RELATIONSHIP GOALS: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BILL SPONSORS AND COSPONSORS ON IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION FROM 1973-2016

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A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of Political Science

University of Houston

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In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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By

Savannah L. Sipole

December, 2018

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This dissertation contains three essays regarding relationships formed between members of Congress in the U.S. House and Senate. The primary focus is to determine how partisanship and polarization influence these decisions to cosponsor with others on these types of bills. The first chapter examines relationships between members of Congress on all immigration bills introduced between 1973 and 2016. The results indicate that there was a higher likelihood of bipartisanship on bills introduced until the mid-1990s when copartisanship was the predominate form of ties to present. In the second chapter, I analyze cosponsorship networks between members of Congress on the different types of immigration legislation introduced over a period of four decades to try and infer how these social relationships may influence behavior when it comes to supporting immigration policy that benefits or sanctions immigrants. The results in the House and Senate reveal that Republicans were more likely to cosponsor with other Republicans on immigration legislation that provided benefits, and Democrats were only more likely to form copartisan ties with one another on this subtype for four of the twenty-two terms—only consecutively so since 2011. For bills that limited immigrants or provided sanctions against them, Republicans in the House were overall more likely to work with other Republicans and Democrats were also more likely to cosponsor enforcement legislation with other Democrats an equal amount of the time. Finally, the third chapter investigates how race and ethnicity shaped the incentives of members to cosponsor different types of immigration legislation. The results provide evidence that members from majority-minority districts were more likely to form cosponsorship relationships with each other. Minority members were generally more likely to form relationships with other minority members on bills that benefit immigrants. However,

being a Hispanic or having a higher percent of Hispanics in a congressional district made a little difference in forming relationships with each other. This research provides an important contribution to the existent literature that looks at the interdependencies of legislators through cosponsorship activities to shed light on how members of Congress work together on immigration policy during the pre-floor stages of the legislative process.

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For the two greatest loves of my life and my biggest reasons to finish,

 *Emma and Boh* 

The souls I thought I didn't need, but God knew better.

For my tribe,

Those who taught me that failure is not a permanent condition and how to get up after every setback with more drive and determination to finish the journey I started.

What an adventure this has been!

Introduction

Immigration consistently ranks among the most important concerns among the U.S. public (CNN/ ORC International 2015; Gallup 2018[1]; New York Times 2017[2]; U.S. News and World Report 2015).[3] Gallup regularly polls individuals asking what they think the biggest problem the nation is facing on a monthly basis. As of September 2018, out of all the issues respondents mentioned as the biggest problem the nation faced, 82% said that the biggest problem was a non-economic issue. Of those non-economic issues, "immigration/ illegal aliens" has consistently ranked in the top three over the last several months (see Figure 1). According to Newport (2018), the mentions of "immigration as the nation's most important problem has averaged 5% over the 17 years Gallup has been asking the questions on a monthly basis." In July of 2018, immigration ranked as the top non-economic problem, surpassing "dissatisfaction with the government", at 22 percent[4] of all non-economic issues. Newport (2018) noted that when respondents named immigration as the top problem had exceeded that five percent margin, it was a reflection of real-world events and political attention being paid to the topic.

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[1] http://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/27/us/politics/most-important-problem-gallup-polling-question.html

[3] http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm

[4] These results come from open-ended questions via telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,033 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and Washington D.C. The margin of sampling error is ±4% at the 95% confidence interval. See https://news.gallup.com/poll/237389/immigration-surges-top-important-problem-list.aspx.

Figure 1: Percentage of Respondents Citing Immigration/Illegal Aliens as the Biggest Problem



Source: Gallup data via the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research[5]

For instance, Figure 1 shows that in April of 2006 the mention of immigration being the biggest problem reached to 19 percent—the highest percent since 1993 when the question first appeared as an important issue for this poll—as Congress was yet again trying to pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill. Immigration protest in some larger cities across the U. S. dominated news coverage during this time leading to a surged level of concern nationwide (Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010; Newport 2018). These protests stemmed from the "Sensenbrenner Bill", otherwise known as the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 introduced by Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI-5). This bill called for harsher penalties for violators of federal immigration laws and non-participants in the electronic verification

[5] Note: September 1993 is the first time "Immigrants/ Illegal Aliens" appeared as an important issue for this poll.

employment systems. This was followed by the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) of 2006 introduced by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) which proposed to allow long-time immigrants to acquire legal status, increase the number of visas for guest workers, and provide some border security along the Mexico border. In 2014 there was another uptick in the percent of respondents answering that immigration was the biggest issue the nation was facing as media attention focused on larger numbers of immigrants illegally entering the country from Mexico and surrounding Central American countries (Newport 2018). And most recently, there has been controversy over President Donald Trump's focus on illegal immigration and the administration's policies on how to deal with them. Over the last summer, President Trump and his administration faced and continue to face backlash over children being separated from their parents after their parents were apprehended for being in the country illegally. With the increased media attention over this issue, the percentage of respondents mentioning that immigration was the number one problem in the country reached a historical high of 22 percent.

From a partisan standpoint, the issue of immigration as waxed and waned among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. In February of 2018, 29 percent of those who self-identified as Republican mentioned that immigration was the top problem opposed to 5 percent of Democrats and 12 percent of independents (Newport 2018). This was during the time there was much rhetoric concerning immigration and congressional debate involving a new budget bill. By March of 2018 the percentage of Republicans citing immigration as the major issue dropped several percentage points, and in July with the Trump administration controversy, 35 percent of Republican respondents and 18 percent of Democratic respondents cited immigration as the biggest issue (Newport 2018). While

there has been a more recent uptick in the importance of this issue from a partisan standpoint, the members of each partisan group might have different reasons for citing this as the most important issue. Republicans may be looking at the issue from the perspective of crime and public safety as well as other factors that arise from an increase in illegal aliens, whereas Democrats may be more concerned on the impact it has on those affected by these new procedures and increases in detainments of undocumented immigrants.

The Problem with Polarization

As the Democratic Party and Republican Party have polarized, consensus and compromise on immigration have become increasingly difficult. For example, in 2013 the "Gang of Eight", a bipartisan group of Senators led by Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY), composed S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013. The bill would have strengthened border security along the southern border with Mexico, created a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, created new jobs with a visa lottery program, and created restrictions on the H-1B and H-2B visa programs. After two months the Senate passed the bill with a vote of 68 to 32. However, the Republican majority in the House was opposed to the bill and it never made it to the floor or even the agenda, creating deadlock between the two chambers and no consensus on a comprehensive immigration reform bill.

Despite the general consensus of the importance of immigration and the need for change, the parties have faced deadlock in achieving comprehensive immigration reform. More recently, in February 2018 there were several key bipartisan proposals introduced

in the Senate. Among those were the Coons-McCain Bill, S.2367 - USA Act of 2018 which would have provided conditional permanent resident status to eligible DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) recipients, increase the number of immigration judges, and would have provided security grants to law enforcement agencies in border states. Of the four major bipartisan proposals introduced during this time, the Rounds plan (S.Amdt.2010 to House Bill 2579, "Border Options for Americans Act") introduced by Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD) was more middle-of-the-road and had the most promise of passing. The plan would have provided a pathway to citizenship for DREAMers, prevented green card holders from sponsoring adult children to immigrate to the U.S., appropriated $25 billion to the DHS for border infrastructure, and would codify the enforcement priorities for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that would shift the focus off of unauthorized immigrants living in the country without a criminal history. Despite much debate and all of the effort these Senators put into garnering support for these plans to reform immigration policies, they each failed to surpass the 60 vote threshold to move them to the next step in the legislative process.

Polarization on the issue between Republicans and Democrats is bellowed in the deadlock in Congress on how to come to a resolve. In general, Congress has been ineffective when it comes to getting things done, not just on the issue of immigration. While there is considerable heterogeneity among members within each party (Tichenor 2008), the Republican Party platform has taken the approach to immigration through a concern of national security and border patrol and target undocumented immigrants; similarly, the Democratic Party platform has also been concerned with border patrol and

national security, but has focused on how to legalize these immigrants and to ensure that those here legally are not discriminated against. (Joppke 1998; Wallace 2014).

There have been roughly 1,200 immigration bills and resolutions introduced in the U.S. Congress over the last decade—nearly half of the proposed bills resounded restrictionist views and the other half were pro-immigrant (Belco, Clark, and Sipole 2015) , but only 29, or about 2.5%, of those bills actually became law over a ten year span of time. Although much of the research investigating Congressional decision-making on immigration focuses on roll-call voting or final passage of legislation, there is an expansive literature that highlights the importance of the agenda-setting stage of the process, particularly the sponsorship and cosponsorship of bills. Whereas action on the floor calls for an up or down vote, this earlier stage of the legislative process provides legislators with considerable discretion to craft the language of proposals, an opportunity to signal their positions and priorities to their constituents, and a means to build *collaborative relationships* with their colleagues by endorsing their colleagues' proposals through cosponsorship.

The goal of this dissertation is to explain why members form relationships (cosponsor) with one another concerning immigration legislation. To solve this puzzle, I create a framework to explain how partisanship can influence these relationships and under what conditions would legislators support certain types of immigration policy. When do members of the same party create relationships and under what circumstances are they more likely to create relationships across party lines? Secondly, what role does constituent demographics and personal characteristics play in making these connections? Do racial/ ethnic minorities make a difference and how so? Are minority legislators more

likely to form relationships with one another? Does having a dense population of racial/ ethnic minorities or foreign born population in a legislator's district/ state help determine how these relationships are formed? Finally, do legislators band together based the types of policies introduced that involve immigration?

The Importance of Relationships

The extant literature on agenda-setting has given us considerable insight into the individual, institutional, and electoral factors that influence the sponsorship and cosponsorship of bills (Bratton and Rouse 2011; Cooper and Young 1989; Koger 2003; Platt and Sinclair-Chapman 2008; Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Schiller 1995). Baumgartner and Talbert (1995) found that when the agenda is set and attention is brought to an issue it can create a problematic atmosphere among Members of Congress. When this happens the decision making process can become stalled until particular solutions to these issues are offered. Members then tend to be focused on the problems forged by the agenda that it becomes harder to reach a consensus to solve these problems across party lines (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Harbridge 2015; Lee 2009).

While legislators *individually* sponsor bills, the agenda-setting process is best conceived of as an institutional exercise in which legislators are not operating in isolation, but are instead working in collaboration with their colleagues to further their policy interests. Krutz (2005) argues that the likelihood of a bill receiving serious attention, which is reflected in the number of legislators endorsing the measure through cosponsorship, is enhanced by members' efforts at recruiting supporters of the bill. In a similar vein, Fowler (2006a) shows that the relationships between sponsors and

cosponsors and those who cosponsor with one another go beyond recruitment. Many legislators who sign onto bills play a much more active role not only promoting legislation to their colleagues, but they also can co-draft legislation. Cultivating these relationships with other members can create a higher likelihood that they will continue to work together in the future and cosponsor each other's pieces of legislation. Furthermore, forming these relationships, or friendships, creates an important avenue to dissipate information to other colleagues (Caldeira and Patterson 1987). Studies were conducted in 1993 using an elite level set of interviews of House Representatives from the Ohio General Assembly to look at how friendships influenced roll-call voting. From these studies Arnold, Deen, and Patterson (2000) and Peoples (2008) have found that the social relationships among these members influenced similar behavior during roll-call votes. In other words, these friendships were strong predictors of roll-call votes even after controlling for partisanship and ideology (Kirkland 2011).

The notion of one's community or social environment shaping the individual's behavior dates back to the "Columbia School" model, which viewed social groups as independent bases of political information and influence on individuals (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). In the words of McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001), "[s]imilarity breeds connection." These authors used the principle of *homophily* which structures network ties of all sorts ranging from marriage to friendship to work relationships to co-memberships in various groups. What they found was that people tend to form relationships with those like them in regards to sociodemographics, interpersonal characteristics, and even behavioral tendencies. These homogenous relationships tend to

limit the radius of people's social worlds that have influential implications for the information they receive and the attitudes they form. When it came to race and ethnicity, McPherson et al. (2001) found that these groups made up the strongest divides in personal environments (followed by age, religion, education, occupation, etc.) which further are exacerbated by geography and family systems. While these homophilous ties create tight-knit communities among these individuals and groups, they found that ties between non-similar individuals tend to dissolve at a higher rate, which sets the stage for the formation of these cliques within a social space.

On the other hand, Mutz and Mondak (2006) found that in work environments where people are forced to interact with others who do not necessarily share the same ideology or partisan views there are more political discussions that "cross the lines of political difference" (p. 144) than between those who share the same neighborhood or attend the same church. These cross-cutting discussions between coworkers are important because they often lead to more political tolerance even among those whose views remain unchanged. Furthermore, these interactions create more opportunities for people to amass information that they may not get in their other groups which can lead to a change in participation (McClurg 2003). Early research demonstrated social influence on the also occurs when people go in to vote (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Gilbert 1993; Key 1949; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Segal and Meyer 1974).

Just as one's social network can shape voting and political attitudes among the voting public, the relationship between and among legislators can also have a profound influence over their behavior. James Fowler's work (2006a; 2006b) demonstrates the value that social network research may bring to studies of legislative cosponsorship

patterns. He found that the relationship between cosponsors is a dense network influenced by institutional features as well as strategic incentives. Additionally, the amount of connections, or "connectedness", with their colleagues both intraparty and across the party line can be used to predict legislator influence on the floor as well as roll-call votes. Much like the situation in a typical work atmosphere, in the legislative work environment, these repeated interactions with colleagues allow for legislators not only to provide information about issues and the bills that are circulating, but they are also able to share strategic information as well (Kirkland 2011). Like Fowler, Kirkland (2011) contends that with this strategic information legislators can then develop networks that will best help them advance their legislative agenda. As Talbert and Potoski (2002, 889) note, the pre-floor stages of the legislative process provide "a rich environment for ambitious policy entrepreneurs to structure and restructure their proposals along favorable evaluative dimensions."

Immigration policymaking provides an ideal policy domain in which to test many prominent theories of legislative and coalitional formation during the pre-floor stages of policymaking. First, this highly salient issue affects millions of individuals in the United States. Due to the broad reach of "immigration policy," it is frequently cited as one of the top three concerns among Americans, as previously stated. Given the salience of the issue among the mass public, prominent theories of representation would suggest the necessity of elected officials to respond to their constituents. However, while bills and bill sponsors have previously and more recently been analyzed in more depth at the state level, a network analysis of sponsors of this particular policy area has not been conducted to determine under what conditions a member of Congress is more or less likely to

introduce and cosponsor this type of legislation. Secondly, the issue of immigration is not just one topic, rather it encompasses several subtopics that are partisan, ideological, economic, and social issues which makes it both hard to define and analyze (see Carmines and Stimson 1980 for more information regarding "hard" vs. "easy" issues). Wong (2017, 1) emphasized that "[i]mmigration can shape a nation. Consequently, immigration policy can maintain, replenish, and even reshape it. Immigration policy debates are thus seldom just about whom to let in and how many, as a nation's immigration policies can define its identity." Finally, and perhaps most importantly, immigration policy cannot succeed without cosponsorships. Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) argue that sponsors will sign onto bills because the relative cost of doing so is low; however, other scholars counter that argument and have exhibited the that cosponsorship is a valuable tool to garner information about how well members of Congress work together (Cho and Fowler 2010). Bratton and Rouse (2011) maintain that sponsorship is important, but if that sponsor cannot gain the necessary support for their proposed legislation the likelihood of it advancing to committee or to a floor vote is low. If immigration policy is to progress, it is first important to understand how and why legislators form these relationships with each other, and second to understand the conditions that drive a member of Congress to form relationships with others concerning this specific policy area.

While studying members' positions through their roll-call votes gives us a great opportunity to disentangle the effects of partisanship, constituency, and ideology on immigration, the paucity of floor votes presents limitations to researchers seeking to gain a systematic understanding of the factors shaping the positions members take on this

important issue. I argue that there is still more to be explored, and perhaps a more telling story of legislative behavior, by looking at other aspects besides roll-call votes. Specifically, I argue that it is essential to look more closely at earlier stages of the process, bill initiation and coalition formulation, to understand what occurs (or rather does *not* occur) at the later stages of the process. While some might criticize the use of cosponsorship over using roll-call votes, more recent work has demonstrated that cosponsorship is interdependent and can be treated as a network (Bratton and Rouse 2011; Desmarais, Cranmer, and Fowler 2009; Kirkland 2011). There are benefits for using sponsorship and cosponsorship data over voting data. For example, Talbert and Potoski (2002) find cosponsorship to be a high-dimensional activity; therefore, roll-call voting alone is not sufficient to explain cosponsorship behavior.

Bill sponsorship and cosponsorship are important aspects of legislative behavior that can potentially benefit both the sponsor and cosponsor. Since 1967, all members of Congress have been able to sign on to legislation as cosponsors. In 1968 limits were set on the number of cosponsors per bill in the House to 25 signatures, and in 1978 with the passing of H.Res. 86, those limits were removed and bills could have unlimited signatures (Deschler 1979; Fowler 2006a; Oleszek 2015; Wilson and Young 1997). The changes in this institutional feature for legislators, first in the Senate in the mid1930s and then the House in 1967 and 1978 have opened doors for scholars to examine the motivations behind cosponsorship and causal relationships between cosponsors and bill sponsors (see Campbell 1982; Fowler 2006a, 2006b; Gross and Shalizi 2008; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996). Studying this type of legislative behavior is not a new trend, yet it is an area that is evolving. As polarization increases, causing partisan and electoral demands to

increase during a legislator's time in office, sponsorship is one way that legislators can cooperate. Caldeira, Clark, and Patterson (1993) note that the Congress as a whole acts as an interactive collectivity pulled by personal and electoral strings based both in self-interest and sincerity to those in their party and to those they represent. This form of cooperation results in a series of formal and informal networks that help shape the collective body of the legislature and purposive action in the decision making process. Through the study of cosponsorship, scholars gain a deeper understanding of representation at the federal level, and the implications these actions have in specific policy arenas.

Roadmap

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 examines how partisan ties, ideological differences among sponsors and cosponsors, and the electoral connection shape cosponsorship networks. Second, James Fowler (2006a; 2006b) and others have assessed cosponsorship networks utilizing all bills introduced in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate from 1973-2004, but did not disaggregate these pieces of legislation into policy areas to determine whether or not these actors are equally important for each policy domain. Chapter 2 builds on Chapter 1 and assesses how the roles of political parties and the party brand shapes cosponsorship networks on the two different types of immigration bills introduced. While much of the partisanship literature indicates that parties are becoming more polarized and the likelihood of bipartisan support on legislation should be slim (Krehbiel 1998), disaggregating immigration as a broad topic and looking at them as subtypes (enforcements or benefits) may not only draw in more support because of the issue, but may also help to draw in support from members of the opposite party. Finally,

Chapter 3 moves from partisanship to legislator characteristics and district demographics to assess whether or not being a minority, having majority-minority districts, and how regional influences affect how members form relationships on immigration bills broadly and disaggregated in the U.S. House. Scholars have generated a large body of knowledge about partisanship, race, and minorities in general and I apply these concepts to examine cosponsorship relationships. Finally, a discussion chapter is provided with regard to the future directions for this research.

The contents of Chapter 1 examine all immigration bills classified as "immigration policy" through congress.gov from 1973-2016. The primary goal of this chapter is to systematically assess the factors that determine who is mostly likely to collaborate with whom on the issue of immigration. I focus on the role of political parties in shaping immigration bill cosponsorship networks. Specifically, I argue that the influence of partisanship will be stronger in the U.S. House compared to the U.S. Senate (where there are greater incentives for bipartisanship) and that the influence of parties in structuring cosponsorship will increase over time as the parties have polarized. The analysis reveals Republicans to be more partisan and strategic overall when it comes to immigration specific legislation; whereas Democrats had discernably less copartisan ties until the 1990s when both parties were more likely to form relationships with those whom shared a party ID.

Chapter 2 takes the next step and disaggregates these bills into two different types: those that provide benefits to immigrants and those that call for sanctions. I reexamine these networks using the subtypes of immigration bills to try and infer how these social relationships may influence behavior when it comes to supporting

immigration policy that benefits or sanctions immigrants. Not all immigration legislation is the same, so it is important to understand these relationships on the subtypes of immigration policy. I postulate that partisanship provides incentives to form relationships on a particular type of bill. Specifically, I argue that Republicans would be more inclined to form relationships with one another on bills that call for sanctions against immigrants and Democrats would be more likely to form ties with other Democrats on bills that provide benefits. The results indicate that partisanship does matter, but not as expected. In the House and the Senate, Republicans were generally more likely to form ties with other Republicans on benefit bills compared to Democrats forming ties with each other or forming a bipartisan tie. The results were also flipped for enforcement bills where I was more likely to randomly get a copartisan tie between two Democrats over two Republicans.

Chapter 3 makes more strides to understand how MCs form relationships on immigration legislation by moving beyond partisanship and tests hypotheses rooted in the literature concerning minorities. I expand the scope of previous studies (see Rouse, Swers, and Parrott 2013) to include a much broader range of congressional sessions to further investigate the coalition building process in Congress among racial/ ethnic minority members on bills involving immigration policy. I utilize social network analysis to examine the sponsor/ cosponsor relationships based on the demographic make-up of members of Congress in the U.S. House and those they represent. The results show that minorities are more likely to form relationships with one another versus forming relationships with white members, members in districts from states that share a Southern border with Mexico were more likely to form ties with each other, especially on bills that

called for sanctions, and those from majority-minority districts were also more likely to form relationships opposed to those with majority white districts. However, despite the growing immigrant populations of Hispanics and Asians in the U.S., these populations did little to influence more ties on bills in this policy area.

Utilizing a new original dataset of immigration bill introductions from 1973-2016, I present the first-ever comprehensive analysis of cosponsorship networks on immigration specific legislation in the U.S. Congress. My findings advance our understanding of legislative behavior, partisan polarization, and policymaking on immigration in a few ways. First, I have expanded the breadth of both the number of bills examined as well as the timespan considered when investigating immigration legislation. To my knowledge, there has not been another study as extensive as this when specifically looking at immigration policy. Many of the studies in the past have focused on one to a few congressional sessions and have mostly explored roll-call voting in the U.S. House. These studies did not consider the pre-floor behaviors of legislators on these bills and many have excluded the Senate; this study considers both. In doing so I have been able to provide some insight on how party position on this issue has changed over a span of 44 years and how the evolution of these positions has transformed how members form relationships with each other. Second, this dissertation contributes more knowledge on how cosponsorship coalitions play a role in the legislative process concerning the types of immigration bills introduced and what types of bills legislators are more likely to work together on. I argue that there are different incentives for a member of Congress to work together on bills that are sanctions compared to bills that provide benefits to immigrants. This type of work had previously been explored at the state level and some at

the national level, but there has never been a study to look at the networks at the depths and lengths this dissertation explores. Third, I offer an expanded scope of the study of immigration and legislator behavior that includes a much broader range of congressional sessions and the coalition building process among racial and ethnic minority members on bills involving this public policy area. Much of the older scholarship in regard to minorities has focused on blacks and the role they play in the legislative process, some have included Latinos, and fewer have considered Asians. This dissertation includes district level data for all of these groups to explore how demographic characteristics affects coalition building on immigration bills in general as well as the subtype of immigration bills.

Chapter 1: The Partisan Divide and Legislative Collaboration on Immigration Policy

"Partisanship is a helluva drug"-Brendan Nyhan, Ph.D.

Partisanship and Immigration Reform

Gridlock and obstruction have become routine activities among those in the U.S. Congress caused, largely, by the hand of partisan polarization. This has been underscored by the inability to pass legislation, particularly when it comes to immigration reform. Gimpel and Edwards (1999) conducted an important analysis of House roll-call votes from the 1960s to the 1990s and discovered that partisanship trends really began to show their colors in the 1980s regarding immigration legislation. After the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 (H.R. 2580, 89th Congress) that eliminated the national origins quota system coupled with growing concerns of the economic impact that growing immigration would leave on the country, a line was drawn among political elites along party lines (Tichenor 1994; Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Wong 2017). In the most recent decades, there have been several pieces of legislation introduced—some that passed and others widely failed—aiming to create more comprehensive immigration reforms; however there has yet to be a comprehensive immigration package.

The primary goal of this paper is to systematically assess the factors that determine who is mostly likely to collaborate with whom on the issue of immigration. I focus on the role of political parties in shaping immigration bill cosponsorship networks. Specifically, I argue that the influence of partisanship will be stronger in the U.S. House compared to the U.S. Senate (where there are greater incentives for bipartisanship) and

that the influence of parties on structuring cosponsorship networks will increase over time as the parties have polarized. I find the likelihood of Republicans networking with each other on immigration bills was always higher than the likelihood of bipartisanship. Conversely, Democrats were more likely to reach across the aisle up until the last two decades, when bipartisanship fell by the wayside. In the Senate the partisan results ebbed and flowed over time, but there is evidence of bipartisan relationships where members of either party were more likely to reach across the aisle as recent as 2006 for Republicans and 2014 for Democrats.

A Brief History of Immigration Laws in the U.S.

Naturalization and immigration laws have been enacted almost as long as the United States has been a country. The Naturalization Act of 1790 established the first rules for naturalized citizenship and a century later the Page Act of 1875 was passed as the first act restricting immigration by prohibiting immigrants from Asia considered "undesirable" by way of forced labor, prostitution, and convicts in their country of origin. Soon after, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was passed (suspending Chinese Immigration) followed by a litany of legislation enacted with the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations that would increase immigration regulations. Fast-forward through the Bracero program in the 1940s, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in the 1980s, to the Immigration Acts of the 1990s, immigration while not always at the forefront of issues has always been a topic of legislative concern (Tichenor 2002).

In 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, also known as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act) was passed after a four year long standoff between the parties. Originally introduced as Senate Bill 2222 by Sen. Alan Simpson (R-WY) and

cosponsored by Rep. Romano Mazzoli (D-KY-3) in 1982, the bill would place sanctions on employers for hiring illegal immigrants, provide a pathway to citizenship to certain immigrants who resided in the country prior to 1982 (due to an amendment passed by Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA)), and would tighten border security. While voting on the bill on the Senate floor went smoothly, the fate of it in the House was not the same (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). As that congressional term ushered in a new era of conservativism with Reagan being elected and the GOP picking up seats in the House and the Senate, Republican concerns specifically about employment and employer sanctions in the House is what ultimately lead to the bill's demise (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Tichenor 2002).

The bill was re-introduced the following term where it met the same fate again as it did in the prior year. The bill was amended and sent through the Senate, but in the House the bill saw the same fate. Gimpel and Edwards (1999, p. 166) wrote that partisanship was "clearly decisive in voting for most amendments…Republicans had stronger support on the amnesty amendments they offered [but the Democrats were not as strong] on their amendments modifying employer sanctions." They noted that if the Democrats were going to be able to pass a reform bill, they would have to recruit more members. Finally, four years after the first introduction, Simpson and Mazzoli reintroduced the bill for the final time in their respective chambers. The new version of this legislation convinced previously opposed Democratic members to jump on board, which finally resulted in the passage of this immigration reform act. Gimpel and Edwards (1999, p.177) argued that the complexities of this bill created a "preference intransitivity problem" that could have been fixed if the bill were introduced into three separate parts

where the majorities would have passed them much faster. This, they noted, strengthened their argument that by the mid-1980s immigration reform became a highly partisan issue. Much of this partisanship emerged due to Republicans foreseeing the number of illegal immigrants becoming legal would have severe implications on public aid—transforming immigration into a redistributive issue.

Beginning in the 1990s there has been a significant growth in restrictionist sentiment towards immigration, tailed by another surge after the attacks on 9/11 mostly concerning national security (Brader, Valentino, and Suhey 2008). In the 104th Congress (1995-1996), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 was passed via an omnibus bill (H.R. 3610) introduced by Rep. Bill Young (R-FL-10). The bill was much more restrictionist in nature compared to the prior reform bill that was passed. It created stricter border control including more fencing at the southern border, restricted welfare benefits from immigrants, and created the 287(g) program that would allow federal officials to partner and train state and local enforcement officials to do the work of federal immigration enforcement agents among other things. Like other bills introduced during this congressional term, this omnibus bill focused on much of the redistributive issues that were taken notice in the mid-1980s. Partisanship remained a constant in explaining votes on immigration bills during this time (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).

However, not all legislation at the time had anti-immigrant sentiment. For instance, in 2001, the DREAM Act was first introduced which would have granted legal residency and an opportunity to gain citizenship to undocumented immigrants who graduate high school in the United States and attend college and / or join the military;

however this Act failed after several attempts to get it passed. At the time the DREAM Act was first introduced, the Republican Party had adopted an aversion to immigration; President George W. Bush began his term in office with a different approach to this area. Prior to his time in the White House, President Bush served as the Governor of Texas, a state that not only borders Mexico, but has had a historically large population of Latino immigrants. His more liberal stance on immigration is what led to his re-election as Governor. Bringing this mentality into his new administration, Bush fostered a comprehensive, compassionate approach and popularity among Latino voters (Wroe 2008). While the majority of the GOP had taken extreme positions regarding immigration prior to the 2000s, the Latino population continued to grow and the realization of these extremist positions on immigration were driving Latino voters to the Democratic Party soon changed the political tune of the Republican Party (Leal, Barreto, Lee, and de la Garza 2005; Wroe 2008).[6] George W. Bush's liberal immigration reforms and a pro-Latino strategy helped win him the 2000 presidential election, but did not completely win over all of the Republican Party as far as immigration was concerned (Wroe 2008).In 2005 and 2006 more important bills were introduced aimed at reforming immigration. The first bill was House Bill 4437, the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, otherwise known as the "Sensenbrenner Bill" after its sponsor, Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI-5). The bill called for harsher penalties for violators of federal immigration laws and non-participants in the electronic verification employment systems. This was followed by a parallel bill S. 2611, the Comprehensive

[6] While this was a general approach for the general GOP, this was not true when it came to the GOP in Texas.

Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) of 2006 introduced by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) which proposed to allow long-time immigrants to acquire legal status, increase the number of visas for guest workers, and provide some border security along the Mexico border. The "Sensenbrenner Bill" passed the House with 92% of Republicans supporting the bill and 82% of Democrats staunchly opposing it (Wong 2017). Neither of these bills ended up receiving votes from the opposing chambers. Immigration reform remained in gridlock due to what Wong (2017) refers to an era of hyper-partisanship defined by the Democrats notion to stand on the side of inclusiveness and the Republicans tendencies towards restrictiveness.

While the issue of immigration was a priority under the Bush Administration, and each chamber successfully passed major overhauls of immigration law in the 109th and 110th Congress, they ultimately failed to reach an agreement on a comprehensive immigration reform package. One major difference between the House and Senate versions of comprehensive immigration reform was their treatment of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. The "Sensenbrenner Bill" would have criminalized their unauthorized presence. By contrast, the legislation passed by the Senate during both the 109th and 110th Congresses would have established avenues for authorized aliens who met certain criteria and paid penalties to acquire legalization.

The prospects of bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform seemed high as the 113th Congress commenced. President Obama and both parties' leaders in Congress announced that comprehensive immigration reform was a top priority. In January 2013, a bipartisan group of Senators led by Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY), known as the "Gang of Eight", proposed a framework for comprehensive immigration reform with elements

aimed at increased border security and enforcement, improved employment eligibility verification, revisions of legal immigration, temporary worker visas, and options to address the millions of unauthorized aliens residing in the country. Senate Bill 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 remained in the Senate for two months the before being passed with a vote of 68 to 32. However, the Republican majority in the House was opposed to the bill and it never made it to the floor or even the agenda, creating deadlock between the two chambers and no consensus on a comprehensive immigration reform bill. However, while this bill fell short of being a law, it led to several changes to legal admission policies when it came to family reunification (Wong 2017, p. 38).

This example of the last failed attempt at comprehensive immigration reform highlights several important aspects of policymaking surrounding immigration. First, the pre-floor stages of the process are a crucial element of the process, setting the parameters of what will be included in the legislation, ironing out the language of the provisions, and reaching consensus among members of various ideological stripes. Second, there are considerable differences between how the chambers approach immigration reform. In the Senate, comprehensive immigration reform legislation generally was formulated from bipartisan deliberations among eight or so influential Senators; whereas in the House, the majority party leadership generally took the lead and the minority party was considerably less involved (and in many instances, excluded from the policymaking process). Third, as a result of who was primarily involved in crafting the comprehensive immigration reform legislation, the House version of reform was much more ideologically extreme compared to the legislation produced by the U.S. Senate. This makes it particularly

difficult for the chambers to ultimately agree on their approach to comprehensive immigration reform. Finally, the devil is in the details; members (across chambers and parties) often agree on many of the broad goals of reforming our immigration system and many provisions receive popular support; however, ideological differences on a handful of provisions have ultimately caused stalemate on comprehensive immigration reform.

These bills and movements are only a small representation of the immigration issue, which is a multifaceted social policy that affects the economic, social, and political spheres. As the immigrant population of both Latinos and Asians[7] has grown exponentially since the 1970s[8], the shift in population has had weighty effects in the political and economic arenas—motivating Congress to adopt policy to attempt to reform the immigration system (Belco, Clark, and Sipole 2015). These attempts, however, often exacerbate partisan cleavages and stalemates in Congress and the states over immigration (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).

Theory and Hypotheses

The main research question I examine in this paper is: are members of the same party more likely to create relationships with each other or reach across party lines when it comes to cosponsoring immigration legislation? I believe this is important for several reasons. First, scholars have consistently demonstrated the importance of the pre-floor

[7] Asians and Hispanics have been the fastest growing racial groups in the United States for the past few decades, however, since 2010 Asians have been the fastest-growing immigrant group in the U.S. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/asianamericans-graphics/

[8] According to the Center for Immigration, the immigrant population in the United States grew from 9.6 million in 1970 to 28.4 million in 2000. http://cis.org/ForeignBornPopulation2000

stages of the policymaking process; reaching out to colleagues and generating support in the early stages can enhance the likelihood of the bill's ultimate success (Krutz 2005; Peoples 2008). Second, scholars (Fowler 2006a; 2006b) have also demonstrated the importance of *relationships* among members and how they can leverage these relationships to increase their effectiveness. Finally, as these recent attempts of comprehensive immigration reform illustrate, bipartisanship is crucial to seeing any advancement on immigration; however, most congressional immigration studies have focused only on the final roll-call voting behavior with few attempting to understand what factors shape members' decisions to join together in becoming cosponsors of immigration legislation. This is the focus of my investigation.

Assuming that these positions are shared among members of both parties, what are the incentives for members to work together within and across party lines? The traditional assumption is that members are more likely to work across party lines to advance policy and electoral goals (Clark and Caro 2013; Hall 1996; Fenno 1973; Krutz 2001). Members of the majority and minority party might seek cosponsors from the opposing party to ease the legislation process, to help bill sponsors attain policy making goals (whether it is bill passage or the opportunity for their bill to be incorporated in an omnibus bill), or for other political rewards like logrolling, for example (Koger 2003; Krutz 2001)

The extant literature on legislative decision-making in large part has focused on the individual legislator and how his or her incentives shape behavior. We see this in studies of roll-call voting (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) in which members are assumed to be policy-maximizers whose actions are guided by the costs and benefits a proposal

would grant them. However, legislators are not acting in isolation; rather they are inherently connected to one another. The mere act of policymaking necessitates members to work together to solve collection action problems. Legislatures consist of formal rules and informal institutions that not only constrain actions of members but also provide strategic considerations or incentives for members to develop relationships with one another to advance their priorities. Moreover, scholars have long argued that legislators look to each other for cues about how to vote. Kingdon's (1989, p. 22) seminal study of Congress concludes that "fellow congressmen appear to be the most important influence on voting decisions."

Despite the dominant view of legislators as individual actors found in contemporary congressional scholarship, the notion of social networks or relational ties among legislators has been long recognized. For example, Samuel Patterson's (1959) work investigating friendship ties in the Wisconsin Assembly represents one of the first applications of sociometric methods to legislative politics. Eulau (1962) examined the influence of authority acquired through friendships and interpersonal relationships in contrast to formal structures (like chamber leadership), finding that formal authority was closely related to interpersonal relations. While much of this early work sought to understand the *sources* of interpersonal relationships among legislators, later work extended the analysis of interpersonal relationships (or social networks) in the legislature to investigate how they shape voting cues (Caldeira and Patterson 1987; Caldeira, Clark, and Patterson 1993), internal cohesiveness within parties (Wahlke et al. 1962; Caldeira and Patterson 1988), and ideological polarization (Wahlke et al. 1962; Caldeira and Patterson 1988).

If, indeed, we buy into the notion of legislators as interdependent actors, then the next question is: how can one best *measure* these connections among legislators? Are there observable behaviors or characteristics that can provide a window into the interpersonal relationships among legislators? There are no perfect answers to these questions. On one hand, one could survey legislators asking them with whom they have close friendships or relationships as much of the early work on social networks in legislatures did. This approach is subject to a number of limitations, however. First, survey nonresponse can be a challenge when conducting elite surveys. Second, there may be strategic considerations that bias the responses that members give to such questions. For instance, members may be more likely to claim relationships or friendship with leaders or those with some institutional power to make themselves appear more powerful. Finally, there could also be concerns of social desirability that could threaten the validity of survey-based measures of friendship or interpersonal relationships among legislators. Members may feel the need to list many more members as "friends" than reality simply because they do not want to appear ineffective, for example.

These concerns have led researchers to develop other indicators as a means to approximate the social relationships (or ties) among legislators. Arnold, Deen, and Patterson (2000) rely on shared leadership positions or committee positions among members as a proxy for social ties, and they find that those who serve in leadership roles together also vote together. Porter et al. (2005) finds that those who serve together on committees also tend to vote together. Examining the California Assembly for over three decades, Masket (2008) finds that members who are deskmates (i.e., those who are seated together) vote identically on a sizeable set of roll-call votes compared with their non-

deskmate counterparts, with the effect still strong after controlling for the strength of partisanship. Rogowski and Sinclair (2012), by contrast, use the House office lottery (in which newly elected members select their office spaces in a randomly chosen order) as an instrumental variable to assess the causal influence of social relationships (as measured by proximity of one's offices) on voting behavior and cosponsorship activity in the U.S. House. Departing from prior research, they find no evidence that office proximity influences patterns of roll-call voting or cosponsorship.

More recently, scholars have relied upon legislative cosponsorship data as a proxy for the relationships or ties between legislators. These data have the advantage of being readily accessible, and historically, there is evidence that points to the significance of bill cosponsorship in legislative policymaking. Campbell (1982) notes that members exert considerable time and effort in recruiting colleagues to become cosponsors of their legislation through the use of "Dear Colleague Letters." Legislative scholarship has demonstrated that the number of cosponsors increases the likelihood of a bill's success (Fowler 2006a, 2006b; Kirkland 2011; Tam Cho and Fowler 2010). It also allows an easy avenue for members of Congress not only to be involved in the policy making process, but is likely driven by both reelection concerns and in order to promote good public policy (Harbridge 2015, 23; but also see Schiller 1995). This lends support to the idea that cosponsorship is not simply "cheap talk" or a costless activity; rather, it is a meaningful activity that can send signals to other members and can ultimately affect the fate of legislation. As Desposato, Kearney, and Crisp (2011, 536) put it, "Taking the 'wrong' position is risky." Therefore, the incentives to cosponsor are more than credit-claiming and one should assume that there is much more sincerity behind those decisions

to sign onto bills. Cosponsoring reflects public position taking and can also create a signaling affect to other members as well as indicate reciprocity (Desposato et al. 2011;Harbridge 2015; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996).

The work of Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) represents one of the first to rely upon legislative cosponsorship data as an indicator of relationships between legislators. They argued that members cosponsored legislation to send signals to their colleagues within the chamber. Other work follows in a similar vein to show the way cosponsorship enables members to signal to each other (Koger 2003; Goodliffe, Rothenberg and Sanders 2005; Woon 2008). Fowler (2006a, 2006b) investigates the descriptive characteristics of social networks in Congress using cosponsorship data and develops measures of centrality and connectedness, which can then be used to explain levels of legislative success in passing one's policy proposals. Fowler's later work with Cho (Cho and Fowler 2010) uses cosponsorship links to understand the relational ties among members and small-world properties of Congress.

Although these studies have given considerable insight into our understanding of the structure of social networks in Congress and the ways in which these connections can translate into bill passage, we have much less understanding of whether these findings translate to specific policy areas, such as immigration. Immigration is a multifaceted policy that affects the economic, social, and political spheres (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Wong 2017).

How Partisanship Influences Cosponsorship Networks on Immigration Policy

Cox and McCubbins's (2005) procedural cartel theory suggests that after a legislator is elected, the next priority after the long term goal of re-election (Fenno 1973;

Hall 1996; Mayhew 1974) is their advancement within their chamber. Advancement is dependent on a couple of things; first, it is dependent on their reputation within their party, and second it is dependent upon their party's ability to gain and/ or maintain majority status within their chamber. Doing so allows the majority party to essentially control which pieces of legislation make it to the floor—negative agenda control. This type of institutional feature allows the majority party to delegate committee chair seats, which ultimately allows parties to reward and punish members for their loyalty to the party. Being able to choose committee chairs almost ensures the members of the majority party will be able to control the agenda by determining which bills make it out of committee to a floor vote (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Consequently, in order to gain these positions, it is safe to assume legislators must also take into consideration the views of their party as well as the wants of their constituents if they want to advance within their chamber. Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer (2013) also note that other institutional features such as term lengths, parliamentary rules (Dion and Huber 1996) and the committee system (Krehbiel 1991) aid in influencing the creation and survival (or death) of public policies.

