

THE CONCEPT OF MODERNIZATION IN  
THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CHANGE

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A Thesis  
Presented to  
the Faculty of the Department of Political Science  
University of Houston

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In Partial Fullfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Masters of Art

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by  
Su-Ik Hwang  
August, 1972

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## ABSTRACT

This study attempts to evaluate the concept of modernization in terms of its paradigmatic role in the study of political change. Until the end of World War II political scientists had been preoccupied mainly with stable Western countries, and the study of change had been a major hiatus in the political inquiry. The recent scholarly preoccupation with modernization represents a drastic change in this static orientation.

As a systematic way of looking at social change modernization has governed strongly political scientists' approach to the problems of change. However, political scientists' experiment with the concept goes on, what it misses or neglects has become evident. Many scholars have found more significance in those aspects of political change which the concept glosses over than in those which it highlights. Consequently, the term has acquired varying, and more often than not conflicting conceptions, and its paradigmatic role has become increasingly confused. This study explores the nature and source of this conceptual confusion.

Major themes of this study are to explicate the concept modernization, to discuss its paradigmatic role in the study of political change both in positive and negative senses, and to examine some logical difficulties inherent in the concept which led to such a conceptual confusion.

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## INTRODUCTION

Theoretical formulations of problems tend to follow developments in real life. That is, problems arise in actual life and attempts at solution follow. This holds for the concept of modernization, which came into common usage after World War II as a "Western intellectual response to the post-colonial emancipation of the non-West."<sup>(1)</sup> If the discovery of the non-Western world ushered in a new chapter in world history, the attainment of independent statehood in this new world opened another. Western man came to study the world which he had ruled not long ago. The first problem confronting him may be stated as follows: how are these newly discovered, qualitatively different units of analysis, i.e., states, to be accommodated in his well-established intellectual discipline? In other words, how to bridge the West and the non-West, that is, the known and the unknown, in a unified intellectual perspective? In tackling this problem the concept of modernization has provided a distinctive and, perhaps, the most convenient solution. This is probably the reason why we see the evolutionary view of social change suddenly being resurrected when we thought we had just buried it.<sup>(2)</sup>

The methodological distinctiveness of the evolutionary explanation is that it orders the spatial variations in terms of temporal series. The present revival of the evolutionary

notion in the study of newly emerging states is based on the general observation that in the course of rapid and tumultuous change, the non-West of today recapitulates the experiences of the West of yesterday. The present situations of non-Western countries are compared with Western ones in the past. Hence, generalizations concerning the Western experience have come to be extrapolated to illuminate what is happening in the non-West today and to predict what will be happening in the future. The dichotomy of tradition and modernity which, in various forms, had been the major conceptual tool of the nineteenth century social evolutionists in articulating the changes of their time has now been re-established as the dominant social typology. The unilinear view of evolution from traditional to modern society has been revived in order to explain the nature of the social changes which many peoples of the world live through today. A major difference between the nineteenth century social evolutionism and the theory of modernization of today is that while the differences between traditional and modern societies are emphasized in the former, the process by which a traditional society becomes more and more modern is stressed in the latter. This difference is another indication of the fact that the academic study of social phenomena is typically responsive to the pressing problems of the day. *\* still remains a reactionary problem solver is concerned with problems that arise in the present*

The current revival of evolutionary interest has been most conspicuous in the field of comparative politics. Not

only has the number of countries more than doubled over a very brief period of time, but the new countries vary in scale, structure, and culture to a much greater degree than the Western ones. A theoretical framework by which to order these non-Western as well as the Western countries has been badly needed. Complicating the problem is the fact that none of these newly independent states is willing to remain as it is.<sup>(3)</sup> The immensity of change taking place in these countries renewed an interest in political change or development. However, until about 1945 political scientists had been preoccupied with stable countries and were not prepared to handle these changes. To meet this need for a theoretical framework to deal with the contemporary comparative and developmental problems, political scientists embraced the concept of modernization almost unanimously.<sup>(4)</sup> What has happened since the early 1950's in the field of political science, especially in comparative politics, forms one of the important links in the chain of the current scholarly preoccupation with modernization.

In the study of political change, the concept of modernization has been 'paradigmatic.' In its simplest terms a paradigm is a pattern or framework that gives organization and direction to a given area of scientific investigation. It defines the basic nature of a certain subject matter which, in turn, conditions empirical research as well as theoretical propositions about it.<sup>(5)</sup> As a



special, systematic way of looking at social change, modernization has limited the political scientist's mode and scope of investigation by its implied range of logical tolerance, which has created certain distinctive tendencies in the study of political change.

As the experiment with the concept of modernization goes on, however, its ~~paradigmatic~~ <sup>system of framework</sup> role has become increasingly confused. Like other concepts, modernization can not do justice to all the complex aspects of the phenomena to which it refers. It involves abstraction from many aspects of social change of those which are deemed to be the most significant: it omits some aspects and includes others, simplifying and exaggerating reality. As its confrontation with the empirical world has continued, there has emerged a group of scholars who find more significance in what it omits than in what it includes and who challenge the validity of modernization as a systematic way of looking at social change. Curiously enough, however, they have not abandoned the term modernization itself. As a result, the term has come to mean both what modernization is and what it is not. Instead of denoting a structure of propositions or a nominal agreement to use the word in a systematic manner, modernization has become at best a signpost in the direction of vague and formless areas of approximate meaning. (6)

The penalty ensuing from the diminishing clarity of the basic orienting concept is, of course, the loss of orientation

in the study of political change as a field. The worst of its results manifests itself in the widening gap between the orienting concept and the empirical research of political change. Most, if not all, empirical research on political modernization produced so far consists of the study of political "happenings" in the so-called developing areas, not the study of modernization, or of development.<sup>(7)</sup> The basic concept has not been related to empirical findings on the one hand, and most empirical research is devoid of theoretical significance on the other.

This paper attempts to explore the nature and source of this conceptual confusion. In particular, I propose to trace the process by which modernization lost its essential quality of a concept, -- that is, its specialty as a way of looking at social change, -- and to discuss some logical difficulties inherent in the concept which led to such a state.

The first task in this paper is to explicate the concept of modernization as a special and systematic tool for analyzing social change. Since something particular can be best understood when put in a more general context, the attempt to explicate modernization makes it necessary to consider several general points for which any dynamic theory should account and on which dynamic theories may vary. The first chapter of this paper will be devoted to this discussion. If change can be conceived of as 'genesis of variation through time,' an analysis of change should include, at least, the

problem of comparison of two or more states of a unit before and after a given interval of time, and the problem of dynamism converting a mere classification into a process. These problems can be detailed in several questions: (1) what is the unit of change? (2) how is the difference of two states of the unit at different moments described? (3) how is the process from one state to the other described? and (4) what causes the change?

The second chapter will examine how these problems appear in the theoretical framework of modernization. Despite its popularity, -- or rather because of it --, modernization, even in a restricted sense, does not mean the same thing to everybody. An attempt will be made to bring forth the family of meanings the influential users of the term attached to it, and to systematize them in the form of answers to the above questions. In so doing, the master assumption which gives these conceptions consistency and coherence will be discussed -- i.e., an organismic model of society.

The third chapter will examine the paradigmatic role of modernization in the study of political change both in positive and negative senses. The point will be made that the major casualties of the adoption of modernization in the study of political change are, ironically, 'politics' and 'change.' Many political scientists have reacted against these losses: they either modify the conceptual structure of modernization or reject it. Consequently, various and more

often than not conflicting meanings have been attached to the concept, and modernization has ceased to be a systematic way of looking at social change.

The last chapter will examine a question raised in the third chapter. I suggest that if we retain the concept of modernization, we can not conduct empirical investigation without distorting the reality of political change to the point of its becoming a fallacy, and that at the empirical level the integrity of the conceptual structure of modernization is destroyed. Here we will confront the perennial problem of the relationship between an orienting concept of a high level of abstraction and empirical research. Much of the conceptual confusion concerning modernization will be considered as a matter of the varying levels of analysis. And the source of the confusion will be attributed to the inherent difficulties of the concept of modernization in making itself be subject to either falsification or verification at the empirical level.

# FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Dankwart Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Oct. 1968), p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>For an illuminating discussion of how the evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century came to fall into discredit, see Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective On Comparative Politics: Past and Present," Eckstein and D. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 8ff.

<sup>3</sup>Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1965), pp. 7ff.

<sup>4</sup>About political scientists' unanimous acceptance of modernization, see, Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. The Political Basis of Economic Development (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1966), p. 7.

<sup>5</sup>R.T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," R.T. Holt and J.E. Turner, The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 23. Thomas S. Kuhn defines paradigms as past scientific achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. He states: "...I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice -- examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together -- provide models from which spring coherent traditions of scientific research." These are, for instance, Aristotelian Dynamics, Newtonian Dynamics, corpuscular optics or wave optics, so on. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 11.

<sup>6</sup>J.P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, International System and the Modernization of Societies (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 17.

★ <sup>7</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, (April 1971), p. 293.

## CHAPTER I

### Some General Problems In A Dynamic Theory<sup>(1)</sup>

Although we often refer to a theory of social change or political development, it is very dubious whether we have such a theory. The relative inattention to the problems of change in modern social theories is partly due to their preoccupation with general theories. The need for a theory with dynamic emphasis is usually engulfed in the desire for a complete theory of society applicable to both static structures and dynamic processes.<sup>(2)</sup> Nevertheless, in order to explicate the concept of modernization as well as to evaluate its role in the study of political change, we need to consider some general problems that must be faced by any theorist of social change.

A theory of change -- indeed, any theory -- puts a set of variables into a system with some of them as dependent variable(s) and the other(s) as independent variable(s). The primary task of a theory is to raise a problem about one or more dependent variables. For instance, why has the divorce rate in America climbed steadily upward during the past century? Or why did the Fourth Republic give way to the Gaullist regime in France? In these questions, the dependent variables are the divorce rate in America and the form of government in France. What is to be explained is the increase of divorce rate or the change from the parliamentary cabinet system to a para-dictatorial presidential one, that is, the

variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, adequate specification of a question in a dynamic analysis begins with description of some change in the dependent variable, and the dependent variable in a dynamic theory should be defined in such a way as to allow for its variation.

"Change," as Robert M. MacIver epitomized, "obviously implies at least three things, that which changes, that which is constant relative to that which changes, and the span of time in which the change takes place."<sup>(3)</sup> The description of change, therefore, involves two basic problems. The immediate one is to determine the beginning and end points for any given process of change. As Parsons notes, to have "an initial and terminal pattern to be used as points of reference" is a must for theory of change.<sup>(4)</sup> The points of reference are to be established in the context of the investigator's theoretical interest. According to the relative length of the interval it is possible to distinguish between short-term changes and long-term changes.

