Digest, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company), November 12, 1921, p. 44.

⁴"Field of Cloth of Gold," The Encyclopedia Americana (New York: The Americana Corporation, 1946), Vol. 9, p. 102.

⁵Yomato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After, (California: Stanford University Press, 1925), p. 3.

proposals progressed beyond the discussion stage.⁶

In 1817 the United States and Great Britain, by the Rush-Bagot agreement, provided for complete disarmament on the Great Lakes boundary with Canada. Under the treaty of January 11, 1909, between Great Britain and the United States, an International Joint Commission of three Americans and three Canadians was charged with the adjustment and settlement of international questions along the frontier.⁷

A series of attempts to perfect similar arrangements among the countries of South America, both with and without the cooperation of the United States, followed the promulgation of the Canadian agreement. Conferences were held in Panama in 1824, at Lima in 1848, at Santiago in 1856, in the City of Mexico in 1901, and Buenos Aires in 1910. At most of these conferences stress was put upon arbitration, especially compulsory arbitration, rather than limitation of armaments, and such results as were obtained had to do with such minor matters as extradition.⁸

After wars between Chile and Argentina had been

⁶"Former Conferences That Failed--and Succeeded", op. cit., p. 44.

⁷Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935), pp. 172-173, 169.

⁸"Former Conferences That Failed--and Succeeded", op. cit., p. 46.

averted by resort to arbitration, these countries, in 1902, signed five-year treaties agreeing to submit all controversies to arbitration, reduce armies to police proportions, halt naval building programs, and diminish existing naval armaments.⁹

Europe, in the meantime, had made two ambitious and unsuccessful attempts at disarmament. The First Hague Conference, called by the Czar Nicholas II of Russia in 1899, was intended to put an end to the incessant armaments, and to seek the means of warding off calamities which threatened the whole world. It was officially proposed as a "Conference on Disarmament," but its title was afterward changed to "Peace Conference."

The first item on the accepted program was the discussion of an understanding stipulating the non-increase for a definite period of military and naval forces and the budgets pertaining to them. However, the Military Committee on the Conference reported that it would be very difficult to regulate the elements of defense organized in each country according to different views. As a consequence of this difficulty, the Committee regretted not to be able to accept the proposition of the Russian government.¹⁰

⁹"A Catechism of the Conference," The Literary Digest, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company), November 12, 1921. p. 25.

¹⁰"Former Conferences That Failed--and Succeeded," op. cit., pp. 46-47.

The Second Hague Conference in 1907 expressly barred questions which might concern the limitation of naval or military forces. Great Britain and the United States, however, reserved the right to bring up the subject, and did so at one session, whereupon the Conference merely reaffirmed and emphasized the resolutions of the First Hague Conference of 1899. At this Second Conference, the British delegates offered to exchange information concerning government plans of constructing warships and expenditures involved, in order to facilitate exchange of views on reductions which might be affected later.¹¹

The League of Nations provisions have much to say on the subject of disarmament; and, by the treaties which concluded World War I, the victorious powers reduced to a minimum the military forces of their former adversaries.¹² Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations disclosed that the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and, in accordance with this, the Council of the League created a special machinery for armament limitation, the Permanent Advisory Armaments Commission.

¹¹"Former Conferences That Failed--and Succeeded," loc. cit.

¹²Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, Austria by the Treaty of St. Germaine, Bulgaria by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, and Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon.

The Permanent Advisory Commission, organized in May, 1920, was limited to three delegates from each member nation representing the army, navy and air services, accompanied by expert advisers. A Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armament was authorized to study the political, social and economic, as distinguished from the technical aspects of disarmament. This Temporary Mixed Commission met at Paris in July, 1921.

Reports were to be made at the League Assembly meeting at Geneva in September, 1921. The formal recommendation of the Temporary Mixed Commission to the Assembly contemplated an approach to disarmament by three stages; first, a pledge by the powers to make no increase in armament; second, a gradual reduction; third, general and complete disarmament, retaining only what was needed for police purposes.

Shortly before the July meeting of the Mixed Armament Commission of the League in Paris, the possibility of a Washington meeting became known. Many advocates of the League in America advocated a working agreement between the Mixed Armament Commission of the League and the Washington Conference. It was believed that the results of the work of the Mixed Commission would be of great service to the governments meeting in Washington.¹³

¹³"Former Conferences That Failed--and Succeeded,"
op. cit., pp. 49-50.

By 1921, however, neither the activities of the League nor pre-war international attempts had been able to make any appreciable accomplishments toward disarmament. Instead, the victorious powers, especially the United States, Japan and the British Empire, entered into a great naval race, and France greatly increased her military strength. Naval expenditures in the United States were increased from \$155,029,000 for 1915-16 to \$1,268,000,000 for 1917-18; and in 1919 America embarked on a new three year's plan designed to make its navy second to none. In 1919 Japan decided to build eight battleships and six dreadnoughts; and in April, 1921, she decided to carry out the original "eight-eight" plan of 1914, which had been given up in 1916 for financial reasons. The first of the "Hood" class had been laid down in 1917, but by 1921 she had three more ships of this type under construction. These greatly increased expenditures caused the nationals of these countries to stagger under the growing burden of taxation.¹⁴

In order to understand these gigantic naval and military programs, it is necessary to sketch the events which led up to them. The principal facts in the naval situation preceding World War I were the long established British

¹⁴Ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 4-6.

mastery of the seas and the German challenge to that supremacy.¹⁵ The doctrine of the necessity of naval supremacy was deeply rooted in the psychology of the British people, but with the passage of the first German Naval Act in 1898, Germany began an ambitious naval program which would endanger the British position. This Anglo-German competition, rationalized for the alleged purpose of safeguarding trade, was heightened by Great Britain's laying down of the Dreadnought, or all-big-gun ship, in 1905. This rendered obsolete the pre-Dreadnought battle-ships, thus cleaning the slate of previous capital ships and giving Germany a fresh start on an equal basis.¹⁶

Britain's position of uneasiness was made more tense by the fact that she was not only engaged in the Boer War, but was also in conflict with Russian interests in the Near East in Asia, and with French interests in Europe and Africa. Furthermore, Britain desired to preserve the territorial integrity of the remainder of China and the Open Door there which Secretary of State John Hay had promulgated in 1899.¹⁷ Since she apparently had few friends, Britain looked about for an ally; when neither the United States, Germany nor

¹⁵Benjamin H. Williams, The United States and Disarmament, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1931) p. 126

¹⁶Hector Bywater: Navies and Nations, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927), p. 126.

¹⁷Bemis, op. cit., pp. 484-486.

Russia would make definite commitments, Britain turned to another country, who, like herself, needed an ally, Japan.

In Asia, Japan was confronted with Russia, who was already established in the Liaotung Peninsula, and was building with French funds a railroad south across Manchuria to a naval base at Port Arthur.¹⁸ After the Sino-Japanese War Japan considered supposedly independent Korea as her preserve and looked beyond it toward Manchuria. On the other hand, Russia considered Manchuria her preserve, and looked beyond it to Korea. Behind their immediate rivalry for Korea and Manchuria was the greater ambition for the domination of all China.²⁰

The parallel situation of both Great Britain and Japan led to the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. This treaty pledged Japan and Britain to the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East with emphasis on maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations. They disavowed aggressive tendencies in China and Korea, but recognized the right of either ally to take measures that would safeguard its existing interests. In case either country should become

¹⁸Bemis, op. cit., p. 423.

¹⁹Bemis, op. cit., pp. 409-490.

involved in war in defense of its interests the other country would remain neutral, but would come to the defense of its ally in case the enemy were joined by another country. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to remain in force for at least five years.²⁰

Before the first five years had elapsed, Great Britain had come to an agreement with France in Morocco, Egypt and other parts of the world by the Entente of 1904, and had ended the Boer War. Japan was now at war with Russia. Thus the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1905 for a period of ten years was motivated not only by the continuing menace of the rising German navy, but also protection against Russian expansion.²¹

The object of the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance was stated as follows:

- (a). The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of eastern Asia and of India.
- (b). The preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by respecting the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for commerce and industry of all nations in China.
- (c). The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special

²⁰Walter Consuelo Langsam, The World Since 1914, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1940), p. 22.

²¹Bemis, op. cit., p. 490.

interests in said regions.²²

Great Britain agreed to join Japan in the war on Russia in case Russia was joined by another party. Furthermore, if, by reason of any provoked or aggressive action, either Japan or Britain should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights in the regions of Eastern Asia, the other party would come at once to the defense of its ally. Britain recognized a free hand for Japan in Korea, subject to the maintenance of the Open Door there, and Japan gave to Britain a free hand to overcome Chinese strength in Thibet. As a result of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was able to concentrate her sea power in Pacific waters. At the same time, Japan pledged herself to observe the Open Door in Korea, and in China.

In 1904 England made a political agreement with France which paved the way for the redistribution of naval forces in 1912. The French Erest Fleet was transferred to the Mediterranean, while the British withdrew most of the Mediterranean squadron

²²Loc. cit.

²³The Russo-Japanese War was concluded by the Treaty of Portsmouth, negotiated through the "good offices" of President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. This treaty, which definitely established Japan as a world power, required both countries to evacuate Manchuria and to restore it to the administration of China, except the Russian leasehold with all concessions in Liaotung, which was transferred completely to Japan; Russia to cede the southern half of Sakhalin Islands to Japan; and Russia to recognize the predominant political, military and economic interests of Japan in Korea, and not to interfere with them in any way.

to the North Sea, thus placing a moral obligation on Great Britain to defend the North Sea and Atlantic Coast of France in return for the protection of British Mediterranean interests by the French fleet.²⁴ In 1912 an attempt to end the dangerous competition by direct diplomatic conversation failed.²⁵ Two years later came the Great War, and British naval supremacy was a considerable factor in the result.

In the meantime, the American navy had developed slowly, but growing commerce and increased participation in world affairs were reflected in an enlarged tonnage. The controversy with Great Britain over the Venezuelan boundary in 1896 emphasized the naval weakness of the United States, and gave a stimulus to the sentiment for a larger navy. The war with Spain brought the exploits of navy men to the attention of the American people. Accordingly, the 1916 program enacted by Congress provided for ten battleships, each armed with twelve 16-inch guns, and six battle cruisers, armed with eight 16-inch guns and capable of 34-knot speed, ten scout cruisers, 110 smaller combat craft, and several other auxiliary vessels. The Act of 1916 would have given the United States a great preponderance in heavy ships. The 1916 program was not completed because of the Washington Conference. It was

²⁴Williams, op. cit., p. 129.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 130-132.

highly significant, however, because for the first time since the Napoleonic Wars the British Navy was threatened with a position of inferiority.

In spite of the fact that the Naval Service Appropriation Act of 1916 was not carried out, it had its effect on England and Japan. At the close of the war, Great Britain had forty-five capital ships, as against not more than forty ships of equivalent power in other navies.²⁶ Nevertheless, the British Admiralty laid plans for a capital ship which would have 37,000 tons displacement and would be armed with eight 18-inch guns.²⁷

Great Britain's concern over growing American naval strength was shared by Japan, who considered that the United States had stood in the way of her expansionist ambitions in China and Siberia.²⁸

Japan was alarmed over United States' annexation of Hawaii in 1898, not only because it represented the advance of the United States into the Pacific, but also on the grounds that it might jeopardize the rights of Japanese residents in Hawaii. The number of Japanese in the islands equalled the combined total of Europeans and Americans. However, after some correspondence, Japan withdrew her protest to the amendment,

²⁶Bywater, op. cit., p. 113

²⁷Ibid., p. 29

²⁸Bemis, op. cit., p. 694.

and the Hawaiian Islands were formally annexed to the United States in 1899, and Guam by the treaty of peace with Spain in the same year. Guam was taken for a possible naval base and coaling station; Wake Island and the Midways (which had been annexed in 1867) were of importance as possible landing places for aerial navigation south and west of the Hawaiian group.²⁹

Further tensions were created by the feeling that had risen in Japan because of legislation in the United States concerning oriental immigration and alien land ownership. Oriental immigration to the United States had begun with the American settlement of the Pacific Coast after the acquisition of California. The comparatively higher wages attracted such large numbers of Chinese laborers that a serious social, legal, and economic problem soon developed. After much negotiation and legislation, in 1904 Chinese exclusion laws were extended to Hawaii and the Philippines. Since then, the Chinese population within the United States had decreased and, since 1900, the Japanese had replaced the Chinese as a factor in the problem of oriental immigration.³⁰

²⁹Bemis, op. cit., pp. 459-462.

³⁰Ibid., p. 672.

The treaty of 1894 between Japan and the United States allowed, reciprocally, free entry, regardless of purpose, but reserved for domestic control the regulation of immigrant laborers, as well as trade or security. The Japanese government fended off statutory exclusion (such as existed between the United States and China) by itself withholding passports, after 1900, to labor immigrants going to the mainland of the United States but not to those going to Hawaii. Thus Japanese laborers entered the United States by way of Hawaii, as well as through Canada and Mexico. Because of the large number of admissions, and the low living standards of the Japanese, which enabled them to work more cheaply than American laborers, a serious situation in regard to the admission of Japanese immigrants developed on the Pacific Coast.

In October, 1906, the San Francisco school board ordered that all Japanese children attend a school in which oriental children were segregated. Japan quickly protested this act as a violation of most-favored-nation treatment under which her people in the United States enjoyed treaty guaranties. President Roosevelt persuaded the school board to rescind this act on the understanding that he would halt Japanese immigration; this he did by using an amendment hastily added to the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, which authorized the President to refuse entrance to the United States to immigrants with passports to any other country than to the United States.

This was effected under an understanding--the "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1907--that Japan would not object to this restriction of Japanese immigration, and that Japan would not issue passports to laborers wishing to emigrate to the United States, except returning immigrants, and except parents, wives, and children under twenty years, of emigrants already established in the United States.³¹

In the following year, President Roosevelt, who felt that his sympathetic handling of the Japanese immigration was regarded by Japan as due to fear on the part of America, sent the American battleship fleet on a cruise around the world, as a naval demonstration that the United States was not only willing to negotiate a friendly settlement, but ready and willing to defend such a settlement if necessary. At Japanese invitation, the fleet visited Yokohama and was cordially entertained there.³² It was on this cruise around the world that American sailors introduced the American game of baseball to the Japanese sailors and civilians.³³

The "Gentleman's Agreement" solved fairly well the problem of immigration, but it did not solve the problem of the Japanese already in the United States. They were

³¹Ibid., p. 674

³²Ibid., p. 675

³³Memorandum of Conference on Limitation of Armament, (Houston: Rein Printing Company, 1921), Not Paginated.

superior workers and savers, and quickly established a dominance in agricultural localities. They found difficulties in assimilating themselves into American society, and tended to stick together. Furthermore, even those born in the United States continued by Japanese law to owe allegiance to their Emperor until after they had done military service for him.³⁴

To solve these economic and social aspects of Japanese immigration, many of the western states, beginning with California, passed laws which denied to alien residents ineligible for citizenship (i.e., oriental aliens) the right to own, and even to lease land, directly or indirectly for agricultural purposes. Japan's protest against such laws was ineffectual because technically they did not violate a treaty, and Japan herself had argued before the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration (in the Japanese House Case), that a sovereign power has the right to make all reservations concerning the land situated within its territory; and she herself then had laws which prohibited the owning or leasing of land by foreigners for agricultural purposes.³⁵

Nevertheless, the spirit of a proud people was rankled, and Japan's concern over the relation of American policy in the Far East to Japanese ambitions on the continent

³⁴Bemis, op. cit., p. 676.

³⁵Ibid., p. 677.

of Asia, aggravated by the problems of oriental immigration and alien land ownership, did little to soothe the wounded national pride.

Mounting tensions between the two nations are evidenced in the agreements that were drawn up over a period of years: the Taft-Katsura Memorandum of 1905; the Root-Takahira Understanding of 1908; and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917.

The Taft-Katsura Memorandum had no constitutional force binding upon the United States; but President Theodore Roosevelt, speaking through Secretary of War William H. Taft, approved a free hand for Japan in Korea, and Count Katsura, the Premier of Japan, disavowed any aggressive designs whatsoever in the Philippines.³⁶

The Root-Takahira Understanding, which was reached after the cruise of the American fleet around the world in 1907, supplemented the earlier Taft-Katsura Memorandum. The United States and Japan declared themselves to be free of all aggressive tendencies in maintaining the status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean; resolved to respect the territorial possessions of each other in that region; and determined to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting the independence and integrity of China and the

³⁶Ibid., pp. 493-496.

opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations within China.³⁷

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 was embodied in a public exchange of notes on November 2, 1917, in which each country made nominal concessions to the other's position, but sought cover for its own policy. The United States recognized that Japan had "special" interests in China created by propinquity, at the same time that both the United States and Japan pledged to respect and maintain the territorial integrity of China. American interests interpreted Japan's "special" interests in China to be only those created by propinquity, while Japan quickly translated special interests to mean "paramount" interests.³⁸ Tensions of Japanese-American relations, punctuated by the Gentleman's Agreement, Taft-Katsura Memorandum, Root-Takahira Understanding and the Lansing-Ishii Notes, continued to mount.³⁹

In July, 1920, the Japanese Parliament adopted the long-anticipated eight-eight program in full, providing for a two-squadron fleet, each to consist of eight capital ships to be replaced every eight years. This would increase the naval

³⁷Ibid., pp. 495-496.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 688-699.

³⁹Hector Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), pp. 23-61.

expenditure to \$4,000,000,000 by 1927. Thus, in spite of the fact that Japan's population was one half that of the United States, the Japanese government planned to spend as much money on its navy as was being spent in the United States for that purpose.⁴⁰

Japanese opinion had regarded the American occupation of the Philippine Islands in the nature of a threat, as some Americans had regarded a Japanese commercial project in Magdalena Bay.⁴¹ The prospect of an enormous increase in the American fleet, combined with possible powerful bases in Guam, and the Philippines, led the Japanese hierarchy to suspect that the United States intended to challenge its position in Asia.

The comparative force of the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan stood in 1921, anticipating building programs to 1924, as follows:

⁴⁰Duell, op. cit., pp. 137-142.

⁴¹Williams, op. cit., p. 138.

CAPITAL SHIPS, BUILT AND BUILDING 1921⁴²

21

	1921	1924
United States:		
Ships	17	33
Displacement, tons	467,250	1,117,850
Guns	188	340
Foot tons energy	11,989,176	28,597,176
Great Britain:		
Ships	32	32
Displacement, tons	808,200	808,200
Guns	284	284
Foot tons energy	19,080,000	19,080,000
Japan:		
Ships	11	11
Displacement, tons	319,140	543,140
Guns	108	164
Foot tons energy	7,480,000	13,415,000

England was unable at the moment to answer the American challenge to her supremacy of the seas. Her finances did not permit her to engage in a new armament race; the problems of the Atlantic had been solved by the European War and the problems of the Pacific were not so important to her. Therefore, in 1920, the British admiralty announced its policy of a one-power, rather than a two-power, standard--a navy as large as, but not larger than, the navy of any other nation.⁴³

However, the people of the British Dominions also had

⁴²This table is taken from Buell's The Washington Conference, p. 143.

⁴³Buell, op. cit., p. 142.

their problems regarding oriental immigration. They were not only concerned over the Japanese-American tensions, but feared the effect of a possible war on themselves. Canada was in a critical position, in view of the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been renewed in 1911 for a ten year period. This alliance called for either party to fight with the other party in case the interests of either in the Far East should be endangered, but it contained a clause to the effect that it should not apply to powers with which either party had a general treaty of arbitration. President William H. Taft negotiated such a treaty in 1911, but the Senate did not ratify it. Hence, in case of a war, Canada might be called upon to bear arms against the United States.

Accordingly, at the Imperial Conference in London in 1921, the Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighan insisted on guarding against any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which would cause Canada to break either with the United States or the new British Commonwealth of Nations. This insistence brought to a focus the whole group of issues regarding Anglo-American and Anglo-Japanese policy, the status of the Far East, the question of the Pacific, and the rivalry of naval armaments. The British government was considering a conference of interested parties to settle these issues when it learned of the intention of the United States to propose such a conference.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Denis, op. cit., pp. 695-696.

In the 1920 session of Congress, Senator William E. Borah suggested that an international conference be held for the purpose of discussing armament questions.⁴⁵ In the 1921 session he offered an amendment to the Naval Bill, as follows:

The President is authorized and requested to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval building programs of each of said Governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, shall be substantially reduced during the next five years to such an extent and such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agreement is to be reported to the respective Governments for approval.⁴⁶

The Naval Bill, so amended, was passed by the Senate in May and by the House in June, and was approved by President Warren G. Harding on July 12, 1921.⁴⁷

In accordance with this bill, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, on the direction of President Harding, issued a formal inquiry on July 8 to the group of powers known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers--Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan--to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on the subject of limitation of armaments to be held in Washington

⁴⁵Williams, op. cit., pp. 133-139.

⁴⁶Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, Vol. LX, Part 3, p. 3740.

⁴⁷U. S. Senate Document, 66th Congress, 3d Session, XV, p. 233.

at a time to be agreed upon. It was suggested that since the question of limitation of armaments had a close relation to the problems of the Far East and the Pacific, the powers especially concerned should undertake consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution.⁴⁸ The formal invitations to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers bear the date August 11, 1921. Belgium, China, Netherlands and Portugal were invited to participate in the deliberation of the Conference on Pacific and Far Eastern questions. The invitation to China was issued on August 11, 1921; the invitations to Belgium, Holland and Portugal were issued on October 4, 1921.⁴⁹

The White House Communiqué of July 10, announcing the plans for the proposed conference, was received enthusiastically and unanimously by the American public. Its reception abroad was neither unanimous nor enthusiastic, except in England. So many international conferences had been held since the end of World War I that the European public paid little attention to them. Moreover, the conferences were not always productive of lasting results; and the European public paid little attention to them because they could not reconcile the American enthusiasm

⁴⁸Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 783.

⁴⁹Ichihasi, op. cit., p. 11.

over this particular conference with American failure to associate herself with either of the two special commissions on disarmament which existed under the League of Nations. Thus there was little public confidence or enthusiasm for the American proposal.

However, it was reported from Rome on the 13th of July that Italy had officially accepted Mr. Harding's invitation. The President's invitation was received with real favor by France, and on July 12, Premier Aristide Briand submitted his acceptance to the Parliament.

The Japanese reaction was skeptical, since the combination of armament limitation and Far East and Pacific problems seemed to them illogical. Consequently, Premier Tokashi Hara gave an interview to the press on July 14, in which he said that it was impossible to say much with regard to the proposed conference, as it involved not only the armaments question, on which public opinion of Japan was entirely in accord with that of America, but also many other points requiring careful consideration by the Japanese government. The Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States held informal interviews, with the result that the Japanese note of acceptance was received by the American government on July 29.⁵⁰

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 13-23.

On November 12, 1921, delegates from the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, China, Holland, Belgium and Portugal met in Washington in the first plenary session of the Conference.⁵¹

⁵¹Williams, op. cit., p. 139.

CHAPTER II

The Personnel of the Conference

Lawyers and statesmen with legal training and authorities on international law so largely dominated the conference that future historians, who may find the official title The Conference on Limitation of Armament and Far Eastern Questions too lengthy, may be justified in calling it The Lawyer's Conference.¹ Most of the representatives of the nations had training as counselors at law. A review of the thirty-two delegates who headed the delegations representing the chief nations reveals a selected group of the most famous statesmen of the day, most of whom had built their achievements in the legal profession. Fewer than half a dozen were professional diplomats, and the remainder were scattered among many professions. A prince, an admiral, a railway director, a labor leader, a surgeon, a social worker, an editor and a military authority were among the delegates. A group of experts accompanied each delegation to make up the complete delegation.²

The American delegation was made up of three lawyers, Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, Oscar W. Underwood, and on

¹"Who's Who at the Conference", The Literary Digest, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, November 12, 1921), p. 37.

