

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND EFFECTIVENESS

by
Burak Giray

A dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science,
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in Political Science

Chair of Committee: J. Tyson Chatagnier

Committee Member: Patrick E. Shea

Committee Member: Nikolay Marinov

Committee Member: J. Michael Greig

University of Houston
December 2022

Copyright 2022, Burak Giray

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to war victims around the world who are displaced from their homes, seek refuge in a foreign land, and have lost their hope and faith. They need to remember that “life will win over death, and the light will win over darkness”.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy

March 1, 2022

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I first would like to thank my supervisors Dr. Tyson Chatagnier and Dr. Patrick Shea for their consistent support and guidance during the running of this project. From the moment I entered the Ph.D. program, Dr. Chatagnier and Dr. Shea have become my role models. I feel extremely lucky and privileged to have two great supervisors.

I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Nikolay Marinov and Dr. Michael Greig for kindly accepting to be part of my dissertation committee and providing me such constructive comments on this project.

I also want to extend my gratitude to other faculty members and colleagues. In particular I would like to thank Dr. Susan Scarrow, Dr. Scott Basinger, Dr. Jennifer Clark, and Dr. Jeffrey Church for providing their expertise, support and suggestions throughout my Ph.D. I would also like to thank Dr. Pablo Pinto, my director at the Hobby School's Center for Public Policy (CPP). It has been an amazing experience working with Dr. Pinto. The Hobby School has been a home to me for the last two years, and it will always stay so. I would also like to offer thanks to my friends that have become my family in the last six years: Ulkar Imamverdiyeva, Samad Karimov, Yuyang Pu, and Myriam Shiran.

Thanks of course to my family, my mother and sister, for their support. I have to admit that I could not have even begun this Ph.D. program without their patience and sacrifices. No matter how far they are, I always feel their love and support. Dad, my hero, I wish you were here seeing all the accomplishments you expected from me. You live in my heart and memories. Finally, I want to express my deepest appreciation to my wife, who has been a constant in my life from the moment we met each other almost ten years ago. She was always there to encourage me every time I felt hopeless. But for her understanding, I would not be able to complete this Ph.D. journey.

ABSTRACT

Private interests influence the decisions of troop-providers to deploy troops to UN peacekeeping missions. The pursuit of private benefits affects how peacekeeping missions' mandates are fulfilled. While some troop-providers align with the UN's ideals and directives, others act in favor of their private benefits. Yet, we only know about peacekeeper-level issues such as coordination problems and lack of capability that hinder peacekeeping effectiveness. Troop-providers' primary motivations behind committing peacekeepers, on the other hand, are largely neglected. This dissertation offers to fill this gap by attempting to examine the relationship between troop-providers' primary motivations and 'success' in peacekeeping operations. While doing that, the dissertation project provides ample evidence that peacekeeping failure largely stems from peacekeepers' reluctance to take orders from the UN, not from their incompetency.

Drawing on the conflict-of-interest theory, I posit that divergent interests within peacekeeping operations reduce the ideational commitment of troop-providers to the UN, therefore, are instrumental on how peacekeeping operations work. The two empirical chapters and a case study contribute to the understanding of whether troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN has an impact on success in UN missions, while assessing the success either at different levels or from different perspectives.

As the financial burden and human loss increase with lengthy peacekeeping missions, the first empirical chapter focuses on the duration of UN missions and evaluates the length of missions as an indicator of success in peacekeeping operations. The results of the duration analysis over all terminated and ongoing peacekeeping operations from April 1991 to December 2019 show that divergent interests within peacekeeping operations increase the time required to terminate UN missions. Undoubtedly, the protection of civilians is the most important mandate assigned to UN peacekeepers. When stationed in a conflict zone, the primary expectation from peacekeepers is to protect civilians from falling victim to warring parties' aggressions. The second empirical chapter, therefore, assesses peacekeeping effectiveness from peacekeepers' ability in combatting the violence against civilians. This chapter explores the effect of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN on reducing civilian victimization by the combatants in all terminated and ongoing peacekeeping

operations from November 1990 to December 2019. The results show that an increase in troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN reduces civilian victimization. Finally, the last chapter conducts a case study in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to examine the relationship between the ideational commitment to the UN and civilian victimization near the UN camps at subnational level. The findings demonstrate that the contingents that have higher levels of ideational commitment to the UN combat and deter the violence against civilians more effectively. In addition, the chapter shows that local sentiments in the DRC on UN peacekeepers is not constant and can change in time, suggesting that UN peacekeepers can lose their impartial image among local groups when they do not carry out the UN's orders and fail to do their job.

This dissertation project contributes to the peacekeeping literature bringing a new perspective on evaluating the composition of UN peacekeeping missions. While the earlier literature focuses on the peacekeepers' individual performance, this project shows that the national interests of their home governments should not be underestimated. The empirical evidence in this project supports the theoretical expectations that troop-providers' tendency to follow their national interests clashes with the UN's impartiality and neutrality, and therefore hinders the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Another contribution of this project is the novel measurement of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN that it develops both at the national and sub-national levels. The ideational commitment to the UN is developed using the voting preferences of troop-providers in the UN General Assembly for human rights issues and their deployment size for a specific mission, which enables me to determine the extent to which missions are composed of countries that seek to provide public goods.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations	2
Why Study Diversity in Peacekeeping Operations?	8
Design of the Project	11
II. HOW PEACEKEEPERS ARE TREATED IN THE LITERATURE	13
The Presence of Peacekeepers	14
The Size and Types of Peacekeepers	16
The Subnational Deployment of Peacekeepers	18
The Mandates of Peacekeepers	20
The Internal Composition of Peacekeepers	22
Conclusion	23
III. THEORY	26
The Supply-side of Peacekeeping	26
The Design of UN Peacekeeping Operations	30
The Length of Peacekeeping Operations	33
Civilian Victimization by the Combatants	37
IV. DATA	42
Dependent Variables	42
Key Independent Variable	43
Other Covariates	52
V. COMMITMENT TO THE UN AND THE LENGTH OF MISSIONS	57
Introduction	57
Methods	58
Results for the Time Required to Terminate UN Missions	60
Results for the Time Required to Hold Post-Conflict Elections	64
Robustness Check	68
Conclusion	69
VI. COMMITMENT TO THE UN AND CIVILIAN VICTIMIZATION	71
Introduction	71
Methods	72
Results for the Civilian Victimization	72
Robustness Check	75

Conclusion	77
VII. PEACEKEEPING IN THE DRC	79
Case Selection	80
Empirical Expectations	83
Case Study: Democratic Republic of Congo	83
A Brief History of First and Second Congo Wars	84
Background on MONUSCO in the DRC	86
Subnational Analysis of Civilian Victimization	87
Anti-MONUSCO Protests in Beni	90
Potential Limitations	93
Conclusion	96
VIII. CONCLUSION	98
Summary	98
Contributions and Implications	99
Limitations	101
Future Research	102
REFERENCES	104
APPENDICES	121
A. Graph Appendices	121
B. Supplementary Empirical Results	129

LIST OF FIGURES

1	Count of Troop-providers and peacekeepers across year	6
2	Ranking of Personnel Contributions by Country (as of 31 May 2022)	8
3	Mean Levels of Yes Percentages for Human Rights Resolutions	45
4	Mean Levels of Index of Voting Cohesion	49
5	Mean Levels of Commitment to UN	51
6	Relative Hazards of Commitment to UN over Time	62
7	Marginal Effect of Commitment to UN for Multiple Levels of Polity Score	67
8	Estimated Coefficient of Commitment to UN on Civilian Victimization by the Size of Military	74
9	Locations of UN Camps in the DRC	81
10	Effect of Commitment to UN on Civilian Victimization in the DRC	89
11	Weekly Sentiment Analysis	92
12	Survey Data vs. Twitter Data	94
13	Count of Tweets on MONUSCO peacekeepers in the DRC	95
A1	Distribution of Benchmark Votes	121
A2	Index of Voting Cohesion	122
A3	Kaplan Meier Curves	124
A4	Relative Hazards of Commitment to UN over Time	125
A5	Residuals vs. Fitted plot	127
A6	Correlation matrix with significant level stars	128
A7	MONUSCO Deployment Map, 2018. Source: Geospatial Information Section	129
B1	Marginal Effect of Voting Cohesion for Multiple Levels of Polity Score on Participa- tion to UN missions	133

I. INTRODUCTION

Due to the design of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, a peacekeeper or the whole battalion from a particular country is not legally obliged to follow the orders of the force commander from another country. The functioning of command and control structures, in this respect, is different than national militaries. At the end of the day, whether peacekeepers are carrying out the orders of UN officials and force commanders is conditional on the troop-contributing countries (TCCs)' willingness to align with the UN.