Likewise, Garand and Burke (2006) argue that legislative activity might be affected by partisan control and found that when there is a shift in partisan control in the chamber, sponsorship and cosponsorship behavior changes. When a member's party is in the majority, they found an increase in bill sponsorships. Furthermore, as polarization increases parties may take more extreme positions. One way for a legislator to show support for their party and party leader, is to sponsor bills or declare support for particular

legislation that coincides with the party's position (Hager and Talbert 2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009; Rohde 1991; Theriault 2008).

In order to address these two schools of thought on legislator collaboration, I offer two competing hypotheses. The first aligns with more traditional views regarding the incentives for members to work together with the end goal of bill passage. While this paper is focused on the pre-floor stages, members still have to keep in mind the long-game and the end result. If the assumption holds that making the strategic move to work across partisan lines increases the likelihood of bill passage, then a legislator should be more inclined to form bipartisan ties early on in the legislative process.

> ***Bipartisanship Hypothesis***: *Members of Congress are generally more likely to form bipartisan ties on immigration bills than copartisan ties.*

While these incentives to form bipartisan relationships seem to be logical if the goals are to promote good public policy and to advance their legislation, there is another puzzle at hand: there appears to be an increasing lack of bipartisanship on the aggregate level. Laurel Harbridge (2015, 190) opines that bipartisanship is not dead; at least when it comes to cosponsorship. However, both parties must find the incentives to reach across the aisle over the incentives to collaborate with members of their own party. Earlier literature showed that members were election focused and worried about being punished by constituents and their party leaders. As polarization has increased among the electorate and members of Congress[9], there has also has been more of a shift of

[9] Pew Research conducted studies in 2014 and 2016 that showed a growing polarization among the American Public. See "Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological

incentives to collaborate out of fear of electorate punishment to a fear of punishment by party leaders (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Koger and Lebo 2012; Lee 2009; Samuelson 2004). Constituents are less inclined to punish their representatives of ineffective legislation; rather, they mostly care about winning—as do members of Congress (Koger and Lebo 2012). While people claim to want bipartisanship, what they really want is for the other side to cave. There has been a continuous decrease in competitive elections meaning that the number of districts deemed "safe" have increased (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006). If more members are running for positions in non-competitive elections, logically it would mean that members are more likely to cater to their base, who often are more ideologically extreme that the average Joe. As polarization has increased among the electorate as well as the elected bodies, members are now being punished by the electorate (or their base) for not toeing the party line rather than not making good public policy. Members of Congress are more likely to work to maximize their share of seats in their respective chambers through electoral benefits of organizing the chamber and getting legislation passed or blocked according to their party's agenda; even at the risk of losing votes from their constituents. This theory is known as Strategic Party Government (SPG) (Carson, Koger, Lebo, and Young 2010; Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007; Koger and Lebo 2012). In Francis Lee's (2009) book, *Beyond Ideology,* she finds that there has been an increased "teamsmanship" among members of the same parties. She found higher conflict in voting that we would expect to see based on

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Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life" http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/. See also "A Wider Ideological Gap Between More and Less Educated Adults" http://www.people-press.org/2016/04/26/a-wider-ideological-gap-between-more-and-less-educated-adults/.

ideological differences; roll-call votes did not necessarily indicate polarization. Members of the same party seemed to be more successful at negotiating deals with copartisan members without respect to issue content (p. 70). In essence, parties were working better as a team and making deals amongst each other which lead to an increase of partisanship across the board.

While immigration has traditionally been a non-partisan issue, more recently partisanship has played a larger role when it comes to immigration policy (Casellas and Leal 2013). Republicans have taken the approach to immigration laws in terms of national security and border patrol and target undocumented immigrants; similarly, Democrats have also been concerned with border patrol and national security, but have focused on how to legalize these immigrants and protect them from undue discrimination (Joppke 1998; Wallace 2014). Because of this, immigration has become a defining policy issue for each party. With the assumption that both parties and the electorate are highly polarized and worried about "winning," I would then expect that as immigration has become a defining party issue for both Republicans and Democrats, members of the same party would be more likely to work with one another and less likely to work with members of the opposing party. Borrowing from the SPG theory, I offer my second hypothesis.

> ***Strategic Party Government Hypothesis****: Members of Congress are generally more likely to form ties with members of their own party on immigration bills (and less likely to reach across the aisle).*

Relationships: Who Collaborates with Whom?

There is no one MC that is endowed with the authority or ability to be an effective lawmaker alone. Any piece of legislation they place on the agenda has to go through a series of steps like any other bill and may be put on through a committee of which they are not a member, and if the bill makes it out of committee, they are only allowed one vote (Volden and Wiseman 2014). In order to promote legislation getting further along in the policy process, and ultimately to a floor vote, these MC's must trust in an informal power to persuade others that their policy is worthwhile to garner the support they need from other legislators. This support may come easy either due to the topic of the bill, the sponsor of the bill, or even a few key cosponsors; however, the opposite effect may occur where sponsors face a harder time to gain support from other legislators for their bill. In order to stimulate support through cosponsorships, it is important to form relationships not only with influential MCs but to get as many on your team as possible to have the best chance of getting bills passed (Fenno 1991; Fowler 2006b; Wilson and Young 1997). This type of networking has been used as a political tool for decades and is influenced by the interorganizational theory which asserts that individual actors are dependent on one another out of necessity for the other's resources to attain their end goal (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Aldrich 1979; Benson 1978; Scharpf 1978). The expectation here is that members act strategically and tend to band together to progress their legislative agendas, and may seek out support from other members with similar backgrounds and ideals; assuming that the goal is to get legislation passed, or blocked. Some circumstances may even require legislators to seek bipartisan support in order to get legislation passed, despite Krehbiel's (1998) pivotal politics theory which argues that there will be little or

no collaboration between Democrats and Republicans because parties are so sharply divided in their platforms on immigration.

Partisanship and Legislative Collaboration in the Pre-floor Stages on Immigration

Despite a growing body of research demonstrating that political parties in Congress have become increasingly polarized over time, this finding is limited to the study of members' roll-call voting behavior. The analysis of other legislative activities, such as bill cosponsorship decisions, has shown that while House members have associated to a great extent with their colleagues who share their partisanship, U.S. Senators have continued to develop and cultivate bipartisan relationships with their colleagues through bill cosponsorship. I argue that these bicameral differences in legislative collaboration can be attributed to the unique structure of each chamber and the important influence of institutional rules and norms in shaping legislative decision-making. While House members rely on across-the-board party loyalty to get ahead, senators must maintain connections to colleagues from both parties in order to achieve their career goals.

Data and Methods

To examine these hypotheses, I rely on an original dataset of all immigration bills and resolutions[10] introduced (3,533 bills and resolutions) from both chambers of Congress from the 93rd – 114th Congresses with 858 individual sponsors[11] and nearly

[10] Note: private and ceremonial resolutions are excluded from the dataset. Only concurrent and joint resolutions are considered.
[11] Individual sponsor is defined by whether or not the MC has been a bill sponsor at least one time. Names are not counted multiple times.

40,000 cosponsorship signatures[12]. These data were compiled from the Library of Congress website www.congress.gov, which contains information on bill introductions, sponsorship/cosponsorship, and bill histories. I collected all immigration bills and resolutions introduced in either the House or the Senate during the aforementioned congressional terms that Congress.gov classified as an "immigration" policy area. Resolutions that call for no legislative action (i.e., ceremonial in nature) were dropped from the dataset (e.g. 103rd Congress, S. Res. 121-A resolution to honor the work and life of Cesar Chavez) as well as appropriation bills.[13]

Table 1.1 depicts the characteristics of the cosponsorship networks. The table shows the number of unique sponsors and cosponsors in the dataset as well as averages of bills that were sponsored and cosponsored by MCs. About 34% of the total bills (1,210) were not cosponsored by anyone; therefore, I cannot derive information about social connections between MCs from these bills. Of the roughly 2,300 bills left, I can see how these MCs publicly supported introduced legislation in their respective chambers. On average, a member of the House sponsored about 4 bills while a member of the Senate sponsored about 5 bills. This suggests that Senators introduce slightly more legislation concerning immigration that their House counterparts. Likewise, when it comes to the average number of bills a member cosponsors, those in the House and the Senate sign on to approximately 2 bills.

[12] Total number of cosponsorship signatures is defined by the total number of signatures on all bills from the 93rd Congress to the 114th Congress. MCs can be counted multiple times.

[13] Appropriations bills are not explicit to immigration and tend to be more omnibus bills with a very broad focus. It is harder to pin down voting and cosponsorship with these types of bills.

Because immigration has grown to become a defining partisan issue, I have separated each bill into three categories: Republican Bills, Democratic Bills, and Bipartisan Bills. Republican and Democratic bills are those that are sponsored and cosponsored primarily by members of the respective parties. Bipartisan bills are defined by those bills that have 20% or more of the total cosponsors that are in a different party from the bill sponsor[14]. Of the 2,623 immigration bills introduced in the House, about 31.8% (834 bills) of those bills were Republican bills and about 44.1% (1,157 bills) were Democratic. The remaining 632 bills were bipartisan; this group made up the smallest portion of immigration bills introduced in the House. Figure 1.1 shows the number of immigration bills introduced in the House by party affiliation.

Here we can see the trends of the number of bills introduced by each party as well as the more recent decline in bipartisan bills being introduced over the last decade. Bipartisanship among immigration bill sponsor/ cosponsors peaked during the 110th Congress with 49 immigration bills, but dropped dramatically the following term going in to President Obama's first presidential term. The number of bipartisan bills introduced in the House only began to increase slowly during the 112th Congress. From the 73rd Congress to the 108th Congress (with the exception of the 104th Congress), Democrats introduced more "Democratic" immigration bills than their Republican counterparts

[14] As Harbridge (2015) notes, there is not a set threshold to deem a bill bipartisan. Some scholars use 20% or 30%, and some may even use up to 50% of cosponsors differing from the sponsor's party. I am following Harbridge and using a 20% threshold. There were some bills that had a large number of sponsors from one party and one or two from the other. Because they did not fit this 20% threshold, they were not considered bipartisan bills.

introduced "Republican bills". It was not until the 109th Congress, when Republican introduced more copartisan immigration bills than their Democratic counterparts, and continued to do so through President Obama's tenure. During the 114th Congress, Republicans introduced more copartisan immigration legislation than they had in any term since 1973 with 115 bills. Likewise, of the 910 bills introduced in the Senate about 33.4% (304 bills) of the bills introduced were Republican bills while about 30.5% (278) of the bills were Democratic. Finally, the remaining Senate 328 bills were bipartisan and made up the largest of the three groups, unlike in the House.

Figure 1.1: House Immigration Bills by Party and Term



Figure 1.2: Senate Immigration Bills by Party and Term



The trend for immigration bills introduced in the Senate in Figure 1.2 was very different from the House, especially with the amount of bipartisan bills introduced. Bipartisanship peaked during the 110th Congress with 32 bills out of a total of 87 bills immigration bills introduced in the Senate, overall. Copartisan Republican bills started a drastic uptick during the 113th Congress and peaked during the 114th Congress with 47 Republican bills introduced; more than quintuple the amount Democratic bills. Generally, Democrats introduced more copartisan bills, or tied for the amount of copartisan bills, than Republicans for about half of the terms in the dataset. Bipartisan bills were introduced more than copartisan bills in 8 of the terms.

Turning to cosponsorship activity in Table 1.1, there were a total of 39,540 cosponsor signatures on all bills: 35,359 in the House and 4,180 in the Senate[15]. The average number of cosponsors that publicly signed onto a House immigration bill was

[15] The bills that were considered were those which had at least 1 cosponsor.

about 21 cosponsors, while in the Senate the average number of cosponsors was about 7. This intuitively makes sense due to the size of the House compared to the size of the Senate—House bills are expected to yield more cosponsors per bill than Senate bills. In the House, the highest average number of cosponsors per bill was in the Democratic category (about 21 bills) and in the Senate it was the Bipartisan category (about 8 bills). The Senate typically operates by a supermajority due to the rule for cloture. This procedural rule can potentially limit debate and restrict the ability of the members of the majority party to secure their preferred policy outcome (Binder 1999, 522). Senators may threaten to filibuster and/ or issue a "hold" in which legislation may not move forward (Binder 1999; Brady and Volden 1998). Because of these procedural rules, we are more likely to see more bipartisan bills go through this chamber. Although, Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) cast some doubt on this conventional wisdom about majority party power in the Senate. They argue that the while the majority leader in the Senate has some scheduling power, he or she still confers with the minority leader while using this power. The Senate has much less control than the House over which issues are considered on the floor. The rules that the House operates under has no such filibuster rule and tends to be less constraining on policy outcomes (Brady and Volden 1998; Jones 1998). The Speaker of the House is much more powerful in controlling the legislative agenda and can prevent bills opposed by the majority of the majority party from getting to the floor (Cox and

McCubbins 2005; Oleszek 1989; 2004). Because of these features of the House, we are more likely to see copartisan bills than bipartisan bills. Generally, these results were as expected.

Table 1.1: Characteristics of Bill Cosponsor Networks from the 93rd to the 114th Congresses

	Total Bills	Total Individual Sponsors	Mean bills sponsored by MCs	Total Individual Cosponsors	Total Cosponsor Signatures on All Bills	Mean bills cosponsored by MCs	Mean cosponsors per bill	Bills not cosponsored
House	**2,623**	**684**	**3.83**	**1,661**	**35,359**	**1.58**	**20.80**	**923**
Republican Bills	834	280	2.98	867	10,255	0.96	20.31	329
Democratic Bills	1,157	303	3.82	951	12,011	1.22	21.33	594
Bipartisan Bills	632	314	2.01	1,559	13,093	0.41	20.72	0
Senate	**910**	**189**	**3.24**	**316**	**4,180**	**1.54**	**6.70**	**286**
Republican Bills	304	87	3.49	151	675	2.01	5.00	169
Democratic Bills	278	81	3.43	144	940	1.93	5.89	118
Bipartisan Bills	328	113	2.90	294	2,565	1.12	7.82	0
Total	**3,533**	**859**	**4.11**	**1,883**	**39,539**	**1.88**	**17.01**	**1,209**

Note: the word "bills" is used to indicate immigration bills or resolutions introduced in the House and Senate. While there are a combined 535 seats in Congress, there are more than 535 MCs included in this dataset. I have included those who were elected in special elections during the term as well as accounted for those who switched chambers. Additionally, while members from the island territories and D.C. do not have a vote on the floor, they can sponsor and cosponsor legislation, and have been included in the dataset. Individual sponsors/ cosponsors are only counted once for the total categories; however, if they served in both chambers they were included once for each chamber. Individual sponsors were counted once for each category of Republican Bills, Democratic Bills, and Bipartisan Bills; therefore, the sum of the categories will not always be equal to the sum of the total individual sponsors for each chamber.

Measures of Centrality

In order to glean information concerning how important unique individuals are in a network, many theorists on social networks have come up with a variety of different measures to look at how well individuals are connected (Fowler 2006a). Because this work focuses on cosponsorship networks I will look at three standard measures of centrality: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality. Proctor and Loomis (1951) developed a measure called *degree centrality* which measures how many directed ties a node—in this case legislator—has to another node. Figure 1.3 shows an example of a cosponsorship network in the Senate from the 93rd Congress with seven senators. In order to see which senator is the most connected, we simply count how many lines are connected to each person, and the one who has the most has the highest degree centrality. In this case, Sen. Paul A. Hart (D-MI) would have the highest degree centrality score with six connections, and Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr. (D-MN) and Sen. Claiborne de Borda Pell (D-RI) have the lowest degree centrality with scores of two.

Figure 1.3: Simple Cosponsorship Network in the Senate during the 93rd Congress



The next centrality measure I use is *betweenness centrality*. This measure is determines which individual is the most important for passing support to one node to another (Freeman 1977). Using Figure 1.3 as an example we can look at the connectivity factor to see what is the shortest distance between nodes? In other words, what is the shortest path for a legislator to get their message out to earn support from another legislator? In some network paths a legislator can go directly to another to ask for support (e.g. Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-MI) can go directly Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr. (D-MN)); however, in other situations they may have to go through other people to reach the members they want. For example, a legislator may need to reach across party lines to get members from the opposite party to support their legislation to give it a higher possibility of getting through the legislative process. In order to do this, they may need to reach out to someone who is connected to others in the opposing party. For this study, betweenness centrality measures the shortest path between legislators that it takes for one legislator to connect to another. Let us say that Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr. (D-MN) wants to connect to Sen. John V. Tunney (D-CA). In order for Sen. Humphrey to reach Sen. Tunney, he has to first go through node Sen. Hart, and from there Sen. Hart can either go directly to Sen. Tunney or from Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) to Sen. Tunney or from Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR) to Sen. Tunney, etc. Regardless of which path Sen. Hart chooses, in order for Sen. Humphrey to get to Sen. Tunney he must first go through Sen. Hart; therefore, Sen. Hart is the most important and the other senators are only half as important in this network. Sen. Hart would have a higher betweenness score than the other nodes. The idea behind this measure is to look at each pair of nodes and assign points to those who lie on the shortest paths. Once all pair options have been gone through, we then can rank the nodes based on the number of times they were on

the shortest path between a pair to see who has the highest or lowest score. Those with the highest scores are more important because they control information flow in the network.

Finally, the third centrality score that I use is *eigenvector centrality*. According to Fowler (2006a, p.465) this score is "an increasing function of centralities of all individuals that support [a legislator]." This measure of centrality does not necessarily mean that a legislator is the most connected in a network. Rather it means that the legislator is important if his/her neighbors are important (Bonacich 1972); it is all a matter of who you know and how important they are.

Table 1.2 shows the top legislator for each centrality measure by chamber and congress. Like Fowler (2006a) found in his study that looked at all legislation introduced from 1973-2004, many of the names appear in multiple columns. Those who often scored the highest in degree centrality were often the highest scorers for eigenvector centrality. This suggests that they had the most connections of all members during that term, and of their connections were important people. One interesting finding from this table is the number of MCs who were the highest scorers that were freshman, or serving in their first term in their respective chamber. For the House, there were a total of eight highest scoring MCs that were freshman; five were the highest in betweenness centrality and the remaining three were the highest scorers in both degree and eigenvector centrality measures. In the Senate, a there were 17 individuals that were the highest scoring MCS who were freshman—some appearing in more than one term. While some argue that freshmen legislators are less likely to put more effort in sponsor/ cosponsoring legislation or struggle getting bills through the legislative process (Aleman and Calvo 2008; Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair 1996),

however, freshmen members may be more likely to increase sponsor and/ or cosponsorship activities to appeal to their constituents when it is time for re-election (Mayhew 1974). While Fowler (2006a) found that members with the strongest ties in the House (1973-2004; all House bills) were between members who served as committee chairs, I find that when I separate immigration legislation from the aggregate, the results do not follow this path. Being in a leadership position (committee chair or ranking member or a party leader) had little impact on who was the top connected member in each term. In fact, of all of the top scoring members when it came to centrality, there were only three terms where a member who was a committee leader ranked the highest. The story was different in the Senate, however, where there were twelve terms where members of the leadership ranked the highest in one or more centrality measures. Finally, and interestingly enough, since the majority of immigration bills are submitted to the judiciary committee in both chambers, I looked at those who were the highest ranking among centrality categories to see whether or not those members served on either the House Judiciary Committee or Senate Judiciary Committee. There were four members in the House (one in each term) that ranked the highest and served on the Judiciary Committee, and there were a total 15 terms that had a member rank the highest in one or more centrality category among 12 different members (Sen. Ted Kennedy [D-MA] ranked the highest for multiple centrality categories in multiple terms).

Table 1.2: Highest Scoring MCs in each Chamber by Congress for All Immigration Bills

	Years	Highest Degree Centrality	Highest Betweenness Centrality	Highest Eigenvector Centrality
House				
93rd	1973-74	160; Bella Savitsky Abzug [D-NY-20]	656; Bella Savitsky Abzug [D-NY-20]	0.356; Bella Savitsky Abzug [D-NY-20]
94th	1975-76	200; Donald M. Fraser [D-MN-5]	1,736; Thomas J. Downey, Jr. [D-NY-2]	0.257; Donald M. Fraser [D-MN-5]
95th	1977-78	316; Charles N. (Charlie) Wilson [D-TX-2]	2,284; Marvin H. (Mickey) Edwards [R-OK-5]	0.233; Henry J. Hyde [R-IL-6]
96th	1979-80	1,018; George W. (William) Whitehurst [R-VA-2]	4,683; George W. (William) Whitehurst [R-VA-2]	0.219; George W. (William) Whitehurst [R-VA-2]
97th	1981-82	960; William F. (Bill) Goodling [R-PA-19]	1,782; Marjorie Sewell Holt [R-MD-4]	0.088; Victor H. (Vic) Fazio, Jr. [D-CA-4]
98th	1983-84	834; Major R. O. Owens [D-NY-12]	3,120; Robert J. (Bob) Lagomarsino [R-CA-19]	0.158; Major R. O. Owens [D-NY-12]
99th	1985-86	1,200; Victor H. (Vic) Fazio, Jr. [D-CA-4]	2,652; Helen Delich Bentley [R-MD-2]	0.140; Victor H. (Vic) Fazio, Jr. [D-CA-4]
100th	1987-88	2,038; Chester G. Atkins [D-MA-5]	2,737; Richard K. (Dick) Armey [R-TX-26]	0.147; Chester G. Atkins [D-MA-5]
101st	1989-90	2,252; Chester G. Atkins [D-MA-5]	1,201; John H. (Howard) Coble [R-NC-6]	0.143; Chester G. Atkins [D-MA-5]
102nd	1991-92	1,018; Robert J. (Bob) Lagomarsino [R-CA-19]	3,087; Henry J. Hyde [R-IL-6]	0.219; Robert J. (Bob) Lagomarsino [R-CA-19]
103rd	1993-94	2,806; Gerald B. H. Solomon [R-NY-22]	2,545; Barnett (Barney) Frank [D-MA-4]	0.168; Gerald B. H. Solomon [R-NY-22]
104th	1995-96	1,166; Kenneth S. (Ken) Calvert [R-CA-43]	5,119; Raymond E. (Gene) Green [D-TX-29]	0.155; Kenneth S. (Ken) Calvert [R-CA-43]
105th	1997-98	1,364; Patsy Matsu Takemoto Mink [D-HI-2]	2,149; William E. (Bill) Barrett [R-NE-3]	0.181; Patsy Matsu Takemoto Mink [D-HI-2]
106th	1999-00	2,810; James P. (Jim) McGovern [D-MA-3]	1,328; Christopher H. (Chris) Shays [R-CT-4]	0.147; James P. (Jim) McGovern [D-MA-3]
107th	2001-02	2,894; Major R. O. Owens [D-NY-11]	2,689; Mark A. Foley [R-FL-16]	0.196; Major R. O. Owens [D-NY-11]
108th	2003-04	2,146; Sheila Jackson-Lee [D-TX-18]	1,912; James A. (Jim) Gibbons [R-NV-2]	0.152; Jose E. Serrano [D-NY-16]
109th	2005-06	1,990; Walter B. Jones, Jr. [R-NC-3]	2,650; John R. Lewis [D-GA-5]	0.162; Thomas G. (Tom) Tancredo [R-CO-6]
110th	2007-08	2,400; Brian P. Bilbray [R-CA-50]	1,730; Christopher H. (Chris) Shays [R-CT-4]	0.161; Brian P. Bilbray [R-CA-50]
111th	2009-10	2,058; Raul M. Grijalva [D-AZ-7]	2,044; Robert A. (Bob) Brady [D-PA-1]	0.144; Raul M. Grijalva [D-AZ-7]
112th	2011-12	1,696; Leon A. (Lynn) Westmoreland [R-GA-3]	3,904; Robert C. (Bobby) Scott [D-VA-3]	0.182; Sue Wilkins Myrick [R-NC-9]
113th	2013-14	1,872; Alan S. Lowenthal [D-CA-47]	2,202; Joyce Beatty [D-OH-3]	0.124; Alan S. Lowenthal [D-CA-47]
114th	2015-16	3,124; Peter A. (Pete) Sessions [R-TX-32]	1,024; John B. (Brad) Ashford [D-NE-2]	0.173; Peter G. (Pete) Olson [R-TX-22]
Senate				
93rd	1973-74	24; Paul J. Fannin [D-AZ]	16; Philip A. Hart [D-MI]	0.277; Paul J. Fannin [D-AZ]
94th	1975-76	14; John V. Tunney [D-CA]	40; John V. Tunney [D-CA]	0.439; John V. Tunney [D-CA]
95th	1977-78	20; Spark M. Matsunaga [D-HI]	4; Dennis W. DeConcini [D-AZ]	0.343; Spark M. Matsunaga [D-HI]
96th	1979-80	48; Paul S. Sarbanes [D-MD]	452; Mark O. Hatfield [R-OR]	0.312; Paul S. Sarbanes [D-MD]
97th	1981-82	114; Paul D. Laxalt [R-NV]	345; James R. (Jim) Sasser [D-TN]	0.179; Paul D. Laxalt [R-NV]
98th	1983-84	68; Daniel K. (Dan) Inouye [D-HI]	96; Daniel K. (Dan) Inouye [D-HI]	0.281; Daniel K. (Dan) Inouye [D-HI]
99th	1985-86	108; Paul M. Simon [D-IL]	365; Alan M. Cranston [D-CA]	0.254; Paul M. Simon [D-IL]
100th	1987-88	248; Barbara A. Mikulski [D-MD]	167; John Melcher [D-MT]	0.291; Barbara A. Mikulski [D-MD]
101st	1989-90	260; Paul M. Simon [D-IL]	220; Rudolph E. (Rudy) Boschwitz [R-MN]	0.253; Paul M. Simon [D-IL]
102nd	1991-92	134; Paul M. Simon [D-IL]	362; Larry E. Craig [R-ID]	0.314; Paul M. Simon [D-IL]
103rd	1993-94	100; Richard C. (Dick) Shelby [D-AL]	458; James S. (Strom) Thurmond [R-SC]	0.296; Charles E. (Chuck) Grassley [R-IA]
104th	1995-96	58; Alfonse M. (Al) D'Amato [R-NY]	243; Alfonse M. (Al) D'Amato [R-NY]	0.294; Alfonse M. (Al) D'Amato [R-NY]
105th	1997-98	172; Thomas S. (Slade) Gorton, III [R-WA]	366; Cornelius A. (Connie) McGillicuddy (Mack), III [R-FL]	0.261; Thomas S. (Slade) Gorton, III [R-WA]
106th	1999-00	404; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]	272; Samuel D. (Sam) Brownback [R-KS]	0.299; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]
107th	2001-02	450; Richard J. (Dick) Durbin [D-IL]	202; Charles T. (Chuck) Hagel [R-NE]	0.223; Richard J. (Dick) Durbin [D-IL]
108th	2003-04	476; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]	163; Larry E. Craig [R-ID]	0.212; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]
109th	2005-06	426; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]	249; William T. (Thad) Cochran [R-MS]	0.240; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]
110th	2007-08	392; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]	213; Arlen Specter [R-PA]	0.256; Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy [D-MA]
111th	2009-10	320; Charles E. (Chuck) Schumer [D-NY]	256; Thomas A. (Tom) Coburn [R-OK]	0.241; John F. Kerry [D-MA]
112th	2011-12	262; Richard Blumenthal [D-CT]	748; Michael S. (Mike) Lee [R-UT]	0.241; Richard Blumenthal [D-CT]
113th	2013-14	166; Amy J. Klobuchar [D-MN]	617; Mark S. Kirk [R-IL]	0.257; Amy J. Klobuchar [D-MN]
114th	2015-16	196; Christopher A. (Chris) Coons [D-DE]	372; Michael S. (Mike) Lee [R-UT]	0.266; James M. (Jim) Inhofe [R-OK]

Brackets represent party (D=Democrat; R=Republican), state, and district of legislator.

Figure 1.4: The Mitosis of Immigration Cosponsorship Networks by Party and Chamber





Figure 1.4 shows the graphical representation of these cosponsorship networks for each congressional term from 1973-2016. For every term the House and the Senate networks are shown[16]. Here we can see the evolution of these networks over time as well as the effect of polarization on the issue of immigration. Much like the process of a cell dividing in the human body, we can visually see the separation of parties over time in each graph making it appear as two new entities. In earlier congresses, these networks were not very dense and we can see that there was a lot of bipartisanship happening among members in these networks. This suggests that MCs were more willing to reach across the party line and show support for each other's legislation. However, as time progressed we can really begin to see the evolution of polarization beginning around the 103rd Congress. The networks are becoming denser and the parties appear to cosponsor more among themselves and seem less likely to cosponsor with members from the opposing party. The 1990s saw several pieces of legislation that would reform immigration as the nation knew it. Amnesty bills were passed, border patrol was increased as well as the penalties for illegally entering the United States, visa numbers were expanded, and the E-Verify system was piloted. By this time, the parties developed

[16] The larger clusters represent the House networks and the smaller ones depict the Senate networks.

a stance on immigration that would create a much bigger cleavage among party and the electorate in the future.

Exponential Random Graph Model: Examining the Factors that Shape Collaboration on Immigration Bills

Dependent Variable

The analysis will derive an affiliation matrix of members by the immigration bill's sponsor and cosponsor which will constitute the dependent variable. From this network, a matrix will be created of a legislator by legislator network (House by House; Senate by Senate). The affiliation matrix shows the number of times each legislator cosponsors an immigration bill with the other legislator, and the diagonal represent the number of bills each legislator has cosponsored. Every legislator is considered, not just those who have cosponsored a bill at least one time.

Independent and Control Variables

The primary independent variable considered is *party affiliation* of each MC. Party affiliation is treated as dichotomous variable (0= Democrat; 1=Republican) and those who were Independent/ Third Party members were given the code that corresponded to the party they caucused with. There were a total 8 MCs that were either elected as Independents or switched from Democrat or Republican during their tenure of office; however, Sen. Dean Barkley (I-MN) did not caucus with either party and only served as an appointed member for two months. He did not sponsor or cosponsor any of the bills in this study; therefore, there was no need to give him a separate code. Six of the remaining MCs caucused with the Democrats and Rep. Virgil Goode (VA-5) briefly

switched from Democrat to Independent during the 106th Congress and caucused with the Republicans until he fully switched the next term to a member of the Republican Party.

The second variable of importance is examining the ideology scores of each MC which are based on competitive roll-call votes (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). DW-NOMINATE scores from both the first and second dimensions were considered. Finally, I control for other individual characteristics of members such as gender, seniority, whether or not they held leadership roles, whether or not they had a competitive election, and regional differences (border state with Mexico).[17]

I expect that the role of partisanship on the issue of immigration will differ across the House and Senate, and therefore, I examine both chambers. A cross-institutional analysis affords several benefits for uncovering how institutional and electoral features may shape how members join together on immigration legislation. For instance, the number of constituents generally represented by Senators and Representative is substantially different (except states and territories with at-large House members). Senators by default typically represent more constituents because they represent an entire state than those who serve in the House who represent districts within a state, with the exception of those Representatives who are members at-large. Senators are more likely to represent a more heterogeneous group than a Representative because they represent the entire states rather than districts. Having a more homogeneous district, however, could alter the number and type of immigration legislation a legislator initiates and cosponsors. For instance, in a state that is considered mostly conservative, there are some districts

[17] For additional information on the coding of the control variables, see Codebook in the Appendix.

within the state that might contain constituents that are very liberal; hence, a legislator may have a higher likelihood to cosponsor or form ties with legislators that support more benefit for immigrants than restrictions. This information is gathered from the U.S. House and Senate websites.

The Model

The model that I am using is an Exponential-family Random Graph Model (ERGM) that uses the Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation (MCMCMLE).

$$\mathrm{P}(Y_{ij}|\mathrm{X}) = \exp \frac{[\theta^{\tau} \mathrm{g}(yij,\ X)]}{k(\theta)}$$

The model explains the probability of observing a connection between a pair of MC's [*i,j*][*i,j*] while accounting for legislator characteristics, or dependencies in the data such as partisanship, seniority, and gender, for example (Calvero and Leiras 2012; Cranmer, Leifeld, McClurg, and Rolfe 2017; Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, and Morris 2010; Robins, Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher 2007). The random graph indicates that the base model is randomly generated using a matrix including covariates and can improve what I randomly get—again trying to explain the ties of legislators as a function of member characteristics. For each MC pair *i* and *j*, the random variable *yij* is 1 if they are connected and a 0 if they are not. X is an affiliation matrix of MCs (nodes) and the connections (edges) in the network: $g(Y_{ij}X)$ is a vector of network statistics, Θ is a vector of coefficients, and $k(\Theta)$ is the constant. This type of analysis is similar but different from

a standard logit and OLS model because there is a relational matrix and I want to know the likelihood of having ties.

The Monte Carlo approach is a *simulation* of a distribution of random graphs that have parameter values that are set at the beginning. From there, the observed graph is compared to the distribution of graphs and the parameter values are refined. This process repeats itself until the parameter estimates stabilize (Strauss 1986; Geyer 1991; Snijders, 2002; Robins, Pattison, and Woolcock 2005; Hunter and Handcock 2006; Robins; Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher 2006). In other words, this particular method is a type of risk analysis that takes into account decision making and simulates the possibilities of all the decision probabilities that could be made. The results from this analysis depict what can happen with each decisions and the likelihood of each outcome possibility.

Results

Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 display the results of the Exponential Random Graph models for all immigration bills introduced in the House and the Senate, respectively. In the House, members were more likely to form ties with one another in about 60% of the models (i.e. there were only 9 terms that at least one party was less likely to form ties with someone in the same party opposed to a bipartisan tie). For the nine terms that a bipartisan (R-D) tie was formed, it was the Democrats who were less likely to form ties with one another and more likely to form a tie with a member of the Republican Party. In each of the 22 terms in the dataset, Republicans (R-R) were always more likely to form a tie with one another than with a Democrat. From 1973 to 1978 and then from 1981 to 1991, the odds of seeing a tie between a Democrat and another Democrat (D-D) were less

likely to occur than an R-D tie ranging from about 26% to 75% decreased odds over this period of time. Moreover, while the likelihood of seeing an R-R tie versus and R-D tie were higher for every term, there seemed to be a hyper-partisanship beginning in the 1990s—starting around the 102nd Congress. While the increased odds fluctuated over time, they generally continued to increase through the 112th Congress where the odds of randomly getting an R-R tie peaked at about 1,632%, all else equal. All of these likelihoods were statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence interval.

The story was a bit different in the Senate, however. There were only 6 terms where the D-D and R-R tie was more likely to occur than a bipartisan tie: the 96th, 103rd, 111th, 112th, and 114th Congresses. Overall, the odds of randomly getting a copartisan tie happened more often for Republicans (19 out of 22 terms) than Democrats (9 out of 22 terms). Overtime there were periods of hyper-partisanship among the Republicans, especially in the 94th, 100th, 112th and 113th Congress all saw an increased odds of getting an R-R tie opposed to an R-D tie by over 1,000%, all else equal.

The second variable of importance was ideology. Using Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) DW-NOMINATE scores for the first dimension, the models showed a mostly consistent, significant effect of ideology on the odds of members forming ties on immigration legislation in the House. Members tend to cosponsor immigration bills with those of like-minded ideology. All but one (113th Congress) of these scores reached conventional levels of statistical significance at the 99.9% confidence level. Generally, as a representative's DW-NOMINATE score increased the odds of a tie forming between representatives decreased in 18 of the 22 terms. Substantively this indicates that as sponsors/ cosponsors become more conservative, the likelihood of cosponsorship ties

forming generally decrease on immigration bills introduced in the House. The results were very similar in the Senate. There were only three terms that had increased odds of a tie forming as a senator's DW-NOMINATE score increased; although, only two of those terms reached statistical significance. Overall, like the House, as a senator's DW-NOMINATE score increases, the likelihood of seeing a cosponsorship tie between senators decrease, all else equal. Again, this means that as members of the Senate become more polarized the likelihood of a tie forming decreases for immigration bills introduced in the Senate.

With regards to my other control variables, being in a leadership position (party leader and/ or committee chair/ ranking member) had no significant impact of determining who would be more likely to cosponsor with one another in the House. Randomly getting a tie between two MCs that had leadership roles was less likely to occur than a tie between to non-leader members for almost all of the bills introduced in this chamber.[18] In the Senate, the models indicate that being in a leadership position mattered in half of the terms in the dataset. Committee leaders and/ or party leaders were more likely to form relationships with one another and/or a relationship with a non-leader in 11 out of 22 terms; however in six of these terms failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.[19]

[18] There was only one term, the 105th Congress, where the likelihood of a tie forming if a sponsor/ cosponsor was in a leadership role increased, but it failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

[19] The 93rd-96th Congress and 108th-109th Congresses had an increased likelihood of leader x leader or leader x non-leader cosponsor tie, but were not statistically significant.

When it comes to gender roles in sponsoring/ cosponsoring legislation, women matter. Females were generally more likely to form ties with one another compared to males forming ties with one another for bills that provide benefits. In the House, women were more likely to form cosponsor relationships other women in about 75% of the terms; in the Senate they were more likely to form ties with other women about half of the time. These results were compared to a male MC forming a tie with another male MC, all else equal. This follows along with the work of Volden, Wiseman, and Wittman (2013) who found support that minority party women in the House of Representatives tended to be more active in forming coalitions. Because there were comparatively fewer women who served in the Senate than men, the odds of women forming ties with each other at higher rates than ties of men was relatively low for all Senate immigration bills introduced. In many of the terms, there were not enough women serving and the models produced coefficients that were negative infinity. During terms where the predicted ties had higher odds of occurring between two women than two men the coefficients in six out of twelve terms failed to reach statistical significance.

The likelihood of randomly getting a tie between two freshmen (F-F) compared to members in at least their second term (NF-NF) in the House was slim. There were only two occasions that the likelihood of F-F tie was greater than randomly getting an NF-NF tie; in the 107th Congress during George W. Bush's first two years as president and the 113th Congress during Obama's fifth and sixth years as president. In the Senate, the odds of getting and F-F tie occurred in about half of the terms in the dataset; however, half of those terms failed to reach statistical significance. I expected that freshmen would fare better than they did in the House because of the differences in term lengths.

The number of terms a member of the House serves was not that important in the likelihood of forming ties, neither was being in a competitive election. In each of these categories neither the more years an MC served nor if the MC was in a competitive district significantly increased the likelihood of a tie forming with each other, overall. Similarly, I saw the same results of for these two variables in the Senate. Finally, other than partisan affiliation in the House, being from a border state with Mexico (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas) was the best indicator of the likelihood of forming ties in every term. The odds of randomly getting a tie from MCs of a border state (B-B) was greater than a tie forming between MCs from non-border states (NB-NB) in all 22 terms.[20] Conversely, representing a border state in the Senate only mattered about half of the time.

[20] Only one term was not statistically significant.

