

ETHOS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRISIS SPEAKING OF
JOHN F. KENNEDY ,

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Speech
University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Lawrence R. Wheelless

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ABSTRACT

Ethical appeal in the international crisis speeches of President Kennedy related to the development of his image in the office of the Presidency. "Image" denotes subjective, structured information about Kennedy concerning his personalization of institutions, fulfillment of role expectations, reputation, prestige, and attainments. "Ethical appeal" refers to the personality and proposals revealed through the good sense, good character, and good will present in the speeches. The speeches arose from international crises in 1961 and 1962, involving the Congo, Laos, Bay of Pigs, European tour, Berlin, nuclear testing, Matsu and Quemoy, and Cuba.

Kennedy was concerned for image and used televised speeches to improve or reinforce his image. Also, his image influenced his choice of ethical appeals. This process was particularly apparent following the Bay of Pigs in 1961, and the Matsu and Quemoy crisis in 1962. During these times, his image took on unfavorable factors. Ethical appeals which appeared in speeches served to offset those unfavorable factors.

Further, ethical appeal directly affected Kennedy's image and produced favorable image factors. At other times during the two years, elements of ethical appeal and factors of image corresponded and exerted mutual influence. In the

life situations discussed in this study, image and ethical appeal existed on a continuum with overlapping factors and elements that interacted to produce the speaker's ethos.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND FOR THE STUDY

John F. Kennedy's ethos has been the subject of the writings of a great number of news writers and a small number of scholars. This chapter presents the purpose, scope, and background for a rhetorical study of image and ethical appeal composing President Kennedy's ethos in international crises. The chapter conclusions form an initial base of information from which analysis and evaluation proceed.

Purpose

This investigation develops the thesis that ethical appeal in the international crisis speaking of President John F. Kennedy relates to the development of his image in the Presidency. The study employs descriptive, historical, and critical methods. Kennedy's speeches in international crises during the years in office are the focus.

The desired outcome is a clearer understanding and definition of President Kennedy's ethos in international crises as revealed in the interrelationship of ethical appeal and image. To accomplish this purpose, the elements of Kennedy's image are defined and its changes and development are traced. That international crisis affected the Kennedy image and that ethical appeal relates to that image are argued.

To do this, the investigation notes how the Kennedy image developed during international crises. Then, the qualities and nature of the ethical appeals in crisis speaking are examined and discussed. The investigation also notes how ethical appeal enhanced or detracted from the image. Not only does the study note the effect of ethical appeal on image, but also other relationships such as the correspondence of image to ethical appeal. The study discusses Kennedy's use of ethical appeal to improve his image and accomplish his goals.

Available materials used include news publications, historical documents, scholarly studies, and biographies of Kennedy. The works by Theodore C. Sorensen,¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger,² Hugh Sidey,³ and Pierre Salinger⁴ were most useful. Scholarly journals, newspapers, and magazines supplied information about the Kennedy administration, his image, and his speaking. The New York Times and The Times of London gave newspaper accounts. Previous scholarly research on Kennedy's speaking is limited primarily to campaign speaking. Two exceptions are a content analysis by Luther Wayne Sanders⁵

¹Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

²Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965).

³Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Atheneum House, Inc., 1964).

⁴Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1966).

⁵Luther Wayne Sanders, "A Content Analysis of President Kennedy's First Six Press Conferences" (unpublished Master's thesis, Ohio University, Athens, 1962).

and a Burkeian analysis of the Cuban speech of October 22, 1962, by Paul S. Melhuish.⁶ Campaign speaking has been the sole area of research into Kennedy's ethos. Celia Dorris attempted to define the components of John Kennedy's ethos in the West Virginia Democratic primaries.⁷ This study, then, represents the first research into President Kennedy's ethos related to international crisis speaking.

The speeches examined are the televised speech on the Laos crisis at the beginning of a televised press conference on March 23, 1961, the televised report to the nation on the Berlin crisis on July 25, 1961, and the televised address to the people on the Cuban missile crisis on October 22, 1962. A major televised speech to the nation on the crisis of nuclear testing on March 2, 1962, is also part of the study. Other minor speeches include his speech at the press conference on February 15, 1961, concerning the Congo, and the speech on Matsu and Quemoy on June 27, 1962. Also included is Kennedy's report to the nation on June 6, 1961, following the Vienna talks which deal with several crises. Kennedy generally announced major policy in crisis through addresses to the nation via radio and television. One exception is an additional speech examined in this study. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy gave a speech to the American Society of Newspaper

⁶Paul S. Melhuish, "The Rhetoric of Crisis: A Burkeian Analysis of John F. Kennedy's October 22, 1962, Cuban Address" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oregon, Eugene, 1963).

⁷Celia Ann Dorris, "John F. Kennedy: A Study in Ethos" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 1965).

Editors. The speech still received a world reading audience due to press publications. All, therefore, have a common audience.

The texts of these speeches are widely available in news magazines, The New York Times, Vital Speeches of the Day, Department of State Bulletins, and various anthologies. All texts are in remarkable agreement. This study uses those texts officially endorsed by the President.⁸ Kennedy stated that "these pages contain full and exact texts of my speeches."⁹ Comparisons of texts confirm Kennedy's observation. Pierre Salinger noted that while Kennedy deviated from many texts, he was true to the texts of "major T.V. addresses to the nation . . . [in which] every word had been carefully chosen for its impact both on the nation and on foreign governments."¹⁰ Sorensen also noted that he "stayed close" to the texts of major televised addresses.¹¹ Since original manuscripts of the speeches are not available at this time, these represent the most authentic texts.

Scope

The major concern of this study is the discovery of the elements and relationships of Kennedy's image and ethical

⁸Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1962); Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1963).

⁹Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. v.

¹⁰Salinger, p. 67. ¹¹Sorensen, p. 331.

appeal composing his ethos. Speech theorists generally agree that ethos is an important factor in the process of persuasion. They disagree, however, on exactly what it is and how it can be divided. This study adopts the position that ethos arises from two sources: (1) information about the speaker--his image, (2) the revelation of personality and proposals in the speech--his ethical appeal. From these two sources arise the persuasiveness of the speaker as a person, that is, his ethos.

Image

Chapter II traces the development and defines the prominent factors of Kennedy's image in international crises. The first factor from which the speaker's ethos emerges consists of information about the speaker outside the speech "that creates the image of the speaker for the audience."¹² Composing the speaker's image are his prestige, reputation, and attainments.¹³ These terms do not represent mutually exclusive categories. They are, however, terms around which many important factors cluster. For the purposes of this study prestige denotes the degree of approval or disapproval, acceptance, popularity, and public support and confidence that the speaker has. Also, prestige arises from association

¹²Robert S. Cathcart, Post-Communication: Critical Analysis and Evaluation (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 50.

¹³Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 113; Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persuasion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 224.

with others of prestige. The term "reputation" refers to knowledge about the speaker's confidence, prudence, temperance, maturity, knowledge, intelligence, conviction, charm, sincerity, trustworthiness, and other similar factors. Attainments, of course, are the speaker's victories, achievements, and successes.

Political images which include additional factors supplement the above factors which compose the speaker's general image.

Political images include not only detailed images of role expectations. They also include what might be called symbolic or personalized images of institutions themselves. A symbolic image is a kind of rough summation or index of a vast complexity of images of roles and structures. These symbolic images are of great importance in political life, and especially in international relations.¹⁴

Such a view of the image of the President will be useful in the context of international crisis speaking.

Image, then, is defined broadly as the "subjective knowledge structure . . . concerning any individual."¹⁵ Consequently, to generalize about a speaker's image for an audience becomes extremely difficult.

For the purposes of this study the speaker's attainments, reputation, prestige, fulfillment of role expectations, and personalization of intuitions are specific factors of his image. Since no comprehensive record of each individual's changing image of the President exists, indices of such an

¹⁴Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), pp. 109-110.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 11.

investigation of image must be comments and evaluations by his contemporaries which also carry the potential of influencing the images of others. Public opinion polls which measure his image in regard to role expectations are useful in exploring the first source from which ethos arises--image.

Ethical Appeal

Chapter III investigates ethical appeal revealed in the speeches. This ethical appeal arises from two broad characteristics or categories. First, ethical appeal is the personality and character¹⁶ revealed in the speaker's good sense, good character, and good will¹⁷ present in the speech. An examination of these factors constitutes the focus of Chapter III. Ethical appeal also arises from the "coincidence of the speaker's proposals with the rigid beliefs and attitudes of the audience."¹⁸ The adaptation of proposals to the audience, then, is a secondary concern of this chapter.

Background Information

Certain information provides perspective in a study of ethical appeal in Kennedy's international crisis speaking. Four areas of investigation are helpful: ethos in international speaking, the characteristics of Kennedy as a speaker, the

¹⁶Minnick, p. 113.

¹⁷Aristotle Rhetoric II. 1. 1378^a. 5-10. This and future references to this source are from the following translation: W. Rhys Robert (trans.), Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics, ed. Frederick Solmsen (New York: Random House, 1954).

¹⁸Minnick, p. 113.

crises supplying occasions for the speeches, and an examination of the audience.

Ethos in International Speaking

Robert T. Oliver has noted that "diplomacy utilizes many means, but fundamental among them is speech. The speech of diplomacy is a vital area for significant research."¹⁹ The importance of speech in foreign affairs is that speeches "not only have marked the various stages in the development of the cold war but in some instances have served as psychological attacks."²⁰ This study extends information available on ethos in Presidential speaking in foreign affairs and makes observations on existing theory.

Ethical appeal and image which are significant to the speaker in foreign affairs are of primary importance in this investigation. Hans Morgenthau implied the importance of the relation of word and deed: The statesman's

rhetoric is verbalized action, an explanation of deeds done or a foretaste of deeds to come. What still moves us today in the recorded oratory of a Churchill or a Roosevelt is not so much the literary quality per se as the organic connection between the words and the deeds. Listening to the words, we remember the deeds, and we are moved.²¹

Since ethical appeal arises in part from trustworthiness

¹⁹Robert T. Oliver, "Role of Speech in Diplomacy," The Southern Speech Journal, XVI (March, 1951), 213.

²⁰W. R. Underhill, "The Role of Speech in Psychological Warfare," Today's Speech, IX (September, 1961), 4.

²¹Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Trouble with Kennedy," Commentary, XXXIII (January, 1962), 52.

and achievements, the speaker who implements what he proposes in his speech increases aspects of ethical appeal. The organic relation between word and deed is an important element of ethos in foreign affairs.

Robert T. Oliver has suggested the need for revision of the "concepts of ethos and the circularity of response between speaker and audience,"²² in diplomatic speaking because of the following beliefs: In foreign affairs, (1) the speech does not arise from speaker's convictions, (2) the speech does not reflect the speaker's personality, and (3) ambiguity in the speech allows reinterpretation in the eventuality of unpredicted events.²³

Other observers contradict Oliver on his observations about the impersonality of speeches in foreign affairs. The fact is, "the decision maker's actions are determined in part by his personality characteristics."²⁴ Kenneth Boulding has, as previously noted, stated that political images consist in part of role expectations and personalized images of institutions. Contrary to Oliver, this concept implies that the personality of the speaker affects the image of the institution he represents. The speaker personalizes that institution for his audience.

²²Robert T. Oliver, "Speech in International Affairs," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), 172.

²³Ibid., 171, 173-174.

²⁴Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations," International Behavior, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 590.

Finally, Oliver's concept of audience response is supplemented by other observations. The chief spokesman and policy maker for the United States is the President, and he may injure his acceptance by grossly violating national opinion.²⁵ Policy statements, especially in democratic countries, "are directed to increasingly informed publics and, therefore, they must be carefully prepared to satisfy the recipients."²⁶ Kelman agreed that foreign policy requires public support and that analysis and adaptation is necessary.²⁷ Therefore, because of the growing influence of public opinion, heads of state must talk with the people in both international and internal crises.²⁸

In conclusion, these observations about speaking in foreign affairs are helpful in providing perspective and insight into John F. Kennedy's international crisis speaking. Analysis of ethical appeal in this study is relevant to a better understanding of international discourse. The conclusion of this study draws these observations about ethical appeal in foreign affairs speaking together with relevant conclusions about Presidential speeches in foreign affairs.

²⁵Milton J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process," International Behavior, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 283.

²⁶Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 217.

²⁷Kelman, pp. 582-583.

²⁸Nanci R. W. Gerstman, "The People: An Added Dimension in Diplomatic Speaking," Today's Speech, X (February, 1962), 20.

Kennedy As A Speaker

Further information supplements the above observations. Kennedy made his philosophy of Presidential speech in foreign policy known. In so doing, he furnished further criteria for investigating his speeches.

The words of any occupant of this office--particularly his words on foreign policy--are certain to be heard and likely to be acted upon by more than one audience: adversaries, allies, neutrals, the Congress, and other members of the Administration as well as all the diverse individuals and interest groups which compose the American electorate. Each must be taken into account. A boon to one may be a bane to others. No group can later be assured privately that words broadcast to all were meant only for some, or were not intended to mean what they clearly seemed to say.²⁹

Kennedy, then, realized the importance of considering the many audiences, and the necessity for integrity, sincerity, and "candor"³⁰ in foreign affairs speeches. The President further remarked that "the nation will listen only if it is a moment of great urgency. They will listen after a Vienna. But they won't listen to things that bore them, that is the great trouble."³¹ International crises were certainly moments of urgency. Kennedy gave one crisis, Vienna, as an example of times when the nation will listen. Often he spoke to the nation in these crises. Kennedy used the urgency of international crisis, therefore, for gaining an audience with the public.

Associates and observers have given further insight

²⁹John F. Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, ed. John W. Gardner (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. xv-xvi.

³⁰Ibid. ³¹Schlesinger, p. 722.

into the Kennedy speech. Speeches were a primary concern of the President: "No problem of the Presidency concerned him more than that of public communication."³² In communication he was "always acutely aware of what impression he was making."³³ Many speeches "served as a means of completing as well as conveying . . . decisions."³⁴

In addition to Kennedy's general speech philosophy, knowledge of his speech preparation is useful for this study. Ethical appeal is, of course, reflected in the speaker's choices in invention. Theodore C. Sorensen played a major role in the production of Kennedy's speeches. The President, however, edited, altered, and added to the content and style of the speeches,³⁵ Pierre Salinger noted that the President often instructed a committee of advisers on his ideas and had them add views to the rough draft of Sorensen, which the President would again review and edit.³⁶ Using a committee system for the inventive process, Kennedy personally directed the preparation and contributed directly to the result.

The Crises

A brief examination of the crises revealing the occasions for the speeches under study will set the stage

³²Sorensen, p. 310. ³³Ibid., p. 311.

³⁴Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, p. xvi. ³⁵Sorensen, p. 60.

³⁶Salinger, pp. 66-67; cf., James L. Golden, "John F. Kennedy and the 'Ghosts'," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LII (December, 1966), 348-357.

for an examination of the Kennedy image. In each of the following crises, Kennedy's historical problem was lessening the possibility of military confrontation or nuclear war without abdication of responsibility.

In May, 1960, Patrice Lumumba became the first Premier of the Congo by forming a coalition cabinet. Joseph Kasavubu became a figurehead President. In September, 1960, Lumumba gained Soviet aid at the United Nations' failure to oust Belgium. Later that month, Col. Joseph Mobutu, with the Congolese army and President Kasavubu's support, deposed Lumumba. The United Nations' troops remained neutral. Lumumba's imprisonment was climaxed with his murder on February 13, 1961.³⁷ "Afro-Asian nations disillusioned by the UN's impartiality threatened to undermine its operation by the withdrawal of their troops."³⁸ On February 15, 1961, at seven p.m., President Kennedy spoke over national television with 350 reporters present at the news conference.³⁹

The next crisis involving the Kennedy administration revolved around certain events in Laos. In early 1961, a communist take-over was imminent. Combined neutralist and communist forces threatened General Phoumi Nosovan's Royal Army in March, 1961. The Soviet Union flew in heavy artillery and the communist Pathet Lao began heavy attacks during

³⁷"Time Runs Out," Newsweek, LVII (February 27, 1961), 20; Sidey, p. 108.

³⁸Sorensen, p. 634.

³⁹Sidey, pp. 57-58; cf., "The U.S. Can Take Care of Itself," Time, LXXVII (February 24, 1961), 9.

the monsoon rains.⁴⁰ At six p.m., March 23, 1961, with 426 reporters present in the State Department Auditorium, Kennedy spoke over national television.⁴¹

The next international problem involved Cuba. Since early in 1960, the United States under the direction of the CIA had been training and arming a Cuban exile army. Kennedy approved the invasion of Cuba by this force on the advice of his Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of Defense and State. On April 17, the fourteen hundred man exile army met defeat in the Zapata Swamp in the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy spoke to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20, 1961, in the Statler Hilton in Washington.

In May and early June, 1961, the President went to Paris, Vienna, and London for diplomatic talks with Charles de Gaulle, Nikita Khrushchev, and Harold Macmillan. Of primary discussion were the areas of concern: the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Congo, Laos, Berlin, nuclear testing, and other trouble spots. Kennedy spoke to the nation on June 6, 1961, over all major networks for twenty-six minutes beginning at seven p.m. This was his first address from the White House.⁴²

Soviet demands for a peace treaty with East Germany

⁴⁰"Laos: Strange Bedfellows," Newsweek, LVII (March 20, 1961), 48.

⁴¹Sidey, p. 79.

⁴²Joseph A. Loftus, "Kennedy Says Khrushchev Talks Eased Danger of a 'Misjudgment'," The New York Times, June 7, 1961, p. 1.

to end occupation and Western rights in West Berlin were the primary objects of Kennedy's attention in the summer of 1961.⁴³ Premier Khrushchev had placed an early 1961 deadline on the treaty but promised six months more at Vienna.⁴⁴ On June 10, in a television report on Vienna, Khrushchev announced his intent of signing the treaty and repeated the ultimatum on June 15.⁴⁵ West Berlin expected American support but did not think Khrushchev would fight. France favored a hard-line stand. Britain, Italy, and Japan wanted negotiations.⁴⁶ In the July 25, 1961, speech on Berlin, Kennedy hoped to seize diplomatic initiative, begin a world-wide propaganda campaign, and persuade Khrushchev to postpone the treaty.⁴⁷

Growing out of the Berlin confrontation was the new problem of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The Soviets announced the resumption of nuclear testing on August 30, 1961, as a response to moves in Berlin. Kennedy ordered resumption of underground tests and "kept quiet so that the world fury would all be directed at the Russians."⁴⁸ The Soviet Union tested first in September, 1961. Then, in November, Kennedy stated that preparations for testing were

⁴³Sidey, p. 217. ⁴⁴Sorensen, pp. 584-585.