Then, what motivates these troop-providers when they are deploying troops? Why do they participate to UN missions if they are not committed to the UN's plans and ideals? Deploying peacekeepers to conflict zones has its own costs. Given that participation to UN missions is a voluntary act with no enforcement mechanism, less developed countries —the new donors— would be more likely to free ride and contribute less compared to more developed and prosperous countries. Yet, the reality is quite the opposite. Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have become more sizeable and diverse than ever, posing a big challenge to the authority of the UN over the troop-providers and their military personnel.

In the light of the current evolution of peacekeeping operations, the first question that this dissertation project attempts to answer is what attracts the new donors¹ to UN peacekeeping operations. After addressing this question, I explore how the private interests of troop-providers contradict the UN's ideals and plans. Finally, this project asks: does the new internal composition of peacekeeping operations balance the individual or group interests of the contributing countries, or just cause new problems? The main argument of this project is that when troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN, the functionality of UN missions is jeopardized. In this project, I am assessing the effectiveness of UN missions from the *time* perspective and peacekeepers' ability to reduce *civilian victimization*. In that sense, I argue that when troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN, the time required to terminate a mission increases, as does the civilian victimization.

¹Global South countries, great powers and former colonial countries.

This project contributes to the peacekeeping literature bringing a new perspective on evaluating the composition of UN peacekeeping missions (Bove and Ruggeri, 2016; Haass and Ansorg, 2018; Phayal, 2019; Bove et al., 2020). While the earlier literature focuses on the peacekeepers' individual performance, this dissertation project shows that the national interests of their home governments should not be underestimated.

The empirical evidence in this study supports the theoretical expectations that troop-providers' tendency to follow their national interests increases the time required to terminate UN missions. Lengthy missions are favorable to particular countries that generate benefit from deploying troops to the peacekeeping operations. Therefore, shorter missions might not be more desirable. On the other hand, when troop-providers are ideationally committed to the UN, the time required to terminate a mission is diminished; suggesting that in the absence of conflict-of-interest among the troop-providers, the mandates are fulfilled in a shorter amount of time. However, the result from the duration analysis indicates that in the long run troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN loses its decreasing effect on time. As troop-providers motivated by public benefits might lose their interest in the missions when they last longer than anticipated, they can adopt risk-avoiding strategies that might unintentionally increase the length of the missions.

Another contribution that this study brings to the peacekeeping literature is that the pursuit of private interests in UN missions clashes with the UN's impartiality and neutrality, and therefore hinders the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in protecting civilians. When troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN, peacekeeping missions fail to provide security guarantees to the combatants, and the conflict persists. In the light of these findings, this dissertation project demonstrates that the 'success' in peacekeeping operations should not be evaluated independently from the primary motivations of troop-providers.

The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations

The history of UN peacekeeping operations dates back to 1948, when the first ever known mission — the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) — was deployed to the Middle East to monitor

ceasefires and ensure the stability in the region. It was during the armistice negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors that Dr. Ralph Bunche, leading the UN's decolonization office, introduced the idea of using the military personnel from third parties to create an impartial army that maintains the stability and peace after the end of a conflict. Soon after the armistice, the phenomenon was started to be called 'peacekeeping', the creators of which thought the impartiality of the peacekeepers and the non-use of violence are keys to success in attaining credible political compromises (Moskos, 1976).

UN peacekeeping was built on three main principles; (1) impartiality, (2) the use of force only in self-defense, and (3) consent of the domestic actors. These principles were first introduced in 1958 by the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, in Document A/3943 that summarizes the experience derived from the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). The document reports that UNEF, established in 1956 to end the Suez Crisis and monitor the cessation, satisfactorily met the founding principles of UN peacekeeping. First, the consents of the governments involved in the crisis were taken. Second, military personnel of the countries at the Security Council or the countries that have private interests in the crisis were excluded. Eventually, UNEF was composed of the military personnel of Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, being the only troop-contributing countries. To that end, the impartial and neutral image of UNEF was secured as the force did not include the military personnel of countries with strategic interests. Third, as for the non-use of force principle, the peacekeepers were lightly equipped, while heavy weapons were avoided. As argued in Findlay (2002, p. 23), "UNEF was described as 'acting as a plate-glass window', not capable of withstanding assault but nevertheless a lightly armed barrier that all see and tend to respect".

Beyond demonstrating how UNEF satisfied the founding principles itself, Document A/3943 and subsequent UN documents have "acquired constitutional status and continue to apply even if the peacekeeping context has radically changed" (Tsagourias, 2006, p. 1). In other words, the founding principles are still the main component of modern peacekeeping operations, while it is much harder today to abide by them, given the drastic increase in the number of peacekeeping

missions, size of peacekeepers, and number of troop-contributing countries in the post-Cold War era. Impartiality ensures that the force is not influenced by the political interests of the great powers or other contributing countries. Particularly, an impartial UN force signals the warring groups that peacekeepers are not deployed to favor any particular group over another. The limitations on the use of force, on the other hand, guarantee that UN forces are not going to transform into a warring party or use power that can alter the conflict dynamics. As stated earlier, peacekeepers are generally lightly armed and their use of force is solely limited to self-defense. The consent of the domestic actors, is the last founding principle, that still applies to modern peacekeeping missions. As an alternative, however, it could also be seen as the product of impartiality and non-use of force. Knowing that the peacekeepers would not take a side and use force, all warring groups would be willing to extend their consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

These three principles are particularly what distinguish UN peacekeeping from other international interventions. Different than counter-insurgency (COIN) operations that “establish order by defeating the insurgents” (Howard, 2019, p. 6), the main goal of peacekeeping operations is to restore peace among warring parties without resorting to violence. In this respect, the UN does not deploy peacekeepers to allow certain groups to win but to restore peace and establish political institutions that prevent future conflicts. Cunliffe (2013, as cited in Howard, 2019, p. 4) argues that the three founding principles of UN peacekeeping can only be sustained when troop-contributing-countries do not include any great powers or former colonial countries. While UNTSO is far from what is known as a multinational peacekeeping operation today, it has satisfied the criteria set by Cunliffe (2013) for an impartial mission. For instance, UNTSO was composed of only a couple of contributors. The countries that contributed soldiers to UNTSO were mostly the Nordic and European countries, along with Australia, Republic of China and New Zealand, which were considered as ‘impartial’ by the warring groups.²

As seen in UNTSO and UNEF, the peacekeepings in the first-generation were mainly dominated by non-colonial countries that are sufficiently seen impartial. The same pattern can also be observed


²A total of 376 UN personnel: Finland (18), Norway (14), Ireland (13), Netherlands (13), Australia (12), Switzerland (12), Denmark (11), New Zealand (7), Sweden (6), Republic of China (5).

during the Cold War. For instance, the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), which was initiated in early 1960s, was an observation mission without much enforcement power, and the countries contributing to the mission were small in number and assumed to be equally-distant to conflicting parties.³ The end of the Cold War, however, witnessed a boom in the number of countries contributing to the UN missions. In the aftermath of the Cold War, more and more countries have begun to make financial and military contributions though some of these military deployments are very modest in number and lack certain capabilities.


Over the past seventy years, both the size of the operations and the number of troop-providers have grown drastically. Figure 1 demonstrates the count of peacekeepers and troop-providers across years. While there has been a steady increase in the number of troop-providers since early 1990s, the number of peacekeepers has seen a boom beginning from the late 2000s. Nevertheless, compared to UNTSO, peacekeeping operations today can be argued to be more sizeable and diverse. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), an ongoing mission established in July 2011, exemplifies the extent of diversity in current peacekeeping missions. As of March 2021, UNMISS is composed of 19,075 total UN personnels, representing 71 different countries ranging from Bolivia, Fiji, Ethiopia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Bhutan, not to mention the traditional contributors such as Australia, Denmark and Norway.⁴

³Troop-Contributing Countries to UNYOM were Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

⁴<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>



(a) Troop-providers



(b) Peacekeepers

Figure 1: Count of Troop-providers and peacekeepers across year

In addition to the increased size and diversity of peacekeeping operations, post-Cold War era also became the period that was majorly marked by a significant proliferation of UN missions. Peacekeeping operations, particularly between 1988 and 1998, were an outcome of a demand with the outbreak of numerous intrastate conflicts, and were viewed as “potential conflict management tools at a time when the UN and multilateralism were experiencing a wave of post-Cold War liberal institutionalist euphoria (Koops et al., 2015, p. 5).

The increased number of peacekeeping operations necessitated the participation of non-traditional donors, largely from the Global South. Thereupon, the composition of peacekeepers is now beyond the super powers and traditional donors. In time, the so-called traditional donors have been outnumbered by the new troop-contributing-countries. As illustrated in Figure 2, developing and the least developed countries are among the highest ranking troop-providers for all currently ongoing peacekeeping operations.⁵ In particular, today’s top five contributors are Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Rwanda and Ethiopia whose characteristics are substantively different than the traditional donors.

⁵There are currently 12 ongoing peacekeeping operations: MINURSO in Western Sahara, MINUSCA in Central African Republic, MINUSMA in Mali, MONUSCA in D.R. of the Congo, UNDOF in Golan, UNFICYP in Cyprus, UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNISFA in Abyei, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNMISS in South Sudan, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan and UNTSO in Middle East.