The other problem is to recognize the features of the subject under examination which change and which do not change. The problem is to depict the states of the subject at the initial and terminal points -- and, if necessary, at intermediate points between them -- and to analyze their similarities and differences.<sup>(5)</sup> Thus, change is specified by comparison of the cross-sectional states of the subject at two or more points in time.

If comparison is the basic method of conceptualizing change, some of the problems involved in the description of change can be clarified by a brief consideration of the basic issues of comparison.

The criticism most commonly levelled against comparison, whether temporal or spatial, is the relativistic assertion that all things are unique. If every historical event is conceived as unique, we evidently cannot compare. As Rustow aptly indicated, however, "comparability is a quality that is not inherent in any given set of objects, rather it is a quality imparted to them by the observer's perspective."<sup>(6)</sup> Social or natural phenomena themselves do not have a quality of 'being comparable,' or 'not comparable.' Comparability is rather a quality of the statement made about them. Apples and oranges are conceived as fruits and, therefore, compared. The political aspect of the primitive tribal organizations of the Bergdama and Bushmen and the highly complex governmental machinery like those of modern nation-states can be compared if both are considered as political systems. Thus it is the generality of the statement applied to express observations which makes us compare seemingly different and unique things.<sup>(7)</sup>

Insofar as comparison is a matter of conceptualization, it must abide by logical rules. If two or more items are entirely identical, we do not have a problem of comparability. On the other hand, if they do not have anything in common, we cannot compare them. To compare is to establish a relation



of sameness and difference in a given set of objects. The sameness and difference is either a matter of 'either-or' or a matter of 'more-or-less.' In the 'either-or' mode of analysis everything is defined in terms of genus proximum and differentia specifica. One of the most fundamental canons in cognition is that we can not see a thing wholly: we only identify a thing with its distinctive attributes. In other words, everything is defined in terms of having or lacking certain attributes. Genus is a class (or kind) of things which includes a number of subordinate classes as sharing in certain common attributes. Each subordinate class (species) is distinguished from all others in the genus by the possession of some peculiar attributes. While class provides the sameness, differences enter as a species of a genus, the subspecies of a species and so forth. In this classificatory procedure the generality of a concept is enhanced by diminishing the number of defining attributes, that is, by climbing up the ladder of abstraction.

Difference also may be a matter of 'more-or-less.' A group of things share a certain common property but in varying degree. Concepts of comparative type allow for measurement of this degree. Quantitative comparison belongs to the logic of classification in the sense that two or more items being compared must be shown to share the common attribute. In other words, they must be classified as belonging to the same genus, species or subspecies, in short, to the same class.

Comparison can be made at any level of abstraction but only within the same level independently.<sup>(8)</sup>

From the previous paragraph we immediately come to two important points as regards the description of change in the dependent variable. At first, in specifying the dependent variables in a dynamic theory it is essential that the definition of concepts must be sufficiently general so as to include instances of the concept at different historical points. If the concept is so specifically defined as to exclude one of the states at different instants, we cannot properly compare them and comprehend the change. The primary rule of thumb in comparative analysis is that we should avoid concepts which are so intimately tied to a particular culture that no instances of the concept can be found in another culture. This is a logical imperative and holds with equal validity in the temporal context. Gabriel A. Almond's pioneering work in fresh thinking about comparative and developmental problems legitimately begins with an attempt to liberate the concept of the political system from its close association with modern nation-states and to make it so general as to imply various forms of political organization, including stateless ones.<sup>(9)</sup> ~~—————~~ \*

Secondly, the description of change through comparison would eventually yield a typology of the states of the dependent variable. The fact that the typology can be made in either classificatory or comparative terms suggests that

there are two types of changes to be distinguished: qualitative and quantitative.<sup>(10)</sup> In this connection, the distinction between 'qualitative development' and 'quantitative growth' is usually made. But the distinction does not mean that there are two different kinds of concrete social reality. Rather, it means that the conception of change ultimately hinges on the level of analysis.<sup>(11)</sup> Such relativity does not erase the analytical distinction, however. The distinction -- to abide by the basic rule of comparison -- is of cardinal importance for uncovering the vagueness and meaninglessness of concepts dealing with change.

Now let us suppose that we have more or less properly tackled the problems of definition and classification of the dependent variable. We are still far from a complete explanation of the change. We know only the beginning, middle and final scenes of the drama, but we do not know how or why the plot unfolded in the way it did. We know only the logical or classificatory variations of the several states of the dependent variable at different moments, but we do not know about the genesis of such variation.<sup>(12)</sup> Change as a process should not be confused with change as a product.

The concept of process presupposes the concept of time as a 'means of ascertaining the order of events.'<sup>(13)</sup> Change as a process can be defined as a succession of modifications of a persisting entity in time in the category of 'from-to.' The form or direction of change is another problem to be dealt

with in the description of change. The direction of quantitative change will be relatively easy to pin down: increase or decrease or some distinctive combination of these, such as a cycle. When we attempt to characterize changes in political structure and cultural patterns, however, our task will be more complex. Since qualitative changes do not have any identical unit of measurement, to describe these processes involves more than simple counting; it requires a detailed account of the ways in which a certain type of system gives way to another.

At the formal level, Pitirim A. Sorokin identifies three principal patterns of form of change: linear, cyclical; and variably or creatively recurrent direction. Change may be quantitatively linear, when the change involves either a quantitative increase or decrease throughout its existence. It may also be qualitatively linear in the sense of a uniform order of sequence of qualitative states A, B, C,....N leading from the state A, through the intermediary states B, C,.... to the final state N. Cyclical direction means either an absolute or relative recurrence of a given state or states; for example, passing through the same phases of increase-decrease, increase-decrease. The third pattern comprises in itself a combination of linear and relatively cyclical direction.<sup>(14)</sup>

An acceptable explanation of change should tell us not only what change happened and how it happened, but also why

it happened. To gain access to the knowledge of the latter, we have to ask about the independent variables in change.

A dynamic analysis is typically 'causal' insofar as it is preoccupied with the problem of what produces variation in the dependent variable. The notion of causality has been in serious dispute since David Hume contended that we cannot prove causality itself empirically. All we can do empirically about causality is, in fact, to establish asymmetrical covariation between variables. An asymmetrical covariation among two or more variables, however, should not be confused with their mere correlation. The difference between them is important enough to make vital sense in distinguishing a dynamic analysis from a static one, because correlation does not indicate the direction of influence without which we can hardly conceive of the genesis of change.<sup>(15)</sup>

In specifying independent variables of change, a basic rule is that the independent and dependent variables which are organized to form hypotheses should not be conceptually or operationally contaminated with each other. A scientifically meaningful hypothesis, above all, should be proposed so as to be susceptible of empirical validation. When the two classes of variables are not mutually exclusive, the association which a hypothesis claims exists between them is merely a function of the fact that the two variables have common conceptual properties and are therefore associated by definition. The conceptual contamination between independent and dependent

variables makes it meaningless to test their empirical association.<sup>(16)</sup> This caveat is so obvious as to appear like putting a fifth wheel to the coach. But it is not necessarily so in empirical research. Let us take an example of a form of such contamination. According to Chalmers Johnson a revolution occurs in a disequilibrated society, by which he means a society of dissynchronization between the structure of values and the <sup>non-matching wealth</sup> social division of labor. In other words, the probability of occurrence of a revolution is a direct function of the level of social <sup>probability of</sup> disequilibrium. He measures the magnitude of social disequilibrium in terms of the suicide rate, the circulation figure for ideological newspapers and journals, military participation ratio and crime rate, and relates them with the dependent variable, that is, the probability of occurrence of a revolution.<sup>(17)</sup> However, the accumulated knowledge of social sciences today shows that both dependent (revolution) and independent variables (suicide, crime....) fall in the same class of behavioral responses to social disorganization. Insofar as this is the case, the presumed independent variable is operationalized by reference to behavioral alternatives to the dependent variable. Consequently, the association turns out to be not between the independent and dependent variables but between two dependent variables, making the proposition basically tautological.

Another problem in specifying independent variables is

that of their organization. In considering what caused the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Gaullist regime in France, the third party movement in the 1968 presidential election in the United States, and so on, we do not have any reason to assume that every occurrence has but one cause. And, on the other hand, it will not suffice to merely list possible independent variables. Each must be assigned to its appropriate contributory role in the genesis of change. In an inquiry into the causes of internal wars Harry Eckstein distinguishes between preconditions and precipitators.<sup>(18)</sup> Proposing the 'value-added' approach in organizing the determinants of change, Smelser specifies four broad categories of independent variables of social change: *the structural* setting for change, *the impetus* to change, *input* mobilization for change, and the operation of *control* social control.<sup>(19)</sup> In whatever form, the independent variables must be organized precisely enough so that the change is the only possible outcome. On the other hand, we also have to acknowledge that such determinacy is far from attained in social sciences today.

The organization of dependent and independent variables, whether determinate or probabilistic, constitutes the hypothetical portion of a theory of change.

The above discussion by no means exhausts the requirements of a theory of change, and is not even an attempt to do so. However, I think the questions raised in the above should not be overlooked by any dynamic theory: whether by modernization

or any other political inquiry concerned with change. This set of questions will be employed as a guide for an attempt to analyze the inner structure of 'modernization' as well as a criterion for an evaluation of its role in the study of political change.

To recapitulate the basic questions: (1) what is the dependent variable, that is, what changes? (2) how are the before and after states described? In classificatory terms or degree terms? (3) how is the process described? (4) what are the independent variables in the change, that is, what causes the change? Are they organized -- either in determinate or probabilistic form?



# FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The basic idea in this chapter heavily draws on the chapter entitled "Toward A General Theory of Social Change," in Neil J. Smelser, Essays In Sociological Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

<sup>2</sup>Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), p. 535; see also David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 106.

<sup>3</sup>Social Causation (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1942), p. 7.

<sup>4</sup>op. cit., p. 483.

<sup>5</sup>Smelser, op. cit., p. 203.

<sup>6</sup>Rustow, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>7</sup>Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley, 1970), p. 10.

<sup>8</sup>For further discussions of the logic of comparison, see Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation In Empirical Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation In Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, (December, 1970), pp. 1033-53, and Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison," World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, (October, 1966), pp. 69-82.

<sup>9</sup>"Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," Almond and J.S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 5-9. ★

<sup>10</sup>For discussions of similar distinctions, see, Parsons, op. cit., p. 481, Wilbert E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 6, and Change and Order (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 9. ★

<sup>11</sup>The terms development and growth are essentially analogies. The attempt to define these terms without considering their relation with the level of analysis usually results in adding ambiguity to these ambiguous terms. See K. De Schweinitz, Jr., "Growth, Development, and Political Modernization," World Politics, Vol. XXII, No. 4, (July, 1970), pp. 518-540.

<sup>12</sup>Smelser, op. cit., p. 205. For a discussion of the distinction between classificatory and genetic variations, see Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 197-98.