Table 1.3: All House Immigration Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-1.39382***	-0.93683***	-0.450992***	0.133089***	-1.127011***	-0.679633***	-0.358683***	-0.531444***
		(0.16044)	(0.07626)	(0.053876)	(0.028314)	(0.022271)	(0.033508)	(0.027921)	(0.025857)
		[0.248126069]	[0.39186662]	[0.63699616]	[1.1423518]	[0.3240004]	[0.50680284]	[0.69859556]	[0.58775549]
	Republican/ Republican	1.64959***	1.46407***	1.156942***	0.645972***	1.181508***	2.171251***	1.116852***	1.254471***
		(0.29398)	(0.1127)	(0.064005)	(0.030019)	(0.023951)	(0.050794)	(0.039613)	(0.034364)
		[5.204861895]	[4.32352276]	[3.18019381]	[1.9078404]	[3.2592842]	[8.76925147]	[3.05522042]	[3.50598396]
GENDER	Female/ Female	1.52234***	1.0938***	-0.43715	0.168579	0.668753***	0.033784	-0.566025***	-0.598074***
		(0.35176)	(0.24002)	(0.418465)	(0.253546)	(0.149239)	(0.18821)	(0.191078)	(0.147539)
		[4.582935455]	[2.98559094]	[0.64587451]	[1.1836221]	[1.9518021]	[1.03436149]	[0.56777767]	[0.54986949]
	Female/ Male	0.45451***	0.45822***	0.043986	0.145309***	0.271573***	0.035096	-0.231319***	-0.242242***
		(0.11369)	(0.06095)	(0.058218)	(0.035775)	(0.023315)	(0.033115)	(0.029904)	(0.025811)
		[1.575397001]	[1.58125077]	[1.04496757]	[1.1563963]	[1.3120273]	[1.03571928]	[0.79348617]	[0.7848663]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-0.60767**	-0.25803**	-0.348501***	-0.293746***	-0.325856***	-0.265039***	-1.477765***	-1.352506***
		(0.28238)	(0.1064)	(0.108249)	(0.053145)	(0.042221)	(0.05651)	(0.157152)	(0.077793)
		[0.544619578]	[0.77257306]	[0.70574517]	[0.745466]	[0.7219093]	[0.76717609]	[0.22814699]	[0.25859153]
	Yes/ No	-0.65258***	-0.21848***	-0.224212***	-0.179642***	-0.208767***	-0.151853***	-0.897354***	-0.734375***
		(0.12034)	(0.05633)	(0.04342)	(0.023091)	(0.016961)	(0.025355)	(0.029102)	(0.022514)
		[0.520701766]	[0.80374137]	[0.79914574]	[0.8355692]	[0.8115845]	[0.8591147]	[0.40764679]	[0.47980514]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.07832***	-0.08625***	-0.095542***	-0.069539***	-0.028372***	-0.072001***	-0.034396***	-0.062272***
		(0.01245)	(0.00652)	(0.005136)	(0.002845)	(0.001799)	(0.002993)	(0.002005)	(0.001875)
		[0.924665178]	[0.91736296]	[0.90888062]	[0.9328236]	[0.9720271]	[0.93053027]	[0.96618866]	[0.93962758]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-5.22835***	-3.31299***	-1.171221***	0.790592***	-1.990933***	-4.368623***	-3.213514***	-3.324982***
		(0.23299)	(0.11135)	(0.074835)	(0.035436)	(0.029287)	(0.051195)	(0.041332)	(0.037769)
		[0.005362385]	[0.03640716]	[0.30998831]	[2.2047016]	[0.1365679]	[0.01266867]	[0.04021506]	[0.03597315]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	0.54729	0.01555	0.082465	-0.617303***	-0.058079	0.041589	-0.488794***	0.268017**
		(0.71718)	(0.28455)	(0.190957)	(0.143096)	(0.074471)	(0.154744)	(0.161742)	(0.133463)
		[1.728561311]	[1.01567267]	[1.08596041]	[0.5393974]	[0.9435758]	[1.04246594]	[0.61336572]	[1.30736876]
	Yes/ No	0.52223***	0.18878***	-0.20143***	-0.235677***	-0.008977	0.020808	-0.244571***	0.098263***
		(0.1295)	(0.06342)	(0.052145)	(0.028911)	(0.019031)	(0.0322)	(0.028329)	(0.026124)
		[1.685782366]	[1.20778007]	[0.81756053]	[0.7900354]	[0.9910631]	[1.02102561]	[0.78304011]	[1.10325293]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	1.14141***	0.33133***	0.912492***	1.194203***	0.580452***	0.45701***	1.017634***	0.322339***
		(0.16226)	(0.1174)	(0.082434)	(0.046566)	(0.041087)	(0.053173)	(0.045555)	(0.045749)
		[3.131181947]	[1.39281372]	[2.49052158]	[3.300925]	[1.7868453]	[1.57934533]	[2.766642]	[1.38035235]
	Yes/ No	0.29589***	0.12903***	0.269365***	0.41897***	-0.077563***	0.083683***	0.398311***	0.051965***
		(0.09663)	(0.04972)	(0.038735)	(0.02063)	(0.015267)	(0.022067)	(0.018308)	(0.017281)
		[1.344323385]	[1.137719]	[1.30913284]	[1.5203943]	[0.9253692]	[1.08728457]	[1.48930693]	[1.05333838]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-0.76549	-0.971006**	-0.980306***	-0.6369***	-0.552922***	-0.255775***	-0.481069***
		(0)	(0.5061)	(0.383814)	(0.157594)	(0.074545)	(0.138926)	(0.085864)	(0.081221)
		[0]	[0.46510714]	[0.37870187]	[0.3751962]	[0.5289296]	[0.57526645]	[0.77431637]	[0.61812202]
	Yes/ No	-1.41269***	-0.2**	-0.525315***	-0.626107***	-0.325445***	-0.301213***	-0.149574***	-0.266236***
		(0.28017)	(0.08058)	(0.067978)	(0.034153)	(0.02065)	(0.03455)	(0.025285)	(0.022972)
		[0.243488115]	[0.81873036]	[0.59136891]	[0.534669]	[0.7222059]	[0.7399198]	[0.86107451]	[0.76625857]
CONSTANT		-6.29769***	-4.0884***	-2.720505***	-1.19362***	-0.097057***	-2.245009***	-1.317011***	-0.326815***
		(0.1848)	(0.08463)	(0.054618)	(0.029846)	(0.020578)	(0.03413)	(0.024415)	(0.023701)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 1.3: All House Immigration Bills continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-0.634602***	-0.2938***	0.15453***	1.356423***	0.30211***	0.459386***	0.40941***
		(0.024287)	(0.037)	(0.03188)	(0.049754)	(0.03721)	(0.034263)	(0.04304)
		[0.5301465]	[0.7454267]	[1.1671071]	[3.8822833]	[1.3527059]	[1.583102]	[1.5059328]
	Republican/ Republican	1.054519***	1.7761***	1.90319***	0.23418***	2.01927***	0.957073***	2.15637***
		(0.02794)	(0.03905)	(0.03307)	(0.042474)	(0.03907)	(0.034943)	(0.04673)
		[2.8705947]	[5.9067487]	[6.707261]	[1.263872]	[7.5328183]	[2.604064]	[8.6397001]
GENDER	Female/ Female	-0.769661***	-0.22217	0.57775***	1.293553***	0.35236***	0.601054***	0.85692***
		(0.116629)	(0.16651)	(0.06813)	(0.085424)	(0.05928)	(0.059147)	(0.05777)
		[0.4631699]	[0.8007793]	[1.7820226]	[3.6457151]	[1.4224214]	[1.8240396]	[2.3559005]
	Female/ Male	-0.395763***	-0.18149***	0.14443***	0.304523***	0.02014	0.117615***	0.11706***
		(0.022023)	(0.03248)	(0.02032)	(0.027706)	(0.01973)	(0.017309)	(0.02023)
		[0.673166]	[0.8340223]	[1.1553842]	[1.3559777]	[1.0203388]	[1.1248108]	[1.1241854]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-1.057762***	-0.19559**	-0.52057***	-1.387056***	-1.00112***	-0.437565***	0.54438***
		(0.077888)	(0.09081)	(0.03604)	(0.060309)	(0.05786)	(0.080554)	(0.08653)
		[0.3472319]	[0.8223483]	[0.594183]	[0.2498096]	[0.367469]	[0.6456067]	[1.7235428]
	Yes/ No	-0.521551***	-0.05255*	-0.26669***	-0.776771***	-0.45909***	-0.241078***	0.26016***
		(0.020347)	(0.02764)	(0.01881)	(0.026539)	(0.02087)	(0.021105)	(0.02492)
		[0.5935991]	[0.9488072]	[0.7659104]	[0.4598887]	[0.6318584]	[0.7857805]	[1.2971325]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.067949***	-0.03206***	-0.03343***	0.035923***	-0.04029***	-0.03157***	-0.02398***
		(0.001751)	(0.00244)	(0.00199)	(0.002462)	(0.00214)	(0.001792)	(0.00205)
		[0.9343078]	[0.9684482]	[0.9671177]	[1.0365759]	[0.9605156]	[0.9689229]	[0.9763092]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-2.095516***	-0.9772***	0.43018***	2.014469***	-1.58545***	-1.086794***	-1.97983***
		(0.031699)	(0.04383)	(0.03647)	(0.047366)	(0.03966)	(0.035213)	(0.04557)
		[0.1230068]	[0.3763616]	[1.5375323]	[7.4967452]	[0.2048555]	[0.3372961]	[0.1380922]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	0.349568*	0.08946	0.28754***	-0.025218	-0.04056	-0.321031*	-0.57039***
		(0.201412)	(0.14766)	(0.07564)	(0.126239)	(0.09598)	(0.180751)	(0.20056)
		[1.4184548]	[1.0935827]	[1.3331435]	[0.9750973]	[0.9602541]	[0.7254006]	[0.5653066]
	Yes/ No	0.232417***	0.04205	0.11042***	-0.060706**	-0.05762**	-0.134016***	-0.33009***
		(0.028113)	(0.03109)	(0.02044)	(0.029756)	(0.02306)	(0.027899)	(0.03254)
		[1.2616457]	[1.0429444]	[1.1167454]	[0.9410996]	[0.9440058]	[0.874576]	[0.7188615]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.512205***	1.16321***	0.91213***	1.399736***	0.58569***	0.890528***	0.64606***
		(0.038144)	(0.04233)	(0.0357)	(0.040487)	(0.03574)	(0.034672)	(0.04081)
		[1.6689666]	[3.2001876]	[2.4896139]	[4.0541282]	[1.7962281]	[2.4364164]	[1.907998]
	Yes/ No	0.172098***	0.35826***	0.29312***	0.574243***	0.1777***	0.260587***	0.16798***
		(0.015006)	(0.02124)	(0.01678)	(0.021592)	(0.01709)	(0.01509)	(0.01854)
		[1.1877943]	[1.4308418]	[1.340606]	[1.7757865]	[1.1944645]	[1.2976915]	[1.1829123]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-0.27519***	-0.28079***	-0.23252***	-1.190699***	0.07004	-0.417931***	-0.45727***
		(0.075254)	(0.10306)	(0.08302)	(0.131024)	(0.08713)	(0.081491)	(0.10403)
		[0.7594275]	[0.7551841]	[0.7925328]	[0.3040088]	[1.072548]	[0.6584078]	[0.6330115]
	Yes/ No	-0.103054***	-0.21455***	-0.1461***	-0.538412***	0.02679	-0.18723***	-0.19785***
		(0.020726)	(0.03006)	(0.02405)	(0.031469)	(0.025)	(0.022295)	(0.02659)
		[0.902078]	[0.8069074]	[0.8640735]	[0.5836744]	[1.0271514]	[0.8292533]	[0.8204931]
CONSTANT		0.363425***	-2.00378***	-0.98543***	-3.185777***	-1.22964***	-0.286473***	-1.4979***
		(0.022188)	(0.03428)	(0.02672)	(0.03587)	(0.02697)	(0.023692)	(0.03004)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 1.3: All House Immigration Bills continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	1.441796***	1.47003***	0.360984***	0.165035***	2.516003***	3.822467***	1.832861***
		(0.034215)	(0.04267)	(0.037766)	(0.038009)	(0.048287)	(0.048845)	(0.039098)
		[4.2282823]	[4.349366]	[1.4347408]	[1.1794339]	[12.37901876]	[45.7168485]	[6.2517481]
	Republican/ Republican	1.510202***	2.222136***	1.79005***	2.621118***	2.852026***	0.539363***	1.718492***
		(0.034409)	(0.04253)	(0.039118)	(0.041539)	(0.04917)	(0.043188)	(0.03743)
		[4.5276451]	[9.227017]	[5.9897491]	[13.7510858]	[17.32283664]	[1.7149144]	[5.576111]
GENDER	Female/ Female	0.322234***	0.364942***	0.079332*	0.002866	0.26695***	-0.3254***	0.112392***
		(0.057375)	(0.0502)	(0.041612)	(0.043482)	(0.051531)	(0.05548)	(0.041468)
		[1.3802072]	[1.4404307]	[1.0825633]	[1.0028701]	[1.30597513]	[0.7222387]	[1.1189514]
	Female/ Male	0.004258	0.064369***	-0.058705***	-0.16441***	-0.034775*	-0.292246***	-0.101555***
		(0.017999)	(0.01793)	(0.015664)	(0.016666)	(0.019716)	(0.018696)	(0.016205)
		[1.0042673]	[1.0664858]	[0.9429849]	[0.8483941]	[0.96582298]	[0.7465845]	[0.9034319]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-0.217803***	-0.472231***	-0.203054***	-1.161838***	-0.204709***	0.118455***	-0.023344
		(0.063142)	(0.07812)	(0.047039)	(0.060283)	(0.040903)	(0.030389)	(0.051314)
		[0.8042841]	[0.6236094]	[0.8162339]	[0.3129105]	[0.81488455]	[1.1257566]	[0.9769264]
	Yes/ No	-0.184627***	-0.302689***	-0.131577***	-0.627434***	-0.177562***	-0.001935	-0.064646***
		(0.020086)	(0.02238)	(0.017765)	(0.019924)	(0.021288)	(0.019494)	(0.018059)
		[0.8314147]	[0.7388289]	[0.8767114]	[0.5339605]	[0.83730892]	[0.9980666]	[0.9373992]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.035882***	-0.045721***	-0.01844***	0.01016***	0.008638***	-0.019764***	-0.021432***
		(0.001755)	(0.00177)	(0.001491)	(0.001395)	(0.001633)	(0.001655)	(0.001429)
		[0.9647539]	[0.9553089]	[0.9817287]	[1.0102113]	[1.00867584]	[0.9804302]	[0.9787959]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-0.673647***	-0.238014***	-0.364036***	-1.137967***	-0.515926***	0.034166	-0.235321***
		(0.032023)	(0.03985)	(0.034951)	(0.035216)	(0.039804)	(0.036634)	(0.038984)
		[0.5098457]	[0.7881918]	[0.6948662]	[0.3204699]	[0.59694786]	[1.0347562]	[0.7903172]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-1.121803***	-0.274117	-0.197211**	1.482896***	-1.040364***	-0.204258*	-0.352064***
		(0.148111)	(0.28063)	(0.081393)	(0.109042)	(0.102295)	(0.121743)	(0.130432)
		[0.325692]	[0.760243]	[0.8210174]	[4.4056866]	[0.35332608]	[0.8152523]	[0.703235]
	Yes/ No	-0.577913***	-0.331168***	-0.428034***	0.502121***	-0.511412***	-0.188827***	-0.139823***
		(0.025615)	(0.03616)	(0.019738)	(0.024116)	(0.023847)	(0.024398)	(0.024195)
		[0.561068]	[0.7180845]	[0.6517893]	[1.6522226]	[0.59964832]	[0.8279298]	[0.8695123]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.677669***	1.068327***	0.0265	0.603623***	0.706452***	0.788935***	0.350606***
		(0.034193)	(0.03463)	(0.031885)	(0.033104)	(0.039002)	(0.03603)	(0.033209)
		[1.9692817]	[2.9105053]	[1.0268543]	[1.8287318]	[2.02678727]	[2.2010512]	[1.4199281]
	Yes/ No	0.257963***	0.22215***	-0.199006***	0.115032***	0.280339***	0.256115***	0.163035***
		(0.015748)	(0.01622)	(0.014652)	(0.015417)	(0.018108)	(0.016706)	(0.015256)
		[1.2942907]	[1.2487589]	[0.8195453]	[1.1219094]	[1.32357905]	[1.2919012]	[1.1770778]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-0.305387***	-0.210648**	-0.706826***	-0.74946***	-0.563381***	-0.802266***	-0.325143***
		(0.081162)	(0.08217)	(0.069704)	(0.069268)	(0.086597)	(0.09506)	(0.072043)
		[0.7368381]	[0.810059]	[0.493207]	[0.4726215]	[0.56928127]	[0.4483118]	[0.7224243]
	Yes/ No	-0.155295***	-0.092118***	-0.377173***	-0.367367***	-0.300324***	-0.367387***	-0.180146***
		(0.02197)	(0.02196)	(0.018936)	(0.019951)	(0.023339)	(0.022795)	(0.01971)
		[0.8561629]	[0.9119975]	[0.6857976]	[0.6925553]	[0.7405783]	[0.6925413]	[0.8351483]
CONSTANT		-0.815976***	-1.214159***	-0.213252***	-0.931017***	-2.562528***	-0.956502***	-0.67411***
		(0.025916)	(0.02906)	(0.02642)	(0.026794)	(0.035393)	(0.032352)	(0.021897)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 1.4: All Senate Immigration Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	1.06706**	-2.71153***	-1.10803***	0.10858	-1.12004***	-1.19698***	-1.58706***	-1.89707***
		(0.45965)	(0.65584)	(0.42871)	(0.21521)	(0.13691)	(0.23877)	(0.17309)	(0.15801)
		[2.906817397]	[0.06643526]	[0.33020805]	[1.114689607]	[0.32626765]	[0.30210472]	[0.204525982]	[0.150007819]
	Republican/ Republican	-0.62355*	3.22462***	1.02545*	1.45418***	1.29508***	1.40244***	2.06908***	2.40812***
		(0.3401)	(0.78084)	(0.52873)	(0.22906)	(0.1334)	(0.28317)	(0.19742)	(0.18753)
		[0.536035898]	[25.1441]	[2.78834336]	[4.280958798]	[3.65129203]	[4.0651041]	[7.917564707]	[11.113039851]
GENDER	Female/ Female	NA	NA	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***
				(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
				[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	Female/ Male	NA	NA	-INF***	-INF***	0.35843**	0.3139	-0.84304***	0.25322
				(0)	(0)	(0.16891)	(0.2932)	(0.26078)	(0.18193)
				[0]	[0]	[1.43108585]	[1.3687507]	[0.430401978]	[1.288166919]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-0.59915	1.52116*	-0.85051	1.58388***	-0.64585***	-0.35558	-1.4504***	-1.48486***
		(0.6129)	(0.86309)	(0.59679)	(0.33756)	(0.17665)	(0.24431)	(0.23779)	(0.21469)
		[0.549279919]	[4.577519]	[0.427198]	[4.873833639]	[0.5242167]	[0.70076948]	[0.234475815]	[0.226533354]
	Yes/ No	0.1588	0.30395	-0.37993	0.82841***	-0.349***	-0.08399	-0.62756***	-0.7864***
		(0.33676)	(0.58229)	(0.37797)	(0.22192)	(0.13018)	(0.16252)	(0.11245)	(0.11195)
		[1.172101752]	[1.355199]	[0.68390851]	[2.289667559]	[0.7053955]	[0.91944348]	[0.533890851]	[0.455480848]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	0.09442	-0.01154	-0.22557*	0.29345***	-0.10596***	-0.02031	-0.12538***	-0.19298***
		(0.0827)	(0.19437)	(0.13363)	(0.06111)	(0.03486)	(0.05963)	(0.04296)	(0.04248)
		[1.099026555]	[0.988525]	[0.79806471]	[1.341040709]	[0.89945826]	[0.97989819]	[0.882157344]	[0.824500763]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	3.81305***	-5.64653***	-2.16645***	-0.70633**	-2.37841***	-4.06874***	-4.70161***	-5.38154***
		(0.48627)	(0.94451)	(0.58265)	(0.28862)	(0.18275)	(0.38276)	(0.27982)	(0.26612)
		[45.288317838]	[0.003529744]	[0.11458417]	[0.493449821]	[0.09269799]	[0.0170989]	[0.009080621]	[0.004600733]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	0.25918	-0.45853	-INF***	-0.58605	1.3617***
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(1.05334)	(0.32248)	(0)	(1.10095)	(0.36572)
		[0]	[0]	[0]	[1.295862746]	[0.63221138]	[0]	[0.556520609]	[3.902817557]
	Yes/ No	-INF***	1.78557***	-1.46972	0.51567***	-0.14601	-1.1744***	0.27154*	0.6506***
		(0)	(0.45935)	(1.02811)	(0.18158)	(0.09358)	(0.27808)	(0.1527)	(0.10618)
		[0]	[5.962974]	[0.22999014]	[1.674757198]	[0.86415054]	[0.30900349]	[1.311980873]	[1.916682019]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	4.97237***	2.84696***	0.97085	1.26087***	1.78895***	1.45111**	-0.02327
		(0)	(1.2061)	(0.80321)	(0.65673)	(0.41657)	(0.59159)	(0.59026)	(0.77983)
		[0]	[144.3686]	[17.23525309]	[2.640183704]	[3.52849158]	[5.98318548]	[4.267842288]	[0.976996493]
	Yes/ No	-0.61781*	2.71321***	0.84543**	-0.04504	0.33036***	1.02693***	0.8268***	0.28349**
		(0.32297)	(0.48959)	(0.36608)	(0.206)	(0.10467)	(0.15651)	(0.13387)	(0.12576)
		[0.539124265]	[15.07762]	[2.32898324]	[0.955961203]	[1.39146937]	[2.79248985]	[2.285983281]	[1.327756138]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	0.5502	-0.20801	-0.23312	0.05893	-0.87684***	-2.23192***	-0.94302***	-1.02537***
		(0.5054)	(1.33656)	(0.74891)	(0.32732)	(0.19329)	(0.41324)	(0.22442)	(0.20801)
		[1.733599656]	[0.8122024]	[0.79205726]	[1.060703925]	[0.41609683]	[0.10732242]	[0.389450206]	[0.358664549]
	Yes/ No	-0.13588	0.51098	0.04464	0.17532	-0.37774***	-1.01251***	-0.50569***	-0.4328***
		(0.37964)	(0.62284)	(0.36183)	(0.19731)	(0.10688)	(0.17068)	(0.12084)	(0.10549)
		[0.872946734]	[1.666932]	[1.04565323]	[1.191623717]	[0.68540775]	[0.36330469]	[0.603087307]	[0.648687228]
CONSTANT		-4.83363***	-8.43775***	-4.0765***	-5.22725***	-0.71873***	-2.60416***	-1.75719***	-1.20455***
		(0.53022)	(1.03487)	(0.5703)	(0.34549)	(0.18737)	(0.24683)	(0.16458)	(0.14727)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 1.4: All Senate Immigration Bills continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-1.65629***	-1.30556***	0.61074***	-1.88865***	-1.466***	0.29453**	0.47552***
		(0.14311)	(0.19143)	(0.20886)	(0.30417)	(0.1746)	(0.12537)	(0.12252)
		[0.1908454]	[0.27102179]	[1.84178771]	[0.15127649]	[0.2308463]	[1.3424965]	[1.608858]
	Republican/ Republican	2.03694***	1.87133***	0.67584***	1.89103***	2.21177***	0.64614***	-0.28851**
		(0.16283)	(0.23198)	(0.18486)	(0.27214)	(0.17022)	(0.11976)	(0.12152)
		[7.6671]	[6.49690507]	[1.96568431]	[6.62615878]	[9.1318762]	[1.9081684]	[0.7493814]
GENDER	Female/ Female	12.15759	-INF***	0.96638	-INF***	0.81267**	0.31943	2.15741***
		(196.968)	(0)	(1.05602)	(0)	(0.40164)	(0.36178)	(0.4731)
		[190535]	[0]	[2.6284207]	[0]	[2.2539276]	[1.3763448]	[8.648724]
	Female/ Male	0.27905*	-INF***	0.37757*	-0.50973*	0.14002	0.31495***	0.59339***
		(0.16318)	(0)	(0.19641)	(0.26383)	(0.11592)	(0.08999)	(0.08001)
		[1.321869]	[0]	[1.45874244]	[0.60065724]	[1.1502917]	[1.3701862]	[1.810108]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	0.48759***	-0.37251	0.18627	0.23098	-0.15118	-0.3922***	-0.07908
		(0.17096)	(0.22957)	(0.26314)	(0.4196)	(0.17099)	(0.13181)	(0.12747)
		[1.628387]	[0.68900528]	[1.20474706]	[1.25982841]	[0.8596971]	[0.6755706]	[0.9239629]
	Yes/ No	0.20674**	-0.17987	0.18317	0.16157	-0.00468	-0.0945	-0.04691
		(0.09893)	(0.12299)	(0.13545)	(0.19542)	(0.10679)	(0.07671)	(0.07475)
		[1.229659]	[0.83537467]	[1.20102179]	[1.17535431]	[0.9953305]	[0.9098264]	[0.9541703]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	0.07117**	0.11637***	0.36219***	0.02877	0.19835***	-0.0282	-0.1182***
		(0.03505)	(0.04404)	(0.04204)	(0.05175)	(0.02574)	(0.02066)	(0.01827)
		[1.073767]	[1.12341064]	[1.43647375]	[1.02918653]	[1.2193853]	[0.9721936]	[0.8885189]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-4.06829***	-3.56125***	1.40711***	-2.37629***	-2.13921***	-0.10018	-0.0845
		(0.22107)	(0.29001)	(0.22833)	(0.35425)	(0.20434)	(0.13895)	(0.13373)
		[0.0171066]	[0.02840316]	[4.08411603]	[0.09289433]	[0.1177475]	[0.9046739]	[0.9189757]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	0.71795	-INF***	0.20718	1.50504	0.29142*	0.42698	0.31631
		(0.54377)	(0)	(0.22035)	(1.07125)	(0.17632)	(0.65209)	(0.48032)
		[2.050223]	[0]	[1.23020037]	[4.50435551]	[1.3383293]	[1.5326148]	[1.372062]
	Yes/ No	0.24848**	0.04082	0.23222	0.0229	0.21366	0.374***	0.18328**
		(0.11344)	(0.22988)	(0.21929)	(0.27608)	(0.17952)	(0.10167)	(0.09294)
		[1.282078]	[1.04166025]	[1.26139336]	[1.02316914]	[1.2382029]	[1.45354]	[1.201148]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	4.06318***	1.90057***	-0.15376	-INF***	-1.94101*	1.00924**	14.15681
		(0.55545)	(0.46438)	(0.62897)	(0)	(1.026)	(0.39874)	(182.419)
		[58.15873]	[6.68970762]	[0.8574782]	[0]	[0.1435585]	[2.7435033]	[1406780]
	Yes/ No	0.97535***	0.54122***	-0.4219***	-3.27859***	-0.65864***	-0.45113***	0.54316***
		(0.09657)	(0.13467)	(0.1628)	(1.00578)	(0.1311)	(0.09646)	(0.0954)
		[2.65209]	[1.71809857]	[0.65580029]	[0.03768117]	[0.5175566]	[0.6369087]	[1.721439]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-1.29729***	-2.58221***	-1.38827***	0.70936**	-1.58743***	-0.29822**	0.86947***
		(0.17528)	(0.29914)	(0.23987)	(0.29865)	(0.17591)	(0.13137)	(0.12992)
		[0.2732711]	[0.07560658]	[0.24950674]	[2.03268152]	[0.2044514]	[0.7421358]	[2.385655]
	Yes/ No	-0.62498***	-1.19739***	-0.6087***	0.46986**	-0.85852***	-0.13857*	0.44851***
		(0.09075)	(0.12861)	(0.1412)	(0.20382)	(0.10371)	(0.07849)	(0.07711)
		[0.5352728]	[0.30198215]	[0.54405564]	[1.59976979]	[0.4237877]	[0.8706058]	[1.565984]
CONSTANT		-1.77055***	-2.37421***	-4.02216***	-3.67951***	-2.02314***	-0.72845***	0.15632
		(0.15347)	(0.19872)	(0.28972)	(0.28697)	(0.22579)	(0.113)	(0.10671)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 1.4: All Senate Immigration Bills continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-0.846094***	0.64012***	-0.52798***	0.54266***	0.22043	-0.05872	2.04687***
		(0.13555)	(0.08636)	(0.12681)	(0.13647)	(0.17707)	(0.16749)	(0.16196)
		[0.42908767]	[1.8967176]	[0.5897965]	[1.7205718]	[1.24661479]	[0.9429747]	[7.7436197]
	Republican/ Republican	2.314846***	-0.15909*	1.56212***	1.27814***	3.02854***	2.64533***	1.10845***
		(0.13937)	(0.08237)	(0.13071)	(0.15741)	(0.20733)	(0.1853)	(0.15959)
		[10.12336768]	[0.8529165]	[4.7689304]	[3.5899432]	[20.66708495]	[14.0880233]	[3.02966218]
GENDER	Female/ Female	0.487732*	0.10765	0.01147	0.08717	0.52735**	0.90556***	0.53153***
		(0.29443)	(0.24647)	(0.21033)	(0.20404)	(0.22531)	(0.17247)	(0.18474)
		[1.62861836]	[1.1136556]	[1.01154]	[1.0910807]	[1.69443634]	[2.4733159]	[1.70153454]
	Female/ Male	0.10306	-0.1047	-0.02984	0.08239	0.26984***	0.20366***	0.30716***
		(0.07928)	(0.07663)	(0.07205)	(0.07434)	(0.09003)	(0.07883)	(0.07833)
		[1.10855758]	[0.9005981]	[0.9705975]	[1.0858819]	[1.30976083]	[1.2258817]	[1.35956447]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	0.060936	-0.70536***	0.71037***	-0.06792	1.06625***	0.21237	0.62579***
		(0.14018)	(0.14147)	(0.13182)	(0.14673)	(0.17956)	(0.18703)	(0.14015)
		[1.06283051]	[0.4939326]	[2.034745]	[0.9343391]	[2.90445697]	[1.2366013]	[1.86971911]
	Yes/ No	0.133035*	-0.35161***	0.22103***	-0.04217	0.31019**	0.12421	0.35391***
		(0.07654)	(0.07561)	(0.07443)	(0.0874)	(0.12116)	(0.13619)	(0.09783)
		[1.14229009]	[0.7035561]	[1.2473614]	[0.9587068]	[1.36368128]	[1.1322497]	[1.42462563]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.088855***	0.01065	-0.01351	0.02899	0.19483***	-0.09943***	-0.02748
		(0.0198)	(0.01914)	(0.01784)	(0.01764)	(0.02794)	(0.02714)	(0.02263)
		[0.91497822]	[1.0107026]	[0.9865784]	[1.0294193]	[1.2151042]	[0.9053548]	[0.97289469]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-2.552805***	-0.6683***	-1.47343***	-1.2724***	-2.70571***	-1.66496***	0.09454
		(0.15958)	(0.07261)	(0.13671)	(0.14963)	(0.20084)	(0.16982)	(0.17014)
		[0.07786292]	[0.5125768]	[0.229139]	[0.2801586]	[0.06682303]	[0.1891986]	[1.0991489]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-0.67819	0.3539***	-1.27918	-0.33552	1.13917**	1.3644	-1.11719
		(0.6619)	(0.12426)	(1.10413)	(0.67297)	(0.50917)	(0.85922)	(1.08254)
		[0.50753503]	[1.4246088]	[0.2782651]	[0.714963]	[3.12416654]	[3.9133566]	[0.32719728]
	Yes/ No	-0.316662***	0.22787*	-0.61091***	0.01859	0.34335***	-0.12425	-0.45047***
		(0.10602)	(0.12429)	(0.11957)	(0.10813)	(0.11747)	(0.13522)	(0.12765)
		[0.72857725]	[1.255923]	[0.5428542]	[1.0187603]	[1.40966796]	[0.8831598]	[0.63732832]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.356556	2.69339***	1.93475***	1.51507***	0.98095**	-0.04597	0.94918**
		(0.40751)	(0.62265)	(0.54804)	(0.40888)	(0.48724)	(0.5192)	(0.41782)
		[1.42840181]	[14.7817319]	[6.9222793]	[4.5497414]	[2.66698853]	[0.9550679]	[2.58358348]
	Yes/ No	0.019665	-0.14836*	-0.24645***	-0.28914***	-0.5151***	-0.1459	0.29747***
		(0.08802)	(0.09)	(0.08754)	(0.09722)	(0.12626)	(0.10562)	(0.0955)
		[1.01985925]	[0.862122]	[0.7815739]	[0.7489099]	[0.59744185]	[0.8642443]	[1.34645376]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	0.079315	0.10719	0.78863***	0.54579***	-1.44531***	-0.12463	0.61491***
		(0.13069)	(0.12866)	(0.11998)	(0.13006)	(0.20712)	(0.16678)	(0.14669)
		[1.08254509]	[1.1131474]	[2.2003814]	[1.7259733]	[0.23567294]	[0.8828224]	[1.84948357]
	Yes/ No	-0.009152	0.05729	0.47485***	0.32673***	-0.72245***	-0.12776	0.21794**
		(0.07966)	(0.07849)	(0.07368)	(0.08256)	(0.11943)	(0.09381)	(0.09147)
		[0.99088974]	[1.0589581]	[1.6077658]	[1.3864326]	[0.48556193]	[0.8800678]	[1.24351135]
CONSTANT		0.456193***	-0.51125***	-0.79194***	-1.82128***	-2.71455***	-1.72141***	-2.4508***
		(0.11197)	(0.15267)	(0.116)	(0.13056)	(0.18964)	(0.20432)	(0.15022)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Discussion

In this paper, I used cosponsorship networks between members of Congress on immigration legislation introduced over a period of four decades to try and infer how these social relationships may influence behavior when it comes to supporting immigration policy. Because immigration has evolved into a more complex issue that can affect other policy areas, it is important to understand these relationships during the pre-floor stages to surmise whether members choose to work together to form ties with one another to support good policy making or if they are being strategic and forming relationships to toe the party line. This could have further implications on whether or not a bill gets passed later on in the legislative process. Overall, the results of the exponential random graph models showed partial support for each of my hypotheses. In the House, the results showed that Republicans were more strategic when cosponsoring immigration legislation consistently over the last four decades. Harbridge (2015) found in her study of all bills in the House from 1973-2004 that members of the majority had shifted their focus from "prioritizing bipartisan legislation to the inclusion of more and more partisan bills" (pg. 189). The Republican Party did not have majority in the House until the 104th Congress (1995-1996), lost the majority in the 110th and 111th Congress, and regained it back in the 112th Congress to present. Despite the findings by Harbridge (2015) about the focus of the majority party to switch focus from bipartisan to partisan, the results from this study shows that Republican members focused more on partisan relationships when it came to immigration specific legislation. The results for the Democrats, however, followed line of Harbridge. Up until the 103rd Congress, Democrats seemed to be focused on forming bipartisan ties because they were more likely to reach across the table and work with members from the opposing party. This could mean that the Democratic

agenda, when it came to immigration, was to get bills beyond the committee, to the other stages of the legislative process. Additionally, it could mean that unlike Republicans, Democrats were more focused on creating good policy rather than merely toeing the party line. However, while the Democrats seemed to be more bipartisan in the 1970s and 1980s, by the 1990s both parties were more likely to form copartisan ties, which supported the Strategic Party Government hypothesis. In the 1990s, immigration became a more definitive partisan issue where both parties polarized on the policy to create a clear difference of the Democratic and Republican agendas and how to deal with legal and illegal immigrants. Being in the majority party did not seem to have a significant impact on how members chose to form relationships.

Like Fowler (2006a) I used several traditional measures of centrality to approximate the importance of each member in these networks, giving the top scoring MC in each chamber. The question is: Which party do better connected members come from? What I found is that it depends; although the Democrats took a slight majority, aggregately. The results were particularly interesting because many of those who were the most important in these networks, were not in the majority party, but were better connected with other important people or had the most connections with other MCs. Additionally, in about 32% of the terms a freshman member in the House was the most important person in the network and in the Senate about 64% of the terms an MC who was serving their first term in office was the top member in either of the three centrality categories. While instinctively it would seem like those member who were most senior would be better connected because they have served longer and had more time to cultivate these relationships, this was not always the case. For instance in a more recent

Congress (113th) the top members for each of the centrality scores in the House were freshmen. I also find that committee leaders were seldom the most important people in the House networks, but were important in the Senate when it came to immigration. This was opposite from Fowler's (2006a) findings of the U.S. House where he looked at aggregate data on all bills introduced from 1973-2004 and found that committee leaders (chairs) were the best connected members in the networks.

There are several opportunities for future empirical work regarding the relationships among members in relation to immigration policy. While this paper uncovers who are more likely to work together on a partisan level, it raises several questions about other member attributes and circumstances that may drive a member to connect with another that goes beyond party affiliation. Does the race/ ethnicity of an MC affect who they form ties with? Do district demographics matter? There could be expectations that members who are racial or ethnic minorities may support one another to get in hopes of getting legislation to the floor, for example. Are racial/ ethnic minority members able to network better than other and form more connections? Does the type of bill matter—are they bills that put sanctions on immigrants or are they helping immigrants? One might expect that members of a certain party may cosponsor more bills or form more connections with other legislators based on whether or not the bill calls for more border security versus a bill that provides pathways to citizenship for immigrants here illegally. On the other hand one could also expect that members are more likely to compromise on other bills in order to create immigration reform. The answers to these questions and others ought to help us better understand the roles legislators take on

immigration policy and help us better understand how a member's relationship with others can impact legislation going forward.

Chapter 2: To Sanction or Not to Sanction? How Members of Congress Form Relationships on Different Types of Immigration Legislation

Over the last five decades, the United States has seen an influx in the immigrant population. The number of immigrants that have come into the country has nearly tripled since the 1970s and has had weighty effects in several areas (e.g. labor, political, and cultural). This has motivated Congress to introduce and adopt several pieces of legislation aimed at reforming the broken immigration system (Belco, Clark, and Sipole 2016). As members of Congress attempted to introduce and pass comprehensive immigration reform, a dust storm of competing ideas on how this policy area needs to be changed has emerged. This caused major conflict on the floors of the House and Senate (Tichenor 1994). Polarization and partisanship has since had a significant effect not only on the number of bills introduced and enacted, but subtypes of bills that were introduced as well (Belco et al. 2016; Newton 2008).

Immigration legislation tends to lean in one of two directions: those that incorporate or benefit immigrants or those that seek sanctions or enforcements against them (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Gonzalez and Kamdar 2000; Tichenor 2002). In Daniel Tichenor's book, *Dividing Lines*, he argues that "immigration policy may be set up to encourage or discourage immigration," and "coalitions elicited by immigration politics [could be better conceptualized] by concentrating on how alien admissions [versus alien] rights unite and divide political actors" (2002, 35).Members of Congress introduce bills for a variety of reasons and these sponsorships can be used to help explain legislator behavior and the political environment (Rocca and Gordon 2010). For instance, some bills may reinforce party politics (Belco et al. 2016) and bill sponsors may be more likely

to introduce bills aligned with their party platform on the issue rather than relying on constituent preferences in order to differentiate themselves from their opposition (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Belco et al. 2016; Kingdon 1989; Rohde 1991). These differences can indicate that MCs generally seek opportunities to show party leaders that they are supporting the party's brand (Cox and McCubbins 2003; 2005; Grimmer 2013; Hager and Talbert 2000; Rohde 1991).

Studying the different types of legislation introduced by MCs concerning immigration is not a new idea. There have been several scholars in the past who have looked at these issues either at the national or state level (e.g. Boushey and Luedtke 2011; Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Monogan 2013; Wong 2017); however, they have primarily focused on roll-call voting. What we do not know is how cosponsorship coalitions play a role in the legislative process concerning the types of immigration bills introduced and what types of bills legislators are more likely to work together on. Republicans and Democrats might have incentives to act a particular way when forming cosponsor coalitions on immigration bills in general; however, not all immigration bills are the same. Because immigration comprises a vast spectrum of issues (from healthcare and public benefits to criminal justice, economic, and workforce issues), members may be motivated to sponsor or cosponsor legislation that promotes the stance of their constituency, the ideals of their party, or both.

This paper builds on Chapter 1 and I focus on the role of political parties shaping the cosponsorships networks on the two different types of immigration bills. I argue that partisanship provides incentives to form relationships on bills that either provides enforcements or benefits to immigrants. Specifically I argue that the likelihood of

Republicans networking with each other on immigration bills providing sanctions (enforcements) on immigration bills should be higher than the likelihood of bipartisanship, especially in the more contemporary period from early-1990s to present. Conversely, Democrats should have higher likelihoods of forming relationships with each other on immigration bills that provide benefits to immigrants. I find mixed support for these arguments. The results of some congressional terms were as predicted, but overall, when it came to support for legislation that issued sanctions/ enforcements to immigrants, it was Democrats that were more likely to form ties with one another than Republicans in both chambers. The opposite occurred for bills that provided benefit immigrants indicated that it was the Republicans who were generally more likely to form ties with one another.

Party platforms on immigration have shown overtime how this policy area has evolved and how parties began to develop their own distinct brand on the issue. There are incentives for legislators to either sponsor bills that seek benefits or enforcements for immigrants. This is the main argument of this paper. The two parties have evolved on their stances on immigration and have distinct stances on the types of issues they support. Since the late-1980s, Republicans have been consistently concerned about border security and the war on crime and drugs and Democrats care more about public benefits and nondiscrimination. Given the various presidents' and party platforms' emphases on the various issues of immigration, I would expect differences in terms of who sponsors bills that provide benefits and those that seek sanctions against immigrants.

The Importance of Party Differences and the Brand Name

In the early-1960s Stokes and Miller found a disconnect between voters and the legislative parties because voters lacked the necessary political knowledge to make informed decisions and they could not attribute a record of accomplishment to parties that were not homogenous within themselves (1962). With these two problems in mind, other scholars (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Snyder and Ting 2002; 2003; Woon and Pope 2008) in the Downs (1957) camp of rational decision-making developed more nuanced theories that addressed some of the challenges that Stokes and Miller (1962) faced. These theories indicated voters not having enough information was not the source of the disconnect, rather the lack of information was the basis of a connection between uninformed voters and using party labels as heuristics (Woon and Pope 2008). When a voter faces uncertainty about the views of a candidate, he or she uses legislators' party affiliation to infer positions on issues, such as immigration. Building off of Downs (1957), Stokes and Miller (1962), and Mayhew (1974), Snyder and Ting (2002; 2003) developed a model of parties that act as producers of brand names for voters in an environment of imperfect knowledge where the voter cannot observe the position an individual candidate. What Snyder and Ting ultimately show is that the information people receive from the party brand name arises from the endogeneity of parties choosing a stance on issues (platforms) and candidates ideologically sorting themselves into a camp (party). Along these lines other scholars find that incumbents, those seeking office, and those seeking benefits will use the party brand as a means to an end and in turn party leaders will act as cartels to both incentivize and

punish members who deviate and weaken the party brand (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005).

As institutional and procedural rules have evolved in Congress, party leaders (especially in the House) now have much more pull over members of their party. Leaders have the ability to punish MCs for going against the party grain on issues the party does not support (Cox and McCubbins 2003; 2005; Rohde 1991). In order to establish themselves apart from the opposing party, both Democrats and Republicans alike have taken particular stances on a myriad of issues, often going to the extremes to differentiate themselves from the other (Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde 2002; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Kirkland 2014; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009; Rippere 2016; Theriault 2008; Woon and Pope 2008; Zhang et al. 2008). While each party will have a consensus on aspects of particular issues, they often stress different things to make them stand apart. For instance, Gimpel and Edwards (1999, 179) noted that by the 1980s much "of the partisanship [on immigration] emerged because Republicans could foresee the distributive implications" if there was a big push to legalize those here illegally. On the other hand, Democrats were worried about the threat of discrimination due to employer sanctions. Much of these ideals after the 1980s have led to an increase in gridlock concerning immigration policy and has prevented much of the legislation from getting beyond the pre-floor stages.