⁴⁵"The Fight for Freedom," America, CV (July 1, 1961), 481.

⁴⁶"The Chances of War over Berlin," U.S. News and World Report, LI (July 10, 1961), 36-39.

⁴⁷Sorensen, p. 590.

⁴⁸"Khrushchev's Troubles--How They're Growing," U.S. News and World Report, LI (July 17, 1961), 38-43.

under way.⁴⁹ On the evening of March 2, 1962, the President gave his televised speech from the White House.

The next crisis arose during problems of a slumping economy and steel strike. In 1962, Chiang Kai-shek began talking about invading the mainland to force Kennedy into action. In late June, reports leaked out in Washington that Red Chinese troops had begun a build-up on the coastal Fukien Province opposite the islands. Kennedy was unable to determine which side had the most aggressive intent.⁵⁰ He instructed John Moore Cabot, ambassador to Poland, to reassure Communist China's ambassador there, Wang Ping-nan, that the United States would not support an invasion of the mainland but that the United States would defend the Taiwan Strait. On June 27, in a televised press conference Kennedy spoke on the crisis.

In late July, 1962, Soviet shipments to Cuba resulted in a Central Intelligence Agency report to Kennedy claiming the presence of 5,000 specialists and construction of surface to air missiles. In the fall of 1962, with rumors about Cuba spreading, Senator Kenneth Keating called attention to the build-up in Cuba claiming that offensive weapons and missiles were there.⁵¹ Kennedy allowed officials to deny

⁴⁹Schlesinger, p. 489; Tom Wicker, "Kennedy Sets Atom Tests in Atmosphere in April," The New York Times, March 3, 1962, p. 2.

⁵⁰Sorensen, p. 662. ⁵¹ Sidey, p. 324.

that report.⁵² On October 14, 1962, however, a U-2 reconnaissance plane brought back films of intermediate range ballistic missile sites and the President ordered stepped-up surveillance.⁵³ Kennedy then set up a committee of top White House and departmental advisors who met with him secretly to help him map out strategy and to cut through bureaucratic red tape.⁵⁴ Secretary Rusk presented six proposals including no response, diplomatic pressures, secret diplomacy with Castro, blockade, a surgical air strike, and an invasion. Finally, Kennedy decided that the blockade was the best solution. During this period of time Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko who asserted that only defensive and economic operations were taking place in Cuba. Washington began to suspect the crisis and became excited. The New York Times on Presidential request cancelled a story on the build-up.⁵⁵ At seven p.m., October 22, 1962, he presented the speech from the White House over national television and a radio broadcast to Cuba.

During 1963 attention turned toward domestic issues, and foreign crises of Soviet threats subsided. No significant international military crises with the Soviet Union

⁵²"Capital's Discussions on Crisis Kept a Tight Secret for a Week," The New York Times, October 23, 1962, p. 19.

⁵³Sidey, pp. 325-326.

⁵⁴"Kennedy's 'Crisis Team,'" Business Week, (November 10, 1962), pp. 34-35.

⁵⁵Schlesinger, p. 809.

occurred requiring Kennedy to make a speech to the nation and world. On November 19, 1962, in a report to the Central Committee, Khrushchev "implicitly called off the world offensive and demanded concentration on the tasks of the Soviet economy."⁵⁶ In January, 1963, Khrushchev announced, as reported by Schlesinger, that the wall in Berlin "had diminished the need for a separate German peace treaty; in effect, he decided to . . . accept Kennedy's version of the status quo."⁵⁷ Although Vietnam forces increased from 1961 through 1963, Kennedy refused to give the situation crisis status with a major television address.⁵⁸

Audience

An examination of the audience, as well as the crises previously discussed, is essential to the understanding of the adaptation of ethical appeal. To evaluate the coincidence of the speaker's proposals with the beliefs and attitudes of the audience, some understanding of the audience is necessary. In regard to audience analysis, Edwin Black theorized that

there are specific beliefs and disbeliefs that, in many people, hang together as constituents of a general point of view. For example, racism, anti-semitism, ultra-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and "states-rightism" form a cluster of opinions held by some of our countrymen.⁵⁹

⁵⁶Schlesinger, p. 891. ⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Sorensen, p. 656.

⁵⁹Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 168.

The world audience confronting Kennedy then held certain clusters of opinions. The clusters concept allows this study to view the audience as composed of groups. Black agreed with viewing the audience as composed of groups:

a sociological explanation [of clusters of opinions] . . . that a certain group of opinions gained adherents because of the anxieties of the Cold War . . . would enable him [the rhetorical critic] to comprehend audiences as groups rather than individuals.⁶⁰

Groups were present in Kennedy's audience during world crises. When Kennedy assumed the Presidency in 1961, a new pattern in power and political structure of the world had emerged. Out of the struggle of the 1950's a bipolarity of alliances had centered around the nations of the United States and the Soviet Union. Other nations, however, sought benefit from both sides through neutrality. Livingston Merchant noted that modern communications removed the decision making process from diplomats and ambassadors and centralized this power in the home capitol.⁶¹

According to one observer, speeches on foreign policy should be adapted to an audience structure consisting of the "relevant domestic public involved, . . . internationally to allies and friends, to neutrals, and to opponents, each of whom has different expectations."⁶² This view of the groups composing the world audience agrees closely with

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 169.

⁶¹ Livingston Merchant, "New Techniques in Diplomacy," The Dimensions of Diplomacy, ed. E. A. J. Johnson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 123.

⁶² Frankel, p. 216.

President Kennedy's description of the world audience.⁶³

Therefore, for the purposes of this study the audience consists of these groups.

The bipolarity of the world power structure encouraged clusters of opinions or attitudes involving neutralism, regionalism, nationalism, and defense. The nations of Afro-Asia, India, and Japan, for example, shared a belief in neutralism. This concept asserted that more could be gained from both sides of the polarity--through non-alignment--than through alignment with either side of the power blocs. Since most countries asserting neutrality were underdeveloped, economic and technical needs were predominant. As both sides of the polarity sought additional support to tip the balance of power, the neutrals received favors from both.

Other countries believing in regionalism sought defense and development through alignment with either side of the bipolarity. This belief in regionalism led to the development of alliances forming the communist and western blocs. Members of the alliances espousing regionalism not only recognized common enemies, but also shared common economic and political means of accomplishing goals. The communist bloc with the Soviet Union's leadership formed regional alliances primarily in the Warsaw Pact of 1955, the Russian-Communist China alliance of 1950, and the Russian-North Korean alliance of 1953.⁶⁴ Common clusters of opinions

⁶³Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, pp. xv-xvi.

⁶⁴Norman L. Hill, International Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 304.

formed around communism. The western bloc with United States' leadership formed regional alliances primarily in Latin America through the Rio Pact and the Organization of American States, in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in Southeast Asia through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Common clusters of opinions formed around interests in the alliances.

In addition to the allies, opponents, and neutrals to which Kennedy's speeches were directed, the American audience was, of course, a primary concern. The United States carried certain images of the President and held certain clusters of opinion in common which were the result of Cold War anxieties. In agreement with Kennedy, relevant groups of the American audience were the public electorate, Congress, members of political parties, and members of the administration.⁶⁵

Conclusion

This chapter has given preliminary expectations and criteria for tracing the development of Kennedy's image in international crises. Image consists of information held about the speaker's attainments, reputation, prestige, fulfillment of role expectations, and personalization of institutions. On the basis of contemporary commentary, Chapter II discusses these five elements of Kennedy's image.

The discussion in Chapter II also provides further

⁶⁵Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, pp. xv-xvi.

insight into the audience which is useful in the analysis of the speeches. Previous information on audience coupled with the discussion of crises and occasions for speech, provide essential background for the discussion of image, and ethical appeal. Examination of the audience over two years allows investigation of ethical appeal arising from the coincidence of the speaker's proposals with the attitudes and beliefs of the audience. The way the speeches were adapted to the American, allied, neutral, and opposing audience determined part of the ethical appeal. Primarily, however, ethical appeal arises from respected qualities of good sense, good character, and good will revealed in the speeches. What the speaker says revealing these qualities, therefore, is the central concern of Chapter III. Information concerning Kennedy's characteristics as a speaker aid the understanding of the speeches and his use of appeals. An understanding of the audience, speaker, speech, and occasion allows the researcher to determine the presence of ethical appeal.

Chapter IV of the thesis draws together observations on rhetorical theory concerning ethos, speech in foreign affairs, and the relationship of image and ethical appeals comprising Kennedy's ethos in international crises.

CHAPTER II

THE KENNEDY IMAGE

The prominent factors of President Kennedy's changing image in international crises are discussed in this chapter. One contention is that these crises affected his image. In addition, the discussion supports the following assertions: (1) Kennedy was concerned about his image and used international crises to improve his image. (2) He developed a greater degree of ability in using crisis to improve his image. Specifically this ability was disclosed in a developing satisfaction of role expectations, changes demonstrating greater personalization of institutions, and the growth of his reputation, prestige, and attainments. The procedure involves an examination of Kennedy's concern for image and an investigation of the above five elements.

Concern for Image

In international crises, President Kennedy had concern for factors of his image. Contemporary observers and associates of Kennedy agreed upon his general concern for image. Victor Lasky believed that "the President deliberately sought to focus attention on himself and his personality."¹

¹Victor Lasky, J.F.K.: The Man and the Myth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 562.

Theodore Sorensen noted that the President felt that his program and personality were "mutually reinforcing and inseparable."² Kennedy worried more about personal attacks than attacks on policy and, as he watched video tapes, he "was frequently critical both of himself and the staging."³ This concern resulted from his belief that image and personality was the primary tool of communication and education of the public.⁴ A close associate observed that "the President was keenly aware of the importance of his foreign image."⁵

This concern continued through the years of international crises of the Kennedy administration. During the Congo crisis this concern was expressed in his effort to gain the confidence of African nations. During the Laos crisis Kennedy expressed worry over factors of acceptance and confidence in his image.⁶ Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy administration showed an increased worry. In May, one news magazine noted that "inside the administration . . . there is more tendency to place a lid on information and try to tailor news to give the country

²Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 634.

³Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 140; cf., Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Atheneum House, Inc., 1964), p. 108.

⁴Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 725-726.

⁵Salinger, p. 131.

⁶"Laos: At the Brink," Newsweek, LVII (April 3, 1961), 21-22.

a strictly favorable image of the President at work."⁷

Perhaps such concern for image was partially responsible for the President's decision to make the European tour and engage in a personal confrontation with Khrushchev.

During the Berlin crisis, the image factor of prestige was obviously at stake for both Kennedy and Khrushchev and the corresponding cold war blocs. The President's anxiety for approval was present as he watched public opinion and reactions from neutral nations.⁸ Kennedy, as quoted by Manchester, expressed a concern for approval in the crises of 1961:

Now I have the necessary support at home. This, this-- base is all-important. A chief of state cannot deal abroad effectively unless he has it. I'm over the hump now but the first four months were delicate.

.
I've always believed that a first impression is important. . . . In press conferences I gave the impression of knowing what I was doing, and my general activity, in my judgment, stimulated confidence. Cuba could have been difficult if I hadn't done that.⁹

In 1962, the guide-line he laid down for nuclear testing reflected concern for his reputation among other countries. He asked for completion of tests quickly to hold down world criticism and tried to restrict publicity and pictures of the tests.¹⁰ Following the resumption of testing,

⁷"Second '100 Days': Education of a President," U.S. News and World Report, L (May 29, 1961), 54.

⁸Kenneth Crawford, "The Test of Nerves," Newsweek, LVIII (July 10, 1961), 19; Schlesinger, p. 519.

⁹William Manchester, "John F. Kennedy: Portrait of a President," Holiday, XXXI (April, 1962), 78.

¹⁰Sorensen, p. 624.

Kennedy's anxiety over image continued. Press criticism, however, bothered him less. The President used pressures and engaged in many personal contacts to gain a favorable image in the press: "Reporters cannot remember when a President was so concerned with what was written or said about him."¹¹ According to the press, Kennedy's favorite means of improving his image, however, was through television speeches and interviews.¹²

Domestic issues emerged predominant in the spring and summer of 1962. Kennedy tried to devote more attention to domestic affairs, to build the confidence of business, and to change his image in domestic affairs.¹³ Little commentary emerged in the fall and winter of 1962 on Kennedy's anxiety over image.

Kennedy, then, maintained a general concern for elements of his image throughout the years of international crises. In several instances such as the Bay of Pigs and the resumption of testing, he used television to improve his image.¹⁴ Finally, because of his concern it is probable that the following discussion reflects further attempts to improve image.

¹¹"The Kennedy 'Image'--How It's Built," U.S. News and World Report, LII (April 9, 1962), 58; Manchester, 167; Sorensen, p. 624.

¹²"The Kennedy 'Image'--How It's Built," 56-59.

¹³"As Kennedy Tries to Change His Image," U.S. News and World Report, LIII (July 9, 1962), 36.

¹⁴Manchester, 78.

Role Expectations

The first factor of Kennedy's image in international crisis for consideration is his fulfillment of role expectations for the Presidency. These expectations which are factors of image include the following: bipartisanship, identification with the people, vigorous activity and accomplishment, experience in foreign affairs, a fighting conviction for principles, conciliatory and compromise ability, affability, accessibility, and the performance of rights and duties as Commander-in-Chief, architect of legislation, cabinet leader, policy planner, chief diplomat, and public ceremonial officer.¹⁵ Public opinion polls and statements by contemporaries revealed fulfillment or neglect of these role expectations. The following discussion supports the assertion that a developing satisfaction of role expectations strengthened his image.

During the period of transition to office, Kennedy began his fulfillment of role expectations concerning bipartisanship and Presidential activity. He was able during this time to expand the partisanship of his election into

¹⁵Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), p. 104; Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 (New York: Atheneum House, Inc., 1961), p. 441; Daniel Yankelovich, "U.S. Voters' Image of Ideal President," Life, XLVIII (March 21, 1960), 124. Yankelovich's study was based upon interviews lasting up to four or five hours, statistically verified with an additional sample. The poll revealed that sixty-nine per cent of voters demanded character and conciliatory ability; sixty-one per cent, experience in foreign affairs; fifty per cent, non-partisanship; thirty-nine per cent, decisiveness; eleven per cent, the common touch. Other qualities expected were bipartisanship and activity.

a bipartisan image as President of the entire nation. In these early months the President expended effort to create the impression of great activity.¹⁶

In the Congo crisis, Kennedy emphasized the compromise and conciliatory aspect of his image. Dean Rusk brought the President a tough-line statement to present at his press conference. Kennedy found it too tough and rewrote the speech to soften his position to the Russians.

Supplementing the commentaries, many polls gave insight into the fulfillment of role expectations by Kennedy in foreign affairs. Polls taken during the Kennedy administration revealed a primary interest on foreign policy by a majority of the respondents.¹⁷ Also during these emergencies, national attention turned toward the President's foreign policy. Polls on the President during crises, then, reflected this interest in foreign affairs.

Preceding the Laotian crisis an American Institute of Public Opinion poll of March 1, 1961, disclosed seventy-two per cent of the nation approved the way Kennedy was handling his job. This index of fulfillment of role expectations showed only six per cent disapproval but a

¹⁶Richard E. Neustadt, "Kennedy in the Presidency: A Premature Appraisal," Political Science Quarterly, LXXIX (September, 1964), 321-334; Lasky, p. 501.

¹⁷Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," International Behavior, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 161.

large twenty-two per cent holding no opinion.¹⁸ This general approval plus the bipartisan approval of Kennedy's emphasis on peaceful negotiations¹⁹ demonstrated two important developments: He was expanding the bipartisan expectations and was extending his conciliatory and compromise ability. After the speech, the same institute reported a corresponding growth in both the approval and disapproval of the way Kennedy was handling his job as President.²⁰

During the Bay of Pigs failure, Kennedy continued to expand his fulfillment of certain role expectations. Polls revealed that seventy-eight per cent in early April felt that he was doing his job well. Following the failure, this figure rose to eighty-three per cent. Only sixty-one per cent, however, approved the way Kennedy was handling his job in regard to Cuba.²¹ Observers remarked on the great activity of the President during these early months.²²

Before the European confrontations, Kennedy's image reflected greater fulfillment of expectations of identification. In an analysis of sociological implications of Kennedy's image, a sociologist stated that the President's image rested in his developing ability to identify with

¹⁸Hazel Gaudet Erskine (ed.), "The Polls: Kennedy as President," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVIII (Summer, 1964), 334.

¹⁹"Senators Applaud Kennedy on Laos," The New York Times, March 24, 1961, p. 8.

²⁰Erskine, 334. ²¹Ibid., 334, 338.

²²Michael Fogarty, "J.F.K.: A British View," The Commonwealth, LXXIV (May 5, 1961), 147-148.

both the common man and the elite. By May, Kennedy was identifying more than ever with his following.²³ Polls, however, revealed that approval of the way Kennedy was handling his job declined during May and June. This situation represented a downward trend in Kennedy's fulfillment of role expectations. The trend undoubtedly was a reaction to Kennedy's failure in the Bay of Pigs.

Preceding the Berlin crisis, indices continued to show a decline in Kennedy's fulfillment of the role expectations of his office. The Berlin problem, however, marked a reverse in this downward trend from the Bay of Pigs. Attention again centered upon the President and the crisis began to affect his image. The same day as the televised speech, his foreign aid bill passed through Congress without major revision. He was demonstrating developing ability in the fulfillment of expectations of him as an architect of legislation. The Congress under the urgency of crisis, as presented by Kennedy, approved the military requests made in the speech. Also, his role as Commander-in-Chief emerged stronger during this period. Even the Russians began to refer to him in this role rather than as President. His image displayed activity in extending his energies in the exercise of his rights and duties.²⁴ Finally in August,

²³Joseph Green, Jr., "The Public Image of President Kennedy," The Catholic World, CXCIII (May, 1961), 106.

²⁴"Mr. Kennedy's Firmness Approved," The Times [London], July 17, 1961, p. 8; James MacGregor Burns, "John Kennedy and His Spectators," The New Republic, CXLIV

following the crisis speech, approval of the way Kennedy was handling his job as President began to rise; by January seventy-seven per cent thought he was doing a good job.²⁵

During the resumption of nuclear testing, when attention centered again upon the President's decision, his fulfillment of role expectations again increased.²⁶ A contemporary news magazine stated that Kennedy appeared then to be "in command of his job."²⁷ Undoubtedly, Kennedy's image was strengthened through this developing satisfaction of role expectations.