<sup>13</sup>Max Heirich, "The Use of Time in the Study of Social Change," American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, (June 1964), p. 377.

<sup>14</sup>Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Cooper Square, 1962), pp. 675-76; see also, W. Moore, Social Change, pp. 33-44.

<sup>15</sup>Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 9-14.

<sup>16</sup>N.J. Smelser, op. cit., p. 208.

<sup>17</sup>Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), Chapter 6.

<sup>18</sup>"On the Etiology of Internal Wars" in History and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1965), pp. 140-43.

<sup>19</sup>op. cit., pp. 204-07.

## CHAPTER II

### The Concept of Modernization: An Explication

Explicating the concept of modernization is a very difficult task for several reasons. First of all, in a temporal sense, modernization began with the transformation of the West and continued with the Western imperialist impact on the rest of the world and the non-Western response to that impact. As very diverse kinds of historical situations came to be denoted by the concept, its connotations became diffused and less precise. As a result of these increasing denotations and varying connotations, participants in a conference on modern Japan agreed only that "the concept of modernization has been brought into being as something more inclusive of the total range of changes affecting the world in modern times" than Westernization or industrialization.<sup>(1)</sup> Secondly, modernization includes many specific changes. And as a concept, it consists of several components (at least, variation and process). However, the tendency of most scholars has been to concentrate on the aspect of immediate interest to them. Some are interested in the economic, others in the political, and still others in the social or psychological aspect. And while some concentrate on the differences between modern and traditional societies, others place more stress on the process. Attempts to systematically define the whole structure of the term have rarely been made, though not without notable exceptions; pieces of ideas are scattered throughout the copious literature on the subject.

However, assuming that the notable lack of systematic attempts to define such a basic term may be a sure sign of the existence of a consensus on the ways in which the term is used, this chapter is devoted to the effort to bring it forth. In so doing, I will extract the pieces of ideas implicit in various works, and more often rely on those scholars who are remarkably explicit about what others only vaguely imply.

### Tradition and Modernity

In modernization, what changes is a society as a whole. One thing uncontested about modernization is that the term is inclusive of diverse changes occurring in a society; rather it may be more correct to say that the various changes are different aspects of modernization of a society. If this is true, we must carefully define the nature of society in order to explicate modernization properly. No one, however, has begun analysis of modernization in this fashion, which raises complex questions. Instead of stepping into this morass, I will consider other conceptual components which are based on certain conceptions of society and return to this question at the end of this chapter.

The two terminal conditions of a society in the concept of modernization are usually labelled as 'traditional' and 'modern' and are characterized by two lists of mutually disjunctive attributes.

Most scholars of modernization generally agree that the

essential difference between modern and traditional societies lies in the greater control which modern men have over their natural and social environment, and that this capacity is derived from society's expanded scientific and technological knowledge. According to C.E. Black, a historian, a modern society results from "adaptation of historically evolved institutions to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in men's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific--revolution."<sup>(2)</sup> Dankwart Rustow, a political scientist, regards modernization as "a process of widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men." both being just different aspects of application of rationality and authority.<sup>(3)</sup> Marion J. Levy states unequivocally what others vaguely imply: the technological priority in the definition of modernity. According to him, the defining elements are the sources of power and the use of tools:

I consider any society the more modernized, the greater the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power and the greater the extent to which human efforts are multiplied by the use of tools.<sup>(4)</sup>

Having this essentially technico-economic definition of modernization in mind, most scholars have devoted much more efforts to the task of identification of the common characteristics associated with these two types of society. The earliest and, perhaps, most influential one in the post-war period was made by Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and their associates, whose aim was to find out a general, systematic

way of classifying the various kinds of action (and interaction). Although they were not directly concerned with a reformulation of the contrast of modern vs. traditional society, their outcome, the famous set of pattern variables,<sup>(5)</sup> has been extensively utilized to characterize both societies. In this analysis, echoing to a great extent what the nineteenth century sociologists, especially Sir Henry Maine and Ferdinand Toennies had done, they conceived of traditional societies as characterized by predominance of particularistic, ascriptive, diffuse orientation as against the universal, achievement, specific orientation of modern societies.★

Somewhat later, with the development of various conceptual and methodological tools in the social sciences, a more diversified search for the indicators or indices of societies was undertaken. The search can be grouped, without much omission, into two types of approach: the socio-economic and the structural-functional.

The socio-economic approach starts with an explicit assumption that modernity as an attribute manifests itself in a certain systemic way in various social, economic, demographic, and psychological dimensions. Those scholars who adhere to this approach try to pin down the level of modernity by measuring the levels of these conditions in a given society. Much of what has been done in this approach was initiated by Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society<sup>(6)</sup> and well summarized by Karl Deutsch in terms of social mobilization.<sup>(7)</sup>

According to Lerner, the conditions which form an interlocking system of modernity as a distinctive way of life are urbanization, literacy, mass-media consumption and political participation. Deutsch breaks down the indicators further: exposure to aspects of modern life (through demonstration of machinery, buildings, consumer goods, etc.), exposure to mass media, change of residence, urbanization, the change from agricultural occupations (the ratio of those gainfully employed in non-agricultural occupations), per capita income, literacy, and so on. As these scholars view it, a society is conceived as more or less modern to the extent to which it is 'socially mobilized.'

The structural-functional approach is another aspect of the contribution made by Parsons and his associates. Where<sup>as</sup> Parsons' set of pattern variables approaches the social system from the ground up by focusing on the attitudinal orientations of elementary social action, his structural-functional formulation starts from the opposite end of the scale, the composite whole. The central conceptual focus moves to a set of functional imperatives of a society and to the fact that major subsystems differentiate to perform these functional imperatives. In this approach social development is interpreted primarily in terms of 'structural differentiation' and 'integration.' Simply defined, "differentiation is the evolution from a multifunctional role structure to several more specialized roles."<sup>(8)</sup> Since the role-differentiation is divisive of established social order, however, the newly

specialized roles should be readjusted and united on a new basis. The process of bringing together the disparate parts of society into a more integrated whole is another aspect of social change. While some people such as the proponents of laissez-faire assume the integration as spontaneous, guided by an invisible hand, those of structural-functional persuasion -- Levy, Eisenstadt, Smelser and others -- emphatically identify as a concomitant of a growing division of labor the increase in mechanisms for coordinating and solidifying the integrations among individuals whose interests are becoming progressively more diversified. In this approach, modern society is characterized by a high degree of social differentiation -- the development of specialized and diversified types of social organization -- and the concomitant development of wider regulative and allocative mechanisms and organizations such as the market in economic life, and party activities in politics, and diverse bureaucratic organization and mechanisms in most institutional spheres.

Out of these extensive researches emerges the multidimensional picture of traditional and modern societies which has been generally accepted among scholars of varying disciplines. Francis X. Sutton summarizes these differences in the following paradigm: (9)



<u>Traditional Society</u>	<u>Modern Society</u>
1. The means of production: agriculture	Industry
2. Predominance of ascriptive, particularistic, diffuse patterns	Predominance of universalistic, specific and achievement norms
3. Stable, local groups and limited spatial mobility	High degree of social mobility (in a general - not necessarily 'vertical' - sense)
4. Relatively simple and stable occupational differentiation	Well-developed occupational system, insulated from other social structure
5. A differential stratification system of diffuse impact	"Egalitarian" class system based on generalized patterns of occupational achievement  Prevalence of "associations" i.e., functionally specific, non-ascriptive structures

A closer glance at the above discussion reveals that two major tendencies underly the contrast of modern vs. traditional society: one is the tendency to treat society as 'natural' system, and the other is the tendency to formulate the contrast in the relative, comparative terms.

It is well known that the structural-functional approach, as a self-conscious attempt to adopt a type of explanation common in biology and especially in physiology, draws heavily on a sociological analogue to the living organism. The concepts of differentiation and integration which constitute the central notion in this approach to the problems of modernization is little more than an analogue to the evolution of highly complex organisms which consist of numerous inter-dependent and specialized organs. In adopting the term of

system, the structural-functionalists tend to consider it as 'natural' rather than as 'constructive.'<sup>(10)</sup>

The tendency to see society as a systemic whole is also evident in the works of Lerner and Deutsch. The basic assumption in Lerner's work is that those factors which are presumed to express the attributes of modernity are so systematically interrelated as to be felt as a consistent whole.<sup>(11)</sup> The method he adopted was Latent Structure Analysis, the fundamental notion of which is derived from Freud's proposition that the varied overt activities of an individual -- his manifest behavior -- can be correlated with and hence predicted from the latent structure of his attitudes.<sup>(12)</sup> Lerner's work was devoted to verifying his conviction of the existence of a latent attribute underlying both societies which renders various overt characteristics of each society compatible and consistent. Such conviction of the systemic nature of society is also expressly revealed in Deutsch's acceptance of Lazarsfeld's conception of the interchangeability of indicators of social mobilization. When we measure the level of social mobilization, according to Deutsch, if one (or even several) of these indicators should be missing, it could be replaced in many cases by the remaining ones, or by other indicators similarly chosen, and the general level and direction of the underlying social process could still remain clear. Because the changes subsumed under 'social mobilization' as a composite concept will tend to go together in terms of recurrent association well above anything to be expected from

mere chance, they are assumed to constitute a single underlying process of which particular indicators represent only particular aspects. (13)

The tendency to formulate the difference between modern and traditional societies in comparative terms is notable as well. Whereas the contrast between modern and traditional societies in the nineteenth century took the form of depicting both as more or less completely closed dichotomous types, the contemporary ones take the form of continuous dichotomy. This tendency finds perhaps its most succinct expression in Levy's definition of modernity. As mentioned above, Levy distinguished societies by focusing upon their source of power and their use of tools. However, there is no society whose members use no inanimate source of power or no tools, nor is there one whose members use only inanimate sources of power and tools. Therefore, the difference among societies is along the continuum of the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power and the continuum of the extent of application of tools. Levy conclusively states that "the most general difference among societies are those of degree, not kinds." (14) ★

The socio-economic approach has most successfully pursued this tendency by trying to identify the modern and traditional orders along a single scale composed of several indicators. It is also a major theoretical insight of the contemporary structural-functional analysis that every society is a varying combination of the structural characteristics of modern and traditional societies. (15)

The effort to conceptualize the difference among societies in terms of degree has helped correct the unrealistic polarity between modern and traditional societies as expressed in the closed dichotomy. Societies are neither fully modern nor fully traditional. Modern and traditional societies per se are conceived of as 'extreme', 'pure', or 'ideal' types.<sup>(16)</sup> Individual societies can not be subsumed under them as instances, but can only be characterized by the extent to which they approximate the types. Some societies stand close to the model of modern society, others to that of traditional society, while still others are in various combinational states of these two extreme types. The paired concepts, modernity and tradition, constitute the two opposite poles of a continuum, which represent the full range of variability of societies.<sup>(17)</sup>

Viewed in a temporal order, "traditional society could only have existed as a hypothetical starting point in the distant past. A truly modern society could only exist if and when traditional remnants disappear in the distant future. Traditionalism and modernity thus cease to be stages in the historical process and become the beginning and ending points of history."<sup>(18)</sup> If all real societies are transitional societies, what are the forms and processes of change at work in these societies?