²Ibid., p. 33.

member, Henry Cabot Lodge, who was admitted to the bar. This delegation, working under the close supervision of President Harding was looked upon as the mainspring of the Conference. The leader of the delegation was Secretary of State Hughes. A former governor of New York and candidate for the presidency of the United States, he had long been considered one of the ablest men in public life. Cyril Arthur Player says of him:

This man casts a big shadow; when the sun is in the right place, his shadow stretches from his office in the State, War and Navy Building clear across the grounds of the White House, envelops the executive mansion and touches the Treasury Building beyond.

When you talk with representatives of the foreign delegations in Washington, and mention Hughes, they look thoughtful, with some you can almost see the mental doffing of the hat. None is disposed to underestimate the force and precision of a man who has shown himself so ready to talk right out in the meeting, and is in a position where he may do it unchecked; a man who has the courage to claim principles and having claimed them to stick by them and fight for them.³

Mr. Lodge, scholar and statesman and member of a distinguished Boston family, had served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives before coming to Washington. He entered the House of Representatives in Washington and then the Senate, where he later became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In 1879 he had edited the International Review, and had set himself to be a student of foreign relations. In his capacity as Senate Foreign Relations Chairman,

³Cyril Arthur Player, Arms--and The Men (Detroit News Reprints, 1922), p. 10.

of the Republican Party in the Senate--a powerful figure of such responsibility. Long the bitter opponent of America's entry into the League of Nations, Lodge had directed his enmity against Woodrow Wilson and the League; hence, his appointment by Harding as a delegate to the Conference was considered an astute move.⁴

Root, elder statesman, and, like Lodge and Hughes, a member of the Republican party, was a remarkably brilliant man who had devoted his highest capacity to the art of compromise, on the basis that a clever lawyer can always make compromise into a victory if he serves his client well.⁵ He had grown up in that international movement which saw its birth at The Hague. He had served as Secretary of State; he had been a senator; he had headed important commissions; he had stood high in the regard of many countries, and his own had honored him conspicuously.⁶ Only three years younger than his crony, Arthur James Balfour, the two old men frequently emerged together from their neighboring apartments and came to the Conference together. Balfour was completely British in his thinking; Root had the international mind but he trained his international mind

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Ibid., p. 16.

⁶Mark Sullivan, "America's Delegates to the Conference", World's Work, December, 1921, pp. 181-187.

in Balfour's British school.⁷

Underwood was the only Democrat in the American delegation. Lawyer and politician, he was a member of the Fifty-fourth to Sixty-third Congresses (1895-1915). He was remembered chiefly for the Underwood Tariff Act and for his astute work as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. He was recognized as an able party leader.⁸

Thus America's spokesmen, all trained in the theory and practice of jurisprudence, were allocated by the New York Tribune:

Mr. Hughes represents the Administration. Mr. Lodge and Mr. Underwood represent the Senate and the two party groups in it, the former being the majority leader and the latter the minority leader. Mr. Root represents the public, and, more especially, that body of intelligent opinion striving for a fuller enforcement of international law and for larger international cooperation, which has long looked to him for leadership.⁹

The Belgian delegate was Baron E. de Cartier de Marchienne, Ambassador to the United States since 1919. He had been engaged in diplomatic work since 1893 in Vienna, Belgrade, Tokyo, Rio de Janeiro, Paris and London. He was

⁷Ibid., p. 16.

⁸Ibid., p. 20

⁹"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 37.

Belgian Minister to Peking in 1910.¹⁰ One of his country's foremost figures in foreign relations, he was a member of the Supreme economic Council of the Peace Conference and represented Belgium on the Inter-Allied Commission on Repatriations. Married to an American girl, the Belgian envoy and his wife were the center of an important and interesting circle in Washington.¹¹

The Right Honorable Arthur J. Balfour headed the British delegation. He was greatly interested in educational work, especially in the Scottish universities. The most important of his many offices had been those of Secretary for Scotland, Chief Secretary for Ireland, Prime Minister, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Lord President of the Council since 1919. One of the greatest living Britons of his day, he was recognized as the most astute gentleman, as far as statecraft was concerned, at the Conference--calm in crisis and composed in victory.

Lord Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the British Admiralty, served in the Royal Artillery in his youth, and

¹⁰Ibid., p. 37.

¹¹Cyril Arthur Player, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

¹²"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 37.

became Professor of Strategy and Tactics in the Royal Military College, Canada. He was a British Military Attaché with the United States Army during the Spanish-American War. Among his parliamentary and military offices, he served in the Ministry of Munitions, as Personal Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Lloyd George, in 1916 and as Minister of Agriculture.¹³

Sir Robert Borden, representative of Canada at the Conference, served in the Canadian Parliament for many years and had been leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons since 1901. A former Prime Minister, he held to the "general principle that in foreign relations in which one or the other of the Dominions had a paramount interest, the view of the Dominion in question shall be not merely heard and considered, but shall prevail."¹⁴

George F. Pearce, Australian Minister for Defense and representative of Australia at the Conference, began life as a carpenter and joiner. His first public work was in organizing trade unions and political associations. He had headed various labor bodies and, since 1901, had been a member of the Australian Parliament.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., p. 33

¹⁴Loc. cit.

¹⁵Player, op. cit., pp. 34-36.

Brinivasa Sastri, representative of India at the Conference, achieved international fame when he was appointed to represent the people of India at the Imperial Conference in London in 1921. President of the Servants of India Society, an organization devoted chiefly to social and humanitarian work, he was considered the most prominent non-official leader of the Moderate Party in India, and had worked for the Advancement of Indian liberty along constitutional lines.¹⁶

John William Salmond, Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, represented that country at the Conference. Professor of Law at the Universities of Adelaide and Victoria, his political offices have been counsel to the Law Drafting Office of the New Zealand Government and Solicitor-General for New Zealand. His writings had been on legal history and jurisprudence.¹⁷

Sir Auckland Gosden, British Ambassador at Washington, was named to act as delegate in the absence of Prime Minister Lloyd George or of any other delegate. He was Professor of Anatomy at the Royal College of Surgeons, Dublin, and at McGill University in Montreal. He served in the European War in 1914-1916. Later he was made, successively, Minister of National

¹⁶Player, op. cit., pp. 3-32.

¹⁷"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 40.

Service, Minister of Reconstruction, President of the Local Government Board, and President of the Board of Trade.¹⁸

All of the Chinese delegates were graduates of American universities. Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Chinese Minister at Washington, graduated from Cornell in 1901. In 1902 he became secretary to Viceroy Chang Chi-Tung; in 1907, he became director of the Peking-Hankow Railway, and in later years he had held other railway directorships. He was one of the five Chinese delegates attending the Peace Conference at Versailles; he was Chinese Minister to London for five years. In spite of his western education and environment, he remained convincingly Chinese, understanding more of the living conditions in China, the sentiments and emotions of the four hundred million than any other Chinese at the Conference.¹⁹

V. K. Wellington Koo, former Chinese minister to the United States, was a graduate of Columbia University, where he was a member of the debating team and served as editor of the Columbia Spectator. He had served on every important Chinese commission since 1910--at twenty-one, he sat on the commission to settle claims arising from the Chinese Revolution. At thirty-three, he presided over the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva. Of impeccable educational background,

¹⁸"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁹Player, op. cit., pp. 43-45.

great brilliance of mind and strong personality, he combined the qualities of a politician and statesman in an effort to wring from the Conference China's opportunity to live.²⁰

Dr. Chung-Hei Wang, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at Peking, received the degree of Doctor of Civil Law from Yale Law School. His translation of the German Civil Code into English is considered the best translation that has ever been rendered.²¹ He served as delegate to the Second Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva and has been characterized as "one of the most promising intellectual leaders of the new era in China."²²

Dr. W. W. Yen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, graduated from the University of Virginia. He was a professor of English in St. John's University at Shanghai and English editor of the Commercial Press. He translated the Standard Chinese-English Dictionary and many other useful books. He had served as minister to Denmark and Germany. His family was said to be "perhaps the only one in China of which all the members received their education in England or America."²³

The French delegation was headed by Aristide Briand, seven times Prime Minister of France, who had served

²⁰Player, op. cit., pp. 45-47.

²¹Player, op. cit., pp. 47-49.

²²"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 42.

²³"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., pp. 41-42.

as a Member of the Chamber of Deputies, Minister of Public Instruction, Minister of Justice, President of the Council and Minister of the Interior. A persuasive orator, his genius was said to reside in his capacity to create the atmosphere in which the decisive vote had to be taken--and in his ability to snatch victory from defeat.²⁴

Rene Viviani, former Prime Minister of France, a Socialist as was Briand, had served in the Chamber of Deputies. He was an outstanding orator. In 1917 he came to America with the picturesque Joffre as his associate to bring the greetings of France on America's entry into World War I. He delivered an address to the Senate which caused Americans to call him the William Jennings Bryan of France.²⁵ His power as an orator had caused him to be known as the "eloquent voice of France".²⁶

Albert Sarrant, Minister of Colonies, had held the offices of General Counsel of the canton of Lezignon and the Under Secretary of State for the Interior. The author of historical studies on the referendum and plebiscite, his abilities as journalist and lawyer were not the main reason for his selection as third member of the French delegation to

²⁴Richard V. Oulahan, "Personnel of the Arms Conference", The New York Times Current History (New York: The New York Times Publishing Company, November, 1921), pp. 190-191.

²⁵Player, op. cit., pp. 55-57.

²⁶"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 40.

the Conference. He was chosen, rather, because he was an admirable link between the French and the twenty-five million people who made up the population of Indo-China.²⁷

Jules Jusserand, fourth member of the French delegation and Ambassador to the United States, had held diplomatic posts in London and Copenhagen. A noted French authority on English literature, he was Dean of the Ambassadors at Washington, having held his appointment since 1902.²⁸

The Italian delegation was made up of Carlo Schanzer, Luigi Albertini, and Vittorio Rolandi-Ricci.²⁹

Senator Schanzer, Italy's foremost financier-statesman, was also a genius in international law. A former Minister of the Treasury and Professor of Constitutional Law in the University of Naples, he had published many works of the jurisdictional nature. He was considered Italy's greatest authority on emigration problems.³⁰

Luigi Albertini, second member of the Italian delegation, was a practicing journalist, serving as editor of the Milan Corriere della Sera, one of Italy's most important newspapers. He was one of the chief promoters of Italy's

²⁷Player, op. cit., pp. 57-60.

²⁸Player, op. cit., pp. 60-62.

²⁹Player, op. cit., pp. 63-70.

³⁰Oulahan, op. cit., p. 193.

intervention in World War I, and now he asked for a peace worthy of it. His newspaper denounced the intolerance of the extremists and kept an open door of sympathy between Italy and the Central Powers.³¹

Rolandi-Ricci, who completed the Italian delegation, had spent forty years as a corporation lawyer and was an expert on financial affairs. He served as Italian representative to the International Finance Conference in Brussels. His desire to cement Italo-American commercial relations moved him to serve at the Conference.³²

The Japanese delegation consisted of Iyesato Takugawa, Tomasuro Kato, Kijuro Shidehara and Masano Hanihara.³³

Prince Takugawa was heir to the last of the Shoguns, President of the House of Peers, a democrat in his views and actions, a member of no political party and a student of international affairs. He was a fluent speaker of English.³⁴

Masano Kanihara, secretary general of the Japanese delegation, was one of the most diplomatic of the younger officials of the empire. He spent twelve years as an attaché of the Japanese Embassy at Washington and served as consul-

³¹Player, op. cit., p. 66.

³²"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., pp. 38-40.

³³"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 41.

³⁴Los. cit.

general at San Francisco. He had been a deep student of American affairs and spoke English fluently.³⁵

Admiral Kato, Minister of the Navy, was chosen to serve on the delegation because of his expert knowledge of the parts of the Pacific that would come under review, and because of his skilled diplomacy and his expert knowledge of English. The Japanese delegation had no ranking head but Kato was recognized as the dominant delegate of the Mikado to the Conference on Limitation of Armament and Far Eastern Questions.³⁶

Baron Shidehara, beginning his career as a graduate from the law college of Tokyo University, entered his country's diplomatic service to rise through a succession of appointments to reach the post of Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy at Washington in 1912. When the Japanese envoys to the Washington Conference were named, Baron Shidehara was the only one at whom no criticism was directed. No one in Japan or Washington seemed to have anything against him; all seemed to feel that his term as the Japanese Ambassador at Washington had proved him eminently fitted for a place among the envoys.

Holland was represented by Van Karnebeek, Van Elokland, and E. Aresco.

³⁵Cushman, op. cit., p. 192.

³⁶Player, op. cit., p. 74.

³⁷"Who's Who at the Conference", ib. cit., p. 40.

³⁸Player, op. cit., p. 42.

Jonkeheer Dr. H. A. Van Karnebeek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was at one time Mayor of The Hague. As Foreign Minister during World War I he stood adamant on Holland's traditional policy of neutrality. He was chosen as President of the first session of the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva.³⁹

Jonkeheer Dr. F. Beelert Van Blokland, Chief of the Department of Diplomatic Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, served as Holland's Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary at Peking.⁴⁰

Dr. E. Moreseo, formerly Secretary General of the Department of Colonial Affairs, was later appointed Vice-President of the Netherlands Indian Council.⁴¹

Portugal was represented by Viscount d'Alte and Ernesto De Vasconcellos.⁴² Viscount d'Alte had been Portugal's envoy to the United States for nineteen years. Portugal's second delegate, De Vasconcellos, was permanent secretary of the Geographical Society with its marvelous library and museum in Lisbon. His whole life had been devoted to the rich field

³⁹Player, op. cit., 82-85.

⁴⁰Oulahan, op. cit., p. 191.

⁴¹"Who's Who at the Conference", op. cit., p. 43.

⁴²Player, op. cit., p. 89.

of Portuguese discoveries, explorations, and cartography.⁴³

In addition to the official delegates, each of the nine countries--United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan the Netherlands and Portugal--sent a group of secretaries and advisers. Prominent among these was the American, John Work Garrett, who became secretary-general of the Armament Conference. Of a well-known Baltimore family, he had spent his life in diplomacy, having been eleven times *chargé d'affaires* at The Hague, seven times at Luxembourg, three times at Berlin and four times at Rome. He was the utility man of American diplomacy; whether as secretary, *chargé* or envoy, whether attending the National Irrigation Congresses, or the American-Russian sealing arbitration, or the arbitral tribunal in the Venezuelan preferential case or the Hospital Ship Conference, all of which had come within his experiences. His usefulness was held justly in high regard by the State Department.⁴⁴

Professor G. Camerlynch was officially attached to the French delegation but rapidly became the common property of the Conference and the public. He was the official interpreter. He was dubbed the Human Echo because he heard and registered every speech made at the Conference in both English and French, as was necessary. A language specialist at the

⁴³Player, op. cit., pp. 90-93.

⁴⁴Player, op. cit., pp. 94-97.

University of Paris, Professor Camerlynch was master of seven languages, irrespective of dialects. During World War I, he was interpreter at the front for French and British army officials. After that, he was attached to the Eighty-ninth American Infantry. After that, he was attached to the Supreme Council of the Allies, being promoted to official interpreter, attending the conferences in Paris, London, Spa and Geneva. Professor Camerlynch's activities at the Washington Conference included the recitation of the entire verbal story of the Convention, since he echoed every word uttered in plenary sessions and, when necessary, in committees. In addition, there was always someone who wanted something interpreted or translated, a telegram written or deciphered, or a press clipping quickly exposed.⁴⁵

The Belgian bankers, Felicien Catlier and Chevalier de Wouters d'Oplinter, represented banking interests in China.⁴⁶ Sir Maurice Hankey and Admiral Earl Beatty served as technical experts to assist the British delegates.⁴⁷

Besides the official delegations, there were unofficial personages of much importance in attendance at the Conference. Among these was Ma Soo, who represented the China outside the

⁴⁵Flayer, op. cit., pp. 97-99.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 99-103.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 103-109.

Conference, the Republic of the South, of which Dr. Sun Yat-sen was president. Ma Soo had no official position at the Conference, but his very presence gave emphasis to his two frequently reiterated demands: abrogation of the notorious twenty-one demands made by Japan (with which there was cordial sympathy--except from the Japanese); and the resignation of Dr. Hsu of Peking and the recognition of Dr. Sun, the only president of China legally elected (about this, there was less feeling, since it represented a domestic issue).⁴⁸

Outside the Conference there was another figure, Dr. Syngman Rhee, President of Korea, who, on the last day of 1921, presented the Conference with a petition asking for a hearing of the Korean question.⁴⁹ He had graduated from Harvard and had received his Ph.D. at Princeton under Woodrow Wilson. His representation of the Young Men's Christian Association in Korea had been abandoned because of Japanese obstruction; so he went to Hawaii and started the Korean Pacific Magazine.

In 1919 delegates from each of the thirteen provinces of Korea met in Seoul, framed a constitution creating a republic, and elected the first ministry; Syngman Rhee was unanimously chosen president. Simultaneously with the presentation of Korea's petition to the Conference, Korean students in Tokyo cabled a similar plea. A cablegram to the

⁴⁸Player, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

⁴⁹Player, op. cit., pp. 111-114.

Korean mission in Washington reported the arrest of twenty-six of the signers, but Dr. Rhee indicated that Koreans were willing to fight and to die for a kingdom that before August, 1910, had remained undivided for 1241 years. He told the story of the Russo-Japanese War, and Japan's need of a mainland base; he said that the Treaty of Portsmouth ended hostilities between Japan and Russia, but for Korea the war had never ended. Dr. Rhee pointed out:

Korea is the crux of the Far Eastern problem. he who has Korea, can, if he will, hold Asia, if he has the forces. He can sweep down through China at will. He can march up into Siberia. Neither Japan, nor China, nor Russia should hold Korea. She should be as she always was, independent. Her independence is the chief factor in the peace of the Far East.⁵⁰

Another personage of much prominence at the Conference was Lord George Allardice Riddell, the super-press agent of the British government. The owner of seventy periodical publications in Great Britain, his position as official spokesman had made him the focusing point of newsmen in Washington. In his two-a-day conferences, Lord Riddell served as liason officer between the delegation on the one side and the press on the other.

Another unofficial personage of much prominence at

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 112.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 114-117.

the Conference was Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, one of the most useful members of United States Senate. More than any other man, he brought about this Conference; he, more than any other man, got one hundred million dollars cut from the naval estimates.⁵²

Frequently in attendance at the plenary sessions was Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby. In a box directly over the forum Mrs. Warren G. Harding sat. Beside her sat Calvin Coolidge; near her sat the daughter of Theodore Roosevelt, Mrs. Nicholas Longworth. William Jennings Bryan was in constant attendance, as was William Allen White of Kansas. A solid phalanx of Senators sat in the section reserved for them. In the section reserved for the Supreme Court sat the venerable Oliver Wendell Holmes with Justice Brandeis close by.⁵³

The editor of the London Times, the editor of the Paris Matin, and the editor of the Shanghai Shun Pao sat in a group. Near them was H. G. Wells, British author of the Outline of History, who sat beside the editor of the Manchester Guardian. On the floor in direct contact with the delegates were the three hundred newspaper men, in their field as picked a group of the elect as were the delegates themselves.⁵⁴

⁵²Ibid., p. 119.

⁵³Loc. cit.

⁵⁴Mark Sullivan, The Great Adventure at Washington (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), pp. 2-9.

CHAPTER III

The Organization of The Conference

Before the work of the Conference is discussed, its organization, procedure and program should be described. The aims of the Conference were indicated in general terms in the American invitation; namely, to bring about a limitation of armaments on the part of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to solve the Pacific and Far Eastern problems by concentrated efforts on the part of the nine participating nations.¹

Each government paid the expenses of its official delegation. As host, the American appropriation was \$200,000. Both English and French served as the official language of the Conference.²

The Conference agenda was determined primarily by the State Department through correspondence and consultation with representatives of the conferring governments. The Conference was permitted to amend its own program.³

This agenda included the following items:⁴

¹Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 24.

²"A Catechism of the Conference", op. cit., p. 25.

³Ibid.

⁴Ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

- I. Limitation of Naval Armament, under which shall be discussed:
 - a) Basis of limitation
 - b) Extent
 - c) Fulfillment
- II. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare
- III. Limitation of land armament

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS

- I. Questions relating to China
 - 1. Principles to be applied
 - 2. Application
 - a) Territorial integrity
 - b) Administrative integrity
 - c) Open door--equality of economic and industrial opportunity
 - d) Concessions, monopolies, or preferential economic privileges
 - e) Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railway
 - f) Preferential railroad rates
 - g) Status of existing commitments
- II. Siberia
(Similar headings)
- III. Mandated Islands
(Except questions earlier settled)

ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

Under the heading of "Status of existing commitments" it is expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of rights may hereafter be asserted.

The nature and scope of the agenda make it obvious that the Washington Conference was in reality composed of two distinct conferences, each with its special tasks. The organization was effected accordingly.

The plenary sessions of the Washington Conference

were held in Continental Hall, founded by American women as a memorial to ancestors who fought in the Revolution. Committees held their sessions in the Pan-American Building, home of the Pan-American Union in Washington. The delegations and the press correspondents had their working quarters in the Navy Building.

The inaugural session on Saturday, November 12, 1921, was presided over by Mr. Hughes and was open to the public. The opening prayer was offered by the Reverend Dr. W. S. Abernathy, pastor of the Calvary Baptist Church in Washington.⁶ The President of the United States opened the Conference with the usual welcoming address. At the close of this speech, Mr. Hughes was elected permanent chairman of the Conference. Then he presented his memorable scheme for the limitation of naval armaments. At the close of his speech, he nominated Mr. John W. Garret for the position of Secretary-General, and he was unanimously elected.

This opening session was followed by six similar ones during the Conference, which was hailed as a mark of departure from secret diplomacy. The reason for open sessions was to prevent secret, executive, or unrecorded sessions,

⁵ Frank K. Simonds, "Human Aspects of the Conference," American Review of Reviews, pp. 42-43.

⁶ "Opening Prayer", Memento of Conference on Limitation of Armaments, Washington MCMXXI (Houston: Rein Printing Company) Not Paginated.

heretofore sanctioned by diplomatic usage, from marking the methods used in reaching conclusions. Petitions, memorials, and hearings were formal means of bringing public opinion to bear upon the Conference.⁷ These open sessions were held to acquaint the public with the general progress of the Conference work by presenting a survey of the things accomplished. These open sessions were well attended by the public.⁸

The organization of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments was begun on Monday, November 14. The senior delegates of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers formed the Committee on Program and Procedure. This committee met and fixed the rules of procedure, the method of organizing various committees which might become necessary as the Conference developed, the manner of keeping records and of making the records public. When this task was completed, the Committee on Program and Procedure was automatically dissolved, but the Committee of Senior Delegates came into being. The Committee of Senior Delegates became the chief controlling and directing board of the Conference.

On the eighteenth of November, the Committee of the Whole was organized. This committee consisted of all the delegates of the five nations. Because its membership was so

⁷"A Catechism of the Conference", op. cit., p. 25.

⁸Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 26.

large, its work was confined to hearing, examining, amending, rejecting, or accepting the reports of the various subordinate committees. Thus the Committee of the Whole became the exclusive plenary session of the delegates.

On November 19, the Committee of Senior Delegates created the Sub-Committee of Naval Experts to examine and report on the American proposals. Mr. Hughes asked Mr. Balfour and Baron Kate to meet him informally at his office in the State Department. These men continued to meet informally and became known as the "Big Three" of the Conference. At their first meeting, it was suggested that the naval experts of the three nations be given an opportunity to examine the technical aspects of the American proposal. Hence the Sub-Committee of Naval Experts of America, Great Britain and Japan was set up. Its function was to examine and report to Mr. Hughes, Mr. Balfour and Baron Kate on technical aspects of the American proposal. This Sub-Committee had no authority to pass judgment on matters of policy, but was to serve strictly in an advisory capacity.⁹

On December 15, another committee was created. This new committee was called the Committee of Fifteen, from the fact that it consisted of the senior delegate of each nation

⁹Mark Sullivan reports in The Great Adventure that it was a source of professional pride to the American navy men that the foreign experts never found a flaw in the American calculations.

plus two naval experts. This committee continued the work of the "Big Three" and attempted to obtain the consent of France and Italy upon the ratio of capital ships assigned to them by the American proposals. At the committee's fourth meeting, France offered a conditional acceptance.