Figure 2: Ranking of Personnel Contributions by Country (as of 31 May 2022)

Note: Data accessed from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>

Why Study Diversity in Peacekeeping Operations?

Although peacekeeping operations were still being operated under the founding principles of impartiality, limited use of force, and consent of domestic actors, as the missions in early 1990s were becoming increasingly interfering due to their widened mandate and scope, these principles started to be called into question. These changes in the mandate and the operationalization of the peacekeeping missions gave way to the birth of new concepts such as ‘first-generation’, ‘second-generation’ and ‘third-generation’ peacekeeping.⁶ First-generation peacekeeping missions generally relate to “the deployment of forces between hostile parties to monitor and guarantee the implementation of peace-related measures”, second and more contemporary versions of UN missions, on the other hand, include “administering the territories of the post-conflict countries and ensuring their internal security (Almutawa, 2020, p. 120). In addition to the widened scope and size of the missions, one another major difference between first-generation peacekeepings and the peacekeepings immediately aftermath of the Cold War was that superpowers such as the United States, France

⁶Hereafter second and third-generation peacekeepings will be called as new generation peacekeeping.

and the United Kingdom, the impartiality of which was dubious, also began to contribute to the peacekeeping, which was followed by Russia and China (Koops et al., 2015).

However, the contribution of the superpowers has never been proportional to that of the developing states. Since early 1990s, the Global South countries have drastically increased their engagement in UN peacekeeping operations. Their decisions to deploy military personnel to missions is notably different than the first-generation contributors. More specifically, UN reimbursements (Gaibullov et al., 2015), foreign aid from great powers (Boutton and D’Orazio, 2020), explicit trade ties (Stojek and Tir, 2015) or trade potential (Zhang, 2021) with the conflict country, and the opportunity to keep specific UN equipment and supplies at the end of peacekeeping missions (Morrison et al., 1996) are among the main source of motivation that drives these countries to contribute. These kind of private interests both contradict the main principles that peacekeeping operations were built on, and jeopardize the functioning of the operations by generating a conflict-of-interest among the troop-providers.

While the UN aims to keep peace and protect civilians in conflict countries, confront any challenges to regional and global security, promote human rights, and establish liberal institutions, the existence of troop-providers that are not ideationally committed to the UN hinders the organization’s ability to achieve these goals. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is a good example that “many of the most common and substantial contributors to PKOs lack track records that suggest a firm commitment to these goals” (Kathman and Melin, 2017, p. 150). What happens when troop-providers’ interests contradict the UN’s ideals is a crucial question, given that it might jeopardize the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Consider the example of UN mission in Sierra Leone. In September 2000, the force commander of UNAMSIL accused the Nigerian peacekeepers of sabotaging the peace process and looting diamonds in alliance with the rebel group, Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In his confidential report, General Jetley made it clear that “the mission directive given to [him] and which [he] tried to follow, directly conflicted with the interests of not only the warring factions but also of the major

players in the diamond racket like Liberia and Nigeria”.⁷ General Jetley’s report manifests that not all troop-providers are equally committed to the UN’s ideals and directives, and they might act in favor of their private interests. Moreover, the report is noteworthy in understanding how UNAMSIL failed to disarm rebel forces and minimize their activities, as stipulated in the Lomé Peace Agreement signed in July 1999.

The situation in Sierra Leone is not unique. Take the example of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), established in February 1992. UNPROFOR was as an interim arrangement to keep peace and create stability required for the overall resolution of the Yugoslavian crisis. The UN troops were assigned with the mandate of demilitarizing and protecting civilians residing in the areas designated as ‘UN Protected Areas’ (Rieff, 1996). However, instead of soothing the ongoing violence in Bosnia, the UN-led humanitarian approach actually paved the way for unintended consequences such as a wider war and prolongation of siege in Sarajevo through feeding warring groups and enriching both Serb and Bosnian black marketeers, and eventually “make[ing] matters worse for the civilians” (Melander, 2009, p. 390). While it was contradicting the UN’s ideals and initial plans, the peacekeepers of certain troop-providers were misusing their ‘UN cards’ to collaborate with particular non-state actors in Sarajevo. Namely, Ukrainian UNPROFOR unit was “a problem from day one” (Andreas, 2011, p. 46). They were often associated with the Ukrainian Mafia and alleged of smuggling activities that endanger the peacekeeping efforts. Undoubtedly, all these events hindered the functionality of peacekeeping operations and led to an extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate for an additional interim period.

The UN missions in Sierra Leone and Bosnia exemplify what might happen when certain troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN and challenges its authority. The examples demonstrate that when troop-contributing-countries lack a firm commitment to the UN’s goals and principles, the functionality of the peacekeeping operations in fulfilling their mandates is reduced, the time required to terminate the operations is prolonged, and ultimately the UN fails to sooth the

⁷Mcgreal Chris, “Nigerian Peace Force Accused of Sabotage,” The Guardian, September 13, 2000. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/14/sierraleone.unitednations> (accessed July 3, 2021)

ongoing civilian victimization by the combatants. Inspired by the cases of UNAMSIL and UNPROFOR, this dissertation focuses on the consequences of how peacekeeping missions are composed. In essence, incorporating the primary motivations of troop-providers, it evaluates whether diversity in UN missions leads to a success or a failure.

Design of the Project

Countries might be motivated by public or private interests when deploying personnel to conflict countries. Bringing in these divergent interests of troop-providers, I assume that conflict-of-interest among troop-providers reduces their ideational commitment to the UN. Therefore, I argue that when troop-providers tend not to align with the UN's ideals and directives, the functionality of UN peacekeeping missions becomes controversial. The primary externality of a malfunctioning UN mission is the time it takes to terminate. In other words, when troop-providers' interests contradicts the UN's ideals and plans, the length of UN peacekeeping operations increases. The second externality is the failure to protect civilians. In the presence of conflict-of-interest among troop-providers, UN missions' capacity to provide security guarantees to combatants is diminished. As a consequence, when there are no security guarantees, warring groups fail to overcome their credible commitment problems, conflict persists, and civilians become even more vulnerable.

In approaching to the empirical evaluation of the expectations stated above, I first introduce the literature on UN peacekeeping operations in Chapter 2. This chapter demonstrates that the majority of the quantitative works either focused on the presence or size of UN peacekeepers. It is only recently that the internal composition of peacekeepers has also started to draw the scholarly attention. However, the relationship between how forces are composed and peacekeeping effectiveness has not been wholly exhausted yet. The earlier literature evaluating the internal composition of military forces focuses too much on the peacekeepers' individual performance, while underestimating the private interests of their home governments. Therefore, after pointing out the gap in the literature, this chapter argues that troop-providers' private interests should be taken into account when studying the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. In addition, after introducing all

the angles that the earlier literature considered to evaluate the success of peacekeeping missions, the chapter introduces *the length of UN missions* as a new angle to assess peacekeeping effectiveness.

In Chapter 3, I introduce the theory on how troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN affects the functionality of UN missions, and provide testable hypotheses on the length of UN missions and civilian victimization. Chapter 4 introduces the data. In this chapter, I explain and visualize how my key explanatory variable, *Commitment to UN*, is different than the level of agreeableness that is used in the literature to assess the similarity of foreign policy preferences of country sets.

Chapters 5 and 6 are the two empirical chapters that provide analyses testing the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3. The former analyzes the relationship between *Commitment to UN* and the length of UN missions, while the latter checks its affect on the civilian victimization by the combatants. Both chapters demonstrate that how peacekeepers are composed, the primary interests of troop-providers, and their willingness to align with the UN have direct impact on how the mandates are fulfilled. In sum, we learn from these two chapters that when troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN, the length of peacekeeping operation increases and the peacekeepers fail to protect civilians from being targeted by the warring groups.

Chapter 7 conducts a case study in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the DRC), with the aim of confirming the theory introduced in Chapter 3. The chapter provides a sentiment analysis using Twitter data from the DRC that demonstrates how civilians react to the UN's damaged impartial and neutral image. Doing so, the chapter provides an in-depth understanding of how troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN affects the conflict dynamics. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with policy implications to the UN.

II. HOW PEACEKEEPERS ARE TREATED IN THE LITERATURE

There exists a great number of large-n statistical studies that have analyzed the success and failure of UN peacekeeping missions. As there is “no single, universally accepted way” to measure the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping (Howard, 2019, p. 9), the scholars have attempted to answer broad questions such as: does UN peacekeeping prevent the spread of conflict? (Beardsley, 2011; Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015; Ruggeri et al., 2018), does it terminate the active conflicts? (David Mason et al., 2011; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001), does it prevent conflict-recurrence? (Fortna, 2004; Hultman et al., 2016), and does it reduce the violence against civilians? (Costalli, 2014; Hultman et al., 2013; Kathman and Wood, 2016; Kreps and Wallace, 2009; Melander, 2009).