The Matsu and Quemoy problem revealed again a downward trend for Kennedy. In foreign policy, he began to lose the bipartisan factor of his image. Partisan attacks by Eisenhower and other Republicans were responsible.²⁸ The investigation of foreign policy by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was not desirable at that time. During this crisis involving Matsu and Quemoy, the polls showed seventy-one per cent felt that the President was doing a good job. The largest percentage since election, nineteen per cent, felt the opposite, however. Just before the Cuban missile crisis, only sixty-one per cent, the lowest figure

(April 3, 1961), 7; David Butler, "An Englishman's Reflections On the Change of Administration," The American Scholar, XXX (Autumn, 1961), 525.

²⁵Erskine, 334. ²⁶Ibid.

²⁷"In Command," Time, LXXIX (March 16, 1962), 15.

²⁸"Republican Onslaught on Mr. Kennedy's Policy," The Times [London], June 28, 1962, p. 10.

since election, felt that he was handling his job as President well. Twenty-four per cent did not feel he was doing a good job.²⁹ In the fall, Republicans continued to take issue with Kennedy's foreign policy toward Cuba. In his meeting with Congressional leaders preceding the Cuban missile speech he still failed to gain bipartisan support for proposals on the crisis.³⁰ But again, world attention focused on the President in an international crisis that threatened American security. Popular approval of the way he was handling his job quickly soared to seventy-four per cent. Those feeling Kennedy was not doing his job well dropped to fifteen per cent.³¹ Again Kennedy was to a greater degree fulfilling role expectations and gaining bipartisan support.³²

Crises, then, affected Kennedy's satisfaction of role expectations in the eyes of others. Attention centered on the President and in some instances Kennedy deliberately tried to focus attention upon himself and his activity. This was particularly true of both emergencies involving Cuba. The early development of the Commander-in-Chief role was appropriate to occasions of international crises. Compromise expectations were fulfilled in early 1961 but gave way to a willingness to fight for principles. Kennedy extended bipartisan support through most crises. The

²⁹Erskine, 334. ³⁰Sorensen, pp. 701-703.

³¹Erskine, 334.

³²"The Backdown," Time, LXXX (November 2, 1962), 15-16; Erskine, 335.

exception was Matsu and Quemoy. This developing satisfaction of role expectations strengthened Kennedy's image.

Personalization

The second factor of Kennedy's image in international crises for consideration is the process of personalization. As noted in Chapter I, a personalized image is a rough summation of a vast complexity of images. To the American people, the Presidency was the symbolic personalization of the nation's government and identity.³³ In this study, the President's extension of his personality and control into institutions are considered factors of the process. In international crises, personalization included the use of personal diplomacy, the assertion of initiative through executive command and authority, the extension of values and purposes into organizations and associates, the growth of leadership, and the affirmation of personal decisiveness and judgement over the organized Presidency. The following discussion asserts that changes demonstrating greater personalization of institutions strengthened Kennedy's image.

During the campaign and early days in office this process of personalization began. One observer noted that "the Kennedy campaigns will always be remembered for the dramatic way they contributed to the personalized and

³³Boulding, pp. 104, 109-110; cf., Schlesinger, p. 664; Reinhold Niebuhr, "A Tentative Assessment," The New Leader, XLVI (December 9, 1963), 7.

plebiscitic Presidency."³⁴ From the beginning of his administration, Kennedy began to abandon the collective, institutionalized Presidency. The use of personal advisors replaced the general staff system in order to make the Presidency more responsive to his values and purposes. He kept the number of advisors small to further avoid institutionalization. Even one who viewed the Kennedy administration unfavorably admitted that the President "as a calculated matter . . . was out to demonstrate to the public that he was the . . . leader of the United States Government."³⁵

In foreign affairs as well, he tried to give the office a personal character and restore Presidential control to the government. The President was his own co-ordinator in foreign affairs.³⁶ Kennedy began with methods of quiet diplomacy and used normal diplomatic channels. He changed, however, to open diplomacy and a personal exercise of communication and decision. The more Kennedy operated in this manner, the more he personified the nation to other countries. Schlesinger noted that Averell Harriman, who had worked under both administrations, felt that Kennedy was more his own Secretary of State than Franklin Roosevelt had been.³⁷

The Laos emergency demonstrated an extension of

³⁴William G. Carleton, "Kennedy in History: An Early Appraisal," The Antioch Review, XXIV (Fall, 1964), 286.

³⁵Lasky, p. 501.

³⁶Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 14.

³⁷Schlesinger, p. 425.

this personalization process. In the period immediately preceding the Laos speech, Kennedy "made up his mind that quiet diplomacy would, for the time being, have to be abandoned."³⁸ Kennedy's personal diplomacy through open policy began replacing the use of quiet diplomacy and the United Nations. The policy itself became more an expression of personal decision. During the Congo crisis the President had allowed the State Department to draw up the policy statement. During the Laos crisis, however, he took an active hand in the speech preparation from the beginning. Because the President was concerned about his leadership at that time and was not happy with advice,³⁹ he began to change to a greater degree of self-reliance in crisis.

The Bay of Pigs affected this personalization process more than other crises. As a result of the debacle, allied nations began to question Kennedy's leadership ability. The failure of the Bay of Pigs and accompanying criticism caused the personalization process to speed up. Personal command and hold on the government developed more quickly.⁴⁰

Because of the Bay of Pigs

the President was far more skeptical of the experts, their reputations, their recommendations, their promises, premises and facts. He relied more on his own White House staff and his own common sense.⁴¹

The Bay of Pigs failure represented the single most

³⁸Sidey, p. 77. ³⁹Ibid.; "Laos: At the Brink," p. 21.

⁴⁰Manchester, 178; Schlesinger, p. 297.

⁴¹Sorensen, p. 644.

influential event on personalization. The failure and criticism forced him to re-evaluate his methods and advisors. This evaluation resulted in greater personalization of institutions.

This process extended into Kennedy's motives for the European tour. A current news magazine agreed with this observation: "the main aims of Mr. Kennedy's personal diplomacy according to his associates, is to assert his leadership of the West in an eventual face-to-face talk with Khrushchev."⁴² The change toward personal diplomacy was part of the personalization process. Such diplomacy was essential to offset the criticism of his leadership rising out of the Bay of Pigs failure. Even the speech given after the tour represented more of this personal extension. Kennedy took a more active part in the preparation with less departmental help. Newspapers and magazines agreed that the tour increased Kennedy's personal leadership image for allies, opponents, and Americans. To the British Kennedy projected the image of a leader who was able to extend his personality and values into institutions and organization.⁴³ Personal diplomacy began to replace the former diplomatic channels. Kennedy had met personally with many world leaders. One

⁴²"President Learns About Personal Diplomacy," U.S. News and World Report, L (April 24, 1961), 46.

⁴³Drew Middleton, "What Europe Thinks of Us Now," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIV (August 19, 1961), 56; cf., Fogarty, 147-148; "The President's Report," The New York Times, June 7, 1961, p. 40; "Personal Diplomacy," Newsweek, LVII (June 12, 1961), 21.

biographer marked June 6, 1961, the date of Kennedy's speech concerning the tour, as the time when Kennedy assumed world leadership.⁴⁴ He spoke to Khrushchev without clearances from allies and reported his evaluation before other leaders spoke on the meetings. This action aided his quest for leadership image. The tour and speech helped his personification or personalization of the nation to the rest of the world. Also the procedures and actions strengthened his personalization of the western bloc to communist nations.

Preceding the next crisis in Berlin this process continued. Kennedy impressed many nations with his leadership at this point. The British, however, felt that he lacked personal command, decisiveness, and leadership.⁴⁵ Since the Times article emphasized his lack of success in Cuba, these British observers were undoubtedly unaware of changes that had occurred. The President decided to defend Berlin and to personally take complete charge of the operation. These decisions represented the assertion of personal initiative through executive command and authority and the assertion of greater personal decisiveness. Kennedy's image reflected leadership, competence, and Presidential initiative. "Beyond his staff, his task forces, his friends, there was the President himself, increasingly the day-to-day

⁴⁴"All in 144 Days: Kennedy and World Leaders," U.S. News and World Report, L (June 19, 1961), 62-65.

⁴⁵Eldon Griffiths, "Kennedy's Image Abroad . . . Free World Leaders Speak Their Minds," Newsweek, LVII (April 3, 1961), 43-44; "A British View of Kennedy Rule," The Times [London], June 23, 1961, p. 12.

director of American foreign policy."⁴⁶ The speech he gave concerning the crisis represented a great personal effort in the preparation.⁴⁷ He by-passed administrative and diplomatic channels and extended his influence so that the need for relegating more decisions to subordinates emerged.⁴⁸

During the resumption of nuclear testing, Kennedy continued previous factors of the personalization process. Personal diplomacy in dealing with British Prime Minister Macmillan and President Ikeda of Japan was evidence of this continuation. During the crisis of Matsu and Quemoy, however, Kennedy reverted to the use of diplomats. Because of the lack of direct diplomatic channels to Communist China, he dealt with the communists through his ambassador to Poland.

The following emergency concerning offensive missiles in Cuba, however, again demonstrated definite factors of the personalization process. Kennedy gained "success in suffusing the web of relationships with his values and purposes."⁴⁹ He extended his control further by reducing the number of spokesmen in foreign affairs and maintaining tighter control

⁴⁶Schlesinger, p. 424; cf., "Taking the Initiative," Time, LXXVIII (August 4, 1961), 9; "Current Comment: The World Listens," America, CV (August 5, 1961), 578.

⁴⁷"Taking the Initiative," 9.

⁴⁸Butler, 525; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Trouble with Kennedy," Commentary, XXXIII (January, 1962), 53.

⁴⁹Schlesinger, p. 644.

on their words.⁵⁰ Thus, he assured closer conformity to his wishes. Kennedy spent almost two weeks with advisors during the Cuban missile crisis in the formulation of policy and speech preparation. He sent the speech through several drafts in another great effort to assure success in his personal declaration in crisis. This was done without clearance from departments or allied governments. The speech was a personal production of Kennedy and his personal advisors. During this time, Kennedy's personal decisiveness and command produced favorable reactions at home and abroad.⁵¹ Such reaction helped further establish his world leadership. He continued to assume a personal role in the conduct of world affairs. Not only did he make the decisions, but he avoided previous diplomatic channels and the use of department heads to gain international support. Rather he kept the decision secret until set forth in his televised speech. The Cuban missile crisis was another step in Kennedy's development in office. He made himself the center of the decision making process. An effective procedure for meeting crisis emerged. Kennedy had by this time developed an effective group of advisors for furthering his purposes and values.

International crises, then, affected the personalization

⁵⁰ Raymond Aron, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," Daedalus, XCI (Fall, 1962), 719.

⁵¹ "What's Being Said About U.S. Crackdown on Castro," U.S. News and World Report, LII (November 5, 1962), 36; Max Ascoli, "Escalation from the Bay of Pigs," The Reporter, XXVII (November 8, 1962), 25.

process of the Kennedy image. This fact was particularly apparent during the Bay of Pigs, European tour, and the Berlin crisis in the first year. Changes demonstrating greater personalization of institutions strengthened the Kennedy image in crisis.

Reputation

The third factor of Kennedy's image for consideration is his reputation. For the purposes of this study, reputation refers to information about the person's confidence, prudence, temperance, maturity, knowledge, intelligence, conviction, sincerity, trustworthiness, and other similar factors. Information about these factors emerged from contemporary commentary. The following discussion supports the assertion that Kennedy's developing reputation strengthened his image in international crises.

During the campaigns Kennedy had built a reputation for sincerity, loyalty, trustworthiness, intelligence, seriousness, frankness, and restraint.⁵² But the campaign, of course, emphasized partisan loyalties undesirable for a President. Further elements of pushiness, youth, and Catholicism were part of that image. Because images useful for becoming elected are not desirable for the occupant of the office,⁵³ Kennedy had to change certain undesirable

⁵²Celia Ann Dorris, "John F. Kennedy: A Study in Ethos" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 1965), p. 74; Harry P. Kerr, "John F. Kennedy," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI (October, 1960), 242.

⁵³Boulding, p. 109; cf., White, p. 443.

elements of his reputation.

During Kennedy's early days in office his reputation varied with different countries. Most reactions revealing his reputation revolved around expected responses to communism: Europe revealed Kennedy's reputation for having a rational, tough-line against communism; Southeast Asia feared abandonment; Japan expected a softer policy; Middle East reactions were mixed; Latin America expected firmness and aid. To the Russians Kennedy's reputation was uncertain diplomatically. They saw him as the rich young man with a "something-for-everybody-approach" that would be more flexible in foreign policy. Kennedy impressed Americans not with acceptable foreign policy but with obvious self-confidence and activity.⁵⁴ From the outset, Kennedy was concerned about factors of credibility and trustworthiness.⁵⁵

The Congo crisis afforded the opportunity for change and enhancement of Kennedy's reputation. The temperance and moderation of the rewritten speech enhanced these qualities. The following problem in Laos, however, showed more definite effects of crisis on reputation. To Southeast Asians, Kennedy's policy appeared to confirm their fears

⁵⁴"How the Rest of the World Sees Kennedy," U.S. News and World Report, L (January 30, 1961), 45-46; Madeliene and Marvin Kalb, "How Mr. Kennedy Looks to the Russians," The Reporter, XXIII (December 8, 1960), 33-34, 51-52; Donald Brandon, "Kennedy's Record in Foreign Affairs," The Catholic World, CLXLV (April, 1962), 219; Lasky, p. 501.

⁵⁵Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," International Behavior, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 410.

of abandonment and lack of loyalty by the President.

Kennedy's willingness to compromise heightened his image as a "paper tiger"⁵⁶ in Southeast Asia. Other more favorable elements of his reputation, however, emerged. He gained the reputation of exercising self-control and of being extremely well-informed.⁵⁷

As with other factors of Kennedy's image, his reputation was affected by the Bay of Pigs. One writer explained the emergence of sincerity as follows:

What was this element that appealed to people at a time when Kennedy had missed so far in Cuba and waged a formless battle of words over Laos? It was sincerity; the deep desire to do the best job as President he knew how to do and to spare no personal effort.⁵⁸

An associate stated that Kennedy wanted to establish his prudence with the world.⁵⁹ In Europe, however, Kennedy gained an unfavorable reputation. His indecision and lack of personal actions cast doubt upon his competence in foreign affairs.⁶⁰ Another historian observed that in this "encounter with a crisis in the Presidency, Kennedy's self-confidence seemed to have been severely strained."⁶¹ In the

⁵⁶ Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1964), p. 284.

⁵⁷ Schlesinger, p. 339; John Cogley, "The Presidential Image," The New Republic; CXLIV (April 10, 1961), 29; W. H. Lawrence, "Kennedy Alerts the Nation on Laos," The New York Times, March 24, 1961, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Sidey, p. 77. ⁵⁹ Schlesinger, p. 287.

⁶⁰ Lasky, p. 569; Schlesinger, p. 291.

⁶¹ Neustadt, 330.

United States certain factors of his reputation offset the failure. In Europe, however, Kennedy's reputation suffered.

Before the European confrontations, the President's reputation suffered from reactions to his youth and inexperience. Some observers saw these factors as barriers in dealing with senior statesmen.⁶² But by the time the tour began the Kennedys

had become international status symbols, possessed of the attributes most individuals would like to find in themselves--wealth, beauty, position, intelligence and what the auditors of society like to call good breeding.⁶³

This improvement of reputation with the world undoubtedly was a secondary aim of the tour. His reputation, which had fallen to some extent after the Bay of Pigs, began to take on more favorable features. Through the crisis speech, Kennedy increased the factors of earnestness and sincerity in his reputation and gained respect from the audience.⁶⁴

Before the Berlin problem, however, Kennedy's reputation still had not displayed sufficient favorable factors to offset the negative qualities accumulated in the Bay of Pigs. Some still believed he lacked good sense and effective policies. While other nations' reactions were

⁶²"President Learns About Personal Diplomacy," 46.

⁶³Sander Vanocour, "Washington: 'No Reason for Despair,'" Memo to J.F.K., ed. National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961), p. 300.

⁶⁴Kenneth Crawford, "Stemming the Red Tide," Newsweek, LVII (June 19, 1961), 34; Joseph A. Loftus, "Kennedy Says Khrushchev Talks Eased Danger of a 'Misjudgment,'" The New York Times, June 7, 1961, p. 16.

mixed or ambiguous, Europe began to recognize Kennedy's intelligence and understanding.⁶⁵ Although the British held reservations about Kennedy, praise of his character and sincerity began to emerge. In the summer of 1961, even reporters referred to the confident President as the "Tiger."⁶⁶ The factors of sincerity, confidence, and intelligence began to improve the President's reputation at home and abroad.

For the remainder of the year some expressions of doubt emerged from foreign capitols concerning Kennedy's competence. At home critics claimed that he was not using his popularity to gain support for his program. Others claimed that he had failed to express a definite foreign policy. With the younger public in Europe and Britain, Kennedy's understanding and competence emerged as favorable reputation factors. The press pointed to how much the President had learned.⁶⁷ By the beginning of the new year of 1962, the President's reputation had changed. He began "to present himself now as a man laboring under grave demands,

⁶⁵"Current Comment: A Warning on Berlin," America, CV (May, 1961), 303; Griffiths, 42; Max Ascoli, "From Europe," The Reporter, XXV (August 17, 1961), 20.

⁶⁶Max Ascoli, "The Wall," The Reporter, XXV (September 14, 1961), 22; Sidey, p. 218; "A British View of Kennedy Rule," 12.