#### Modernization As A Process

It has been claimed that the present-day study of modernization has shifted its focus from painting a before-

and-after picture to specifying the process by which a traditional society becomes a modern one. It is true that, as compared with the nineteenth century predecessors, the contemporary theorists of modernization are dominantly preoccupied with the various problems of societies in the so-called transitional state. It is also true that, by conceiving the differences among various states of society in terms of degree, they facilitate the shift of interest from the static dichotomy to the dynamic process. The emphasis on process in the theory of modernization, however, seems to have been more claimed than achieved.

The conception of modernization as a process is basically inferred from a <sup>method of comparable permanent</sup> methodology of comparative statics. As discussed above, since a society -- a society in any state -- is conceived as a systemic whole, and since the before-and-after state is <sup>divisively (defined by division)</sup> dichotomously defined, the only way in which a society changes, when and if it ever does, is an 'eurhythmic,' unilinear move toward modernity. The process is unilinear in that society changes in the direction of an ever-increasing ratio of modernity to tradition. The process is eurhythmic and systemic in that significant change in one sphere of activity occasions coordinating and supportive change in other spheres. Modernization is also universally uniform in that all societies are held to undergo a parallel series of transformation that results in a highly homogeneous product. (19)

As to the eventual prevalence of modernity, Levy states:

We are confronted -- whether for good or for bad -- with a universal solvent. The pattern of the relatively modernized societies, once developed, has shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them....The patterns always penetrate; once the penetration has begun, the previous indigenous patterns always change; and they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized society.(20)

John Plamenatz writes of the irresistibility of modernity:

Progress is not inevitable in the sense that it will go on forever without leading to catastrophe, ....or in the sense that it would happen whatever men did; but it probably is inevitable in the sense that those who are against it cannot now stop it because of its very nature it adds to the power of those who are for it.(21)

Modernization is not only an inevitable, unilinear move toward modernity but also a systemic move. No one may be more explicit on the systemic qualities of modernization than Lerner:

Modernization is a process with some distinctive quality of its own....We know that urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard and unrelated fashion....Our multiple correlation showed them to be so highly associated ....suggesting that perhaps they went together so regularly, in some historical sense, they had to go together.(22)

Co-authors of the book edited by Milikan and Blackmer concur with Lerner:

The process of modernization is a seamless web and the strands that it comprises can be analytically separated only with some loss of realism.(23)

Such a conception of the process, as the Etzionis pointed out, rests on the assumption that the various parts of any social system are interdependent, so that changes in one sector will be followed by strains which necessitate adjustive changes in other sectors, if the social system is to maintain its viability.<sup>(24)</sup>

Now, it is in order to raise a question, namely, what causes a society to move toward modernity (systemically and unilinearly)? In the concept of modernization, change is immanent in the society as a whole.<sup>(25)</sup> It is the manifestation of forces internal to society itself. External events and processes can and do affect modernization: they can and do decelerate it, accelerate it, distort it, even obliterate it. But what is decelerated, distorted, accelerated, or even obliterated is immanent in the society itself. According to Leibnitz, "each created being is pregnant with its future state, and it naturally follows a certain course, if nothing hinders it."<sup>(26)</sup> Each of the great evolutionists -- Condorcet, Comte, Hegel, Spencer, and others -- was convinced that he had discovered the law of the pattern of change to be bound up with internal forces of society. Modernization is essentially the process by which what is enveloped in a society develops. This developmental, teleological idea which many people of today think of as obsolete is far from obsolete. Rather, it has been taken from the forefront of explicit contention to the background of implicit consensus.

Just as Marx saw the sources of change within the system of capitalism, so the contemporary searchers for the sources of change look within the society. Here, we find the built-in tie between the contemporary theory of modernization and functionalism: the explanation of social phenomena in terms of other social phenomena. The contemporary theories of modernization are certainly not unaware of the exogenous source of change, but their attention has been turned mainly to the stresses and strains created by and contained within the social structure, with "dysfunction as the potential source of change,"(27)

As far as independent variables in the process of modernization are concerned, we can raise the question only in terms of the prime mover of the process. However, it also turns out soon to be meaningless. Since all aspects of human activity have been undergoing transformation at the same time, it is in some sense even unnecessary to ask which element causes modernization. Paradoxically enough, for the very same reason, if necessary, we can pick out any factors as independent. Whatever element initiates the change, it will eventually lead to the change of the whole. Consequently, in the theories of modernization, we have seen a high degree of causal indeterminacy: indifference to the distinction between dependent and independent variables on the one hand, or some arbitrariness in specifying the independent variables on the other.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that the definitional priority should not be confused with the causal



significance of the defining element. As discussed above, the primacy of the technico-economic factor is found in almost every definition of modernization. But no contemporary theorist takes it to be the independent variable. Rather he never fails to qualify the technico-economically biased definition:

...economic change is one of the key factors causing the changes in values, motivations, and aspirations that we associate with the modernization process. One of the paradoxes of development is that the very innovational spirit which is itself an essential source of economic change is at the same time in part a product and consequence of such change. ...the social and psychological and political changes...are in part preconditions for economic development and in part its consequences.(28)

It is by no means implied that the defining elements should be viewed as causing other elements of the phenomena concerned. Rather, it is important to note that while denying the causal priority of the technico-economic factor, scholars of modernization substitute the reciprocal or circular relation for the causal relation among various elements. Consequently, "a plurality of systemic variables interact on a parity of causal significance."(29) What really matters in the study of modernization, therefore, is not to establish a causal relationship among variables, but to recognize the correlation among them, that is, their systemic interrelation.

To sum up the major points of the above discussion, in the concept of modernization (1) the unit of change is a society as a systemic whole; (2) change is conceived of as variation in the ratio of two contrasting attributes which

trace the range of variability of social phenomena; the difference is a matter of degree, not of kind; so modernization is the process of growth, not of development; (3) the process is one of replacing tradition by modernity and the manner of the replacement is the same for all societies; systemic, unilinear, and eurhythmic; and (4) modernization is supposed to be caused within the society; the causal relation among various elements within the society is highly indeterminate, reciprocal or circular.

To conclude this chapter, I return to the question raised at its beginning, that is, the concept of society as the master assumption which gives consistency and coherence to the notions summarized in the above. Unfortunately, I can not find any satisfactory answer to the question: what is society? But there are ample indications of the nature of what is called 'society.' Society is assumed to be basically an autonomous entity like an individual organism. The organismic analogy in social theory is old and recurrent. Especially the analogy between social change and the life-cycle of the organism has dominated our conceptions of the modus operandi of social change. Sometimes, the analogy of the lifespan has been applied to a dynasty, a civilization, or a type of social system. In this case we have a cyclical conception of history; birth, growth, decay and death, and birth, growth, decay and death. Otherwise, the life-span has been prolonged to the whole history of a society as in modernization. Then, we

see the unilinear, continuous, endless, directional progress. And all societies, like individual organisms belonging to the same genus, have a structurally cognate life-history.

# FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Marius B. Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1967), pp. 3-4.

<sup>4</sup>"Patterns (Structures) of Modernization and Political Development," in The Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Science, Vol. 358, (March, 1965), p. 30.

★ <sup>5</sup>T. Parsons, E. Shils, and others, Toward A General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 76ff.

<sup>6</sup>New York: The Free Press, 1958.

<sup>7</sup>"Social Mobilization and Political Development" in American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, (Sept. 1961), pp. 493-514.

<sup>8</sup>N.J. Smelser, "Toward a Theory of Modernization," op. cit., p. 129.

<sup>9</sup>"Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>10</sup>The distinction is made in David Easton, op. cit., pp. 27-34.

<sup>11</sup>Lerner, op. cit., p. 438.

★ <sup>12</sup>Lerner, op. cit., pp. 438-446. For a further discussion of latent structure analysis, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ed., Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954), pp. 349-387.

<sup>13</sup>Deutsch, op. cit., p. 495. For the concept of interchangeability of indicators, see Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, ed., The Language of Social Research (New York: Free Press, 1955), pp. 73-77.

<sup>14</sup>Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), Vol. 1, pp. 12-13.

<sup>15</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, op. cit., pp. 20ff.

<sup>16</sup>Carl G. Hempel, "Symposium: Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," American Philosophical Association, Science, Language and Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), pp. 67ff.

<sup>17</sup>R. Bendix and B. Berger "Images of Society and Problem of Concept Formation in Sociology" in L. Gross ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1959), pp. 97ff.

<sup>18</sup>Huntington, op. cit., pp. 296-297.

<sup>19</sup>See for good summaries of the characteristics of the process, Huntington, op. cit., pp. 288-289, see also C.S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2 (January, 1967), pp. 190-198.

<sup>20</sup>Annals, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>21</sup>Quoted in D. Rustow, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>22</sup>op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>23</sup>The Emerging Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), p. 44.

<sup>24</sup>Amitai and Eva Etzioni, eds., Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 403.

<sup>25</sup>Nisbet, op. cit., pp. 170-174.

<sup>26</sup>Quoted in ibid., pp. 170-171.

<sup>27</sup>Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), p. 142.

<sup>28</sup>Milikan and Blackmer, op. cit., p. 44.

★<sup>29</sup>Andrew Hacker, "Sociology and Ideology," in Max Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 299. Emphasis added.

### CHAPTER III

#### Modernization and the Study of Political Change

When the immensity of change taking place in Africa, Asia and Latin America drew the attention of the political scientist, he had been singularly ill-equipped to deal with change.<sup>(1)</sup> When France changed from the Third to the Fourth Republic, the traditional political scientist's chore to update his textbook was simply to delete a chapter on the institutions of the one and to add a chapter on the next. The acceptance of 'modernization' among political scientists meant a drastic change from this static, institutional orientation.

Modernization has served political scientists as the theoretical framework in which to see political change: it defines the nature of political change; identifies the category of problems worth solving; and limits (or permits) the kind of evidence as well as the form of propositions. The relation of a concept to the reality it refers to, however, is not so one-sided. While we approach social and historical reality with some sense of the significant, the reality responds in its own way. No concept can be free of the boomerang effects emanating from the empirical world to which it refers. The concept of modernization is no exception. What it misses or neglects has become obvious in the continuous confrontation with the reality of political change. Consequently, there has been much effort to modify the theoretical scheme of modernization and even to discard it entirely.

The role of modernization as an orienting concept in the study of political change is thus both positive and negative. In this chapter the political scientist's experience with the concept of modernization will be discussed in terms of three stages: his attempts to embrace the theoretical scheme as explicated in the previous chapter, to modify it, and to reject it.