On December 22, the Joint Committee was organized. The Joint Committee was composed of all the delegates of the five participating nations, plus two naval experts for each nation. This Joint Committee was formed to study the question of abolishing submarines, limiting auxiliary craft, airplane carriers and battleships.

On December 28, the Subcommittee of Aviation was formed to study and to report on what could be done in regard to airplanes.

On January 2, 1922, the Committee of Naval Experts was joined by a committee of legal authorities, and was renamed the Committee of Naval and Legal Experts. This committee had two functions: to study the matters upon which provisional agreements had been secured, and to draft treaties and resolutions.

On January 10, the Committee of Senior Delegates resumed its meetings for the purpose of examining and passing upon the tentative drafts, as well as of discussing the uncompleted parts of the treaty. The Committee of the Senior Delegates continued this work until the results were ready to submit to the Committee of the Whole.

Thus there were instituted ten committees and sub-committees, exclusive of the plenary session.¹⁰ The names of the committees indicate the complicated tasks that were to be considered by the Arms Conference. However, the minutes contained in the Official Record are only those of the Committee of the Whole, the Committee of Fifteen and the Joint Committee.¹¹

The Conference on the Far Eastern and Pacific Problems was organized similarly. On Monday, November 14, the Senior Delegates of the nine participating nations formed the Committee on Program and Procedure. This committee set up the rules of procedure, the methods of organizing various committees which the development of the discussions might necessitate and the manner and methods of keeping records of various meetings, as well as of making public such parts of the records as might be judged advisable. As soon as these things were established, the Committee was dissolved, and, as in the Arms Conference, was followed by the Committee of the Senior Delegates, which became the governing body of the Conference. On November 16, the Committee of the Whole was formed. This Committee was composed of all the delegates of the nine nations.¹²

On November 26, the Sub-Committee on Foreign Post

¹⁰Ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 26-28.

¹¹Conference on the Limitation of Armament, November 12, 1921--February 6, 1922, Washington, 1922.

¹²Loc. cit.

Offices was formed.

On November 28, the Sub-Committee on Extra-territoriality in China was appointed.

On November 29, a sub-committee was named to examine Chinese tariffs.

On December 3, a Draft Committee was appointed to draft treaties and resolutions.

These various committees met to perform the function assigned to them. They reported to the Committee of the Whole, which met regularly and achieved the main part of the work. The Committee of the Whole was able to perform the greater part of the work because all of the participating nations were interested in the solution of the problems of China, toward which the attention of this Conference was directed.

The question of Yap, however, concerned only the United States and Japan. Negotiations on Yap were held during the Conference, and an agreement was reached shortly after the Conference. In a like manner, Japan and China reached an agreement on the Shantung question at this time. Neither the settlement of the Yap question nor the Shantung question was actually part of the Conference.¹³

An important phase of the machinery of the Conference was the work of the correspondents who transmitted the happenings

¹³Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 29.

of the Conference to the world outside Washington. At first the delegates made special efforts to meet members of the press and talked to them rather freely, but, of course, within the scope agreed upon among the conferees. Since there were more than three hundred correspondents in Washington, these individual interviews had to be given up and the unique practice of "Group Interviews" was instituted. Each delegation maintained an office for this purpose and regularly gave interviews on the progress of the Conference. The delegates allowed themselves to be questioned on any subject, although they were not always able to answer. These frequent interviews resulted in a close personal relationship between the delegates and the journalists.¹⁴

In spite of these practical arrangements, the heads of delegations spent almost as much time with the press as they spent in conference among themselves. A day's program as it was posted in the press room at the Navy Building, by James Preston, Superintendent of the Senate Press Gallery, read like this:¹⁵

- 10:30 A. M. - Lord Riddell, of the British delegation,
in the Navy Building
- 11:30 A. M. - Signor Bartelli, of the Italian delegation,
at the Italian Embassy
- 3:00 A. M. - Lord Riddell, of the British delegation,
in the Navy Building
- 3:30 P. M. - The Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, at
the State Department

¹⁴Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 31-33.

¹⁵Simonds, op. cit., p. 45.

- 4:30 P. M. - Mr. Hanihara, of the Japanese delegation, at the home of the Japanese delegation on Massachusetts Avenue.
 5:00 P. M. - Mr. Sze, of the Chinese delegation, at the Navy Building
 6:00 P. M. - Mr. Balfour, of the British delegation, at the Navy Building

The newspaper conferences in Washington differed from any other ever held in this one respect--they were open to correspondents of every nationality. At Paris, the British held conferences for the British journalists, with an occasional conference for the Americans. The Americans held conferences to which only their own country's newspaper representatives were admitted. And so with the other countries.

When this gathering of the journalists was arranged, the great danger that would arise from admitting Japanese and British journalists to his confidential talks with the American press was pointed out to Mr. Hughes. When he decided to open his conferences to all journalists, the others followed his example; thus, added impact was given to international public opinion.¹⁶

The Washington Conference was said to be characterized by people's diplomacy, informality, and open diplomacy hitherto unknown in the history of international relations. Although plenary sessions in connection with the Conference called forth this enthusiasm, these informal procedures were a response to

¹⁶Simonis, op. cit., pp. 45-50.

a universal demand of the modern public. Except for the plenary sessions, none of the meetings of the Committees was open to the public, not even to the members of the delegations, unless they were properly designated as members of such committees. Not only that, but many of the committee meetings were without minutes. Furthermore, in order to facilitate free and frank discussions, verbatim records were not kept of the remarks of the various speakers. Thus, even when the minutes were kept they were more or less edited by the speakers themselves--perhaps it is nearer the truth to say that drafts were written out afterward by the speakers themselves. The communiques issued for the press were confined to those meetings on which minutes were officially kept; consequently the records render an incomplete story of the work of the Conference.¹⁷

The happenings of the first day of the Conference have been cited as an outstanding example of the informality of the Conference. According to the official program of the day, President Harding and Secretary Hughes alone were to speak with no response from the foreign delegates. But the galleries cried out for "Briand," and the French premier said a few words about France and international friendliness. Then, in the same way, the crowd called "Japan", and Prince Tokugawa spoke a few gracious words. The next cries were

¹⁷Ichinashi, op. cit., pp. 29-33.

"Italy, Italy," and Signor Schanzer spoke more seriously than the others had. The cries continued until all the nations represented there spoke.¹⁸

E. G. Lowry in The Philadelphia Public Ledger of November 20, 1921, says of Ealfour in this connection:

I am sure it has not lain in his (forty year's) experience to sit publicly in an international assemblage to consider the peace of the world where the public galleries participated to the extent of interrupting the fixed program by calling aloud and by name upon the foreign delegates to make impromptu addresses and cheering them heartily when they sat down.¹⁹

To this extent informality was characteristic of the Washington Conference.

¹⁸loc. cit.

¹⁹News Article in The Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 20, 1921.

CHAPTER IV

The Work of the Conference on Limitation of Armament

The work of the Conference on Limitation of Armament began on Saturday, November 12, with the address of Secretary of State Hughes which followed President Harding's address of welcome.¹ As a fitting prelude, America's "Unknown Soldier" had been laid at rest in Arlington Cemetery the day before.² Mr. Hughes indicated the dual nature of the scope of the Conference when he said:

The President invited the governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan to participate in a conference on the limitation of armament in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions would also be discussed. It would have been most agreeable to the President to have invited all the powers to take part in this conference, but it was thought to be a time when other considerations should yield to the practical requirements of the existing exigency and, in this view, the invitation was extended to the group known as the principal allied and associated powers, which by reason of the conditions produced by the war, control, in the main, the armaments of the world. The opportunity to limit armament lies within their group.

It was recognized, however, that the interests of the other powers in the Far East made it appropriate that they should be invited to participate in the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and, with the approval of the five powers, an invitation to take part in the discussion of those questions has been extended to Belgium, China, The Netherlands and Portugal.

¹For full text of the American proposal, see Appendix I.

²Buell, op. cit., p. 151.

The inclusion of the proposal for the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions was not for the purpose of embarrassing or delaying an agreement for the limitation of armament, but rather to support that understanding by availing ourselves of this meeting to endeavor to reach a common understanding as to the principles and policies to be followed in the Far East and thus greatly to diminish and if possible, to wholly remove, discernible sources of controversy. It is believed, that by interchange of views at this opportune time, the Governments represented here may find a basis of accord and thus give expression to their desire to assure enduring friendship.

In the public discussions which have preceded the conference, there have apparently been the two competing views: one that the consideration of armament should await the results of the discussions of the Far Eastern question, and another, that the latter discussion should be postponed until an agreement for the limitation of armament has been reached. I am unable to find sufficient reason for adopting either of these extreme views. I think that it would be most unfortunate if we should disappoint the hopes that have been attached to this meeting by a postponement of the consideration of the first subject. The world looks to this conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armament, and it is the view of the American government that we should meet that expectation without delay. It is therefore proposed that the conference should proceed at once to consider the question of the limitation of armament.

This, however, does not mean that we must postpone the examination of Far Eastern questions. These questions of vast importance press for solution. It is hoped that immediate provision may be made to deal with them adequately, and it is suggested that it may be found to be entirely practicable through the distribution of work among the designations by the committees to make progress to the ends sought to be achieved without either subject being treated as a hindrance to the proper consideration and disposition of the other.³

³Address of Charles E. Hughes, Secretary of the United States and American commissioner to the Conference on Limitation of Armament on assuming the duties of the Presiding Officer at the Conference, Washington, D. C., November 12, 1921, Congressional Record, November 14, 1921, pp. 8531-8532.

With this introduction, then, Mr. Hughes proceeded to electrify his audience with the American proposal for the limitation of armaments.⁴ The gist of the plan was as follows:

1. That all capital ship building programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned.
2. That further reductions should be made through the scrapping of certain older ships.
3. That, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned.
4. That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.⁵

In brief, the program for the United States would scrap all capital ships under construction, fifteen in number, and fifteen of the older battleships up to the King George V class.⁶

⁴George R. Holmes (International News Service Staff Correspondent), reflected the general astonishment of the conferees, press and public in his article entitled "Powers Startled by United States Proposal to Scrap Navies" in The Houston Chronicle of November 13, 1921. He declared the Secretary's proposal to be without precedent and called it open diplomacy with a vengeance which caught the delegates of eight other nations--only two of whom were vitally concerned--totally unprepared. "Thus," Mr. Holmes says, "with one swift daring stroke did the United States today seize the leadership of the world from the statesmen who sat about the green covered table in Continental Hall. There, before the press of the world, with the American Congress and hundreds of others looking on, did Secretary of State Hughes bring forth a plan, which, in the ordinary course of diplomatic procedure, would have been discussed with great secrecy behind closed and guarded doors."

⁵Address of Mr. Hughes, op. cit., p. 8533.

⁶News article in The Austin Statesman, November 12, 1921. p. 1.

Great Britain would stop construction on her four new ships of the Hood type, and scrap all her second and first line battleships up to the King George V class.⁷

Japan would abandon plans for two battleships and four battle cruisers not yet laid down and in addition would scrap three capital ships and four battle cruisers in process of construction, and all ten of the pre-dreadnought and battleships of the second line.⁸

Thus, while Britain would sacrifice her supremacy of the seas, in that her facilities were to be on an equal basis with those of the United States, the United States would lose most under the Hughes program, since she gave up her potential superiority.⁹

In regard to replacement, the United States proposed:

1. That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until ten years from the date of this agreement.
2. That replacement be limited by a maximum of capital ship tonnage as follows:

For the United States . . .	500,000 tons
For Great Britain . . .	500,000 tons
For Japan . . .	300,000 tons
For France . . .	175,000 tons
For Italy . . .	175,000 tons

3. That subject to the ten year limitation above fixed,

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

and the maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced after they are twenty years old by new capital ship construction.

4. That no capital ship shall be built in replacement with a tonnage displacement of more than 500,000 tons.¹⁰

The plan also included provisions for the limitation of auxiliary combatant craft. Three classes of auxiliary combatant craft were recognized. That is:

1. Auxiliary surface combatant craft, such as cruisers, (excluding battle cruisers) flotilla leaders, destroyers, and various surface types.
2. Submarines.
3. Airplane carriers.¹¹

The most important initial task of the Conference, then, was to bring about an agreement on the ratio of capital ships, the backbone of the fleet.¹²

America's proposed solution involved a sweeping reduction on the part of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Specifically, the requirements of the three leading naval powers were as follows:

The United States proposed, if this plan was accepted:

1. To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This includes six battle cruisers and seven battleships on the way and in the course of building and

¹⁰Loc. cit.

¹¹Loc. cit.

¹²Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 16.

two battleships launched. The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped is fifteen. The total tonnage of new capital ships when completed would be 618,000 tons.

2. To scrap all the older battleships up to, but not including, the Delaware and North Dakota. The number of these old battleships to be scrapped was fifteen.

Thus, the number of capital ships to be scrapped by the United States, if this plan was accepted, was thirty with an aggregate tonnage (including that of ships, in construction, if complete) of 845,740 tons.

The plan contemplated for Great Britain and Japan, which follows, was fairly commensurate with the action on the part of the United States.

It was proposed that Great Britain:

1. Should stop further construction on the four new Hoods, the new capital ships not laid down, but upon which money had been spent. The four ships, if completed, would have a tonnage displacement of 172,000 tons.
2. Should, in addition, scrap her pre-dreadnoughts, second line battleships and first line battleships up to, but not including, the King George V class.

These, with certain pre-dreadnoughts which it was understood had already been scrapped, would amount to nineteen capital ships and a tonnage reduction of 411,735 tons.

It was proposed that Japan:

1. Should abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz: The K-11, Owari No. 7 and No. 8 Battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 Battle Cruisers.

It should be observed that this did not involve the stopping of construction, as the construction of none of these ships had been begun.

2. Should scrap three capital ships (the Matsu, launched, the Tosa, the Kago, in course of building) and four battle cruisers (the Amagi and Akagi, in course of building, and the Atoga and Takao, not yet laid down but for which certain material had been assembled.)

The total number of new capital ships to be scrapped under this paragraph was seven. The total tonnage of these new capital ships when completed would be 289,190 tons.

3. Should scrap all pre-dreadnoughts and battle-ships of the second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up to, but not including the Settsu; that is, the scrapping of ten old ships with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons.

The total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which material had been assembled (taking the tonnage of new ships when completed), would be 448,928 tons.¹³

Thus, under this plan there would be immediately destroyed of the navies of the three powers, sixty-six capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage of 1,878,043 tons.

It was proposed that it should be agreed by the United States, Great Britain and Japan that their navies with respect to capital ships, within three months after the making of the agreement, should consist of certain ships designated in the proposal and numbering for the United States eighteen, for Great Britain twenty-two, and for Japan ten.

The total tonnage of these ships would be as follows: of the United States, 500,650; of Great Britain, 604,450; of

¹³Ibid.

Japan 299,700. In reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respective navies received appropriate consideration.¹⁴

In view of the fact that the destruction of many tons of their capital ships was required of the United States, Great Britain and Japan in order to establish the ratio desired, while no such sacrifice was required of France and Italy, it became evident that an agreement among the three great naval powers was of primary importance.¹⁵

At the Second Plenary Session held on November 15, all of the nations concerned supported in spirit and in principle the American proposal. However, Baron Kato, in replying for the Japanese delegation, cast a shadow of things to come when he said that he perceived that certain modifications should be made in regard to the tonnage basis for replacement of various types of vessels.¹⁶ On November 17, he issued a more specific statement saying that because of Japan's geographical position she should be allotted more than sixty per cent of the tonnage allowed the United States and Great Britain. Further, he thought Japan might need a higher per cent of defensive vessels.¹⁷

Accordingly, on November 19, Mr. Hughes asked Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato to meet him informally for discussion

¹⁴Address of Mr. Hughes, op. cit., p. 8533.

¹⁵Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁶Buell, op. cit., p. 155.

¹⁷Loc. cit.

of the proposed ratio of 5-5-3. The complexity of their task was indicated by the fact that the "Big Three" met thus informally twenty times, the last meeting being held on December 15, when a provisional agreement was reached on the ratio of ships according to the American proposal, 5-5-3. At the first meeting, Mr. Hughes urged that quicker results could be facilitated by informal discussions by the chief delegates of the three nations most vitally concerned, in which view Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato concurred.¹⁸ Baron Kato then proposed that naval experts of the three nations be given an opportunity to examine the technical aspects of the plan, said committee to have no authority to pass judgment on matters of policy.¹⁹

On November 19, a subcommittee of experts was named. This subcommittee was not able to reach any agreement, but did report their views to the members of their delegations. On November 28, Baron Kato made the following statement:

Owing to her geographical situation and to her peculiar national conditions, the imperative need of a navy is recognized by Japan in no less degree than any other country; but Japan has resolved not to possess armaments in excess of the minimum strength for the bare necessity of securing her national security. Japan is unable to accept the ratio of sixty per cent because she considers it impossible to provide for her security and defense with any less force than seventy per cent. She desires to have the proposed ratio so modified that the relative strength of the three navies will be 10-10-7.²⁰

¹⁸Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 47.

¹⁹Loc. cit.

²⁰News article in The Beaumont Enterprise, Nov. 29, 1921

Great concern was felt by the conferees and reflected in the press over the Japanese attitude. The Houston Chronicle carried the headline "Japan's Attitude Puzzles Conferees" on page one; in this headlined article Japan's request for a great navy and silence on Far Eastern questions was said to have bewildered the delegates, while the precise attitude of Japan was becoming more and more the interrogation point of the Conference.²¹

Frank H. Simond readily sensed that the work of the Conference was plagued by lack of good faith among the nations, and that the absolute failure of the plan was both a possibility and a menace; that unless a great measure of mutual confidences could be achieved, the whole Conference would become a failure and a tragedy.²²

Until November 30, the Subcommittee of Experts argued over the Japanese demands. At first the Japanese argued that the requirements of national security demanded the increased ratio. As this basis was wholly indeterminable, and as the basis of the proposal was the existing strength as of November 12, this contention was rejected.²³

²¹News article in The Houston Chronicle, Nov. 19, 1921.

²²Frank H. Simonds, "Distrust May Imperil Any World Pact," The Houston Chronicle, Nov. 15, 1921.

²³"Report of the American Delegation to the President", February 9, 1922, Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 799.

The Japanese, challenging the accuracy of the American figures, worked out a formula by six different means which resulted in an existing ratio of 147 for Great Britain, 100 for United States, and 70 for Japan; the Americans countered with three different calculations showing Japan was not even entitled to the sixty per cent which had been accorded to her. The first was on the basis of the number of capital ships in commission plus the keels of ships laid down, which gave the American tonnage a ratio of 100 to Japan's 45; the second was in relation to ships in commission plus keels laid, plus ships on which money had already been spent, which ratio was 100 to 55; the third was according to the number of ships in commission plus the percentage of ships under construction, which ratio was 100 to 49.²⁴

The Japanese then insisted that existing strength should refer only to completed ships; whereas the American Government took the position that ships in course of construction should be counted to the extent to which construction had already progressed at the time of the convening of the Conference.²⁵

²⁴News article in Japan Weekly Chronicle, Dec. 8, 1921, quoted in Duell's The Washington Conference, p. 156.

²⁵"Report to the President", op. cit., p. 799.

When the Subcommittee could not reach an agreement, the controversy was handed back to the Big Three on November 30.²⁶ On December 1, Mr. Balfour made a personal call on Baron Kato to express his regrets upon the inability of the experts to agree on the capital ship ratio and to inquire as to whether he could do anything to reconcile the conflicting views so that the work of the Conference could proceed. Baron Kato replied that he would not obstruct the work of the Conference, but the 10-10-7 ratio was not only the desire of his naval experts but of the government and people of Japan; therefore, he would not be able to make a satisfactory explanation to them if he accepted the 10-10-6 ratio under the pressure of American opinion.²⁷

Mr. Balfour then asked Baron Kato whether he had any definite suggestion upon which he might be able to accept the American ratio; Baron Kato then stated his request to substitute the Settsu for the Mutsu in the list of capital ships to be scrapped, and to effect an agreement on Pacific fortifications. Mr. Balfour requested that he might be

²⁶Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 48.

²⁷Buell explains the Japanese delay in accepting immediately the proposal by the rivalry between the army and navy offices in Tokyo (the proposal would mean a deathblow to the naval profession and would increase the power of the army clique because the future of Japanese imperialism now lay exclusively on the Asiatic mainland and manpower would be its principal weapon); and by the natural chauvinism of many elements in Japan which prohibited the immediate adoption of the proposal. See pages 157-159 of The Washington Conference for full discussion.

authorized to approach Mr. Hughes on these matters. He received the authorization.²⁸

The Mutsu was one of the largest battleships afloat, a super-dreadnought with a displacement of 38,000 tons, and a speed of twenty-three and one-half knots an hour, two knots more than the Maryland, the only super-dreadnought the United States was to have retained under the original proposal; the Mutsu was equipped with eight 16-inch guns, firing projectiles of 2,200 pounds in weight at a maximum range of 44,000 yards.²⁹ The American Delegation had understood that the Mutsu was only ninety-eight per cent complete, and that therefore it should be scrapped.³⁰ The Japanese Delegation insisted that the Mutsu had been commissioned in September, 1921, and was fully manned before the convening of the Conference, and that, therefore, it should not be scrapped.³¹

The retention of the Mutsu would have given Japan a seventy per cent ratio which would have upset the whole plan. Under the original proposal each of the three powers would retain one super-dreadnought; the United States, the Maryland; Great Britain, the Hood; and Japan, the Magato. But if Japan should retain also the Mutsu she would have twice as many ships as the United States or Great Britain. Japan's offer to offset this difference by sacrificing the

²⁸Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 49.

²⁹Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific, pp. 202, 208.

³⁰Buell, op. cit., p. 160.

³¹Loc. cit.

Settsu was not satisfactory, because the Settsu was an old ship, commissioned in 1912 with a displacement of 21,420 tons and armed with 12-inch guns (as compared with the 38,000 ton displacement and the 16-inch guns on the Mutsu).³²

On December 2, following the meeting of Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato on December 1, the Big Three met for the first time since the Subcommittee of naval experts had reported their failure to agree.³³ Mr. Hughes received the report of the Subcommittee and concluded that he saw no serious conflict. In answer to a direct question, Baron Kato replied that Japan would be willing to give up her Eight-eight program if an international agreement were reached.³⁴ He then stated that the Japanese government and people were convinced that the 10-10-7 ratio was fair; and, in speaking of the latest addition to the Japanese fleet, said that the Mutsu, which was built partly by the subscriptions of school children as well as the general public, and therefore had great sentimental value, had been commissioned on the previous day (i.e., December 1) and had joined the fleet. He therefore faced a serious situation; on the one hand, he desired a harmonious relationship

³²Loc. cit.

³³Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 49.

³⁴Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 50.

with the Conference; and, on the other hand, he had to have satisfactory explanations for Japan. So far he had not been able to find the necessary means for mutual satisfaction.³⁵ He continued:

However, I said yesterday to Mr. Balfour, should it be possible for the Powers situated in the Pacific, particularly the United States and Japan, to maintain the status quo on their Pacific fortifications and naval bases, that would give me a reason to satisfy the Japanese people.³⁶

The question was finally settled in a provisional agreement on December 15 when it was agreed that Japan was to retain both the Mutsu and the Nagato; to offset this gain, the United States would complete two battleships of the West Virginia class and Great Britain was allowed to build two super-dreadnoughts which had been authorized in August.³⁷ The new arrangement maintained the 10-10-6 ratio and, in fact, worked to the naval advantage of the United States and Great Britain, for they were each to have three dreadnoughts to Japan's two. Japan's advantage was a negative one since the Mutsu was already completed and work on the Hood, begun only two weeks before the Conference, had been suspended on November 17 as an earmark of sincerity toward the Conference.³⁸ But in order to retain these additional vessels the powers agreed to scrap

³⁵Loc. cit.