⁶⁷"How Kennedy Looks to the World Now," U.S. News and World Report, LI (September 18, 1961), 64-68; Butler, 523-525; Morgenthau, 51-55; Lasky, p. 544; "The U.S.A. Under Kennedy," The Political Quarterly, XXXIII (April-June, 1962), 113; Middleton, 56; Sidey, p. 288.

cautious, serious, in a mood almost fatalistic."⁶⁸

His reputation developed further as a result of the resumption of nuclear testing. Kennedy's reputation in Britain still was not as favorable as at home or on the European continent. The British doubted the sincerity of his stated reasons for resuming tests. These observers felt that domestic political forces were more responsible than the balance of nuclear power. To the British, the President appeared much too cautious since April, 1961.⁶⁹ At home Kennedy's intelligence and maturity developed as factors of his reputation.⁷⁰

During the Matsu and Quemoy problem Kennedy's reputation suffered from a willingness to compromise and an apparent inconsistency with campaign statements. Further factors of distrust lowered his reputation. The Republican attack on the Cuban policy was additionally detrimental.⁷¹ Kennedy's reputation during this period, of course, did not strengthen his image in international crisis. Concern for domestic problems, such as the steel strike and suffering economy, were partly responsible.

⁶⁸"J.F.K.: The Shifting Image," National Review, XII (January 30, 1962), 50.

⁶⁹Karl E. Meyer, "Cloud of Unknowing," The New Statesman, LXIII (March 16, 1962), 361; Edmond Wright, "Foreign Policy Since Dulles," The Political Quarterly, XXXIII (April-June, 1962), 128.

⁷⁰Manchester, 167, 170.

⁷¹Ted Lewis, "Congress Versus Kennedy," The Nation, CXCV (July 14, 1962), 4.

During the following Cuban missile crisis, however, Kennedy regained many favorable factors of his reputation. In this emergency he displayed competence and ability in controlling preceding news, events, and the timing involved in the occasion for speech. Observers commented favorably on his courage, earnestness, intelligence, wisdom, prudence, confidence, and power. Around the world, Russian credibility, not Kennedy's, was in doubt. With this gained stature, Kennedy approached the status of a hero figure.⁷² Without a doubt, the Cuban missile crisis affected Kennedy's reputation favorably. This reputation overcame the Republican criticism and strengthened his image in crises.

Prestige

Closely related to reputation is prestige, the next factor of Kennedy's image for consideration. This factor denotes the degree of approval, acceptance, popularity, public support, confidence in the speaker, and association with others of prestige. The following discussion supports the assertion that Kennedy's developing prestige strengthened his image in international crises.

⁷² Arthur Krock, "In the Nation," The New York Times, October 23, 1962, p. 36; Ascoli, "Escalation from the Bay of Pigs," 24; "After Cuba," Time, LXXX (November 2, 1962), 32; "What's Being Said About U.S. Crackdown . . ." 37; Meg Greenfield, "The New Frontier," The Reporter, XXVII (November 8, 1962), 27; Charles D. Bolton, "Cuba: Pivot to the Future," The Nation, CXCV (November 17, 1962), 324; "Showdown-Backdown," Newsweek, LX (November 5, 1962), 32; "The Magic Eye of Television," The New Republic, CXLVII (December 29, 1962), 2; "T.V. Versus the Press," The New Republic, CXLVII (December 29, 1962), 2.

During the period of transition to office, Kennedy gained general approval of the nation, allies, and from association with other men of prestige. Kennedy selected a personal advisory staff of prestige both to the nation and other countries such as Britain. When Kennedy became President, world and particularly allied attitudes toward him were generally favorable. He carried the firm approval of European liberals and those who had become dissatisfied with Eisenhower. American attitudes were favorable, and he was able to deepen his acceptance early.⁷³

His policy in the Congo and Laos crises deepened his acceptance and widened his approval in Britain and with both American political parties.⁷⁴ The British reaction following a midnight cabinet meeting after the President's speech on Laos was typical: "When the ministers dispersed it was clear that they welcomed the President's references to British suggestions for ending hostilities."⁷⁵ Russia reacted the next day with a desire for neutrality for Laos.

Following the Bay of Pigs, however, the President's prestige dropped noticeably. General American popular

⁷³Hazel Gaudet Erskine (ed.), "The Cold War: Report from the Polls," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV (Summer, 1961), 314; Middleton, 55; Butler, 518-519; Erskine, "The Polls: Kennedy as President," 338; Neustadt, 321-334.

⁷⁴"Britain Likes Kennedy," U.S. News and World Report, L (February 20, 1961), 58; "Senators Applaud Kennedy on Laos," p. 8; Fogarty, 147.

⁷⁵"Mr. Macmillan Calls Cabinet At Midnight," The Times [London], March 24, 1961, p. 14.

approval rose, but confidence in the President began to decline. Disapproval was prevalent among many of the nation's political experts. In Europe Kennedy's prestige, especially with the French, dropped abruptly; and in Latin America, strong disapproval emerged.⁷⁶ The Bay of Pigs was the

greatest disaster of his entire administration. He was to suffer the scorn not only of the Communist world but of the exiles themselves. Our own allies began to question the wisdom of his leadership. Neutral nations were now more receptive to overtures from the Kremlin.⁷⁷

Preceding the European tour, Kennedy's prestige was at a low point. Wide news coverage and his wife's presence on the tour increased his popularity at home and abroad. Although popularity was generally high, Americans expressed mixed reactions of varying degrees of approval and disapproval.⁷⁸ One writer felt that his speech concerning the tour did much to repair his prestige.⁷⁹

Before the Berlin crisis Kennedy was suffering from loss of prestige from previous encounters with communism. World reactions, though somewhat improved, waited for more conclusive evidence. Kennedy had the approval of Japan;

⁷⁶Schlesinger, pp. 286, 291; "Second '100 Days': Education of a President," 54; Carl G. Anthon, "The Berlin Crisis and Atlantic Unity," Current History, XLII (January, 1962), 22; "How Kennedy Looks to the World Now," 66; "Bitter Lessons of Stevenson Tour," The Times [London], June 23, 1961, p. 10.

⁷⁷Salinger, p. 149.

⁷⁸Sidey, pp. 161, 177-190; Vanocour, p. 300; "What the American People are Troubled About," U.S. News and World Report, L (June 12, 1961), 63.

⁷⁹Crawford, "Stemming the Red Tide," 34.

other neutrals, the French, and the British held reservations. Following his speech American approval of his policy in Berlin rose, and politicians felt that the public would support him all the way. General approval again came from Europe and Canada with some desire for more emphasis on negotiation. Communists, of course, disapproved.⁸⁰

As the press began to draw conclusions on Kennedy's first year in office, they were cautiously favorable. Approval increased again by January a news magazine noted his popularity: "Today his personal popularity compares with such popular heroes as Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower."⁸¹

During the next emergency of nuclear testing, Kennedy maintained his prestige with the majority of his allies and America. Following his announcement on television, Japan, Egypt, India, Italy, Communist China, and the Soviet Union opposed the Kennedy decision to resume tests. Britain, France, Canada, the Philippines, Germany, and Australia gave approval. Although seventy-seven per cent of the American public approved the policy, some British observers felt that he had failed to gain public support.⁸²

⁸⁰ "The Kennedy Score After Six Months," U.S. News and World Report, LI (July 31, 1961), 28; Griffiths, 42; Hazel Gaudet Erskine (ed.), "The Quarter's Polls," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV (Winter, 1964), 657; Crawford, "The Test of Nerves," 19.

⁸¹ "Man of the Year," Time, LXXIX (January 5, 1962), 11.

⁸² "The Atom: The Reasons Why," Time, LXXIX (March 9, 1962), 19-20; Meyer, "Cloud of Unknowing," 361; Eugene J.

During Matsu and Quemoy, public confidence in Kennedy's associates decreased, and confidence in the President suffered by association. His prestige suffered also from domestic problems and the Republican onslaught previously discussed. One writer noted that the anti-Kennedy talk was almost as great as against Roosevelt in 1935 and Hoover in 1932.⁸³

The Republican attack continued until the Cuban missile crisis. Reaction to his television speech, however, revealed much prestige gained from the policy. The 48,000 telegrams received at the White House gave approval to Kennedy's decision ten to one.⁸⁴ Further approval came from the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Organization of American States. Latin America's response reflected relief, a shift in opinion against Castro, and approval for Kennedy. British commentary suggested that political pressure had forced a favorable vote from the Organization of American States, and that private displeasure was expressed in Mexico and Brazil. Popular support for the President was higher than official government support in Britain. Italy did not give specific approval. Japanese leaders

Rosi, "Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Tests and Fallout, 1954-1963," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX (Summer, 1965), 285; Wright, 128.

⁸³David Lawrence, "Confidence," U.S. News and World Report, LIII (July 2, 1962), 92; Kenneth Crawford, "Tavern Talk," Newsweek, LIX (June 25, 1962), 30.

⁸⁴Sidey, p. 343.

regretted the decision but recognized its necessity. Other neutrals in Africa indicated their approval. In Southeast Asia, the governments of South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines approved of what they felt was a new tough-line against communism. With such general world wide approval, Kennedy's prestige displayed high personal popularity.⁸⁵ By the end of the year the President felt that he had done well in maintaining popularity.⁸⁶

With the American public, Kennedy generally sustained and improved the popularity factor of his prestige. Approval of foreign nations, however, was generally affected by the way the policy related to them. For example, the invasion policy of Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs alienated much of Latin America. Nevertheless, the generally high prestige Kennedy maintained in most international crises was a significant contribution to his image.

Attainments

The final factors of the Kennedy image in international crisis for examination are his attainments.

⁸⁵"After Quarantine," The Nation, CXCV (November 3, 1962), 278; Jorge Castellanos, "What Living Under Castro Means," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXIX (December 15, 1962), 152; "What's Being Said About U.S. Crackdown . . ." 36-37; "The Big Showdown?" U.S. News and World Report, LIII (November 5, 1962), 36; Adolph A. Berle, "It Had to Be Faced," The Reporter, XXVII (November 8, 1962), 29; "Latin America: Unanimous Support?" The New Statesman, LXIV (November 2, 1962), 604; Schlesinger, p. 815; "Political Fallout: Who Gains?" Newsweek, LX (November 5, 1962), 35.

⁸⁶"As Kennedy Looks at U.S. and World--His Views for '63," U.S. News and World Report, LIV (January 14, 1963), 38.

Certainly many factors such as approval and popularity could be considered attainments. This discussion, however, is concerned with only those successes, victories, and achievements not previously mentioned. Again, many of the attainments strengthened the improvement of Kennedy's image in crisis.

The President's support of the United Nations' effort and his offer of military aid were instrumental in restoring order and reuniting the Congo. This policy was successful not only in that accomplishment, but also in forcing communist influence out of the area.⁸⁷

In Laos, the coalition government which formed in May, 1962, can hardly be considered solely Kennedy's attainment. He did play an active part, however. Hugh Sidey believed that the President's policy was aimed at securing a truce. On May 3, 1961, a truce began: "For the time being, at least, John Kennedy had stopped the offensive with words."⁸⁸ Sidey referred to Kennedy's Laos crisis speech.

The Bay of Pigs displayed failure, not accomplishment. Undoubtedly this accounted for the emergence of many negative factors in Kennedy's image at that time. The one attainment possible to note was the less tangible extension of control and self-reliance the President exerted as a result of the failure.

The European tour, of course, opened channels of communication and aided the attainment of a greater image of leadership for the President. But not until the Berlin

⁸⁷Sorensen, pp. 635-639.

⁸⁸Sidey, p. 77.

crisis did the President again establish any tangible success. Kennedy was able through the policy and accompanying actions to prevent the Soviet Union from signing the peace treaty with East Germany. He also sustained Western access rights and avoided a military or nuclear conflict. Kennedy also used this crisis to guarantee the success of requests for conventional military appropriations. Congress, of course, promptly approved. These attainments, however, were not possible without the undesirable consequences of the erection of the wall and the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. Some writers felt that there was another attainment gained: as a result of proposals in the speech and accompanying actions, experts believed Khrushchev was readier to talk and gained respect for Kennedy.⁸⁹

In regard to nuclear testing, Kennedy managed to allay much criticism and to maintain general approval. Careful timing and control of publicity aided that accomplishment. During the Matsu and Quemoy crisis, however, the President was not successful in halting the Republican criticism.

The Cuban missile crisis represented the President's greatest attainment in international emergencies. Not only did he gain unusually favorable image factors, but he also was successful in other ways. He gained his demands for the removal of the offensive weapons with world wide approval

⁸⁹"Krushchev Shows Worry over War," U.S. News and World Report, LI (August 7, 1961), 30.

and established credibility with Khrushchev.⁹⁰ At least two historians felt that the crisis was one of America's most important diplomatic victories and the turning point of the cold war.⁹¹ As a result of this encounter the communist bloc pushed for no new gains militarily in 1963. These attainments were undoubtedly influential in establishing a favorable image.

Conclusion

A definite relationship between international crises and the Kennedy image has been shown. These crises affected his image as attention centered upon his policy and actions. The international crises also made the public aware of Presidential activity and brought out various features of his image. In some instances such as the Bay of Pigs, the development of certain features of his image was speeded up.

This discussion has also demonstrated that Kennedy was concerned about various aspects of his image in international crises, and that he tried to improve that image. This ability in image improvement was evidenced not only by the specific examples discussed, but also by the general trends revealed in the crises. Through the Congo and Laos problems Kennedy generally maintained the favorable image derived from the period of transition to office. Following

⁹⁰Sidey, p. 345.

⁹¹Schlesinger, p. 841; Richard L. Watson (ed.) The United States in the Contemporary World, 1945-1962 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 290.

the failure of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy admitted his concern for image. Kennedy's policy and actions in the European tour, Berlin crisis, and the resumption of testing steadily improved various factors of his image. Domestic problems causing a devaluation of his foreign policy were alleviated with his policy and actions during the Cuban missile crisis. From that crisis he emerged with greatly increased prestige, reputation, and attainments, and fulfilled expectations to such an extent that he became a hero figure. More specifically, however, the greater ability in the improvement of his image has been revealed in the following: a developing satisfaction of role expectations, changes that demonstrated greater personalization of institutions, and his growing reputation, prestige, and attainments.

Certain personal characteristics of Kennedy's image emerged dominant. His historical knowledge of the Presidency, of facts, and his intellectual capacity accompanied desirable qualities of restraint, temperance, control, confidence, determination, and courage. His image changed from youthfulness, inexperience, and rashness to maturity, experience, and caution. Earlier questioning of his competence gave way to confidence in the image of a decisive, reasonable man. His appearance and socially acceptable personality, coupled with restraint, led to the development of the image of a "folk-hero."⁹²

Because of these findings the following is argued

⁹²Carleton, 296.

in subsequent chapters: Speeches also were part of the process that served to improve his image. It should be remembered that television was a favorite means employed for the purpose of image improvement. The following chapter, then, examines the ethical appeals present in the speeches to find a suggested correlation between ethical appeals and Kennedy's image. The desired outcome is a clearer understanding of the relationship of ethical appeal and image composing Kennedy's ethos. Another desired outcome is a clearer definition of the elements composing both his image and ethical appeals.

CHAPTER III

ETHICAL APPEAL

Ethical appeals in the international crisis speeches of President Kennedy are the focus of the following investigation. The character and personality revealed in the good sense, good character, and good will present in the speeches are examined. Additional criteria, however, are useful in categorizing the appeals.

Some elements in a speech reflect good sense. Aristotle named nine virtues reflecting both good sense and good character.¹ "Two of them, wisdom and prudence, are intellectual virtues."² Intellectual virtues reveal good sense. Contemporary theorists have added other elements of good sense to Aristotle's list: insight, judgment, imagination, competence judged adequate by hearers, accuracy with information, preparation, reasoning, discernment, mental alertness, knowledge, and decisiveness.³ Others added

¹Aristotle Rhetoric I. ix. 1366^b. 1-20. This and future references to this source are from the following translation: W. Rhys Roberts (trans.), Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics, ed. Frederick Solmsen (New York: Random House, 1954).

²William Martin Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1941).

³James H. McBurney and Ernest J. Wrage, Guide to Good Speech (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965),

common sense and familiarity with the interests of the day⁴ to the above qualities. All or any of these elements present in the speech reveal, according to these theorists, what the audience considers good sense. For the purposes of this study, then, these elements present in the speech are regarded as evidence of ethical appeal revealing good sense.

Other elements in the speech reflect good character. Aristotle listed justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, and gentleness as qualities of good character.⁵ Contemporary theorists have supplemented that list with the following: integrity, sincerity, fairness, courage, determination, assurance, trustworthiness, self-discipline, color, confidence, eccentricity, and uniqueness.⁶ When the speaker makes references to himself or refers to associations with persons, places, or institutions of

p. 41; Edward Rogge and James C. Ching, Advanced Public Speaking (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1966), pp. 210-211; James H. McBurney, James O'Neill, and Glenn E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), pp. 210-214; Loren Reid, First Principles of Public Speaking (Columbia: Artcraft Press, 1962), pp. 276-284; Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), pp. 116-120.

⁴Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949), p. 387.

⁵Aristotle I. ix. 1366^b. 1-20.

⁶McBurney and Wrage, p. 41; McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, pp. 210-214; Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamentals of Public Speaking (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960), pp. 340-343; Reid, pp. 276-284; Carl Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (Winter, 1961), 647; Minnick, pp. 116-120.

prestige for the audience he is demonstrating his character.⁷ In addition, association of message or self with virtue, association of opponent with evil, praise of self or cause, and reliance upon the authority of personal experience all reflect good character in the speech.⁸ According to the theorists, these elements enhance the speaker's ethos with the audience. For the purposes of this study, the presence of these elements in the speech is regarded as evidence of ethical appeal revealing good character.

Finally, certain elements in the speech reveal good will. According to Aristotle, elements of friendship reveal good will.⁹ Friendship involves having the same view of good and evil, liking the friends of friends, being beneficial, promoting personal safety, minding one's own business, being admired, being good tempered, displaying good humor, praising good qualities, dressing neatly, not holding grudges, showing respect, having things in common, being faithful, not deserting friends in trouble, doing favors privately.¹⁰ Contemporary theorists have supplemented Aristotle's discussion with other elements that reflect good will: candor, humility, stability, control, strength, warmth, sympathy, humor, respect for audience, courtesy, frankness, even temper, restraint, understanding, praise of audience, identification

⁷McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, p. 213.

⁸Thonssen and Baird, p. 378.

⁹Aristotle, II. i. 1378^a. 15-20.

¹⁰Ibid., II. iv. 1381^a-1382^a.

with hearers, tact, consideration, and the revelation of personable qualities.¹¹ This study will regard the presence of these elements in the speech as evidence of ethical appeal revealing good will.