#### Political Modernization

'Political modernization' in this paper refers only to the effort made by political scientists to apply the theoretical scheme of modernization as explicated above to the analyses of political changes going on in many parts of the world. Political scientists especially in the earlier stage of the study of political change almost unanimously accepted the concept of modernization and placed the understanding of political change in that scheme. As a special and systematic way of looking at social change, the concept of modernization has contributed to the development of several conspicuous tendencies in the study of political change by its implied logical possibility and inevitability. This section will discuss how the study of political change has been governed by the concept of modernization.

#### Political Change as a Dependent Variable

One of the most important contributions made by the concept of modernization in the study of political change is that it has placed political change in the broader context of economic,



cultural, social and psychological dynamics. The broadening scope of political analysis, however, is not attributable solely to 'modernization'. The trend to broaden the scope of political analysis had had diverse origins and had taken various paths which became manifest in the studies of American politics in the 1920's and 30's, and which culminated in the Behavioral Revolution in the early 1950's.<sup>(2)</sup> The Continental political sociologists around the turn of this century such as Mosca, Weber, Pareto and Michels, and the British normative pluralists like Harold Laski, all greatly contributed to undermining the narrow emphasis on constitutional law and philosophical doctrine. [The Marxian impact on contemporary thought is simply staggering. So is the Freudian influence. Modernization, by seeing political change as an inseparable aspect of the total societal change, has placed the study of political change in the middle of this notable trend toward diversification and enrichment in the field of political science, and, to a great extent, reinforced it. The theoretical insights, hypotheses, conceptual tools and techniques originated in such sister disciplines as economy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology have come to be shared and utilized to explore into the deeper layers of political phenomena.

The potential and actual gains from such a broadening of the scope of analysis are too well known to be repeated here. However, the cost political scientists paid for them is expensive as well. It is the loss of focus on politics.

The general reasoning is: society as an over-all system, i.e., a set of interrelations, roles, and structures, consists of a number of subsystems for which no hard and fast boundaries can be drawn: the political system as a subsystem of society converts inputs from other subsystems into outputs. In this reasoning, all that is social is also political. By the same token, all that is political can be said to be social but only through the process of feedback. The role of the political system is reduced to the narrow confines of an organization that channels, reflects, and expresses commands and instructions that come from 'elsewhere.' So much emphasis has been placed on the input elements of the political system, i.e., 'everything that is potentially political' that one of the leaders of the departure from institutional-legalism came to call it a fallacy -- the fallacy of inputism.<sup>(3)</sup>

If the discovery of the 'wholeness' of society has anything to do with the loss of focus on politics, no single factor other than the concept of modernization would be more responsible for it in the study of political change. In the study of political change, this inputism takes the form of the relegation of politics to the ever dependent variables. It is by no means implied that to take political change to be a dependent variable is scientifically illegitimate. The caution is exercised against the somewhat deterministic tendency to reify politics as a dependent variable.

Most of the literature on political modernization especially up to 1965 treated political change as a dependent

variable. When we take political change as a dependent variable, our question will be "what change in the political system is to be explained in what terms?" Since social change from the viewpoint of modernization is a systemic and unilinear movement toward modernity, the political systems of the more modernized countries are states which every traditional or less modernized country would eventually reach or pass through. So the political characteristics of the modernized countries tend to be assumed as the ends of the political order in developing countries. What is problematic is the change from the traditional political system to the modern one. Definitions of the modern polity are many and multiple, but all, implicitly or explicitly, denote 'democratic nation-state.'<sup>(4)</sup>

Taking the distinctive characteristics of the modern polity for granted, a growing interest centered around the problems of the conditions of its emergence. For this problem too, the concept of modernization has ready-made answers. Since society is a seamless whole, all the non-political factors usually found in the modernized countries are considered as independent variables for political modernization. The list of independent variables is understandably long.

S.M. Lipset and Phillip Cutright reemphasized on a firmer empirical basis the venerable idea that politics is largely a function of economics. They confirmed that there

is a linear relationship between the degree of democraticness and the levels of wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization.<sup>(5)</sup> Lerner tested his hypothesis in the Middle East that the higher levels of urbanization, education, and mass communication exposure make 'empathic' men who, in turn, make active political participants.<sup>(6)</sup> Deutsch also found a high degree of political participation in highly mobilized societies.<sup>(7)</sup> Almond and Verba testified that democracy flourishes only where there is the civic culture, a set of attitudinal and personality characteristics that enables the members of the political system both to accept the privileges and to bear the responsibilities of a democratic political process.<sup>(8)</sup> Pye attributed the failure of Burmese nation-building to the crises of personality identity expressed in ambivalent attitudes of Burmese officials.<sup>(9)</sup> Deutsch, Lerner, and Pye suggested that national political development of any form is predicated upon the development of communication systems sufficiently sophisticated to overcome the parochialism of traditional society.<sup>(10)</sup>

Now, we are surely in a better position than ever to understand the relevance of the above mentioned variables to political change. However, many of the propositions relating political modernization to economic, social, and cultural factors have not been adequately tested. (This point will be discussed in the next section.) And there have rarely been attempts to assign each of these factors the relative causal

weight and organize them in any determinate or probabilistic form. Most of the researches are little more than explorations into the relevance of non-political factors to political phenomena. The question of how or how much each of these factors is relevant to political change has yet to be answered.

Another point to be made in this connection is that the query into the independent variable is usually confined to the endogenous sources of change. As indicated earlier, in the concept of modernization the primary source of change is assumed to lie within the society undergoing change itself. So most scholars have been preoccupied with the search for the endogenous sources of change but have never taken seriously the influences coming from the international environment, though they might have been well aware of them. The prevalent negligence of the exogenous sources of change is due to the notion of society as an autonomous entity, which is inherent in the concept of modernization.

More substantially, by treating political phenomena as determined by massive socio-economic and psychological factors, this approach downgrades the role of politics in actual social change and ignores the will and capacity of the political actors. However, much of the tumultuous change occurring in the so-called developing areas today is derived from the will and capacity of the established or aspiring political leadership which deliberately and systematically seeks to change and manipulate the social environment to achieve a preconceived

purpose.<sup>(11)</sup> The socio-economic or cultural determinism in political analysis simply overlooks the very obvious political realities.

### Evidence

The exploration of the independent variables of political modernization continues, and answers diverge. Yet a notable trend stands out: while all these scholars consider the emergence of a modern political system as caused by something else, the evidence given in support of their hypotheses almost without exception takes the form of correlation. The evidence does not come from analyses of the process of change from the traditional to the modern political system, but from the cross-sectional comparison between modern and non-modern countries in the contemporary world, or, though rarely, from the diachronic comparison of the states of a polity. While they find mass literacy, relatively high living standard, a sizeable and stable middle class, a sense of social equality and a tradition both of tolerance and of individual self-reliance in the countries of modern polity, they are impressed by the almost universal absence of these conditions in the traditional countries. These striking differences tend to be taken as the independent variables for, or even as the prerequisites of, the emergence and successful functioning of modern political systems.

The fact that certain factors are distinctively correlated with the modern political system, however, by no means tells us that those factors caused the modern polity. It must be

remembered that significant covariation among a set of variables may be the result, not of any real relation among them, but only of a similarity in the pattern of forces operative in them. And even where there is a causal connection, it may be quite indirect: they may be the effects of the same cause rather than one being the cause of the other(s). Even when we have sure reasons to assume that there is a direct causal relation among them, the correlation itself gives us no way of distinguishing which variable is cause and which is effect.<sup>(12)</sup> Rustow makes this point perfectly clear:

If authors such as Lipset or Cutright find democracy highly correlated with education, affluence, urbanization --, we still do not know (1) whether college graduates, rich people, and townmen make better democrats or (2) whether democracy is a system of government that encourages schooling, wealth, and urban residence, or (3) whether both democracy and its alleged correlates result from further unexplained causes.<sup>(13)</sup>

Needless to repeat, a mere correlation must not be confused with a causal relationship. Nevertheless, such leading scholars employ correlational evidence to support causal hypotheses. It is unlikely that they do not know the difference between them. The notable lack of appropriate historical data may be their excuse. A more basic reason, however, seems to lie in the concept of modernization.

In the concept of modernization, a society as a unit of change is a systemic whole. So the correlation of various overt traits in a society at any given point in time is not a matter of mere coincidence, but a necessary manifestation

of a latent structure. As a corollary, all aspects of a society always go together, and the change in one aspect is assumed to yield eventually consistent and supportive changes in other aspects. In this scheme of reasoning, the difference between correlation and causation comes to be virtually negligible. Consequently, all the social, demographic, economic and psychological characteristics associated with the modern political systems are taken to be prerequisites of political modernization.

The confusion of correlation and causation mirrors indifference to the time-dimension built into the concept of modernization and tends to impede any serious interest in differentiating causes and consequences. Attempts have rarely been made to ask about the genuine independent variables in the dynamic process in which a type of political system gives way to another. Much effort has ended in the static 'cross-sectional' comparison of political systems.

#### Synchronization of the Temporal and the Logico-Spatial Dimensions

Another symptom of the indifference to the time-dimension in the concept of modernization is revealed in its synchronization of the temporal and the logico-spatial series. In the logico-spatial series, the co-existing peoples, societies, social organizations, or artifacts are drawn from all parts of the earth and arranged essentially in terms of a certain logical principle, say, from the simple to the complex. The temporal series means that the time dimension serves as the



basis of ordering facts and concepts. The concept of modernization, by seeing societies, like individual organisms of the same genus, as possessing structurally cognate life histories, synchronizes these two series into the developmental or evolutionary series. The evolutionary series is abstracted from the concretes of actual peoples or societies, or historical periods and areas, and might be supposed to have formed the successive stages of development over the whole duration of total society's existence on the earth.<sup>(14)</sup>

A notable example of this synchronization is found in the work of members of the Yale Political Data Program, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.<sup>(15)</sup> Alker, and Russett, co-authors of the Part B of the Handbook, entitled "The Analysis of Trends and Patterns," despite severe caution and constant self-criticism, were bold enough to use cross-sectional data for a longitudinal prediction. They divided all the political units (107) for which they have data on most of their variables (73) into five groups as identified by levels of per capita G.N.P. with the cutting points chosen so as to maximize the internal consistency of groups. A step further, they synchronized this logico-spatial classification with the temporal series by identifying these 'groups' with the 'stages' or 'leaps' of the life history every country passes through. They stated:

The model implicit in this presentation is in some degree a longitudinal one, for we at least partially assume that as a country develops, as its G.N.P. rises, the values of the other indices also rise.