Just like the success of peacekeeping operations has been analyzed from different perspectives, the way that peacekeepers are treated in the empirical studies also shows variation. For instance, while the earlier empirical strategy in estimating the effect of UN peacekeeping has been to treat peacekeepers as a binary variable (Beardsley, 2011; Fortna, 2004, 2008; Hartzell et al., 2001; Lundgren, 2017; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), with the amplification of data on the size, type, and nationalities of UN personnel (Perry and Smith, 2013; Kathman, 2013) along with where they are deployed subnationally (Cil et al., 2020), more recent studies have started to take into account the size of peacekeepers (Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015; Fjelde et al., 2019; Kathman and Wood, 2016; Kathman and Benson, 2019), the mandates assigned to them (Kreps and Wallace, 2009), the peacekeeper types (military personnel, police, or civilian) (Hultman et al., 2013, 2016; Kirschner and Miller, 2019), the locations that they are deployed (Ruggeri et al., 2018; Phayal, 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020), and their internal composition (Bove and Ruggeri, 2016, 2018; Bove et al., 2020; Haass and Ansorg, 2018).

In this section, I introduce the studies that explored the question of whether UN peacekeeping operations work. While doing that, I also provide information on the empirical strategies adopted regarding how to treat peacekeepers. After I introduce the empirical studies on UN peacekeeping

under six subtitles: the presence of peacekeepers, size of peacekeepers, types of peacekeepers, mandates of peacekeepers, peacekeepers' subnational deployment, and the internal composition of peacekeeping forces, I conclude with the questions that have not been addressed in the existing literature and a brief discussion on what this dissertation project offers.

The Presence of Peacekeepers

The pioneer works in the literature of peacekeeping effectiveness attempted to answer a number of questions with a particular focus on the presence of peacekeepers in the conflict zones. Such an empirical strategy in earlier large-n studies necessitated the treatment of peacekeeping operations as a binary variable.

To begin with, the presence of peacekeepers has been used to understand what convinces warring parties to sign and implement peace accords. Numerous studies have reached the conclusion that the presence of peacekeepers increases the likelihood of reaching a negotiated peace settlement. Adopting a more comprehensive point of view, Walter (2002) finds that warring groups are more likely to sign a peace agreement when it is accompanied by a third party that will monitor the implementation process. The study shows that the recurrence of conflict is most likely when there is no third party. The study is in line with the findings of Lundgren (2017). Analyzing 109 intrastate conflict mediation efforts between 1975 and 2004, Lundgren finds that enforcement assistance by any international organization has ex-ante increasing effect on the likelihood of reaching a negotiated peace settlement. In other words, the information that an enforcement assistance will be provided to post-conflict country persuades the combatants to sign a peace agreement even before the third party arrives. Additionally, the study finds that UN peacekeeping is the most favorable enforcement mechanism to the combatants. One recent study by Beardsley et al. (2019), however, concludes that peacekeeping efforts, on its own, is not sufficient to reduce battlefield fatalities and bring the dispute to an end. Contrarily, the authors argue that peacekeeping and mediation have interactive effect on the conflict. They do enhance one another's violence-reducing impact, and the peace is most likely when peacekeeping and mediation work in tandem.

That combatants signed a negotiated peace agreement does not always guarantee a durable peace. The greatest challenge in the post-conflict phase is, undoubtedly, to prevent the recurrence of violence (Diehl, 2016). The risk of conflict recurrence should not be underestimated. According to Quinn et al. (2007), around 40 percent of countries fall into the conflict trap for the second time. Peacekeepers serve a great purpose at this phase of the post-conflict, too. For instance, they facilitate the repatriation of refugees, disarm rebel groups, monitor the implementation of peace agreements, organize elections, and promote human rights. While UN peacekeeping is not a panacea for conflict-recurrence, many of the scholars that study peacebuilding in the post-conflict phase agree that peacekeepers do a great job in diminishing the risk of conflict recurrence (David Mason et al., 2011; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008).

In their study, Hartzell et al. (2001) find that the presence of a third party, that physically separates warring groups from each other and deters parties from attacking each other, increases the survival of a peace agreement after a civil war ends. Focusing particularly on UN peacekeeping, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) show that peacekeepers are able to either delay another conflict by increasing the duration of peace or completely prevent the conflict recurrence. Comparing the cases of post-conflict settlements with and without peacebuilding missions, Fortna (2008) finds that the renewal of conflict decreases significantly when peacekeepers are around. Fortna's findings are robust to controlling for the severity of conflicts. In line with the earlier findings, David Mason et al. (2011) also conclude that the deployment of peacekeepers to post-conflict countries decreases conflict renewal by around 70 percent.

In addition to the studies that focus on the relationship between the presence of peacekeepers and conflict-recurrence, there are also those that conduct a duration analysis or employ other techniques to answer whether peacekeeping leads to a durable peace. Gilligan and Sergenti (2008), for instance, employ matching techniques that capture increased peace time in post-conflict settlements accompanied by peacekeepers. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), however, are the first to quantitatively analyze the factors that affect the duration of post-conflict peace. They find that peacekeeping efforts increase the length of peace after the conflict ends. Fortna (2004) is another that employ Cox

Proportional Hazard regressions with time-varying covariates. In comparison to other peacekeeping operations, Fortna finds that UN peacekeeping has a statistically significant positive impact on the peace time.

Intrastate conflicts are not always constrained by national borders, and can easily spread to neighboring countries (Esen and Oğuş Binath, 2017; Gaier, 2016; Patrick, 2017) in the form of another domestic conflict, refugee flows, or interstate war between neighboring states. To begin with, mass refugee flows are known to be an important factor of increasing the risk of civil war in receiving countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). The mechanism that causes an internal conflict in receiving countries is threefold. Refugee flows first alter the demographic balance in the country. Then, they create a competition over resources, and finally, militarize civilians as a result of increased availability of arms (Forsberg, 2016). In addition to that, mass refugee flows can also increase the likelihood of an interstate war between the home and host countries given that host states might opt for an intervention to prevent the refugee flows and negative externalities associated with refugees (Salehyan, 2008).

Arguing that the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war cannot be understood without examining the internal conflicts in Lebanon and Israel, Beardsley (2011) investigates whether the presence of peacekeepers in a conflict country reduces the expected risk of conflict between neighboring states. His study shows that by containing the internal conflict by preventing the transnational movement of warring factions and the international support they receive, the presence of peacekeepers reduces the risk of armed conflict between states by more than 70 percent.

The Size and Types of Peacekeepers

While the pioneer works in early 2000s utilized the presence of peacekeepers to evaluate ‘success’ from many different perspectives, more recent works from 2010s started to take into account the size of peacekeeping operations. Ruggeri et al. (2013) are among the first scholars that have asked how many peacekeepers are required to fulfill basic mandates and keep peace.

Analyzing all UN peacekeeping operations in Africa from 1989 to 2005, Ruggeri et al. (2013)

examine the factors that make warring groups more willing to cooperate with the UN. Their most important finding is that warring groups are more open to cooperation with larger UN peacekeeping operations. The study shows us that UN missions have to be large enough to provide the security guarantees that help the warring groups overcome their mistrust problems.

What happens when warring groups start to cooperate with the UN? Undoubtedly, they will be less likely to target civilians (Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2020), and the length of conflict will be shortened (Kathman and Benson, 2019). Carnegie and Mikulaschek (2020)'s analysis over all UN missions between 1989 and 2010 also finds that sizeable UN missions are more effective in reducing the violence against civilians. Building on the earlier works, the authors account for the endogeneity and selection bias issues by using quasi-random variation in the size of multilateral peace operations. To that end, focusing on the rotating the UN Security Council (UNSC) presidency, they find that countries deploy more personnel to their preferred locations when they have more leverage. Ultimately, these additional military personnel help to reduce civilian victimization. As for the conflict duration, Kathman and Benson (2019) argue that by increasing the cost of continuing war, providing security guarantees, and overcoming information asymmetries, UN peacekeeping is effective in reducing the length of conflicts. The empirical findings in the study support the expectations, and show that UN missions are most effective in decreasing the conflict duration when deployed in large numbers.

Peacekeeping forces do not only include military personnel. In their study, Hultman et al. (2013) disaggregate peacekeepers into three types; troops, police, and observers. Then, they examine the relationship between the size of each type and violence against civilians. Using monthly data from 1991 to 2008 in all armed conflicts in Africa, the authors find that more sizeable military and police forces are associated with reduced civilian victimization. Nonetheless, observers are found to increase the one-sided violence against civilians, potentially creating incentives for the warring groups to target civilians. In another study, Hultman et al. (2016) focus on the peace time as the outcome variable, and examine whether large deployments of different types of peacekeepers have an impact on the longevity of peace. The authors find that larger troop deployments are

more effective in increasing the time of peace, while other types of peacekeepers such as police and observers have null effect.