In brief, the concern of this chapter is the character and personality--good sense, good character, and good will--revealed in the speeches. With the above elements serving as criteria and based upon a knowledge of the speaker, speech, occasion, and audience, the researcher will make judgments as to the presence of ethical appeal in the speech. Primarily descriptive, the discussion characterizes the ethical appeals. In addition, the investigation notes the correspondence of ethical appeals to the elements of image discussed in Chapter II. In some instances the effect of ethical appeals resulted from changes in image. The procedure followed is an examination and comparison of the speeches for elements revealing good sense, good character, and good will.

Good Sense

The dominant elements of good sense in Kennedy's crisis speaking were judgment, decisiveness, prudence, knowledge, competence, and reasoning. As noted below, some of these elements continued throughout the crises; others changed or appeared after the Bay of Pigs failure.

¹¹Rogge and Ching, pp. 212-213; McBurney and Wrage, p. 41; Bryant and Wallace, pp. 340-343; Reid, pp. 280-284; Minnick, pp. 118-120; Thonssen and Baird, p. 387.

Judgment

A continuing characteristic of Kennedy's crisis speaking was his judgment. This study regards judgment and discernment as the same quality. The nature of his judgments changed after the Bay of Pigs crisis. Before that point, judgments or discernments were presented in the speeches as expressions of personal opinion. The judgments were stated as maxims with little reasoning or evidence demonstrating how the judgment was made. Changes in the speeches revealed an increasing tendency to demonstrate the validity of judgments with reasoning and evidence.

During the Congo crisis speech, for example, Kennedy made several judgments demonstrating good sense. The judgment that "the United States can take care of itself, but the United Nations system exists so that every nation can have the assurance of security,"¹² demonstrated the following: (1) Kennedy's understanding of American attitudes and desires, and (2) his knowledge of the attitudes and beliefs of the neutrals and the less powerful nations, who sought negotiation and actions through the United Nations. Characteristically the judgment at this time represented a discernment or considered opinion of the speaker. The judgment that the "recognition of Congolese factions as so-called governments in other parts of that divided country can only confuse and make more difficult the task of securing

¹²Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1962), p. 91.

Congolese independence and unity,"¹³ reflected Afro-Asian, allied, and American values and attitudes favoring independence and unity. Acceptance of these judgments by the audience was dependent upon knowledge the audience already held. In Kennedy's judgment, "unilateral intervention in the affairs of the . . . Congo"¹⁴ was a threat "aimed directly at the independence and security of every nation, large and small."¹⁵ Such statements characterizing the speech represented Kennedy's judgment or discernment and were not supported by reasoning or evidence which might confirm them. Rather, the vast majority of judgments relied upon the knowledge and attitudes of the audience for acceptance.

Again, most judgments presented in the Laos crisis speech were similar. The following example was typical: "The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence. Its own safety runs with the safety of us all--in real neutrality observed by all."¹⁶ This restatement of Eisenhower's "domino theory" represented a bipartisan judgment respected by much of the audience although no evidence or reasoning was offered in support. The first sentence in the quotation represented a change in policy that depended upon audience attitudes and knowledge for acceptance.

¹³Ibid., p. 92. ¹⁴Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁵Ibid. ¹⁶Ibid., p. 213.

Of particular interest in the Bay of Pigs crisis speech were personal judgments and insights set forth as a result of the invasion.

First, it is clear that the forces of Communism are not to be underestimated, in Cuba or anywhere else in the world. . . .

Second, it is clear that this nation . . . must take an even closer and more realistic look at the menace of external Communist intervention and domination in Cuba.

.
Third, and finally, it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments.¹⁷

These judgments, unlike the previous ones, were backed by evidence, emotional and logical proof, and specific instances and examples. In addition, the audience's own knowledge of the invasion debacle would have tended to confirm these discernments. Further judgments reflected an emphasis upon a reasonable analysis of the problem:

Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders or missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough, that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.¹⁸

More reasoning and evidence supported judgments in the European tour speech than in the Congo and Laos speeches. Primarily, however, the judgments relied upon logical and emotional proof arising from his specific tour experience. Judgments made in the speech continued to reflect adaptation to the attitudes and desires of various segments of the audience. Note the adaptation to the allied nations of the

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 305-306.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 306.

western bloc:

I believe just as strongly that . . . liberty and independence and self-determination--not communism--is the future of man, and that free men have the will and resources to win the struggle for freedom.¹⁹

In reference to neutral and underdeveloped nations, his judgments reflected the same adaptation but were not based on specific reasoning and evidence presented in the speech:

If they [underdeveloped nations] have the will to determine their own future, if their governments have the support of their own people, if their honest and progressive measures--helping their people--have inspired confidence and zeal then no guerrilla or insurgent action can succeed.²⁰

In the Berlin crisis speech, even more reasoning and evidence supported judgments than in the Congo and Laos speeches. The specific instances and examples present in the Bay of Pigs crisis speech, however, were absent in this one. The judgments in the Berlin speech revealed a reliance upon explanation, reasoning, and evidence for support. His initial judgment, for example, that "our rights there are clear and deep-rooted"²¹ followed a brief history of post war diplomacy and the use of a visual aid map. In the light of Soviet challenges this supported judgment revealed good sense. As with other judgments, the statement in the area of defense spending that "our economy has the capacity to bear this new request"²² was supported by statistics and reasoning. By seeking out information and refraining from additional taxation, this judgment reveals good sense for

¹⁹Ibid., p. 445. ²⁰Ibid. ²¹Ibid., p. 533.

²²Ibid., p. 537.

his American audience. Throughout the speech, Kennedy based his judgments upon demonstrated knowledge of the facts.

In the next crisis speech, the basic judgment that Kennedy revealed was that the resumption of testing was necessary.²³ The reasoning in support consisted of the premise that in light of the Russian tests, the United States' security and deterrent must be strengthened.²⁴ With statistical evidence, he supported the judgment that minimal radioactivity resulting from the tests would not be harmful.²⁵ Although some observers questioned his reasoning, as will be discussed later, Kennedy continued to explain and support his judgments.

Later, Kennedy's judgment that it was necessary to defend Quemoy and Matsu was based upon the authority of the previous administration's policy. He offered no further reasoning or evidence. The judgments in the speech reverted to the practice preceding the Bay of Pigs crisis of basing judgments on personal opinion and precedent.

The judgments revealed in the Cuban missile crisis speech were based clearly upon evidence of the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba and upon reasoning. Observe the reasoning of the following judgment:

We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. . . .

²³Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1963), p. 187.

²⁴Ibid., p. 188. ²⁵Ibid., p. 187.

Any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.²⁶

The evidence that demonstrated (1) the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and (2) the untrustworthiness of the Russians in the false statements of the Soviet Foreign Minister, further enhanced his judgment that

this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles . . . in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy . . . is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country.²⁷

These and other judgments in the international crisis speaking of President Kennedy were characteristic. The changes present were basically changes in support. While earlier judgments were generally unsupported by reasoning and evidence, later judgments revealed a stronger reliance on supporting material. This change corresponded to the change in his image revolving around the Bay of Pigs, and possibly as a result of that image. His self-confidence and reliance on authority were shaken by the Bay of Pigs. Therefore, greater reliance in the speeches on factual information and sound reasoning to support his judgments was only natural.

Decisiveness

Another element revealing good sense in the speeches was decisiveness. The following discussion illustrates a

²⁶Ibid., p. 807. ²⁷Ibid.

basic change in the nature of the President's decisions. Early speeches presented decisions as products of a body of advisors or departments. Later speeches, as shall be seen, presented decisions as personal products of the President.

Decisiveness is, of course, an integral part of policy speaking in crisis. The clarity with which a decision is set forth distinguishes decisiveness from diplomatic generality. Such generalities, unlike decisions, can be interpreted according to the results of a problem. Kennedy's speech in the Congo crisis displayed such clarity in decisiveness:

I feel it important that there should be no misunderstanding of the position of the United States in such an eventuality. The United States has supported and will continue to support the United Nations' presence in the Congo.²⁸

As presented in the speech, however, the decisions represented the position of the United States government and was the result of group action. Kennedy did not claim that he had made the decision personally.

Again in the Laos crisis speech the President refrained from expressing decisions as personal products. Rather his wording emphasized their collective nature. Notice the use of the terms "we" and "administration" rather than "I."

²⁸Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 91.

The position of this administration has been carefully considered and we have sought to make it just as clear as we know how to the governments concerned.

First, we strongly and unreservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos.²⁹

Kennedy also linked his decision to Eisenhower and his discussions with the former President. Again, observe the collective nature of the decision.

In my last conversation with General Eisenhower, the day before inauguration on January 19, we spent more time on this hard matter than on any other thing. And since then it has been steadily before the administration as the most immediate of the problems that we found upon taking office.³⁰

Collective decisions continued in crisis speaking during the Bay of Pigs. But the report to the nation following the European tour revealed a change. The growing personal decisiveness and control which characterized the personalization of the Kennedy image during this period³¹ were apparent in the speech. Attend to how the President frankly stated his new view of decision making process:

I bear the responsibility of the Presidency of the United States, and it is my duty to make decisions that no adviser and no ally can make for me. It is my obligation and responsibility to see that these decisions are as informed as possible, that they are based on as much firsthand knowledge as possible.³²

The personal decisiveness reflected in the above speech was closely related to decisiveness in image resulting from the Bay of Pigs episode.

Also, in the Berlin speech, the presence of multiple

²⁹Ibid., p. 214. ³⁰Ibid., p. 213.

³¹Supra, pp. 35-37.

³²Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 443.

requests and clearly proposed action revealed a personal decisiveness to a greater degree than in previous speeches. No longer was the action a decision of the administration but one made by the President himself. Consider that quality in the following example:

Let me make it clear that I intend to take . . . whatever steps are necessary to make certain that . . . forces can be deployed at the appropriate time without lessening our ability to meet our commitments elsewhere.

Thus, in the days and months ahead, I shall not hesitate to ask the Congress for additional measures, or exercise any of the executive powers that I possess to meet this threat to peace. . . . And if that should require more men, or more taxes, or more controls, or other new powers, I shall not hesitate to ask them.³³

His personal decisiveness was revealed in the wording of his decisions. Notice that the first person singular replaced collective terms: "Accordingly, I am now taking the following steps,"³⁴ "Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives."³⁵ This decisiveness coincided with the extension of personal control and leadership inherent in his developing image at the time.

In the speech on the resumption of nuclear testing, this personal decisiveness continued: "I have today authorized . . . a series of nuclear tests."³⁶ The Quemoy and Matsu crisis speech demonstrated to a lesser degree the continuation of this personal decisiveness. He supported his decision to extend the Eisenhower policy in that area in a personal

³³Ibid., p. 535. ³⁴Ibid. ³⁵Ibid., p. 536.

³⁶Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 187.

manner: "In my own discussion of this issue in the campaign of 1960, I made it quite clear that I was in agreement with President Eisenhower's position on this matter."³⁷

The Cuban missile crisis speech revealed the President to be a personally decisive man. He presented seven decisions preceded by the following statement: "I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately."³⁸ Not only did the President indicate that this was his own decision, but also the numbering of the statements that followed heightened the decisiveness present.

The change to the assumption of personal responsibility for decisions coincided with changes in Kennedy's image following the Bay of Pigs crisis. Following the Bay of Pigs, when the advice of others had produced failure, Kennedy relied more on his own authority. Decisions given in the remainder of the speeches reflected this personal decisiveness.

Knowledge

Disclosure of knowledge in international crisis speeches revealed Kennedy's good sense. Use of information and speech materials, accuracy with information, and wisdom are regarded as elements of knowledge useful in examination of the speeches. An emphasis on the disclosure of knowledge was present in some speeches and absent in others.

In the Congo crisis speech, Kennedy demonstrated that

³⁷Ibid., p. 510. ³⁸Ibid., p. 807.

he was familiar with the important elements of the problem. No emphasis on information was present, however. In the Laos speech, background information not only brought the complex history down to simple dimensions to aid understanding, but also demonstrated his personal knowledge of the problem.³⁹ Other information not necessary for understanding was included in the speech and simply demonstrated the President's knowledge. For example, he stated unnecessarily that "the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was organized in 1954."⁴⁰ Some negative factors were also present. He called South Vietnam "a signatory of the SEATO Pact."⁴¹ Later in the conference, skillfully using humor and downgrading the importance of the mistake, he corrected the error.⁴²

One observer noted another mistake reflecting inaccuracy: "An interesting example of the absence of accurate information on the situation in Laos were the three maps on Communist progress. . . ."⁴³ Another writer praised the knowledge of an apparently well-informed President.⁴⁴ These observations demonstrate the effects information in the speech had on Kennedy's image.

³⁹Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 213.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 214. ⁴¹Ibid., p. 216.

⁴²Ibid., p. 220.

⁴³Bernard B. Fall, "Reappraisal in Laos," Current History, XLII (January, 1962), 11.

⁴⁴John Cogley, "The Presidential Image," The New Republic, CXLIV (April 10, 1961), 29.

The Berlin crisis speech particularly demonstrated the knowledge of the President over the wide range of his duties. He demonstrated his knowledge of foreign problems and their histories, civil defense needs, the state of the economy, budget requirements, and legality in international negotiations. In regard to the international problem and legality in the Berlin problem he revealed the following information:

We are there as a result of our victory over Nazi Germany--and our basic rights to be there, deriving from that victory, include both our presence in West Berlin and the enjoyment of access across East Germany. These rights have been repeatedly confirmed and recognized in special agreements with the Soviet Union. Berlin is not a part of East Germany, but a separate territory under the control of the allied powers.⁴⁵

In reference to the economy, he revealed the following information further demonstrating his knowledge.

The increase in this last quarter of our year of our total national output was greater than that for any postwar period of initial recovery. And yet, wholesale prices are actually lower than they were during the recession, and consumer prices are only $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1% higher than they were last October. In fact, this last quarter was the first in eight years in which our production has increased without an increase in the overall-price index. And for the first time since the fall of 1959, our gold position has improved and the dollar is more respected abroad. These gains, it should be stressed, are being accomplished with Budget deficits far smaller than those of the 1958 recession.⁴⁶

Throughout the speech, Kennedy displayed a knowledge in many areas of Presidential duties. One writer commented upon this element in the President's speech. This comment

⁴⁵Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 533.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 537.

further demonstrates the effect of appeals on image.

The President's speech has proved that he can encompass with a steady mind the new meanings of war and peace and negotiations. . . .

The President has put the issue of Berlin in its right perspective. . . . He also made it quite clear that he fully understands.⁴⁷

This use of information continued in the speech on testing resumption and the Cuban missile crisis. Knowledge disclosed in the speech on nuclear testing, for example, further effected his image. One news magazine commented upon the information:

In a speech that complimented the intelligence and maturity of the American people--a speech crammed with facts yet made convincing by its speaker's intensity--the President stated his case.⁴⁸

In the Cuban missile crisis speech, the President began by presenting his detailed information on the military buildup in Cuba. Again he demonstrated his knowledge.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. . . .

Other sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles--capable of traveling more than twice as far--and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere.⁴⁹

The use of this and other information in the speech was particularly noteworthy. Each division was a prerequisite to the persuasiveness and clarity of those sections following.

⁴⁷Max Ascoli, "From Europe," The Reporter, XXV (August 17, 1961), 20.

⁴⁸"The Atom: The Reasons Why," Time, LXXIX (March 9, 1962), 19.

⁴⁹Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 806.

The section following the information on the Cuban buildup developed Kennedy's justification for the quarantine. The justification was built upon previous information; the proposals designed to counteract the threat were built on the justification. The next section, a message to the Cuban people, could only follow the preceding sections. This appeal would have been useless had the President proposed intervention, opposed by Latin America. Latin America would not have been responsive to the appeal without knowing the threat and what the President had proposed.

Later speeches, then, displayed more emphasis upon demonstrating knowledge through the disclosure of information. Greater care with accuracy in the use of information followed the Laos speech. This greater care with accuracy corresponded to Kennedy's concern for better advice and greater accuracy in foreign policy. Kennedy's concern for that factor of image influenced his use of ethical appeals.

Prudence

An element of good sense continuing through Kennedy's international crisis speeches was prudence. Examples from various speeches illustrate. In the Congo crisis speech, rather than accusing the Soviet Union of hostile intentions, he cautiously stated, "I find it difficult to believe that any government is really planning to take so dangerous . . . a step."⁵⁰ Although Kennedy endorsed the United Nations'

⁵⁰Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 91.

support of Kasavubu, he prudently added that "the broadening of the government under President Kasavubu is a quite legitimate subject of discussion."⁵¹ In the Laos crisis speech, Kennedy displayed prudence also. Rather than stating that negotiations were being conducted, Kennedy chose to state that "careful negotiations are being conducted."⁵² In this speech, he revealed his decision to act with caution: "We will not be provoked, trapped, or drawn into this or any other situation."⁵³ Other speeches also revealed prudence. The Cuban missile crisis speech characteristically reflected this element. Observe the prudence in the following statement: "We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the cost of world wide nuclear war in which the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth."⁵⁴ Acting with caution, he also assured his American audience of "continued surveillance of Cuba."⁵⁵

Competence

Another element of good sense in Kennedy's speeches was competence. Kennedy revealed this element through reference to previous actions and jobs done, plans for improvement, and his activity in various aspects of his job. Such references, absent in earlier speeches, appeared following the Bay of Pigs failure when his image took on

⁵¹Ibid., p. 92. ⁵²Ibid., p. 214. ⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 807.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 808.

qualities of incompetence. In the Bay of Pigs crisis speech, he promised to learn from the failure. He stated that "there are from this sobering episode useful lessons for all to learn,"⁵⁶ and "we intend to profit by this lesson. We intend to reexamine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics and other institutions here in this community."⁵⁷ In the speech following the European tour, Kennedy described the manner in which he dealt with world leaders. For example, he related his competence in making agreements and exchanges with De Gaulle:

I believe that certain doubts and suspicions that might have come up in a long time--I believe were removed on both sides. . . . No question, however sensitive, was avoided. No area of interest was ignored, and the conclusions that we reached will be important for the future--in our agreement on defending Berlin, on working to improve defenses of Europe, on aiding the economic and political independence of the underdeveloped . . . world. . . .⁵⁸

He revealed competence in the preparation for his exchange with Khrushchev:

I had read his speeches and of his policies. I had been advised on his views. I had been told by other leaders of the West . . . what manner of man he was.⁵⁹

As a result of the meeting, he maintained that he had done a good job, for "the chances of a dangerous misjudgment . . . should now be less."⁶⁰

The effect of such statements on competence factors of his image was revealed in contemporary comment: Kennedy

⁵⁶Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 305.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 306.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 442.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 443.