Stage III [group III], for instance, in some way show what a country now in stage II [group II] may look like some years hence. (16)

As reviewers of the book aptly indicated, "to read the Handbook is to follow horizontal history as it were, around the globe." (17)

This tendency is so prevalent that the Handbook is but one example, though a notable one. Actually all the cross-sectional analyses as we see them today are explicitly or implicitly based on such an assumption. Those who are well aware of the limitations and risks involved in this assumption like the members of the Yale team justify their endeavor only on the grounds that they do not have any better historical data. If the lack of adequate data makes necessary the use of the cross-sectional data for a longitudinal prediction, the concept of modernization makes it possible.

What is implied in the synchronization of the logico-spatial and the temporal series is the substitution of the classificatory variation for the genetic variation. The victim of such substitution is, of course, time, and, therefore, the process of change: the scope, timing, and rates of change is left out of the analysis. What makes it possible to talk about change without taking time seriously is the special conception of the process which makes the time-dimension meaningless: namely, process as the unfolding of the universally determined series of 'stills.'

To sum up, the concept of modernization, by encouraging one to see society as a systemic whole, has brought about the

unprecedented flourish of interdisciplinary research in the study of political change. The diversification and enrichment of the field, however, have cost the political scientist the loss of analytic focus. Political change tends to be explained away in terms of other social phenomena with the very facts of political life left out of the analysis. By seeing all societies pass through the same life history, it also tends to inhibit any genuine interest in political change as process. The notion of a universal, eurhythmic, unilinear process of modernization, a corollary of the holistic view of society, has made insignificant the particular time and place when and where a certain political change takes place. More effort has been devoted to depicting the logical variations between modern and traditional societies than to describing and explaining the process of genetic variation from traditional society to a modern one.

#### Modification: Political Development

As we have seen above, the major casualties of 'modernization' in the study of political change are, ironically enough, 'politics' and 'change.' It seems quite natural, therefore, that the efforts to modify the theoretical scheme has centered around the problems of the rediscovery of 'politics' and 'process.'

When the assumption that the closer a country approximates the Western countries in socio-economic terms, the more it will become like them politically broke down in many non-Western countries, it became quite clear that the dynamics of politics is relatively autonomous. While the wealth of a

nation has increased, the society has been becoming more mobilized, and greater proportions of people have participated in politics, contrary to our general anticipation, there has been an erosion of democracy and a tendency to autocratic military or one-party regimes instead of a trend toward political competitiveness and democracy. Instead of stability, there have been repeated coups and revolts. Instead of unifying nationalism and nation-building there have been repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars.<sup>(18)</sup> As a result, it became manifest that political change proceeds along lines distinguishable from economic, social or other forms of change.<sup>(19)</sup> Although we can not deny that politics is affected by other social aspects in one way or another, we also have to realize that society is not a seamless whole.

By the benefit of hindsight, the term political development, which came into fashion in the early 1960's, reflected the newly obtained autonomy of politics. In the concept of political development, the unit of change is the political system, not the whole society. If we think a society as a seamless whole, such a shift in the unit of change is virtually meaningless. Actually many scholars still tend to think of political development as identified with political modernization.<sup>(20)</sup> However, if we recognize that the various elements of a society are more or less discrete, such a shift opens up the way to conceive of the mechanism of political change independently of other aspects of social change.

The first declaration of the autonomy of politics was  
made by Huntington. He defines political development as  
institutionalization of political organizations and procedures.  
A political organization or procedure is considered as an  
arrangement for promoting community among two or more social  
forces which have divisive or conflicting interests. In this  
conception, the political system is not the one-sided  
reflection of the relations among social forces. Rather, the  
major function of the political system is conceived as governing  
the relations among them. Political development does not mean  
establishing a form of government as found in the Western  
countries but rather achieving a higher degree of government,  
irrespective of its forms. <sup>(21)</sup> Both in emphasizing the  
societal functions of the political system and in liberating  
the concept of political development from modernization  
(democratization), Huntington set the general tone of what  
has followed.

Somewhat earlier than Huntington, Eisenstadt, puzzled  
with the breakdown of political modernization in the new  
countries, came to recognize that along with the development  
of the various socio-demographic and structural indices of  
modernization, there should be a viable political institutional  
structure, which is able to deal with the problems generated  
by the socio-demographic and structural changes. <sup>(22)</sup> David  
Apter, who views politics as the control mechanisms of the  
normative and structural aspects of choice, consistently

searches for the type of political system optimally suited for the level of human choices and alternatives widened by modernization.<sup>(23)</sup> Almond, with Powell, unlike his earlier preoccupation with the input side, came to find the significance of the increased structural differentiation and the increased cultural secularization in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the performance of the political system, that is, increasing its output capabilities.<sup>(24)</sup> Manfred Halpern defines political development in the terms of "the will and capacity of political authority to cope with the structural changes and demands set loose by modernization."<sup>(25)</sup> Diamant views political development not as a process which aims at achieving a particular political condition, but one which creates an institutional framework for solving an ever-widening range of social problems.<sup>(26)</sup>

All of these writers recognize that the passing of traditional society in Lerner's term does not automatically bring about a viable modern political system. Rather, they think it poses new issues, demands, or crises to the political system. Whether people in a certain political system successfully copes with these crises or not is considered as ultimately dependent on the will and capacity of the political elites and organizations. Underlying these discussions is the notion of the political system as an over-all problem-solver of a society. Political development is basically conceived as maintaining a 'moving equilibrium' between the forces of change and the capacity to cope with them.<sup>(27)</sup>

As the societal problem-solver, the modern political system must cope with challenges, crises, or requirements cast upon by the force of, or the imputed desire for modernization. Almond suggest four challenges: nation-building, state-building, participation, and distribution.<sup>(28)</sup> Rustow lists three key requirements.<sup>(29)</sup> The Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council identifies five crises: identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution.<sup>(30)</sup> And it has been generally suggested that the particular pattern of development in a certain country depends largely upon the sequence in which these crises occur and the ways in which they are handled by the political elite.

As in the history of England, the model of modern democracies, the crises may arise somewhat separately from one another and largely according to the order in which the crises are listed in the above. In contrast, development of the continental European systems followed more chaotic sequences. In Italy and Germany the preludes of state-building did not involve the resolutions of the issue of national identity. In most of the new states all these crises are appearing simultaneously. The resolution of each of these crises exacts from the political elite different capacities and skills. The sequence of appearance or varying combination of them, therefore, is considered to be critical in determining what pattern of development a political system takes.<sup>(31)</sup>

This approach draws our attention to the points neglected in the theoretical scheme of modernization, but with limited success. At first, this approach tries to formulate the process of political development independently of other social, economic, and cultural changes by emphasizing the autonomous role of the political elites and organizations. The autonomy of politics, however, is quite limited because the situational changes yielded by modernization set the margin within which the political elites can maneuver. It is ambiguous as well because the relationship between political change and other social changes still remains undetermined. The crises, challenges, or requirements are posed by social changes, not generated within the political system. But the question that what kind of social change poses what kind of political crisis has not been explored. Most of the writers on political development apparently agree that the modern nation state as a particular type of political system is the product of modernization and refer the term 'political development' only to the problems of successful nation-building.

The point will be made clearer when we examine Huntington's concept of political development. As mentioned above, Huntington defines political development in terms of institutionalization, which he, in turn, defines as the process by which political organizations or procedures acquire value and stability. As he emphasizes, the concept indeed does not have anything to do with the type of political organizations



and procedures. So we can talk of the institutionalization of tribal authority, feudal systems, modern democracy, or whatever types of political organization. On the other hand, if we use the term meaningfully, we always have to talk of institutionalization of something. So the concept of institutionalization must presuppose a sort of typology of the political system unless there are universal political organizations and procedures to be institutionalized.

Actually, after defining political development in terms of institutionalization, Huntington still talks of the differences between the modern and traditional polities and of the process of political modernization. He regards the modern polity as characterized by rationalized authority, differentiated structure and expanded participation. While he reserves the term 'political modernization' for the process by which authority rationalizes, structure differentiates, and participation expands, he refers 'political development' to the institutionalization of either a traditional or a modern polity. It becomes manifest that Huntington's concept of political development excludes the process by which the political system changes from a certain type to another and only refers to the process by which a given type of the political system stabilizes itself. If this is the case, his concept of political development -- and the autonomy of politics -- is bought at the expense of drastic narrowing of its scope.

Secondly, this approach focuses more upon the time-dimension than the concept of modernization by regarding the

sequence of crises as critical in determining the path a political system takes. The sequence of events as an independent variable in political development is an interesting and welcome notion for remedying the systemic inattention to the particular time and place when and where a certain event occurs, which we find in the concept of modernization. In order to be meaningful, however, this notion requires an end-product and a set of well-defined events. In the concept of political development, the end-product is the modern nation-state and the set of events is a set of challenges or crises as listed above. The variation in the sequence in which these events occur makes the task of nation-building easy or difficult and results in the variation of the form a nation-state takes. What is worthy of note for our purposes in this section is not the contentions that the formulation of the set of crises draws primarily on the Western experience, and whether the crises are well-defined or not, but that the set of events concerns only the problems of the modern nation-building.

The point to be made from the above discussion is that the concreteness, if any, of the concept of political development is gained at the expense of the comprehensiveness of modernization. As we have seen in the above, the concept of political development refers to much limited phenomena as compared with political modernization. The narrowing scope of the concept is compensated for by its closer approximation

to reality. By shifting the focus from the problem of the structural differentiation of a total society to the viability or stability of the nation-state the writers on political development get closer to the reality of political development and decay and to various ways to achieve political stability.

### Rejection of Modernization

As another response to the universal generalization of the modernization process, there have developed several criticisms which have gradually converged into what is tantamount to an almost total rejection of the concept of modernization. These criticisms have come mainly from those scholars who are well acquainted with the details of the social or political changes going on in a certain country by being indigenous or through conducting extensive field research in the area of change.

They challenge the very basic notion of modernization: the unilinear, systemic replacement of tradition by modernity. The basis for their challenge is the 'discovered' persistence of traditional forms of social organizations and cultural orientations in the confrontation with modernity. According to the eurhythmic, unilinear notion of social change, the social or political transformations, once introduced through colonization or in other ways, should have occasioned the consistent and supportive changes in other spheres of human activity and proceeded along the preconceived way to modernity.

What empirical researchers have discovered, however, reveals that such a notion is hardly consistent with empirical reality.