Increasingly we have seen parties become more polarized and distinct on the issues they champion, and internally they have become more homogenized (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). I would expect then that members of the same party would have very similar positions on immigration policy. There are incentives for party leaders to corral

all of their members in their party on immigration to support the party brand. If there are too many rogue legislators going in a direction that does not support the goals of the party, then the party lacks clarity and reduces its usefulness as a cue to voters (Rohde 1991). Over the last couple of decades (since the early-1990s), the Republican and Democratic Party platforms have had consistent and distinct ideas on where their party stands on immigration; however, these platforms have not always embodied the views of today. The question is how and when did they evolve to the stances they have today?

The Evolution of Party Platforms on Immigration: A Brief History

Prior to the 1970s members of both parties in Congress were in lockstep on immigration. However, as refugee admissions began to increase under President Carter, the parties became more divided on the issue (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). During this time, the Republican Party platform sought to reaffirm the 1965 Immigration Act which called for non-discrimination against national origins, to increase visas for immigrants with special talents, and called for the reunification of families. Additionally, the party's platform aimed to end the illegal entry of aliens into the U.S., but firmly supported the right of people to emigrate from any country through the legal channels—they positioned themselves as the party of law and order (Republican Party Platforms 1972). During the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the Republican Party expanded its efforts on immigration to enact legislation that prevented employers from knowingly hiring illegal immigrants and also restrict illegal immigrants from receiving welfare and other public benefits (Ford 1974; Republican Party Platforms 1972; 1976). The Democratic Party platform in the 1970s only mentioned immigration when it came to support for laws that

facilitated acquisition of citizenship by Resident Aliens (Democratic Party Platforms 1976). However, by the 1980s, the Democratic Party stressed respectful treatment of all illegal immigrants while they were being prosecuted under the law; they also stressed that they would oppose any legislation that would allow migrant workers into the U.S. that would result in a reinstatement of the past Bracero program or that would cause citizen wages to be cut (Democratic Party Platforms 1980).

By the early-1980s, the country saw a new era of conservativism that promoted immigration and temporary worker programs (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Tichenor 2002) mainly from those in Canada and Mexico. Congress considered immigration policies going forward that protected American citizens while still keeping the doors open for those seeking refuge and new lives in the U.S. These changes were very important because politicians pay attention to party platforms and generally follow them. Therefore, as the partisan platforms began to evolve on immigration, so did policy changes on immigration. By the time midterm elections came around, both chambers of Congress had been working tirelessly on creating a comprehensive immigration bill (what would become IRCA in 1986), and President Reagan recognized that the U.S. had essentially lost control of its borders. While the GOP believed that immigrants who made positive contributions and accepted American values should be admitted to the country and also believed in family reunification, there was a greater issue at hand for those who wished to enter to comply with current immigration laws (Republican Party Platforms 1984; 1988). Republicans stressed that if these laws were not strictly enforced it would not only be unjust to those from other countries waiting for legal entry, but it would also contribute more economic pressure on a country facing a refugee problem beyond its

capacity to handle. Conversely, the Democratic Party Platform wanted to combat the economic instability the country was in by encouraging economic development programs in other countries in order to ease the migration of these economic refugees into the U.S. (Democratic Party Platforms 1984; 1988). Finally, the Democratic Party was also concerned about efforts made to eradicate employment based discrimination, especially with the influx of immigrants and economic refugees.

The most important legislative breakthrough regarding immigration during this time was the signing of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA; previously discussed). Championed for several years by Sen. Alan Simpson (R-WY) and Rep. (enter first name) Mazzoli (D-KY), this bipartisan bill created stricter penalties on employers who knowingly hired illegal immigrants, gave legal status to certain seasonal agricultural workers who were in the country working illegally, and gave legal status to those who were undocumented who had been in the country prior to 1982 under the conditions that they would pay certain fines and back taxes. This bill took principles from both party platforms, providing a pathway to gain legal status for certain workers to protect certain states from losing workers (in turn helping the economy), while making it harder for employers to knowingly hire illegal immigrants. The bill also enforced anti-discrimination employment practices against citizens or legal immigrants based on national origin (Reagan 1986).

From the late-1980s going into the early-1990s, the dynamic between the parties slowly began to turn; Republicans began to support more legislation that was sanctioning immigrants, especially concerning employers and border security but were still in favor of welcoming immigrants to legally come to the country to continue to support the

economy. The Democrats took the role of supporting more legislation that benefitted immigrants in the form of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination. This was the beginning of the parties creating the definitive line in the sand that we see today concerning immigration. With the changing economy, influx in immigrant populations, and the expanding welfare state, the congressional consensus on immigration began to vanish (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). The GOP promoted policies that strengthened and increased Border Patrol to combat the growing problem of illegal immigrants, promoted harsher penalties on those who smuggled in illegal aliens, and to reduce incentives to enter the U.S. by promoting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to create more economic opportunities in Mexico (Republican Party Platforms 1992; 1996). The Democrats supported immigration policies that promoted non-discrimination, family reunification, protection for constitutional freedoms of speech, association, and travel, stopping illegal immigration, and advocating for increased criminal and civil penalties against employers who knowingly hired illegal workers (Democratic Party Platforms 1992; 1996). Furthermore, the Democratic Party was opposed to providing welfare benefits to illegal immigrants and family members and believed that sponsors should be fully responsible for immigrants who have come to the country legally both financially and legally (Democratic Party Platforms 1996).

At the turn of the century, the attack on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 created large uproar from Americans that included cries for more security around the borders, and consequently put a larger target on Arab and Muslim populations. In response, the Homeland Security Act was signed into law the following year and in 2003 the DHS began operations which included stricter enforcement policies especially at the

border[21]. The Republican and Democratic Party platforms of the 2000s were generally the same as the 1996 platforms. Republicans acknowledged that the country reaped the benefits of attracting immigrants in STEM programs who had enhanced the economy and enriched the American culture but argued that the borders still lacked the security measures needed to ease the exploitation of smuggled immigrants. They valued the family reunification system and felt that it should be the cornerstone of the legal system. They believed in balance of the immigration system that consisted of strong enforcement of the law while treating immigrants and their families fairly. The Democratic Party recognized that the immigration system at the time was failing to control illegal immigration and it was beginning to have adverse impacts on state and local services (Democratic Party Platforms 2000; 2004). They still advocated for harsher punishments for those engaged in employer practices that exploited undocumented workers, to increase safeguards to protect those workers while rejecting calls for guest worker programs that would end up being exploited by some employers. Finally, they supported restoration in due process protections for immigrants so they would no longer be deported for minor offenses and in equitable asylum policies (Democratic Party Platforms 2000).

Finally, and more and more recently, there has been another sense of urgency to create comprehensive immigration reform. The Democratic Party emphasized that immigrants could not continue to come into the country undocumented and there needed to be more secure borders with additional personnel, infrastructure, and technology at all ports of entry. The legal immigration system needed to be made more accessible to those

[21] See https://www.ice.gov/features/history

coming in legally, families needed to be kept together, and the number of immigrant work visas for family members of those living in the U.S. should be increased (Democratic Party Platform 2008; 2016). They supported a system that required undocumented immigrants who had not committed any other criminal acts to pay taxes and assimilate to American culture by learning English and starting the process to become legal (Democratic Party Platforms 2008). Finally, at the crux of the party's platform on this issue was still to fight discrimination against immigrants and to continue to fight for immigration reform that defended DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) recipients as well as DREAMers to avoid deportation (Democratic Party Platforms 2016).

Like past stances on this issue, the Republican Party focused on national security and a "strong immigration system without sacrificing the rule of law" (Republican Party Platforms 2008; 2016). For Republicans, border security was essential to combat terrorism, drug cartels, and gang violence—all of which they contributed to the reason millions of undocumented immigrants came into the country and stayed here. They called for a need for more effective enforcement of the law at the borders and in the workplace, which meant using the E-Verify system, denying federal funds for self-described sanctuary cities, and opposing amnesty (Republican Party Platforms 2008; 2016). On the other hand, the party acknowledged that the government needed to do more to foster the integration of legal immigrants, including helping them learn English. Lastly, Republicans accepted refugees fleeing troubled and war-torn nations, but opposed granting refugee status for non-political factors (Republican Party Platforms 2008).

Theory and Hypotheses

The main research questions I examine in this paper are: Does party explain the likelihood of sponsoring/ cosponsoring bills that seek benefits for immigrants versus sanctioning them? And, are members of the same party more likely to come together to cosponsor bills that sanction or benefit immigrants? Given the importance of relationships between members and the incentives for members to cosponsor with each other to advance electoral goals (Clark and Caro 2013; Fenno 1973; Fowler 2006a; 2006b; Koger 2003; Krutz 2001), I argue that members also have incentives to cosponsor particular types of immigration legislation (Talbert and Potoski 2002). As immigration has grown more salient over time, each party has taken a clear stance on the issue. Republicans tend to promote more restrictive policies when it comes to immigrants (Gimpel and Edwards 1999), particularly with border patrol and verification systems concerning employment. Democrats, on the other hand, have taken the less restrictive position and have promoted more comprehensive reforms for immigrants. We also know from Koger (2003) that MCs can invest a great deal of time and effort in petitioning other MCs to sign onto their bills. Grimmer (2013) also adds that MCs might also be looking for opportunities to express their polarized positions; therefore, cosponsoring a particular type of bill could be an easy vehicle to show support for their party's position and send a signal to constituents. If we consider these assumptions, then when a sponsor wants to take a clear partisan approach to immigration, the makeup of their cosponsors may play a larger role (Belco et al. 2016). Sponsors and other cosponsors might put more effort into reaching out to their colleagues who are members of their own party, or who share similar views.

There are also electoral incentives outside of trying to reinforce party platforms and the goals of party leaders—the primary goal of an MC is to appease their constituents. During elections, candidates do not only use partisanship as the driving factor of their campaign, but they also have to rely on how they would alleviate some of the biggest problems constituents feel the country is facing (Fetzer 2006; Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Gonzalez and Kamdar 2000). These issues of concern shape the electoral environment during elections and have led the Republican and Democratic Parties to claim "ownership" of particular issues (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003). Republicans generally have an advantage when public concern over economic issues such as taxes and spending, foreign affairs, government regulation, and crime is high on the agenda. Democrats usually have an edge over Republicans when issues concerning social welfare, education, healthcare, and civil rights are salient (Petrocik 1996). Furthermore, symbolic politics theories propose that political attitudes and behavior are in part due to broader attitudes like partisanship and ideology learned during the socialization process, which can affect attitudes towards immigration. Hood and Morris (1997; 1998) find in their studies that individuals who identify as liberals are more likely to favor non-restrictive levels of immigration and those with a conservative standpoint are more likely to possess favor more restrictive immigration policies. Furthermore, according to the issue ownership theory, voters are able to use party as a heuristic to elect the candidate who they believe is the most competent to handle the issues they feel are most important (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). Bélanger and Meguid (2008) argue that the party ownership of specific issues are important for vote choice, but is only effective if the issue is salient to the voter at the time of election.

Given the consistent party platforms since the late-1980s, and previous studies that found liberals to be more in opposition to restrictive immigration policies and conservatives to be in favor of more restrictive policies, I expect when there are immigration bills calling for more enforcements or sanctions on immigrants such as law enforcement, border security, and implementing employment verification systems, for example, there will be a higher likelihood of Republicans joining together to support those bills. The same expectations for bills that provide benefits for immigrants also hold (e.g. healthcare for illegal immigrants, extending visas, and rejecting guest worker exploitation), where I expect Democratic members to join together to support those pieces of legislation.

> ***Hypothesis 1*****:** *Republicans (Democrats) are more likely to form ties with other Republicans (Democrat) on enforcement (benefit) bills.*

While Republicans and Democrats have not always had such extreme views on this issue, polarization has continued to play a role in creating a larger precipice between the partisan aisles. Since the late-1980s when the parties created a definitive stance on the types of immigration legislation they would support, MCs have been less inclined to work across the table on these bills (see Chapter 1). Since these relationships tend to be more copartisan, particularly in the House, I expect that as polarization continues to increase (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997; 2009) the likelihood of Republicans and Democrats forming ties with members of their own party should also increase given the types of immigration policy introduced.

Hypothesis 2: *Given increasing polarization between the parties, the likelihood of Republicans (Democrats) forming ties with their copartisans should increase over time.*

Data and Methods

To examine these hypotheses, I rely on an original dataset of all immigration bills and resolutions[22] introduced (3,533 bills and resolutions) from both chambers of Congress from the 93rd – 114th Congresses with 870 individual sponsors[23] and nearly 40,000 cosponsorship signatures[24]. These data were compiled from the Library of Congress website www.congress.gov, which contains information on bill introductions, sponsorship/cosponsorship, and bill histories. I collected all immigration bills and resolutions introduced in either the House or the Senate during the aforementioned congressional terms that Congress.gov classified as an "immigration" policy area. Resolutions that call for no legislative action (i.e., ceremonial in nature) were dropped from the dataset (e.g. 103rd Congress, S. Res. 121-A resolution to honor the work and life of Cesar Chavez) as well as appropriation bills.[25]

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[22] Note: private and ceremonial resolutions are excluded from the dataset. Only concurrent and joint resolutions are considered.

[23] Individual sponsor is defined by whether or not the MC has been a bill sponsor at least one time. Names are not counted multiple times.

[24] Total number of cosponsorship signatures is defined by the total number of signatures on all bills from the 93rd Congress to the 114th Congress. MCs can be counted multiple times.

[25] Appropriations bills are not explicit to immigration and tend to be more omnibus bills with a very broad focus. It is harder to pin down voting and cosponsorship with these types of bills.

Because the issue of immigration can be approached in a variety of different manners, I and a team of researchers read each bill and coded the bill as either seeking to provide some benefit to immigrants (i.e., "benefit") or aimed at enforcing against immigrants (i.e., "enforcement")[26]. Benefit bills are defined as legislation that provides regulations or policies intended to improve social, economic, and/or legal status of documented or undocumented immigrants.[27] For example, in 1995 House Bill 2318 was introduced by Representative William Lipinski (D-IL) proposing to provide additional diversity immigrant visas for certain natives of Poland.[28] Enforcement bills are defined as legislation that provides regulations or policies intended to inflict limitations or restrictions on immigrants' status in society.[29] For example, in 2013 Senator David Vitter (R-LA) introduced Senate Bill 302- The Voter Integrity Protection Act. This Act would make a vote casted in a federal election by an alien who is unlawfully in the U.S. an aggravated felony and a deportable offense.[30] These bills are measured as dichotomous variables coded 1 if the bill was an enforcement or benefit and 0 if not. Additionally, there were a few bills in the data that were both an enforcement and benefit for immigrants. Often these bills had multiple parts where some sections provided some benefits while others imposed sanctions. For example, S.1200 "The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986" introduced in the 99th Congress allowed for status adjustment

[26] I and a team of two other researchers read each bill and coded them individually. We then compared the coding and at least 90% of the cases matched.

[27] Belco and Clark 2015

[28] Library of Congress (www.congress.gov)

[29] Belco and Clark 2015

[30] Library of Congress (www.congress.gov)

for "specified aliens who entered legally as nonimmigrants but whose period of authorized stay ended before January 1, 1982", and made it "unfair immigration-related employment practice for an employer of three or more persons to discriminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien) with respect to hiring". On the other hand, the bill called for stricter enforcement of current laws, set forth newer numerical limitations on certain admission, prohibits legalization of persons, and makes it "unlawful for a person to hire…any alien knowing that such person is unauthorized to work" or without verifying work status. In cases such as this, the bill was coded as a "dual" bill (1=yes; 0=no)

Of the 2,623 immigration bills introduced in the House, about 60.3% (1,582 bills) of those bills provided some sort of benefit for immigrants. The remaining bills imposed restrictions on immigrants (1,016 bills) or were classified in both categories (25 dual bills) as an enforcement and benefit bill. Similarly, of the 910 bills introduced in the Senate about 66.4% (604 bills) of the bills introduced were benefit bills while about 32.6% (297) of the bills were enforcements, and only 9 bills were double coded. The opposite occurred, however, when we look at the average number of cosponsors that signed onto these bills.[31] There were a total of 39,539 cosponsor signatures on all bills: 35,360 in the House and 4,182 in the Senate. The average number of cosponsors that publicly signed onto a House immigration bill was 21, while in the Senate the average number of cosponsors was 7. This makes sense due to the size of the House compared to the size of the Senate—House bills are expected to yield more cosponsors per bill than Senate bills.

[31] The bills that were considered were those which had at least 1 cosponsor.

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Bill Cosponsor Networks from the 93rd to the 114th Congresses

	Total Bills	Total Individual Sponsors	Mean bills sponsored by MCs	Total Individual Cosponsors	Total Cosponsor Signatures on All Bills	Mean bills cosponsored by MCs	Mean cosponsors per bill	Bills not cosponsored
House	**2,623**	**684**	**3.83**	**1,661**	**35,359**	**1.58**	**20.80**	**923**
Enforcement Bills	1,016	381	2.67	1452	14,280	0.70	20.67	325
Benefit Bills	1,582	470	3.37	1489	20,822	1.06	20.82	582
Dual Bills	25	18	1.39	255	257	0.10	28.56	16
Senate	**910**	**189**	**4.81**	**316**	**4,180**	**2.88**	**6.70**	**286**
Enforcement Bills	298	98	3.04	245	1052	1.22	5.34	101
Benefit Bills	603	153	3.94	280	3112	2.15	7.37	181
Dual Bills	9	6	1.50	16	16	0.56	3.20	4
Total	**3,533**	**859**	**4.11**	**1,883**	**39,539**	**1.88**	**17.01**	**1,209**

Note: the word "bills" is used to indicate immigration bills or resolutions introduced in the House and Senate. While there are a combined 535 seats in Congress, there are more than 535 MCs included in this dataset. I have included those who were elected in special elections during the term as well as accounted for those who switch chambers. Additionally, while members from the island territories and D.C. do not have a vote on the floor, they can sponsor and cosponsor legislation, and have been included in the dataset. Individual sponsors/ cosponsors are only counted once for the totals; however, if they served in both chambers they were included once for each chamber. Individual sponsors were counted once for each category of enforcement, benefit, and dual bills; therefore, the sum of the categories will not always be equal to the sum of the total individual sponsors for each chamber.

Figure 2.1: The Cosponsorship Networks of Enforcement Legislation by Party and Chamber





Figures 2.1and 2.2 show the graphical representation of cosponsorship networks on all legislation from 1973 to 2016 that were enforcements against immigrants and benefits for immigrants, respectively. Each chamber is labeled above their respective networks. There are a few things that we can tell from these graphs. First, we can visually see party polarization on this issue as well as an increase in cosponsors and their networks over time. These patterns are similar to the timelines of polarization in general, especially since the early-1990s. One very interesting finding is the amount of Democrats who are cosponsoring enforcement bills and Republicans cosponsoring benefit bills. I have hypothesized that members were more likely to cosponsor legislation with members of their own party, specifically that Democrats would be more likely to cosponsor on bills that provide benefits to immigrants opposed to those that provide sanctions/ enforcements. However, if we were just relying on these graphical representations of these networks, those prior suppositions do not necessarily hold. Some congressional terms have sparse networks (e.g. the 93rd, 94th, 95th, and 100th Congresses). This is due to the low number of enforcement bills introduced during those terms and the same MCs sponsoring and cosponsoring those few pieces of legislation. For example, during the 95th Congress, there were a total of 77 enforcement bills introduced and only 11 were Senate bills.

Figure 2.2: The Cosponsorship Networks of Benefit Legislation by Party and Chamber





Exponential Random Graph Model: Examining the Factors that Shape Collaboration on the Subtypes of Immigration Bills

Dependent Variable

Like Chapter 1, the analysis will derive an affiliation matrix of members by the immigration bill's sponsor and cosponsor which will constitute the dependent variable. From this network, a matrix will be created of a legislator by legislator network (House by House; Senate by Senate). The affiliation matrix shows the number of times each legislator cosponsors an immigration bill with the other legislator, and the diagonal represent the number of bills each legislator has cosponsored. Every legislator is considered, not just those who have cosponsored a bill at least one time.

Independent and Control Variables

The primary independent variable considered is *party affiliation* of each MC, the same in Chapter 1. Party affiliation is treated as dichotomous variable (0= Democrat; 1=Republican) and those who were Independent/ Third Party members were given the code that corresponded to the party they caucused with. There were a total 8 MCs that were either elected as Independents or switched from Democrat or Republican during

their tenure of office; however, Sen. Dean Barkley (I-MN) did not caucus with either party and only served as an appointed member for two months. He did not sponsor or cosponsor any of the bills in this study; therefore, there was no need to give him a separate code. Six of the remaining MCs caucused with the Democrats and Rep. Virgil Goode (VA-5) briefly switched from Democrat to Independent during the 106th Congress and caucused with the Republicans until he fully switched the next term to a member of the Republican Party.

The second variable of importance is examining the *ideology* scores of each MC which are based on competitive roll-call votes (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). DW-NOMINATE scores from both the first and second dimensions were considered. Finally, I control for other individual characteristics of members such as whether or not they held leadership roles, were in a competitive election, whether or not they were a freshman in the chamber. Given previous research that has shown these variables are important I include them here. Additionally, I controlled for regional differences (border state with Mexico) with the expectation that members from border states will be more likely to form ties with one another, gender, and seniority.[32] Since women generally emphasize more cooperation and coalition building (Evans 2016; Evans and Clark 2016; Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal 1998; Rouse, Swers, and Parrott 2013; Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013) and are more likely to sponsor and or cosponsor bills pertaining to social welfare policies (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Osbourn 2012; Reingold 2000; Rosenthal 1998; Wolbrecht 2000), I expect female MCs to form relationships with each other on bills that provide benefits for immigrants. When it comes to seniority, more senior members may be less

[32] For additional information on the coding of the control variables, see Codebook in the Appendix.

inclined to cosponsor bills in order to protect his/ her reputation; more senior members often hold positions of influence as committee chairs or leaders (Campbell 1982). I would expect that the more senior a member is, the less likely a tie will occur.

I expect that the role of partisanship on the issue of immigration will differ across the House and Senate, and therefore, I examine both chambers. A cross-institutional analysis affords several benefits for uncovering how institutional and electoral features may shape how members join together on immigration legislation. For instance, the number of constituents generally represented by Senators and Representative is substantially different (except states and territories with at-large House members). Senators by default typically represent more constituents because they represent an entire state than those who serve in the House who represent districts within a state, with the exception of those Representatives who are members at-large. Senators are more likely to represent a more heterogeneous group than a Representative because they represent the entire states rather than districts. Having a more homogeneous district, however, could alter the number and type of immigration legislation a legislator initiates and cosponsors. For instance, in a state that is considered mostly conservative, there are some districts within the state that might contain constituents that are very liberal; hence, a legislator may have a higher likelihood to cosponsor or form ties with legislators that support more benefit for immigrants than restrictions. This information is gathered from the U.S. House and Senate websites.

The Model

In order to test these theories of relationships on the subtopics of immigration policy, I am using the same Exponential-family Random Graph Model (ERGM) as I did in Chapter 1 which uses the Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation (MCMCMLE).

$$P(Y_{ij}|X) = \exp \frac{[\theta^{\tau} g(yij,\ X)]}{k(\theta)}$$

The model explains the probability of observing a connection between a pair of MC's [*i*,*j*][*i*,*j*] while accounting for legislator characteristics, or dependencies in the data such as partisanship, seniority, and gender, for example (Calvero and Leiras 2012; Cranmer, Leifeld, McClurg, and Rolfe 2017; Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, and Morris 2010; Robins, Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher 2007). The random graph indicates that the base model is randomly generated using a matrix including covariates and can improve what I randomly get—again trying to explain the ties of legislators as a function of member characteristics. For each MC pair *i* and *j*, the random variable *yij* is 1 if they are connected and a 0 if they are not. X is an affiliation matrix of MCs (nodes) and the connections (edges) in the network: $g(Y_{ij}X)$ is a vector of network statistics, Θ is a vector of coefficients, and $k(\Theta)$ is the constant. This type of analysis is similar but different from a standard logit and OLS model because there is a relational matrix and I want to know the likelihood of having ties (see Chapter 1).

The Monte Carlo approach is a *simulation* of a distribution of random graphs that have parameter values that are set at the beginning. From there, the observed graph is

compared to the distribution of graphs and the parameter values are refined. This process repeats itself until the parameter estimates stabilize (Strauss 1986; Geyer 1991; Snijders, 2002; Robins, Pattison, and Woolcock 2005; Hunter and Handcock 2006; Robins; Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher 2006). In other words, this particular method is a type of risk analysis that takes into account decision making and simulates the possibilities of all the decision probabilities that could be made (see Chapter 1). The results from this analysis depict what can happen with each decisions and the likelihood of each outcome possibility. Before running the models, bills were first separated into enforcement and benefit categories[33]. From there I further separated the bills by chamber yielding four different tables—two for the House and two for the Senate.

Results

Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 present the results of the statistical models. Tables 2.2 and 2.4 represent the networks of the House on enforcement and benefit legislation, respectively. Tables 2.3 and 2.5 represent the networks of the Senate enforcement and benefit bills, respectively. In terms of members of the same party forming relationships with one another as opposed to forming ties across party lines, the results are mixed. In the House, members were more likely to form ties with one another in 64% of the models for enforcement bills (i.e. there were only 8 terms that one or both parties were less likely to form ties with someone in the same party opposed to a bipartisan tie). For the eight terms that there was a bipartisan tie formed Republicans and Democrats were equally

[33] Bills that were double coded were used in both enforcement and benefit models. Bills that were missing data such as DW-NOMINATE scores were dropped by the statistical program R from the dataset.

likely to form a tie with the opposing party with four terms a piece. Moreover, for benefit bill models, members were more likely to form ties with the opposing party 82% of the time (18 terms had one or both parties more likely to form a bipartisan tie). Of the 18 terms where a bipartisan tie was more likely, it was the Democrats who were less likely to form a tie with one another compared to the bipartisan tie. Republican were always more likely to cosponsor together than to reach over party lines.

The overall results for the Senate were much different than those of the House models when it came to enforcement bills. This is in a similar vein to the findings of Casellas and Leal (2013) who examined how partisanship, constituencies, and legislator's characteristics affected congressional voting during the 109th and 110th Congresses. They found that there were several differences in the voting patterns in each chamber. There were 18 terms (82% of all terms) where a tie between a Republican and Democrat was more likely to happen than a Republican-Republican (R-R) or Democrat-Democrat (D-D) tie. The D-D tie was less likely to occur compared to a Republican-Democrat tie in 9 terms, while the R-R tie was less likely to occur compared to the bipartisan tie in 10 terms when it came to enforcement legislation. Likewise, there were 20 out of 22 terms (91%) in the dataset where the bipartisan tie was more likely to occur than either the D-D or R-R tie for benefit bills. Similar to the House, all but one of the ties that that were less likely to occur than the R-D tie was Democrats. The only term that an R-R tie was less likely to occur than the bipartisan tie was during the 110th Congress. An important note, however, is that there were fewer bills introduced by Senators (see Table 1.1) which means that during some terms the likelihood of seeing ties between members of the same party were so small and yielded a result of negative infinity ("-INF"). While these

numbers are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, the results are essentially null.

Overall the results lend mixed support for the first hypothesis. While there is a large number of the terms that have one party that was less likely to form ties than having a bipartisan tie, there were only a few times across the entire dataset that the D-D and R-R options were both less likely to see ties formed among the same party than the R-D counterparts. This means that one or both parties were still likely to form ties with one another; however, for all bills in both chambers we saw R-R and D-D ties to be more likely to occur than the R-D at the same time.

My second hypothesis also bore mixed results though there was less support in general. Surprisingly, the opposite of what was predicted occurred. Overall, when it came to support for legislation that issued sanctions/ enforcements to immigrants, it was Democrats that were more likely to form ties with one another than Republicans in both chambers. The odds that a D-D tie was more likely to occur compared to an R-D tie on for enforcement legislation in the House ranged from 4.5% (93rd Congress) to 30,656.9% (113th Congress), all else equal. While these likelihoods have ebbed and flowed throughout the course of this time period (i.e. this was not just a continuous increase over time), it generally shows that partisanship is getting more intense over time for immigration policy. One reason for this could be that the incentives have changed for a member to form a relationship with one another. Instead of MCs being penalized for being highly partisan, they are rewarded for it, and in turn likely penalized for reaching across party lines. Referring back to Figure 2, these partisan trends are nicely depicted where we can see the dense partisan clustering in more recent terms. The D-D tie was

more likely to occur than an R-R tie in 12 out of 22 terms, all statistically significant. In the Senate, I saw similar results as to the number of times a D-D tie was more likely to occur than an R-R tie for 11 terms. The odds of a D-D tie more likely to occur compared to the bipartisan counterpart ranged from 84.5% (108th Congress) to 2,926.8% (111th Congress), all else equal. For Republicans, the likelihood of a Republican cosponsoring with another Republican on enforcement legislation rather than a Republican and Democrat cosponsorship pair ranges from 4.8% (104th Congress) to19.4 octillion % (94th Congress) in the Senate, at means. In the House, the odds of the R-R cosponsorship tie occurring versus the R-D tie ranges from 7.1% (96th Congress) to 3,315.4% (100th Congress), all else equal.

The results were the opposite for cosponsorship ties on bills that provided benefits to immigrants. Republicans were overall more likely to form ties with one another on these bills than Democrats. The chance that an R-R cosponsorship tie would occur was greater than the chances of an R-D relationship in the House for every congressional term in the dataset, all reaching conventional levels of statistical significance. The D-D tie was only more likely to occur than the R-D tie twice—in the 113th and 114th Congresses. During these two terms, it was the only time that the D-D tie was more likely to occur than the R-R tie, ranging from 239.4% (114th Congress) to 1,813.2% (113th Congress), at means. The odds of seeing a Republican-Republican tie more likely to occur than the R-D tie ranged from 61.4% (113th Congress) to 2,948.8% (112th Congress), all else equal. There were similar results were similar for Republicans in the Senate. Republicans were more likely to cosponsor with each other in 21 out of the 22 terms.[34] Like the House,

[34] All but one of the 21 terms reached statistical significance.

there was only two terms where Democrats were more likely to form ties with each other than Republicans were more likely to form ties with each other; the 106th Congress and the 114th Congress.

The second variable of importance was ideology. Using Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) DW-NOMINATE scores for the first dimension the models show a consistent, significant effect of ideology on the odds of members forming ties on immigration legislation. Members tend to cosponsor immigration bills with those of like-minded ideology. All of these scores reached conventional levels of statistical significance at the 99.9% confidence level. Conversely, as a representative's DW-NOMINATE score increased the odds of a tie forming between representatives increased in 18 of the 22 terms[35] on bills that were enforcements towards immigrants. Substantively this indicates that as House members become more conservative, the likelihood of cosponsorship ties generally increases on bills that sanction and decrease on bills providing benefits in the House. The results were almost identical in the Senate. The main differences between the two chambers was that one term had increased odds as a senator's DW-NOMINATE score increased that a cosponsorship tie would occur for benefit bills. There were also four terms that had decreased odds of a tie forming a tie among senators as well. Again, this means that as members of the Senate become more polarized the likelihood of a tie forming increases for enforcement legislation and decreases for bills benefitting immigrants, all else equal.

[35] All but one term of the 18 terms, the 106th Congress, reached statistical significance. The four terms where an increase in DW-NOMINATE scores led to a decrease in odds of a tie forming were the 94th-95th Congresses and the 99th-100th Congresses

Turning to my other control variables, being in a leadership position (party leader and/ or committee chair/ ranking member) had no significant impact of determining who would be more likely to cosponsor with one another. More often, randomly getting a tie between two MCs that had leadership roles was less likely to occur than a tie between to non-leader members for all bills in both chambers.[36] Females were generally more likely to form ties with one another compared to males forming ties with one another for bills that provide benefits, and were only more likely to form ties with each other compared to a male-male tie in about a third of the terms for enforcement bills. This follows along with the work of Volden, Wiseman, and Wittman (2013) who found support that minority party women in the House of Representatives tended to be more policy oriented and worked harder at building coalitions.[37] Because there were comparatively fewer women who served in the Senate than men, the odds of women forming ties with each other at higher rates than ties of men was relatively low for all Senate immigration bills introduced. In many of the terms, there were not enough women serving and the models produced coefficients that were negative infinity. During terms where the predicted ties had higher odds of occurring between two women than two men the coefficients failed to reach statistical significance. However, like the results in the House, women were more likely to form ties with each other versus men forming ties with each other for benefit bills.

Seniority—the number of terms served—had little effect on the increased likelihood of cosponsor relationships forming between MCs overall. This is what I

[36] There were some terms were a tie between to members in leadership positions were more likely to randomly occur than ties between two members not in leadership; however, overall it did not happen often.
[37] The authors also found that as parties became more polarized, women in the majority tended to be less effective.

expected. More senior members of the Senate had more impact than those in the House, though in the terms where the odds were increased, the variable failed to reach statistical significance. Additionally, being in a competitive election had little statistical effect on the models in either chamber. While those in competitive elections were statistically more likely to form ties with one another compared to those in non-competitive elections in less than a third of the terms for House benefit bills, the results for enforcement bills in the House as well as all bills in the Senate did not fare well for this category.

The likelihood of getting a freshman-freshman (F-F) tie or freshman-non-freshman (F-NF) tie occurring at a higher rate than non-freshman ties was slim. For all bills in the House, the increased likelihood (of those reaching statistical significance) of seeing an F-F pair and N-F pair compared to two non-freshman members occurred in less than a quarter of the terms. Similarly, in the Senate the results were only slightly better for F-F or F-NF ties. For benefit bills about a third of the terms saw increased odds of seeing freshman forming more ties than non-freshman and less than a quarter of the terms for enforcement bills. Finally, members from border states were significantly more likely to form ties with one another compared to their members from states that do not border Mexico in the House. As the number of people in the network increases, the odds of getting a tie between two people from Arizona, California, New Mexico, or Texas or a member from these border states and a person from a non-border state overall increases compared to their non-border state counterparts, all else equal.