⁶⁰Ibid.

"enhanced his stature and his authority as leader of the free world,"⁶¹ in the speech.

In the Berlin crisis speech Kennedy revealed his competence as President in two ways. First, he described his activity, previous actions, and jobs done. Second, he announced plans for the future. In the area of the Commander-in-Chief role, he pointed out, "The supplementary defense build-ups that I asked from the Congress in March and May have already started moving us toward these and our other defense goals."⁶² Then he proposed six steps⁶³ to increase military preparedness. In the area of civil defense, he said, "In May, I pledged a new start on Civil Defense. Last week, I assigned . . . responsibility. . . . Tomorrow I am requesting of Congress new funds."⁶⁴ In the area of the nation's economy, he recounted the success of his administration in that field with this statement:

These gains, it should be stressed, are being accomplished with budget deficits far smaller than those of the 1958 recession. . . . I intend to submit to the Congress in January a budget for the next fiscal year which will be strictly in balance.⁶⁵

His discussion of many areas of responsibility demonstrated his competence to deal in a wide range of activities. This emphasis on competence corresponded to the growth of that quality in his image. Contemporary writers commented upon

⁶¹"The President's Report," The New York Times, June 7, 1961, p. 40.

⁶²Ibid., p. 535. ⁶³Ibid., pp. 535-536.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 536. ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 537.

the President's competence as a result of hearing the speech.⁶⁶ Again these reactions demonstrated the effect of appeal on image.

In the final speech on the Cuban missiles, he further disclosed his competence through references to activities in his job. Activity as Commander-in-Chief was emphasized. Note Kennedy's reference to security activity: "This Government as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba."⁶⁷ He also disclosed his competence in the quarantine and other proposals for future action in the speech.

References to activity following the Bay of Pigs revealed the President's competence in the speeches. Activity was particularly discussed in the area of his role as Commander-in-Chief. The emphasis on this role related to a corresponding dominant factor of his image in international crisis.

Reasoning

Finally, the element of reasoning revealed good sense in Kennedy's international crisis speeches. Often he relied heavily upon the urgency of the crises, not argument, to gain support. In most of the speeches his reasoning was acceptable to the audience. In several speeches, however, certain weaknesses occurred that affected audience acceptance.

⁶⁶Ascoli, 20; "Current Comment: The World Listens," America, CV (August 5, 1961), 578.

⁶⁷Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 806.

In the Berlin speech Kennedy stated that "any dangerous spot is tenable if men--brave men--will make it so."⁶⁸ Some British observers questioned the reasoning and logic of that statement.⁶⁹ Some observers found the reasoning upon which Kennedy based the resumption of testing inadequate. Kennedy reasoned deductively as follows:

The United States must maintain an effective number and quality of nuclear weapons, so deployed and protected as to be capable of surviving a surprise attack and devastating the attacker. Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike. . . . Only through such strength can we in the Free World--should that deterrent fail--face the tragedy of another war with any hope of survival.⁷⁰

One observer questioned this reasoning: "If we fail to deter, how can deterrent weapons help us to survive? They may help a dying country to destroy its assassin, a thought to comfort us on our exit."⁷¹

The same magazine stated, "It does not seem to us that the President explained convincingly why the scientific facts make testing imperative at this time."⁷²

Another example of faulty reasoning was also present in the speech. During the speech, Kennedy made the following conditional offer to the Soviet Union:

⁶⁸Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 534.

⁶⁹"Negotiation, Not War," The New Statesman, LXII (July 28, 1961), 105.

⁷⁰Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 534.

⁷¹James R. Newman, "Testing--What Does Kennedy Mean?" The New Republic, CXLVI (March 26, 1962), 12.

⁷²"Testing--Carrot and Stick," The New Republic, CXLVI (March 12, 1962), 4.

If the Soviet Union should now be willing to accept such a treaty [nuclear test ban], to sign it before the latter part of April, and apply it immediately--if all testing can thus be actually halted--then . . . there would be no need for our tests to begin.⁷³

This statement seriously weakened or contradicted the argument that Soviet testing had given them an advantage and had weakened "the Free World's Ability to deter."⁷⁴ A contemporary source agreed:

If the scientific military judgment that another Soviet series in the absence of further U.S. testing "might alter the balance of power," then the President came to the wrong conclusion. For if this is the case, we should promptly resume testing and refuse to sign any agreements rather than announce our willingness to call off the tests.⁷⁵

The British questioning of his reasons for resuming tests⁷⁶ undoubtedly arose from such discrepancies revealed in the speech.

Despite these observations on the resumption of testing speech, to the vast majority of the allied and American audience, the reasoning must be judged sufficient, in the light of reaction and approval of the speech.⁷⁷ To most of his audience the following observation must apply:

As he went on nationwide TV to disclose his plans, John Kennedy had already managed not only to neutralize opposition to the tests at home--such as it was--but to ease the impact of the test abroad. In a speech that complimented the intelligence and maturity of the American people . . . the President stated his case.⁷⁸

⁷³Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 191.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 188. ⁷⁵"Testing--Carrot and Stick," 5.

⁷⁶Supra, p. 45. ⁷⁷Supra, p. 49.

⁷⁸"The Atom: The Reasons Why," 19.

In the Quemoy and Matsu speech, reasoning was notably absent. Instead, the President relied implicitly upon precedent and other features for acceptance. Statements in the Cuban missile crisis speech, such as "aggressive conduct if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war,"⁷⁹ were unquestioned in news commentary. Rather, the reasoning that the recent actions in Cuba demanded counteraction met with general approval.

In Kennedy's international crisis speeches, the dominant elements of good sense were the following: judgment, decisiveness, prudence, knowledge, and competence. Changes in judgment and decisiveness, and more emphasis on activities reflecting competence corresponded to changes in Kennedy's image. Some of these ethical appeals affected the President's image.

Good Character

Ethical appeal reflecting good character is the second major area of investigation into Kennedy's international crisis speaking. In Kennedy's speeches, as the following discussion illustrates, the dominant elements revealing good character were the following: association of self with virtue, with men of prestige, and association of opponent with evil. Courage, sincerity, temperance, references to self, reliance upon the authority of personal experience are additional elements. The following discussion illustrates that some

⁷⁹Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 807.

of these elements demonstrated changes corresponding to changes in Kennedy's image; some affected his image; others continued throughout the speeches displaying little change.

Associations

The following discussion illustrates how Kennedy associated himself and his goals with virtue and with men of prestige. Also characteristic was the association of his opponent with nonvirtuous goals.

In the Congo crisis speech Kennedy associated his message and self with a person respected by allies and neutrals: "Prime Minister Nehru has stated, and I quote, 'If the United Nations goes out of the Congo, it will be a disaster.' I strongly agree with this view."⁸⁰ By supporting the United Nations he displayed qualities respected by members of the United Nations including particularly Great Britain and the smaller emerging nations and neutrals. This position, coupled with the British emphasis on negotiations, contributed to the favorable British reaction to the speech.⁸¹ More directly the speech reflected association with virtuous attitudes and with the desires of the allies, neutrals, and home audiences. Observe Kennedy's association with peaceful goals:

I hope it will be possible for the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union to develop in

⁸⁰Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 92.

⁸¹Supra, p. 47.

such a way that the peace can be protected and that it will be possible for us to use our energies along peaceful and productive and fruitful lines.⁸²

Kennedy associated his policy with Eisenhower's in the Laos speech: "In my last conversation with General Eisenhower . . . we spent more time on this hard matter than on any other thing."⁸³ He also referred to the "strong leadership from our last administration."⁸⁴ This association was, of course, admired by Republicans and large segments of the American audience. More generally, however, Kennedy associated his Laos message with virtuous goals and attitudes. Notice the association with freedom, honor, and security in the following example: "I know that every American will want his country to honor its obligations to the point that freedom and security of the free world and ourselves may be achieved."⁸⁵ This association with meeting obligations and the concern for freedom and security accompanied his desire for "a peaceful solution."⁸⁶ These virtuous goals balanced an association of his opponents with non-virtuous goals. He stated that "the efforts of a communist-dominated group to destroy this neutrality never ceased."⁸⁷

In the Bay of Pigs crisis speech, this same association of communists with non-virtuous traits was clearly present:

⁸²Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 93.

⁸³Ibid., p. 213. ⁸⁴Ibid., p. 214.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 213. ⁸⁶Ibid. ⁸⁷Ibid.

Those who staged automatic "riots" in the streets of free nations over the effort of a small group of young Cubans to regain their freedom should recall the long roll call of refugees who cannot now go back--to Hungary, to North Korea, to North Vietnam, to East Germany or to Poland, or to any of the other lands from which a steady stream of refugees pours forth, in eloquent testimony to cruel oppression now holding sway in their homeland.⁸⁸

Should that time ever come, we do not intend to be lectured on "intervention" by those whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest.

.....
It is not the first time that Communist tanks have rolled over gallant men and women fighting to redeem the independence of their homeland.⁸⁹

This acrimony against his enemies and association of opponents with evil accompanied his association of self and message with virtue. Notice how Kennedy associated his message with freedom and courage: "Nor is it by any means the final episode in the eternal struggle of liberty against tyranny, anywhere on the face of the globe, including Cuba itself."⁹⁰

At the beginning of the speech following the European tour, Kennedy associated himself with virtue as defender of freedom. "We knew of course that the crowds and the shouts were meant in large measure for the country that we represented, which is regarded as the chief defender of freedom."⁹¹ Again he made the same association in the recognition of "our fate as Americans in this generation as the chief defender of the cause of liberty."⁹² Further expression of virtuous beliefs was present in emphasis on freedom in the

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 306.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 305.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 441.

⁹²Ibid., p. 444.

following statement: "I believe just as strongly that . . . liberty and independence and self-determination . . . is the future of man, and that free men have the will and the resources to win the struggle for freedom."⁹³ His good character was further revealed by association with European leaders of prestige to various allied countries:

My stay in England was short but the visit gave me a chance to confer privately again with Prime Minister Macmillan, just as others of our party in Vienna were conferring yesterday with General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. We all agreed that there is work to be done in the West and from our conversations have come agreed steps to get on with that work. Our day in London, capped by a meeting with Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip was a strong reminder at the end of a long journey that the West remains⁹⁴ united in its determination to hold to its standards.

But, in regard to his relationship with Khrushchev, he stated, "We have wholly different views of right and wrong."⁹⁵

In the Berlin crisis speech, Kennedy continued this association. The speech on testing revealed Kennedy's association of his proposal with virtuous goals. The following examples illustrate: "For our ultimate objective is not to test for the sake of testing. Our real objective is to make our own tests unnecessary."⁹⁶ "Our foremost aim is the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a world made safe for mankind."⁹⁷

⁹³Ibid., p. 445. ⁹⁴Ibid., p. 446.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 443.

⁹⁶Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 191.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 192.

Throughout the speech on Matsu and Quemoy, Kennedy associated his policy with Eisenhower. Some examples will illustrate:

In the earlier years President Eisenhower made repeated efforts to secure the agreement of Communist China to the mutual renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan area, and our support of this policy continues.⁹⁸

In my own discussion of this issue in the campaign of 1960, I made it quite clear that I was in agreement with President Eisenhower's position on this matter.⁹⁹

In the Cuban missile speech the following examples reflected the same association with virtues: "We are also true to our word."¹⁰⁰ "We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms. . . . We are prepared to discuss new proposals."¹⁰¹ Kennedy's association of Khrushchev with evil was clear: "I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace."¹⁰²

Association with virtue, men of prestige, and of opponent with evil was characteristic of the good character revealed in Kennedy's international crisis speeches.

Courage

The element of courage or determination in the international crisis speeches further revealed good character. This element continued throughout the speeches. Following

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 509. ⁹⁹Ibid., p. 510.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 802. ¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 808. ¹⁰²Ibid.

the Bay of Pigs, added determination emerged. Kennedy's self-confidence in the speeches was additionally indicative of courage and determination.

Little reason existed in the Congo crisis for Kennedy to include appeals demonstrating his courage and determination since that was his first encounter in an international crisis. His appearance and delivery, however, revealed some negative qualities concerning confidence:

The new President was beginning to feel the heat that any occupant of the White House must learn to endure. He showed it plainly at his press conference; he appeared red-eyed and tired, less crisp, and sure of himself than he had been at his first . . . meetings with the press.¹⁰³

The Laos speech reflected the President's courage and determination in statements such as the following: "No one should doubt our resolution on this point [resisting aggression]."¹⁰⁴

The Bay of Pigs speech reflected greater courage and determination. Notice his implied willingness to invade Cuba should matters become worse: "Let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible."¹⁰⁵ Additional determination and direct references to his own determination began to appear: "I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril."¹⁰⁶ Statements in the speech following the European

¹⁰³"Suddenly--Grave Problems," Newsweek, LVII (February 20, 1961), 23.

¹⁰⁴Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 214.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 304. ¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 306.

tour revealed the same qualities: "We must be determined. We must be courageous. We must accept both risks and burdens."¹⁰⁷ The strong condemnation of communism enhanced the courage disclosed in the speech. In the Berlin crisis speech he continued to reveal good character through qualities of courage and determination. Observe his willingness to fight for an untenable military position: "I hear it said that West Berlin is militarily untenable. . . . Any dangerous spot is tenable if men--brave men--will make it so. We do not want to fight--but we have fought before."¹⁰⁸ Since Kennedy's speech revealed that he was willing to fight for Berlin, the above statement made him one of the "brave men." Again he directly stated: "We must look to long days ahead which if we are courageous and persevering can bring us what we all desire."¹⁰⁹ In this speech, however, his delivery produced conflicting reports concerning his confidence. An article stated that "he appeared nervous as he frequently wiped the sweat from his brow."¹¹⁰ Because of that trait of his delivery, Victor Lasky stated that the President was no longer "the same possessed and coolly confident young man who only six months before . . . had urged: 'Let us begin.'"¹¹¹ The fact of the matter was, "though some viewers attributed

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 446. ¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 534.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 540.

¹¹⁰"Taking the Initiative," Time, LXXVIII (August 4, 1961), 9.

¹¹¹Victor Lasky, J.F.K.: The Man and the Myth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 573.

the gestures to tension, reporters present pointed out that the air conditioning had been shut off because of its noise, and the room was like an oven."¹¹²

The element of courage continued through the remainder of the speeches in manner similar to that above. In the final speech on the Cuban missile crisis, that quality was particularly prominent. He demonstrated that he would risk even nuclear war: "We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the cost of nuclear war . . . but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced."¹¹³ He also referred directly to courage: he discussed the "unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe."¹¹⁴ He made it clear that the Soviet threat would be met "with determination."¹¹⁵ Finally, in the conclusion, he stated the following: "The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are--but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage."¹¹⁶ Such statements affected his image. Mayor Willie Brandt of West Berlin pointed to Kennedy's

¹¹²"Kennedy: 'A Wider Choice,'" Newsweek, LVIII (August 7, 1961), 14.

¹¹³Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 807.

¹¹⁴Ibid. ¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 808.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 809; italics mine. Notice Kennedy's direct association of character and courage.

courage in the speech. Max Ascoli also noted that the President "displayed somber courage."¹¹⁷

The element of courage was a continuing characteristic of Kennedy's international crisis speaking. This element was revealed to a greater degree in the speeches following the failure of the Bay of Pigs. This added courage and determination likely resulted from the failure.

Temperance

The element of temperance was another continuing characteristic of good character in Kennedy's international crisis speeches. Self-discipline, stability, control, reasonableness, and willingness for negotiation revealed temperance. Examples from the speeches illustrate.

The Congo crisis speech displayed this element. In regard to the Soviet threat, Kennedy re-wrote the first speech given him by Dean Rusk to soften the policy. The final draft contained no threats which might provoke Russia further toward intervention. Rather, the President wisely displayed temperance in rebuke: "I find it difficult to believe that any government is really planning to take so dangerous and irresponsible a step."¹¹⁸ In the light of possible alternatives of intervention, bilateral diplomacy,

¹¹⁷ "What's Being Said About U.S. Crackdown on Castro," U.S. News and World Report, LII (November 5, 1962), 37; Max Ascoli, "Escalation from the Bay of Pigs," The Reporter, XXVII (November 8, 1962), 24.

¹¹⁸ Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 91.

or censure, Kennedy's proposals were temperate. Temperance toward Russia likely aided the prevention of direct Soviet intervention.

The Laos speech furnishes typical examples. The matter was handled with temperance and self-control. Theodore C. Sorensen noted that "he spoke coolly, quietly, without bombast."¹¹⁹ Acrimony toward the communists was notably absent in the speech. Instead of stating that the United States would intervene and supply military aid, the wording was much more restrained:

If these attacks do not stop, those who support a truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response. The shape of this necessary response will, of course, be carefully considered, not only here in Washington, but in the Seato conference with our allies, which begins next Monday.¹²⁰

This element of temperance continued in most of the crisis speeches. The notable exception to the temperate nature of the speeches was the one concerning the Bay of Pigs. He refused to temper the statements in the speech but associated communism with "the bloody streets of Budapest,"¹²¹ "tyranny,"¹²² "the iron discipline of the mailed fist,"¹²³ and with specific instances of oppression and violence.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 643.

¹²⁰Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 91.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 304. ¹²²Ibid., p. 305.

¹²³Ibid. ¹²⁴Ibid., p. 306.

In the Berlin speech, Kennedy devoted an entire section to the desire for negotiations instead of military solutions. He stated in that section this firm desire, and demonstrated his preference for this type of international exchange over reliance on the power of the military to solve international problems:

We do not intend to abandon our duty to mankind to seek a peaceful solution.

As signers of the UN Charter, we shall always be prepared to discuss international problems.¹²⁵

In short, while we are ready to defend our interests, we shall also be ready to search for peace--in quiet exploratory talks--in formal or informal meetings. We do not want military considerations to dominate the thinking of either East or West.¹²⁶

Italian, British, Canadian, and Japanese officials, however, wanted more temperance through negotiation in the speech.¹²⁷

Kennedy further stated his desire for temperance through negotiation:

I must emphasize again that the choice is not merely between resistance and retreat, between atomic holocaust and surrender. Our peace-time military posture is traditionally defensive; but our diplomatic posture need not be. Our response to the Berlin crisis will not be merely military or negative. It will be more than merely standing firm. For we do not intend to leave it to others to choose and monopolize the forum and the framework of discussion. We do not intend to abandon our duty to mankind to seek a peaceful solution.