Harry Benda emphatically recognized that in Indonesia, once decolonized, those changes introduced through colonization were adapted to an Indonesian image and they moved in the direction of strengthening its traditional structures and cultures.<sup>(32)</sup>

Concurring with Benda, Jan Hesterman -- a Dutch Indologist -- contended that the impact of modernity did not really change the basic traditional cultural frameworks, orientations, symbols and self-identity of Indian society.<sup>(33)</sup>

If the concept of a universal modernization process is a somewhat teleological, end-product determinism, the contentions of Benda and Hesterman sound like a starting-point determinism.<sup>(34)</sup>

Though not going to the extremes found in the discussions of Benda and Hesterman, an increasing number of scholars have come to recognize the importance of traditional factors in the modernization process. Among others, David Apter has taken a lead in this endeavor. To him, tradition is not anything to be quickly discarded in the favor of modernity, but is rather one of the most important factors which shape the outcome of modernization in traditional societies. The conceptualization which underlies Apter's theory of political change in Africa can be schematized as follows:<sup>(35)</sup>

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Intervening Variable</u>	<u>Dependent Variable</u>
The Impact of Modernization (Colonization)	(Traditional System)	
	Pyramidal Authority	
	Consummatory Value	---Mobilization
	System	System

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Intervening Variable</u>	<u>Dependent Variable</u>
	Hierarchical Authority	
	Instrumental Value System	---Modernizing Autocracy

The continuously growing awareness of the symbiosis of traditional and modern elements in society has led some scholars to doubt the validity of the dichotomy of tradition and modernity itself. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph ascribe the now prevailing conception of the mutual exclusiveness or incompatibility between tradition and modernity to the cumulative effect of the misdiagnosis of traditional societies and the misunderstanding of modern societies. They argue that the co-existence of both elements is not a transitional, ephemeral phenomenon, but rather a persisting feature of a society. They go on to contend that the objective conditions subsumed under the concept of tradition are not peculiar to the so-called traditional societies but satisfy certain universal requirements of the human condition and, therefore, are found even in the most modernized societies. In a similar fashion, they also contend that the values, configurations or structures that may fit a model of modernity are found in traditional societies, though in the form of latent, deviant, and minority alternatives. One of the main themes in the Rudolphs' work is that the Indian caste system which is usually considered to be an approximation of the ideal type of traditional stratification also incorporates a certain degree of horizontal and vertical mobility, which has contributed to the success of representative democracy in India. (36)

As a corollary, the homogeneity of both tradition and modernity is also called into question. It has often been indicated that the abstraction of a traditional society as a type separate from a specific historical and cultural setting ignores the diversity of content of a specific tradition which influences the acceptance, rejection or fusion of modern forms. The ways in which one traditional society differs from another may be more significant than anything they share in determining the path that each society takes in the process of modernization. For instance, the caste structure of an Indian village and the structure of Chinese peasant life are critically different from one another and while one facilitates certain aspects of modernization, the other impedes them. It is emphasized that each tradition adapts to modernization in its own specific context. Thus the internal variation of tradition and its differing potentiality for change have received a growing attention.<sup>(37)</sup> If these varieties of traditional structure did not disappear, modern societies are complex and diverse as well, as many empirical researches confirm.<sup>(38)</sup>

Thus the two terminal categories, tradition and modernity, cease to refer to definite, internally consistent, and mutually exclusive entities, but become 'semantic blanks' vaguely implying vast inchoate and by no means internally integrated areas of human experience. The modernization process is no longer uniform and systemic, but diverse and adaptive, becoming vague enough to mean "something inclusive of the total ranges of changes affecting the world in modern times."<sup>(39)</sup>

# FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>D. Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 47, S. Huntington, "The Change to Change," in Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 382.

<sup>2</sup>Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics: Past and Present," op. cit., pp. 16ff.

<sup>3</sup>Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Government: The Search for Focus," Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Oct. 1969), pp. 81-85.

<sup>4</sup>Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 21-25.

1. structural differentiation and subsystem autonomy;

2. secularization of political culture.

Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," J. La-Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 9.

1. a high degree of differentiation in political roles and institutions and the development of a centralized and unified polity with specific goals and orientation; 2. the extension of the activities of the central administrative and political organizations and their gradual permeation into all spheres of the society; 3. the tendency of potential power to spread to wider and wider groups in the society -- ultimately to all adult citizens; 4. the weakening of traditional elites and traditional legitimization of rulers and the increase in ideological and institutional accountability of the rulers to the ruled who hold potential power.

S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 32-37.

1. rationalization of authority; 2. differentiation of structure; 3. mass participation and a consequent capability to accomplish a broad range of goals.

Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 6.

1. a highly differentiated and functionally specific system of governmental organization; 2. a high degree of integration within the governmental structure; 3. the prevalence of rational and secular procedures for the making of political decisions; 4. the large volume, wide range, and high efficacy of its political administrative decisions; 5. a wide spread and effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory and national identity of the state; 6. widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in the decision-making aspects thereof; 7. the

allocation of political roles by achievement rather than ascription; and, 8. judicial and regulatory techniques based upon a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law.

<sup>5</sup>Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review LIII, No. 1, (March, 1959), pp. 69-105, Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis" American Sociological Review XXVIII, (April, 1963), pp. 253-64.

<sup>6</sup>Lerner, op. cit.

<sup>7</sup>Deutsch, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup>Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

<sup>9</sup>Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burmese Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

<sup>10</sup>Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundation of Nationality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953). Lerner, "Toward A Communication Theory of Modernization," Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 327-350. Pye, "Introduction," in ibid, pp. 3-23.

<sup>11</sup>Glenn D. Paige, "The Rediscovery of Politics," J.D. Montgomery and W.J. Siffin, Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change (New York: McGraw Hills, 1966), pp. 49-58.

<sup>12</sup>Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), pp. 249-50.

<sup>13</sup>Rustow, op. cit., p. 48, see also his article, "Transition to Democracy: Toward A Dynamic Model," in Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, (April, 1970), pp. 337-63.

<sup>14</sup>Robert A. Nisbet, op. cit., pp. 195-96.

<sup>15</sup>Bruce M. Russett and others, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.



<sup>16</sup>op. cit., pp. 293ff., the quotation is from p. 299.

<sup>17</sup>Raymond Grew and Sylvia Thrupp, "Horizontal History in Search of Vertical Dimensions," (Review Article), Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 8, No. 2, (January, 1966), p. 258.

<sup>18</sup>S.P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," in World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, (April, 1965), p. 392.

<sup>19</sup>Alfred Diamant, "Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy," Montgomey and Siffin, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>20</sup>Lucien Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 31-48.

<sup>21</sup>Huntington, op. cit., see also his Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

<sup>22</sup>"Breakdown of Modernization," in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 12, No. 4, (July, 1964), p. 347.

<sup>23</sup>The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), see especially, "Political Systems and Developmental Change," in Holt and Turner, ed., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 153-71.

<sup>24</sup>Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 105.

<sup>25</sup>"The Rate and Costs of Political Development," Annals, Vol. 358, (March, 1965), pp. 20-28.

<sup>26</sup>Diamant, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>27</sup>R.A. Packenham, "Political Development Research," in Hass and Kariel, ed., Approaches to the Study of Political Science (Scranton, Penn.: Chandler, 1970), p. 180.

<sup>28</sup>Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, p. 35.

<sup>29</sup>A World of Nations, p. 36.

<sup>30</sup>See, L. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, p. 62.

<sup>31</sup>For discussions of the problem of sequence, see, Pye, op. cit., pp. 62-67, Rustow, op. cit., pp. 12-32 LaPalombara, Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 14ff.

<sup>32</sup>"Democracy in Indonesia," (Review Article) The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, (May, 1964), pp. 449-56.

<sup>33</sup>See, Eisenstadt, "Reflections On a Theory of Modernization," A. Rivkin, ed., Nations by Design (Garden City, New York: 1968), pp. 47-49.

<sup>34</sup>Rajni Kothari, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited," in Government and Opposition, Vol. 2, No. 3, (Summer, 1968), p. 278.

<sup>35</sup>D. Apter, op. cit.

<sup>36</sup>L. Rudolph and S. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development In India, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 5-6.

<sup>37</sup>Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 72, No. 4, (January, 1966), pp. 351-62, also see, Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 9, No. 3, (April, 1967), p. 313-14.

<sup>38</sup>cf. Ian Weinberg, "The Problem of the Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of a Theory," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 11, No. 1, (January, 1969), pp. 1-15.

<sup>39</sup>Marius Jansen, op. cit., p. 11.

## CHAPTER IV

The Concept of Modernization Reconsidered

The above discussion suggests that the term modernization has lost an essential quality of a concept, the ability to differentiate one referent from another. Modernization originally refers to the systemic, eurhythmic social change from tradition to modernity. But the term is no longer used exclusively in such a way. The integrity of the conceptual structure of modernization has been unrecoverably destroyed at the hands of area specialists who are well-immersed in the events of social or political change in particular countries. Modernization has come to refer to whatever is happening in the so-called developing areas. We are no longer surprised to see that under the semantic blanket, modernization, there coexist both the unilinear notion of systemic development and the dysrhythmic notion of specific, adaptive change.

A reflection upon this state of affairs leads us to see that much of the confusion results from a mixing of levels of analysis. As Alexander Gerschenkron pointed out, the basic methodological precept in historical study of this kind is that everybody finds what he is seeking. Those who seek uniformity can find uniformity, and those who seek diversity can find diversity. It all depends on how broad the student chooses his focus and his time frame to be. If a very broad and long view is taken, most differences tend to come out in the historical wash. If an analysis focuses on a relatively

narrow and finite events, the uniqueness and particularity emerge in bold relief.<sup>(1)</sup> When Whitaker, a specialist in Nigerian politics, concluded in a manner similar to other area specialists that the political situation in the Northern region of Nigeria during the fourteen-year period up to 1966 had shown no sign of either regression to untrammelled "traditionality," or spontaneous growth toward true modernity.<sup>(2)</sup> It should be noted that he was simply talking about a different thing from what modernization originally referred to. As we have seen above, modernization is a generalization of world-wide, history-long human experiences. It is an abstraction divorced from the particularity of the events, actions, personages, places, and periods; that is, the very substance of what empirical research is concerned with. Some scholars attempt to generalize the abstract long-term life process of an abstract entity -- society --, encapsulating the diversity of concrete events which comprise history. On the other hand, others, focusing on concrete, finite, and particular social changes, complain that they can not find what those generalists claim to have found in human history. If they have different referents, their conclusions may well be different and even conflicting.

The coexistence of conflicting conclusions in a field itself, therefore, is not necessarily contradictory or undesirable. Rather, it may mean that the pursuit of truth can be made at various, but equally legitimate, levels of analysis.<sup>(3)</sup>

But it should also be kept in mind that the basic methodological norm in scientific research demands that these levels be bridged. Only after the logical relation between a general scheme and a particular fact is established do we come to know whether the fact supports the generalization or not. From this viewpoint, the seemingly confusing state of the concept of modernization may or may not be a confusion at all. It may be just a reflection of varying emphases and choices, or it may be a real confusion. Which one it really is can be determined only after examining whether the various levels of analysis in the study of modernization are bridged or not.