Table 2.2: House Enforcement Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	2.023084***	-0.001604	-0.144002**	0.417215***	0.724109***	0.404075***	0.043965	-1.188633***
		(0.769829)	(0.100576)	(0.05998)	(0.03635)	(0.05243)	(0.07976)	(0.03366)	(0.08474)
		[7.561611]	[0.99839762]	[0.86588566]	[1.5177292]	[2.06289133]	[1.49791612]	[1.0449463]	[0.30463753]
	Republican/ Republican	-3.086268***	0.426848***	0.786622***	0.06816**	-0.649388***	-0.239888***	0.288862***	3.530879***
		(1.153271)	(0.130845)	(0.06753)	(0.03305)	(0.04611)	(0.07782)	(0.04609)	(0.164372)
		[0.04567208]	[1.53241927]	[2.19596571]	[1.0705363]	[0.52236526]	[0.7867159]	[1.3349072]	[34.153991454]
GENDER	Female/ Female	-INF***	1.430808***	-1.09542	0.045188	-0.410396	-INF***	-0.224805	-1.185218***
		(0)	(0.367351)	(0.713)	(0.37566)	(0.58453)	(0)	(0.23314)	(0.454681)
		[0]	[4.1820756]	[0.33439928]	[1.0462244]	[0.66338756]	[0]	[0.798672]	[0.305679534]
	Female/ Male	-INF***	0.588692***	-0.193807***	0.067119	0.065336	-0.776818***	-0.070522**	-0.495721***
		(0)	(0.094609)	(0.0752)	(0.04748)	(0.06377)	(0.1311)	(0.03547)	(0.071173)
		[0]	[1.8016298]	[0.82381725]	[1.0694231]	[1.06751809]	[0.459867]	[0.9319071]	[0.609131306]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-0.767855***	-0.118605	-0.71695***	-1.24182***	0.645301***	-1.274767***	-0.17446
		(0)	(0.18281)	(0.11407)	(0.06603)	(0.13103)	(0.14407)	(0.20272)	(0.217581)
		[0]	[0.46400753]	[0.8881588]	[0.488239]	[0.28885812]	[1.90656137]	[0.2794961]	[0.839910482]
	Yes/ No	-0.009673	-0.283252***	-0.061097	-0.418885***	-1.083041***	0.345143***	-0.722062***	-0.038772
		(0.666346)	(0.081693)	(0.04816)	(0.02873)	(0.04853)	(0.06185)	(0.03588)	(0.060337)
		[0.9903732]	[0.75332998]	[0.94073164]	[0.65778]	[0.33856433]	[1.41219158]	[0.4857497]	[0.961970402]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.212507**	-0.050264***	-0.090998***	-0.093719***	0.017049***	0.002143	-0.017169***	-0.02993***
		(0.102982)	(0.008716)	(0.00592)	(0.0037)	(0.00411)	(0.00759)	(0.00232)	(0.004418)
		[0.8085543]	[0.95097814]	[0.91301973]	[0.9105385]	[1.01719542]	[1.0021448]	[0.9829771]	[0.970513114]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	3.885855***	-0.586557***	-0.168678**	2.621236***	2.690239***	1.686206***	-1.476555***	-6.583699***
		(0.916966)	(0.13808)	(0.08093)	(0.04322)	(0.05568)	(0.08934)	(0.04477)	(0.111172)
		[48.70858]	[0.55623889]	[0.84478119]	[13.7527169]	[14.73519728]	[5.39895728]	[0.2284232]	[0.001382725]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	0.210949	-0.101172	-0.859233***	-0.399316*	-2.366323***	-0.488999**	-0.328397
		(0)	(0.342038)	(0.22593)	(0.18568)	(0.23058)	(0.71056)	(0.2142)	(0.613715)
		[0]	[1.23484912]	[0.90377779]	[0.423487]	[0.67077846]	[0.09382505]	[0.6132397]	[0.720077197]
	Yes/ No	-INF***	0.323128***	-0.267308***	-0.360874***	-0.190239***	-0.99318***	-0.21184***	-0.055473
		(0)	(0.085469)	(0.05967)	(0.03631)	(0.05151)	(0.09275)	(0.03478)	(0.084387)
		[0]	[1.38144262]	[0.76543721]	[0.6970665]	[0.82676178]	[0.3703968]	[0.8090944]	[0.94603799]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	1.246523	-0.170246	0.31219***	1.366502***	0.50538***	-0.176987	1.102054***	1.129159***
		(1.075106)	(0.218077)	(0.11703)	(0.05493)	(0.07864)	(0.137)	(0.04491)	(0.08351)
		[3.478228]	[0.84345711]	[1.36641365]	[3.9216078]	[1.65761593]	[0.83779035]	[3.0103434]	[3.093053314]
	Yes/ No	0.325656	-0.045279	0.149094***	0.43662***	0.230319***	-0.09234*	0.516827***	0.472664***
		(0.628789)	(0.075235)	(0.04449)	(0.02538)	(0.03535)	(0.05552)	(0.02075)	(0.041627)
		[1.384938]	[0.95573089]	[1.16078261]	[1.5474684]	[1.25900114]	[0.91179516]	[1.6766984]	[1.604261978]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-1.329475*	-1.300301***	-0.747232***	-0.04103	-0.103341	0.153557	-2.138715***
		(0)	(0.713055)	(0.50395)	(0.1941)	(0.15583)	(0.28851)	(0.0951)	(0.417117)
		[0]	[0.26461617]	[0.27244971]	[0.4736758]	[0.95980038]	[0.90181958]	[1.1659737]	[0.117806092]
	Yes/ No	-INF***	-0.321094***	-0.472039***	-0.257977***	0.073117	0.067223	0.091921***	-1.015467***
		(0)	(0.108991)	(0.07573)	(0.03996)	(0.04664)	(0.08097)	(0.02895)	(0.067872)
		[0]	[0.7253553]	[0.62372932]	[0.7726134]	[1.0758567]	[1.06953381]	[1.0962783]	[0.362233245]
CONSTANT		-6.986475***	-4.337335***	-2.824736***	-1.393415***	-3.216688***	-4.066938***	-2.140848***	-5.532146***
		(1.014642)	(0.110476)	(0.0615)	(0.03678)	(0.0493)	(0.08438)	(0.02906)	(0.080958)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.2: House Enforcement Bills Continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-0.285428**	0.846958***	0.938861***	0.920552***	0.752314***	0.387441***	0.905947***
		(0.11793)	(0.11002)	(0.04141)	(0.06496)	(0.06706)	(0.04513)	(0.09843)
		[0.75169251]	[2.33254122]	[2.5570682]	[2.51067539]	[2.12190413]	[1.4732061]	[2.47427323]
	Republican/ Republican	1.052731***	0.268011***	0.537496***	-0.269802***	0.802733***	0.31058***	0.586523***
		(0.07727)	(0.06741)	(0.03582)	(0.04537)	(0.06256)	(0.04483)	(0.07958)
		[2.86546656]	[1.30736141]	[1.711715]	[0.76353101]	[2.23163221]	[1.3642158]	[1.79772731]
GENDER	Female/ Female	0.410224	-INF***	0.464097***	0.324924**	-1.121391***	-0.269357***	-0.128971
		(0.36568)	(0)	(0.10129)	(0.14738)	(0.18978)	(0.07566)	(0.17199)
		[1.50715602]	[0]	[1.5905765]	[1.38392532]	[0.32582622]	[0.7638704]	[0.8789997]
	Female/ Male	0.221251***	-0.643049***	0.166469***	0.167022***	-0.440189***	-0.131842***	-0.178379***
		(0.06937)	(0.09104)	(0.02577)	(0.03219)	(0.03964)	(0.02325)	(0.04595)
		[1.24763715]	[0.52568711]	[1.1811264]	[1.18177976]	[0.64391459]	[0.8764792]	[0.83662528]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-1.667185***	-0.667257***	-0.797905***	-1.453985***	-0.43542***	-0.419765***	0.363249***
		(0.28589)	(0.16414)	(0.04555)	(0.06398)	(0.10463)	(0.11616)	(0.11861)
		[0.18877768]	[0.51311414]	[0.4502714]	[0.23363731]	[0.64699299]	[0.6572013]	[1.43799389]
	Yes/ No	-0.769244***	-0.339443***	-0.397489***	-0.821738***	-0.305886***	-0.243247***	0.122842***
		(0.06716)	(0.05379)	(0.02283)	(0.0289)	(0.03621)	(0.02833)	(0.04244)
		[0.46336312]	[0.71216676]	[0.6720053]	[0.43966696]	[0.73647059]	[0.7840778]	[1.13070526]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.049971***	-0.033099***	-0.011384***	0.061414***	-0.002039	-0.01021***	-0.02509***
		(0.00676)	(0.00522)	(0.00241)	(0.0027)	(0.00361)	(0.00232)	(0.00424)
		[0.95125724]	[0.96744253]	[0.9886809]	[1.06333931]	[0.9979635]	[0.9898424]	[0.97522258]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	1.700294***	3.529088***	2.96582***	2.873801***	0.418532***	0.024484	1.4513***
		(0.09726)	(0.09072)	(0.04705)	(0.05266)	(0.06464)	(0.045)	(0.07805)
		[5.4755573]	[34.09287146]	[19.4106193]	[17.70418611]	[1.51972881]	[1.0247862]	[4.26866035]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	1.9052***	-0.082672	0.457633***	0.01542	-0.559949***	-0.674582**	0.097288
		(0.43004)	(0.23627)	(0.08511)	(0.14197)	(0.18683)	(0.31633)	(0.31345)
		[6.72074869]	[0.92065263]	[1.580329]	[1.01553932]	[0.57123829]	[0.5093694]	[1.10217742]
	Yes/ No	1.078473***	-0.006042	0.208848***	-0.043026	-0.31226***	-0.216963***	0.045516
		(0.07177)	(0.05584)	(0.02411)	(0.03308)	(0.04139)	(0.03933)	(0.05661)
		[2.94018733]	[0.99397643]	[1.2322574]	[0.9578863]	[0.73179106]	[0.80496]	[1.04656743]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	1.918045***	1.660586***	0.628232***	1.281967***	0.792549***	0.930953***	0.80555***
		(0.07638)	(0.07029)	(0.04449)	(0.04573)	(0.05343)	(0.03718)	(0.06857)
		[6.80763758]	[5.26239553]	[1.8742931]	[3.60372238]	[2.2090199]	[2.5369259]	[2.23792614]
	Yes/ No	0.767735***	0.590273***	0.092482***	0.576305***	0.198422***	0.215091***	0.025034
		(0.04691)	(0.04066)	(0.02064)	(0.02359)	(0.02905)	(0.01966)	(0.03612)
		[2.154879]	[1.80448122]	[1.0968929]	[1.77945057]	[1.21947709]	[1.2399745]	[1.02534993]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-1.228704***	-0.496798**	-0.523729***	-1.643515***	-0.781792***	-0.60866***	-0.88359***
		(0.42338)	(0.2165)	(0.10223)	(0.15163)	(0.18181)	(0.11989)	(0.26794)
		[0.29267174]	[0.60847591]	[0.5923078]	[0.19329949]	[0.45758514]	[0.5440793]	[0.41329652]
	Yes/ No	-0.402523***	-0.340024***	-0.336892***	-0.743621***	-0.382002***	-0.23681***	-0.273711***
		(0.07438)	(0.05827)	(0.02915)	(0.03471)	(0.04416)	(0.02972)	(0.05197)
		[0.66863105]	[0.71175293]	[0.7139857]	[0.47538956]	[0.68249336]	[0.7891415]	[0.7605521]
CONSTANT		-4.228586***	-4.273865***	-1.711492***	-3.686661***	-3.11897***	-1.805167***	-3.997005***
		(0.08459)	(0.07561)	(0.03293)	(0.04038)	(0.04766)	(0.03129)	(0.06329)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.2: House Enforcement Bills Continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	2.379011***	2.609803***	1.595284***	1.289699***	0.432105***	5.7287***	0.978811***
		(0.062587)	(0.05709)	(0.04896)	(0.049142)	(0.1158)	(0.06206)	(0.05371)
		[10.7942258]	[13.59636667]	[4.9297296]	[3.6316918]	[1.54049713]	[307.56916128]	[2.66129]
	Republican/ Republican	0.272113***	2.126359***	0.456842***	2.033448***	1.762782***	1.863031***	1.391581***
		(0.051997)	(0.05245)	(0.04552)	(0.048999)	(0.06553)	(0.06028)	(0.044)
		[1.31273541]	[8.38428281]	[1.5790794]	[7.6403845]	[5.8286302]	[6.44323702]	[4.0212039]
GENDER	Female/ Female	-0.28104*	0.484832***	-0.274384***	0.314447***	-0.551089***	0.683521***	-0.117714*
		(0.110998)	(0.06099)	(0.06146)	(0.05156)	(0.13019)	(0.07308)	(0.06223)
		[0.75499816]	[1.62390225]	[0.7600405]	[1.3695021]	[0.57632162]	[1.98084015]	[0.8889503]
	Female/ Male	-0.314543***	0.091221***	-0.207655***	-0.072418***	-0.244478***	0.067836**	-0.267135***
		(0.029877)	(0.02292)	(0.0206)	(0.021266)	(0.03143)	(0.02581)	(0.02184)
		[0.73012257]	[1.09551146]	[0.8124871]	[0.930142]	[0.78311358]	[1.07018929]	[0.7655696]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	0.28733***	-0.318715***	0.085008	-1.390239***	-0.5697***	-0.079087	0.478756***
		(0.079742)	(0.09587)	(0.05489)	(0.079999)	(0.0509)	(0.04165)	(0.05865)
		[1.33286338]	[0.72708302]	[1.0887261]	[0.2490158]	[0.56569495]	[0.92395942]	[1.6140655]
	Yes/ No	0.067021*	-0.215299***	-0.036056	-0.701082***	-0.423167***	-0.086754**	0.241926***
		(0.028408)	(0.02745)	(0.02244)	(0.025602)	(0.02925)	(0.02665)	(0.02217)
		[1.06931813]	[0.80630063]	[0.9645864]	[0.4960485]	[0.65496895]	[0.91690238]	[1.2736994]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.011159***	-0.03543***	-0.033321***	-0.001207	0.019142***	-0.023731***	-0.022311***
		(0.002672)	(0.00226)	(0.00199)	(0.001779)	(0.00248)	(0.00223)	(0.0019)
		[0.98890281]	[0.96519071]	[0.9672278]	[0.998794]	[1.01932609]	[0.97654813]	[0.9779362]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	2.27625***	1.169244***	1.628184***	0.300336***	1.548027***	0.285138***	1.343836***
		(0.050829)	(0.04942)	(0.0437)	(0.043145)	(0.05249)	(0.04873)	(0.0478)
		[9.74008371]	[3.2195582]	[5.094615]	[1.3503125]	[4.70218494]	[1.32994489]	[3.8337197]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-0.580459*	-1.832014***	0.375717***	1.720541***	-0.202316	-0.944405***	-0.4157**
		(0.229408)	(0.53837)	(0.08482)	(0.122258)	(0.16995)	(0.18515)	(0.18384)
		[0.55964142]	[0.16009076]	[1.456035]	[5.5875516]	[0.8168364]	[0.38891097]	[0.6598783]
	Yes/ No	-0.197577***	-0.988379***	0.005931	0.479804***	-0.125367***	-0.566022***	-0.296837***
		(0.038074)	(0.05059)	(0.0231)	(0.029849)	(0.03629)	(0.03549)	(0.0328)
		[0.82071678]	[0.3721795]	[1.005949]	[1.615757]	[0.88217317]	[0.56777975]	[0.7431655]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.338571***	1.308738***	0.129355***	1.029448***	0.586045***	1.885407***	0.254614***
		(0.050056)	(0.04065)	(0.04091)	(0.036962)	(0.05686)	(0.04637)	(0.04388)
		[1.40294108]	[3.70149773]	[1.1380937]	[2.7995207]	[1.79686852]	[6.58903642]	[1.2899642]
	Yes/ No	-0.203076***	0.53886***	0.006851	0.227771***	0.165378***	0.819855***	0.157867***
		(0.02413)	(0.02031)	(0.01856)	(0.019317)	(0.02606)	(0.02296)	(0.01964)
		[0.81621607]	[1.7140521]	[1.0068746]	[1.2557973]	[1.17983869]	[2.27017035]	[1.1710109]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-0.397255**	-0.1597	-0.479496***	-0.722795***	-0.854405***	-0.687632***	-0.190772*
		(0.132978)	(0.10323)	(0.09853)	(0.093426)	(0.14791)	(0.11674)	(0.09985)
		[0.67216291]	[0.85239973]	[0.6190955]	[0.4853938]	[0.42553645]	[0.50276529]	[0.8263211]
	Yes/ No	-0.177701***	-0.053716**	-0.242067***	-0.336298***	-0.375835***	-0.311516***	-0.086804***
		(0.032777)	(0.02732)	(0.02477)	(0.025437)	(0.03446)	(0.03018)	(0.02554)
		[0.83719311]	[0.94770113]	[0.7850036]	[0.71441]	[0.68671544]	[0.73233563]	[0.9168566]
CONSTANT		-3.440993***	-3.221448***	-1.916437***	-2.483457***	-4.549835***	-3.432646***	-2.185302***
		(0.043203)	(0.04072)	(0.03471)	(0.035577)	(0.05615)	(0.04849)	(0.02963)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.3: Senate Enforcement Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	1.45178**	-INF***	5.1769**	3.0002***	1.18211***	0.73496**	2.17048***	-INF***
		(0.70581)	(0)	(2.5771)	(0.4895)	(0.43651)	(0.3646)	(0.59619)	(0)
		[4.270718]	[0]	[177.1257]	[20.08901]	[3.2612578]	[2.08540289]	[8.76245777]	[0]
	Republican/ Republican	-1.73077***	58.225	-1.7766	-0.3471	-0.26761	-0.79769**	-2.29358***	-INF***
		(0.41469)	(17160.398)	(2.4369)	(0.456)	(0.57786)	(0.38303)	(0.46211)	(0)
		[0.1771481]	[1.935652E+25]	[0.1692147]	[0.7067231]	[0.76520261]	[0.45036806]	[0.10090423]	[0]
GENDER	Female/ Female	NA	NA	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***
				(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
				[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	Female/ Male	NA	NA	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	1.70135***	-INF***	-INF***
				(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.31958)	(0)	(0)
				[0]	[0]	[0]	[5.48133646]	[0]	[0]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	0.19191	17.178	1.3023	1.4009**	-2.40295***	-0.59483	-0.36545	-INF***
		(0.76705)	(36139.951)	(2.4202)	(0.6268)	(0.58158)	(0.37477)	(0.63765)	(0)
		[1.211558]	[28869170]	[3.677668]	[4.058893]	[0.09045074]	[0.55165904]	[0.69388401]	[0]
	Yes/ No	0.20708	-INF***	-0.1713	0.8657**	-0.96113***	-0.21139	0.05325	-INF***
		(0.40698)	(0)	(1.6936)	(0.3959)	(0.32262)	(0.24967)	(0.31198)	(0)
		[1.230084]	[0]	[0.8425865]	[2.376557]	[0.38246152]	[0.80945988]	[1.05468813]	[0]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	0.08647	20.599	0.5084	0.7797***	-0.03779	-0.19458**	-0.39457***	1.6974*
		(0.09456)	(6740.511)	(0.74)	(0.1148)	(0.09355)	(0.08894)	(0.11261)	(0.9552)
		[1.090318]	[883226700]	[1.662709]	[2.180824]	[0.96291879]	[0.82317876]	[0.67397145]	[5.459603]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	6.46484***	6.991	3.6337	5.314***	0.01364	0.39559	4.60128***	-2.1142
		(0.66782)	(6.783)	(3.0019)	(0.6023)	(0.59762)	(0.48057)	(0.60075)	(5.2406)
		[642.162]	[1086.636]	[37.85403]	[203.1678]	[1.01373056]	[1.4852572]	[99.61203474]	[0.1207315]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
		[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	Yes/ No	-INF***	41.05	0.6691	1.5898***	-0.89137**	0.22861	-0.97036**	-INF***
		(0)	(12520.659)	(1.5217)	(0.3381)	(0.44939)	(0.29448)	(0.46634)	(0)
		[0]	[672939200000000000]	[1.952553]	[4.902657]	[0.41009359]	[1.25685685]	[0.37894693]	[0]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-INF***	7.029***	-INF***	-INF***	1.84978***	-INF***	-INF***
		(0)	(0)	(1.8418)	(0)	(0)	(0.63813)	(0)	(0)
		[0]	[0]	[1128.878]	[0]	[0]	[6.35843269]	[0]	[0]
	Yes/ No	-1.58392***	43.008	2.7766**	-INF***	-INF***	1.05515***	-0.7046*	-INF***
		(0.40876)	(12520.659)	(1.3187)	(0)	(0)	(0.2077)	(0.37281)	(0)
		[0.2051697]	[4765181000000000000]	[16.06373]	[0]	[0]	[2.87240487]	[0.49430403]	[0]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	1.88803**	-INF***	-INF***	-1.9738***	-1.16211**	-0.60644	2.40833***	-INF***
		(0.76527)	(0)	(0)	(0.6596)	(0.54334)	(0.52481)	(0.49556)	(0)
		[6.606347]	[0]	[0]	[0.1389331]	[0.31282448]	[0.54528721]	[11.11543395]	[0]
	Yes/ No	0.99083	-INF***	-INF***	-0.8414**	-0.54869*	-0.13707	1.35639***	-INF***
		(0.61403)	(0)	(0)	(0.3966)	(0.32883)	(0.24209)	(0.37022)	(0)
		[2.693476]	[0]	[0]	[0.4311227]	[0.57770665]	[0.87190664]	[3.88215061]	[0]
CONSTANT		-6.76202***	-144.318	-11.4203***	-8.0066***	-2.90537***	-3.25401***	-4.55342***	-12.364**
		(0.77489)	(44156.009)	(3.5869)	(0.6719)	(0.4941)	(0.36029)	(0.50338)	(4.9248)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.3: Senate Enforcement Bills Continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-INF***	0.71987*	0.37713	-0.431459	-1.466***	-2.0318901***	1.64752***
		(0)	(0.42804)	(0.25734)	(0.84633)	(0.1746)	(0.2290845)	(0.12965)
		[0]	[2.054157348]	[1.45808681]	[0.649560778]	[0.2308463]	[0.13108752]	[5.194091]
	Republican/ Republican	17.8878	-0.10195	0.5246***	0.046414	2.21177***	1.9691824***	-1.48464***
		(6756.05)	(0.43233)	(0.19664)	(0.48809)	(0.17022)	(0.21251)	(0.13457)
		[58689650]	[0.903073769]	[1.68977892]	[1.047508324]	[9.1318762]	[7.16481633]	[0.2265849]
GENDER	Female/ Female	-INF***	-INF***	1.79304*	-INF***	0.81267**	-0.5992864	2.25189***
		(0)	(0)	(1.07262)	(0)	(0.40164)	(0.5727581)	(0.3537)
		[0]	[0]	[6.00770439]	[0]	[2.2539276]	[0.54920343]	[9.505659]
	Female/ Male	-INF***	-INF***	0.88728***	-0.977152	0.14002	-0.0004453	0.78182***
		(0)	(0)	(0.20736)	(0.73745)	(0.11592)	(0.1473824)	(0.08015)
		[0]	[0]	[2.42850831]	[0.37638152]	[1.1502917]	[0.99955478]	[2.185443]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	1.95749***	-0.55395*	-0.039519	-0.15118	-0.5125795**	-0.50372***
		(0)	(0.46851)	(0.29523)	(0.70773)	(0.17099)	(0.2478607)	(0.13592)
		[0]	[7.081501987]	[0.57467678]	[0.961252062]	[0.8596971]	[0.59894858]	[0.6042773]
	Yes/ No	18.9249	1.03845***	-0.22213	0.065253	-0.00468	-0.1465063	-0.23445***
		(7877.44)	(0.2717)	(0.1517)	(0.39879)	(0.10679)	(0.1291878)	(0.07839)
		[165568200]	[2.824836947]	[0.80081084]	[1.067428902]	[0.9953305]	[0.8637203]	[0.7910037]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	0.6932	0.52805***	0.30357***	0.007432	0.19835***	0.1539902***	-0.0857***
		(0.905)	(0.08456)	(0.04903)	(0.10035)	(0.02574)	(0.033652)	(0.01899)
		[2.000099]	[1.695630104]	[1.35467985]	[1.007460106]	[1.2193853]	[1.16647948]	[0.9178728]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	2.0901	1.26709**	2.05512***	1.704296***	-2.13921***	-2.6242016***	1.17949***
		(4.7298)	(0.54066)	(0.24795)	(0.58183)	(0.20434)	(0.2627241)	(0.14358)
		[8.085414]	[3.55049033]	[7.80778983]	[5.497515201]	[0.1177475]	[0.07249762]	[3.252715]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-INF***	0.38443	3.404285***	0.29142*	-INF***	0.38583
		(0)	(0)	(0.24849)	(1.14665)	(0.17632)	(0)	(0.46416)
		[0]	[0]	[1.46877096]	[30.092774808]	[1.3383293]	[0]	[1.470839]
	Yes/ No	-INF***	-INF***	0.28601	1.699908***	0.21366	-1.3777581***	0.25942***
		(0)	(0)	(0.24742)	(0.34055)	(0.17952)	(0.3448502)	(0.09465)
		[0]	[0]	[1.33111152]	[5.473445322]	[1.2382029]	[0.25214321]	[1.296173]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	3.16313***	-0.26704	-INF***	-1.94101*	3.1331338***	14.60352
		(0)	(0.50043)	(0.64456)	(0)	(1.026)	(0.4202956)	(178.218)
		[0]	[23.644443766]	[0.76564502]	[0]	[0.1435585]	[22.94577337]	[2199024]
	Yes/ No	-INF***	1.48667***	-0.64325***	-2.141961**	-0.65864***	0.0052399	0.80843***
		(0)	(0.2237)	(0.18292)	(1.01773)	(0.1311)	(0.1705)	(0.09426)
		[0]	[4.422330282]	[0.52558102]	[0.117424394]	[0.5175566]	[1.00525369]	[2.244383]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-2.06181***	-1.58627***	1.514191**	-1.58743***	-2.0194657***	1.05281***
		(0)	(0.54392)	(0.27321)	(0.61658)	(0.17591)	(0.248952)	(0.13364)
		[0]	[0.12722335]	[0.20468702]	[4.545740608]	[0.2044514]	[0.13272636]	[2.865686]
	Yes/ No	18.062	-0.86935***	-0.73671***	0.833853**	-0.85852***	-1.0308398***	0.54891***
		(8766.2)	(0.28209)	(0.16004)	(0.39947)	(0.10371)	(0.1354943)	(0.08072)
		[69862740]	[0.419225566]	[0.47868428]	[2.302171647]	[0.4237877]	[0.35670729]	[1.731359]
CONSTANT		-62.5287	-6.58745***	-3.91767***	-5.770205***	-2.02314***	-2.1899169***	-0.70395***
		(13584.7)	(0.45991)	(0.32553)	(0.57823)	(0.22579)	(0.1844324)	(0.11246)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.3: Senate Enforcement Bills Continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	0.61244**	-0.2211	-0.01525	3.4101***	2.21361***	-0.3535	2.384356***
		(0.27324)	(0.38484)	(0.55942)	(0.4092)	(0.42828)	(0.61938)	(0.21545)
		[1.84493315]	[0.8016384]	[0.984866244]	[30.268175289]	[9.148699215]	[0.702224885]	[10.8520699]
	Republican/ Republican	0.78571***	0.7775***	1.66902***	-0.10254	1.56868***	1.10839***	0.603784***
		(0.17524)	(0.29385)	(0.33641)	(0.40592)	(0.41078)	(0.36527)	(0.19712)
		[2.19396738]	[2.17602593]	[5.306986242]	[0.902545733]	[4.800290151]	[3.029485569]	[1.8290259]
GENDER	Female/ Female	1.04122***	-INF***	-0.83957	0.18762	0.36792	-INF***	0.46554*
		(0.39215)	(0)	(1.04963)	(0.48773)	(0.55443)	(0)	(0.2427)
		[2.83267078]	[0]	[0.431894585]	[1.206380019]	[1.44472326]	[0]	[1.5928734]
	Female/ Male	0.39283***	-1.74331***	-0.30528	0.23394	-0.12189	-0.01858	0.194292*
		(0.12606)	(0.52726)	(0.22218)	(0.18656)	(0.22842)	(0.23815)	(0.10251)
		[1.48117241]	[0.1749398]	[0.736916737]	[1.263573643]	[0.88524186]	[0.981596428]	[1.2144503]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-0.18904	-0.20354	2.75516***	1.33645***	0.32812	0.34593	-0.001692
		(0.21038)	(0.50834)	(0.34991)	(0.40364)	(0.36917)	(0.37951)	(0.17604)
		[0.82774989]	[0.81583388]	[15.723570289]	[3.805527842]	[1.388354525]	[1.413303299]	[0.9983095]
	Yes/ No	0.01387	0.01092	1.38555***	0.24086	-0.19139	0.25815	0.090571
		(0.11495)	(0.2957)	(0.23447)	(0.22558)	(0.24513)	(0.25224)	(0.12418)
		[1.01396325]	[1.01097572]	[3.997011666]	[1.272345876]	[0.825807879]	[1.294534462]	[1.0947997]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	0.16154***	-0.0322	0.08606	0.04501	0.05587	0.18011***	0.03366
		(0.0334)	(0.07883)	(0.05544)	(0.04568)	(0.0593)	(0.05007)	(0.02884)
		[1.17531998]	[0.96831417]	[1.089870922]	[1.046041353]	[1.057458329]	[1.197348358]	[1.0342329]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	2.59514***	-0.45453*	1.04921***	2.2137***	0.97561***	1.54396***	1.544116***
		(0.22547)	(0.26966)	(0.34075)	(0.40056)	(0.37563)	(0.35542)	(0.21545)
		[13.39839713]	[0.63474463]	[2.855386701]	[9.149469963]	[2.652791288]	[4.6831071]	[4.6838298]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	0.94621	0.19112	-INF***	-INF***	0.69718	-INF***	-INF***
		(0.76393)	(0.53801)	(0)	(0)	(1.07048)	(0)	(0)
		[2.57591643]	[1.21060157]	[0]	[0]	[2.008075458]	[0]	[0]
	Yes/ No	0.72713***	0.35573	-0.404	0.21328	-0.32715	0.33839	-0.304555*
		(0.14083)	(0.53581)	(0.33681)	(0.31903)	(0.29628)	(0.33185)	(0.15911)
		[2.06913399]	[1.42722645]	[0.667641227]	[1.237731536]	[0.720977757]	[1.402687857]	[0.7374515]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.93993*	1.44485	2.02973***	4.13167***	2.65106***	-INF***	0.668283
		(0.49078)	(1.06455)	(0.59933)	(0.45587)	(0.51757)	(0)	(0.47855)
		[2.55979062]	[4.24123699]	[7.611998411]	[62.281926129]	[14.169086325]	[0]	[1.9508853]
	Yes/ No	0.26045**	0.13358	0.77093***	1.11943***	0.1253	-0.84289***	-0.005334
		(0.12411)	(0.3552)	(0.18681)	(0.18021)	(0.23836)	(0.28054)	(0.12149)
		[1.29751766]	[1.14290771]	[2.161770075]	[3.063116607]	[1.13348718]	[0.430464983]	[0.9946807]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-1.28611***	-0.42196	0.97978***	2.40167***	0.37	-0.07957	-0.258802
		(0.21615)	(0.53934)	(0.30155)	(0.34403)	(0.39847)	(0.3406)	(0.19274)
		[0.27634497]	[0.65575905]	[2.663878999]	[11.041608946]	[1.447737033]	[0.923516131]	[0.7719759]
	Yes/ No	-0.72494***	-0.25136	0.62786***	1.32117***	-0.04003	0.10746	-0.18181
		(0.12139)	(0.29885)	(0.18763)	(0.27502)	(0.26164)	(0.22918)	(0.11304)
		[0.48435267]	[0.77773932]	[1.873588569]	[3.747814414]	[0.960758493]	[1.113443336]	[0.83376]
CONSTANT		-3.2999***	-4.1168***	-6.53718***	-6.87177***	-5.25164***	-5.39045***	-3.199051***
		(0.19029)	(0.64597)	(0.43503)	(0.43222)	(0.43125)	(0.44684)	(0.19456)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.4: House Benefit Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-1.56841***	-2.045442***	-1.426157***	-1.062575***	-1.441311***	-1.110228***	-1.009962***	-0.481618***
		(0.16486)	(0.11169)	(0.10192)	(0.04687)	(0.02348)	(0.03743)	(0.03514)	(0.02583)
		[0.208377074]	[0.129322957]	[0.24023027]	[0.34556496]	[0.23661736]	[0.329483806]	[0.364232654]	[0.61778304]
	Republican/ Republican	1.85432***	2.08539***	1.939369***	1.15106***	1.459585***	2.402907***	1.99932***	1.198138***
		(0.30354)	(0.2246)	(0.14564)	(0.06731)	(0.02526)	(0.06636)	(0.05932)	(0.03444)
		[6.387345638]	[8.047726663]	[6.95436404]	[3.16154137]	[4.30417449]	[11.055271448]	[7.384031215]	[3.31394134]
GENDER	Female/ Female	1.51807***	0.703217**	0.147371	0.167068	0.711261***	0.1033	-0.400574*	-0.559876***
		(0.35419)	(0.30375)	(0.46312)	(0.30964)	(0.15238)	(0.1987)	(0.21286)	(0.14737)
		[4.563399683]	[2.020242021]	[1.15878415]	[1.18183428]	[2.03655678]	[1.108823852]	[0.669935609]	[0.57127965]
	Female/ Male	0.46106***	0.360471***	0.262808***	0.230592***	0.285614***	0.110978***	-0.152749***	-0.220249***
		(0.11448)	(0.07825)	(0.08752)	(0.0487)	(0.0238)	(0.03557)	(0.03538)	(0.0258)
		[1.585750092]	[1.43400455]	[1.30057713]	[1.25934592]	[1.33057813]	[1.117370772]	[0.858345285]	[0.80231863]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-0.51108*	0.167553	-1.85697***	0.236586***	-0.185184***	-0.375452***	-1.710062***	-1.392222***
		(0.28356)	(0.13489)	(0.34404)	(0.08022)	(0.04346)	(0.06133)	(0.21204)	(0.0783)
		[0.599849336]	[1.182408353]	[0.15614497]	[1.26691607]	[0.83095104]	[0.686978926]	[0.180854553]	[0.24852255]
	Yes/ No	-0.65349***	-0.106137	-0.874956***	0.096547***	-0.094412***	-0.217396***	-1.010932***	-0.762601***
		(0.12299)	(0.07699)	(0.08859)	(0.03596)	(0.01747)	(0.0279)	(0.03727)	(0.0226)
		[0.520226418]	[0.899301204]	[0.41688018]	[1.10136173]	[0.9099077]	[0.804611022]	[0.363879712]	[0.46645159]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.07231***	-0.118484***	-0.11z6098***	-0.049244***	-0.032169***	-0.086101***	-0.070823***	-0.063088***
		(0.01258)	(0.00954)	(0.00903)	(0.00425)	(0.00187)	(0.0033)	(0.00248)	(0.00188)
		[0.930238783]	[0.888266226]	[0.89038759]	[0.95194836]	[0.96834283]	[0.917501551]	[0.931626818]	[0.9388613]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-5.6246***	-6.154209***	-3.903207***	-2.998382***	-2.700081***	-5.802425***	-5.250648***	-3.246183***
		(0.24143)	(0.17311)	(0.15028)	(0.06832)	(0.03173)	(0.06125)	(0.05649)	(0.03762)
		[0.003608023]	[0.00212452]	[0.0201771]	[0.04986771]	[0.06720005]	[0.003020222]	[0.005244117]	[0.03892247]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	0.64086	-0.137294	0.615898*	-0.219587	-0.021874	0.466276***	-0.457926**	0.303614**
		(0.71771)	(0.50816)	(0.32623)	(0.21802)	(0.07679)	(0.16174)	(0.20653)	(0.13344)
		[1.898107472]	[0.871713505]	[1.85131882]	[0.80285004]	[0.97836371]	[1.59404687]	[0.632594184]	[1.35474599]
	Yes/ No	0.58271***	0.123811	0.117987	-0.060513	0.009045	0.2149***	-0.194805***	0.119346***
		(0.13022)	(0.09381)	(0.08966)	(0.04514)	(0.01963)	(0.03504)	(0.03497)	(0.02615)
		[1.79088267]	[1.131801753]	[1.12522958]	[0.94128149]	[1.00908582]	[1.239737548]	[0.822994903]	[1.12676014]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	1.10684***	0.339331**	1.369789***	0.463728***	0.482637***	0.418853***	0.279416***	0.314255***
		(0.16483)	(0.14384)	(0.11426)	(0.0789)	(0.04243)	(0.05902)	(0.05822)	(0.04573)
		[3.024790851]	[1.404008229]	[3.93452117]	[1.58999115]	[1.62034222]	[1.520217171]	[1.322356879]	[1.36923864]
	Yes/ No	0.27606***	0.130457**	0.304945***	0.152731***	-0.149591***	0.016943	0.07068***	0.043573**
		(0.09804)	(0.06633)	(0.0691)	(0.03278)	(0.01589)	(0.02434)	(0.02272)	(0.01729)
		[1.317926396]	[1.139349502]	[1.35655066]	[1.16501136]	[0.86105976]	[1.01708691]	[1.073238061]	[1.04453578]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-0.09969	-0.018597	-0.983754***	-0.755132***	-0.62752***	-0.308736***	-0.437614***
		(0)	(0.71622)	(0.5119)	(0.25815)	(0.07984)	(0.15707)	(0.11201)	(0.08118)
		[0]	[0.905117697]	[0.98157474]	[0.37390479]	[0.46994851]	[0.533914208]	[0.734374933]	[0.64557467]
	Yes/ No	-1.39386***	-0.068754	-0.383452***	-1.217312***	-0.393076***	-0.364287***	-0.192913***	-0.243755***
		(0.28068)	(0.11862)	(0.1218)	(0.06699)	(0.02153)	(0.03828)	(0.03133)	(0.02298)
		[0.248116916]	[0.933556691]	[0.68150481]	[0.29602482]	[0.67497772]	[0.694692109]	[0.824553664]	[0.78367992]
CONSTANT		-6.55218***	-5.612106***	-4.472306***	-3.008523***	-0.271489***	-2.678879***	-1.992764***	-0.33447***
		(0.19156)	(0.13169)	(0.1013)	(0.04814)	(0.02129)	(0.03837)	(0.03065)	(0.02371)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.4: House Benefit Bills Continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-0.75303***	-1.24229***	-1.537983***	-0.688635***	-0.14788***	0.189001***	-0.57294***
		(0.02463)	(0.04194)	(0.04818)	(0.10876)	(0.04221)	(0.0368)	(0.04918)
		[0.47093728]	[0.2887223]	[0.2148139]	[0.5022613]	[0.86253621]	[1.2080417]	[0.56386488]
	Republican/ Republican	0.865071***	1.782471***	2.770532***	1.89634***	2.34077***	1.192572***	2.26733***
		(0.02882)	(0.05073)	(0.05624)	(0.12153)	(0.0457)	(0.03906)	(0.05833)
		[2.37517517]	[5.94452824]	[15.96713047]	[6.6614656]	[10.38926699]	[3.2955458]	[9.65355855]
GENDER	Female/ Female	0.757126***	-0.304726*	0.368282***	1.385971***	0.45033***	0.712897***	0.87818***
		(0.11769)	(0.16847)	(0.08018)	(0.10455)	(0.06105)	(0.05938)	(0.06121)
		[2.13213873]	[0.73732557]	[1.44524886]	[3.99870565]	[1.56882861]	[2.0398931]	[2.40651266]
	Female/ Male	0.353106***	-0.140152***	0.145986***	0.456779***	0.10624***	0.170278***	0.15098***
		(0.11892)	(0.03475)	(0.02731)	(0.05155)	(0.02111)	(0.01829)	(0.02237)
		[1.42348196]	[0.86922597]	[1.15718034]	[1.5789805]	[1.11209064]	[1.1856342]	[1.16296836]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	0.943269***	0.030763	-0.055222	-1.434912***	-1.09396***	-0.323163***	0.43585***
		(0.07906)	(0.10471)	(0.04977)	(0.21036)	(0.06314)	(0.08608)	(0.11286)
		[2.56836322]	[1.03124139]	[0.94627551]	[0.23813639]	[0.33488705]	[0.7238556]	[1.54627568]
	Yes/ No	0.480409***	0.058518*	-0.020682	-0.744377***	-0.48058***	-0.175806***	0.27563***
		(0.07892)	(0.03182)	(0.0278)	(0.0635)	(0.02297)	(0.02283)	(0.0294)
		[1.61673625]	[1.06026363]	[0.97953072]	[0.47503036]	[0.61842543]	[0.8387807]	[1.31735814]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.066339***	-0.024023***	-0.057313***	-0.083675***	-0.05251***	-0.035681***	-0.02183***
		(0.00177)	(0.00273)	(0.00305)	(0.006)	(0.00236)	(0.00196)	(0.00231)
		[0.93581343]	[0.97626311]	[0.94429866]	[0.91973046]	[0.94884381]	[0.9649478]	[0.97841062]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-2.342501***	-2.733688***	-3.498839***	-2.505902***	-2.37618***	-1.683662***	-3.3626***
		(0.03256)	(0.0528)	(0.05848)	(0.12134)	(0.04685)	(0.03929)	(0.05541)
		[0.09608707]	[0.06497918]	[0.03023245]	[0.08160192]	[0.09290453]	[0.1856927]	[0.03464493]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-0.26533	0.190783	0.120832	0.617968***	0.15147	-0.269193	-0.6921***
		(0.20379)	(0.18188)	(0.12771)	(0.21465)	(0.10423)	(0.19368)	(0.24219)
		[0.76695277]	[1.21019631]	[1.12843584]	[1.8551538]	[1.16354487]	[0.7639959]	[0.50052267]
	Yes/ No	-0.081662	0.085691**	0.041541	0.237057***	0.03823	-0.105735***	-0.38323***
		(0.20491)	(0.03658)	(0.03174)	(0.06023)	(0.02533)	(0.03021)	(0.03773)
		[0.92158367]	[1.08946964]	[1.04241641]	[1.26751397]	[1.03897483]	[0.8996626]	[0.68165655]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-0.220758***	0.482855***	1.12302***	1.099093***	0.43045***	0.573633***	0.60988***
		(0.03904)	(0.05656)	(0.04684)	(0.07905)	(0.04029)	(0.03674)	(0.04639)
		[0.80191057]	[1.62069464]	[3.07412266]	[3.0014414]	[1.53794204]	[1.7747028]	[1.84020931]
	Yes/ No	-0.126635***	0.074896***	0.306401***	0.159528***	0.09433***	0.216781***	0.19776***
		(0.04005)	(0.02514)	(0.02474)	(0.05007)	(0.01894)	(0.01636)	(0.02113)
		[0.88105547]	[1.07777185]	[1.35852732]	[1.17295764]	[1.09892709]	[1.2420715]	[1.21866999]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	0.233894***	-0.417915***	0.148433	0.499376**	0.27994***	-0.327286***	-0.44479***
		(0.07615)	(0.1168)	(0.11766)	(0.24372)	(0.09418)	(0.08973)	(0.11556)
		[1.26351058]	[0.65841835]	[1.16001558]	[1.64769249]	[1.323057]	[0.7208773]	[0.64095727]
	Yes/ No	0.153525**	-0.302707***	0.118818***	0.285862***	0.15061***	-0.212771***	-0.19593***
		(0.0752)	(0.03483)	(0.03522)	(0.07054)	(0.02746)	(0.02458)	(0.03049)
		[1.16593654]	[0.73881563]	[1.12616475]	[1.33090859]	[1.16254189]	[0.808341]	[0.8220698]
CONSTANT		-1.115586***	-2.269307***	-2.327433***	-3.557387***	-1.32608***	-0.574922***	-1.54855***
		(0.25503)	(0.03844)	(0.04065)	(0.07324)	(0.02946)	(0.02562)	(0.03354)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.4: House Benefit Bills Continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-0.203923***	-0.705388***	-0.536493***	-1.551706***	1.014911***	2.95136***	1.221932***
		(0.03963)	(0.05382)	(0.04104)	(0.04536)	(0.06094)	(0.0522)	(0.04295)
		[0.81552542]	[0.4939167]	[0.5847958]	[0.2118861]	[2.75911878]	[19.1320132]	[3.3937385]
	Republican/ Republican	1.740401***	2.250632***	2.736101***	3.358906***	3.417322***	0.47888***	0.986625***
		(0.04466)	(0.05843)	(0.04353)	(0.05251)	(0.06694)	(0.0486)	(0.04318)
		[5.69962589]	[9.49373714]	[15.4267244]	[28.7577113]	[30.48767176]	[1.6142631]	[2.682167]
GENDER	Female/ Female	0.413839***	0.326915***	0.183737***	-0.090271*	0.24647***	-0.40353***	0.172321***
		(0.06483)	(0.0544)	(0.04357)	(0.0476)	(0.05831)	(0.05717)	(0.04304)
		[1.51261374]	[1.38668305]	[1.2017001]	[0.9136832]	[1.27950067]	[0.6679607]	[1.1880594]
	Female/ Male	0.096855***	0.093724***	0.025913	-0.161219***	-0.02254	-0.36102***	0.04419**
		(0.02134)	(0.02148)	(0.0168)	(0.01922)	(0.02398)	(0.0204)	(0.01787)
		[1.10170095]	[1.09825703]	[1.0262513]	[0.8511053]	[0.97771252]	[0.696966]	[1.045181]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-0.819446***	-0.510344***	-0.598534***	-0.748247***	0.207986***	0.26779***	-0.677797***
		(0.09392)	(0.10447)	(0.05632)	(0.07536)	(0.0583)	(0.03353)	(0.06601)
		[0.44067572]	[0.60028878]	[0.549617]	[0.4731951]	[1.23119574]	[1.3070703]	[0.5077342]
	Yes/ No	-0.400168***	-0.390083***	-0.273249***	-0.453436***	0.013009	0.05005**	-0.342058***
		(0.02587)	(0.02944)	(0.01947)	(0.02369)	(0.02767)	(0.02161)	(0.02101)
		[0.67020766]	[0.67700084]	[0.760903]	[0.6354412]	[1.01309367]	[1.0513221]	[0.7103072]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.049056***	-0.052565***	-0.016604***	0.012033***	-0.003503*	-0.01793***	-0.015854***
		(0.00217)	(0.00221)	(0.0016)	(0.00161)	(0.002)	(0.00182)	(0.00159)
		[0.95212816]	[0.94879305]	[0.9835335]	[1.0121059]	[0.99650299]	[0.9822337]	[0.9842715]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-2.873909***	-2.709277***	-1.679984***	-3.332145***	-2.3879***	-0.84873***	-1.266427***
		(0.04178)	(0.05504)	(0.03885)	(0.04507)	(0.05566)	(0.04146)	(0.04529)
		[0.05647774]	[0.06658492]	[0.186377]	[0.0357164]	[0.09182231]	[0.4279576]	[0.2818369]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-1.104499***	0.831346***	-0.821299***	0.814284***	-0.920493***	0.07161	-0.141447
		(0.17865)	(0.2901)	(0.10621)	(0.1402)	(0.11981)	(0.12374)	(0.14201)
		[0.33137698]	[2.29640774]	[0.4398598]	[2.2575598]	[0.3983226]	[1.0742397]	[0.8681009]
	Yes/ No	-0.715043***	0.319679***	-0.627196***	0.248353***	-0.468364***	0.01936	-0.038973
		(0.03165)	(0.04266)	(0.02278)	(0.02925)	(0.02908)	(0.02595)	(0.02706)
		[0.48917114]	[1.37668586]	[0.5340872]	[1.2819127]	[0.62602532]	[1.0195514]	[0.9617769]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.989835***	0.741824***	0.190056***	0.452884***	1.05596***	0.31263***	0.289637***
		(0.04084)	(0.04058)	(0.03347)	(0.03921)	(0.04679)	(0.04016)	(0.03633)
		[2.69079058]	[2.09976245]	[1.2093172]	[1.5728415]	[2.87473354]	[1.3670134]	[1.3359427]
	Yes/ No	0.424451***	-0.164559***	-0.172314***	0.079559***	0.34797***	0.01825	0.090619***
		(0.01946)	(0.02089)	(0.01584)	(0.01818)	(0.02275)	(0.01855)	(0.01716)
		[1.52875063]	[0.848268]	[0.8417145]	[1.0828098]	[1.41619009]	[1.0184153]	[1.0948522]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-0.223281**	-0.383815***	-0.832444***	-0.787194***	-0.318766***	-0.76279***	-0.520545***
		(0.09777)	(0.11481)	(0.07847)	(0.08182)	(0.10242)	(0.10835)	(0.08586)
		[0.79989007]	[0.68125737]	[0.4349848]	[0.45512]	[0.72704533]	[0.4663639]	[0.5941969]
	Yes/ No	-0.1224***	-0.142102***	-0.438071***	-0.388532***	-0.16474***	-0.36517***	-0.288287***
		(0.02748)	(0.02855)	(0.02074)	(0.02359)	(0.02885)	(0.02584)	(0.02287)
		[0.88479457]	[0.86753298]	[0.6452802]	[0.6780514]	[0.84811378]	[0.6940771]	[0.7495462]
CONSTANT		-0.637183***	-0.833041***	-0.432594***	-0.882364***	-2.43717***	-0.70222***	-1.01622***
		(0.03132)	(0.03502)	(0.02848)	(0.03087)	(0.04312)	(0.03521)	(0.02437)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.5: Senate Benefit Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-2.5662***	-3.1734***	-1.20777***	-1.062575***	-1.32412***	-3.50189***	-3.1026***	-1.89707***
		(0.8247)	(0.6814)	(0.43086)	(0.04687)	(0.14251)	(0.35546)	(0.21458)	(0.15801)
		[0.076825359]	[0.04186299]	[0.29886413]	[0.34556496]	[0.26603708]	[0.03014025]	[0.04493219]	[0.150007819]
	Republican/ Republican	2.2593*	2.3184*	1.05256*	1.15106***	1.38361***	3.3895***	3.36381***	2.40812***
		(1.2533)	(1.1875)	(0.55312)	(0.06731)	(0.13621)	(0.47476)	(0.25268)	(0.18753)
		[9.576110306]	[10.1597]	[2.86497655]	[3.16154137]	[3.98927406]	[29.65126]	[28.89913]	[11.113039851]
GENDER	Female/ Female	NA	NA	-INF***	0.167068	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***
		NA	NA	(0)	(0.30964)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
		[NA]	[NA]	[0]	[1.18183428]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	Female/ Male	NA	NA	-INF***	0.230592***	0.36597**	-INF***	-0.64241**	0.25322
		NA	NA	(0)	(0.0487)	(0.16945)	(0)	(0.27006)	(0.18193)
		[NA]	[NA]	[0]	[1.25934592]	[1.4419101]	[0]	[0.5260208]	[1.288166919]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-1.9896	0.7101	-1.11343*	0.236586***	-0.55392***	0.21682	-1.51343***	-1.48486***
		(1.404)	(0.9796)	(0.63455)	(0.08022)	(0.18417)	(0.32314)	(0.26744)	(0.21469)
		[0.136753103]	[2.034245]	[0.32842948]	[1.26691607]	[0.57469348]	[1.242119]	[0.2201529]	[0.226533354]
	Yes/ No	-0.3993	0.1855	-0.36372	0.096547***	-0.28437**	0.1649	-0.72903***	-0.7864***
		(0.7444)	(0.611)	(0.37975)	(0.03596)	(0.13694)	(0.21281)	(0.12711)	(0.11195)
		[0.670810127]	[1.203764]	[0.69508428]	[1.10136173]	[0.75248808]	[1.17927]	[0.4823768]	[0.455480848]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.2598	-0.1383	-0.24702*	-0.049244***	-0.12691***	0.17328**	-0.0621	-0.19298***
		(0.2668)	(0.2276)	(0.13586)	(0.00425)	(0.03662)	(0.08156)	(0.04984)	(0.04248)
		[0.771229152]	[0.8708797]	[0.78112757]	[0.95194836]	[0.8808089]	[1.1892]	[0.93979]	[0.824500763]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate	-5.9305***	-7.2791***	-2.46464***	-2.998382***	-2.51844***	-9.32166***	-8.12218***	-5.38154***
	1st Dimension	(1.3562)	(1.1101)	(0.59716)	(0.06832)	(0.18844)	(0.68184)	(0.39592)	(0.26612)
		[0.002657208]	[0.0006898299]	[0.08503982]	[0.04986771]	[0.08058498]	[0.00008946486]	[0.0002968805]	[0.004600733]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-0.219587	-0.42625	-INF***	-0.52337	1.3617***
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.21802)	(0.32331)	(0)	(1.13835)	(0.36572)
		[0]	[0]	[0]	[0.80285004]	[0.65295227]	[0]	[0.5925225]	[3.902817557]
	Yes/ No	-INF***	1.7289***	-INF***	-0.060513	-0.11665	-INF***	0.29025*	0.6506***
		(0)	(0.5161)	(0)	(0.04514)	(0.09498)	(0)	(0.17136)	(0.10618)
		[0]	[5.634209]	[0]	[0.94128149]	[0.88989463]	[0]	[1.336755]	[1.916682019]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	5.9132***	2.26728**	0.463728***	1.41527***	1.83206*	2.60366***	-0.02327
		(0)	(1.2867)	(1.07676)	(0.0789)	(0.41735)	(1.08358)	(0.64137)	(0.77983)
		[0]	[369.8943]	[9.65312686]	[1.58999115]	[4.11758289]	[6.24673]	[13.51312]	[0.976996493]
	Yes/ No	1.8633***	3.0252***	0.9378**	0.152731***	0.45607***	1.20641***	1.36581***	0.28349**
		(0.6973)	(0.5556)	(0.36938)	(0.03278)	(0.10578)	(0.23214)	(0.15502)	(0.12576)
		[6.44496386]	[20.59741]	[2.55434328]	[1.16501136]	[1.57786429]	[3.341476]	[3.918883]	[1.327756138]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	1.0499	-0.13547	-0.983754***	-0.82725***	-3.96175***	-1.98331***	-1.02537***
		(0)	(1.4286)	(0.75273)	(0.25815)	(0.20141)	(0.6896)	(0.28566)	(0.20801)
		[0]	[2.857266]	[0.87330601]	[0.37390479]	[0.43724827]	[0.0190298]	[0.1376124]	[0.358664549]
	Yes/ No	-0.4497	1.0061	0.09584	-1.217312***	-0.35642***	-1.85714***	-0.92338***	-0.4328***
		(0.6927)	(0.6705)	(0.36401)	(0.06699)	(0.10985)	(0.24607)	(0.14066)	(0.10549)
		[0.637824666]	[2.734918]	[1.10058088]	[0.29602482]	[0.70017877]	[0.1561185]	[0.3971759]	[0.648687228]
CONSTANT		-6.4121***	-8.9941***	-4.11012***	-3.008523***	-0.84246***	-4.52211***	-2.60212***	-1.20455***
		(1.2452)	(1.1666)	(0.57969)	(0.04814)	(0.19595)	(0.38161)	(0.19879)	(0.14727)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.5: Senate Benefit Bills Continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-1.66366***	-1.91199***	-0.8666*	-2.95817***	-0.42557*	0.58765***	-0.52624***
		(0.14323)	(0.21563)	(0.4532)	(0.34591)	(0.23828)	(0.1291)	(0.1275)
		[0.1894437]	[0.14778598]	[0.4203693]	[0.05191384]	[0.65339909]	[1.799756]	[0.5908229]
	Republican/ Republican	2.03517***	2.18239***	0.6557	2.784177***	2.07604***	0.4145***	0.79797***
		(0.16301)	(0.28269)	(0.6604)	(0.33499)	(0.21973)	(0.12281)	(0.13301)
		[7.653524]	[8.86748229]	[1.926406]	[16.1864838]	[7.97283502]	[1.5136169]	[2.2210293]
GENDER	Female/ Female	-12.15591	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-1.34883	0.5861	0.53016**
		(196.968)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1.03382)	(0.3717)	(0.25999)
		[0.000005257207]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0.25954462]	[1.7969624]	[1.6992083]
	Female/ Male	-11.87608	-INF***	-3.2182***	-0.414177	-1.41341***	0.38661***	0.25801***
		(196.968)	(0)	(1.0364)	(0.28613)	(0.23232)	(0.09262)	(0.07857)
		[0.000006954756]	[0]	[0.04002517]	[0.660884]	[0.24331139]	[1.4719819]	[1.2943539]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	-0.47868***	-0.81824***	2.9131***	-0.255798	0.225	-0.28836**	0.59436***
		(0.17104)	(0.25875)	(0.6111)	(0.59278)	(0.22034)	(0.13551)	(0.13161)
		[0.6196015]	[0.44120777]	[18.41311]	[0.77429824]	[1.25231983]	[0.7494925]	[1.8118661]
	Yes/ No	-0.27894**	-0.42548***	1.6422***	0.006687	0.25058*	-0.04431	0.2885***
		(0.13359)	(0.13496)	(0.3161)	(0.22935)	(0.14387)	(0.07918)	(0.08027)
		[0.7565815]	[0.65345518]	[5.166759]	[1.00670959]	[1.28477545]	[0.9566583]	[1.3344219]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	0.06958**	0.04983	0.5508***	0.002891	0.2011***	-0.03505	-0.03499*
		(0.03507)	(0.04849)	(0.0783)	(0.0604)	(0.03389)	(0.02136)	(0.01986)
		[1.072056]	[1.05109136]	[1.734619]	[1.00289548]	[1.22275009]	[0.9655593]	[0.9656117]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-4.08309***	-5.03314***	-2.9025***	-4.549815***	-1.02553***	0.23705*	-1.361***
		(0.2214)	(0.34971)	(0.6642)	(0.46012)	(0.25666)	(0.14262)	(0.14783)
		[0.01685526]	[0.00651828]	[0.05488465]	[0.01056916]	[0.35860709]	[1.2675105]	[0.2564054]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-0.72141	-INF***	-0.798*	-INF***	0.69451***	0.54838	0.44015
		(0.54401)	(0)	(0.4624)	(0)	(0.25347)	(0.65272)	(0.4545)
		[0.4860686]	[0]	[0.4502325]	[0]	[2.00272679]	[1.7304456]	[1.5529376]
	Yes/ No	-0.46974	0.25688	-0.1741	-INF***	0.49913*	0.50972***	0.20821**
		(0.54755)	(0.23944)	(0.4563)	(0)	(0.25692)	(0.10229)	(0.09282)
		[0.6251628]	[1.29289547]	[0.8401959]	[0]	[1.64729151]	[1.6648258]	[1.231469]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-4.06904***	0.77641	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-0.93317*	0.51826
		(0.55564)	(0.76846)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.50404)	(0.46579)
		[0.01709373]	[2.17366021]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0.3933039]	[1.6790959]
	Yes/ No	-3.09893***	0.34913**	0.9031***	-INF***	-0.75878***	-0.60239***	-0.11816
		(0.5582)	(0.15932)	(0.3486)	(0)	(0.20115)	(0.10197)	(0.09917)
		[0.04509747]	[1.41783171]	[2.467224]	[0]	[0.46823582]	[0.5475006]	[0.8885539]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	1.29575***	-2.6549***	-0.703	0.541313	-1.68818***	-0.07548	0.10723
		(0.17528)	(0.34451)	(0.4954)	(0.34242)	(0.23387)	(0.13569)	(0.14306)
		[3.653732]	[0.07030581]	[0.4951141]	[1.71826104]	[0.1848549]	[0.9272954]	[1.1131895]
	Yes/ No	0.66892***	-1.2239***	-0.1985	0.389282	-1.04925***	0.01224	0.10201
		(0.15499)	(0.14056)	(0.2998)	(0.23801)	(0.1351)	(0.081)	(0.08162)
		[1.952124]	[0.29408021]	[0.8199398]	[1.47592007]	[0.35019999]	[1.0123125]	[1.1073895]
CONSTANT		14.36759	-2.4223***	-7.1826***	-3.863868***	-3.39269***	-1.02396***	-0.97009***
		(196.969)	(0.22043)	(0.6505)	(0.33215)	(0.32342)	(0.11724)	(0.11553)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Table 2.5: Senate Benefit Bills Continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
PARTY	Democrat/ Democrat	-2.14478***	-2.033896***	0.62437***	-0.832401***	0.19369	-0.67939***	-0.144918
		(0.1523)	(0.15055)	(0.08651)	(0.12951)	(0.14042)	(0.19497)	(0.14319)
		[0.117093283]	[0.13082478]	[1.867068]	[0.4350037]	[1.2137239]	[0.5069246]	[0.8650933]
	Republican/ Republican	2.32157***	2.233044***	-0.18897**	1.492175***	1.27436***	3.2741***	1.867054***
		(0.14735)	(0.14595)	(0.08311)	(0.13299)	(0.16861)	(0.24528)	(0.16981)
		[10.191692034]	[9.32821406]	[0.8278143]	[4.4467573]	[3.576414]	[26.41956214]	[6.4692087]
GENDER	Female/ Female	0.37004	0.144728	0.13582	0.037907	0.06143	0.53611**	0.982545***
		(0.28405)	(0.27315)	(0.24721)	(0.21093)	(0.20777)	(0.2298)	(0.17357)
		[1.447786664]	[1.15572524]	[1.1454729]	[1.0386345]	[1.0633573]	[1.70934619]	[2.671245]
	Female/ Male	0.06327	-0.002009	-0.08278	0.003321	0.06581	0.3952***	0.299186***
		(0.08272)	(0.08224)	(0.07697)	(0.07271)	(0.07645)	(0.09658)	(0.08197)
		[1.065316069]	[0.9979931]	[0.9205536]	[1.0033263]	[1.0680281]	[1.4846802]	[1.3487606]
FRESHMAN	Yes/ Yes	0.28449*	0.314716**	-0.72509***	0.414839***	-0.22273	1.22877***	0.011558
		(0.1513)	(0.15053)	(0.14281)	(0.13457)	(0.15322)	(0.20049)	(0.21062)
		[1.329085822]	[1.36987]	[0.4842823]	[1.5141262]	[0.8003332]	[3.41702118]	[1.0116253]
	Yes/ No	0.18497**	0.188945**	-0.36039***	0.098664	-0.07115	0.43947***	0.031281
		(0.08289)	(0.0825)	(0.07604)	(0.07552)	(0.09066)	(0.13435)	(0.15509)
		[1.203180596]	[1.20797467]	[0.6974046]	[1.1036952]	[0.9313184]	[1.55189199]	[1.0317752]
SENIORITY	Terms Served	-0.12206***	-0.106545***	0.01146	-0.023675	0.03369*	0.23252***	-0.156646***
		(0.02104)	(0.02091)	(0.01922)	(0.01804)	(0.01807)	(0.03065)	(0.03128)
		[0.88509313]	[0.89893502]	[1.0115288]	[0.9766031]	[1.0342588]	[1.26177656]	[0.8550065]
IDEOLOGY	DW-Nominate 1st Dimension	-4.62537***	-4.489791***	-0.7107***	-1.880827***	-1.75661***	-4.10739***	-1.896635***
		(0.1899)	(0.18751)	(0.07318)	(0.14146)	(0.15791)	(0.24007)	(0.14474)
		[0.009800005]	[0.01122299]	[0.4912992]	[0.1524639]	[0.1726295]	[0.01645063]	[0.1500727]
COMPETITIVE ELECTION	Yes/ Yes	-2.19117**	-2.177223**	0.33282***	-1.075298	-0.243	1.63802***	1.497495*
		(1.08959)	(1.08835)	(0.12485)	(1.10084)	(0.6729)	(0.52106)	(0.84331)
		[0.111785795]	[0.11335594]	[1.3948911]	[0.3411962]	[0.7842682]	[5.14496068]	[4.4704779]
	Yes/ No	-0.62599***	-0.617969***	0.20618*	-0.586958***	0.02946	0.70294***	-0.001483
		(0.11784)	(0.11741)	(0.12486)	(0.12293)	(0.11073)	(0.12705)	(0.1414)
		[0.534729571]	[0.53903834]	[1.2289792]	[0.5560162]	[1.0299001]	[2.01968551]	[0.9985184]
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-0.43243	-0.362415	2.72765***	2.069348***	-1.21665*	-0.31459	0.22956
		(0.45404)	(0.4509)	(0.62394)	(0.54989)	(0.64057)	(0.6785)	(0.53066)
		[0.648930992]	[0.69599351]	[15.296973]	[7.9196541]	[0.2962219]	[0.73008722]	[1.2580468]
	Yes/ No	-0.18419*	-0.157251*	-0.1649*	-0.371478***	-0.461***	-0.50967***	0.003364
		(0.09582)	(0.09529)	(0.09069)	(0.0905)	(0.10379)	(0.13786)	(0.11157)
		[0.831779766]	[0.8544897]	[0.8479773]	[0.6897145]	[0.6306519]	[0.60069344]	[1.0033695]
LEADERSHIP	Yes/ Yes	0.71016***	0.595855***	0.12826	0.74666***	0.43992***	-1.90811***	-0.272688
		(0.14038)	(0.13937)	(0.12936)	(0.12169)	(0.13496)	(0.23055)	(0.19013)
		[2.034317737]	[1.81458251]	[1.1368531]	[2.1099411]	[1.5525899]	[0.148361]	[0.7613305]
	Yes/ No	0.34804***	0.278907***	0.07802	0.452984***	0.25627***	-0.89635***	-0.1758*
		(0.08566)	(0.08509)	(0.07901)	(0.07523)	(0.08509)	(0.13138)	(0.1006)
		[1.416293349]	[1.32168467]	[1.0811401]	[1.5729983]	[1.292102]	[0.40805799]	[0.8387861]
CONSTANT		0.29826**	0.265735**	-0.51148***	-0.641604***	-1.77385***	-2.99514***	-1.574559***
		(0.11931)	(0.11879)	(0.15328)	(0.117)	(0.13366)	(0.211)	(0.22647)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios in brackets.