³⁶Remarks of Baron Kato in December 2 conference of the Big Three, quoted in Ichihashi's The Washington Conference, p. 50.

³⁷The agreement was described as provisional because the position of France and Italy had not been determined.

³⁸Buell, op. cit., p. 161.

the following: Japan, the Settsu; the United States, the North Dakota, and the Delaware; Great Britain, four battle-ships of the King George V type.³⁹

Thus the existing tonnage of the three fleets remained practically the same, with a slight increase for Japan and the United States which was offset by the type of vessels retained by Great Britain, and the replacement tonnage was slightly increased; but the ratio 10-10-6 was maintained. This ratio was to be maintained until 1931, when replacements of capital ships could take place (with the provision that no capital ship could be replaced until twenty years after the date of its completion).⁴⁰

The following comparison showed the difference between the original and final proposals for limitation:

Navies for Next Ten Years⁴¹

	United States		Great Britain		Japan	
	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage
Original	18	500,650	22	604,450	10	299,700
Final	18	525,850	20	582,050	10	313,300

Replacement

Original	18	500,000	22	500,000	10	300,000
Final	18	525,000	20	525,000	10	315,000

³⁹Buell, op. cit., p. 161.

⁴⁰Loc. cit.

⁴¹This arrangement is that given by The Literary Digest, January 7, 1922, p. 37.

The price of Japan's agreement to the 10-10-6 ratio was not only the retention of the Mutsu but accession on the part of the United States to Japan's demand that the United States stop further fortifications in the Pacific Islands. The provisional agreement adopted on December 15, covering the point in question, stated:

It is agreed with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific region, including Hongkong, the status quo shall be maintained, that is, there shall be no increase in these fortifications, and naval bases except that this restriction shall not apply to the Hawaiian Islands, New Zealand, and the islands composing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the United States and Canada, as to which the respective powers retain their entire freedom;⁴²

Despite the fact that the United States had a large number of islands in the Pacific Ocean (Guam, the Philippines, the Aleutians, Tutuila, the Hawaiian group), in 1919 none of them was a base sufficiently developed to supply the needs of a great fleet.⁴³ But if the United States should continue to fortify the Philippines and Guam, completing a chain of bases across the Pacific, she would have the bases necessary to sustain her fleet; hence, the Japanese demand that fortifications cease.⁴⁴

⁴²See Appendix II.

⁴³Bywater, op. cit., p. 255.

⁴⁴Loc. cit.

This demand placed the American delegation in a serious position; for if the disarmament plan was accepted, the United States would be forced to surrender the possibility of physically enforcing the policy of the Open Door in the Orient, and even of defending the Philippines from attack. The two matters--non-fortification and disarmament--seemed impossible; consequently, it was agreed on December 15 that the status quo would be maintained with respect to the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, the islands composing Japan proper, and the coasts of the United States and Canada.⁴⁵

Difficulties arose over the differences in the interpretation of the terms "Pacific region" and "Japan proper", since the negotiators did not specify what they were to include.⁴⁶ Britain wished the area in which the status quo would be maintained to be a parallelogram with the equator at its south, the 30th degree of latitude its north, the 110th degree of longitude its west, and the 110th degree of longitude, its east side; thus all the British islands south of the equator, and Singapore, would be excluded from the fortifications, but the Japanese Bonin Islands would be included.⁴⁷ Japan insisted that the Bonin Islands, 520 miles away from Tokyo constituted part of the Japanese

⁴⁵Buell, op. cit., p. 165.

⁴⁶Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴⁷Buell, op. cit., p. 166.

mainland on the ground that they were within the administrative jurisdiction of the Home Government.⁴⁸ The American delegation resisted the contention in regard to the Bonin Islands, because, when fortified, these islands would be in a position to dominate Guam and to cut the communications of the United States with the Philippines, if not the Orient.

Actually, Buell suggests in The Washington Conference that the real reason for Japan's efforts to exclude the Bonins from the rule of status quo was not the desire to increase fortifications, since she had hurriedly completed fortifications there just before the Conference. Rather, Japan was playing for time. She used this means to delay the naval treaty until the Manchurian and Siberian settlements were satisfactory to her interests, just as she used the Kurile Islands to secure a promise that the Aleutians (ordinarily considered a part of the homeland of the United States) would not be fortified.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the Japanese raised a question in regard to Singapore, which stands off the Malay Peninsula between the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, a port of first importance to the British, and upon which they considered the safety of Australia,

⁴⁸Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴⁹See pages 166 to 171 for full discussion.

⁵⁰Buell, op. cit., p. 167.

India, and New Zealand depended.⁵¹ Britain had created such facilities and fortifications in Singapore as to make it a first class naval station, thus indicating the British Empire was preparing to defend its possessions in the Pacific and in Asia, irrespective of the Japanese navy.⁵²

As long as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance existed, Japan felt Singapore could never be a menace to her; but if it should be cancelled outright, the American and British fleets could unite against Japan, and, with Singapore as a base, the advantage gained by Japan in the pledge of the United States not to construct bases of her own would thus be lost.⁵³ For such reasons did Japan object to the exclusion of Singapore from the status quo.

On January 9, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Balfour, and Baron Kato entered into a verbal agreement which was later to appear in Article XIX of the Five Power Naval Treaty.⁵⁴ By this agreement, the United States agreed to maintain the status quo in regard to fortifications and naval bases in the possessions which it now holds or may acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone and Hawaii, not including the Aleutians. The British agreed to the status quo in Hongkong and the other insular

⁵¹Loc. cit.

⁵²Loc. cit.

⁵³Buell, op. cit., p. 171.

⁵⁴Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 90.

possessions it held or might acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of 110 degrees east longitude except those adjacent to the coast of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japan agreed to the status quo in the Kurile Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, as well as all future acquisitions in the Pacific. Thus the United States had the right to increase fortifications and naval bases in Hawaii, and Great Britain had the same right in Singapore, since it was west of the dividing line of the Treaty--110 degrees east longitude.⁵⁵

In the meantime, as soon as the Big Three had reached a provisional agreement, the Subcommittee of fifteen was established on December 15 to secure French and Italian consent to the 1.75 ratio assigned to their navies. It was generally expected that France would not accept the ratio, since it was reported that she would ask an allotment of 315,000 tons of capital ships, and that Italy would expect an allotment equal to that of France.⁵⁶ At the first meeting of the Subcommittee on December 15, Mr. Hughes called on the French and Italian representatives for their views. Admiral de Bon, who, with M. M. Sarrant and Jusserand, made up the French representation on the Subcommittee, presented the case for France as follows:

⁵⁵Buell, op. cit., p. 169.

⁵⁶News article in The Dallas Morning News, December 3, 1921.

France had a population of 39,000,000 and 60,000,000 in her colonies on whom she depended for raw materials; therefore she required a navy commensurate with these needs. She desired to replace her ten existing capital ships with ten ships of 35,000 tons each; moreover, as her existing ships would become obsolete by 1930, she would have to begin to replace them before that date.⁵⁷

M. Schanzer said that two principles governed the Italian point of view; the parity of the Italian with the French fleet, and the limitation of armament to the quantity strictly necessary for defense.⁵⁸ The French delegate said that the French people had responsibilities to the world to insure peace, as well as to insure the interest of their own nation--that was why they had accepted parity with Italy whose colonies were less extensive than those of France.⁵⁹ Yet, they resented the implication of the American and British delegates that France was taking an attitude which might dislocate the general agreement for the reduction of naval expenditures, so as to start again the competition in armaments.⁶⁰

⁵⁷"Subcommittees", Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Washington, 1922), pp. 11, 12, 14, 16.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 18, 20.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 46.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 48-58.

Mr. Hughes had little hope of reconciling the French demands with the aim of the Conference, and on December 16 he entered into direct negotiations with M. Briand, who had returned to Paris. In response to a letter from Mr. Hughes, M. Briand wrote on the 18th:

In the question of naval armaments, the pre-occupation of France is not the offense, but uniquely the defensive point of view.

With regard to the tonnage of capital ships which are the most costly, I have given instructions to our delegates in the sense which you desire. I am certain I shall be sustained by my Parliament in this view.⁶¹

This letter was a source of gratification to Mr. Hughes, who understood the words "instructions to our delegates in the sense that you desire" meant that the 1.75 ratio should be accepted. However, the French delegation objected to this interpretation.⁶² They said that the acceptance of the ratio was conditioned by the consent of the French delegation, and the consent of the other delegations to French replacements starting in 1927.⁶³ They also reiterated the desire that France have six capital ships instead of five, thus demanding 210,000 tons instead of 175,000.⁶⁴ They also said that before the problem of capital ships could be solved, indisputable guaranties were needed in regard to other parts of

⁶¹Senate Document, No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 257.

⁶²"Subcommittees", op. cit., p. 72.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 62, 64, 76.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 28

the fleet.⁶⁵

In view of failure to reach agreement, the committee abandoned the subject.⁶⁶

In the meantime, George Harvey, American ambassador to the Court of St. James, had arranged a London meeting with Premier Briand.⁶⁷ From this and subsequent negotiations came the announcement that France would accept the capital ship ratio, although she would demand a large defense navy.⁶⁸

Behind the French attitude in regard to naval disarmament, was the more pressing problem, to the French, of land armament.⁶⁹ France, whose people had witnessed two wars in the preceding half century, and who were resolved that the Germans should never again cross the Rhine, was maintaining the largest army in the world to make certain the collection of indemnity from Germany, and to safeguard France from attack and the newly drawn boundary lines of Europe from alteration. On November 21, Briand stated publicly the position of France, asserting that France could not disarm physically until Germany had disarmed morally.⁷⁰ On November 23, he said France would consider the reduction of armies if the powers were willing to share the

⁶⁵"Subcommittees", *op. cit.*, pp.

⁶⁶Ichihashi, *op. cit.*, p. 71

⁶⁷News article in The Houston Chronicle, Dec. 19, 1921

⁶⁸Loc. cit.

⁶⁹Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-2-5.

⁷⁰*ibid.*, pp. 202-3

burden of guarding France's frontiers.⁷¹ Since he heard no such offers he insisted that the third subject on the Agenda, the Limitation of Land Armaments, be dropped,⁷² although France would agree to the appointment of three subcommittees on the control of new agencies of warfare.⁷³

Undoubtedly the attitude of France in regard to acceptance of the 1.75 naval ratio stemmed from her belief that Germany would take revenge when she could.⁷⁴

The French delegation gave its formal consent on December 28 to the proposed capital ship ratio, thus completing the most important of the naval questions, but they demanded 90,000 tons of submarines. Since no agreement on the limitation of submarines could be reached, the desire to limit submarine tonnage had to be abandoned.⁷⁵

The French insistence on a larger number of submarines was said by some to be of this nature: That she did not really want them, nor have the money to build them, nor even the intention of building them, but merely wanted to use this opportunity to hold the Conference up as a trading point to

⁷¹Loc. cit.

⁷²Loc. cit.

⁷³Loc. cit.

⁷⁴Buell, op. cit., p. 94.

⁷⁵Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 94.

compel the British to make a separate treaty that France wanted.⁷⁶ The French sensitiveness shown at the Conference seemed to stem about equally from trivial incidents and matters of real national importance.⁷⁷ To illustrate, on the opening day Briand found that all seats at the top side of the table were occupied by American and British delegates; at the next and all subsequent sessions there had been a new shuffling of seats in order to make a seat at the head table for the head of the French delegation.⁷⁸ In a broader sense, the French had other experiences likely to wound that they called their amour propre. All the important work of the early days of the Conference had to do with the naval ratio, and the naval ratio was treated as a matter for Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. These three were the only nations specifically mentioned by Mr. Hughes in his proposals for the reduction of capital ship tonnage. These three were treated as if, in regard to naval matters, they were a class apart--which was, of course, literally true. During the war against Germany there had been an understanding between Great Britain and France, whereby Great Britain was to attend to the sea, and France was to concentrate her efforts on land warfare. The

⁷⁶Mark Sullivan "Attitude of Present French Government Toward World is Complicated", The Dallas Morning News, Jan. 29, 1922.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid.

result was that for the preceding seven years France practically closed the building of new ships; Great Britain, on the other hand, greatly stimulated her shipbuilding, as did the United States and Japan. Thus the end of the war found France a poor fourth, probably weaker on the sea than at anytime since modern sea power began. But her feelings were wounded, and she felt a sense of injustice at being treated as an inferior.⁷⁹

After prolonged negotiation, the ten year naval holiday was established with the compromise that France, and, therefore, Italy also, were conceded the right to lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929 and 1931, while the remaining powers were not to lay down ships before the last-named date.⁸⁰ This was granted on the ground that France had actually begun her holiday in 1915, since she had done little building; thus, the duration of the naval holiday was actually only six years for France and Italy, and ten years for the United States, Great Britain and Japan.⁸¹

In the matter of limiting auxiliary-craft tonnage, the French held they could not reduce the tonnage of this class of vessels below 330,000 tons.⁸² The conferees feared the failure to limit auxiliary-craft would decrease the value of the

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Chapter 11 of the Naval Treaty

⁸¹Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 310.

⁸²Ibid., p. 314.

agreement on capital ship tonnage, but the only agreement they were able to bring about was limitation of their individual maximum size to 10,000 tons.⁸³

In the question of aircraft carriers, the American plan fixed the tonnage for the United States and Great Britain at 80,000 tons, for Japan at 48,000 tons, and for France and Italy at 28,000 tons; the maximum size was fixed at 27,000 tons, with guns not to exceed eight inches. An agreement was finally reached by which the United States and Great Britain were allowed 135,000 tons each, Japan 81,000 tons, and France and Italy 60,000 tons each.⁸⁴ This greatly increased ratio of aircraft carriers was granted in response to the plea of Italy, who pointed out that only one carrier of 27,000 tons could be maintained under the original allotment to Italy of 28,000 tons; and if that one carrier were sunk, Italy would have no carrier whatsoever. The new allotment, if reduced to ratio, would give 5-5-3-2.2-2.2, showing a slight gain for France and Italy over the original 1.75 ratio.

The study of the number, character and use of aircraft was entrusted to a Subcommittee of Aircraft Experts, inasmuch as aircraft was one of the newly developed agencies of warfare. On January 7, the Subcommittee of Aircraft Experts presented a report which said in part:

⁸³Ibid., pp. 356-57.

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 360-61.

The Committee is of the opinion that it is not practicable at this time to impose any effective limitation upon the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or military, excepting in the single case of lighter than aircraft. The Committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft in warfare should be governed by the rules of warfare as adapted to aircraft by a further conference, which should be held at a later date.⁸⁵

The Conference deemed it advisable to accept, for the present, the recommendations submitted.

In regard to limitation of land armaments, from the early stages of the Conference it became pretty well evident that there was little hope. At the third plenary session, Mr. Hughes introduced the subject by saying that so far as the United States was concerned, there was no problem, since the army of the United States numbered fewer than 160,000 men; however, he recognized the special difficulties relative to land armament abroad and, therefore, this subject should be recognized by the Conference.⁸⁶

Briand then made his celebrated speech upon the need of his nation to be guarded against Germany.⁸⁷ Although it was not expected that the Conference would take action, the explanation to the people was considered worthwhile.⁸⁸ He explained that the laws of France compelled three generations

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 407-8.

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 76-77.

⁸⁷Frank H. Simonds, "Brian sets France Right With World", The Houston Chronicle, November 28, 1921.

⁸⁸Ibid.

of young men to be under the flag, but the Government had recently cut the period of service from three years to two, with the result that the metropolitan military force was reduced to half of the force of November 11, 1918. Beyond this, France could not go.⁸⁹

The British took the position that there was no hope for land armament limitation because of the French position.⁹⁰ Such being the case Mr. Hughes concluded no decision could be reached at this time.⁹¹

In regard to the French attitude at the Conference, Mr. Sullivan, writing in The Great Adventure at Washington, said:

The French delegates prevented the consideration of land armaments; the French delegates took a position about capital ships which would have made the Conference a complete failure, and only receded after Hughes "put it up to the French Premier that the action of that country would determine the success or failure of this effort to reduce the heavy burden of armament"; the French delegates made any limitation on the quantity of submarines impossible; the French delegates made limitation on the quantity of auxiliary craft impossible.⁹²

The negotiation of all these matters--the provisional agreement of the Big Three on the proposed capital ship ratio of 5-5-3-1.75-1.75; the French refusal and subsequent acceptance of the 1.75 naval ratio; the Italian acceptance of parity with

⁸⁹"Subcommittee", op. cit., pp. 76-77.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 88.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 794.

⁹²Mark Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 200-1.

the French; the treatment of the submarine question; Japan's demands for concessions in the Pacific, together with an adjustment on the original proposal of ships and tonnage to be scrapped, as a price for her acceptance of the capital ship ratio allotted to her--were but a part of and leading up to the negotiation of the most important part of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments, the Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, Limiting Naval Armament. Commonly called the Naval Treaty, it was signed in the closing hours of the Conference in the Assembly Hall of the Daughters of the American Revolution. A resume of the Treaty follows: It consists of three chapters: the first contains general provisions relating to the limitation of naval armament; the second, the rules relating to the execution of the treaty--definition of terms; the third, miscellaneous provision.⁹³ Twenty-four articles make up the treaty, twenty of these articles being within the scope of Chapter I, which gives the general provisions of the Treaty. Chapter I specifies the agreement on capital ship ratio. The number and tonnage of capital ships retained under, and the maximum replacement tonnage fixed by, the Treaty, are as follows:⁹⁴

⁹³See appendix II, Treaty I for complete text of Naval Treaty.

⁹⁴A capital ship is defined in Chapter II, Part 4, of the Naval Treaty as a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding eight inches.

Country	Number of Ships	Existing Tonnage	Maximum Replacement Tonnage
United States	18	525,850	525,000
Great Britain	20	558,950	525,000
Japan	10	303,320	315,000
France	10	221,170	175,000
Italy	10	182,800	175,000

The difference in the existing tonnage retained by United States and Great Britain and by France and Italy is explained by the age factor; therefore, the tonnage adheres to the ratio of the original proposal.

The agreement on scrapping ships required the United States to scrap fifteen ships with a tonnage of 845,740; Great Britain 583,000; Japan 435,328.⁹⁵ Thus, although neither France nor Italy was required to scrap a vessel, 66 ships with an aggregate tonnage of 1,864,000 were destroyed.

This section of the treaty carried specifications for the number of calibre of guns to be carried by the various type vessels; the guns on capital ships could not exceed sixteen inches.⁹⁶ If an aircraft carrier carried guns exceeding six inches, the number of guns was limited to ten.⁹⁷ Aircraft carriers could carry no more than eight guns exceeding six inches.⁹⁸ Light cruisers could not carry guns exceeding eight inches.⁹⁹

⁹⁵Scrapping is defined in Chapter 11 Part 2 of the Naval Treaty as putting a vessel in such condition that it cannot be put to combatant use. This is accomplished by the permanent sinking of vessel, breaking the vessel up, or converting the vessel to target use exclusively.

⁹⁶Article VII

⁹⁷Article VIII

⁹⁸Article X

⁹⁹Article XII

Chapter II of the Naval Treaty laid down rules relating to the execution of the Treaty and definition of terms used in the Treaty. Part I of this chapter listed the capital ships which may be retained under the Treaty; Part 2 itemised the rules for scrapping vessels; Part 3 detailed the replacement and scrapping of capital ships. Section I established the rules for replacement and Section II gave tables for each of the five participating countries (these tables listed ships laid down, ships completed, ships scrapped, ships retained); while Part 4 contained definitions of expressions used in the Treaty.

Chapter III of the Naval Treaty contained Miscellaneous Provisions in which the term of the Treaty was designated as fifteen years (it was to continue in force five years after the naval holiday; and provisions were made for the reconsideration and amendment of the Treaty if such were deemed necessary during its life).

Such was the nature and scope of the Five-Power Naval Treaty.

Incidental to the Naval Treaty was a treaty between the same five powers in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰In discussions concerning the submarines, the British had consistently demanded its outlawry while the French had hailed it as the defensive weapon of the weak--American opinion supported the French view. See "May Defer Problem of Submarine" in The Houston Chronicle, December 26, 1921, and "Has the Arms Parley Been Submarined?" The Houston Chronicle, December 27, 1921.

The rules for the protection of neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war were as follows: a merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed after seizure, and no merchant vessel must be destroyed until the crew and passengers have been placed in safety. Belligerent submarines were to observe these rules, and the signatory powers agreed not to use submarines as commerce destroyers. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and analogous liquids, materials or devices was prohibited; non-signatory powers were invited to adhere to this treaty.¹⁰¹

Growing out of the negotiations leading to the Five-Power Naval Treaty was the Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan, relating to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean. Commonly called the Four Power Pact, it was a surprise to the public, since such a subject was not even on the agenda.¹⁰² This treaty was signed on December 13, 1921.¹⁰³ This treaty stemmed from

¹⁰¹For full text of this treaty see Appendix II, Treaty II.

¹⁰²Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 113.

¹⁰³According to the news article "Four Powers Sign Peace Treaty" in The Houston Chronicle of December 13, 1921, the signing of the treaty, which was devoid of ceremony was held in an ante-room of the office of the Secretary of State. At the shoulder of signer (the Americans first; then the British who signed twice--once for Britain and once for Union of South Africa who had no delegate; then, the French; and lastly, the Japanese) stood Eddie Savoy, the picturesque Negro doorman with a blotter in his hand. The business of official seal and was affixed beforehand, but each signer touched the crest of sealing wax beside his name to signify formally that his seal had been officially executed.

concern in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the obligations which both nations felt to each other under it, and the situations which would be created by the provisions of the Naval Treaty.¹⁰⁴

Mr. Balfour, who realized that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could not be continued, drafted a three-power agreement in which the United States, Great Britain and Japan would guarantee their respective interests in the Far East, but the Chinese Delegation objected to any agreement concerning the Far East to which China was not a party; the United States refused to enter the Alliance.¹⁰⁵ Mr. Hughes then proposed a draft which included France as a party to the agreement and which abolished entirely the guaranty in the Far East.¹⁰⁶ The Treaty was introduced by Senator Lodge in a flowery speech to the Conference.¹⁰⁷

The Treaty provided:

That the four signatories should respect the rights of each other in their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean.

In case of controversy, a joint conference is to be held to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

¹⁰⁴Buell, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

¹⁰⁵Buell, op. cit., pp. 172-175.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 176.

¹⁰⁷Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 113-114.

If these rights are threatened by aggressive action by outside powers, the parties agree to communicate with each other fully to arrive at an understanding as to the best measure to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the situation.

The treaty is to remain in force indefinitely, subject to cancellation after the termination of ten years, upon twelve months notice.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance shall come to an end, upon deposit of ratification of this treaty.¹⁰⁸

Despite the fact that this agreement applied only to the islands of the Pacific, the Japanese were ready to substitute it for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance because it constituted a pledge that the United States and Great Britain would not jointly intervene in the Pacific; therefore, it recognized the Japanese as supreme, from the military standpoint, in the regions of the eastern Pacific.¹⁰⁹ In return for the Four Power Treaty the United States gained a pledge to respect American rights.¹¹⁰

The exclusive nature of the Four Power Pact has been noted. The fact that Italy, one of the Five Great Powers, was not a signatory was due to the fact that she possessed no insular territory in the Pacific region.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ See Appendix II, Treaty III for full text of the Four Power Pact.

¹⁰⁹ Buell, op. cit., pp. 177, 186.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 195.

¹¹¹ Senate Document No. 126, 78th Congress, 2d Session, p. 112.