One of the logical principles in bridging a highly abstract concept and empirical reality is 'the ladder of abstraction.'<sup>(4)</sup> The notion of the ladder of abstraction can be best explained with reference to the relation between the extension (denotation) and intension (connotation) of a term. The extension of a word is the class of things to which the word applies; the intension of a word is the collection of properties or attributes which determine the things to which the word applies. The relation between the extension and intension of a word is usually inversely proportionate. The larger the class, the fewer its differentiating attributes; the greater the differentiating attributes (the defining properties), the smaller the number of things to which the word applies. So in order to broaden the extension of a concept, in other words, to make the concept more abstract and general,

we have to diminish its properties, i.e., to reduce its intension. Conversely a concept is specified by the addition of qualities, i.e., by augmenting its attributes. The higher the level of abstraction of a term, the less it means; the lower, the more. The way to bridge a general term and an empirical reality is to climb or to descend this ladder of abstraction. Following this procedure, we can develop conceptualizations which, no matter how all-embracing, still bear a traceable relation to empirical reality.

In the light of this basic principle, let us reconsider the situation in which the concept of modernization finds itself. As discussed in the above, what gives consistency and coherence to the conceptual elements of modernization is the notion of society as a functionally autonomous entity. Such a conception of society is the result of a drastic sacrifice of its connotations in order to meet the requirement of universal denotation -- either in space, time, or both. In some sense, the connotation was too drastically sacrificed. The extension of a concept can be broadened as far as is necessary but never beyond a point at which at least one relatively precise connotation is retained. In other words, however highly abstract or general a concept may be, it must still mean something, discriminating some things from others. The concept of society as an autonomous entity, however, seems to be very weak in this discriminating power. Without any means of positive or even negative identification, society

denotes every type of human grouping: tribe, city-state, feudal society, empire, nation-state, etc. All these human groupings are considered to be same in the sense that they perform a common set of functions for their persistence. Although what society means is never specified, one thing certain is that it is the ultimate genus of human groupings.

The trouble with the concept of modernization seems to derive more directly not from the fact that the level of abstraction of the concept society is too high to mean anything, but rather from the fact that while society is thus considered as the ultimate genus of human groupings, the difference within the genus is conceived to be a matter of degree. As explicated in the above, one of the characteristic ways of reasoning common to the theorists of modernization is that they conceive the differences -- spatial as well as temporal -- among societies in terms of degree, not of kind. In short, in the concept of modernization society as the ultimate genus cancels all its species. Instead, the variation among members of the genus is specified in terms of gradation.

Such conceptualization can be achieved in two different ways with different implications. One is to stay in the abstract world, not getting out of it in order to reach the empirical world. The other is to destroy brutally the ladder of abstraction.

To conceptualize the variation in the ultimate genus in terms of degree is not logically wrong, because, in principle,

as long as the level of abstraction is maintained, the logic of gradation can enter at every level of abstraction. Though not wrong, it seems extremely absurd. The rule of thumb seems to be that the higher the level of abstraction, the more difficult the application of a degree language becomes; whereas the lower the level of abstraction, the more correct and profitable it becomes.<sup>(5)</sup> As Hempel suggests, the transition from classificatory to more elusive degree terms is necessary for the purposes of precise description.<sup>(6)</sup> It should be noted, however, that if the logic of gradation enters at the high level of abstraction, the degree terms also become equally highly abstract. If so, the description in highly abstract terms is not exactly what the introduction of the degree term is intended to achieve, and not even what a description is in the proper sense. In other words, gradation without explicit criteria for its use has programmatic but no systematic status.<sup>(7)</sup> It is by no means a way to reach empirical reality, but at best a metaphor.

A good example is found in Levy's distinction between modern and non-modern societies. Levy is unequivocal, as elsewhere, in defining the difference among societies in a degree term. Levy's two criteria in defining the difference among societies, that is, the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power and the extent of the application of tools, look very simple and measurable in principle, as he insists. But neither we nor he know how to operationalize these seemingly simple but highly abstract variables. So when he



faced the problem of deciding upon a cutting-off point between modern and non-modern societies, he could not but rely on what he called 'common sense' rather than on the criteria he had so convincingly proposed. He stated:

For the lack of nicety of measurement, again, no one will disagree that in terms of such a continuum . modern United States society must be judged much more highly modernized than traditional Chinese society and that traditional Chinese society must be judged much more modernized than that of the Australian Bushmen.(8)

Then his criteria must have been proposed to let us know what all of us know without them. Otherwise, the definition by example on which he had to rely is surely a confession of the helplessness he must have felt when he tried to do something impossible, that is, to operationalize the highly abstract degree terms. Consequently, his theoretical scheme has never reached empirical reality. In this sense, it may well deserve LaPalombara's accusation that it is a modern version of scholasticism.(9)

The other way to combine the ultimate genus and the degree terms, as we noted above, is to ignore the whole ladder of abstraction between these two extremes. This is surely a logical sin, but so commonly committed that it is no longer regarded as a sin. But a commonly committed sin is still a sin.

While the modern scholastics begin with and end in the world of abstract speculation, the empirically-oriented scholars start with what they observe. They measure the G.N.P., the degree of social mobilization, political participation,

so-called democraticness and so forth. They decide whether the process of modernization is eurhythmic or disrhythmic from these direct observations. As repeatedly stressed in the above, such observations or measurements are meaningful only when what is to be measured or observed is specified. Before we can measure we must know what it is we are measuring. However, in order to meet the universality which the general schemes require, what is measured or observed usually become so vague as to be wrong. For example, let us look at the pages under the heading of "Votes in National Elections as a Percentage of Voting Age Population" in World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. The authors of the book did not fail to notice that there are different kinds of voting, but they simply ignored the significance of the different voting systems. In the countries with free elections -- it may be also a problem whether there are other kinds of elections besides free election -- the voting rate may be the single most important indicator of political participation. But in the countries where non-voting is punished as a sign of disloyalty to the regime, the voting rate may be more legitimately interpreted as indicating the degree of penetration of compulsory administration. Naturally, the U.S.S.R. topped the list of voting rates. The voting rates in different countries may thus measure these apparently different phenomena. Therefore, to compare these voting rates is to compare incomparable things, and to generalize about them is basically wrong. Nevertheless, the difference in content, that is, the

difference between the voluntary participation and compulsory mobilization is simply forgotten in the desire to achieve universal comparison or generalization. In other words, universal generalizations as we see them today have been attained by seeing different things as the same. All the differences in properties or species are cancelled in order to bring them into direct relation with universal categories.

What is worse is that this kind of logical error is by no means idiosyncratic to a scholar or a group of scholars, but is very pervasive in the whole field, and expressed in various languages. Let us take another example. Today nobody objects to the assertion that the U.S.S.R. is a modern political system. Nobody will disagree that the Russian political system has achieved as high degree of functional specialization or structural differentiation as is found in other modern countries, but it is also observed that the differentiated and functionally specialized structures in Russia are under the strict and over-all control of a relatively small number of elites. Faced with this striking difference, Almond and Powell coined the concept of differentiation without autonomy. (10) The differentiation without autonomy must be contrasted with the differentiation with autonomy logically as well as in reality. The term differentiation originally refers to the autonomous differentiation. Then, they should have redefined the term, that is, to reduce its connotations, to include both kinds of differentiation. However, they did not. The concept of

differentiation just adds its denotation -- the non-autonomous structural differentiation -- without any loss of connotation.<sup>(11)</sup> Again, two different phenomena are referred to by the same term, paving the way for indiscriminate measurement on a single scale.

Whereas the empirical theorists try to relate what they see directly to the general scheme by destroying the whole ladder of abstraction, area specialists try not to go beyond what they see. They see more difference than similarity between the Chinese traditional society and the Indian caste system, and stick to the peculiarity of each one. To them, each society, each process of political change, each event is unique and incomparable. Therefore, they do not attempt to ascend the ladder of abstraction, and more often than not deny its existence.

From our point of view, then, both empirical theorists and area specialists commit the same error: they ignore the ladder of abstraction. When the empirical theorists conclude that their empirical data conform to the general pattern of modernization, and when the area specialists insist that the process of modernization is far from being uniform, they are making the same mistake; that is, they are treating the highly abstract concept, modernization, as though it were directly observable and measurable.

Pulling threads together, the real confusion which the concept of modernization has caused in the study of political

change is not that it produced seemingly conflicting conclusions, but that we do not know whether they are conflicting or not, because empirical data and the general scheme have never been appropriately bridged. And the wide gap between the theoretical framework and empirical data is mainly due to the conceptualization inherent in the concept of modernization which ignores the ladder of abstraction.

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>"Industrialization in Russia," in W. Rustow, ed., The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth (New York: St. Martin, 1963), p. 165.

<sup>2</sup>op. cit., p. 202.

<sup>3</sup>A. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>4</sup>For a extensive discussion of the ladder of abstraction, see, Giovanni Sartori, op. cit., pp. 1040ff.

<sup>5</sup>Sartori, op. cit., p. 1040.

<sup>6</sup>Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, pp. 54ff.

<sup>7</sup>Hempel, "Symposium," op. cit., pp. 70ff.

<sup>8</sup>Modernization and Structure of Societies, p. 13.

<sup>9</sup>"Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics," Holt and Turner, eds., op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>10</sup>Comparative Politics, pp. 271ff.

<sup>11</sup>Sartori calls the broadening of denotation without decreasing connotation as "conceptual stretching." op. cit., p. 1041.

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

This research was initiated with the impression that in the study of political change, the term modernization has been used to mean too many things but nothing precisely. Faced with this conceptual confusion, I have attempted to understand its nature and source. To do so, my effort was directed, at first, toward a brief discussion of some general problems which any theory of social change should consider, because modernization, whatever else it may be, means social change, and, then, to the explication of what it really means for these basic problems. When we explicated the meaning of modernization as evolutionary, political scientists' response toward it may be divided into three: to embrace it, to modify it, and to reject it. Nobody abandons the terms modernization itself, but they use the term in their own ways. It goes without saying that these various responses among political scientists constitute conceptual confusion.

The real source of the conceptual confusion, however, seems not to lie in their different responses toward the conceptual scheme, but in their common attitude toward the relation between empirical data and general theory. Both those who reject the evolutionary notion of modernization, and those who claim that they validate the notion, do so on the grounds of what they observe. But the concept modernization is too abstract to be either validated or repudiated by direct observation. They do not pay attention to the elementary

logic by which we can connect between abstract, general concepts and concrete, observable items, and make them relevant to each other. The price we have to pay for such an ignorance of the ladder of abstraction is the coexistence of the modern version of scholasticism with no empirical anchorage and the accumulation of data vacuous of theoretical import, none of which is desirable for our understanding of political change.

We are now fairly long both on talking about abstract, general theoretical schemes and on collecting data from all over the world, but very short on bridging them. The conceptual tools for connecting them are more badly needed than ever, because we now have something to connect. If society as a whole is too big, and the life history of a society from time immemorial to the hypothetical end point is too long to be properly managed, the first thing to be done is to slice the phenomena into manageable size. From here, along the ladder of abstraction, we can go up to a higher level of generalization and go down to a lower level of empirical research. Only by doing so, will we be able to see something general validated or repudiated by empirical research.



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