Civilians are not always only targeted during the conflict. They can fall victim to the spoilers of peace even after the active conflict ends. Kathman and Wood (2016) analyze peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing anti-civilian violence in the post-conflict period. Their results demonstrate that sizeable troop forces are better able to control violence against civilians, while larger deployments of observers are associated with increased civilian victimization in line with the earlier findings. In addition to perpetrating anti-civilian lethal violence, warring groups can also engage in nonlethal violence against civilians. Sexual abuse is among these types of violence that disturbs peace and stability. Arguing that UN peacekeeping raises the cost of abuses and promotes institutional and cultural changes that prevent such kind of violence, Kirschner and Miller (2019) find plausible support that sizeable and multidimensional missions are more effective in reducing nonlethal violence. Interestingly, the results show that rebels are more responsive to the missions with large civilian components, challenging the earlier works that portray observers as ineffective in UN missions.

UN peacekeeping's effect on the violence perpetrated by warring groups has long been examined in the literature, but Di Salvatore (2019) is the first to ask whether peacekeepers have a reducing impact on the violence committed by nonpolitically motivated individuals—the criminals. In sum, large troop deployments are unexpectedly found to increase homicide deaths, while large police deployments have an opposite trend. The findings support the author's expectations that the disarmament of insurgents allow them to use their violent skills in other criminal activities, if not for political purposes. Finally, Di Salvatore (2019)'s work is an important piece given that it demonstrates the police forces as an important segment of the whole peacekeeping process.

The Subnational Deployment of Peacekeepers

As acknowledged earlier, domestic conflict might sometimes exceed the national borders. However, the contagion effect of conflict does not always refer to the spread of violence across borders. Conflict can also travel within the country. For instance, insurgents might employ the strategy of

suicide terrorism to coerce governments to make territorial concessions (Pape, 2003). In an attempt to examine whether UN peacekeeping can prevent the spread of violence within conflict countries, Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) use geo-referenced event data from 1990 to 2010 to find that UN peacekeepers, particularly when they are deployed in large numbers, are effective in containing violence and preventing it from spreading to other regions. Similarly, Ruggeri et al. (2018) find that subnational deployment of peacekeepers has a decreasing effect on the likelihood of conflict outbreak in the nearest urban area.

In contrast to earlier studies that evaluate the effect of peacekeeping on civilian victimization at the country-level, Fjelde et al. (2019) provide the first comprehensive evaluation of peacekeeping effectiveness in civilian protection at the subnational level. The authors argue that sizeable local presence of peacekeepers increases the military and political cost of civilian targeting, and therefore, reduces the civilian victimization by the rebel groups. While they find supportive findings for this expectation, their results suggest that peacekeepers struggle to reduce violence by the government forces. Phayal (2019) and Phayal and Prins (2020) also examine this relationship at the local-level. While the former studies the subnational deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur, the latter extends this strategy to four other conflict countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (the DRC, Ivory Coast, South Sudan, and Sudan). Both studies find that UN peacekeeping operations are effective in diminishing one-sided violence by the combatants, but not the violence perpetrated by the government forces.

Costalli (2014) also conducts a single case study, analyzing the relationship between troop deployments and local variation of violence in Bosnian civil war. One important takeaway from this study is that it shows that peacekeepers are deployed where violence is the most severe. The empirical findings of this study support the argument that peacekeepers are effective in diminishing immediate violence. However, the findings also demonstrate that they have null effect in deterring future violence. Another study that employs a single case study is Di Salvatore (2020). Examining the UN mission in Sierra Leone from 1997 to 2001, the study finds that UN troops are effective in diminishing one-sided violence against civilians. However, peacekeeping effectiveness decreases as power asymmetries between warring groups grow.

Finally, evaluating the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations from another perspective, Fjelde and Smidt (2021) examine the association between the local presence of peacekeepers and the risk of electoral violence. Using geo-referenced data on peacekeeping deployment for all UN missions in Africa, the authors find that the local presence of peacekeepers diminish the risk of experiencing electoral violence. The risk of electoral violence is decreased for two main reasons. First, just like international electoral observers, peacekeepers increase the reputation costs for the political actors that resort to violence. And, second, ensuring the security of the election workers, observers and voters, UN peacekeepers increase the implementation cost of violence.

The Mandates of Peacekeepers

A former force commander’s statement, “it may look like war, but it’s peacekeeping,”⁸ portrays all UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations in the post-1999 era. While in early 1990s the UNSC was issuing force mandates generally for other non-UN interveners to use force, in 1999 it was the first time that the UNSC authorized the use of force by peacekeepers to protect civilians (Howard and Dayal, 2018). In other words, the year 1999 was when the UN multidimensional missions were born with the force mandates given to UN peacekeepers.

The addition of force mandates to protect civilians has not been unnoticed in the literature of peacekeeping effectiveness. For instance, comparing UN-led operations to other regional peacekeeping missions, Kreps and Wallace (2009) find that UN-led operations are more successful in protecting civilians. The authors claim that the UN is better able to overcome asymmetric information problem and create conditions of peace, given that it has more resources to do so. The authors go one step further and also check the variance within UN peacekeeping missions. They argue that not all UN operations are created equally to share similar mandates. In their study, they also find that peace enforcement and multidimensional missions are the most effective in confronting violence against civilians.

⁸MONUC Force Commander Lt. General Babcar Gaye, “Quote of the Day,” New York Times, 23 May 2005 in Howard and Dayal (2018).

‘Robust mandates’, which authorize the peacekeepers to “employ armed force beyond the traditional exception of self-defence” (Longobardo, 2019, p. 166), are clear signals to the warring groups that the UN is committed to the protection of civilians. In her study, Hultman (2013) examines the relationship between the levels of civilian violence and the mandates assigned to the peacekeeping operations. The overall findings demonstrate that the higher levels of civilian violence lead to the deployment of peace operations with more robust mandates, suggesting that the UN is taking the protection of civilians seriously. Yet, robust mandates do have some unexpected consequences. Henke (2018), for instance, reports that robust peace enforcement mandate increases the likelihood of peacekeepers being targeted by the belligerents. Such a finding is significant as it shows that peace enforcement mandate is incompatible with the understanding of traditional non-use of force.

For a very long time, the main responsibilities of peacekeepers had been to supervise the peace agreements, monitor the implementation of them, and create a buffer zone separating warring parties from each other. Since the end of the Cold War, however, peacekeepers have been assigned a number of new mandates. In addition to the aforementioned peace enforcement mandates, multidimensional missions have also been in charge of the peacebuilding processes. For instance, UN peacekeepers in Somalia and former Yugoslavia were authorized to resort to force for civilian protection, but they were also responsible for the restoration of peace and the building of liberal democratic institutions. In her seminal work, Pouligny (2006) refers to these new tasks introduced in multidimensional UN missions as ‘over-ambitious mandates’. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) exemplifies the complexity of the mandates assigned to today’s multidimensional missions. UNTAC not only functioned as a transitional authority and adopted some administrative duties, but also attempted to “rebuild a state—indeed, a nation” (p. 4).

Conflict management at the local level is among these over-ambitious mandates that are inherent to the contemporary UN missions. Creating conditions for intergroup dialogues is an important tool for ensuring peace and security at the local level, and they are often organized by the civilian components in peacekeeping operations. In her study, Smidt (2020b) finds that peacekeepers’ attempts to ensure community-based intergroup dialogues revives coordination among different

groups and diminish negative biases against one another. The findings are not without implications on the risk of local conflict. In another study, Smidt (2021) focuses on another mandate, the organization of fair and transparent elections and the provision of electoral security. In sum, the paper examines the relationship between UN missions and electoral violence, and concludes that when peacekeepers engage in election-related activities, the electoral security increases.

The Internal Composition of Peacekeepers

Large and multidimensional missions have their unique problems. That UN peacekeeping, particularly the sizeable deployments, unintentionally lead to economic distortions and long-term economic downturn (Beber et al., 2019), increase the demand for sex trafficking (Beber et al., 2017; Bell et al., 2018), and boost black market activities (Andreas, 2011) is a well-known fact. Bove et al. (Nd) also acknowledge that multidimensional peacekeepings come with new organizational-related and coordination problems. Given the heterogeneity in terms of the military training the peacekeepers have had and the challenges that stem from language barriers, the coordination problem is widespread.

The most recent studies go beyond the presence and size of peacekeeping, and examine the internal composition of peacekeepers. Bove and Ruggeri (2016) are the first to explore the diversity within peacekeeping missions. They find that diversity in the internal composition of peacekeeping forces reduces the levels of civilian victimization through increasing complementarity and monitoring among the military personnel. In another study, Bove and Ruggeri (2018) look at the linguistical and cultural distance between troops and locals. They conclude that civilian violence decreases with an effective communication and interaction with local actors. Haass and Ansorg (2018), as well, evaluate the internal composition of peacekeepers, taking into account the military expenditures of the troop-providers. The authors conclude that UN peacekeeping operations with a large share of troops from countries with high-quality militaries are better able to deter violence in an ongoing conflict.