China was not considered because it was expected that this agreement would be supplemented by a further convention to which all the powers would be parties which would provide for the amicable adjustment of conditions in the Far East.¹¹²

However, both Holland and Portugal held insular possessions in the Far East and yet were not signatories to the Four Power Pact. Mr. Van Karnebeck of Holland remarked that the Four Power Pact would be received in his country with sympathy because it endeavored to promote peace in the regions neighboring The Netherlands' possessions.¹¹³ Viscount d'Alte of Portugal commented on the pact by saying it was the spirit in which this agreement was reached which gave it its tremendous binding power.¹¹⁴ The United States gave to the Dutch and Portuguese delegates identical notes declaring that the United States, anxious to forestall any conclusion contrary to the spirit of the treaty, was firmly resolved to respect their rights (i.e., the rights of Portugal and Holland) in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the

¹¹²Ibid., pp. 112-113.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 113.

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 113-114.

Pacific Ocean.¹¹⁵

However, the fact that the United States did not belong to the League of Nations, and that some of the "possessions" dealt with in the Four Power Pact had been mandated by the League gave rise to a need for clarification. Consequently, the Treaty was accompanied by a Declaration in which the four signatories agreed that the Treaty should apply to the mandated islands of the Pacific Ocean, provided, however, that the making of the Treaty should not be deemed as assent on the part of the United States to the mandates and should not preclude any agreement between the United States and the mandatory powers in regard to the mandated islands.¹¹⁶

Further confusion arose as to the exact meaning of the words "insular possessions and dominions" in the wording of the Four Power Pact. Mr. Harding expressed the opinion that the homeland of Japan was not included in the phrase,¹¹⁷ but he later stated that he agreed with the American delegates who had accepted the construction which included Japan in the homeland.¹¹⁸ Public opinion, both in America and Japan, was

¹¹⁵United States Senate Document No. 128, 67th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 922-23.

¹¹⁶For full text of the Declaration see Appendix II, IV Declaration accompanying the above Four-Power Treaty.

¹¹⁷News article in The Beaumont Enterprise, December 20, 1921.

¹¹⁸Loc. cit.

divided as to interpretation of the phrase; consequently, the Four Power Pact and its accompanying Declaration were further reinforced by a Treaty between the same Four Powers, supplementary to the above, and signed on February 6, 1922. This supplementary treaty defined the term "insular possessions and insular dominions" as including only Karafuto (or the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa, and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan. Thus, the homeland of Japan was excluded from the treaty.¹¹⁹

The official results of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, which began on Saturday, November 12, 1921, and lasted a little more than twelve weeks, until Monday, February 6, 1922, may be summarized as follows:

1. The Five Power Naval Treaty, signed by United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, which limited naval armament on the basis of existing tonnage on the 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 ratio; provided for the scrapping of ships and replacement of ships to maintain the specified ratio; gave specifications as to aircraft carriers; gave agreements as to non-fortifications and maintenance of the status quo in their respective territories and possessions, and declared a ten year naval holiday.

¹¹⁹For the full text of the Supplementary Treaty see Appendix II, Treaty V.

2. A Five Power Treaty, between the same nations in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare, which pledged belligerent submarines to observe the rules for the protection of neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war and prohibited the use in war of poisonous gases, liquids or devices.

3. The Four Power Pact between United States, Great Britain, France and Japan relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean which pledged the signatories to respect each others possessions and to refer all future controversies in that area to a joint conference.

4. A Declaration accompanying the Four Power Pact, and signed by United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, which clarified the position of the United States in regard to mandated islands.

5. A treaty between the same Four Powers, supplementary to the preceding treaties, in which the meaning of the term "insular possessions and insular dominions", was defined in its application to Japan.

The inter-relations of these treaties with questions of the Far East will be observed in the next chapter, The Pacific and Far Eastern Conference.

CHAPTER V

Work of the Pacific and Far Eastern Conference

That part of the Conference dealing with questions of the Far East and the Pacific was largely concerned with problems related to China. In this regard, two treaties were signed, and ten resolutions were passed. In addition, though not as a part of the Conference, the question of Shantung was settled in a treaty between China and Japan; and the United States and Japan negotiated a treaty in regard to the former German islands in the Pacific, in particular the Island of Yap.¹

In the report of the American delegation to President Harding, there occurs this paragraph:

When the Conference was called there existed with regard to the Far East causes of misunderstanding and sources of controversy, which constituted a serious potential danger. These difficulties centered principally about China, where the developments of the past quarter of a century had produced a situation in which international rivalries, jealousies, distrust, and antagonism were fostered.²

These international rivalries had developed between Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and Japan; but Japan had

¹Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 155.

²Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 819.

become the greatest offender, having established its political and economic ascendancy over Manchuria, Shantung and parts of Siberia by the time of the Conference. Therefore, the purpose of the Conference as stated in its agenda (to restore the territorial and administrative integrity of China, to enforce equality of economic and industrial opportunity as expressed in the policy of the Open Door, and to deal with similar questions in regard to Siberia and the Mandated Islands) not only conflicted with Japan's policies in the past, but possibly, also, with her intentions in the future.³

In an effort to prevent the Conference from disturbing her gains, the Japanese Foreign Office, in its note of July 27, 1921, to the American Government declared that in order to secure the success of the Conference, questions should not be included in the agenda "such as are of sole concern to certain particular Powers, or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished fact." This statement contained the germ of two doctrines that came to be associated with Japanese policy: the Doctrine of Sole Concern, by which the Japanese Government made it known that she did not wish the Conference to deal with disputes between Japan and China or Japan and Siberia which did not technically

³Buell, op. cit., pp. 240-241.

affect the treaty rights of a third power; and the Doctrine of the Accomplished Fact, by which Japan admitted her willingness to discuss the future policy to be followed by foreign powers in Asia, but she could not permit her position already established there to be challenged.⁴

However, the agenda was adopted, in its entirety, and, according to the schedule, the first question the Conference had to decide was that of principles.⁵

When the matter of principles was presented at the first meeting of the Committee of the Whole on November 16, the Chinese introduced the following resolutions:

1. (a) The powers engage to respect and observe the territorial integrity and political and administrative independence of the Chinese republic.
(b) China, upon her part, is prepared to give an understanding not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to another power.
2. China, being in full accord with the principle of the so-called Open Door, or equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all the nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept and apply it in all parts of the Chinese republic without exception.
3. With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and Far East, the powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these

⁴Loc. cit.

⁵Conference on Limitation of Armaments, Washington, November 12, 1921--February 6, 1922, Volume I, p. 10.

regions without previously notifying and giving her an opportunity to participate.

4. All special rights, privileges, immunities, or commitments, whatever their character or contractual basis, claimed by any of the powers in or relating to China are to be declared, and all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities and commitments now known or to be declared, are to be examined, with a view to determining their scope and validity, and, if valid, to harmonizing them with one another and with the principles declared by this conference.
5. Immediately, or as soon as circumstances will permit, existing limitations upon China's political, jurisdictional, and administrative freedom of action are to be removed.
6. Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be attached to China's present commitments, which are without time limits.
7. In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights or privileges, the well-established principle of construction that such grants shall be strictly construed in favor of the grantors is to be observed.
8. China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in future wars to which she is not a party.
9. Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in the Pacific and the Far East.
10. Provision is to be made for future conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of international questions relative to the Pacific and the Far East as a basis for determination of common policies, of the signatory powers in relation thereto.⁶

⁶Ibid., p. 444.

China's Ten Principles were referred by Chairman Hughes to the Subcommittee of Senior delegates of the nine participating nations--the United States, Belgium, British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal. This Subcommittee had been set up for the purpose of arranging and classifying the topics for discussion at the Conference. This Subcommittee met on the following day. On November 19, Mr. Hughes reported to the Committee of the Whole the findings of the Subcommittee, viz: the first eight points of the Ten Principles might be discussed in accordance with the order of the agenda; the last two points did not concern China alone, but they might be discussed also, or they could be referred to special committees for individual study.⁷

Mr. Hughes then invited the delegates to a general discussion on the questions relative to China. Baron Kato declared that Japan was uninfluenced by any policy of territorial aggrandizement in China, that it adhered unconditionally to the policy of the Open Door, and was willing to agree to principles which would guide the future actions of nations.⁸ Mr. Balfour expressed Britain's belief in the integrity of China and the desirability of leaving China to work out her own affairs and to substitute, when circumstances

⁷Ibid., p. 446.

⁸Ibid., p. 447.

⁹Ibid., p. 449.

warranted, the normal processes of law for the extra-territoriality.⁹ Baron de Cartier reported that Belgium was anxious to help furnish China the means to overcome her difficulties.¹⁰ M. Schanzer added that Italy was ready to support the solutions found by the Conference to China's problems.¹¹ M. Briand remarked that France was ready to consider the most favorable light the Chinese claims.¹² Jonkheer Van Karnebeck said that Holland was ready to examine China's claims in a spirit of friendship.¹³ Viscount d'Almeida gladly associated Portugal with the other nations in this expression of sympathy.¹⁴ Dr. Sze expressed China's sincere appreciation of this united understanding in connection with their kind remarks, and he would reserve to the Chinese delegation the privilege of discussing them in detail.¹⁵ Dr. Sze then made a lengthy explanation of China's interests in, and attitude on, the Far Eastern questions.¹⁶

In view of these sentiments, Mr. Root was requested by the Committee to formulate resolutions embodying these principles. Accordingly, on November 21, Mr. Root presented

¹⁰Ibid., p. 448.

¹¹Ibid., p. 449-50.

¹²Ibid., p. 448.

¹³Ibid., p. 449.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 450.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 451.

¹⁶"China Defines Position in the Far East", The Houston Chronicle, November 16, 1921.

to the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs the four following principles known as the Root Resolutions:

It is the firm intention of the powers attending this conference, hereinafter mentioned to wit, the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.¹⁷

Buell remarks that these resolutions, which were unanimously adopted, are noteworthy because they omit all references to the vested rights of powers in China which Articles Four and Six of the China's Ten Principles had included. In other words, the American Delegation limited its propositions to future applications in accordance with Japanese

¹⁷Buell, op. cit., pp. 246-250.

wishes.¹⁸

The Conference was now ready to discuss the application of adopted principles, and it was suggested that China present such matters as she wished to have discussed. Mr. Underwood then called attention to the financial condition of China, saying that her main source of revenue was customs dues, which were inadequate.¹⁹

Dr. Koo then made a detailed statement which included: a statement of the history and origin of China's treaty tariffs; a request that China, after a certain measure of time, have the right to fix and to differentiate the import tariff rates (maritime customs were, in part, controlled by foreigners); and a proposal that China would abandon likin (transit duties) in return for tariff autonomy. As an immediate measure of relief, he asked that China be allowed to increase custom duties to twelve and one-half per cent effective, which he estimated, with the removal of other restrictions, would bring in an additional \$300,000,000 annually.²⁰ This request was referred to a Subcommittee on Chinese Fiscal Affairs, headed by Mr. Underwood, in whose deliberations it was reported that the United States was willing to grant China the twelve and one-half per cent

¹⁸Euell, op. cit., pp. 246-250.

¹⁹Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 463.

²⁰Ibid., p. 471.

increase in duties at once, and that Great Britain would grant seven and one-half per cent, but Japan was willing to grant up to five per cent, only.²¹

Instead of granting Dr. Koo's request, a compromise plan was effected on January 5, which was to be embodied in the final Tariff Treaty of February 6.²² This compromise provided that:

1. A Revision Committee at Shanghai shall revise the customs schedule so that the rates of duty shall be five per cent effective. This revision shall proceed with a view to its conclusion within four months from the conclusion of the Washington Conference.
2. Within three months a Special Conference shall meet in China to take immediate steps to prepare the way for the abolition of the likin tax and for raising the tariffs to twelve and one-half per cent effective, in accordance with the Treaties of 1902 and 1903.
3. Prior to the abolition of the likin tax, a surtax of two and one-half per cent is to be levied, which may be increased to five per cent on luxuries. But these surtaxes are to be authorized by the Special Conference, as from such date, for such purposes and subject to such conditions as it might determine.²³

It was evident from the vague terminology and provisions of the compromise that there were means by which to

²¹"The Arms Conference", The New York Times Current History, January, 1922, p. 556.

²²See Appendix II, Treaty VII.

²³H. G. W. Woodhead, "China and the Pacific Conference", Weekly Review of the Far East, November 12, 1921.

prevent the permanent increases of the Chinese tariffs. But even if the changes in tariff agreed to in the compromise were effected, the increase in revenue could only be \$46,167,000, whereas China's minimum financial needs required an increased revenue of \$200,000,000. Forty million dollars was necessary to pay off troops, which was essential before they would consent to be disbanded; overdrafts on Chinese banks amounted to seventy million dollars; foreign loans had been contracted totaling \$376,000,000. China was not able to create a central government strong enough to control military governors (supported in part by Japanese funds and the likin tax) without much greater increases than were allowed.²⁴ Furthermore, an increase in tariffs and tariff autonomy differed from the question of Manchuria and the Open Door, in that it did not affect the "vested rights" of foreign powers as did Articles Four and Six of the Ten Principles; it merely meant the payment of higher duties on imported goods in the future, and duties which, even when they were raised to twelve and one-half per cent, would be about a third as low as those charged in the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan.²⁵

²⁴Buell, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

²⁵Loc. cit.

The Shantung settlement was a matter which concerned the Chinese and Japanese, and thus was a "by-product" of the Conference; and yet, because it was vitally related to Far Eastern questions, and because, in a sense from the American standpoint, the settlement of the Shantung problem was most important, a sketch is included here.²⁶ Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour offered their "good offices" in negotiation over the former German leased territory of Kiaochow Bay, which had come into Japan's possession in connection with World War I. Two issues were at stake: the disposition of property held by individual Japanese in Tsingtau which had been taken from the Chinese and Germans during the war by duress; and the control of the Shantung (Tsing Tau-Tsinan) Railroad. For thirty-six meetings, the Japanese haggled over details--to illustrate, when China would agree to purchase the road and to pay cash, Japan refused to accept the offer, nominally on the ground that China could not raise the cash and that the road would be mismanaged unless directed by Japanese experts.

On January 20, the Conference was startled by a resolution in the United States Senate calling on the President

²⁶In 1919, Harding had denounced the Shantung settlement at the Treaty of Versailles as the "rape of the first great democracy of the Orient"; if the Conference could not effect an apparent settlement of the Shantung question, it was likely to have serious political consequences.

for information as to the settlement of the Shantung problem. Both the President and the Japanese delegation realized the Senate would never ratify the Naval Treaty unless the Shantung problem was solved. Realizing that Japan agreed to come to terms in regard to Shantung only if no pressure was placed upon her in regard to Manchuria and Siberia.

In the Shantung Treaty, announced on February 1, 1922, Japan agreed to transfer the Shantung Railway to China within nine months in return for 32,000,000 silver dollars; simultaneously China was to deliver to Japan, Chinese Government Treasury notes, secured by the property and revenue of the railroad, running for fifteen years, but redeemable after five years. Pending their redemption, China was to hire a Japanese traffic manager and a Japanese chief accountant. The treaty required that the vested rights of Japanese citizens in Shantung be respected; the Shantung Railway was to be transferred in nine months.²⁷

In spite of Japan's demand for reassurance as to her position in Manchuria, the Chinese delegation was determined to secure the return of Manchuria to China and the cancellation of the notorious Twenty-One Demands, which had been presented to China in 1915, and on which Japan's position

²⁷This sketch of the Shantung settlement has been based on Buell's discussion, "The Defeat of China" in The Washington Conference, pp. 240-280.

in Manchuria was based.²⁸ Since neither Manchuria nor the Twenty-One Demands was on the agenda, Dr. Sze was obliged to introduce them indirectly. On November 28, Dr. Sze proposed the removal of all unauthorized foreign troops from Chinese soil.²⁹ The Japanese delegate replied that the Japanese police in Manchuria were stationed there in accordance with treaties³⁰ to prevent crimes against the Japanese and that they did not interfere with Chinese citizens--a blunt warning that Japan's position in Manchuria was not to be disturbed.³¹ The Conference then passed a resolution stating that the diplomatic representatives of the powers at Washington in Peking should associate themselves with three representatives of the Chinese Government to conduct a full inquiry into the matter of foreign armed forces in China.³²

On December 3, the Chinese Delegation asked for the annulment and early termination of all foreign leaseholds in China; these included, for the British, Wei-hai-Wai across from Port Arthur and Kowloon opposite Hongkong; for the French, Kwangchow-wan opposite the island of Hainan in South China;

²⁸Westel W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920), pp. 381-407.

²⁹The Arms Conference, The New York Times Current History, January 1922, p. 529C.

³⁰Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935, p. 217).

³¹"The Arms Conference", op. cit., p. 529C.

³²Loc. cit.

and for the Japanese, leases of Kiachow, Port Arthur and Darien. Since the ports of Port Arthur and Darien, together with the South Manchurian Railroad, control the commerce of Manchuria and Siberia, the termination of the Japanese leases meant the weakening of Japan's special position in Manchuria.³³ The Japanese made it clear that they would not relinquish territory which they had acquired as successor to other Powers; the British would not give up Kowloon because it was necessary to the defense of Hongkong.³⁴

Four days later the Chinese attacked Japan's position in regard to the Manchurian lease, stating that it was obtained in such a manner as to be one of the gravest questions between China and Japan, which was the first real injection of the "Twenty-One Demands" into the Conference.³⁵ On December 14, the Chinese asked the abrogation of the Manchurian leases by 1923.³⁶ On the 19th, the Chinese Delegation issued a statement saying that unless the Twenty-One Demands were cancelled, the principles of the Conference could be little more than a scrap of paper.³⁷ The Committee on Far Eastern Questions adjourned on December 14, just when

³³Ibid., pp. 529A-530.

³⁴Ibid., p. 529B.

³⁵Ibid., p. 529C.

³⁶Loc. cit.

³⁷Ibid., p. 529D.

the Twenty-One Demands were introduced.³⁸ At the Committee meeting of January 16, Mr. Hughes suggested that the question of the Twenty-One Demands and the Spheres of Influence should be postponed until after the settlement of the Shantung question.³⁹

The Shantung settlement was announced on February 1, 1922. The Conference had lasted a month longer than expected, and the conferees were anxious to get home, but Mr. Hughes was on record that the Twenty-One Demands would be put before the Conference; so he announced that on February 2 an opportunity had been reserved for the Japanese to make a statement.⁴⁰ Baron Shidehara then arose and declared that the validity of the treaties and notes of May, 1915, could not be questioned, but that, in view of changed conditions, Japan was willing to make these modifications: that Japan was willing to throw open to the joint activity of the international financial consortium recently organized the right of participation granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital; that Japan had no intention of insisting on her preferential right concerning the engagement of Japanese advisers in South Manchuria; and

³⁸Loc. cit.

³⁹Loc. cit.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 529D.

that Japan was ready to withdraw her reservation that Group V of the original proposals would be postponed for future proposals.⁴¹

The Chinese Delegation made a statement recognizing the concessions of Japan, but regretting that she had not renounced other claims based on the same treaties.⁴² Mr. Hughes then read the American note of May 13, 1915, protesting the Twenty-One Demands, and asserted that the United States would claim all rights for Americans which China had granted to Japanese nationals in Manchuria, under the Most-Favored-Nation Clause.⁴³

After the three statements of Japan, China, and the United States had been spread upon the records of the Plenary Session of February 4, 1922, the Twenty-One Demands were dropped. Japan's position in Manchuria remained secure.⁴⁴

Of less importance was the matter of extra-territoriality which Dr. Wong introduced to the Conference on November 25, 1921. The right of foreigners in China to be tried in their own and not in Chinese courts, had been granted in 1844, when China believed it to be beneath her dignity to allow foreigners to use her courts; but the

⁴¹Ibid., p. 529D.

⁴²Ibid., p. 530.

⁴³Loc. cit.

⁴⁴Loc. cit.

exemption of foreigners from Chinese jurisdiction had become both objectionable to China and disadvantageous to foreigners. Therefore, China asked that representatives of the powers negotiate for the modification and ultimate abolition of extraterritoriality. This request was referred to a Subcommittee. The report of the Subcommittee was adopted on November 28 in the form of a resolution that a Commission be appointed to inquire into the practice of extraterritoriality, said Commission to be formed within three months after the Conference and to make its report within one year after its first meeting. Each of the powers would be free to accept or reject the recommendations of the Commission.⁴⁵

Under the heading "application", the Agenda of the Conference listed:

1. The Open Door--equality of commercial and industrial opportunity; Concessions, monopolies or preferential economic privileges; Development of railways, including plans relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway; Preferential railroad rates; and Status of existing Commitments.⁴⁶

Mr. Hughes introduced the subject of the Open Door by submitting the following draft resolution:

With a view to applying more effectively the principles of the Open Door, or equality of opportunity, in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the powers, other than China at this Conference agree:

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 533.

⁴⁶See Agenda, p. 48.

- a. Not to seek or support their nationals in seeking any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China.
- b. Not to seek or support their nationals in seeking any such monopoly or preference as would deprive other nationals of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese government or with any provincial government in any category of public enterprise or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that this agreement is not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking, or to the encouragement of invention and research.

- 2. The Chinese government takes note of the above agreement and declares its intention of being guided by the same principles in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from governments and nationals whether parties to the agreement or not.
- 3. The powers (including China) represented at this Conference agree in principle to the establishment in China of a board of reference to which any question arising on the above agreement may be deferred for investigation or report.
- 4. The powers, including China, represented at this Conference agree that any provisions of an existing concession which appears to be inconsistent with those of another concession or with the principles of the above agreement or declaration, may be submitted by the parties concerned to the board of reference when established for the purpose of endeavoring to arrive at a satisfactory adjustment on equitable terms.⁴⁷

In the general discussion that followed the reading of this resolution, M. Sarrant said that certain abuses could grow out of Article Four.⁴⁸ Baron Shidehara said that the principles formulated in the resolution were of an entirely different scope from the policy of the Open Door conceived in 1898, and, therefore, should not be retroactive.⁴⁹ Mr. Hughes then presented a resume of international instruments bearing on the Open Door, including the circular notes of Secretary Hay in 1899, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1900, and the Root-Takhira note of 1908; he concluded that he had not made a new statement, but merely a more definite statement of a principle to which the powers concerned had adhered for twenty years.⁵⁰

Sir Robert Borden said that the principal difficulties had arisen in regard to Article Four; it appeared to him that the powers could act with equal effect under Article Three and he, therefore, prepared to omit Article Four.⁵¹ Dr. Sze argued to retain Article Four, but the Article was withdrawn.⁵² Otherwise, the Hughes resolutions were adopted and became Article III of the Nine Power Treaty Relating to Principles

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 625.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 630-31.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 631-35.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 635.

⁵²Loc. cit.

and Policies in Matters Concerning China.⁵³

In dealing with equality of economic and industrial opportunity which constituted the policy of the Open Door, the first phase, which came indirectly in connection with the tariff question, was followed by the question of foreign postoffices and wireless facilities.

For fifty years different nations had maintained their own postoffices in China at a time when the Chinese postal system did not exist. In spite of the development of an efficient postal system in China, Japan maintained 124 postoffices in China, Britain twelve, France thirteen, and the United States one. None of these postoffices existed by reason of treaty rights.⁵⁴ Therefore, on November 25, Minister Sze proposed that all of the powers abolish their postal services in China at once on the following basis: that the Chinese postal system was adequate to meet the needs of all foreigners; the operation of foreign postoffices deprived the Chinese system of a source of revenue to which it was entitled; and these postal agencies violated the territorial and administrative integrity of China.⁵⁵

⁵³See Appendix II, Treaty VI.

⁵⁴"The Arms Conference", op. cit., pp. 526-529A.

⁵⁵Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 485.

On November 28, the Far Eastern Committee adopted China's request but the date for the withdrawal was left blank until the Japanese delegation had communicated with their home government; the date of withdrawal was finally fixed as January 1, 1923. Moreover, foreign postoffices located in leased territories were exempted from the resolution.⁵⁶

On November 28, Minister Sze brought up the questions of foreign electrical facilities maintained on Chinese soil without authorization of treaty: Japan maintained fifty regular telegraph stations in China plus eleven wireless installations; France, four; Great Britain, two; and the United States, three.⁵⁷ These electrical facilities were as abusive of the principles of the Open Door and the administrative integrity of China as the postoffices; consequently, he asked that they be withdrawn. On December 7, the Far Eastern Committee recognized the justice of the request by adopting a resolution which provided that all radio stations maintained on Chinese territory without the consent of the Chinese government should be transferred to the Chinese authorities after the Chinese had made full compensation for the properties.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the question

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 496-97, 572.