Discussion

In this paper, I used cosponsorship networks between members of Congress on the different types of immigration legislation introduced over a period of four decades to try and infer how these social relationships may influence behavior when it comes to supporting immigration policy that benefits or sanctions immigrants. Not all immigration legislation is the same, so it is important to understand these relationships on the subtypes of immigration policy. This could have further implications on whether or not a bill gets passed later on in the legislative process. Overall, the results of the exponential random graph models showed partial support for each of my hypotheses. In the House, the results showed that Republicans were more likely to cosponsor with each other on immigration legislation that provided benefits, consistently over the last four decades. Despite all of the incentives for members to act a particular way on certain types of legislation, these results are opposite than what was expected. One explanation for this is it could be the same group of Republicans cosponsoring together on these benefit bills. The results for the Democrats on benefit bills were equally peculiar. Democrats were only more likely to form copartisan ties with one another for four of the twenty-two terms—only consecutively so since 2011. The results, overall, were also similar for Republicans and Democrats in the Senate. Republican senators were more likely form relationships on immigration legislation providing benefits with other Republicans in all but the 109th Congress. Democrats only formed ties with other Democrats opposed to forming a tie with a Republican in four, non-consecutive terms.

When a bill called for sanctions or limitations against immigrants, Republicans in the House were overall more likely to work with other Republicans over 80% of the time

(less likely in four terms). Given the conservative party platform that emphasized more border security and harsher enforcements of the law, especially since the late 1980s, these results were expected. However, Democrats were also more likely to cosponsor enforcement legislation with other Democrats an equal amount of the time. Interestingly, Democrats have consistently been more likely to work together consecutively since the 99th Congress (1985-1986). They have also been more likely to work together on this subtype of bill more than Republicans have been likely to form copartisan ties for about 60% of the terms in this study in the House and the Senate. As the parties became more distinct on their position of immigration, Democrats typically set themselves apart by emphasizing protections for immigrants whether they were legal or not, but also recognized that illegal immigration was the root of several issues the nation needed to fix. With this in mind, one explanation for Democrats being more likely to form ties with one another on bills that sanctioned immigrants is that the bill supported those aspects of the Democratic Party platform.

The next steps for future empirical research are to first categorize each type of enforcement and benefit bill. Just as all immigration bills are not the same as a whole, not all enforcement or benefit bills are the same. For instance, some enforcement bills prohibits individuals associated with a gang from being admitted into the U.S. while others may prohibit pregnant women with certain tourism visas from coming to the country so she does not give birth here and claim American citizenship for her child. The second step is to look at the individual relationships between members to determine if the same Republicans are sponsoring/ cosponsoring bills that benefit immigrants; conversely, are the same Democrats sponsoring/ cosponsoring bills that call for sanctions. Answering

these questions ought to help us better understand why a member chooses to cosponsor an enforcement or benefit bill and how these relationships can impact immigration legislation beyond the pre-floor stages.

Chapter 3: Race, Ethnicity, and Regional Influences on Immigration Bill Cosponsorship

In December of 1985 the U. S. Supreme Court heard a case involving black citizens of North Carolina who alleged that the redistricting plans created seven new districts that would significantly reduce the chances of blacks being able to select a representative of their choice (Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30, 1986). Gingles et al. filed a suit in the District Court claiming that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) had been violated as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. By the time the case was heard in the District Court, Congress had amended Section 2 of the VRA to specify that voting violations only had to have a "discriminatory effect" (Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30, 1986). With the redistricting plan in North Carolina, the District Court ruled that these newly created districts were now in violation of the VRA because they diluted the power of the black vote. The ruling was appealed but upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986. This case and the amendments to the VRA in 1982 led to the creation of majority-minority U.S. House districts where black and Hispanic candidates had a higher likelihood of being elected (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004)[38]

Soon after, the redistricting lines were redrawn in 1990, and Congress underwent important changes with the creation of majority-minority districts that expanded opportunities for descriptive representation; the idea that a legislator or elected official

[38] The terms "black" and "African American" are used interchangeably through this paper as well as the terms "Hispanic" and "Latino".

will represent the interest of a particular group such as race or gender (Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1972; Rouse, Swers, and Parrott 2013). These changes included the expansion of minorities who won seats in Congress, specifically in the House of Representatives. Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of minorities elected into the U.S. House from the 93rd Congress (1973-1974) to the 114th Congress (2015-2016). While the overall percentage of black and Hispanic legislators in the House had been on a slow rise after the 99th Congress (1985-1986), there was a drastic increase in the percent of black legislators following the redistricting in 1990 from 5.8 percent (102nd Congress) of the House to 8.3 percent (103rd Congress); the percent of Hispanics in the House grew from 3.6 percent (102nd Congress) to 4.7 percent (103rd Congress). Even though the number of minority representatives has considerably increased since the 1990s, these groups are still descriptively underrepresented in Congress relative to their proportion in the population (Casellas 2009; 2011).

Since legislative districts are based upon data from the U.S. Census, members of Congress (MCs) do not only represent U.S. citizens; they also represent immigrants—legal or otherwise. Since the 1970s there has been an influx in the foreign-born[39] population from 9.6 million to approximately 40 million in 2010 (Grieco 2014). By 2000, the percentage of the foreign-born population of immigrants who came from Mexico, Latin America, and South and East Asia that resided in the U.S. had each surpassed those who hailed from Europe and Canada. With this second wave of immigration, immigrants who came from Central and South America made up the largest group of the foreign-born population, and recently the Asian population surpassed the European/ Canadian group in

[39] In this paper, foreign-born and immigrant are used interchangeably.

2000 and the foreign-born population from Mexico in 2016. While the foreign-born population from Asia is the fastest growing immigrant population in the U.S., the collective group from Central and South America remain the largest at about 51% of the total foreign-born population.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Minority Legislators in the U. S. House of Representatives



As the number of Hispanic and Asian immigrants coming into the U.S. grew, the number of majority-minority districts has also witnessed a sharp increase. As the foreign-born population has increased, one would expect that immigration has become increasingly salient among voters, especially those residing within these majority-minority districts. There is a vast body of research on minority representatives at the state and national level that shows racial and ethnic minority legislators tend to endorse immigration legislation and promote the inclusion of minority interests in the pre-floor stages of the legislative process and are more likely to vote in line with minorities' interests (e.g. Bratton and Haynie 1999; Bratton and Rouse 2011; Canon 1999; Casellas

and Leal 2011; Gamble 2007; Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Rouse 2013; Rouse, Swers, and Parrot 2013).

Rouse et al. (2013, 3) note that "minority legislators as individuals bring unique priorities and new issues to the congressional agenda;" however, the process of policy making is largely collaborative. Rouse et al. (2013) studied how the agenda setting phase of bill sponsorship/ cosponsorship networks was influenced by minority groups within legislatures using all bills sponsored and cosponsored in the 111th Congress. They found that Democratic women built coalitions with racial and ethnic minorities and supported the legislation of racial and ethnic minorities. Additionally, they found that racial and ethnic minorities built coalitions with one another. However, research by Betina Wilkinson (2015) suggests that racial and ethnic minorities often are in competition with one another rather than working together to advance their interests. Furthermore, McClain et al. (2006) find that Latino immigrants have negative stereotypes of blacks that are modulated by a since of linked fate with other Latinos, and generally feel closer to whites in the South. This presents an interesting puzzle concerning when racial and ethnic minorities find it advantageous to join together to pursue their legislative agenda and how group threat may work against the coalition-building process. This paper builds on the work of Rouse et al. (2013) and Wilkinson (2015) by expanding the scope of the study to include a much broader range of congressional sessions and seeks to understand the coalition building process in Congress among racial/ ethnic minority members on bills involving immigration policy. I utilize social network analysis to examine the sponsor/ cosponsor relationships based on the demographic make-up of members of Congress and those they represent.

Theory and Hypotheses

Descriptive and Substantive Representation

Representation is a fundamental concept in the U.S. political system. The extent to which citizens' preferences are translated into public policy is an important benchmark by which we assess the health of our democracy. Scholars have proposed a variety of ways to conceive of representation. Hanna Pitkin's (1972) seminal work, *The Concept of Representation*, sets forth a multifaceted conception of representation that is comprised of formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive representation. While Pitkin is quite critical of the notion of *descriptive representation* as an important precursor for achieving *substantive* (or policy) *representation*, other scholars have emphasized the influential role that one's background and unique experiences can play in the policy priorities and preferences of elected officials (Mansbridge 1999).

Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representation allows a legislator to connect with subgroups of the population better than others not only through visible characteristics but through shared experiences as well. These common shared experiences of members of particular minority groups produce a sense of "linked fate" that implies that individuals within the group are equally affected by government actions. For instance, Dawson (1994) argues that African Americans typically rely on racial group interests as a heuristic and proxy for their personal interests. The black group interest is the most salient to their individual ideals and norm crystallization (Jackson 1965) would suggest that there is an understood behavioral expectation among African Americans as a collective group. In other words, group interest for African Americans is the default when making political decisions, especially for economic and racial policies. Sanchez (2006)

found that for Latinos, group consciousness and perceived discrimination played the biggest roles in determining public opinion and coalition formation with other groups. However, not all Latinos had the same perceptions of group consciousness; foreign-born Latinos had differing opinions on policy than those who were born in the U.S. Therefore, legislation that seeks to provide benefits to historically-underrepresented groups and level the playing field would likely be perceived favorably by individuals who are Latinos, and legislation that may provoke economic sanctions may be more favorable to blacks. Their fates are inherently connected (Wilkinson, Garand, and Brown 2011).

Many scholars have found support for the idea that descriptive representation leads to better substantive representation of marginalized groups. For instance, in the women in politics literature, scholars have demonstrated that women elected officials do place more importance on so-called "women's issues" compared to their male counterparts (Swers 2002; Htun 2004; Reingold 2008; Kittilson 2008; Clark and Caro 2013). Others find that minority lawmakers provide better quality representation of minority interests than their white counterparts (Banducci et al. 2004; Casellas 2011; Haynie 2001; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004; Minta 2011; Whitby 1997). Thus, this body of research suggests that as diversity increases in Congress, issues that disproportionately affect historically-marginalized groups will receive greater attention on the legislative agenda. For example, there are currently[40] 46 Hispanic MCs: 41 in the House including the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico and 5 members in the

[40] 115th Congress

Senate[41]. While these numbers have set a record high for Hispanics serving as Representatives and Senators, they still only make up about 8.5% of the current elected congressional body. According to a Pew Research study, as of 2015, Hispanics make up approximately 18% of the U.S. population.[42] The number of Hispanics serving in Congress is proportionately less than half of the total number of Hispanics they represent. The question is how do these numbers affect descriptive/ substantive representation and immigration policy? Casellas (2011, 145) noted that "Latino legislators viewed themselves as better able to represent Latino constituents." As modern immigration has become synonymous with Hispanics, particularly those from Mexico and Central America (Chavez 2013; Huntington 2004) there is a greater weight on Hispanic MCs to put more emphasis on introducing and supporting immigration policy that would affect this group of people. Immigration has essentially turned into a predominantly Hispanic issue in the sense that the discourse regarding immigration focuses on this group more than other minority groups. As the legislative agenda regarding immigration today has become heavily focused on border security and deportation of illegal immigrants on one end and about commonsense immigration reform and promoting growth and fairness on the other, the role of Hispanic MCs are increasingly important for policy outcomes on immigration. This includes things such as refusing to sign legislation because components of bills were too harsh on immigrants (Casellas 2011)

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[41] Manning, J. E. (2017). "Membership of the 115th Congress: A Profile." *Congressional Research Service* retrieved at https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/b8f6293e-c235-40fd-b895-6474d0f8e809.pdf.

[42] Flores, A., G. López, and J. Radford. (2017). "Facts on US Latinos, 2015. " *Pew Research Center on Hispanic Trends Proj*ect.

Other research casts doubt upon the strong relationship between descriptive representation and policy outcomes that are beneficial to marginalized groups. Whereas many scholars show that women legislators are more likely to sponsor bills related to "women's issues" and campaign on "women's issues" (Evans and Clark 2015), Reingold (2000) finds inconsistent patterns of women legislators voting for legislation that benefits women as a group. Moreover, others find a statistically insignificant relationship between the number of women in the legislature and policy outcomes that are more beneficial to women as a group (Childs and Krook 2006; Dahlerup 2006). Furthermore, Rocca and Sanchez (2008) find that minority legislators lack influence in Congress and thus sponsor fewer bills than their white counterparts contingent upon party control of Congress. Despite the findings that racial and ethnic minorities in Congress tend to sponsor and cosponsor bills beneficial to marginalized minorities (Hakesworth 2003), without the support of a broader coalition of legislators these bills frequently fail to advance through the legislative process. Consequently, there can be a disconnect between the descriptive representation of groups and policy outcomes.[43]

Group and Economic Threat

Group threat theory suggests that as members of the subordinate group (out-group) threaten the dominant group's (in-group) interests, the likelihood of the dominate group to support subordinates and their policies and programs decreases (Blalock 1967;

[43] In this case, the growing number of women and minorities could lead to more bills that disproportionately benefit women or minorities sponsored; however, if the group lacks "critical mass" and cannot form a broader coalition to support the legislation, then it will not translate into policies that are more beneficial to the marginalized group.

Blumer 1958). Thomas Wilson (2001) addressed policy-related attitudes of native-born Americans regarding legal and undocumented immigrants using data from the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS). He found that people who were born in the U.S. opposed policies that benefitted immigrants when they felt that immigrants posed a direct threat to their interest as native-born Americans. An additional and important finding of Wilson (2001) was that group threat not only impacted the policy views of whites vs. nonwhites, but instead his study suggested that perceived group threat predicted policy views in the same way among whites and nonwhite Americans. Others, however, found that this was not always the case for all nonwhite groups. For example, Taylor (1998) found that areas with higher concentrations of Hispanic and Asians did not have any meaningful impact on Americans' attitudes toward their racial/ ethnic groups, but when the black population rose so did prejudice among whites.

In 2008-2009, the economy collapsed in the United States which led to an increase in unemployment as well as home foreclosures in many states. With this devastation at hand and many out of work, anti-immigrant rhetoric increased among some legislators, using Latinos as scapegoats for economic hardships (Wallace 2014). While this type of rhetoric crossed partisan lines, conservatives struck a chord with many constituents insinuating that these immigrant workers were coming into the country and taking away jobs from those who were born in the United States. With the wake of the economic crash and the increase in competition in the job market, citizens of all racial and ethnic backgrounds (including Latino citizens) began to promote the need to protect native workers (Briggs 2010; Kunovich 2013; Wallace 2014). These fears, according to Wallace (2014), were very influential in prompting legislators to propose legislation that

will presumably protect U.S. citizens and place enforcements on immigrants. Burns and Gimpel (2000, 204) argued that in times of economic insecurity, racial prejudice and restrictionist views on immigration policy were likely on the rise. As the term "immigrant" is increasingly associated with "ethnic minority" in the U.S. (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Glenn and de Jong 1996) and more Asian and Hispanic immigrants continue into come into the country, "attitudes towards immigrants may be more linked to ethnic stereotypes than they were in the late 1900s" (Burns and Gimpel 2000, 204). Furthermore, as the term "immigrant" grows to be negatively associated with minority groups, we see a greater likelihood that immigration policy will be decided based on racial attitudes of the electorate (Burns and Gimpel 2000). Today, the focus on immigration reform has been primarily on Latino migration. The *Latino Threat Narrative*[44] suggests Latinos do not act like other immigrant groups because they are unwilling to assimilate and become part of the national community (Chavez 2013). This perceived notion that immigrants threaten the American way of life creates a discourse that has led to past and recent actions involving anti-immigrant riots, more restrictive immigration laws, and heated public debates regarding government policies (Chavez 2013, 3). In Samuel Huntington's (2004) book, *Who Are We?, he* argues that the influx of Hispanic immigrants has created a national identity crisis. He contends that Hispanics bring challenging issues such as bilingualism and multiculturalism, coupled with the lack of assimilation, which has led to the devaluation of citizenship and is eroding the

[44] Chavez (2013) discusses this narrative in a similar vein as its antecedents: the German, Chinese, Japanese, and Southern and Eastern European threats. At various time periods in the U.S. waves of migrants from these groups created a wave of perceived threat to citizens of the U.S. with alarmist discourse about the negative impact they would have on the country.

"American way". Others, however, have found that as second and third generations Hispanics are more likely to assimilate and are more likely to reject a pure ethnic identification and show more patriotism for the U.S. (Citrin, Lerman, Murakami, and Pearson 2007)

Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong (1997) tested how economic factors swayed public opinion on immigration policy in the 1990s. They found that when people believed that the national or state economy was doing poorly Hispanics and Asians were seen as a threat and bolstered restrictionist sentiment. Those advocates of restricting immigration suggest that foreign-born newcomers displace U.S. citizen workers in the labor market and cause more strain on the government to more services than are covered by taxes (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). If the economy is perceived to be declining, whether it is through personal experience or media influence, constituents will be more likely to possess anti- immigration attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Borjas 2003; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Gay 2006; Kobach 2008; Rocha and Espino 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Waldinger and Lichter 2003; Wallace 2014), especially in states with border migrant entry points, like Mexico.

Therefore, as the economy worsens, resources deplete, and/ or unemployment rises, Latinos are considered to belong in the "out-group" and become a target for anti-immigrant rhetoric and a push for harsher legislation concerning immigration from the electorate (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Hoskin 1991). Furthermore, Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, and Armstrong (2001) argue that resource stress and the presence of a potentially competitive out-group lead to perceived group competition for resources (see also Bobo 1999 and Bobo and Hutchings 1996). For example, African American's

opinions toward immigration are likely motivated by economic self-interest and/or symbolic politics (Wilkinson 2007). African Americans may feel that they are in competition with Latino and Asian immigrants for jobs and may support more restrictionist views towards immigration, but if they possess commiserate feelings for civil rights of minorities they may support more non-restrictionist immigration policies (McClain et al 2007). The perceived competition could motivate the in-group to remove the source of competition—in this case an illegal or undocumented immigrant. This could motivate a legislator to support more enforcement bills than bills that benefit immigrants. Additionally, Hood and Morris (1997) also find that gender influences attitudes towards immigration, specifically that women are more likely to favor non-restrictive immigration policies than their male counterparts. Conversely, racial and group competition may have the opposite effect. These fears, according to Wallace (2014), may motivate legislators to propose legislation that will presumably protect U.S. citizens and place enforcements against immigrants.

Much of the literature has focused on mass attitudes on immigration or when focusing on congressional policymaking on immigration, researchers tend to only examine roll-call voting on final passage votes for a limited number of congressional sessions. My research departs from this approach by focusing on the earlier stage of the policymaking process, investigating the factors that lead legislators to collaborate on immigration bills. I argue that this provides a better means of investigating these theories as bill cosponsorship is less constrained by party leaders who control the legislative agenda. Thus, I set forth the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1*: Hispanic legislators are more likely to form ties with other Hispanic legislators, Black legislators are more likely to form ties with other Black legislators, and Asian-Pacific Islander legislators are more likely to form ties with other Asian-Pacific Islander legislator on immigration legislation.*

Hypothesis 2 *Minority legislators are more likely to form ties with other minority legislators on immigration bills.*

As previously mentioned, not all immigration bills are created equal, and we need to take into account the overall aim of the legislation. Therefore, I expect differences in minority sponsorship depending on whether it is legislation aimed at benefitting immigrants or whether it seeks sanctions.

Hypothesis 3: *Minority legislators are more likely to form ties with other minority members on bills that benefit immigrants.*

Alternatively, Allport (1954) notes that members of the minority group might also be inclined to adopt the attitudes of those in the majority group (generally white) that would lead them to discriminate against or stereotype other minorities.[45] When people are brought up in similar areas with similar education there may be fewer differences in opinions between racial and ethnic majorities and minorities (Bratton and Haynie 1999). For instance minorities who live in more affluent areas and are more highly educated might not have differing interests and opinions than their white neighbors. Another way to look at it is that majorities tend to be more likely to advance policy whether it's

[45] Hispanics generally see more in common with whites than with blacks, but this is generally for the masses. Elites, however, have more linked fate among all minority groups (see Hero and Preuhs 2013)

partisan or racial majorities. Therefore, in the spirit of getting legislation through the legislative process, minorities might be more likely to form relationships with whites to increase the odds of bill enactment. Since the literature presents mixed findings in regard to the likelihood of minorities working with each other or with whites, I offer Hypothesis 4 as an alternative to Hypothesis 1. While this paper does not focus on roll-call voting, I could expect that racial/ ethnic minority members would form relationships with white members in order to garner more support in the pre-floor stages in order to help the advancement of their legislation once it gets to the floor.

> ***Hypothesis 4:*** *Minority legislators are more likely to form ties with white legislators and less likely to form ties with other minority legislators on immigration bills.*

Data and Methods

I rely on an original dataset of all immigration bills and resolutions[46] introduced (2,623 bills and resolutions) in the U. S. House of Representatives from the 93rd – 114th Congresses[47]. These data were compiled from the Library of Congress website www.congress.gov, which contains information on bill introductions, sponsorship/cosponsorship, and bill histories. I collected all immigration bills and resolutions introduced during the aforementioned congressional terms that Congress.gov classified as an "immigration" policy area. Resolutions that call for no legislative action

[46] Note: private and ceremonial resolutions are excluded from the dataset. Only concurrent and joint resolutions are considered.

[47] I originally examined both chambers of the U.S. Congress; however, because there are so few minority members of the Senate the results were not very meaningful and often yielded no or –INF results.

(i.e., ceremonial in nature) were dropped from the dataset (e.g. 103rd Congress, S. Res. 121-A resolution to honor the work and life of Cesar Chavez) as well as appropriation bills.[48]

Racial Diversity

Racial composition of congressional district populations and government institutions are important in considering the environment that influences policy support regarding immigration. I collected data on the racial makeup of the legislative districts and state populations from the U.S. Census[49]. Data on Latino/a Representatives and Senators were acquired from the *National Association of Latino Elected Officials Educational Fund* (NALEO) as well as legislative and social media websites indicating the legislator's race through pictures or references to memberships to particular minority caucuses. Similar processes were conducted for Black, Asian, Native American, and Pacific Islander members. The *National Black Caucus of State Legislators* and the *Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies* were both used to verify race for Black/

[48] Appropriations bills are not explicit to immigration and tend to be more omnibus bills with a very broad focus. It is harder to pin down voting and cosponsorship with these types of bills.

[49] The racial composition of each district is obtained using decennial census data. Unless states redistricted, the data for each district remained the same for a ten year period until another census was taken. In the 94th Congress, the states of California, New York, and Texas redistricted. I was able to collect the data for California but not for the latter two. Therefore, I used the 93rd Congress's data as a proxy for the state and district demographic and unemployment data for New York and Texas for the 94th-97th Congresses. While the data would stay consistent with the other states who used the same data from the 93rd-97th Congresses, these proxies could slightly affect the outcome of the models depending on how large or small the changes were for these two states after redistricting.

African American officials. The *National Caucus of Native American State Legislators* was used to verify race for Native American legislators. Finally, the *Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus* (CAPAC) was later used to verify the race for Asian American or Pacific Islander members.

Second, the racial / ethnic compositions of the congressional districts are considered. Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I collected the data for percentages of Blacks, Hispanics, Asian/ Pacific Islanders, and Foreign-Born populations by congressional district. During the 1970s, the Census Bureau only had complete data for the white and black populations, and had partial data for Hispanics (Spanish Origin) for some states. It was not until the 1980 census when the Hispanic and Asian populations were added and the 106th Congress (1999-2000) was the first time that Pacific Islander data was available for all congressional districts. I combined the Asian and Pacific Islander groups, which other studies using demographic data commonly do.