In their seminal book, Bove et al. (2020) build on their earlier diversity measurement. While the above introduced earlier works of the authors investigate the diversity among peacekeepers—field

diversity; in their book, Bove et al. also include the investigation of top leadership diversity, vertical leadership distance and horizontal distance. Top leadership diversity is the geographic and cultural distance between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the force commander (FC). Vertical leadership distance is the distance between the FC and peacekeepers. Lastly, horizontal distance is between peacekeepers and the locals. Based on the empirical findings, the authors argue that an effective peacekeeping operation is the one with more diversity in top leadership, and less vertical leadership and horizontal distances.

The inclusion of female personnel in peacekeeping operations is argued to be an effective strategy to reduce the unintended consequences such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, the rise in the number of brothels, and the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) (Simić, 2010). Moreover, female peacekeepers are found to increase the local-level trust for UN missions as they interact with the locals more than their counterparts (Bridges and Horsfall, 2009). In their study, Karim and Beardsley (2016) focus on the gender equality within UN peacekeeping forces and use the internal composition of peacekeepers to explain the occurrence of SEA. The authors' mission-level analysis from 2009 to 2013 demonstrates that both the inclusion of more female peacekeepers and the peacekeepers coming from countries with better records of gender equality are associated with less occurrence of SEA.

Conclusion

A great deal of quantitative works that evaluate peacekeeping effectiveness from different angles conclude that UN peacekeeping works. The literature introduced above shows that UN peacekeeping increases the durability of peace settlements, decreases the conflict duration, and most importantly, reduces civilian victimization by the combatants. In sum, UN peacekeeping is a cost-effective way of saving lives and ensuring the global security (Hegre et al., 2010).

Conversely, the situation of ongoing UN missions, as we know from the headlines, and the main findings of some qualitative works are less auspicious. The headlines that highlight peacekeepings' failures such as 'Why UN peacekeeping missions have failed to pacify Africa' (Mugabi, 2021) and

‘Record number of UN peacekeepers fails to stop African wars’ (Raghavan, 2014) are widespread. The pessimism, particularly in qualitative works, comes from two reasons. First, a vast number of qualitative works (Autesserre, 2010; Von Billerbeck, 2016; Lake, 2016) evaluate peacekeeping effectiveness while the missions are still in motion and tend to focus on the major problems rather than the whole picture (Howard, 2019).

Take the issue of ‘local ownership’ as an example. In her study, Pouligny (2006) focuses on the problem of miscommunication between the peace workers and locals. She argues that such problems reduce the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, and recommends that UN missions include more local agents to overcome the cultural and language barriers. Another problem is the attitude of peace workers. Autesserre (2014) shows that peace workers’ arrogant and bossy attitudes can create resentment among the local, and hinder the functionality of peacekeeping missions. Second, the concept of ‘peace’ (success) can be perceived differently by locals and peace workers (Autesserre, 2014), which results in the development of a critical attitude. For instance, “while an Indian peacekeeper define[s] peace as the absence of violence in the area under his purview, a Congolese child argue[s] that it [is] the possibility to eat to his heart’s content . . . [and] Timorese parents claim that it mean[s] the possibility to send their children to school” (p. 23). As seen in the example, UN missions’ effectiveness might be evaluated differently depending on what is seen as a success, which explains the critical point of view in qualitative studies to a great extent.

While the earlier literature that focuses on the presence and size of UN peacekeepers has reached the consensus that the UN’s endeavors to bring peace, prevent future aggressions, and promote good governance are not in vain, the situation is different for more recent studies that focus on the diversity of peacekeepers. Acknowledging the problems outspoken in the qualitative works, studies that examine the internal composition of peacekeepers argue that diversity is a double-edged sword, and provide inconclusive results. In short, the literatures on peacekeeping effectiveness and composition of peacekeepers have not been wholly exhausted yet. There is still room to contribute to the literature both theoretically and empirically. This dissertation project does both. It not only introduces a new angle in evaluating peacekeeping effectiveness—*the length of peacekeeping*

operations, but also contributes to the understanding of how peacekeeping works.

The causal mechanism in the literature that examines the internal composition of peacekeepers, for instance, is too much focused on the peacekeepers' individual performance; their distinct skills and capabilities. In short, the national interests of troop-contributing-countries are underestimated, while giving too much agency to the peacekeepers. The existing literature did a great job in incorporating peacekeeper characteristics into the analysis. Yet, we still need a better understanding of the directives given to these peacekeepers. What happens when troop-providers' interests contradict the UN's ideals and directives? Contributing to the peacekeeping literature, this dissertation project asks whether the conflict-of-interest among troop-providers affects the length of UN missions and the their overall effectiveness in reducing civilian victimization.

In assessing the conflict-of-interest within UN peacekeeping operations, this project examines troop-providers' voting behaviors on human rights issues in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and calculate overall ideational commitment scores. *Troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN* is used to explain the length of UN missions and the levels of civilian victimization. In addition, the key explanatory variable is also calculated at subnational level in the DRC to analyze the negative externalities of divergent interests in subnational deployments. To that end, another contribution of this dissertation project is the evaluation of internal composition of peacekeepers at a different level of analysis— across different contingents in the DRC.

III. THEORY

This chapter introduces the theory on the internal composition of peacekeepers and peacekeeping effectiveness. I particularly argue that how peacekeeping operations are composed is an important determinant of the ‘success’ in UN peacekeeping missions. In this dissertation project, the success is evaluated from the prism of *missions’ lengths* and *the levels of civilian victimization by the combatants*. Therefore, below I build theoretical expectations on how the internal composition of peacekeepers is influential on the length of UN peacekeeping missions and how it deters combatants from targeting civilians.

The main argument of this chapter is that in assessing the effectiveness of UN peacekeepings, the primary motivations of troop-providers and the levels of their engagement should not be neglected since contradictions might arise between their private interests and the UN’s ideals. I assume that such contradictions damage the overall functionality of peacekeeping operations, along with the impartial and neutral image of the UN in the eyes of the warring groups. When the functionality of the missions is damaged and peacekeepers fail to fulfill their mandates, the time that it takes to terminate a mission is increased. The contradictions between troop-providers’ private interests and the UN’s ideals does more than increasing the missions’ lengths. By damaging the impartial and neutral image of the UN, such contradictions fail UN peacekeepers to provide security guarantees that help the combatants overcome their credible commitment problems. In the absence of the security guarantees provided by an impartial party, the conflict persists and the civilians become even more vulnerable.

The Supply-side of Peacekeeping

Before assessing the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, it is important to understand first why countries are being selective in conflict-zones when they are sending their combat and non-combat personnel. Understanding the factors leading to the deployment of peacekeepers is crucial as the motivations behind troop deployments are directly related to how peacekeeping forces later act while

on the ground. Therefore, it is efficacious to consider the supply-side explanations for personnel contributions on evaluating the peacekeeping effectiveness.

While Diehl (1994) sees UN peacekeeping as purely the provision of a public benefit in the form of a global peace and stability, the literature on the supply-side of peacekeeping has reached a consensus that peacekeeping contribution is an ‘impure public good’. Sheehan (2011), for instance, is among those who argue that “peacekeeping cannot be called a pure international public good because it is impossible to reach an international collective choice for its production” (p. 7). The decision to contribute to a peacekeeping mission, then, mainly depends on member countries’ national interests and the expected utility from their participation to the mission.

Public benefits might still be a good source of motivation for many states. However, with such understanding of troop-contribution, we are not able to explain why states are choosing one mission over another while deploying soldiers. For that reason, private benefits come to the fore and become an important factor for many troop-providers.

Thinking of the current diverse composition of UN peacekeeping operations, it would not be wrong to expect that much of today’s troop-providers would not be willing to join the operations in the first place if they had not received any private benefits. As already known, participation to the UN peacekeeping missions is a voluntary act and there is no punishment when member countries opt not to contribute to a mission. Nevertheless, troop-contribution comes with a number of benefits that motivate countries engage in peacekeeping mission no matter how treacherous the conflict-zones may be. Not all these private benefits are economic, though. Earlier literature classifies the private benefits into three main categories: economic, political and normative benefits.

Monthly reimbursements are among these economic private-benefits. According to Gaibullov et al. (2015), this particular ‘donor-specific benefit’ is unique to the UN and non-UN PKOs do not possess this mechanism. In short, troop-providers are reimbursed by the UN on a monthly basis for all the equipment and personnel they contribute to the missions. The idea that troop-providers might make profit from deploying peacekeepers is contested. For instance, Thakur (1984) and Krishnasamy (2003) argue that when the monthly UN reimbursement rate exceeds the governments’

pre-deployment costs, the UN reimbursement becomes attractive to the contributing countries. There are others, however, who claim that in practice UN reimbursement mechanism does not even cover all the costs, set aside being a source of profit. Coleman (2014) and Coleman and Nyblade (2018) challenge the earlier literature that accepted reimbursements as a source of income for TCCs. Both studies argue that stagnant reimbursement rate, which remained unchanged at \$1,028 from early 1990s to 2015, is the main reason to why peacekeeping is not profitable. In addition, the financial shortages that UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations experiences chronically cause UN reimbursement to arrive rather slow, leaving pre-deployment costs as a burden to the troop-providers.