⁵⁷"The Arms Conference", op. cit., pp. 548-549.

⁵⁸Loc. cit.

of radio stations in leased territories in the South Manchurian Railway Zone and in the French concession were regarded as matters for discussion between the Chinese government and the French and Japanese, respectively.⁵⁹

On November 28, Minister Sze brought the matter of Chinese railways before the Far Eastern Committee: as in the case of postoffices and electrical installations, most of the railways of China operated under some form of foreign control, to the detriment of that equal opportunity for commerce promulgated by the policy of the Open Door.⁶⁰ In order to enact the principle of equality of treatment, Sir Auckland Geddes presented a resolution, which was unanimously adopted, which aimed at producing non-discrimination.⁶¹ However, recognizing that as long as the railways were under foreign direction, discrimination could neither be completely recognized nor abolished, Mr. Hughes recognized that the fundamental solution lay in placing the railways under Chinese management.⁶²

Therefore, on December 19 a resolution was adopted by which the powers expressed their hope that the future development of railways in China should be so conducted as to

⁵⁹Loc. cit.

⁶⁰"The Arms Conference", op. cit., pp. 524-25.

⁶¹Loc. cit.

⁶²Loc. cit.

enable the Chinese Government to effect the unification of railways into a railways system under Chinese control; but no attempt was made to bring about this result.⁶³

Included under the question of railways was the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which connected the South Manchurian Railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was under Russian control before World War I. In 1919 an Inter-Allied Commission was established to take charge of the Siberian transportation systems and continued to operate the Chinese Eastern which had fallen into grave financial difficulties.⁶⁴ On January 18 Mr. Hughes appointed a Subcommittee to determine what action the Conference would take in regard to the Chinese Eastern. On January 23, this Subcommittee reported that the problems of the Far Eastern Railway were those of finance, operation and police, and that foreign funds could not be obtained without foreign supervision; therefore the Subcommittee recommended that the present Inter-Allied Commission be replaced by a permanent Finance Committee, composed of one representative of each of the powers at Washington, sitting at Harbin. This Finance

⁶³Loc. cit.

⁶⁴Loc. cit.

Committee should act as trustee for the road.⁶⁵

The Chinese representatives so vigorously opposed these recommendations⁶⁶ that Mr. Hughes found it advisable to appoint a Subcommittee to make a further study.⁶⁷ Mr. Root reported for this Subcommittee that studies had been made of technical drafts and various resolutions, none of which seemed to make any improvement in the situation; therefore, it was recommended that the subject should be dealt with through the proper diplomatic channels.⁶⁸ This served to recognize the principle of direct negotiation between China and Japan in regard to matters of international concern.⁶⁹

On January 19, the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs officially considered the subject "The status of existing commitments". On January 20, a resolution that the powers represented at the Conference should file a list of all treaties and engagements upon which they based their claims was vigorously opposed by the Japanese on the ground that most of the agreements between Japan and China were in the Chinese and Japanese languages, of which no authentic translations had been made and existing complications could not

⁶⁵Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 689-91.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 691-92.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 692.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 751.

⁶⁹"The Arms Conference", op. cit., p. 534.

be regarded as authentic.⁷⁰ Therefore, a substitute Publicity Resolution was adopted which required the publication of contracts of a public character which would be signed in the future.⁷¹

Again, on January 23, Mr. Koo raised the question of existing commitments by calling the attention of the Conference to Number Six of the original Ten Principles which provided that reasonable, definite terms of duration were to be attached to China's present commitments which were without time limits. Mr. Underwood gave a characteristically legal reply when he said that if the Conference should interfere with those contracts, it would violate the sovereignty of China.⁷² In reply to Mr. Koo's reiterated desire for machinery to settle these disputes, Mr. Hughes remarked that China was a member of the permanent court of arbitration at The Hague, and he doubted if it were wise to duplicate already existing machinery.⁷³

Siberia occupied an identical position on the agenda as China; but while thirty-one meetings and twelve weeks were devoted to China, only parts of two sessions were used to discuss the affairs of Siberia. A settlement was actually made on her affairs within some fifteen minutes.⁷⁴

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 539.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 542.

⁷²Buell, op. cit., p. 309.

⁷³Ibid., p. 310.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 310-311.

Moreover, Siberia had no recognized government because of the refusal of the United States to recognize either the Soviet Government at Moscow or the Far Eastern Republic.⁷⁵ The troops had gone into Siberia in 1918-1920; the Japanese troops had promised to withdraw upon the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops, which had been accomplished in September 1920; the American troops had withdrawn in the same year. Yet in January, 1922, the Japanese troops remained in Siberia. They captured the three eastern outlets of Siberia, and they occupied the maritime Provinces and northern Sakhalin.⁷⁶

On January 23, Mr. Hughes introduced the Siberian question to the Far Eastern Committee, whereupon Baron Shidehara made a declaration on the position of the Japanese government.⁷⁷ He promised that Japan would respect the territorial integrity of Russia, would observe the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs and of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations; and as soon as possible would terminate finally the Siberian expedition.⁷⁸

On January 24, Mr. Hughes reviewed the history of the Siberian expedition and the promises which Japan had made.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 311.

⁷⁶Loc. cit.

⁷⁷Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 698-701.

⁷⁸Loc. cit.

A resolution was then passed by the Committee to the effect that the statement of the Japanese and American delegations in regard to the presence of foreign troops in Siberia be reported to the Conference at its next plenary meeting, and spread upon the records. This was done on February 4, 1922. The resolution did not name a date by which these troops were to be withdrawn, or by which northern Sakhalin was to be evacuated.⁷⁹

In addition, on February 11, 1922, but not as a part of the Conference, the United States and Japan negotiated a treaty in regard to the mandated islands of the Pacific, and in particular the island of Yap, the westernmost of the Caroline group, about nine degrees north of the Equator in longitude 138 degrees east. The Peace Conference had conferred on Japan only mandatory powers over the German Pacific Islands north of the Equator, including Yap.⁸⁰ On November 12, 1920, the Japanese Foreign Office received a note from the American Government stating it was the clear understanding of the United States that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference had reserved for future consideration the island of Yap in the hope that it might be placed under international

⁷⁹Loc. cit.

⁸⁰Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 324.

control for use as an international cable station.⁸¹ On the nineteenth of November, 1920, the Japanese Government replied that it understood the whole of the German islands north of the Equator were placed under the Japanese mandate.⁸²

The exchange of diplomatic notes continued; and in view of the fact that the United States did not join the League of Nations, the American and Japanese reached a definite understanding as regards the right of the two governments and their nationals in the mandated islands, including Yap. In this treaty, the United States consented to the Japanese mandates, the United States secured all the rights granted to the members of the League; American citizens secured free access to the island of Yap on equal footing with Japanese in all that related to the landing and operation of the Yap-Guam cable or any cable which might thereafter be laid by the United States.⁸³

In summary, then, the work of Pacific and Far Eastern Conference emerged in two main treaties, covering numerous negotiations; two treaties between China and Japan which were incidental to the work of the Conference, and numerous

⁸¹Ibid., p. 324.

⁸²Loc. cit.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 323-339.

resolutions which represented the will of the Conference.

The two main treaties were: a Treaty between all Nine Powers relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China; and a Treaty between all Nine Powers relating to Chinese customs tariff.

The Nine Powers Treaty, by which the nations bound themselves in regard to matters concerning China, was composed of nine articles.⁸⁴ These nine articles represented a mass of negotiations in regard to tariff increase and autonomy, the return of Shantung, the cancellation of the Twenty-One Demands, foreign troops in China, the Open Door and Spheres of Interest.⁸⁵ Article I revised the Chinese customs duties to an effective five per cent ad valorem. Article II directed the speedy abolition of likin. Article III authorized a surtax at a uniform rate of two and one-half per centum ad valorem. Article IV provided for periodic revision of Chinese import duties. Article V required effective equality of treatment for all the Contracting Powers. Article VI recognized the principle of uniformity in the rates of customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China. Article VII set two and one-half per centum ad valorem on the charge for transit duties until they

⁸⁴See Appendix II, Treaty VI for full text.

⁸⁵For full text, see Appendix II, Treaty VII.

were abolished as required in Article II. Article VIII invited the adherence of non-signatory powers. Article IX stated that the provisions of the existing treaty were to override all stipulations of treaties between China and the respective Contracting Powers which were inconsistent therewith. Article X provided for the proper ratification of that treaty.

The treaties, of which the English and French texts were both authentic, were to remain deposited in the archives of the government of the United States, and duly certified copies were to be sent to the Contracting Powers.

The two Nine-Power treaties were signed in the two final hours of the Conference beginning at 10:00 o'clock a. m. in the Assembly Hall of the Daughters of the American Revolution on Monday, February 6, 1922. President Harding delivered an address closing the Conference as he had formally opened it some twelve weeks before. Dr. Abernathy, who had offered the invocation at the beginning of the Conference, pronounced the benediction.

Chairman Hughes rapped the table with the gavel, and declared, "The Conference is adjourned sine die."⁸⁶

⁸⁶"Limitation of Armament Conference Is Ended", The Houston Chronicle, February 6, 1922.

CHAPTER VI

Evaluation of the Conference

An attempt has been made to present an over-all picture of The Washington Conference of 1922. Confidence in the Conference ran the gamut from the fanaticism of idealism to the bitterness of disillusionment. So great was President Harding's enthusiasm, that, during the annual meeting of the Red Cross on December 7, 1921, he told its members that they might never again be called on to relieve war suffering on a scale comparable to that of recent years, "because we are going to succeed beyond our fondest hopes in the Armament Conference."¹

In his address at the closing session of the Conference, Mr. Harding said:

This Conference has wrought a truly great achievement. It is hazardous to speak in superlatives, and I will be restrained. But I will say, with every confidence, that the faith plighted here today, kept in national honor, will mark the beginning of a new and better epoch of human affairs.²

That Secretary Hughes concurred in the ardor of the President is evidenced by his remarks on the signing of the Five Power Treaty: "This treaty ends, absolutely ends,

¹News article in The Houston Chronicle, December 7, 1921.

²"Address of the President", Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, (American Association for International Conciliation, Greenwich, 1922), p. 71.

the race in competition in naval armament."³

At the other end of the scale is the reaction presented by H. C. Ferrady in his article "Sea Power in the Pacific" in his remark that the British acceptance of such drastic scrapping of capital ships as was required by the Hughes plan was a fatal step. He added that the use of the word 'drastic' constituted a grave understatement; 'suicidal' would have been a more accurate word.⁴ In this regard, he continued:

What unconscious irony there was in Balfour's words at the final session of the Washington Conference! The Conference, he said, had inaugurated a new era for part of the world in which the great maritime Powers are most intimately and deeply concerned.

It is indeed a new era when a great maritime power finds herself incapable of defending her seaborne interests.⁵

General contemporary opinion was both laudatory and condemning. It was heralded as a universal success by the newspapers.⁶ However, that public opinion was somewhat critical was evidenced in the editorial "From Principles to Problems", in which it was observed that the Arms Conference had opened with a parade of principles and seemed likely to end up with a riot of problems.⁷ Editorial opinion clearly

³"Where the Arms Conference Failed", World's Work, April, 1927, p. 593.

⁴H. C. Ferrady, "Sea Power in the Pacific", The Nineteenth Century, February, 1942.

⁵Ibid., p. 604.

⁶Buell, op. cit., p. 324.

⁷Editorial, The New York Herald, January 31, 1922.

discerned a great weakness of the Conference in "Parties to the Problems" which dealt with European nations not represented at the Conference.⁸

Gilson Gardner writing in Labor Age facetiously referred to the Four-Power Pact as the faux pas pact and then recalled Frank Simonds' description of the disarmament conference--"secret disagreements openly arrived at."⁹

Ichihashi aptly noted that the naval experts of England, Japan and the United States alike uttered lamentations over the Washington Arms treaties, each expert feeling that his own country had made the greatest sacrifices. The British critics charged that the Americans gained the substance of all they desired at the expense of the British and Japanese; the Americans insisted that Japan secured the naval mastery of Asia; and the Japanese lamented that Japan's hands were tied, and she was thus rendered helpless as a naval power.¹⁰

Lord Wester-Wemyss, British naval expert, in regretting Britain's voluntary resignation from her position as ruler of the waves, which position was obtained as a result of a three-hundred years' struggle, said:

⁸Editorial, The Washington Post, November 29, 1921.

⁹Gilson Gardner, "The Arms Conference Has Not Found the Way", Labor Age, February, 1922, pp. 15-17.

¹⁰Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 145.

The Conference has proven an unqualified success for the United States. . . , but they never would have obtained so triumphant an issue without the wholehearted co-operation of Great Britain.¹¹

Admiral Sims pointed out that while the United States was given a capital strength ratio equal to that of Great Britain, the United States had practically no necessary auxiliaries except destroyers. To reach equality with Great Britain she should build, but Congress refused to appropriate the money. He declared that:

Our present policy makes us a bad third. Britannia not only rules the waves but rules them more economically now; . . . learned foreign naval experts are fond of pointing out that the Washington Conference was a shrewd Yankee move to gain naval supremacy because we were convinced that the battleship is doomed. But the irony of the situation is that our naval men are firmly convinced that it is not. Curiously enough, each country appears to be convinced that it made the heaviest sacrifices, and that the United States alone gained.¹²

The Japanese naval expert, Admiral T. Ishimaru, declared that the national defense of Japan suffered on account of the Naval Treaty because of the unjust ratio of capital ships which forced her to feel the insecurity of her position in the Pacific; she was placed in a disadvantageous position from the point of view of her fleet organization

¹¹Lord Wester-Wemyss, "And After Washington", The Nineteenth Century, March, 1922, pp. 405-416.

¹²W. S. Sims, "Status of the United States Navy", Current History, May, 1922, pp. 185-194.

because of the differences in the character of the ships possessed by Japan and the other nations; and because under the Four-Power Pact, Japan sacrificed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and was made a co-partner to guarantee the security of Guam, the Philippines, etc.¹³

G. Schornsteiner took the position that the Washington Conference had benefitted Japan primarily. He said:

In all the diplomatic history of Japan there has been no victory quite so complete, so important, or one gained at so little cost, as her victory at the Washington Arms Conference. She had gained the position for which she has been struggling for fifty years, and accomplished it without bloodshed, and even without creating hard feelings All other nations must now stand back, despite the fact that the Naval Treaty leaves Japan forty per cent weaker than either the British Empire or the United States. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been terminated and the Japanese Empire is no longer bound by agreements which she may be forced to keep . . . Japan has absolutely a free hand in the Pacific and Asia today. We have given it to her in the Arms Conference treaties. I state these things not as arguments for or against the treaties. It would be useless to do so, for they have been ratified by our Senate, and nothing more is to be said. But of our own choosing, perhaps blundering, we must keep our hands off Asia in the future, if we are to have peace and retain our possessions.¹⁴

J. O. P. Bland, writing in the Atlantic Monthly in regard to the settlement of the Pacific problem, declared

¹³T. Ishimaru, "Public Opinion on the Imperial Navy After the Washington Conference", Taiyo (The Sun), February 1922, pp. 69-75, quoted in Ichihashi's The Washington Conference, p. 145.

¹⁴G. Schornstheimer, "Japan's Naval Mastery in Asia", Current History, August 1922, pp. 744-50.

that the outlook was not hopeful, declaring that Japan would undoubtedly continue with all resources at her disposal to accelerate her peaceful penetration into that field of economic activity, upon which, as Baron Shidehara frankly told the Conference, she depended for her very existence.¹⁵

Norman H. Davis, formerly Undersecretary of State for the United States, delivered an address before the Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 1922.¹⁶ In this address, "An Analysis of the Work of the Conference on The Limitation of Armament and Far Eastern Questions", Mr. Davis gave, perhaps, the most discriminating and comprehensive of the contemporary commentaries on the Conference. He pointed out the seriousness of the absence from the parley of the nations so recently defeated in World War I; he pointed out the failure of the Conference to provide machinery to achieve its desires, that too much was left to the "spirit" of the Conference; he feared the effect of its failure to limit auxiliaries; he sensed the dangers inherent in the non-fortification commitments America had made in the Four-Power Pact to secure ratification of the Naval Treaty; he questioned

¹⁵J. O. P. Bland "After Washington, The Future of The Pacific Problems", Atlantic Monthly, December 1922, pp. 843-853.

¹⁶Norman H. Davis, "An Analysis of the Work of the Conference on The Limitation of Armament and Far Eastern Questions" (An Address Delivered Before the Council on Foreign Relations, Hotel Astor, New York City, February 17, 1923).

the exclusive nature of the Four-Power Pact, as well as the possibilities of obligations involved therein.

In analysing the various treaties of the Conference, Mr. Davis concluded that as a result of the Naval Treaty it would be impossible for any power, if acting alone, to intervene successfully in the Orient. The Four-Power Treaty made it impossible for Great Britain and United States to combine their fleets to intervene jointly. The result was that Japan was left absolutely supreme in the eastern Pacific and over Asia. These conclusions were contingent upon an adherence to the Treaties.

These agreements, he continued, have nipped in the bud an impending struggle for the supremacy of the seas; and, with the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, have brought the English speaking peoples of the world closer together.

The Nine-Power Treaty, Mr. Davis averred, was of little practical value; if the Door had been closed in China before the Conference, it was still closed after the Conference. The values of the Open Door treaty were minor but definite, he continued; Japan could no longer plead that the Open Door policy did not prohibit discriminations in concessions or monopolies; the Contracting Powers went on record as being in favor of the integrity of China; the danger that the Powers would recognize the "special interests" of Japan in

Manchuria was avoided, though theoretically, through the Open Door Treaty; and the Treaty reasserted the traditional Oriental policy of the United States. He concluded that if the Conference had been able to create some machinery to settle disputes arising out of the principles of the Open Door, its success would have been unlimited.

Dr. Buell gave an interesting analysis, from a contemporary viewpoint, of the work of the various delegations.¹⁷ He ascribed the success of the Japanese at the Washington Conference to their ready adherence to declarations in principle which the Conference was forced to accept at face value; and their great bargaining ability which led them to withhold final approval of settlement until their concessions were granted.¹⁸

Dr. Buell called attention to the obvious co-operation between the French and Japanese delegations; the two countries had common interests so far as submarines and land armaments were concerned; France supported Japan in regard to withdrawal of troops from China, existing concessions and publication of private contracts. The harmony of the American and British delegations gave France scant hope for American support of French European policy against

¹⁷Buell, op. cit., pp. 320-327.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 320.

that advocated by the British; hence, France sought the only remaining ally, Japan.¹⁹

Dr. Buell also related that the policy of the American delegation was also pro-Japanese.²⁰ Only once did the American delegation question the vested interests of Japan in China: in the original draft of the Open Door Resolutions, which, upon the Japanese protests, Mr. Hughes immediately withdrew.²¹ One explanation given for this was political: after having prevented the entrance of the United States into the League of Nations, the Republican Party was pledged to do something constructive for the peace of the world. Disarmament seemed to be the solution to the problem; but the American delegation could not secure Japanese ratification to the Naval Treaty without making the fortification concessions. The American delegation was sincere in believing that war could not settle the problems of the Far East; therefore, it was willing to achieve the limitation of disarmament at the cost of the Far East and then to do what it could to restrain Japanese imperialism by moral pressure.²²

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 320-21.

²⁰Ibid., p. 322.

²¹Loc. cit.

²²Ibid., pp. 322-26.

Dr. Buell's final conclusion was that the Conference made war between the United States and Great Britain impossible, and it postponed war between the United States and Japan at an exorbitant price. The Conference did not succeed in establishing the equality of commercial opportunity in China: rather, it strengthened the position of Japan, and it increased the hostility of the Chinese toward the Japanese.²³ Dr. Buell adds:

The Conference was unable, due to no fault of its own, to alter Japanese imperialism and the military machine responsible for its existence.²⁴

Such was contemporary Conference comment.

Five years later, Thomas S. Butler, Chairman of the Committee of Naval Affairs of the United States House of Representatives, stated:

The 1922 Washington Conference, while it accomplished much, has failed to end the race in competition in naval armaments. The spirit of that Conference was that there should be no intensive building of auxiliary ships that would give any of the five great nations greater naval strength than was contemplated in the Conference discussions. The treaty placed a limit on capital ships and the spirit of the Conference was that the ratio for capital ships should be applied to auxiliary ships. That at least is the understanding of the average American citizen.

My contention proved by the statement of delegates to the Conference, is that the letter

²³Ibid., pp. 326-27.

²⁴Ibid., p. 327.

of the naval treaty has been maintained, but not the spirit, and that the world powers, apart from the United States, are increasing their armaments in such numbers as to arouse suspicion and impair the equality in navy units enjoyed by the United States with Great Britain.²⁵

Immediately after the Conference, Japan began building feverishly, and the other nations likewise began to increase their auxiliaries.

Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, was quoted as follows:

The fact remains that, in letter and spirit, the United States of America has adhered to the Washington pact. It is doubtful whether the same thing can be unequivocally said about either Britain or Japan.²⁶

By 1927 Japan had laid down or appropriated for 116 auxiliary craft; France, 88; Italy, 46; British Empire, 37; and United States, 19. These ranged in type from the smallest craft to the formidable 10,000 ton cruiser with ten eight-inch guns and twelve 21-inch torpedo tubes. In this situation the United States was forced to build or force the other nations to suspend building programs.²⁷

Mr. Butler contended:

Does anyone imagine that the American Congress would have been foolish enough to have destroyed \$275,000,000 worth of good ships (whose destruction itself cost an additional \$27,000,000), abandoning its lead in sea power, if it had not thought there was some reliance to be placed in the spirit manifested treaty?

²⁵Thomas S. Butler, "Where The Arms Conference Failed", World's Work, April 1927, p. 669.

²⁶Thomas S. Butler, "Where The Arms Conference Failed", op. cit., p. 673.

²⁷Ibid. p. 671.

I mean what I say when I assert that, if any other understanding should have been in the minds of Congress at the time it destroyed this Government property, every one who took part in it, if he is now in public place should be thrown out of office. Any public official who would thus destroy public property, anticipating that it would have to be replaced within four years, should be driven from the society of good men. Nowhere in history can there be found a greater waste. Within four years of this unprecedented destruction of Government property, because of the great building programs of other nations, this Government is forced to put in its place many cruisers, just as dangerous to both property and men as the battleships which were destroyed, and requiring more money than the cost of the ships destroyed.²⁸

In the same year, 1927, Dr. L. M. Sears, erudite American student of foreign affairs, suggested that the diplomacy of Harding and Hughes in regard to the Four-Power Pact was in part responsible for later manifestations of distrust which continued between the United States and Japan. Although the Four-Power Pact was a notable development in the foreign policy of the United States, but it was doubtful compensation for Japan's being relegated to a position second to either of the Anglo-Saxon powers.²⁹

Such was the comment on the Conference in 1927.

In this thirty-second year (1954) after the Conference, it is possible to view the events of the Conference

²⁸Thomas S. Butler, "America Misled by Five Power Naval Treaty", Current History, April 1927, p. 90.

²⁹Louis Martin Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Thomas U. Crowell Company, 1927), p. 573.

with more objectivity than did those who participated in it or reported its happenings; and with less discomposure than those who saw its failure of attainment in the following decade. This frustration was to persist through succeeding conferences, innumerable negotiations, increasing land and naval armaments, the rise of dictatorships, mounting tensions; its climax was to come in World War II and the accompanying Korean Conflict.