As signers of the UN Charter, we shall always be prepared to discuss international problems with any and all nations that are willing to talk--and listen--with reason.¹²⁸

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 538.

¹²⁶Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 191.

¹²⁷"Negotiation, Not War," 105; "Mr. Kennedy's Firmness Approved," The Times [London], July 17, 1961, p. 8; "How Other Countries Greeted the Kennedy Program," U.S. News and World Report, LI (August 7, 1961), 32.

¹²⁸Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 537.

Kennedy did not want "military considerations to dominate the thinking of either East or West."¹²⁹

However, the position of the negotiation section in the speech created problems. The principle of primacy and recency was operative: materials presented first and last in a speech are better attended. The beginning of the speech recounted the Soviet threat and the necessary United States response. The last of the speech consisted of a challenge to the Atlantic community and a strong direct personal appeal. The position of the section on negotiation, in the middle of the speech, reduced its emphasis. The position of other sections emphasized the military aspects. This faulty adaptation of ethical appeal elements of restraint and temperance was at least partially responsible for reactions wanting more emphasis on negotiation.¹³⁰ Perhaps, the neutrals' equation of the firmness of the speech with belligerence¹³¹ also resulted from this arrangement.

In the resumption of testing speech, the element of temperance was present in the offer to abandon tests if the Soviet Union would sign a treaty.¹³² This element was further revealed in his reluctance to begin the tests.

Every alternative was examined. Every avenue of obtaining Soviet agreement was explored. We were determined not to rush into imitating their tests. And we were equally determined to do only what our own security required us to do.¹³³

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 538. ¹³⁰Supra, p. 49.

¹³¹Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 519.

¹³²Ibid., p. 187. ¹³³Ibid.

Further speeches revealed this element. The Cuban missile crisis speech, for example, revealed temperate proposals. In the light of alternatives considered, an invasion of Cuba, and an air strike,¹³⁴ the quarantine Kennedy proposed enhanced temperance and restraint in the speech. Further, Kennedy's choice of labeling of the military weapons blockade as a "quarantine" was designed to soften the impact of the actions for the rest of the world.¹³⁵ The "quarantine" label was desirable because of unfavorable connotations of the Soviet Blockade of Berlin in 1948. Kennedy implied this more temperate nature of the quarantine in the speech: "We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948."¹³⁶

Temperance, then, was a quality of good character present in the speeches. This element continued throughout the speeches as further evidence of the speaker's good character.

Sincerity

Other ethical appeals revealing good character in the speeches reflected the speaker's sincerity. In this discussion, sincerity refers to his candor and clarity, integrity, consistency, and credibility. On certain occasions

¹³⁴Sorensen, pp. 682-685. ¹³⁵Ibid., p. 694.

¹³⁶Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 108. This statement also made Soviet condemnation of the quarantine more difficult.

the sincerity had effects on his image. Examples from some of the speeches reveal the nature of the appeals involving this quality.

In the Laos speech, for example, sincerity was a particular concern. Kennedy realized that there should be no "misunderstanding."¹³⁷ Hugh Sidey noted that Kennedy "was determined to try to talk the Pathet Lao out of a war before involving American troops."¹³⁸ To accomplish that, he had to be believed. One historian reported that part of one paragraph was "designed to re-establish credence . . . in American promises of non-intervention in Laos."¹³⁹ The sentence referred to was the following: "If in the past there has been any possible ground for misunderstanding of our desire for a truly neutral Laos, there should be none now."¹⁴⁰ One observer noted the fact that "Mr. Kennedy was unusually serious,"¹⁴¹ which was consistent with the sincerity he attempted to project and perhaps was the effect of that quality.

Other speeches emphasized sincerity. In the Bay of Pigs speech, Kennedy wanted to "present the facts, to present

¹³⁷Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 214.

¹³⁸Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Atheneum House, Inc., 1964), p. 80.

¹³⁹Fall, 11.

¹⁴⁰Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 214.

¹⁴¹W. H. Lawrence, "Kennedy Alerts Nation on Laos," The New York Times, March 24, 1961, p. 1.

them with candor."¹⁴² Again in the European tour speech, he stated that, "I believe it is my obligation to the people, to the Congress and to our allies to report on these conversations candidly and publicly."¹⁴³ Kennedy assured the audience of his sincerity and honesty: "Neither of us tried to merely please the other, to agree merely to be agreeable, to say what the other wanted to hear."¹⁴⁴ This assurance accompanied the statement that "no advantage or concession was either gained or given, . . . achieved or pretended."¹⁴⁵ Sincerity present in the speech helped to improve Kennedy's image according to some observers.

The stark candor of the President's report to the nation on the Vienna conference is unprecedented in the diplomacy of this generation. Following each previous summit an attempt has been made to create the impression that something hopeful, if not momentous, was accomplished. . . . He [Kennedy] was utterly honest. . . . Mr. Kennedy's performance . . . has commanded universal respect in Washington and, apparently, in foreign capitals as well. It has done much to repair the damage Cuba did his prestige.¹⁴⁶

Another observer confirmed sincerity and honesty present, calling the quality earnestness: "He has rarely spoken with such unbroken earnestness."¹⁴⁷ These observations demonstrate the effect of ethical appeal on his image.

In the Berlin speech, a writer noted the sincerity of

¹⁴²Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 304.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 442. ¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 443.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 442.

¹⁴⁶Kenneth Crawford, "Stemming the Red Tide," Newsweek, LVII (June 19, 1961), 34.

¹⁴⁷Joseph A. Loftus, "Kennedy Says Khrushchev Talks Eased Danger of a 'Misjudgment,'" The New York Times, June 7, 1961, p. 16.

his request for suggestions and help from the audience.¹⁴⁸

In the speech on the resumption of testing, Kennedy further implied his sincerity:

I must report to you in all candor that further Soviet tests . . . could well provide the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack and defense capability so powerful as to encourage aggressive designs.¹⁴⁹

The British, however, doubted the sincerity of the President's stated reasons for testing.¹⁵⁰

In the Quemoy and Matsu crisis speech, Kennedy took steps to establish his consistency. Kennedy asked Sorensen "to excerpt from his campaign speeches those statements making clear his determination to defend Formosa and the Pescadores against attack."¹⁵¹ Mr. Kennedy, however, avoided using campaign statements that were not consistent enough to demonstrate his sincerity on the policy. It would not have been necessary to seek material from the campaign supporting that policy had there not been some appearance of contradiction. One observer noted this inconsistency: "He hid behind former President Eisenhower . . . though he was highly critical . . . in the Presidential Campaign of 1960."¹⁵²

During the press conference a reporter questioned the President on the apparent inconsistency:

¹⁴⁹Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 186.

¹⁵⁰Karl E. Meyer, "Cloud of Unknowing," The New Statesman, LXIII (March 16, 1962), 361.

¹⁵¹Sorensen, p. 662.

¹⁵²James Reston, "Kennedy on Defensive," The New York Times, June 28, 1962, p. 13.

Mr. President, in your campaign . . . you suggested . . . that this was not the appropriate place to draw the line because the islands were strategically indefensible and unnecessary. What is your view now?¹⁵³

The President answered as follows:

My views on the matter in 1954 when the treaty came up are well known. But the fact of the matter is I also said in the fall of 1960 that there should be no withdrawal from these islands under the point of a gun, and that the matter of these islands--that the President must make a judgment based on the resolution of the Congress.¹⁵⁴

Writers also reacted to the sincerity of the Cuban missile speech. Again these reactions revealed effects of ethical appeals on image.¹⁵⁵

Appeals involving sincerity affected both positively and negatively the Presidential image. Except for the Matsu and Quemoy crisis speech, however, sincerity had desirable effects on Kennedy's image.

References to Self

Other characteristics of Kennedy's speeches were reference to self through pronouns, reference to various roles of his office, and reliance on personal authority. These references underwent a change. This change corresponded to the personalization process following the Bay of Pigs, which reflected extension of personal values and control. The following discussion illustrates that Kennedy abandoned

¹⁵³Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 510.

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵"After Cuba," Time, LXXX (November 2, 1962), 32; Meg Greenfield, "The New Frontier," The Reporter, XXVII (November 8, 1962), 27.

collective references to self and administration.

Additionally, references to his roles as President began to appear.

Decisions in early speeches reflected group efforts not of the President personally.¹⁵⁶ That characteristic was revealed in the use of the collective terms "we" and "us" rather than the first person singular, "I" and "me." In the Laos speech, for example, the following statements were typical: "And since then, it has been steadily before the administration as the most immediate of the problems we found upon taking office."¹⁵⁷ "The position of this administration has been carefully considered and we have sought to make it just as clear as we know how to the governments concerned."¹⁵⁸ Notably absent from the speech were references to his position as President and roles in office.

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the President began to assume personal control due to loss of confidence in advisors. Certain changes also occurred in personal references. The more extensive use of the first person singular pronouns emerged. Speeches were also marked by the use of references to his position: (1) "I bear the responsibility of the Presidency of the United States."¹⁵⁹ (2) "Their welcome to me as President of this country should be heartwarming

¹⁵⁶Supra, pp. 67-69.

¹⁵⁷Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 213.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p. 214. ¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 443.

to us all."¹⁶⁰ These examples from the speech following the European tour were similar to statements appearing in the remainder of the speeches. Kennedy's early policy speeches rested upon the authority of advisors as much as they did upon his own authority. Later speeches, then, revealed another change. In the European tour speech, the President relied exclusively upon the authority derived from personal experience, not upon that of advisors. He related his talks with world leaders and drew his own conclusions from that experience. This feature corresponded to his image which revealed extension of personal decisiveness and control in foreign crises. This change was a natural consequence of loss of confidence in advisors.

In the Berlin speech, he demonstrated his activity and experience in international affairs, economy, civil defense, and other areas. Using this first hand experience, he presented proposals based on that personal authority. Only once in the lengthy speech did he rely upon the authority of another: "The Secretary of the Treasury and other economic advisers assure me . . . that our economy has the capacity to bear this new request."¹⁶¹ Background information was also presented as from Kennedy's own experience. Statements such as the following from the Berlin and Cuban missile crisis speeches revealed the nature of this personal authority. Notice how Kennedy referred to his and the audience's experience for authority: "Three times in my life-time our country

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 442. ¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 537.

and Europe have been involved in major wars."¹⁶² "The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war."¹⁶³

References to self and roles continued also in the speech on the resumption of testing. Observe the implicit reference to his role as Commander-in-Chief: "I am sworn to uphold and defend the freedom of the American People--and I intend to do whatever must be done to fulfill that solemn obligation."¹⁶⁴ In the Cuban missile speech, references to self and role continued:

Acting therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution . . . I have directed that the following initial steps be taken.¹⁶⁵

Following the Bay of Pigs, another similar change was present. In the Berlin speech, Kennedy spoke directly about his position and office in an informal, extended personal appeal:

I would like to close with a personal word. When I ran for the Presidency of the United States, I knew that this country faced serious challenges, but I could not realize nor could any man realize who does not bear the burdens of this office--how heavy and constant would be those burdens.

Three times in my life-time our country and Europe have been involved in major wars. . . .

Now . . . any misjudgment . . . could rain more devastation in several hours than has been wrought in all the wars of human history.

Therefore, I as President and Commander-in-Chief, and all of us as Americans, are moving through serious

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 539.

¹⁶³Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 707.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 442. ¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 807.

days. I shall bear this responsibility under our
 Constitution for the next three and one-half years. . . .

 In these days and weeks I ask for your help and your
 advice. I ask for your suggestions, when you think we
 could do better.¹⁶⁶

Such references to self characterized Kennedy's international crisis speeches. The changes to more personal use of pronouns, direct references to self and roles, and reliance on personal authority corresponded to the greater personalization in his image.

Good Will

Elements of good will also disclosed ethical appeal in Kennedy's international crisis speeches. Continuing elements of identification with audience, praise of audience, and faithfulness revealed good will in the speeches. Following the Bay of Pigs crisis, elements of sympathy and warmth and direct references to friendship emerged as evidence of good will.

Identification with Audience

The first prominent element of good will revealed in the speeches was Kennedy's identification with various segments of his audience. Such identification accompanied praise for the audience which is a form of identification.

In the Congo crisis speech, the necessity for Kennedy to adapt his proposals to the audience was obvious. Soviet Premier Khrushchev sought reinstatement of ex-Premier Patrice

¹⁶⁶Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961,
 pp. 539-540.

Lumumba. Neutral Afro-Asians threatened to remove troop support from the United Nations effort. With Lumumba's murder, Soviet intervention appeared imminent. The withdrawal of Afro-Asian troops would undermine the operation. In this situation Kennedy supported the United Nations and identified with neutral nations by quoting a respected neutral leader and identifying his program with that leader:

The press reports this afternoon that Prime Minister Nehru has stated, and I quote, "If the United Nations goes out of the Congo, it will be a disaster." I strongly agree with this view. Only by the presence of the United Nations in the Congo can peace be kept in Africa.¹⁶⁷

In the Laos speech, Kennedy identified with the Republican segment of his audience by reference to his discussions with Eisenhower.¹⁶⁸ In regard to the British, the President stated, "We strongly support the present British proposal."¹⁶⁹ British ministers were pleased with that reference.

The proposal for negotiation, references to both houses of Congress, and concern for both parties¹⁷⁰ undoubtedly aided in securing the following response: "Republican and Democratic leaders tonight [March 23] applauded President Kennedy's efforts to seek a peaceful settlement."¹⁷¹

President Kennedy's consideration of Southeast Asian opinions represented a further extension of his something-

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 213.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 214.

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

¹⁷¹"Senators Applaud Kennedy on Laos," The New York Times, March 24, 1961, p. 8.

for-everybody approach: "The shape of this necessary response will, of course, be carefully considered, not only here in Washington, but in the SEATO Conference with our allies, which begins next Monday."¹⁷² Identification with nations of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was desirable in light of their attitudes favoring a hard-line stand against communism. Although Kennedy's proposals emphasizing negotiations were adapted to American and British attitudes, they did not coincide with Southeast Asian desires for a hard-line stand. Finally, the identification with the American public-- "My fellow Americans"¹⁷³--completed the something-for-everybody adaptation process.

In the Bay of Pigs crisis speech, identification with the Latin American audience was prominent:

We and our Latin Friends will have to face the fact that we cannot postpone any longer the real issue of the survival of freedom in this hemisphere. . . . Together we must build a hemisphere where freedom can flourish.¹⁷⁴

His strong identification with Latin America was also necessary in light of their unfavorable attitudes toward the invasion. This identification, however, was not effective enough to stem Latin American criticism.¹⁷⁵ He also identified with Americans and allies: "I am convinced that we in this country and in the free world possess the necessary resources and the skill and the added strength that come from

¹⁷²Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 214.

¹⁷³Ibid. ¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 305.

¹⁷⁵Supra, p. 48.

a belief in the freedom of man."¹⁷⁶ The only expression of good will toward his immediate audience was the identification with the editors at the beginning of the speech. Notice the establishment of common obligations:

The President of a great democracy such as ours, and the editors of great newspapers such as yours, owe a common obligation to the people: an obligation to present the facts . . . in perspective.¹⁷⁷

The speech following the European tour was characterized by a high degree of identification and praise. Kennedy began by identifying and praising the American audience: "We know of course that the crowds and the shouts were meant in large measure for the country that we represented."¹⁷⁸ Praise of de Gaulle and the French was present:

General de Gaulle could not have been more cordial, and I could not have more confidence in any man. In addition to his individual strength of character, the French people as a whole showed vitality and energy which were both impressive and gratifying. Their recovery from the post-war period is dramatic, their productivity is increasing, and they are steadily building their stature in both Europe and Africa.¹⁷⁹

Establishing common ground aided identification with the countries of France, Germany, and England: "We all agreed that there is work to be done in the West and from our conversations have come agreed steps to get on with that work."¹⁸⁰

In the Berlin speech, his good will was demonstrated in his identification with American, allied, French, Berlin, and neutral groups in his audience. The use of the word "we"

¹⁷⁶Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 306.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 304.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., p. 441.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., p. 442.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 446.

in reference to the United States enhanced the identification. By aligning his American audience with him against a common threat, he created common goals and allowed common attitudes and values to come to focus. This same device was expanded to the Western nations in alliance: he could use the inclusive term "we" in that context also.

The speech also revealed a creative extension of the direct, personal appeal used. Through this appeal he identified with his American audience:

I would like to close with a personal word. When I ran for the Presidency of the United States, I knew that this country faced serious challenges, but I could not realize--nor could any man realize who does not bear the burdens of this office--how heavy and constant would be those burdens.

.
Therefore, I, as President and Commander-in-Chief, and all of us as Americans, are moving through serious days. I shall bear this responsibility under our Constitution for the next three and one-half years, but I am sure that we all, regardless of our occupations, will do our very best for our country, and for our cause. For all of us want to see our children grow up in a country at peace, and in a world where freedom endures.

I know that sometimes we get impatient, we wish for some immediate action that would end our perils, but I must tell you that there is no quick and easy solution. The Communists control over a billion people, and they recognize that if we should falter, their success would be imminent.

We must look to long days ahead, which if we are courageous and persevering, can bring us what we all desire.

In these days and weeks I ask for your help and your advice. I ask for your suggestions when you think we could do better.¹⁸¹

Notice that through the appeal Kennedy identified with the American audience and asked respectfully for advice and

¹⁸¹Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, pp. 539-540.

prayers and referred frequently to his office, roles, and common experiences with the audience.

The identification process in this speech revealed personalization. Certain developing qualities in the speech revealed a continuation of the personalization in speaking. This coincided with the extension of personal control and leadership inherent in his developing image. Kennedy spoke not only for his nation but also as the spokesman for the western alliance to the communist bloc. He thus extended his personalization of the nation to other nations, and of the western alliance to the communist bloc.

Other speeches demonstrated similar identification. In the Quemoy and Matsu crisis speech, Kennedy identified with the Republican segment of his audience and with Eisenhower.¹⁸² In the Cuban missile crisis speech, Kennedy identified with the United States, Latin America, allies, and Berlin. In this speech Kennedy carried out the identification through the use of a common enemy:

It shall be the policy of the nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

.
Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed--including in particular the brave people of West Berlin will be met by whatever action is needed.¹⁸³

Praise of the audience included calling the people of Berlin

¹⁸²Ibid., p. 808.

¹⁸³Ibid., p. 808-809.