Trade interests and opportunity to get foreign aid from great powers are other economic private-benefits that motivate troop-providers. While Perkins and Neumayer (2008) find no relationship between bilateral trade and troop-contributions, Rost and Greig (2011) argue that countries would be more likely to deploy peacekeepers to missions where their interests are at stake. To that end, trade ties are found to be an influential factor in troop-providers' decision to contribute. Beyond realized trade, countries can also take into account the trade and investment potential in conflict countries. Therefore, deploying peacekeepers is an effective tool of eliminating the risk of trade disruption with the future trade partner (Zhang, 2021). Foreign aid to troop-providers also plays an influential role in persuading countries to join the peacekeeping operations. As Boutton and D'Orazio (2020) put forward, 'pivotal states' use foreign aid as a tool to ensure the contributions of the developing countries.

Security concerns in the region and back at home are what generally motivate countries that pursue political benefits. To begin with, regional security and humanitarian concerns increase troop-providers' engagement in UN missions. The empirical results in Bove and Elia (2011) display that countries are more likely to participate to UN missions as the risk of incoming refugees increases and when troop-providers are close to the conflict zones. Even in the absence of the risk of incoming refugees, sharing a border with a conflict country increases the likelihood of instability in neighboring countries, endangering their national securities (Gleditsch, 2007). In this respect,

neighboring countries tend to participate to peacekeeping missions more than other troop-providers. Another security benefit of peacekeeping is its coup-proofing effect. Kathman and Melin (2017) find that deploying troops to peacekeeping operations benefits political leaders for two main reasons. First, their military personnel gains experience and professionalization abroad, while leaders do not have to allocate resources for the military training. Second, by sending troops to mission countries, leaders try to lower the risk of coup d'état at home and any other kind of military intervention to the domestic politics. Finally, colonial ties are the last set of politically-driven motivations. Since former colonizing states would be more interested in the political stability and economic welfare of their former colonies, they would be more likely to contribute to the peacekeeping operations in those countries. In addition, given the familiarity between the colonizing states and their former colonies, the participation of colonizing states would be more welcome in the former colonies (Perkins and Neumayer, 2008). This explains why colonial ties are found to be an important factor at the supply-side of UN peacekeeping missions.

Finally, from the normative benefits' point of view, participation to peacekeeping missions is known to be prestigious for many troop-providers. Through deploying troops to peacekeeping operations, some troop-providers prove their 'good-citizenship' and restore their reputation. Neack (1995) is one of the scholars who studied the normative-benefit aspect of UN peacekeepings. Examining whether troop-providers contribute with a realist or idealist approach, the article concludes that UN peacekeeping operations are mainly dominated by the Western countries that are better off in a status quo and some non-Western countries that are attempting to restore their reputation. What is more interesting is the increase in the number of troop-providers with poor domestic human rights records. Levin (2020) finds that by committing large numbers of troop, such countries are able to whitewash the occurrence of human rights violations at home and prevent any kind of foreign intervention to their domestic affairs.

The extent literature on the supply-side of UN peacekeeping operations introduced in this part outlines three main sources of motivation behind committing peacekeepers to UN missions. We have come to the conclusion that economic, political and normative benefits are the main catalysts

behind the peacekeeper contributions of some troop-providers. However, it would be wrong to expect all troop-providers to be driven by these private-benefits. Some others, in particular the ‘moral superpowers’ and ‘global good Samaritans’ (Dahl, 2006; Brysk, 2009), solely contribute to generate public goods. Their ultimate goal is to construct and expand the liberal institutions in conflict countries, and prevent future aggressions. In other words, their contribution stems from the fact that they are ideationally committed to the UN and are motivated to empower the UN to prevent violence and human rights violations in conflict countries and assist with the post-conflict transition process.

The Design of UN Peacekeeping Operations

As of February 2022, there are currently more than 90,000 UN peacekeepers including military, civilian and police personnel that operate in multiple UN missions around the world. These peacekeepers operate in the most dangerous places risking their lives to bring security and political stability to countries that have long suffered from domestic violence or been the target of foreign aggression.

A UN peacekeeping operation is established by the UN Security Council following the consent of the host parties. Since the UN does not have a homogeneous standing army, it is dependent on the troop contributions of the member states (Bove et al., 2020). Sending peacekeepers is a voluntary act with no enforcement mechanism to ensure the contribution of member states. Nevertheless, it has its own distinct requirements. For instance, contingents’ equipment is provided by troop-providers, not the UN. And, the equipment soon-to-be sent needs to meet the UN deployment standards introduced in the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). Otherwise, troop-providers cannot participate to peacekeeping missions. Troop-providers are later reimbursed for the personnel and equipment they deploy. However, since “the [reimbursement] system is primarily designed to compensate states for the costs associated with the use of their equipment in a UN operation, not for the cost of acquiring this equipment” (Coleman, 2014, p. 1), troop-providers should possess the equipment that meets the UN deployment standards prior to their participation. The system,

therefore, makes participation much easier for wealthier and more developed troop-providers. On the other hand, states that own equipment that does not meet UN standards face a financial disincentive to deploying troops to UN missions. Considering the financial disincentive they face, one may expect to see less contribution by the least developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, the reality shows that many least developed and developing countries are the biggest contributors in terms of troop size. In this respect, private interests can be argued to play an important role in encouraging the contributions of member states and ensuring the continuation of their engagement till the end of the missions.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping has experienced a boom on both the supply and demand sides of operations. In other words, the contributors and beneficiaries have both become more diverse than ever (Abiola et al., 2017; Koops et al., 2015). As a consequence, UN peacekeeping operations have become more multinational and bigger in size. Diversity in peacekeeping operations, however, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, bigger and more diverse troops better monitor one another's work, discourage misconduct, and bring a diverse set of linguistic and technical capabilities that can facilitate the completion of the mandates (Bove and Ruggeri, 2016; Haass and Ansorg, 2018). On the other hand, it can cause coordination problems due to the communication barriers among peacekeepers, and different training and legal systems that peacekeepers come from (Bove and Ruggeri, 2016; Bove et al., Nd).

When peacekeepers are stationed in mission countries, the UN has the primary responsibility to ensure the highest standards of conduct and accountability of all UN personnel. The UN Standards of Conduct, which are to be followed by the UN personnel at all times, are built on three key principles; 1) commitment to competence, efficiency and integrity, 2) zero-tolerance on sexual exploitation and abuse, and 3) accountability of personnel who violate UN Standards of Conduct.⁹ With an aim of ensuring the highest standards of conduct in peacekeeping operations, the UN necessitates all troop or police contributing member states to train their personnel to function effectively as a peacekeeper before the deployment. However, a brief training on the UN's

⁹<https://conduct.unmissions.org/standards-overview>

founding principles and code of conduct would not be sufficient to overcome the problems inherent in multidimensional operations.

It is true that coordination problems among peacekeepers can affect the functionality of UN peacekeeping operations. However, what is more hazardous is when troop-providers interests clashes the UN ideals and plans. As acknowledged in the literature, mediators can sometimes be biased and have preferences over certain issues (Kydd, 2003). When these third party interveners are not neutral, their presence makes the war more likely through strengthening minority groups and lowering the cost of war (Kydd and Straus, 2013). Additionally, biased third party interveners might also work to prolong the conflict in order to use that time to alter the conflict dynamics for their own benefits (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Gent, 2008; Linebarger and Enterline, 2016). According to Beardsley (2012), even the mediators without leverage can involve in a dispute for a reason. Most of the time, they serve as surrogates for other countries that have leverage. With this in mind, certain troop-providers can also be expected to behave alike to gain the maximum benefit from contributing to a UN mission. In Diehl and Druckman (2015)'s words, "individual states have national interests in the conduct of a peace operation that might or might not comport with others" (p. 95). Moreover, in the design of the UN missions, there is no strict checks that can limit such behaviors in UN peacekeeping operations. As argued by Howard (2019), "command and control structures do not function like national militaries: a battalion commander from country X is not legally obliged to carry out the orders of a superior from country Y" (p. 14), which shows the main problem with the design of the UN peacekeepings.

Then, what explains peacekeepers' responsiveness to their home governments? When they are deployed by the member states to the conflicting zones, "peacekeepers wear their countries' uniform and are identified as UN Peacekeepers only by a UN blue helmet or beret and a badge".¹⁰ Their outfit demonstrates us that these personnel are representing their home governments as much as the UN itself. Although peacekeepers' wages come from the UN throughout the time they spend abroad, once they are withdrawn they have to return to their home countries. In other words,

¹⁰<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/forming-new-operation>.

they are only temporarily recruited by the UN. Knowing that at the end of the mission, they will be held accountable for their actions by their home governments, the peacekeeping personnel feel responsible to their home countries and have a tendency to follow their orders.