With the memory of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 fresh in mind, it seems strange that our American delegation could not foresee, that having promised not to fortify further our possessions in the Pacific, only one knock-out blow at Hawaii would put America in a precarious position. It is equally singular that the erudite Dr. Buell should declare that the Naval Treaty had made it a physical impossibility for Japan to attack the United States and the United States to attack Japan.²⁹ However, negotiations had to be conducted according to the recognized tenets of diplomacy, statements had to be accepted at their face value, and promises had to be accepted as though they were made in full sincerity. The events of the following years were in the unforeseeable future.

If the future could have been charted, the mistakes that brought about the failures of the Conference might have

²⁹Buell, op. cit., p. 200.

been avoided; and, as a result, its obvious defects could have been remedied. However, no calculations of the future could have changed the conditions in which the world found itself at that time; nor could any amount of foresight have altered the maneuvering for positions of preference. It was not within the province of the Conference to change the character of men, nor the nature of nations.

The Washington Conference did not fail in the sense that it did not adhere to its program; a naval treaty was agreed upon and the Far Eastern situation was prevented from becoming a world problem which demanded immediate attention.

The editorial comment headed "Arms Parley About Through" seems apropos:

To put it another way, Hughes and associates got what they went after (though they went after a little more than they were assured of getting).

Either we are going to revert to the old system of unrestricted national aspiration, as represented by diplomatic intrigue, preparedness and special alliance, or we are going to have a fundamentally new order.

That is the one big issue which the civilized world faces today.

The Arms Parley has done little to clarify it, much less to solve it.³⁰

³⁰"Arms Parley About Through", The Baltimore Sun, February 3, 1922.

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APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
A LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS¹

The United States proposes the following plan for a limitation of the naval armaments of the conferring nations. The United States believes that this plan safely guards the interests of all concerned.

In working out this proposal the United States has been guided by four general principles:

- A. The elimination of all capital-ship building programs, either actual or projected.
- B. Further reduction through the scrapping of certain of the older ships.
- C. That regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the conferring powers.
- D. The use of capital-ship tonnage as the measurement of strength for navies and proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

CAPITAL SHIPS

United States

1. The United States to scrap all new capital ships now under construction and on their way to completion. This includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and building and 2 battleships launched.

Note.--Paragraph 1 involves a reduction of 15 new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 618,000 tons. Total amount of money already spent on 15 capital ships, \$332,000,000.

2. The United States to scrap all battleships up to, but not including, the Delaware and North Dakota.

Note.--The number of old battleships scrapped under paragraph 2 is 15; their total tonnage is 227,740 tons. The grand total of capital ships to be scrapped is 30, aggregating 845,740 tons.

¹Copied from Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress.

Great Britain

3. Great Britain to stop further construction of the 4 new Hoods.

Note.--Paragraph 3 involves a reduction of 4 new capital ships not yet laid down, but upon which money has been spent, with a total tonnage when completed of 172,000 tons.

4. In addition to the 4 Hoods, Great Britain to scrap her pre-dreadnoughts, second-line battleships and first-line battleships up to, but not including, the King George V class.

Note.--Paragraph 4 involves the disposition of 19 capital ships (certain of which have already been scrapped) with a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons. The grand total tonnage of ships scrapped under this agreement will be 583,375 tons.

Japan

5. Japan to abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz., the Kii, Owari, No. 7, No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, battle cruisers.

Note.--Paragraph 5 does not involve the stopping of construction of any ship upon which construction has begun.

6. Japan to scrap 3 battleships: the Mutsu launched, the Tosa and Kaga building; and 4 battle cruisers: the Amagi and Akagi building, and the Atago and Takao not yet laid down but for which certain material has been assembled.

Note.--Paragraph 6 involves a reduction of 7 new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 288,100 tons.

7. Japan to scrap all pre-dreadnoughts and capital ships of the second line. This to include the scrapping of all ships up to but not including the Settsu.

Note.--Paragraph 7 involves the scrapping of 10 elder ships with a total tonnage of 159,928 tons. The grand total reduction of tonnage of vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled, is 488,928 tons.

France and Italy

8. In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting existing strengths of the navies of France

and Italy, the United States does not consider necessary the discussion at this stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but proposes it be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

Other New Construction

9. No other capital ships shall be constructed during the period of this agreement except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter.

10. If the terms of this proposal are agreed to then the United States, Great Britain, and Japan agree that their navies, three months after the making of this agreement, shall consist of the following capital ships:

LIST OF CAPITAL SHIPS

United States	Great Britain	Japan
Maryland	Royal Sovereign	Negato
California	Royal Oak	Huuga
Tennessee	Resolution	Ise
Idaho	Ramillies	Yamashiro
Mississippi	Revenge	Fuso
New Mexico	Queen Elizabeth	Settsu
Arizona	Warspite	Kirishima
Pennsylvania	Valiant	Haruna
Oklahoma	Barham	Hiyei
Nevada	Mayala	Kongo
Texas	Benbow	Total.....10
New York	Emperor of India	
Arkansas	Iron Duke	Total tonnage 299,700
Wyoming	Marlborough	
Utah	Erin	
Florida	King George V	
North Dakota	Centurion	
Delaware	Ajax	
Total.....18	Hood	
	Renown	
Total tonnage 500,650	Repulse	
	Tiger	
	Total.....22	
	Total tonnage 604,450	

DISPOSITION OF OLD AND NEW CONSTRUCTION

11. Capital ships shall be disposed of in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

Replacements

12. (a) The tonnage basis for capital ship replacement under this proposal to be as follows:

United States.....	500,000 tons
Great Britain.....	500,000 tons
Japan.....	300,000 tons

b) Capital ships twenty years from date of completion may be replaced by new capital ship construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion. Provided, however, that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the signing of this agreement.

c) The scrapping of capital ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of new construction; or if the date of completion of new construction be delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

d) No capital ships shall be laid down during the term of this agreement whose tonnage displacement exceeds 35,000 tons.

e) The same rules for determining tonnage of capital ships shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agreement.

f) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform promptly all of the other Powers party to this agreement concerning:

- (1) The names of the capital ships to be replaced by new construction;
- (2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;
- (3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;
- (4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

g) No fabricated parts of capital ships, including parts of hulls, engines and ordnance, shall be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement.

h) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of capital ships, they may be replaced by new capital ship construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT

13. In treating this subject auxiliary combatant craft have been divided into three classes:

a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft.

b) Submarines.

c) Airplane carriers and aircraft.

a) Auxiliary Surface Combatant Craft

14. The term auxiliary surface combatant craft includes cruisers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers, and all other surface types except those specifically exempted in the following paragraph.

15. Existing monitors, unarmored surface craft as specified in paragraph 16, under 3,000 tons, fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs, mine sweepers, and vessels readily convertible from merchant vessels are exempt from the terms of this agreement.

16. No new auxiliary combatant craft may be built exempt from this agreement regarding limitation of naval armaments that exceed 3,000 tons displacement and 15 knots speed, and carry more than four 5-inch guns.

17. It is proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers allowed each Power shall be as follows:

For the United States.....	450,000 tons
For Great Britain.....	450,000 tons
For Japan.....	270,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of auxiliary craft for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of New Construction

18. (a) All auxiliary combatant craft whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

b) No new construction in auxiliary surface combatant craft except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this agreement, provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the auxiliary surface combatant craft tonnage allowances hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of Old Construction

19. Auxiliary surface combatant craft shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

b) Submarines

20. It is proposed that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each Power shall be as follows:

For the United States.....	90,000 tons
For Great Britain.....	90,000 tons
For Japan.....	54,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in submarines on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of submarines for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of New Construction

21. (a) All submarines whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

b) No new submarine tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided herein shall be laid down during the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the submarine tonnage allowance hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of Old Construction

22. Submarines shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

c) Airplane Carriers and Aircraft

Airplane Carriers

23. It is proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers allowed each Power be as follows:

United States.....	80,000 tons
Great Britain.....	80,000 tons
Japan.....	48,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of New Construction

24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

b) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided herein shall be laid down during the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the airplane carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of Old Construction

25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT

Replacements

26. (a) Cruisers 17 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels for such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 15 years of age from date of completion.

b) Destroyers and flotilla leaders 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

c) Submarines 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new submarine construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which the new tonnage is to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

d) Airplane carriers 20 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new airplane carrier construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion.

e) No surface vessel carrying guns of caliber greater than 8 inches shall be laid down as replacement tonnage for auxiliary combatant surface craft.

f) The same rules for determining tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agreement.

g) The scrapping of ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of the new construction, or, if the completion of new tonnage is delayed, then within 4 years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

h) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform all other Powers party to this agreement concerning:

- (1) The names or numbers of the ships to be replaced by new construction;
- (2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;
- (3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;
- (4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;
- (5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;
- (6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

i) No fabricated parts of auxiliary combatant craft, including parts of hulls, engines, and ordnance, will be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement.

j) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of ships of this class they may be replaced by new construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

AIRCRAFT

27. The limitation of naval aircraft is not proposed.

Note.p-Owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily adapted from special types of commercial aircraft, it is not considered practicable to prescribe limits for naval aircraft.

General Restriction on Transfer of Combatant Vessels of all Classes

28. The Powers party to this agreement bind themselves not to dispose of combatant vessels of any class in such a manner that they later may become combatant vessels in another navy. They bind themselves further not to acquire combatant vessels from any foreign source.

29. No capital-ship tonnage nor auxiliary combatant craft tonnage for foreign account shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any one of the Powers party to this agreement during the term of this agreement.

Merchant Marine

30. As the importance of the merchant marine is in inverse ratio to the size of naval armaments, regulations must be provided to govern its conversion features for war purposes.

PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, BRITISH EMPIRE, AND JAPAN

The following are the points of agreement that have been reached in the course of the negotiations between the United States of America, Great Britain, and Japan with respect to their capital fighting ships:

An agreement has been reached between the three powers--the United States of America, the British Empire, and Japan--on the subject of naval ratio. The proposal of the American Government that the ratio should be 5-5-3 is accepted. It is agreed that with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific region, including Hongkong, the status quo shall be maintained, that is, that there shall be no increase in these fortifications and naval bases except that this restriction shall not apply to the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and the islands composing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the United States and Canada, as to which the respective powers retain their entire freedom.

The Japanese Government had found special difficulty with respect to the "Mutsu," as that is their newest ship. In order to retain the "Mutsu," Japan has proposed to scrap the "Settsu," one of her older ships, which under the American proposal, was to have been retained. This would leave the number of Japan's capital ships the same, that is, 10, as under the American proposal. The retention of the "Mutsu" by Japan in place of the "Settsu" makes a difference in net tonnage of 13,600 tons, making the total tonnage of Japan's capital ships 313,300 tons, as against 299,700 tons under the original American proposal.

While the difference in tonnage is small, there would be considerable difference in efficiency, as the retention of the "Mutsu" would give to Japan 2 post-Jutland ships of the latest design.

In order to meet this situation and to preserve the relative strength on the basis of the agreed ratio, it is agreed that the United States shall complete two of the ships in course of construction, that is, the "Colorado" and the "Washington," which are now about 90 per cent completed, and scrap two older ships, that is, the "North Dakota" and the "Delaware," which under the original proposal were to be retained.

This would leave the United States with the same number of capital ships, that is, 18, as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,850 tons, as against 500,650 tons as originally proposed. Three of the ships would be post-Jutland ships of the "Maryland" type.

As the British have no post-Jutland ships, except one "Hood," the construction of which is only partly post-Jutland, it is agreed that in order to maintain proper relative strength the British Government may construct two new ships not to exceed 35,000 legend tons each, that is, calculating the tonnage according to British standards of measurement, or, according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons each.

It is agreed that the British Government shall, on the completion of these two new ships, scrap four of their ships of the "King George V" type, that is the "Erin," the "King George V," the "Centurion," and the "Ajax," which were to have been retained under the original American proposal. This would leave the British capital ships in number 20, as against 22 under the American proposal. Taking the tonnage of the two new ships, according to American calculation, it would amount to 74,000, and the four ships scrapped having a tonnage of 96,400 tons, there would be a reduction in net tonnage of 22,400 tons, leaving the British tonnage of capital ships 582,050 instead of 604,450.

This would give the British as against the United States an excess of 56,200 tons, which is deemed to be fair, in view of the age of the ships of the "Royal Sovereign" and the "Queen Elizabeth" types.

The maximum limitation for the tonnage of ships to be constructed in replacement is to be fixed at 35,000 legend tons, that is, according to British standards of measurement, or, according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons, in order to give accommodation to these changes. The maximum tonnage of capital ships is fixed, for the purpose of replacement, on the basis of American standards of calculations, as follows:

United States.....	525,000 tons
Great Britain.....	525,000 tons
Japan.....	315,000 tons

Comparing this arrangement with the original American proposal, it will be observed that the United States is to scrap 30 ships as proposed, save that there will be scrapped 13 of the 15 ships under construction and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships.

The total tonnage of the American capital ships to be scrapped under the original proposal, including the tonnage of ships in construction, if completed, was stated to be 845,740 tons. Under the present arrangement the tonnage of the 30 ships to be scrapped, taking that of the ships in construction if completed, will be 820,540 tons.

The number of the Japanese ships to be retained remains the same as under the original proposal. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped by Japan under the original American proposal, taking the tonnage of new ships when completed, was stated to be 448,923 tons. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped under the present arrangement is 435,326 tons.

Under the original proposal Great Britain was to scrap 19 capital ships (including certain pre-dreadnoughts already scrapped), whereas under the present arrangement she will scrap four more, or a total of 23. The total tonnage of ships to be scrapped by Great Britain, including the tonnage of the four "Hoods," to which the proposal referred as laid down, if completed, was stated to be 583,375 tons. The corresponding total of scrapped ships under the new arrangement will be 22,6000 tons more, or 605,975 tons.

Under the American proposal there were to be scrapped 66 capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as completed), of 1,878,043 tons. Under the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculations, there are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,643 tons.

The naval holiday of ten years with respect to capital ships, as originally proposed by the American Government, is to be maintained except for the permission to construct ships as above stated. This arrangement between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan is, so far as the number of ships to be retained and scrapped is concerned, dependent upon a suitable agreement with France and Italy as to their capital ships, a matter which is now in course of negotiations.

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II

TREATIES APPROVED AND ADOPTED
BY THE CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT¹

- I. A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan limiting naval armament.
- II. A treaty between the same Powers in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare.
- III. A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, signed December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean.
- IV. Declaration accompanying the above Four-Power Treaty.
- V. A treaty between the same Four Powers, supplementary to the above, signed February 6, 1922.
- VI. A treaty between all Nine Powers relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China.
- VII. A treaty between the Nine Powers relating to China customs tariff.

¹Copied from Senate Document No. 124, 67th Congress, 2d Session.

TREATIES

I. A TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, AND JAPAN LIMITING NAVAL ARMAMENT¹

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan:

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of the general peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament;

Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purposes, to conclude a treaty to limit their respective naval armament, and to that end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries;

Charles Evans Hughes
Henry Cabot Lodge
Oscar W. Underwood
Elihu Root
Arthur James Balfour
Lee of Fareham
A. C. Geddes
R. L. Borden
G. F. Pearce
John W. Salmund

Arthur James Balfour
V. S. Srinavasa Sastri
A. Sarrant
Jusserand
Carlo Schanzer
V. Rolandi Ricci
Luigi Albertini
T. Kato
K. Shidehara
M. Hanihara

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

Article I.--The Contracting Powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty.

Article II.--The Contracting Powers may retain respectively the capital ships which are specified in chapter II, Part 1. On the coming into force of the present Treaty, but subject to the following provisions of this Article, all other capital ships, built or building, of the United States, the British Empire and Japan shall be disposed of as prescribed in chapter II, Part 2.

¹Document, pp. 871-85.

The British Empire may, in accordance with the replacement table in chapter 11, Part 3, construct two new capital ships not exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement each. On the completion of the said two ships the Thunderer, King George V, Ajax, and Centurion shall be disposed of as prescribed in chapter 11, Part 2.

Article III.--Subject to the provisions of Article II, the Contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital-ship building programs, and no new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the Contracting Powers except replacement tonnage which may be constructed or acquired as specified in chapter 11, Part 3.

Ships which are replaced in accordance with chapter 11, Part 3, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 2 of that chapter.

Article IV.--The total capital-ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for the British Empire 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for France 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Italy 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Japan 315,000 tons (320,040 metric tons).

Article V.--No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

Article VI.--No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 16 inches (406 millimeters).

Article VII.--The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for the British Empire 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).

Article VIII.--The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in chapter 11, Part 3,

provided, however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, without regard to its age.

Article IX.--No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any two of their ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II. The armament of any aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accordance with the requirements of Article X, except that the total number of guns to be carried in case of any such guns be of such a calibre exceeding 6 inches (152 millimeters), except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimeters), shall not exceed eight.

Article X.--No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 8 inches (203 millimeters). Without prejudice to the provisions of Article IX, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimeters) in caliber the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimeters), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimeters) in caliber, the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimeters) is not limited.

Article XI.--No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, other than a capital ship or aircraft carriers, shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers. Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under government

control for fighting purposes, which are employed as fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise than the fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of this Article.

Article XII.--No vessel of war of any of the Contracting Powers, hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 8 inches (203 millimeters).

Article XIII.--Except as provided in Article IX, no ship designated in the present Treaty to be scrapped may be reconverted into a vessel of war.

Article XIV.--No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6-inch (152 millimeters) caliber.

Article XV.--No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers for a non-Contracting Power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and armament prescribed by the present Treaty for vessels of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the Contracting Powers; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft carriers constructed for a non-Contracting Power shall in no case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement.

Article XVI.--If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-Contracting Power is undertaken within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers, such Power shall promptly inform the other Contracting Powers of the date of the signing of the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is laid; and shall also communicate to them the particulars relating to the ship prescribed in chapter II, Part 3, Section I (b), (4) and (5).

Article XVII.--In the event of a Contracting Power being engaged in war, such Power shall not use a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

Article XVIII.--Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign Power.

Article XIX.--The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

1. The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

2. Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand.

3. The following insular territories and the possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

Article XX.--The rules for determining tonnage displacement prescribed in chapter 11, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each of the Contracting Powers.

CHAPTER II

RULES RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE
TREATY--DEFINITION OF TERMSPart 1. Capital Ships Which May Be Retained By The
Contracting Powers

In accordance with Article II ships may be retained by each of the Contracting Powers as specified in this Part.

Ships which may be retained by the United States:

Name	Tonnage
Maryland.....	32,600
California.....	32,300
Tennessee.....	32,300
Idaho.....	32,000
New Mexico.....	32,000
Mississippi.....	32,000
Arizona.....	31,400
Pennsylvania.....	31,400
Oklahoma.....	27,500
Nevada.....	27,500
New York.....	27,000
Texas.....	27,000
Arkansas.....	26,000
Wyoming.....	26,000
Florida.....	21,825
Utah.....	21,825
North Dakota.....	20,000
Delaware.....	20,000
Total tonnage.....	<u>500,650</u>

On the completion of the two ships of the West Virginia class and the scrapping of the North Dakota and Delaware, as provided in Article II, the total tonnage to be retained by the United States will be 525,850 tons.

Ships which may be retained by the British Empire:

Name	Tonnage
Royal Sovereign.....	25,750
Royal Oak.....	25,750
Revenge.....	25,750

Name	Tonnage
Resolution.....	25,750
Ramillies.....	25,750
Malaya.....	27,500
Valiant.....	27,500
Barham.....	27,500
Queen Elisabeth.....	27,500
Warspite.....	27,500
Benbow.....	25,000
Emperor of India.....	25,000
Iron Duke.....	25,000
Marlborough.....	25,000
Hood.....	41,200
Renown.....	26,500
Repulse.....	26,500
Tiger.....	28,500
Thunderer.....	22,500
King George V.....	23,000
Ajax.....	23,000
Centurion.....	23,000

Total tonnage.....583,450

On the completion of the two new ships to be constructed and the scrapping of the Thunderer, King George V, Ajax, and Centurion, as provided in Article II, the total tonnage to be retained by the British Empire will be 558,950 tons.

Ships which may be retained by France:

Name	Tonnage (metric tons)
Bretagne.....	23,500
Lorraine.....	23,500
Provence.....	23,500
Paris.....	23,500
France.....	23,500
Jean Bart.....	23,500
Courbet.....	23,500
Condorcet.....	18,890
Diderot.....	18,890
Voltaire.....	18,890

Total tonnage.....221,170

France may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929, and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section II.

Ships which may be retained by Italy:

Name	Tonnage (metric tons)
Andrea Doria.....	22,700
Caio Duilio.....	22,700
Conte Di Cavour.....	22,500
Giulio Cesare.....	22,500
Leonardo Da Vinci.....	22,500
Dante Alighieri.....	19,500
Roma.....	12,600
Napoli.....	12,600
Vittorio Emanuele.....	12,600
Regina Elena.....	12,600
Total tonnage.....	182,800

Italy may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929, and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section II.

Ships which may be retained by Japan:

Name	Tonnage
Mutsu.....	33,800
Nagato.....	33,800
Huaga.....	31,260
Ise.....	31,260
Yamashiro.....	30,600
Fuso.....	30,600
Kirishima.....	27,500
Haruna.....	27,500
Hiyei.....	27,500
Kongo.....	27,500
Total tonnage.....	301,320

Part 2. Rules For Scrapping Vessels of War

The following rules shall be observed for the scrapping of vessels of war which are to be disposed of in accordance with Articles II and III.

I. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such condition that it cannot be put to combatant use.

II. This result must be finally effected in any of the following ways:

- a) Permanent sinking of the vessel;
- b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom plating;
- c) Converting the vessel to target use exclusively. In such case all the provisions of paragraph III of this Part, except sub-paragraph (6), in so far as may be necessary to enable the ship to be used as a mobile target, and except sub-paragraph (7), must be previously complied with. Not more than one capital ship may be retained for this purpose at one time by any of the Contracting Powers.
- d) Of the capital ships which would otherwise be scrapped under the present Treaty in or after the year 1931, France and Italy may each retain two seagoing vessels for training purposes exclusively, that is, as gunnery or torpedo schools. The two vessels retained by France shall be of the Jean Bart class, and of those retained by Italy one shall be the Dante Alighieri and the other of the Giulio Cesare class. On retaining these ships for the purpose above stated, France and Italy respectively undertake to remove and destroy their conning-towers, and not to use the said ships as vessels of war.

III. (a) Subject to the special exceptions contained in Article IX, when a vessel is due for scrapping, the first stage of scrapping, which consists in rendering a ship incapable of further warlike service, shall be immediately undertaken.

b) A vessel shall be considered incapable of further warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed, or else destroyed in the ship:

- (1) All guns and essential portions of guns, fire-control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets;
- (2) All machinery for working hydraulic or electric mountings;

- (3) All fire-control instruments and range-finders;
- (4) All ammunition, explosives and mines;
- (5) All torpedoes, war-heads and torpedo tubes;
- (6) All wireless telegraphy installations;
- (7) The conning tower and all side armour, or alternatively all main propelling machinery; and,
- (8) All landing and flying-off platforms and all other aviation accessories.

IV. The periods in which scrapping of vessels is to be effected are as follows:

a) In the case of vessels to be scrapped under the first paragraph of Article II, the work of rendering the vessels incapable of further warlike service, in accordance with paragraph III of this Part, shall be completed within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, and the scrapping shall be finally effected within eighteen months from such coming into force.

b) In the case of vessels to be scrapped under the second and third paragraphs of Article II, or under Article III, the work of rendering the vessel incapable of further warlike service in accordance with paragraph III of this Part shall be commenced not later than the date of completion of its successor, and shall be finished within six months from the date of such completion. The vessel shall be finally scrapped, in accordance with paragraph II of this Part, within eighteen months from the date of completion of its successor. If, however, the completion of the new vessel be delayed, then the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of further warlike service in accordance with paragraph III of this Part shall be commenced within four years from the laying of the keel of the new vessel, and shall be finished within six months from the date on which such work was commenced, and the old vessel shall be finally scrapped in accordance with paragraph II of this Part within eighteen months from the date when the work of rendering it incapable of further warlike service was commenced.