"brave," and the people of the United States "peaceful"¹⁸⁴
and "courageous."¹⁸⁵

Kennedy's justification for proposals rested on
identification with the common experience, knowledge, beliefs,
and attitudes of his audience:

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. . . . Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace. . . . Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception. . . . Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.

In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger--although it should be noted that the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat. . . .

This . . . deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo . . . cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word.¹⁸⁶

The direct ethical appeal to Latin America that followed in the speech revealed Kennedy's friendship and identification. Latin America, angered by the Bay of Pigs invasion, opposed United States intervention in Latin American affairs. Such opposition, of course, influenced Kennedy's decision for quarantine.¹⁸⁷

Necessarily, then, Kennedy justified his quarantine,

¹⁸⁴Ibid., p. 808.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p. 809.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 512.

¹⁸⁷Sorensen, pp. 672-702.

issued reassurances of non-intervention, and demonstrated the threat to Latin America before he offered the appeal. Had he presented the appeal before such reassurances, the influence of the appeal would undoubtedly have been less. With these qualities of identification present, then, strong ethical appeal emerged in the speech. Adaptation in the speech was present through identification with various segments of the audience. Identification with the audience, then, was characteristic of the good will revealed in the speeches.

Reference to Friendship

Following the Bay of Pigs crisis, other elements of good will emerged in the speeches. Some of these were Kennedy's sympathy and warmth and references to his friendship. In the Bay of Pigs crisis speech, for example, he referred to "our Latin Friends."¹⁸⁸ In the speech following the European tour, sympathy and warmth were present to a greater degree than in previous speeches. In regard to the underdeveloped area of the world, the following statement revealed that sympathy:

The hopes for freedom in these areas which see so much poverty and illiteracy, so many children who are sick, so many children who die in the first year, so many families without homes, so many families without hope . . . rest with the local peoples and their governments.

.
Yet . . . we have an historic opportunity to help these countries build their societies.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 305.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., p. 445.

Notice the sympathetic reasons for aid in the following statements:

I do not justify this aid merely on the grounds of anti-Communism. It is a recognition of our opportunity and obligation to help these people. . . .¹⁹⁰

In the Berlin crisis speech, the direct personal appeal at the conclusion of the speech enhanced the sympathy and warmth revealed in the speech. Kennedy demonstrated further, however, his understanding and concern:

I am well aware of the fact that many American families will bear the burden of these requests. Studies or careers will be interrupted; husbands and sons will be called away; incomes in some cases will be reduced. But these are burdens which must be borne if freedom is to be defended.¹⁹¹

Again in the speech on the resumption of testing, Kennedy demonstrated sympathy and warmth in his concern for the audience: "I find it deeply regrettable that any radioactive material must be added to the atmosphere--that even one additional individual's health may be risked in the foreseeable future."¹⁹²

Finally, the Cuban missile crisis speech demonstrated a sympathy and warmth which accompanied direct references to his own friendship. First he tried to show that his nation was friendly: "Our history--unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II--demonstrates that we have no desire to conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people."¹⁹³ The direct personal appeal to the Latin Americans

¹⁹⁰Ibid., p. 444. ¹⁹¹Ibid., p. 536.

¹⁹²Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 187.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 807.

also demonstrated that friendship:

I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. . . . This country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you.¹⁹⁴

Faithfulness

The final dominant element reflecting good will in Kennedy's international crisis speeches was faithfulness. Kennedy demonstrated faithfulness in promoting safety of allies and Americans, meeting commitments, and not abandoning friends in trouble.

In the Laos speech, for example, the President stated his interest in meeting commitments: "I know that every American will want his country to honor its obligations."¹⁹⁵ Additionally, he promised not to abandon allies in time of trouble.¹⁹⁶ The Berlin speech clearly demonstrated that he would not abandon friends in trouble and that he would meet commitments.¹⁹⁷ Because these crisis speeches were all concerned with crises, they were also concerned with promoting the safety of various segments of the audience. The Cuban missile crisis, for example, revealed a threat to American security. Kennedy proposed action which was designed to correct the problem and promote safety. He further stated that he would not abandon commitments to Latin America or Berlin

¹⁹⁴Ibid., p. 809.

¹⁹⁵Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1961, p. 213.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., p. 214. ¹⁹⁷Ibid., p. 444.

but would be faithful. He promised to defend them against nuclear and conventional attack.¹⁹⁸ In a concern for safety, Kennedy also ordered the evacuation of dependents of personnel from the Guantanamo base in Cuba.¹⁹⁹

Identification with audience revealed elements of Kennedy's good will in the speeches. Elements of candor, faithfulness, friendship, and sympathy and warmth were further characteristics of the good will in the speeches. The friendship and sympathy and warmth emerged with stronger emphasis following the Bay of Pigs crisis.

Conclusion

The above elements reflecting good sense, good character, and good will characterize the nature of ethical appeals in Kennedy's international crisis speeches. Certain changes in elements of decisiveness, judgment, and others corresponded to changes in the Kennedy image. Some elements of ethical appeal were the consequence of other changes in image. Some ethical appeals affected the recorded reaction to the speech about the speaker--his image. The following chapter summarizes the findings on ethical appeal and draws relationships of ethical appeal to image.

¹⁹⁸Public Papers of the Presidents . . . 1962, p. 808.

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has presented an analysis of President Kennedy's ethos in international crises. His image and ethical appeal comprised that ethos. Kennedy's ethical appeal in the crisis speeches revealed qualities of good sense, good character, and good will. Elements of judgment, decisiveness, prudence, knowledge, competence, and reasoning were evidence of ethical appeal revealing good sense. Supported judgments, greater personal decisiveness and prudence, evidence of competence, accuracy with information, and more emphasis on reasoning emerged to a greater degree following the Bay of Pigs crisis. The greater personal decisiveness and prudence revealed in the speeches, corresponded to the decisiveness and prudence in his image. The speeches reflected his greater self-reliance following that crisis. The greater accuracy with information and increased support of judgments revealing ethical appeal in the speeches related to the image factor of loss of confidence in the advice of others. Naturally, the failure produced greater concern for accuracy and a greater need to justify and support judgments. The new emphasis on ethical appeal elements of competence and reasoning corresponded to decreased competence and intelligence in his

image. Specific instances existed in which certain ethical appeals revealing good sense affected his image. In this regard, observations resulting from the speeches revealed the President's knowledge, competence, reasoning, and other qualities. Causal relationships between ethical appeal and specific Presidential image factors were present.

Next, elements of good character in the speeches were the following: courage, sincerity, temperance, references to self, the association of opponents with evil, the association of self with virtue, and association with men of prestige. The association of opponents with evil, the association of self with virtue, and the association with men of prestige were characteristic devices throughout the speeches. Greater disclosure of ethical appeals reflecting courage, sincerity, and references to self, emerged following the early failure in Cuba. Again ethical appeal related to the development of his image. Ethical appeals disclosing courage and determination in the speeches corresponded to the emergence of image factors of courage and determination. In addition, these elements of courage and determination in the speeches enhanced the element of courage in his image and further fulfilled role expectations. The specific instances demonstrated the effects of these ethical appeals on image. The growing ethical appeal elements of references to self and reliance on personal authority coincided with the emergence of image factors of greater self-reliance and personal control. These elements in the speeches not only corresponded to image factors of the

personalization process, but also enhanced the fulfillment of role expectations. References to self in the role of Commander-in-Chief in the speeches accompanied the emergence of this role in his image. A similar correlation existed in relation to other ethical appeals and role expectations of Presidential image. The element of temperance revealed by emphasis on negotiations in the speeches corresponded to the compromise and conciliatory ability reflected in his image. In some instances, such as in the Laos speech in which the British welcomed Presidential references to negotiations, the ethical appeal element of temperance affected Kennedy's image. The elements of sincerity and credibility in the speeches coincided with the factors of sincerity and credibility in his image. When inconsistency appeared, as in the relation of the Quemoy and Matsu speech to campaign speaking, reporters noted this factor of inconsistency in the President's image. In other speeches such as the European tour speech, the ethical appeal element of sincerity brought favorable observations reflecting sincerity in Kennedy's image. The element of sincerity in the speeches affected and corresponded to the sincerity in his image. Certain ethical appeals, then, revealing good character corresponded to changes in the Kennedy image. Elements of ethical appeal such as courage, confidence, sincerity, and temperance affected the President's image.

Elements revealing good will in the speeches were identification with the audience, faithfulness, friendship, sympathy, and warmth. Ethical appeals disclosing sympathy

and warmth emerged following the Bay of Pigs. This sympathy and warmth in the speeches corresponded to growing maturity in his image. Elements of faithfulness, friendship, and identification continued throughout the speeches and reflected his prestige and popularity with the American public.

These findings lead to the assertion that ethical appeal in the international crisis speaking of President John F. Kennedy related to the development of his image in the Presidency. The discussion that follows concludes the findings of this study in regard to observations on the speeches, speech in foreign affairs, the concept of ethos; and other relevant conclusions end the study.

Use of Speeches

Various means were available to President Kennedy for improving or changing factors of his ethos. Theodore Sorensen noted the President's use of political machinery, travel, the press, radio, and television. Of these, television and speeches were his favorite and best means.¹ With all the means available, the President relied heavily on his televised speeches. Through these speeches he could speak to all the diverse segments of his world audience. When secrecy was necessary, as in the Cuban missile crisis, the televised speech allowed him to inform all areas of his administration and

¹Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 310, 328, 330; cf., "The Kennedy 'Image'--How It's Built," U.S. News and World Report, LII (April 9, 1962), 56-59; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 715.

government. Other men in public life have relied heavily on the press, speeches by subordinates, written policy statements, and other indirect means of communication to establish image. Kennedy, however, chose to confront his audiences often and directly through major addresses, televised press conferences, and television interviews. The choice of speaking directly to the public in international crises was not only influenced by this concern for image but also by his loss of confidence in subordinates and associates. In addition, Kennedy was strongly aware of press criticism and was distrustful of the views of the press. In early 1961, following the Bay of Pigs crisis, Kennedy and the press grew further apart as a result of growing attacks of the press accusing him of trying to manage the news.² The press criticism influenced him to rely more on himself in his speeches. Thus, speeches were frequently employed in international crises and often reinforced or improved his ethos.

Ethos in Speech of Foreign Affairs

Kennedy's speeches in international crises supply additional information on ethos in speech of foreign affairs. Contrary to Robert Oliver's observations,³ this study has shown a definite relationship between the speaker's personality and his speech. Personality was included as a constituent of ethical appeal.⁴ In Presidential address in international

²Sorensen, p. 321. ³Supra, pp. 8-10.

⁴Supra, p. 7.

crises, Kennedy's ethical appeal in the speeches reflected many factors of his image.

Other elements of Kennedy's speeches give insight into the nature of ethos in speeches on foreign affairs. The unprecedented candor in Kennedy's speech following the European tour, for example, contradicted Oliver's belief in the necessity for ambiguity in foreign affairs speaking. In the international crisis speeches and the direct personal appeals, Kennedy demonstrated that he felt it necessary to speak not only to the people of America but to those of foreign countries. While these observations are not applicable to all speech in foreign affairs, they are applicable to Presidential speech in international crises.

Image Influence on Ethical Appeal

The analysis of Kennedy's ethos leads to the conclusion that changes in Kennedy's image influenced his choice of ethical appeals. During early crises of the Congo and Laos, the President generally sustained from election and transition to office a favorable image at home and abroad. Following the Bay of Pigs crisis, however, unfavorable factors emerged in Kennedy's image. Comment at the time was critical of factors comprising his personalization of institutions, his reputation, and attainments. His prestige dropped abruptly in some foreign nations. This unfavorable image had a limiting influence on his choice of ethical appeals. His speeches revealed that he chose to emphasize ethical appeals revealing his good sense. These ethical appeals disclosed emphasis on

elements of competence, personal decisiveness, prudence, accuracy with information, and reasoning. Hypothetically, all the factors of image were available for reinforcement and all the elements of ethical appeal were available for use. Why, then, did ethical appeal elements of competence, personal decisiveness, prudence, accuracy with information, and reasoning emerge only when similar factors of his image in international crises were called into question? With all the choices available, Kennedy chose to emphasize qualities which would change undesirable factors of his image. In such a situation, his image had influence on his choice of ethical appeals.

Another example further illustrates the influence of image on choices of ethical appeals. In the Matsu and Quemoy crisis, Kennedy's image was suffering from domestic problems and Republican criticism. In this situation, Kennedy chose to identify with the opposing party through references to his agreement with Eisenhower and Dulles. With the choices of ethical appeals available to him, his image with Republicans influenced his choices of appeals. To establish good will with those who were hostile was desirable. The situation thus limited his choice of ethical appeals. Again, Kennedy, because of unfavorable image, chose appeals to reinforce his suffering image. The quality of his image, then, had a limiting influence on his choice of available ethical appeals.

Ethical Appeal Influence on Image

Ethical appeal, likewise, influenced Kennedy's image. Chapter III noted many specific instances when ethical appeals in the speeches affected his image. Remember, for example, as a result of information displayed in certain speeches, observers noted the President's knowledgeability. Such observations, of course, comprised part of Kennedy's image.

Written reactions to the speeches by contemporary observers do not disclose the total influence of ethical appeal on image. Undoubtedly much influence goes unrecorded. The nature of image as subjective, structured information contributes to the difficulty of determining such influence upon the image of the speaker held by individuals of the audience. Despite this problem, the researcher must assess the speaker, audience, and occasion to evaluate the potential of ethical appeals in the speeches.⁵

This study, then, disclosed a more general influence of ethical appeals on image. In two instances when Kennedy's image was suffering--following the Bay of Pigs and before the Cuban missile crisis--speeches were influential in the recovery of desirable factors in his image. Kennedy's image reclaimed the factors which had suffered. Ethical appeals which carried the potential of producing these favorable image factors were partially responsible.

⁵Cf., Robert S. Cathcart, Post Communication: Critical Analysis and Evaluation (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 93.

Interrelation of Image and Ethical Appeal

This study has demonstrated an interrelation of image and ethical appeal, although separated for purposes of analysis. As discussed above, a mutual influence existed between them. Both are parts of a larger consideration--ethos. Elements of ethical appeal disclosing good sense were similar to the factors of the personalization process. Elements of good character were similar to factors of the speaker's reputation. Elements of good will undoubtedly relate to factors of acceptance, approval, and popularity in the speaker's image. In short, image and ethical appeal in Kennedy's ethos shared similar elements or factors and were mutually influential and reinforcing.

Ethical appeal and image jointly comprised the larger consideration of Kennedy's ethos. Observations about ethical appeals in the speeches partially comprised the speaker's image. Ethical appeals, then, partly determined what the speaker's image would be. In the sense that these appeals served other persuasive purposes, however, they extended beyond merely influencing the image of the speaker. Ethical appeals influence the audience toward the acceptance or rejection of the speaker's proposals. This is particularly true of ethical appeal that arises from the coincidence of the speaker's proposals with the beliefs and attitudes of the audience. Likewise, image extended beyond influence on ethical appeals. Image also affects the persuasiveness of the speaker, and is not wholly determined by ethical appeals in the speeches. Rather

ethical appeal and image exist on a continuum with overlapping elements and mutual influence and reinforcement. Each supplements the other to produce the speaker's ethos. Because of this overlapping of elements and influence, ethical appeals and image are dynamically related and inseparable in life situations. In this situation an appropriate desired outcome for studies on image or ethical appeal is insight into a larger consideration of ethos.

The Concept of Ethos

Insights from this study lead to observations in regard to ethos in rhetorical theory. Through the analysis of the factors comprising Kennedy's image and the elements of ethical appeal, a picture of the speaker's ethos emerged. This approach also disclosed relevant information about the audience related to the study. Expectations of the audience toward the speaker's role in society, for example, were an integral part of his image. Black's concept of clusters of opinion was useful in allowing the researcher to view the audience as composed of groups with certain images and expectations of the speaker. The clusters of opinion concept further allowed the writer to note ethical appeal arising from the speaker's adaptation of proposals to the audience.

This approach also allowed a broader, longer range view of the speaker's ethos. Employing this method, the researcher need not consider the speaker's ethos as only his image following a particular speech in a particular time in history. Rather, he can view image and ethical appeal over

a period of change and development. This approach allows study of the speaker's ethos in the process of change due to the cumulative influence of elements of image and ethical appeal. The unrecorded or potential influence of ethical appeals comprising the speakers ethos can also be taken into account. This provides a different view of the ethos of the speaker. Later readers of speeches might well possess changed images and expectations of a speaker, which coupled with ethical appeals of speeches contribute to increased ethos of the speaker.

Further, this concept of ethos suggests a use in speech analysis and evaluation. This discussion does not attempt to establish a new method of criticism but rather suggests, as a result of this study, further considerations for the researcher in speech. Ethical appeals, as defined by this study, allows the researcher to view the speech as a whole. An examination of the quality of good sense encourages an investigation of logical proof in the speech. Good will is closely related to the emotions as were some elements of the quality of good character. In addition, ethical appeals are revealed in choices in regard to invention, arrangement, style, and delivery. Kennedy's style--choice of pronouns, for example--revealed the assumption of personal responsibility for decisions. Delivery in the Berlin crisis speech affected his image. Likewise his arrangement produced lack of emphasis on negotiations and brought undesirable reactions calling for temperance. Choices of appeals and other inventive

processes were important to this approach. This concept of ethos, then, provides a point of view which allows the researcher to examine the traditional elements of the speech process in a different perspective. The rhetorician can view the speech process as an attempt at influencing images--subjective, structured information--held by present and future audiences. The interplay and influence of images could be examined. The influence of images on what the speaker chooses to say in his speeches also becomes an important element for consideration. The influence of ethical appeals on the audiences' images are likewise important.

In this approach, speeches would be viewed as having the end aim of influencing or reinforcing audiences' images of the speaker and his position or cause. The researcher could discover not only how the speaker affected image through ethical appeals, but also the potential of such appeals over a broader range of history as role expectations, images, and values change. This approach would help explain, for example, Lincoln's greater ethos with later generations.

This has not been an exhaustive study of ethos or Kennedy's speaking. Comparative studies of ethos in the speaking of several Presidents in foreign crises could disclose further useful information about speech in foreign affairs. Other areas of President Kennedy's speaking are as yet unexplored. Further study of Kennedy's ethos in domestic crisis speaking would draw a more complete picture of his ethos. As yet, little scholarly research has investigated Kennedy's

speaking as President. Until further study in this area is done, judgment on Kennedy's place among the speakers of history is difficult.

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