Table 3.1 shows the aggregate number of individual sponsors and cosponsors by their race/ ethnicity and party affiliation on the different types of immigration bills from 1973-2016. Each MC was only counted once, unless he/she switched parties. Overall whites were more active on sponsoring and cosponsor legislation, but this was expected given their large majority status. White-Republicans (W-R) sponsored and cosponsored more bills overall and enforcement bills compared to white-Democrats (W-D). However, there were more W-Ds that sponsored benefit bills overall, but there were more individual W-Rs that cosponsored the same type of bill. This lends some support to the expectation set out in *Hypothesis 4* that minorities could seek out White legislators (and particularly White Democrats) to cosponsor immigration legislation. The second highest

Table 3.1: Number Individual Sponsors and Cosponsors by Bill Type in the U.S. House

	All Bills		Enforcement Bills		Benefit Bills		Dual Bills	
	Total Individual Sponsors	Total Individual Cosponsors	Total Individual Sponsors	Total Individual Cosponsors	Total Individual Sponsors	Total Individual Cosponsors	Total Individual Sponsors	Total Individual Cosponsors
White	**582**	**1,462**	**349**	**1,291**	**374**	**1,298**	**13**	**181**
Republican	319	787	288	735	174	680	5	25
Democrat	263	675	61	556	200	618	8	156
Black	**38**	**104**	**7**	**84**	**37**	**101**	**0**	**39**
Republican	3	9	1	8	2	8	0	0
Democrat	35	95	6	76	35	93	0	39
Hispanic	**42**	**64**	**21**	**59**	**38**	**65**	**4**	**23**
Republican	10	15	7	13	8	15	1	1
Democrat	32	49	14	46	30	50	3	22
API	**21**	**31**	**4**	**24**	**21**	**30**	**1**	**12**
Republican	2	7	1	3	2	6	0	0
Democrat	19	24	3	21	19	24	1	12

group was Hispanics, who had more individual sponsors than the next highest group, blacks. Hispanic-Democrats (H-D) sponsored and cosponsored more immigration bills than their Hispanic-Republican (H-R) counterparts in every bill category. Most of these MCs were in the Democratic Party, who typically supports more legislation that benefits immigrants; however, there were a few individuals who supported enforcement bills. Of the H-Ds who sponsored enforcement legislation, 11 were from border states—mostly Texas—and New York who has the second largest percent of the foreign-born population in a state under California. These bills include the Border Security and Enforcement Act of 1997 (H.R. 2588, 105th Congress), the Border Security and Responsibility Act of 2009 (H.R. 2076, 111th Congress), and the L-1 Nonimmigrant Reform Act (H.R.2702, 108th Congress). There were more individual black MCs that signed on to immigration bills as cosponsors than any other minority group; specifically, more black-Democrats (B-D). There were very few black-Republicans in the study, and among those, Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX) was the most active, especially for enforcement legislation. Finally the smallest

racial group in the study was Asian-Pacific Islanders (API). Similar to black MCs, there were more individual API-Democrats that participated either as sponsors or cosponsors on immigration legislation. This pattern lends some support of the idea set out in *Hypothesis 2* that minority legislators will ban together to cosponsor immigration bills.

Table 3.2 shows the number of bills that were sponsored by MCs broken out by race/ ethnicity and party. Overall, these trends aligned with the number of individual sponsors shown in Table 3.1. Again, out of all of the bills sponsored and cosponsored by racial/ ethnic minority members, those who belonged to the Democratic Party sponsored and cosponsored more bills than their Republican counterparts. This is mostly due to the number of individual cosponsors in any given congressional session.

Table 3.2: Number of Bills Sponsored and Cosponsored by MCs by Race and Party in the U.S. House

	All Bills		Enforcement Bills		Benefit Bills		Dual Bills	
	Total Sponsors	Total Cosponsors	Total Sponsors	Total Cosponsors	Total Sponsors	Total Cosponsors	Total Sponsors	Total Cosponsors
White	**2,134**	**28,223**	**947**	**13,453**	**1,167**	**14,587**	**20**	**183**
Republican	1,086	15,427	695	10,964	383	4,437	8	26
Democrat	1,084	12,796	252	2,489	784	10,150	12	157
Black	**166**	**3,559**	**17**	**352**	**149**	**3,168**	**0**	**39**
Republican	4	57	1	35	3	22	0	0
Democrat	162	3,502	16	317	146	3,146	0	39
Hispanic	**216**	**2,756**	**46**	**379**	**167**	**2,352**	**4**	**23**
Republican	35	384	14	106	20	277	1	1
Democrat	181	2,372	32	273	147	2,075	3	22
API	**107**	**814**	**6**	**94**	**100**	**708**	**1**	**12**
Republican	7	53	2	31	5	0	0	0
Democrat	100	761	4	63	95	708	1	12

Cosponsorship Networks, Race, and Geography

Burns and Gimpel (2000) noted that having contact with immigrants is not a necessary means to forming opinions regarding immigration policy; however, the large number of immigrants in border states has sparked heated debate and concern at the state

and national levels (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). As a result, policies such as reducing government benefits to immigrants (legal or otherwise), reducing public services to immigrants, or banning sanctuary cities have been introduced and/ or enacted in Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas, and even in Florida. Melissa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal argue in their book, *White Backlash,* that variations in immigrant settlement patterns negatively affect how white Americans feel about immigration and subsequently how they react politically (2015, 47; but also see Provine, Varsanyi, Lewis, and Decker 2016). Furthermore they argue that the proximity to large foreign-born populations raises the potential for more competition for resources like welfare and education. The juxtaposition between geographical location and the Latino population has been found to related to the number of anti-immigrant legislation being introduced and enacted (Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1998). On the other hand, some have found that there is a positive relationship between foreign-born populations and views on immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ha and Oliver 2010; Hood and Morris 1998) people in some areas either benefit from immigrant labor or recognize that we cannot simply deport 11 million people and are in favor of creating more policies that benefit immigrants. For instance, legislators representing districts along the Southern border that focus in agriculture may be more open to creating policies such as increasing the number of temporary work visas (H-2A Visa for agriculture workers). Others legislators in districts along the Southern border may be proponents for creating pathways to legal status or even pathways to citizenship for those who have been in the country for a period of time and have otherwise not broken the law (besides illegal

entry or violating or overstaying their visa). These legislators might see these immigrants as assets to their district and removing them could hurt their economy, for instance.

Figure 3.2: Cosponsorship Networks on All Immigration Bills in the U.S. House, 114th Congress[50,51]



Figure 3.2 shows the relationships between members of the U.S. House on immigration bills (as gleaned through legislative cosponsorship on immigration bills)

[50] For the following three maps, I used the 'maps' and 'geosphere' packages in R. See Becker, R. A. and A. R. Wilks. (1993). "Maps in S." *AT\&T Bell Laboratories Statistics Research Report, 93(2)* and Hijmans, R. J. (2015). "Geosphere: Spherical Trigonometry." R package ver. 1.5-7.

[51] I would also like to thank Katherine Ognyanova for creating the tutorials for creating these visualizations, "Network Visualization with R" at the POLNET workshop in 2015. For more information see http://www.kateto.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Polnet%202015%20Network%20Viz%20Tutorial%20-%20Ognyanova.pdf .

during the 114th Congress (2015-2016).[52] This particular congressional term was chosen not only for it being the most recent completed term, but because it was during these two years that the most immigration bills were introduced. Second, there were more minority legislators in every racial/ ethnic category than there had been in any years prior. In the 114th Congress, minority members made up about 20% of the U.S. House (including territories). This figure shows the more active MCs who have more than 10 connections on all immigration bills in this study. Each dot represents a legislator and the color code corresponds to the race or ethnicity of the member. The size of the node represents the intensity of bill sponsorship on immigration, in which a larger node represents a legislator who is most active in sponsoring/cosponsoring immigration bills. The lines connecting the nodes represent cosponsorship between these members. We can see from the map that the most active legislators on the issue of immigration are members from the Southern border states. In addition, of the 63 legislators that had more than ten connections, 15 were minorities: 3 APIs, 4 Hispanics, and 8 black members. These minority members were predominately from Southern border states and states with larger immigrant populations like New York and Florida. Others like Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD), Rep. Lacy Clay, Jr. (D-MO), and Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-SC) represented districts with majority-minority populations.

Figure 3.3 shows these connections for immigration legislation that seeks enforcements against immigrants. For the enforcement networks, the members who are

[52] This graph is thinned and portrays those with more than 10 connections. This was done so it would be easier to see those who were more active than those who only cosponsored one or two times. The points represent an MC and are in proportion to the amount of bills they cosponsored.

more active (have more than 5 connections) tended to be districts from Texas, Arizona, Alabama and Florida who appear to form relationships at higher rates (notice the prominent triangular pattern in the graph). There are also many shared connections among MCs in the same state.

Figure 3.3: Cosponsorship Networks on Immigration Enforcement Bills in the U.S. House, 114th Congress[53]



Out of the 47 MCs who had more than 5 connections, they were predominately White; there were only 4 were minorities (2 black and 2 Hispanic). Three of those who are minorities were Republicans: Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX) who is mixed race but identifies as black, Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID) who is Puerto Rican, and Rep. Carlos Curbelo (R-FL), the son of Cuban exiles. Casellas (2011, 4) writes that there is a pan-ethnic identity among Latino members who view themselves as better able to represent other Latinos

[53] This graph is thinned and portrays those with more than 5 connections. This was done so it would be easier to see those who were more active than those who only cosponsored one or two times. The points represent an MC and are in proportion to the amount of bills they cosponsored.

despite their district differences. However, these groups of Latinos they represent might have different stances on the different issue and different partisan preferences because "they are less reliably tied to Democrats (Casellas 2011, 4). He notes that Latinos are a diverse group who are distinctively different in their geographic origins, partisan preferences, and even how they identify as Latinos.

For instance, many Cuban-Americans were political refugees seeking better economic opportunities who saw America as a refuge from tyranny under Fidel Castro (Gann and Duignan 1986). Because the Republican Party was perceived as being anti-communist and more supportive of tightening the trade embargo with Cuba, Cuban-Americans have traditionally classified themselves as Republican, run for office as Republicans, and generally vote Republican (Casellas 2011, 7). Puerto Ricans, who are citizens of the U.S. have predominately settled in New York and more recently Florida on the mainland and have typically been supporters of the Democratic Party and are typically elected as Democrats when they run for political office. However, they are not as strongly tied to the Democratic Party as Cuban-Americans are to the Republican party (Casellas 2011, 6). Mexican-Americans are the largest group of Latinos in the U.S. and like Puerto Ricans, they have traditionally been more supportive of the Democratic Party; however, in some states the Republican Party has done more to appeal to Mexican-Americans and incorporate them into their party (Casellas 2011, 5).

If we refer back to Figure 3.3, it makes sense that Rep. Curbelo (R-FL) would be one of the four minority members who have more connections on enforcement legislation. Rep. Curbelo is not only a Cuban-American, but also represents a district with one of the highest concentrated areas of Cuban-Americans—Miami, FL. Given that

Puerto Ricans who are elected into a political office are typically stronger Democrats, it is somewhat of a perplexity that Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID) was not only a three-term incumbent elected in a Republican district but was also elected by a predominantly white population (about 85.2%). He has more stringent views about immigration including supporting mass deportations of young, illegal immigrants.

Figure 3.4: Cosponsorship Networks on Immigration Benefit Bills in the U.S. House, 114th Congress[54]



Figure 3.4 shows the cosponsorship networks among members on immigration bills that aim to provide benefits to immigrants. At first glance, these networks are quite different than those we found with enforcement bills in Figure 3.3, and there is more geographical variation. Members from California and New York share the most connections between the two states. While New York is not a border state, it ranks

[54] Ibid.

number 2 among states with the highest percent of foreign-born population.[55] Intuitively, it would make sense for an MC from New York to form relationships with members from California—a border state that ranks number 1 among states with the highest percentage of foreign-born population. Logically, MCs from these two states would share the same issues that arise from having a large immigrant population, both share a more Democratic leaning in their partisanship, and would be more likely to form relationships on this type of immigration legislation. The member with the most connections was Rep. Yvette Clark (D-NY), a triple minority member (i.e., female, black, and a Democrat). The state with the most active members was California with 11 MCs, including two members who are Hispanic and two who are Asian/Pacific Islander.

Exponential Random Graph Model: Examining the Demographic Factors that Shape Collaboration on Immigration Bills in the U.S. House

Dependent Variable

Although the descriptive analysis of cosponsorship ties is instructive, I will next turn to a more systematic analysis of the factors influencing members to form ties with one another. For this analysis, I created a legislator-by-bill matrix that noted when a legislator sponsored or cosponsored a given immigration bill. From this, I created a legislator-by-legislator affiliation network (House by House) in which each cell denotes the number of times a given legislator cosponsored an immigration bill with another

[55] Krogstad, J. M. and M. Keegan. (2014). "15 States with the Highest Share of Immigrants in Their Population." Pew Research Center accessed from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/14/15-states-with-the-highest-share-of-immigrants-in-their-population/.

legislator, and the diagonal represent the number of bills each legislator has cosponsored. Every legislator is considered, not just those who have cosponsored a bill at least one time. This affiliation matrix served as the dependent variable.

Independent and Control Variables

The primary independent variable considered is *race/ ethnicity* of each MC. Race is coded in the following way: 0=White; 1=Black; 2=Hispanic; 3=Asian/ Pacific Islander; 4=Native American/ Alaskan Eskimo.[56] The second variable(s) of importance is the racial/ethnic demographics of each MCs legislative district. Third, given the drastic rise in the number of immigrants who come from Mexico and other parts of Central America and the regional settlement of these groups across the Southern border, I consider the relationships among MCs from the *border states*. I expect more bills to be sponsored and cosponsored from members of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas, and even Florida given the proximity to Cuba. I also expect members of these states to form relationships with each other at higher rates due to common concerns stemming from immigration and immigrant communities. Finally, I control for other individual and district characteristics of members such as gender, partisanship, whether or not the MC held a leadership position, the unemployment rate of the district, and whether or not the district had a majority-minority population.[57] I expect that the strength of relationships

[56] There was only one MC who was a Native American in the study, Benjamin Nighthorse Campbell from Colorado. Because he was the only MC that represented this category and rarely sponsored/ cosponsored legislation, he was dropped from the study. Dropping him from the model did not significantly alter the results.

[57] For additional information on the coding of the control variables, see Codebook in the Appendix.

between minorities on immigration policies will differ over time as the minority population increases or decreases. Having a more homogeneous district, however, could alter the number and type of immigration legislation a legislator initiates and cosponsors.

The Model

In order to test these theories of relationships on immigration policy, I utilize an Exponential-family Random Graph Model (ERGM) that uses the Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation (MCMCMLE). This is the same model I have used in Chapters 1 and 2.

$$\mathrm{P}(Y_{ij}|\mathrm{X}) = \exp \frac{[\theta^{\tau}\mathrm{g}(yij,\ X)]}{k(\theta)}$$

The model explains the probability of observing a connection between a pair of MC's [*i,j*][*i,j*] while accounting for legislator characteristics, or dependencies in the data such as partisanship, seniority, and gender, for example (Calvero and Leiras 2012; Cranmer, Leifeld, McClurg, and Rolfe 2017; Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, and Morris 2010; Robins, Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher 2007). The random graph indicates that the base model is randomly generated using a matrix including covariates, and this analysis will ask whether I can improve upon what I would randomly get—again trying to explain the ties of legislators as a function of member characteristics. For each MC pair *i* and *j*, the random variable *yij* is 1 if they are connected and a 0 if they are not. X is an affiliation matrix of MCs (nodes) and the connections (edges) in the network: $g(Y_{ij}X)$ is a vector of network statistics, Θ is a vector of coefficients, and $k(\Theta)$ is the constant. This type of analysis is similar but different from a standard logit and OLS model because

there is a relational matrix, and I want to know the likelihood of legislators forming ties with one another.

The Monte Carlo approach is a *simulation* of a distribution of random graphs that have parameter values that are set at the beginning. From there, the observed graph is compared to the distribution of graphs and the parameter values are refined. This process repeats itself until the parameter estimates stabilize (Strauss 1986; Geyer 1991; Snijders, 2002; Robins, Pattison, and Woolcock 2005; Hunter and Handcock 2006; Robins; Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher 2006). In other words, this particular method is a type of risk analysis that takes into account decision making and simulates the possibilities of all the decision probabilities that could be made. The results from this analysis depict what can happen with each decisions and the likelihood of each outcome possibility.

Results

The results of the ERGMs of cosponsorship on all immigration policy bills introduced in the U.S. House are presented in Table 3.3. The table shows the individual ERGM results by congressional term (22 total terms). The majority of the relationships between racial/ ethnic minority members are statistically significant and in a positive direction. Like Rouse et al. (2013), I find that race and ethnicity influence cosponsorship activity. For all immigration bills introduced, blacks were statistically and significantly more likely to form relationships with each other compared to forming relationships with other minority members or whites in 7 congressional terms. Hispanics were more likely to form relationships with other Hispanics in 6 congressional terms and API members were equally more likely to form relationships with each other compared to a relationship

with other minority members or whites. There is some support for my first hypothesis regarding members of the same race being more likely to form relationships with one another. I find more support for my second hypothesis regarding minority members being more likely to form relationships with other minorities at higher rates than forming relationships with their own race/ ethnicity or whites. These findings are corroborated by the findings of Hero and Preuhs (2013) where they found that there was little intergroup conflict among minorities at the national level. Blacks were more likely to form a relationship with a Hispanic or API MC in 13 of the terms in the study (over half of the time). Hispanics and API members were equally as likely to form a relationship with another minority member over whites and members of their own race/ ethnicity in 12 out of 22 congressional terms. Overall, black MCs had an increased likelihood of cosponsoring immigration legislation with each other in 18 out of 22 terms (about 82%), Hispanics were likely to form relationships with each other in 12 terms (about 55% of the total terms), and API members were likely to work with other API members in 6 terms (about 27% of the time). I found no support for Hypothesis 4, that minority legislators would be more likely to form relationships with white legislators.

In regard to the demographic make-up of an MC's district, the percentage of the foreign-born population was a significant predictor of cosponsorship patterns. Specifically, MCs from districts with higher levels of foreign-born population had significantly higher odds of ties forming with one another on all immigration bills. This is consistent with my expectations. However, while the percent of the the Hispanic or API populations in a district was statistically significant, the direction of the coefficients were

generally negative and did not support my expectations.[58] In fact, the percentage of the API population in a district had a greater likelihood of forming a tie than the percent of the Hispanic population, which was contrary to my expectations. In addition, the black population also affected the likelihood of forming relationships; however, these results were not in the direction I hypothesized. As the percentage of the black population in a district increased, the likelihood of a tie forming between members decreased in 14 of the terms in the study, all else equal. Geographically speaking, compared to members from states that do not border Mexico, members from Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas were more likely to form ties with one another about 59% of the time (13 terms) and were likely to form ties with a member from a non-border state 50% of the time.

Because the U.S. Census did not have complete data on all of the major races/ ethnicities for U.S. House districts until the 98th Congress, there were very few majority-minority districts from 1973-1980. However, after the 1980 census representation changed as far as the official demographic make-up of the districts with the addition of other races considered by the U.S. Census. And after Section 2 of the VRA was amended in 1982 and upheld by the Supreme Court in 1986, there were significantly more majority-minority districts created at higher rates. From the 98th-114th Congress, members from majority-minority districts were significantly more likely to form ties with other members of majority-minority districts in every term compared to those in districts with a white majority, all else equal.[59]

[58] The percent of the Hispanic and API populations were only considered for the 98th-114th Congresses due to the Census not having data available for these groups.

[59] All but one term (104th) reached conventional levels of statistical significance.

For the other control variables, being a female legislator increased the likelihood of a tie forming on an immigration bills about 50% of the time compared to males. The last term a woman was more likely to form a tie than her male counterpart was during the 109th Congress (2005-2006). Republican MCs were slightly less likely than Democrats to form ties on immigration legislation, and those in a leadership position (party leader, committee chair, or ranking member) did not increase the odds of a tie forming compared to members not in leadership in all but the 93rd Congress. Finally, as the percent of a district's unemployment rate increased there was an overall decreased likelihood of a tie forming between an MC. This was an interesting result given the vast literature on the effects of unemployment and anti-immigrant sentiment.

Enforcement and Benefit Bills

Next, I examine immigration bills separately depending on whether the immigration legislation seeks enforcements on immigrants or aims to provide benefits to immigrants. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 show the results of the ERGMS for enforcements and benefits, respectively. For enforcement bills, compared to a white-white tie, black, Hispanic, and API MCs were not very likely to form ties with members of their own party overall, and slightly more likely to form a tie with another minority member. Minority MCs were even less likely to form a tie with a white member. There was essentially no support for my first, second, and fourth hypotheses when it comes to immigration bills that call for sanctions or enforcements against immigrants. On the other hand, when it came to bills aimed at benefitting immigrants (Table 3.5), I did find a significant effect of race on cosponsorship patterns. Hispanics were more likely to form ties with one another in 14 terms. I found an increased likelihood of black MCs forming

ties with other black MCs in all but three terms (93rd, 95th, and 114th).[60] However, API members were only more likely to form ties with other API members in 6 terms; about as much as they were to form ties with each other on enforcement bills. I found support for my third hypothesis—Minority MCs were more likely to form ties with one another compared to whites in almost all congressional terms in the dataset. The odds of ties forming between an API member and a Hispanic or black member was significantly more likely to occur than a tie between a black and Hispanic member; however, the margins were slim in many cases. Compared to a white-white tie, the odds of a tie forming between a Hispanic and white member occurred only in 5 terms, otherwise, there was either a decreased odds or coefficients were not statistically significant. Black or API members were more likely than Hispanics to form a tie with a white member in every benefit model, all else equal.

For enforcement legislation, members from border states were almost always more likely to form ties with another member who was from a border state compared to members of the other 46 states that do not share a border with Mexico.[61] These results were as expected. Members from border states face different issues when it comes to immigration and typically house over half of the nation's immigrant population. Often these members will push for legislation to strictly enforce immigration laws, and they are more likely to introduce and cosponsor legislation that seeks to increase border security.

[60] These were in the expected positive direction but failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

[61] In the 94th Congress the coefficient was in the predicted positive direction but was not statistically significant.

Conversely, when it came to forming ties on bills that benefitted immigrants, the likelihood of seeing a tie between two members from border states or a member from a border state and non-border state were very small overall.

For district demographics, the percent of Hispanics or API populations in a member's district generally did not increase the likelihood of ties being formed; however, the % of the black population substantially increased the odds of a tie being formed in most of the congressional terms. Furthermore, as the percent of the overall foreign-born population increased, there was a positive and significant increase in the likelihood of a tie forming between MCs on enforcement and benefit bills.

Conversely, the results for the percentage of the black population in a member's district were the complete opposite on bills aiming to provide benefits to immigrants. In fact, as the black population grew, the likelihood of a tie forming between MCs decreased in allbut four of the terms in the dataset. The results for the % Hispanic and % API in a member's district almost mirrored the results for the enforcement bills. These results were surprising. Given the growing Hispanic population and the rising API population in the nation, I would have expected that as these populations increased, it would lead to more cosponsorship connections on benefit bills.

Compared to members with a majority white population in their districts, the results show that members from majority-minority districts were more likely to form ties with other members of majority-minority district on enforcement legislation from the 106th Congress to the 113th Congress, all else equal. The results were reversed for immigration bills aiming to benefit immigrants. Being in a majority-minority district

significantly increased the odds of a tie being formed between an MC from a majority-minority or a non-majority-minority district. This means that members of districts with a non-white majority population were more likely to form relationship with members who had districts similar to theirs and were predominantly Democratic. Finally, the unemployment rate of the district had very small effects on bill cosponsorship patterns. For enforcement bills the percent unemployed only increased the odds of a tie forming in 6 terms and only increased the odds by about 11% at the highest. Similarly, for benefit bills as unemployment increased in a member's district the odds of relationships forming only increased in 8 terms and only increased the odds by 9% at the highest.

For the control variables, the results for enforcement bills indicated being a female decreased the odds of ties forming compared to males; however, women were more likely to form ties on bills that benefitted immigrants compared to their male counterparts. Given women's nature to support more legislation that promotes social welfare, these results were as predicted. Republicans were more likely to form ties on bills that provided sanctions to immigrants, and Democrats were more likely to form ties on bills that provided benefits. Lastly, members of the leadership in the House were not likely to form ties on either type of immigration bills. As others have posited, those in leadership may be more concerned about their reputation within Congress and their party and simply may choose not to endorse this type of policy in the pre-floor stages.

Table 3.3: All House Immigration Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	-INF***	0.997649***	-0.112941	-0.3769883***	0.4614***	0.9542822***	0.962***	0.8945453***
		(0)	(0.10756)	(0.09967)	(0.06696)	(0.03901)	(0.04294)	(0.04003)	(0.03689)
	Hispanic/ White	-INF***	-0.3803**	-0.340599***	-0.9892341***	0.2744***	1.1850623***	0.9051***	0.2126195***
RACE		(0)	(0.15832)	(0.10876)	(0.07982)	(0.04361)	(0.06371)	(0.04968)	(0.05079)
	API/ White	--	-1.245801***	0.353173**	-1.1564851***	0.5537***	1.2582027***	1.428***	1.33226***
			(0.26411)	(0.15931)	(0.12074)	(0.06382)	(0.07256)	(0.07311)	(0.0883)
	Black/ Black	-INF***	3.005588***	-0.10689	1.8099947***	1.545***	3.3294113***	3.051***	3.3596195***
		(0)	(0.35007)	(0.53088)	(0.30271)	(0.2704)	(0.27609)	(0.2973)	(0.29967)
	Hispanic/ Black	-INF***	1.282695***	0.197238	-2.505999**	0.8817***	3.1612344***	2.592***	2.7416425***
		(0)	(0.42915)	(0.41005)	(1.01328)	(0.2221)	(0.19885)	(0.2285)	(0.24096)
	API/ Black	--	0.260015	0.231075	0.5542736	2.387***	3.9651319***	3.788***	3.2610984***
			(0.76923)	(0.76548)	(0.41658)	(0.5348)	(0.48708)	(0.6056)	(0.35182)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	0.03786	3.074776***	3.385***	1.6478368***
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.5465)	(0.39428)	(0.6191)	(0.41681)
	API/ Hispanic	--	-INF***	1.024652	-INF***	1.163**	3.6415484***	13.34	2.8835742***
		--	(0)	(0.78989)	(0)	(0.5888)	(0.49752)	(55.05)	(0.47019)
	API/ API	--	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	12.07	12.4556783	13.39	3.8026665***
			(0)	(0)	(0)	(182.5)	(66.3467)	(183.4)	(1.15215)
PARTY	Republican	1.213799***	-0.335547***	0.355214***	0.5895432***	0.1599***	-1.2257227***	-1.196***	-1.1201447***
		(0.18524)	(0.04092)	(0.02806)	(0.01434)	(0.01039)	(0.01804)	(0.01436)	(0.01289)
GENDER	Female	-12.937723	0.530566***	0.136747**	0.1574024***	0.2509***	0.2573626***	0.02703	-0.0001447
		(349.513)	(0.06129)	(0.05826)	(0.03471)	(0.02253)	(0.03099)	(0.02792)	(0.02427)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	2.13784***	-0.541851***	-0.976703***	-1.056222***	-0.3565***	-0.6360793***	-0.1395***	-0.4927119***
		(0.15687)	(0.07182)	(0.05999)	(0.02828)	(0.01627)	(0.02642)	(0.01966)	(0.01829)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.13192	0.13673	0.790748***	1.494417***	0.07531*	0.7168097***	0.7101***	-0.115069**
		(1.01631)	(0.1234)	(0.08648)	(0.04791)	(0.04186)	(0.05804)	(0.04938)	(0.04967)
	Yes/ No	-0.038377	0.035939	0.20932***	0.571915***	-0.3225***	0.2574473***	0.2895***	-0.1236203***
		(0.28289)	(0.05382)	(0.04103)	(0.02108)	(0.01624)	(0.02618)	(0.02164)	(0.02117)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.39801***	0.001042	-0.021311***	-0.03829***	0.02049***	0.0510065***	0.08117***	0.039593***
		(0.07926)	(0.00656)	(0.00642)	(0.00327)	(0.00216)	(0.00301)	(0.0026)	(0.00247)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	0.056139***	-0.012917***	0.005528***	-0.0020594***	-0.01394***	-0.0257592***	-0.01763***	-0.0252996***
		(0.00642)	(0.00163)	(0.00117)	(0.00067)	(0.00047)	(0.00076)	(0.00057)	(0.00056)
	% Hispanic in District	--	--	--	--	--	-0.0355471***	-0.01451***	-0.0097068***
							(0.00131)	(0.00093)	(0.00096)
	% API in District	--	--	--	--	--	-0.0485226***	-0.007677***	-0.0397682***
							(0.00197)	(0.00128)	(0.002)
	% Foreign Born in District	-0.029706	0.049773***	0.053773***	-0.005054***	0.04172***	0.069418***	0.04515***	0.0538121***
		(0.02394)	(0.00195)	(0.00192)	(0.00142)	(0.00099)	(0.00134)	(0.00113)	(0.00121)
MAJORITY-MINORITY	Yes/ Yes	.	-1.199212**	0.471287	0.0938876	13.12	2.7013864***	0.2871*	1.6299022***
		.	(0.57209)	(0.49689)	(0.39044)	(33.16)	(0.16967)	(0.1658)	(0.1996)
	Yes/ No	.	-0.227664*	0.174061*	-0.2598806***	1.132***	1.1610618***	0.1756***	0.6767145***
		.	(0.11957)	(0.09521)	(0.07582)	(0.0433)	(0.05189)	(0.04185)	(0.04049)
CONSTANT		-8.483124***	-4.135349***	-4.007577***	-1.852406***	-0.7255***	-1.7582683***	-1.482***	-0.2868032***
		(0.71896)	(0.07651)	(0.06976)	(0.03678)	(0.02659)	(0.04548)	(0.04038)	(0.03845)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.3: All House Immigration Bills continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	0.1552325***	-0.1925311***	-0.2360532***	-0.1425513**	0.5270858***	0.0655235**	0.164043***
		(0.03668)	(0.04899)	(0.03826)	(0.06133)	(0.03302)	(0.03074)	(0.03489)
	Hispanic/ White	-0.2401023***	-0.2840699***	-0.613343***	-0.5529677***	0.0584339	-0.0542133	0.065624
RACE		(0.0452)	(0.05853)	(0.0486)	(0.06069)	(0.04384)	(0.03685)	(0.0408)
	API/ White	0.3478005***	0.652146***	-0.0861277	-0.6230005***	0.1936217***	0.080657	0.2561905***
		(0.08065)	(0.08556)	(0.0585)	(0.08786)	(0.0639)	(0.05639)	(0.05405)
	Black/ Black	0.6138741***	-0.0357363	0.6628787***	-0.3442125**	2.1694503***	0.3168453**	0.8023106***
		(0.17914)	(0.18193)	(0.11238)	(0.17548)	(0.1129)	(0.13646)	(0.11992)
	Hispanic/ Black	0.3522573**	0.3530811**	-0.4459149***	0.9676212***	1.033247***	0.4773912***	0.6609905***
		(0.151)	(0.15422)	(0.10681)	(0.13281)	(0.10089)	(0.1345)	(0.11175)
	API/ Black	0.6794932***	1.3164362***	1.3849312***	0.2768029	1.503976***	1.4953171***	1.5936906***
		(0.22772)	(0.26399)	(0.17645)	(0.23129)	(0.18903)	(0.27841)	(0.19813)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	0.0318449	0.7376269**	-0.7987002***	3.0377948***	0.2879665	0.5587833**	0.9019818***
		(0.30544)	(0.29229)	(0.20175)	(0.20279)	(0.18148)	(0.28358)	(0.22136)
	API/ Hispanic	0.3059201	1.8985554***	0.3441444	1.6580392***	0.5090917**	1.9691891***	1.6080403***
		(0.30382)	(0.371)	(0.24232)	(0.24884)	(0.25003)	(0.52469)	(0.28716)
	API/ API	0.6388757	12.3645802	1.7564474**	0.4734139	0.6667529	10.063155	2.5051194**
		(0.67244)	(68.5658)	(0.74781)	(0.85177)	(0.88781)	(46.1774)	(1.06105)
PARTY	Republican	-0.4047562***	0.5119124***	1.2164211***	1.0284999***	-0.2545529***	-0.5719932***	-0.8471108***
		(0.01062)	(0.01574)	(0.01312)	(0.01812)	(0.01259)	(0.01115)	(0.01375)
GENDER	Female	-0.4440208***	-0.2698766***	0.0986878***	0.1613021***	0.0375556**	0.1542413***	0.1403032***
		(0.02098)	(0.03131)	(0.01834)	(0.02408)	(0.01707)	(0.01546)	(0.01745)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-0.4588713***	-0.2956868***	-0.3486433***	-0.3008257***	-0.0986339***	-0.2973199***	-0.2748609***
		(0.01647)	(0.02392)	(0.01787)	(0.02542)	(0.01901)	(0.01712)	(0.02119)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	0.0201909	0.7790665***	0.8695742***	1.7123992***	-0.1065459**	0.3319304***	-0.296451***
		(0.04371)	(0.05206)	(0.04613)	(0.05208)	(0.04505)	(0.04298)	(0.04889)
	Yes/ No	-0.064632***	0.1585789***	0.2810212***	0.76858***	-0.1302725***	-0.0091866	-0.2792275***
		(0.0188)	(0.0258)	(0.02158)	(0.02664)	(0.02157)	(0.01955)	(0.02298)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.0227631***	0.0478919***	-0.0331476***	0.0278681***	0.053309***	0.0079497	-0.0159358**
		(0.00222)	(0.00325)	(0.00341)	(0.00455)	(0.00329)	(0.00611)	(0.00718)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	-0.0069233***	-0.0052204***	0.0137916***	0.0096827***	-0.0048171***	-0.0086428***	-0.0012394*
		(0.00048)	(0.00075)	(0.00071)	(0.00094)	(0.00066)	(0.00056)	(0.00067)
	% Hispanic in District	-0.0068924***	-0.0069052***	-0.0013606	0.0001403	-0.0044115***	-0.0043084***	-0.0017069*
		(0.00086)	(0.00109)	(0.00114)	(0.0013)	(0.00111)	(0.00084)	(0.00098)
	% API in District	-0.0102242***	0.0074241***	0.0103232***	0.0229355***	0.0199683***	-0.0035688***	0.0008338
		(0.0018)	(0.00169)	(0.00151)	(0.00226)	(0.00138)	(0.00132)	(0.00133)
	% Foreign Born in District	0.0483214***	0.045353***	0.0169832***	-0.0111267***	0.0235025***	0.01965***	0.0300843***
		(0.00105)	(0.00125)	(0.00112)	(0.00159)	(0.00105)	(0.00089)	(0.00095)
MAJORITY-MINORITY	Yes/ Yes	0.9390734***	2.3203789***	1.1785723***	0.1516928	1.0016559***	3.1226253***	1.7059526***
		(0.16436)	(0.17742)	(0.09096)	(0.14326)	(0.08459)	(0.13354)	(0.08889)
	Yes/ No	0.4452453***	0.4486088***	-0.7007788***	-1.4189568***	-0.5538957***	0.2441681***	0.0562108*
		(0.04102)	(0.05561)	(0.04131)	(0.06933)	(0.03549)	(0.02953)	(0.03344)
CONSTANT		0.0844941**	-3.4120046***	-2.0827555***	-3.7714551***	-1.824625***	-0.0628149	-0.9595608***
		(0.03491)	(0.0519)	(0.04519)	(0.06633)	(0.04357)	(0.03988)	(0.0467)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.3: All House Immigration Bills continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	-0.0135622	-0.2364***	-0.3902384***	-0.1028392***	-0.3536616***	-0.2991966***	-0.1808427***
		(0.03116)	(0.03125)	(0.02687)	(0.02781)	(0.0301)	(0.02801)	(0.02584)
	Hispanic/ White	-0.1114758***	-0.04886	0.1108501***	-0.284174***	-0.0565736*	-0.6437555***	-0.4647075***
RACE		(0.03515)	(0.03121)	(0.03497)	(0.03464)	(0.03429)	(0.03004)	(0.02743)
	API/ White	-0.0999009*	0.0524	-0.3591536***	-0.0203174	0.0438686	-0.2814934***	-0.1483439***
		(0.05837)	(0.05249)	(0.04774)	(0.04213)	(0.04566)	(0.04348)	(0.03873)
	Black/ Black	1.6683813***	1.502***	0.5705847***	1.3541678***	0.5146015***	0.8616285***	0.3954738***
		(0.15532)	(0.1004)	(0.08263)	(0.11219)	(0.08823)	(0.12229)	(0.08023)
	Hispanic/ Black	0.6737418***	0.1281*	1.0448457***	1.378098***	0.492256***	-0.073815	0.1176560*
		(0.11593)	(0.07578)	(0.0788)	(0.10342)	(0.07427)	(0.08278)	(0.06722)
	API/ Black	1.6664494***	0.45***	0.3670343***	0.8178382***	1.0413262***	1.1064135***	0.8250578***
		(0.28842)	(0.1562)	(0.13574)	(0.13071)	(0.12815)	(0.21505)	(0.11579)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	0.9453402***	0.5283***	2.4557217***	1.3271853***	0.5985172***	-0.6311165***	0.0647235
		(0.23587)	(0.1227)	(0.20083)	(0.19168)	(0.12457)	(0.1278)	(0.11354)
	API/ Hispanic	-0.235646	0.4369**	0.9419864***	0.7376787***	1.1014896***	0.33186*	0.4904934***
		(0.25384)	(0.1827)	(0.18368)	(0.16196)	(0.15312)	(0.19643)	(0.13618)
	API/ API	-0.6672043	0.2258	0.7012148	0.8273882**	2.1336116***	10.5635255	1.0126397***
		(0.91626)	(0.6757)	(0.56649)	(0.37455)	(0.50255)	(49.9937)	(0.36901)
PARTY	Republican	-0.31621***	0.3557***	0.2821365***	-0.0125194	-0.1904633***	-1.0746986***	0.0801014***
		(0.01153)	(0.0119)	(0.01036)	(0.01073)	(0.01241)	(0.01277)	(0.01188)
GENDER	Female	0.0147246	0.07383***	-0.0313141**	-0.1755383***	-0.0646962***	-0.1765769***	-0.0248811**
		(0.01547)	(0.01431)	(0.01313)	(0.01374)	(0.01476)	(0.01385)	(0.01265)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-0.2703475***	-0.2434***	-0.4009287***	-0.1584534***	-0.1312925***	-0.3927131***	-0.2468636***
		(0.01731)	(0.0171)	(0.01562)	(0.0162)	(0.01786)	(0.01776)	(0.01547)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-0.2446157***	0.6857***	0.0043406	-0.0726211*	0.2161817***	0.3384578***	0.1239308***
		(0.04182)	(0.03528)	(0.03968)	(0.04031)	(0.04158)	(0.04137)	(0.0376)
	Yes/ No	-0.0939422***	0.1764***	-0.09506***	-0.1257449***	0.1309259***	0.1424583***	0.1216278***
		(0.01921)	(0.0169)	(0.01843)	(0.01894)	(0.01992)	(0.01941)	(0.01774)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.022635***	-0.03238***	-0.006252***	-0.0194385***	-0.0582983***	0.016693***	-0.0238373***
		(0.00223)	(0.00232)	(0.00172)	(0.00215)	(0.00318)	(0.00239)	(0.00221)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	-0.0045102***	0.004828***	0.0068215***	0.0049224***	0.0130714***	-0.0044398***	-0.0005132
		(0.0006)	(0.00058)	(0.00054)	(0.00056)	(0.00063)	(0.00065)	(0.0006)
	% Hispanic in District	0.0025491***	-0.00000007742**	-0.0006123	0.0039766***	0.003262***	-0.0025328***	-0.0031315***
		(0.00082)	(3.3E-08)	(0.0008)	(0.00081)	(0.00082)	(0.00077)	(0.00068)
	% API in District	-0.0075282***	-0.005134***	0.0138324***	-0.0102923***	0.012288***	0.003747***	-0.0105601***
		(0.00137)	(0.00128)	(0.00131)	(0.00125)	(0.00154)	(0.00145)	(0.00118)
	% Foreign Born in District	0.019073***	0.01476***	0.0013288	0.0181707***	0.0175413***	0.0126006***	0.0195713***
		(0.00088)	(0.00072)	(0.00085)	(0.00086)	(0.00093)	(0.00096)	(0.00084)
MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICT	Yes/ Yes	2.0221833***	0.6124***	0.424503***	1.176406***	0.3434105***	1.0651028***	0.7121956***
		(0.06476)	(0.05225)	(0.05243)	(0.05638)	(0.0536)	(0.0545)	(0.04791)
	Yes/ No	-0.027747	-0.4447***	-0.5479499***	-0.0890415***	-0.5226303***	-0.2155128***	-0.3215164***
		(0.02663)	(0.0255)	(0.02513)	(0.02522)	(0.02657)	(0.02535)	(0.0236)
CONSTANT		-0.3149172***	-1.036***	-0.419894***	-0.7593652***	-0.849169***	0.5460551***	0.1507803***
		(0.032)	(0.03377)	(0.02626)	(0.02782)	(0.03808)	(0.04761)	(0.04526)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.4: House Enforcement Immigration Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	-INF***	0.641413***	-0.401918***	-1.2744037***	-INF***	-0.685776**	0.4535302***	0.83612***
		(0)	(0.16838)	(0.12559)	(0.12261)	(0)	(0.30614)	(0.04556)	(0.06494)
	Hispanic/ White	-INF***	-0.992946***	-0.760087***	-0.4714665***	-INF	1.509472***	0.9739531***	0.692751***
RACE		(0)	(0.36005)	(0.15298)	(0.08633)	(0.10716)	(0.20553)	(0.05445)	(0.09125)
	API/ White	--	-INF***	0.059356	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	1.3535807***	1.640397***
			(0)	(0.22727)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.07505)	(0.12889)
	Black/ Black	-INF***	0.946389	-1.329766	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	2.1314591***	1.920781***
		(0)	(1.04302)	(1.07596)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.22093)	(0.19987)
	Hispanic/ Black	-INF***	1.396149*	-0.714291	-1.7509041*	-INF***	2.815878***	1.5692851***	2.004359***
		(0)	(0.74288)	(0.72444)	(1.0313)	(0)	(0.75547)	(0.17045)	(0.19112)
	API/ Black	--	-INF***	0.182938	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	2.0541098***	2.911685***
			(0)	(1.05649)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.30672)	(0.31033)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	3.60566***	2.3229632***	1.80234***
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1.07722)	(0.32897)	(0.40168)
	API/ Hispanic	--	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	3.3597904***	2.853443***
			(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.48082)	(0.45464)
	API/ API	--	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	12.5636049	3.294736***
			(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(67.4262)	(1.276)
PARTY	Republican	0.08591	0.023839	0.549416***	1.0061079***	0.57426***	0.589048***	-0.6786996***	1.926699***
		(0.44751)	(0.05449)	(0.0313)	(0.01748)	(0.02508)	(0.03862)	(0.01693)	(0.018862)
GENDER	Female	-15.17715	0.55199***	-0.167989*	0.1602277***	-0.117415*	-0.948727***	0.0142655	-0.180912***
		(1,755.26)	(0.09144)	(0.07492)	(0.04607)	(0.06173)	(0.12988)	(0.03434)	(0.019043)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-15.76102	-0.445491***	-0.961846***	-0.9449429***	0.011161	-0.256996***	0.0936573***	-1.409704***
		(928.735)	(0.09692)	(0.06684)	(0.0316)	(0.0366)	(0.06034)	(0.02261)	(0.06299)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	2.4961**	-0.14913	0.321681***	2.1372887***	1.816611***	0.875175***	1.1671919***	0.541100***
		(1.14997)	(0.22862)	(0.12096)	(0.05471)	(0.08033)	(0.174)	(0.05328)	(0.054670)
	Yes/ No	0.94599	-0.025962	0.153782**	0.8650258***	0.884901***	0.438152***	0.5556854***	0.313616***
		(0.66066)	(0.08177)	(0.04708)	(0.0254)	(0.03603)	(0.07671)	(0.02533)	(0.024930)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.02577	-0.087472***	-0.029454***	-0.0103066**	-0.274819***	-0.124308***	0.1022401***	-019589***
		(0.14004)	(0.01863)	(0.00829)	(0.00333)	(0.00967)	(0.00994)	(0.00305)	(0.002945)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	0.05863***	0.001689	0.012336***	0.0022769***	0.027397***	0.019439***	-0.0037409***	0.009913***
		(0.01473)	(0.00223)	(0.0013)	(0.00081)	(0.00103)	(0.00186)	(0.00066)	(0.000792)
	% Hispanic in District	--	--	--	--	--	-0.036171***	-0.0182223***	0.001732*
							(0.00464)	(0.00106)	(0.001050)
	% API in District	--	--	--	--	--	-0.202098***	0.0073269***	-0.022806***
							(0.01738)	(0.00145)	(0.002259)
	% Foreign Born in District	-0.09295	0.030391***	0.04812***	-0.1043998***	-0.040722***	0.066286***	0.0378224***	0.010304***
		(0.06654)	(0.00314)	(0.00224)	(0.00268)	(0.00305)	(0.00517)	(0.00126)	(0.001406)
MAJORITY-MINORITY	Yes/ Yes	--	-INF***	-0.256619	-INF***	-INF***	-1.878143.	-0.6202376***	-0.047344
			(0)	(0.79201)	(0)	(0)	(1.04807)	(0.16175)	(0.077617)
	Yes/ No	--	-1.515346***	-0.083594	-0.5473486***	0.750816***	-2.324582***	-0.3828805***	-0.335808***
			(0.24298)	(0.1199)	(0.12706)	(0.13599)	(0.2613)	(0.0468)	(0.033286)
CONSTANT		-9.99347***	-4.327987***	-4.344965***	-2.5003972***	-2.16484***	-3.601233***	-3.2015902***	-4.61553***
		(1.182)	(0.15949)	(0.08539)	(0.04323)	(0.08446)	(0.14401)	(0.04907)	(0.08902)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.4: House Enforcement Immigration Bills continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	-0.344933*	-2.097227***	-0.7754262***	0.5865***	0.6087841***	-0.0641682	-0.90761***
		(0.17737)	(0.25541)	(0.05449)	(0.07281)	(0.06077)	(0.0416)	(0.09858)
	Hispanic/ White	-0.117142	0.424534***	-1.2674097***	-0.7793***	0.5837328***	0.2066745***	-0.336689***
RACE		(0.14163)	(0.13971)	(0.07086)	(0.0801)	(0.0784)	(0.04537)	(0.10905)
	API/ White	-INF***	-INF***	-0.439661***	-0.6431***	0.9329369***	0.2020219**	-INF***
		(0)	(0)	(0.08054)	(0.1093)	(0.09443)	(0.07653)	(0)
	Black/ Black	-INF***	-INF***	-1.6116054***	0.8145	1.2253141***	0.0453788	-2.06481***
		(0)	(0)	(0.30733)	(0.7769)	(0.24124)	(0.13372)	(0.36039)
	Hispanic/ Black	-0.102593	-INF***	-1.5790737***	-0.334	1.5536791***	0.0704446	-1.258533***
		(0.74353)	(0)	(0.23848)	(0.5346)	(0.17365)	(0.111)	(0.2552)
	API/ Black	-INF***	-INF***	-1.6097465***	-0.01342	1.912959***	0.634763***	-INF***
		(0)	(0)	(0.53205)	(0.7761)	(0.28973)	(0.21148)	(0)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	-0.65469	2.341315***	-0.6833403**	-1.797*	1.9975615***	0.2522278	-0.980379**
		(1.04402)	(0.63489)	(0.30067)	(1.026)	(0.2295)	(0.16821)	(0.38512)
	API/ Hispanic	-INF***	-INF***	-1.834655***	-1.71*	2.0190326***	0.6389832**	-INF***
		(0)	(0)	(0.63586)	(1.039)	(0.30134)	(0.24906)	(0)
	API/ API	-INF***	-INF***	-0.3944856	-INF***	1.9496909*	1.4644581*	-INF***
		(0)	(0)	(1.1929)	(0)	(1.16663)	(0.87204)	(0)
PARTY	Republican	1.913048***	2.211335***	1.7572137***	1.414***	0.5078428***	0.0080752	1.542703***
		(0.04226)	(0.03675)	(0.01653)	(0.02131)	(0.02278)	(0.01464)	(0.03408)
GENDER	Female	-0.025871	-1.220909***	-0.0318538	0.03604	-0.5001732***	-0.1041489***	-0.186779***
		(0.0695)	(0.09673)	(0.02353)	(0.03011)	(0.03696)	(0.02105)	(0.04189)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-0.829015***	-0.596371***	-0.5652102***	-0.363***	-0.3567199***	-0.2862777***	-0.463801***
		(0.06229)	(0.04597)	(0.02158)	(0.02876)	(0.03567)	(0.02353)	(0.04443)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	2.15323***	2.460957***	1.314281***	2.799***	0.647971***	0.9398747***	1.069102***
		(0.1096)	(0.09477)	(0.05923)	(0.06444)	(0.07313)	(0.04938)	(0.09763)
	Yes/ No	0.907222***	1.064908***	0.455014***	1.333***	0.15545***	0.2250128***	0.172036***
		(0.06148)	(0.05131)	(0.02756)	(0.03166)	(0.03822)	(0.0254)	(0.04977)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.054254***	-0.072658***	-0.0668164***	0.04612***	0.0457231***	0.0476973***	0.02201
		(0.00783)	(0.00668)	(0.00442)	(0.0053)	(0.00584)	(0.00784)	(0.01482)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	-0.005484**	0.008292***	0.0120761***	0.0232***	-0.0146847***	-0.0115315***	0.014455***
		(0.00194)	(0.00157)	(0.00087)	(0.0011)	(0.00119)	(0.00075)	(0.00127)
	% Hispanic in District	0.011337***	-0.013787***	0.0015914	-0.01765***	0.0003006	-0.0046321***	0.00372*
		(0.00273)	(0.00268)	(0.00148)	(0.00167)	(0.00192)	(0.00106)	(0.00221)
	% API in District	-0.149017***	-0.069096***	-0.032397***	-0.02907***	0.0074123**	-0.0233005***	-0.023809***
		(0.01364)	(0.01098)	(0.00314)	(0.00442)	(0.00291)	(0.00187)	(0.00482)
	% Foreign Born in District	0.014231***	0.027175***	0.0170461***	0.00001923	-0.011366***	0.0036466**	-0.000153
		(0.00373)	(0.00377)	(0.00168)	(0.00243)	(0.00205)	(0.00115)	(0.00269)
MAJORITY-MINORITY	Yes/ Yes	-INF***	-INF***	-0.3015281*	-INF***	-0.3801513**	0.8154526***	1.765905***
		(0)	(0)	(0.15492)	(0)	(0.16739)	(0.0895)	(0.18959)
	Yes/ No	-0.055241	-1.01448***	-1.2874227***	-4.119***	-0.6463038***	0.2815623***	-0.442615***
		(0.19439)	(0.26816)	(0.05601)	(0.129)	(0.06954)	(0.03925)	(0.09458)
CONSTANT		-5.732581***	-5.65965***	-2.4381752***	-4.816***	-3.4325914***	-1.7738936***	-5.389355***
		(0.13671)	(0.11565)	(0.05842)	(0.07924)	(0.08087)	(0.05184)	(0.11128)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.4: House Enforcement Immigration Bills continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	-1.793163***	-0.4748***	-1.008682***	-0.1592929***	-1.558692***	-0.4332354***	-0.569917***
		(0.08977)	(0.04425)	(0.04318)	(0.03832)	(0.09356)	(0.03157)	(0.03948)
RACE	Hispanic/ White	-0.7964582***	-0.06907	-0.013796	-0.6620716***	-0.292239***	-0.3192263***	-0.519688***
		(0.08297)	(0.04315)	(0.05158)	(0.0487)	(0.07115)	(0.03348)	(0.03958)
	API/ White	-1.5671771***	-0.04179	-2.812133***	-0.9246306***	-0.908382***	-0.3710827***	-1.068749***
		(0.22558)	(0.0699)	(0.17032)	(0.06663)	(0.12952)	(0.0471)	(0.09656)
	Black/ Black	-1.6677789***	0.5366***	0.930743***	1.9769324***	-2.683233***	0.198515*	-0.076947
		(0.21877)	(0.1142)	(0.09606)	(0.09731)	(1.0044)	(0.1069)	(0.14995)
	Hispanic/ Black	0.0089427	0.3979***	1.473978***	1.05998***	-1.796102***	-0.1865766**	-0.326140***
		(0.13641)	(0.09575)	(0.08801)	(0.08278)	(0.58987)	(0.08004)	(0.12007)
	API/ Black	-0.8947614**	0.7888***	-1.047828***	0.7791822***	-1.857142*	0.9204659***	0.175660
		(0.34918)	(0.178)	(0.24695)	(0.125)	(1.0132)	(0.18793)	(0.24406)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	1.9374754***	0.742***	3.167486***	0.2647157*	-1.572319	-0.2272324*	-0.622044***
		(0.17685)	(0.1401)	(0.14704)	(0.13558)	(1.01993)	(0.12763)	(0.19306)
	API/ Hispanic	0.4195701	1.109***	0.020989	-0.0690241	-1.381425	0.5020761***	-0.725276**
		(0.31485)	(0.1997)	(0.2478)	(0.15041)	(1.02609)	(0.17731)	(0.34857)
	API/ API	-INF***	1.054	-INF***	-0.4350082	-INF***	11.0195241	0.238490
		(0)	(0.7294)	(0)	(0.40066)	(0)	(50.4692)	(1.01556)
PARTY	Republican	1.4832803***	1.511***	1.036963***	0.7100482***	2.845426***	-1.6209339***	1.926699***
		(0.02148)	(0.01737)	(0.01402)	(0.01402)	(0.03627)	(0.01537)	(0.01886)
GENDER	Female	-0.30116***	0.1058***	-0.135544***	-0.0828071***	-0.216174***	0.0333495**	-0.180912***
		(0.02715)	(0.01819)	(0.01794)	(0.01767)	(0.02892)	(0.01534)	(0.01904)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-0.3185509***	-0.1956***	-0.453185***	-0.2734614***	-0.272866***	-0.2104598***	-0.247627***
		(0.02708)	(0.0214)	(0.02094)	(0.02082)	(0.03103)	(0.02047)	(0.02134)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	1.1905767***	1.29***	0.772989***	0.626636***	2.403442***	1.0644967***	0.541100***
		(0.06711)	(0.042)	(0.05188)	(0.04615)	(0.07866)	(0.04472)	(0.05467)
	Yes/ No	0.3455604***	0.6316***	0.434354***	0.1424695***	1.066546***	0.5692649***	0.313616***
		(0.03172)	(0.02102)	(0.02393)	(0.02352)	(0.036)	(0.02224)	(0.02493)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.0536382***	-0.01902***	-0.024969***	-0.0638495***	-0.131863***	0.0201256***	-0.019589***
		(0.00442)	(0.00248)	(0.00239)	(0.00375)	(0.00676)	(0.00275)	(0.00295)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	0.0138331***	0.01114***	0.010621***	0.0054278***	0.029766***	0.0070413***	0.009913***
		(0.00092)	(0.00073)	(0.00069)	(0.00074)	(0.00106)	(0.00075)	(0.00079)
	% Hispanic in District	-0.0094673***	-0.0000006513***	0.001454	0.0102204***	-0.024113***	0.0003984	0.001732*
		(0.0016)	(7.1E-08)	(0.0011)	(0.00103)	(0.00194)	(0.00085)	(0.00105)
	% API in District	-0.0202024***	0.003227*	0.010263***	0.0079612***	-0.015309***	0.0069764***	-0.022806***
		(0.00332)	(0.00179)	(0.00201)	(0.00154)	(0.00475)	(0.00159)	(0.00226)
	% Foreign Born in District	-0.0019895	0.0042***	-0.029977***	-0.0043971***	0.000299	0.0003874	0.010304***
		(0.00196)	(0.00103)	(0.00129)	(0.0011)	(0.00291)	(0.00104)	(0.00141)
MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICT	Yes/ Yes	1.9877928***	0.8897***	0.664821***	1.3100784***	1.405646***	0.5063446***	-0.047344
		(0.1026)	(0.06732)	(0.07227)	(0.06293)	(0.16562)	(0.0561)	(0.07762)
	Yes/ No	-0.5720539***	-0.4473***	-0.586732***	-0.2033696***	0.036647	-0.4939943***	-0.335808***
		(0.05187)	(0.03312)	(0.03474)	(0.03307)	(0.05464)	(0.02919)	(0.03329)
CONSTANT		-3.2013332***	-3.477***	-1.723532***	-1.7651241***	-5.538715***	-0.0675546	-3.489560***
		(0.06204)	(0.04547)	(0.03623)	(0.04251)	(0.0994)	(0.05426)	(0.06458)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.5: House Benefit Immigration Bills