Part 3. Replacement

The replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers shall take place according to the rules in Section I and the tables in Section II of this Part.

Section I

Rules for Replacement

a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after the date of their completion may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be replaced by new construction, but within the limits prescribed in Article IV and Article VII. The keels of such new construction may, except as otherwise provided in Article VIII and in the tables in Section II of this Part, be laid down not earlier than seventeen years from the date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided, however, that no capital-ship tonnage, with the exception of the ships retained and referred to in the third paragraph of Article II, and the replacement tonnage specifically mentioned in Section II of this Part, shall be laid down until ten years from November 12, 1921.

b) Each of the Contracting Powers shall communicate promptly to each of the other Contracting Powers the following information:

(1) The names of the capital ships and aircraft carriers to be replaced by new construction;

(2) The date of governmental authorization of replacement tonnage;

(3) The date of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;

(4) The standard displacement in tons and metric tons of each new ship to be laid down, and the principal dimensions, namely, length at waterline, extreme beam at or below waterline, mean draft at standard displacement;

(5) The date of completion of each new ship and its standard displacement in tons and metric tons, and the principal dimensions, namely, length at waterline, extreme

beam at or below waterline, mean draft at standard displacement, at time of completion.

c) In case of loss or accidental destruction of capital ships or aircraft carriers, they may immediately be replaced by new construction subject to the tonnage limits prescribed in Articles IV and VII and in conformity with the other provisions of the present Treaty, the regular replacement program being deemed to be advanced to that extent.

d) No retained capital ships or aircraft carriers shall be reconstructed except for the purpose of providing means of defense against air and submarine attack, and subject to the following rules: The Contracting Powers may for that purpose, equip existing tonnage with bulge or blister or anti-air attack deck protection, providing the increase of displacement thus effected does not exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) displacement for each ship. No alterations in side armour, in caliber, number or general type of mounting of main armament shall be permitted except:

(1) In the case of France and Italy, which countries within the limits allowed for bulge may increase their armour protection and the caliber of the guns now carried on their existing capital ships so as not to exceed 16 inches (406 millimeters) and

(2) The British Empire shall be permitted to complete, in the case of the Renown, the alterations to armour that have already been commenced but temporarily suspended.

Section II

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships--United States

Ships Laid Down	Ships Com- pleted	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
			Pre- Jutland	Post- Jutland
		Main (20), Missouri (20), Virginia (17), Nebraska (17), Georgia (17), New Jersey (17), Rhode Is- land (17), Connecticut (17), Louisiana (17),	17	1

Year	Ships Laid down	Ships Com- pleted	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
				Pre- Jutland	Post- Jutland
			Vermont (16), Kansas (16), Minnesota (16), New Hampshire (15), South Carolina (13), Michigan (13), Wash- ington (0), South Dakota (0), Indiana (0), Montana (0), North Carolina (0), Iowa (0), Massachus- sets (0), Lexington (0), Constitution (0), Constellation (0), Saratoga (0), Ranger (0), United States (0)*, Delaware (12), North Dakota (12).	15	3
1922	A, B/	15	3
1923	15	3
1924	15	3
1925	15	3
1926	15	3
1927	15	3
1928	15	3
1929	15	3
1930	15	3
1931	C, D	15	3
1932	E, F	15	3
1933	O	15	3
1934	H, I	C, DFlorida (23), Utah (23), Wyoming (22).....	12	5
1935	J	E, F	Arkansas (23), Texas (21), New York (21)..	9	7
1936	K, L	G	Nevada (20), Okla- homa (20).....	7	8
1937	M	H, I	Arizona (21), Pennsylv- ania (21).....	5	10
1938	N, O	J	Mississippi (21).....	4	11
1939	P, W	K, L	New Mexico (21), Idaho (20).....	2	13
1940	M	Tennessee (20).....	1	14
1941	H, O	California (20), Mary- land (20).....	0	15
1942	P, Q	2 ships of West Vir- ginia class	0	15

*The United States may retain the Oregon and Illinois, for non-combatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III, (b).

/Two West Virginia class.

Note.--A, B, C, D, etc., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard displacement, laid down and completed in the yards specified.

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships--British Empire

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Com- pleted	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
				Pre- Jutland	Post- Jutland
			Commonwealth (16), Agamemnon (13), Dread- nought (15), Ballero- phon (12), St. Vincent (11), Inflexible (13), Superb (12), Neptune (10), Hercules (10), Indomitable (13), Teme- raire (12), New Zealand (9), Lion (9), Princes Royal (9), Conqueror (9), Monarch (9), Orion (9), Australia (8), Agincourt (7), Erin (7), & building or projected*.	21	1
1922	A, B	21	1
1923	21	1
1924	21	1
1925	A, B	King George V (13), Ajax (12), Centurion (12), Thunderer (13).....	17	3
1926	17	3
1927	17	3
1928	17	3
1929	17	3
1930	17	3
1931	C, D	17	3
1932	E, F	17	3
1933	G	17	3
1934	H, I	C, D	Iron Duke (20), Marl- borough (20), Emperor of India (20), Banbow (20).....	13	5
1935	J	E, F	Tiger (21), Queen Elisa- beth (20), Warspite (20), Barham (20).....	9	7
1936	K, L	G	Malaya (20), Royal Sever- eign (20).....	7	8
1937	M	H, I	Revenge (21), Resolution (21).....	5	10

*The British Empire may retain the Colossus and Collingwood for non-combatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III, (b).

Two 35,000-ton ships, standard displacement.

Note.--A, B, C, D, etc., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard displacement laid down and completed in the years specified.

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
				Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1938	M, O	J	Royal Oak (22).....	4	11
1939	P, Q	K, L	Valiant (23), Repulse (23).....	2	13
1940	M	Benown (24).....	1	14
1941	N, O	Ramilles (24), Hood (21).....	0	15
1942	P, Q	A (17), B (17).....	0	15

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships--France

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
				Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1922	7	0
1923	7	0
1924	7	0
1925	7	0
1926	7	0
1927	35,000 tons	7	0
1928	7	0
1929	35,000 tons	7	0
1930	35,000 tons	Jean Bart (17), Courbet (17).....	5	(*)
1931	35,000 tons	5	(*)
1932	35,000 tons	35,000 tons	France (18).....	4	(*)
1933	35,000 tons	4	(*)
1934	35,000 tons	Paris (20), Bretagne (20).....	2	(*)
1935	35,000 tons	Provence (20).....	1	(*)
1936	35,000 tons	Lorraine (20).....	0	(*)
1937	0	(*)
1938	0	(*)
1939	0	(*)
1940	0	(*)
1941	0	(*)
1942	0	(*)

*Within tonnage limitations; number not fixed.

Note.--France expressly reserves the right of employing the capital-ship tonnage allotment as she may consider advisable, subject solely to the limitations that the displacement of individual ships should not surpass 35,000 tons, and that the total capital-ship tonnage should keep within the limits imposed by the present treaty.

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships--Italy

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
				Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1922	6	0
1923	6	0
1924	6	0
1925	6	0
1926	6	0
1927	35,000 tons	6	0
1928	6	0
1929	35,000 tons	6	0
1930	6	0
1931	35,000 tons	35,000 tons	Dante Alighieri (19)	5	(*)
1932	45,000 tons	5	(*)
1933	25,000 tons	35,000 tons	Leonardo da Vinci (19).....	4	(*)
1934	4	(*)
1935	Giulio Cesare (21)...	3	(*)
1936	45,000 tons	Conte di Cavour (21) Guilio (21).....	1	(*)
1937	25,000 tons	Andrea Doria (21)...	0	(*)

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships--Japan

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
				Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
			Mitsubishi (20), Mikasa (20), Kashima (16), Katori (16), Satsuma (12), Aki (11), Settsu (10), Ikoma (14), Ibuki (12), Kurama (11), Amagi (0), Akagi (0), Kaga (0), Tosa (0), Takao (0), Atago (0), Projected programs 8 ships not laid down.*	8	
1922	8	2
1923	8	2
1924	8	2
1925	8	2
1926	8	2

Japan may retain the Shikishima and Asaki for non-combatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III, (b).

Note.--A, B, C, D, etc., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard displacement, laid down and completed in the years specified.

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships--Japan (continued)

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Com- pleted	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Summary of Ships Retained	
				Pre- Jutland	Post- Jutland
1927	8	2
1928	8	2
1929	8	2
1930	8	2
1931	A	8	2
1932	B	8	2
1933	C	8	2
1934	D	A	Kongo (21).....	7	3
1935	E	B	Hiyei (21), Haruna... (20).....	5	4
1936	F	C	Kirishima (21).....	4	5
1937	G	D	Fuso (22).....	3	6
1938	H	E	Yamashiro (21).....	2	7
1939	I	F	Ise (22).....	1	8
1940	G	Hiuga (22).....	0	9
1941	H	Nagato (21).....	0	9
1942	I	Mutsu (21).....	0	9

Note.--A, B, C, D, etc., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard displacement, laid down and completed in the years specified.

Note Applicable to All the Tables in Section II

The order above prescribed in which ships are to be scrapped is in accordance with their age. It is understood that when replacement begins according to the foregoing tables the order of scrapping in the case of the ships of each of the Contracting Powers may be varied at its option; provided, however, that such Power shall scrap in each year the number of ships above stated.

Part 4. Definitions

For the purpose of the present Treaty, the following expressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this Part.

Capital Ship

A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches (203 millimeters).

Aircraft Carrier

An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon, and not designed and constructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that allowed to it under Article IX or Article X as the case may be.

Standard Displacement

The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, engine and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

The word "ton" in the present Treaty, except in the expression "metric tons," shall be understood to mean the ton of 2,240 pounds (1,016 kilos).

Vessels now completed shall retain their present ratings of displacement tonnage in accordance with their national system of measurements. However, a Power expressing displacement in metric tons shall be considered for the application of the present Treaty as owning only the equivalent displacement in tons of 2,240 pounds.

A vessel completed hereafter shall be rated as its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition defined herein.

CHAPTER III

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article XII.--If during the term of the present Treaty the requirements of national security of any of the Contracting Powers in respect to naval defense are, in the opinion of that Power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at the request of such Power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the Treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

In view of possible technical and scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other Contracting Powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the Contracting Powers, which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the present Treaty to consider what changes, if any, in the Treaty may be necessary to meet such developments.

Article XXII.--Whenever any Contracting Power shall become engaged in a war which in its opinion affects the naval defense of its national security, such Power may after notice to the other Contracting Powers suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Treaty other than those under Articles XIII and XVII, provided that such Power shall notify the other Contracting Powers that the emergency is of such a character as to require such suspension.

The remaining Contracting Powers shall in such case consult together with a view to agreement as to what temporary modifications if any should be made in the Treaty as between themselves. Should such consultation not produce agreement, duly made in accordance with the constitutional methods of the respective Powers, any one of the said Contracting Powers may, by giving notice to the other Contracting Powers, suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Treaty, other than those under Articles XIII and XVII.

On the cessation of hostilities the Contracting Powers will meet in conference to consider what modifications, if any, should be made in the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article XXIII.--The present Treaty shall remain in force until December 31st, 1926, and in case none of the Contracting Powers shall have given notice two years before that date of its intention to terminate the Treaty, it shall continue in force until the expiration of two years from the date on which notice of termination shall be given by one of the Contracting Powers, whereupon the Treaty shall terminate as regards all the Contracting Powers. Such notice shall be communicated in writing to the Government of the United States, which shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notification to the other Powers and inform them of the date on which it was received. The notice shall be deemed to have been given and

shall take effect on that date. In the event of notice of termination being given by the Government of the United States, such notice shall be given to the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the other Contracting Powers, and the notice shall be deemed to have been given and shall take effect on the date of the communication made to the said diplomatic representatives.

Within one year of the date on which a notice of termination by any Power has taken effect, all the Contracting Powers shall meet in conference.

Article XXIV.---The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington the sixty day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Two.

II. A TREATY BETWEEN THE SAME POWERS IN RELATION TO THE USE OF SUBMARINES AND NOXIOUS GASES IN WARFARE.¹

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, hereinafter referred to as the Signatory Powers, desiring to make more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of noxious gases and chemicals, having determined to conclude a Treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Charles Evans Hughes
Henry Cabot Lodge
Oscar W. Underwood
Elihu Root
Arthur James Balfour
Lee of Fareham
A. C. Geddes
R. L. Borden
G. F. Pearce
John W. Salmund

Arthur James Balfour
V. S. Srinavasa Sastri
A. Sarrant
Jusserand
Carlo Schanser
V. Rolandi Ricci
Luigi Albertini
T. Kato
K. Shidehara
M. Hanihara

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I.--The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of a war, the following are to be deemed an established part of international law:

1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized.

A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.

A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety.

2. Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above states; and if a submarine

¹Senate Document, pp. 886-89.

cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.

Article II.---The Signatory Powers invite all other civilised Powers to express their assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.

Article III.---The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.

Article IV.---The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilised nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto.

Article V.---The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilised Powers are parties;

The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves, and invite all other civilised nations to adhere thereto.

Article VI.---The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the Signatory Powers and shall take effect on the deposit of all ratifications, which shall take place at Washington.

The Government of the United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

Article VII.---The Government of the United States will further transmit to each of the Non-Signatory Powers a duly certified copy of the present Treaty and invite its adherence thereto.

Any Non-Signatory Power may adhere to the present Treaty by communicating an Instrument of Adherence to the Government of the United States, which will thereupon transmit to each of the Signatory and Adhering Powers a certified copy of each Instrument of Adherence.

In faith whereof, the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

III. A TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, AND JAPAN, SIGNED DECEMBER 13, 1921, RELATING TO THEIR INSULAR POSSESSIONS AND INSULAR DOMINIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, with a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and dominions of the Pacific Ocean, have determined to conclude a Treaty to this effect and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Charles Evans Hughes
Henry Cabot Lodge
Oscar W. Underwood
Elihu Root
Arthur James Balfour
Lee of Fareham
A. C. Geddes
R. L. Borden
G. F. Pearce
John W. Salmund

Arthur James Balfour
V. S. Srinavasa Sastri
A. Sarrant
Jusserand
Carlo Schanser
V. Rolandi Ricci
Luigi Albertini
T. Kato
K. Shidehara
M. Hanihara

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

I

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights, which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly to arrive at an understanding as to the most effective measures to be taken jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III

The Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period, it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.

IV

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate.

The Government of the United States shall transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, in French and in English, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

In faith whereof the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington the thirteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one.

IV. DECLARATION ACCOMPANYING THE ABOVE FOUR-POWER TREATY.

In signing the Treaty this day between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, it is declared to be the understanding and intent of the Signatory Powers:

1. That the Treaty shall apply to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the making of the Treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between the United States and the Mandatory Powers respectively in relation to the mandated islands.

2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers.

Washington, D. C., December 13, 1921.

Charles Evans Hughes
Henry Cabot Lodge
Oscar W. Underwood
Elihu Root
Arthur James Balfour
Lee of Fareham
A. C. Geddes
R. L. Borden
G. F. Pearce
John W. Salmund

Arthur James Balfour
V. S. Srinavasa Sastri
A. Sarrant
Jusserand
Carlo Schanzer
V. Rolandi Ricci
Luigi Albertini
T. Kato
K. Shidehara
M. Hanihara

V. A TREATY BETWEEN THE SAME FOUR POWERS, SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ABOVE, SIGNED FEBRUARY 6, 1922.

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon the following stipulations supplementary to the quadruple Treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921:

The term "insular possessions and insular dominions" used in the aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karatuto (or the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan.

The present agreement shall have the same force and effect as the said Treaty to which it is supplementary.

The provisions of Article IV of the aforesaid Treaty of December 13, 1921, relating to ratification shall be applicable to the present Agreement, which in French and English shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement.

Done at the City of Washington the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

Charles Evans Hughes
Henry Cabot Lodge
Oscar W. Underwood
Elihu Root
Arthur James Balfour
Lee of Fareham
A. C. Geddes
R. L. Borden
G. F. Pearce
John W. Salmond

Arthur James Balfour
V. S. Srinavasa Sastri
A. Sarrant
Jusserand
Carlo Schanzer
V. Rolandi Ricci
Luigi Albertini
T. Kato
K. Shidehara
M. Hanihara

VI. A TREATY BETWEEN ALL NINE POWERS RELATING TO PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES TO BE FOLLOWED IN MATTERS CONCERNING CHINA.

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Portugal;

Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equal opportunity;

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty for that purpose and to that end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Charles Evans Hughes

Henry Cabot Lodge

Oscar W. Underwood

Elihu Root

Baron de Cartier de Marchienne

Arthur James Balfour

Lee of Fareham

A. C. Geddes

R. L. Borden

G. F. Pearce

John W. Salmund

Arthur James Balfour

V. S. Srinavasi Sastri

Sao-Ke Alfred Sze

V. K. Wellington Koo

Chung-Hui Wang

A. Sarrant

Jusserand

Carlo Schanzer

V. Rolandi Ricci

Luigi Albertini

T. Kato

K. Shidehara

M. Hanihara

Beelarts van Blokland

W. de Beaufort

Alte

Ernesto de Vasconcellos

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself and effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights or privileges of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any Treaty, Agreement, arrangement or understanding, either with one another, or individually with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I.

ARTICLE III

With a view to applying more effectively the principles of the Open Door, or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Power, other than China, agreed that they will not seek nor support their respective nationals in seeking,

(a) Any arrangement which might purport to establish in the favor of their interests or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of Public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this Article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a practical commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing with application for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all countries, whether parties to the present Treaty or not.

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreement by their respective nationals to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of continually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

ARTICLE V

China agrees that, throughout the whole of railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be no discriminations whatsoever, direct or indirect, in respect to charges or of facilities on the grounds of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese Railways.

The Contracting Powers, other than China, assume a corresponding obligation in regard of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.

ARTICLE VI

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

ARTICLE VII

The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises in which in the opinion of any one of them there is involved the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

ARTICLE VIII

Powers not signatory to the present Treaty, which have governments recognized by the Signatory Powers and which have treaty relations with China, shall be invited to adhere to the present Treaty. To this end the Government of the United States shall make the necessary communications to non-Signatory Powers and will inform the Contracting Powers of the replies received, adherence by any Powers becoming effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE IX

The present Treaty shall be ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof, the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

VII. A TREATY BETWEEN THE NINE POWERS RELATING TO CHINESE CUSTOMS TARIFF.

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Portugal:

With a view to increasing the revenues of the Chinese Government, have resolved to conclude a Treaty relating to the revision of the Chinese customs tariff and cognate matters and to that end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Charles Evans Hughes	V. K. Wellington Koo
Henry Cabot Lodge	Chung-Hui Wang
Oscar W. Underwood	A. Sarrant
Elihu Root	Jusserand
Baron de Cartier de Marchienne	Carlo Schanser
Arthur James Balfour	V. Rolandi Ricci
Lee of Fareham	Luigi Albertini
A. C. Geddes	T. Kato
R. L. Borden	K. Shidehara
C. F. Pearce	M. Hanihara
John W. Salmund	Beclarts van Blokland
Arthur James Balfour	W. de Beaufort
V. S. Srinavasi Sastri	Alte
Sao-Ke Alfred Sze	Ernesto de Vasconcellos

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The representatives of the Contracting Powers having adopted on the fourth day of February, 1922, in the City of Washington, a Resolution, which is appended as an Appendix to this Article, with respect to the revision of Chinese Customs duties, for the purpose of making such duties equivalent to an effective 5 per centum ad valorem, in accordance with existing treaties concluded by China with other nations, the Contracting Powers hereby confirm the said Resolution and undertake to accept the tariff rates fixed as a result of such revision. The said tariff rates shall become effective as soon as possible but not earlier than two months after publication thereof.

Annex

With a view to providing additional revenue to meet the needs of the Chinese Government, the Powers represented at

this Conference, namely, the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Portugal, agree:

That the customs schedule of duties on imports into China adopted by the Tariff Revision Commission at Shanghai on December 19, 1918, shall forthwith be revised so that the rates of duty shall be equivalent to 5 per cent effective, as provided for in the several commercial treaties to which China is a party.

A Revision Commission shall meet at Shanghai, at the earliest practicable date, to effect this revision forthwith and on the general lines of the last revision.

This Commission shall be composed of representatives of the Powers above named and of the representatives of any additional Powers having Governments at present recognized by the Powers represented at this Conference and who have treaties with China providing for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per cent. ad valorem and who desire to participate therein.

The revision shall proceed as rapidly as possible with a view to its completion within four months from the date of the adoption of this Resolution by the Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions.

The revised tariff shall become effective as soon as possible but not earlier than two months after its publication by the Revision Commission.

The Government of the United States, as convener of the present Conference, is requested forthwith to communicate the terms of this Resolution to the Governments of Powers not represented at this Conference, but who participated in the Revision of 1918, aforesaid.

ARTICLE IX

Immediate steps shall be taken, through a Special Conference, to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of likin and for the fulfillment of the other conditions laid down in Article VIII of the Treaty of September 5th, 1902, between Great Britain and China, in Articles IV and V of the Treaty of October 8th, 1903, between the United States and China, and in Article I of the Supplementary Treaty of October 8th, 1903, between Japan and China, with a view to levying the surtaxes provided for in those articles.

The Special Conference shall be composed of representatives of the Signatory Powers, and of such other Powers as may desire to participate and may adhere to the present Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII, in sufficient time to allow their representatives to take part. It shall meet in China within three months after the coming into force of the present Treaty, on a day and at a place to be designated by the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE III

The Special Conference provided for in Article II shall consider the interim provisions to be applied prior to the abolition of likin and the fulfillment of the other conditions laid down in the articles of the treaties mentioned in Article II; and it shall authorize the levying of a surtax on dutiable imports as from such date, for such purposes, and subject to such conditions as it may determine.

The surtax shall be at a uniform rate of 2½ per centum ad valorem, provided, that in the case of certain articles of luxury which, in the opinion of the Special Conference, can bear a greater increase without unduly impeding trade, the total surtax may be increased, but may not exceed 5 per centum ad valorem.

ARTICLE IV

Following the immediate revision of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China, mentioned in Article I, there shall be a further revision thereof to take effect at the expiration of four years following the completion of the aforesaid immediate revision, in order to ensure that the customs duties shall correspond to the ad valorem rates fixed by the Special Conference provided for in Article II.

Following this further revision there shall be, for the same purpose, periodical revisions of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China every seven years, in lieu of the decennial revision authorized by existing treaties with China.

In order to prevent delay, any revision made in pursuance of this Article shall be effected in accordance with rules to be prescribed by the Special Conference provided for in Article II.

ARTICLE V

In all matters relating to customs duties there shall be effective equality of treatment and opportunity for all the Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE VI

The principle of uniformity in the rate of customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China is hereby recognized. The Special Conference provided for in Article II shall make arrangements to give practical effect to this principle; and it is authorized to make equitable adjustments in those cases in which a customs privilege to be abolished was granted in return for some local economic advantage.

In the meantime, any increase in the rates of customs duties resulting from tariff revision, or any surtax hereafter imposed in pursuance of the present Treaty, shall be levied at a uniform rate ad valorem at all land and maritime frontiers of China.

ARTICLE VII

The charge for transit passes shall be at the rate of 2½ per centum ad valorem until the arrangements provided for by Article II come into force.

ARTICLE III

Powers not signatory to the present Treaty whose Governments are at present recognized by the Signatory Powers, and whose present treaties with China provide for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per centum ad valorem, shall be invited to adhere to the present Treaty.

The Government of the United States undertakes to make the necessary communications for this purpose and to inform the Governments of the Contracting Powers of the replies received. Adherence by any Power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE IX

The provisions of the present Treaty shall override all stipulations of treaties between China and the respective Contracting Powers which are inconsistent therewith, other than stipulations according most-favored-nation treatment.

ARTICLE X

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington on the sixth day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Two.