		93rd Congress	94th Congress	95th Congress	96th Congress	97th Congress	98th Congress	99th Congress	100th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	0.3302052**	1.319347***	0.290486*	0.526278***	0.8048***	1.0664602***	1.2449228***	0.8859233***
		(0.165)	(0.13723)	(0.1522)	(0.08417)	(0.03997)	(0.04478)	(0.04366)	(0.03688)
	Hispanic/ White	-0.6607414***	-0.077175	0.206861	-3.090455***	0.3662***	1.2561187***	0.5548085***	0.197543***
RACE		(0.22448)	(0.17124)	(0.14523)	(0.31878)	(0.04467)	(0.0668)	(0.05514)	(0.05074)
	API/ White	.	-1.471428***	0.67535***	-0.37596***	0.7038***	1.378806***	1.2248127***	1.3358073***
		.	(0.28532)	(0.20741)	(0.12724)	(0.06501)	(0.0747)	(0.07613)	(0.08823)
	Black/ Black	0.8915414	3.792846***	0.721851	2.906657***	2.07***	3.4913745***	3.6264101***	3.3666198***
		(0.5618)	(0.38361)	(0.60855)	(0.31396)	(0.2737)	(0.28035)	(0.29656)	(0.29924)
	Hispanic/ Black	-1.2965902	1.657751***	0.761673	-INF***	1.281***	3.298566***	2.4416894***	2.738902***
		(1.03689)	(0.44931)	(0.49584)	(0)	(0.2255)	(0.20618)	(0.20356)	(0.24068)
	API/ Black	.	0.245365	0.90537	1.205659***	2.758***	4.0073389***	4.2081772***	3.2740758***
		.	(0.78664)	(0.78724)	(0.42455)	(0.5373)	(0.48911)	(0.60546)	(0.35218)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	0.2753	3.2120605***	1.609058***	1.6315264***
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0.5575)	(0.40947)	(0.37194)	(0.41572)
	API/ Hispanic	.	-INF***	1.622118**	-INF***	1.366**	3.7211737***	2.7971963***	2.8886492***
		.	(0)	(0.81251)	(0)	(0.5977)	(0.50893)	(0.53907)	(0.47039)
	API/ API	.	-INF***	-INF***	-INF***	13.15	12.3735329	11.6857536	3.8233207***
		.	(0)	(0)	(0)	(296.4)	(66.8328)	(68.415)	(1.15256)
PARTY	Republican	-0.9825641***	-0.761272***	-0.219954***	-0.407767***	0.09983***	-1.5961029***	-1.6165233***	-1.1313737***
		(0.09163)	(0.06201)	(0.05452)	(0.02473)	(0.01069)	(0.0209)	(0.01866)	(0.01294)
GENDER	Female	0.6585084***	0.4746***	0.556082***	0.194049***	0.2752***	0.3856969***	0.2498034***	0.0183911
		(0.10832)	(0.07936)	(0.08859)	(0.04734)	(0.02292)	(0.03263)	(0.03182)	(0.02427)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-1.8362616***	-0.641026***	-0.811043***	-1.319629***	-0.408***	-0.7251307***	-0.3396086***	-0.4764094***
		(0.27073)	(0.10581)	(0.10577)	(0.0581)	(0.01704)	(0.02901)	(0.02456)	(0.01829)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	1.7694217***	0.331319**	1.393341***	0.735435***	-0.2306***	0.8015485***	-0.043257	-0.0974003**
		(0.17929)	(0.1486)	(0.1203)	(0.08063)	(0.04293)	(0.0618)	(0.05957)	(0.04967)
	Yes/ No	0.6535431***	0.139926**	0.341243***	0.300027***	-0.4937***	0.2842484***	-0.0384968	-0.118907***
		(0.10647)	(0.07089)	(0.07257)	(0.03459)	(0.01696)	(0.02801)	(0.02581)	(0.02119)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.0618743**	0.01833***	-0.022862**	-0.100283***	0.03751***	0.0758195***	0.0616144***	0.0388959***
		(0.02514)	(0.00647)	(0.01044)	(0.00773)	(0.00228)	(0.0032)	(0.00303)	(0.00247)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	0.0002659	-0.025401***	-0.004849**	-0.01261***	-0.02056***	-0.033065***	-0.025788***	-0.025589***
		(0.0027)	(0.00232)	(0.00216)	(0.0011)	(0.0005)	(0.00084)	(0.00069)	(0.00056)
	% Hispanic in District	.	.	.	.	.	-0.0385842***	-0.0078086***	-0.0093766***
		.	.	.	.	.	(0.00138)	(0.00102)	(0.00096)
	% API in District	.	.	.	.	.	-0.0524638***	-0.0159947***	-0.0402635***
		.	.	.	.	.	(0.002)	(0.00141)	(0.002)
	% Foreign Born in District	0.0984354***	0.060525***	0.058005***	0.055879***	0.0502***	0.0759148***	0.0462132***	0.0516373***
		(0.00368)	(0.00242)	(0.0031)	(0.00159)	(0.00101)	(0.00142)	(0.00124)	(0.00121)
MAJORITY-MINORITY	Yes/ Yes	.	-0.314805	1.15196*	0.692869*	14.44	3.229821***	1.4126867***	1.6906421***
		.	(0.59864)	(0.61383)	(0.40475)	(53.12)	(0.17565)	(0.16981)	(0.19924)
	Yes/ No	.	0.480411***	0.537737***	0.152332	1.239***	1.4937339***	0.6649355***	0.6975853***
		.	(0.14812)	(0.14172)	(0.09556)	(0.04456)	(0.05518)	(0.04672)	(0.0405)
CONSTANT		-5.7603419***	-4.787264***	-4.938406***	-2.113174***	-0.8735***	-2.0465571***	-1.5125157***	-0.2654345***
		(0.21277)	(0.09094)	(0.11475)	(0.06845)	(0.02762)	(0.04816)	(0.04632)	(0.03848)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.5: House Benefit Immigration Bills continued

		101st Congress	102nd Congress	103rd Congress	104th Congress	105th Congress	106th Congress	107th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	0.2021688***	0.1803592***	0.314212***	0.517668***	0.485697***	0.2413019***	0.4547078***
		(0.03691)	(0.05198)	(0.04904)	(0.11157)	(0.03551)	(0.03267)	(0.03922)
RACE	Hispanic/ White	-0.2677738***	-0.2604804***	0.054709	-0.3825265***	-0.0200798	-0.0976326**	0.1585129***
		(0.04564)	(0.06305)	(0.06048)	(0.10329)	(0.04747)	(0.03882)	(0.0452)
	API/ White	0.3566873***	0.8612692***	0.331638***	-0.3235004**	0.0098683	0.1625252***	0.4923929***
		(0.08084)	(0.09027)	(0.07172)	(0.15994)	(0.07169)	(0.05834)	(0.05803)
	Black/ Black	0.6698074***	0.4250171**	1.411568***	1.6002599***	2.0837442***	0.5425407***	1.2346817***
		(0.17956)	(0.18188)	(0.12053)	(0.22406)	(0.11528)	(0.13674)	(0.12525)
	Hispanic/ Black	0.3845829**	0.5484578***	0.382139***	1.0058823***	0.9837611***	0.6861332***	0.8843381***
		(0.1507)	(0.1558)	(0.11168)	(0.17126)	(0.10292)	(0.13261)	(0.11635)
	API/ Black	0.6863852***	1.5560373***	1.826602***	1.0696684***	1.5305504***	1.4501564***	1.7401287***
		(0.2277)	(0.26794)	(0.17221)	(0.27952)	(0.19328)	(0.25383)	(0.20341)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	0.0395264	0.5594176*	0.235347	1.9279966***	0.22825	1.0805909***	1.0902182***
		(0.3046)	(0.30402)	(0.20689)	(0.2246)	(0.18294)	(0.29014)	(0.23201)
	API/ Hispanic	0.3258969	1.9973967***	0.913282***	1.5971694***	0.5367569**	2.0626364***	1.6487942***
		(0.30478)	(0.37759)	(0.24017)	(0.26577)	(0.25914)	(0.47927)	(0.29937)
	API/ API	0.5901265	12.4405277	1.807057***	1.1898594	0.7971192	10.1645983	2.399136**
		(0.67472)	(67.4881)	(0.66927)	(0.8752)	(0.91201)	(45.2266)	(1.06509)
PARTY	Republican	-0.5515322***	-0.1206167***	-0.177962***	-0.8990079***	-0.5463298***	-0.8932467***	-1.64358***
		(0.01088)	(0.01872)	(0.01968)	(0.04074)	(0.01405)	(0.01238)	(0.01729)
GENDER	Female	-0.453837***	-0.1332667***	0.238684***	0.6369531***	0.1693885***	0.1981335***	0.1816858***
		(0.02132)	(0.03344)	(0.02422)	(0.04147)	(0.01817)	(0.01633)	(0.01975)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-0.4178207***	-0.2191333***	0.062632**	0.1574042***	-0.0161565	-0.3091359***	-0.2267316***
		(0.01672)	(0.0277)	(0.0266)	(0.05516)	(0.02077)	(0.01896)	(0.02441)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-0.2893842***	-0.1639075**	0.435753***	-0.7887003***	-0.3526263***	-0.1915368***	-0.6663692***
		(0.04457)	(0.06717)	(0.05911)	(0.10851)	(0.04995)	(0.04633)	(0.05612)
	Yes/ No	-0.1545316***	-0.2361817***	-0.006048	-0.7258905***	-0.2573133***	-0.1466032***	-0.42744***
		(0.01911)	(0.03068)	(0.03101)	(0.06175)	(0.02373)	(0.02122)	(0.02629)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.0225677***	0.0858643***	-0.005178	-0.0752058***	0.060631***	-0.0283422***	-0.0310497***
		(0.00225)	(0.00366)	(0.00474)	(0.01061)	(0.00358)	(0.00664)	(0.00822)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	-0.0070242***	-0.0110155***	0.009939***	-0.0055291***	-0.0037774***	-0.0096138***	-0.0067974***
		(0.00049)	(0.00085)	(0.00104)	(0.00201)	(0.00073)	(0.00062)	(0.00078)
	% Hispanic in District	-0.0068859***	-0.0044103***	-0.007858***	0.0301416***	-0.0060638***	-0.0052053***	-0.0031738***
		(0.00087)	(0.00119)	(0.00158)	(0.00239)	(0.00121)	(0.00091)	(0.00111)
	% API in District	-0.0080805***	0.0101854***	0.019109***	0.0276268***	0.0218843***	0.0004168	-0.0010251
		(0.00181)	(0.00177)	(0.00173)	(0.00276)	(0.00145)	(0.00137)	(0.00146)
	% Foreign Born in District	0.0504474***	0.0535348***	0.033***	0.0003171	0.0293592***	0.0269515***	0.0403621***
		(0.00106)	(0.00135)	(0.0014)	(0.00244)	(0.00112)	(0.00094)	(0.00106)
MAJORITY-MINORITY	Yes/ Yes	0.8294032***	1.9116928***	1.138199***	0.2936736	0.9976798***	3.109987***	1.6814812***
		(0.16465)	(0.18105)	(0.10957)	(0.1996)	(0.08824)	(0.12652)	(0.09458)
	Yes/ No	0.4194651***	0.3566633***	-0.037438	-0.223958**	-0.5046459***	0.2406481***	0.2373188***
		(0.04125)	(0.05888)	(0.05577)	(0.10279)	(0.03811)	(0.03127)	(0.03752)
CONSTANT		0.1273451***	-3.715639***	-3.134163***	-2.9286428***	-2.0480455***	-0.0635152	-0.7673165***
		(0.03529)	(0.05765)	(0.06201)	(0.13742)	(0.04709)	(0.04283)	(0.05251)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.5: House Benefit Immigration Bills continued

		108th Congress	109th Congress	110th Congress	111th Congress	112th Congress	113th Congress	114th Congress
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS	Black/ White	0.5628226***	0.1971***	0.0060548	0.2519246***	0.1125291***	-0.1230276***	0.1350149***
		(0.03646)	(0.03758)	(0.02825)	(0.03102)	(0.03569)	(0.03068)	(0.02904)
	Hispanic/ White	-0.0605879	0.08261**	0.2467752***	-0.1275492***	-0.0144432	-0.7651114***	-0.4393664***
RACE		(0.04067)	(0.03722)	(0.03667)	(0.03801)	(0.04184)	(0.03369)	(0.03182)
	API/ White	0.2372784***	0.4048***	0.1649609***	0.6476393***	0.380223***	-0.2320965***	0.1523652***
		(0.06411)	(0.06073)	(0.04822)	(0.04554)	(0.05284)	(0.04665)	(0.04103)
	Black/ Black	2.3774718***	2.008***	0.8818375***	1.5363441***	0.9160505***	0.8791873***	0.5584121***
		(0.15838)	(0.1045)	(0.08233)	(0.11329)	(0.09405)	(0.12568)	(0.08223)
	Hispanic/ Black	0.9469406***	0.1622**	0.9702457***	1.2759863***	0.6303365***	-0.1414757	0.2341533***
		(0.12305)	(0.08037)	(0.07655)	(0.10054)	(0.08211)	(0.08768)	(0.06922)
	API/ Black	1.9337776***	0.7364***	0.8502103***	1.2375855***	1.3852162***	0.9461307***	0.7344016***
		(0.28703)	(0.1615)	(0.13621)	(0.13315)	(0.13703)	(0.21753)	(0.11724)
	Hispanic/ Hispanic	0.8968237***	0.2476**	2.2522461***	1.2398503***	0.4671879***	-0.9550851***	0.1216942
		(0.25759)	(0.1251)	(0.18336)	(0.19234)	(0.14231)	(0.13579)	(0.11689)
	API/ Hispanic	-0.4711792*	0.3799**	1.203259***	0.9739684***	1.2640635***	-0.02367	0.4119266***
		(0.25771)	(0.1912)	(0.1854)	(0.16278)	(0.17098)	(0.19694)	(0.14000)
	API/ API	-0.7022718	0.6654	1.147774**	1.6375942***	2.5664291***	10.198817	0.5782237
		(0.87549)	(0.6996)	(0.56707)	(0.38882)	(0.53781)	(50.0747)	(0.37128)
PARTY	Republican	-1.5490855***	-1.138***	0.0658781***	-0.9071213***	-1.5859785***	-1.9213352***	-1.1132548***
		(0.01592)	(0.01599)	(0.01108)	(0.01389)	(0.01727)	(0.01596)	(0.01405)
GENDER	Female	0.1519206***	0.1288***	-0.0104707	-0.1527627***	-0.0511984***	-0.2188652***	0.0569995***
		(0.01885)	(0.01796)	(0.01383)	(0.01592)	(0.01819)	(0.01536)	(0.01409)
LEADERSHIP	Party or Committee Leader	-0.2155709***	-0.2939***	-0.3898356***	-0.0648151***	-0.0304705	-0.4247375***	-0.2594272***
		(0.022)	(0.02347)	(0.01721)	(0.01969)	(0.02252)	(0.02041)	(0.01863)
BORDER STATE	Yes/ Yes	-0.7395865***	-0.1678***	-0.3064077***	-0.9635376***	-0.2297062***	-0.4831908***	-0.1899503***
		(0.05117)	(0.04579)	(0.04185)	(0.05017)	(0.05197)	(0.04685)	(0.04277)
	Yes/ No	-0.3835915***	-0.5117***	-0.3147947***	-0.5247133***	-0.2064292***	-0.274714***	-0.0888859***
		(0.0244)	(0.02377)	(0.01969)	(0.02297)	(0.02586)	(0.02208)	(0.02054)
UNEMPLOYMENT	% Unemployed in District	-0.0098681***	-0.05083***	-0.0042888**	0.0026726	-0.0526492***	0.0208608***	-0.0185288***
		(0.00278)	(0.00379)	(0.0019)	(0.00237)	(0.00399)	(0.00271)	(0.00261)
DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHICS	% Black in District	-0.0188947***	-0.005334***	0.0056643***	0.0010297	0.0039602***	-0.0141147***	-0.0092735***
		(0.00078)	(0.00077)	(0.00058)	(0.00066)	(0.00083)	(0.00075)	(0.00073)
	% Hispanic in District	0.0049696***	0.0000003243***	0.0003999	0.0067116***	0.0084585***	-0.0008761	-0.0052858***
		(0.00097)	(3.5E-08)	(0.00085)	(0.0009)	(0.00098)	(0.00085)	(0.00077)
	% API in District	-0.0126627***	-0.006074***	0.0170697***	-0.0125041***	0.0095778***	0.0046349***	-0.0105284***
		(0.00156)	(0.00144)	(0.00134)	(0.00138)	(0.00177)	(0.00158)	(0.00129)
	% Foreign Born in District	0.032389***	0.02607***	0.0172318***	0.0309044***	0.0280882***	0.0131971***	0.0236419***
		(0.001)	(0.00082)	(0.00088)	(0.00093)	(0.00105)	(0.00103)	(0.00091)
MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICT	Yes/ Yes	2.0580355***	0.4778***	0.2009461***	1.1258296***	0.0254437	1.3533484***	0.8180925***
		(0.07234)	(0.0621)	(0.05418)	(0.06133)	(0.06282)	(0.05892)	(0.05255)
	Yes/ No	0.3651828***	-0.1747***	-0.5133764***	0.0364856	-0.3861877***	0.073467***	-0.0165428
		(0.03255)	(0.03334)	(0.02701)	(0.02937)	(0.03308)	(0.02846)	(0.02717)
CONSTANT		-0.2138409***	-0.3728***	-1.1392827***	-1.2391873***	-0.5639543***	1.1331684***	0.4896138***
		(0.03837)	(0.04589)	(0.02843)	(0.03116)	(0.04554)	(0.05354)	(0.05213)

Estimates are corresponding probabilities of a tie occurring = exp(estimate)/ (1+exp(estimate)). ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Discussion

In this paper, I relied upon cosponsorship networks between members of Congress to examine how race and ethnicity shaped the incentives of members to cosponsor different types of immigration legislation. Social network methods were used to infer how these social relationships on the different types of immigration policy could be influenced by personal and district attributes. Just as all immigration policies are not the same, neither are the members who sponsor or cosponsor them. Members are elected to represent subsets of the U.S. population that might look differently than the population of their neighbors who may have different needs and concerns. The primary responsibility of these representatives is to be the voice of their constituents.

These results help shed more light upon the question of who is working with whom on immigration. Overall, the results of the exponential random graph models showed large support for one of my key hypotheses. Majority-minority districts matter and they matter in a significant way. Minority members were generally more likely to form relationships with other minority members on bills that benefit immigrants and less likely to form ties on bills that called for sanctions. This was also to be expected considering that the majority of minority members are more likely to be Democrats who generally support immigrants. Women were also more likely to form ties on bills that provided benefits. These results were consistent with other findings of women and minorities (see Clark and Caro 2013; Rouse et al. 2013). Geography also made a difference in the types of bills that were cosponsored. Members from border states with Mexico were overall more likely to form relationships with one another, especially on bills that called for sanctions. These results are in a similar vein of other studies that

looked at the areas immigrants settled and anti-immigrant sentiment (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1998). Despite the incentives of Hispanic members to introduce or support legislation with like members that could benefit immigrants, the results yielded little evidence that either being a Hispanic or having a higher percent of Hispanics in a congressional district made a difference in forming relationships with each other. These results could be because of the small number of members from this minority group and the vast underrepresentation of the Hispanic population in general.

In future work, I hope to explore district demography in further depth by including variables for rural and urban populations as well as the industry make-up of the district. Historically, immigrants have settled in more rural areas, especially those with large agriculture communities and this may not only affect representation but also how members form relationships on particular types of bills. Additionally, these populations could also be largely undocumented and are not able to vote. For instance, a member may be from a Republican state in a predominately white district, but because of the area and industry they may be more inclined to form relationships with Democrats or be likely to support more legislation that benefits immigrants. These areas are often dependent on immigrant labor and they might be more prone to support legislation that provides more legal options to keep their workforce. It would also be instructive to examine how union membership in the district may influence constituents' economic considerations and how that could shape attitudes towards immigration.

Additionally, this analysis only investigates four states for the variable "border state" (those that share a border with Mexico). In the future, I would like to expand this

variable to include states with larger immigrant populations such as New York, Florida, New Jersey, Michigan, and North Carolina. While I found that the percent foreign-born population does affect the relationships on immigration bills in general, adding in these states may further bolster these results and have a more accurate representation of how MCs act regarding this policy area.

Conclusion and Future Work

This work set out to understand the factors that determine who collaborates with whom on immigration bills in Congress. This issue has consistently over the past 20 years been one of the most pressing problems according to constituents. However, Congress remains in stalemate over how to address various issues concerning immigration in the U.S. I argue that examining the pre-floor stages of the process is a useful avenue for understanding the coalition-building process. Chapter 1 examines all legislation classified as immigration policy introduced by congressional term from 1973-2016 and assesses how partisanship and polarization helps or deters members from forming relationships with others (i.e. cosponsoring bills with other members). It provides an answer the question of whether or not members of the same party are likely to create relationships with each other or are they more likely to reach across party lines to form cosponsor coalitions immigration legislation. The existing literature has tried to measure these connections among legislators using observable behaviors or characteristics to provide a window into the interpersonal relationships among legislators and using cosponsorship behavior. While these studies have given considerable insight to our understanding of the structure of social networks in Congress, there are still questions on how these findings translate to specific policy area verses examining aggregated legislation. The analyses in Chapter 1 provides additional insight and evidence that shows that party does matter when making the decision to cosponsor an immigration bill and as polarization increased, members were less likely to form bipartisan relationships on immigration bills. Tichenor (2002, 35) noted that an anonymous lawmaker in 1995 observed that immigration "makes arch-enemies into uneasy partners, and old friends into

awkward rivals." However, the lack of bipartisanship, particularly since the mid-1990s, is noteworthy because in order to get things accomplished in Congress there has to be some level of bipartisanship. Perhaps this is due to changing incentives or being able to take a side on extreme policies because members of Congress are not being punished by their constituents for their lack of compromise and gridlock. This has important consequences for policymaking now and in the future.

Chapter 2 took another step forward by examining cosponsorship by immigration bill type. I achieved this by disaggregating the data into two subtypes: enforcement bills and benefit bills. The area of immigration as a policy area encompasses multiple issues. In order to evaluate if partisanship and polarization mattered on each subtype of bill, I reassessed the findings in the previous chapter to see if those results held after separating the bills into the two camps. I argue that partisanship provides incentives to form relationships on bills that either provides enforcements or benefits to immigrants. After reassessing the data, I found that bill types matter as well as partisan affiliation; however, not in the way I expected. I found that Republicans had a higher propensity to form relationships on bills that benefitted immigrants and Democrats worked together more on bills that provided sanctions. These results contradicted much of the existing literature on parties and their platforms and historic norms regarding feelings of immigration. I offered some alternative avenues to explore to explain this peculiar phenomenon.

Finally, Chapter 3 makes more strides in understanding how relationships are formed on immigration policy by considering how individual legislator characteristics, district demographics, and region affect cosponsorship networks. I first examine all immigration bills and then separate the bills out into the two subtypes and estimated

models for each congressional term as I did in the first two chapters. The results provide evidence that the size of the minority (non-white) populations matters. Representatives from these districts had higher likelihoods of forming ties with one another, minority members (including women) were generally more likely to form ties on bills that benefitted immigrants and less likely to form ties on bills that called for sanctions. These results reinforced existing scholarly notions about propensities of minorities to support social benefit policies. In addition, members from states along the Southern border, especially those who border Mexico, were more likely to form relationships with those from neighboring states, particularly on bills calling for enforcements against immigrants. These provide insight into how relationships are formed with regard to district make-up. The percent of the foreign-born population in a member's district affects the likelihood of ties being formed; however, there was little evidence to suggest that either being a Hispanic legislator or having a higher percentage of Hispanics in a congressional would increase the likelihood of a tie being formed. These three studies provide a unique perception into how members of Congress form relationships with one another during the pre-floor stages of the legislative process as well as external factors that shape how these members choose to sign certain immigration bills with other members.

Moving Forward

While this large and unique dataset has provided the ability to test several different hypotheses as to why members form relationships specifically on bills that congress.gov has classified as immigration policy, there are other ways this study can be expanded. One way to empirically expand upon this study in the future is to further examine hitchhiker bills or those in which an amendment concerning immigration was added. The next step in empirical work moves beyond bill introduction to explore the

roles of committees. I have collected the data on committee membership and committee leadership and the next phase is to test how these memberships affect relationships on immigration policy. Most of these bills go through the House and/ or Senate Judiciary committees and subcommittees; therefore, they might affect who is cosponsoring and how often. There is existing literature on the roles of committees and how they affect cosponsoring activities. With this dataset I would be able to test whether or not these theories are applicable to immigration policy.

Finally, the next stage would be to continue the work with Belco and Clark and follow these bills beyond the pre-floor stages. Members can add their names to bills up until the time the committee the bill was referred to files reports. Once the bill advances to the floor, these relationships should logically translate into votes. This further reiterates the importance of coalition building during the pre-floor stages and could have serious implications throughout the legislative process. The end goal is to determine whether or not these relationships have an effect on bills getting out of committee, and through each chamber of Congress. This study can be used both as a way to advance our knowledge on legislator behavior concerning immigration, and as tool for legislators to determine who will be the best at helping to advance their immigration bills.

Appendix

Codebook

Variable	Code	Description	Source
Party		Party affiliation of the member.	Congressional Profiles and personal websites.
Democrat	0		
Republican	1		
Gender		Gender of the member.	Congressional Profiles and personal websites.
Male	0		
Female	1		
Leadership		Member was either a party leader (House: Speaker, Majority/ Minority Leader, Majority/ Minority Whip; Senate: President Pro Tempore, Majority/ Minority Leader, Majority/ Minority Whip) or committee leader (chair or ranking member of a standing committee).	The official Congressional Directories for each Congress.
No	0		
Yes	1		

Race

Race/ Ethnicity of member of Congress identifies as. This coding also applies to the race/ ethnic demographics of a member's district population. Asian and Pacific Islander populations were combined; otherwise these are congruent with the U. S. Census Bureau categories.

Data on Hispanics was acquired from the *National Association of Latino Elected Officials Educational Fund* (NALEO) as well as legislative and social media websites indicating the legislator's race through pictures or references to memberships to particular caucuses. Similar processes were conducted for Black, Asian, Native American, and Pacific Islander members through: The *National Black Caucus of State Legislators*, *Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*, *National Caucus of Native American State Legislators,* and the *Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus.* For district demographics, the data on race/ ethnicity was collected using the U.S. Census Bureau's congressional district data files provided through the *Haithi Trust Digital Library* for the 93rd-107th Congresses and through the American Fact Finder via the Census Bureau for the 108th-114th Congresses.

White/ Non-Hispanic	0
Black/ Non-Hispanic	1
Hispanic	2
Asian or Pacific Islander/ Non-Hispanic	3
Native Alaskan or American Indian/ Non-Hispanic	4

Border with Mexico		Does the member's state border Mexico (Arizona, California, New Mexico, or Texas)?	Congressional Profiles and personal websites.
No	0		
Yes	1		
Freshman		Is the member in their first term serving in office of that chamber?	Congressional Profiles and personal websites.
No	0		
Yes	1		
Competitive Election		Did the member win their election by %5.0 or less?	Federal Election Commission (FEC) results.
No	0		
Yes	1		
Seniority		Number of terms member has served.	Based on the year elected until the last day they served.
Ideology		DW-NOMINATE scores for the 1st dimension.	*Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes and Database.* https://voteview.com/data

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