That troop-providers deploy troops to pursue their private interests, and the personnel from these countries follow the orders from their home governments when there is a conflict-of-interest are the two main assumptions that help me build my argument. Private interests that motivate troop-providers, in that sense, reduce troop-providers' overall ideational commitment to the UN and damage the functionality of peacekeeping operations.

The Length of Peacekeeping Operations

As introduced earlier, the decision to establish a peacekeeping operation is taken by the UN Security Council. After the host parties give their consent for the deployment of peacekeepers, the UNSC evaluates the situation and establish UN missions. The size and mandates of the peacekeeping operations are decided based on the needs of the conflict countries. While many of the earlier peacekeeping operations were solely mandated to supervise and monitor the peace agreements, more contemporary UN missions have more ambitious mandates. For instance, UNTAC had to function as a transitional authority and adopted some administrative duties.

The UNSC Resolutions establish the peacekeeping operations for a year with certain mandates that are determined by the requirements of the host countries. The following year, the UNSC re-examines the situation in conflict countries and decides to grant one-year mandate extension to the operating peacekeeping missions if necessary. The UNSC Resolution S/RES/1925 (2010) that establishes the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), for instance, initially decides that the mission shall be deployed until 30 June 2011. The following year, the UNSC Resolution S/RES/1991 (2011) determines that the situation in the DRC continues to threaten the international peace and regional security, and therefore; decides to extend the mandate of MONUSCO until 30 June 2012. The mandate of the mission has been extended ever since the first extension in 2011. The last time that the mandate of

MONUSCO was extended was in 2021 with the Resolution S/RES/2612 (2021). After determining that the critical situation still persists, the resolution extends the mandate until 20 December 2022. It is highly likely that MONUSCO will be around for at least a couple of more years.

UN peacekeeping operations are in fact just an interim measure that helps countries overcome the root causes of conflict and create conditions for durable peace settlements. While, in theory, the presence of UN peacekeepers needs to be short (Diehl, 1994), in practice, there are many peacekeeping operations that last longer than anticipated. In that respect, MONUSCO is not alone.

The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), for instance, is among the longest running peacekeeping operations. The peacekeepers were first deployed to the island in April 1964 and have been operating there since then. Even though the peacekeepers' only task was to prevent the conflict recurrence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots when they were first deployed in 1964, after 1974 new mandates were assigned to the peacekeeping forces following the Turkish army's military operation in the northern side of the island. From then on, UNFICYP has created a buffer zone that separates the military forces of the two communities and provided humanitarian assistance. Assessing the success of UNFICYP, Asmussen (2015) argues that "the length of UNFICYP's mission alone signifies its biggest failure: the absence of a fundamental settlement" (p. 206). While the mission has been largely successful in maintaining the status quo since 1974, the threat of conflict recurrence is still too big to talk about a complete withdrawal of the forces.

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is another lengthy mission that has lasted from September 1991 to date. As it can be understood from the mission's name, MINURSO's mandate was to create a peace settlement which leads to a referendum on self-determination for the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara. All these years, however, have passed without a successfully organized referendum, which is as of today still unforeseeable (Theofilopoulou, 2015). Peacekeepers operating in Western Sahara concentrated instead on de-mining the border regions and monitoring the ceasefire.

Driven by the examples of UNFICYP and MINURSO, two things can be argued about the

length of peacekeeping missions. First, longer missions signify failure given that peacekeepers are still present as the mandates are not successfully fulfilled. Second, the length of UN missions can be claimed to be a function of the nature of the mandate and the intensity of the conflict. In that sense, peacekeeping operations can take longer to terminate when the conflict is more intractable. While the intensity of conflict and the difficulty of mandates are important determinants of the length of UN missions; and therefore, the overall success, the willingness of troop-providers to align with the UN ideals and perform their responsibilities should not be neglected.

Considering that peacekeeping missions are different than national militaries, I expect that conflict-of interest in UN missions is inevitable, which alters the direction of peacekeeping operations (Albrecht and Cold-Ravnkilde, 2020). The initial plans and the time anticipated to terminate a UN mission can change when peacekeepers are more responsive to their home governments than the UN, and when troop-providers continue to generate gains as the missions last longer. For instance, countries may generate an income from the UN reimbursements, and the termination of a UN mission also brings a halt to this particular resource. Alternatively, regional hegemons or neighboring countries might not be impartial, favoring one warring group over another. In this respect, instead of working to bring peace and security, peacekeepers of these particular countries might actually spoil the functioning of UN peacekeeping operations. In sum, troop-providers' lack of ideational commitment to the UN increases the time needed to terminate missions as the UN Security Council has to renew the mandates to give extra time to complete the tasks. In contrast, when UN missions are contributed by troop-providers that are ideationally committed to the UN, the length of UN missions decreases.

Hypothesis 1 *As troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN increases, the time required to terminate UN missions decreases.*

Since civil wars ending with negotiated peace settlements are more common now, post-civil war elections are the desideratum of the peace settlements. Elections not only establish the political order, but also ensure good governance through holding politicians accountable for their decisions.

But, when should be the timing of these elections? While, as Reilly (2008) argues, post-conflict elections are part of the peace deal among the warring parties and need to be held as early as possible, there is no one universal rule that fits all. International actors, however, are accepted as an important determinant of election timing. Seeing democracy as a panacea that prevents any potential conflict-recurrence, international actors often tend to push for early elections (Brancati and Snyder, 2011).

Given the importance of post-war elections for a durable peace settlement, the organization of peaceful elections is often among the main activities of multinational peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers are, therefore, assigned with a number of important tasks. For instance, they assist with the repatriation of refugees, reduce the incidents of electoral manipulations and election-related violence (Smidt, 2021), and educate voters to confront false information and hate speech that can endanger the peace settlements (Smidt, 2020a).

Formulating the rules of the electoral system that satisfy all parties and holding the elections at the earliest convenience, however, both require a financial capability and credible commitment among the local actors. Since UN peacekeeping provides financial assistance and security guarantees that help warring groups overcome their commitment problems (Howard, 2019; Hultman et al., 2014), I expect a shorter organizational time frame for elections when there exists a multidimensional UN mission. Nevertheless, the UN peacekeeping will fail to successfully provide these security guarantees when troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN. In this respect, warring groups will tackle more overcoming their credible commitment problem in the absence of security guarantees, and thus, the time required to organize post-war election will increase. Contrarily, when UN missions are dominated by troop-providers that align with the UN, the organizational time frame of post-war elections will decrease.

Hypothesis 2 *As troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN increases, the time required to hold first post-conflict election decreases.*

Yet, lack of financial capability and credible commitment problem might not be the only two

factors that determine the election timing. When post-war countries do not have a prior electoral experience, establishing the democratic institutions and designing the electoral rules might require much more time. On the contrary, when the country has electoral experience prior to the conflict, some of the time-consuming tasks of peacekeepers no longer exist. In this respect, as the voters are already familiar to the electoral processes, there remains no need for extensive voter education. Moreover, the existence of former party leaders leads to a faster organization of new parties, which again facilitates the tasks of peacekeepers. All these considered, the organizational time frame of post-war elections in peacekeeping missions with troop-providers that are ideationally committed to the UN will be less, when the conflict country has prior democratic experience.

Hypothesis 2.1 *The decreasing effect of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN on the time required to hold first post-conflict election is conditional on the prior institutional maturity of the country.*

Civilian Victimization by the Combatants

Earlier scholarship on political violence has showed that a clear connection exists between intra-party conflicts and the occurrence of practices such as use of violence against unarmed civilians, ethnic-cleansing and mass killing (Kalyvas, 1999, 2006; Valentino, 2000). The studies acknowledge that it would be wrong to assume that such practices are arbitrary or simply unintended consequences of the conflict. Instead, they prove that there is a logic behind targeting civilians in armed conflicts. According to Valentino (2014), “civilians are not merely bystanders to armed conflict; they play a central, if often involuntary, role as the underwriters of war’s material, financial, and human requisites. Sometimes they become the objects of war itself” (p. 94). Similarly, Pouligny (2006) argues that civilians in conflicts are not simply “passive or neutral victims, they assert themselves, to some extent at least, as authentic actors, capable of rethinking their situation and commenting on it, continuing to make political choices, indicate preferences and even make commitments” (p. xi).

In an intra-state conflict, civilian victimization is perpetrated by both governments and the

insurgents with an aim of shaping the behaviors of the population. Whilst it is majorly the governments that target unarmed civilians as a part of their counterinsurgency tactic, rebel groups also commit violence against civilians from time to time. The governments do so in order to penalize the supporters of the armed groups, and more importantly to disrupt the connection between rebel groups and civilians by diminishing combatants' control over the territory. The disruption of the connection between the armed groups and civilians is an important counterinsurgency strategy as it prevents the flows of resources, such as food, shelter, weapon, money or soldier, to the insurgent groups (Wood et al., 2012). On the other hand, rebel groups use violence against civilians, particularly in government-controlled territories, in order to create chaos that might diminish civilians' trust in the government forces. As Hultman (2009) explains,

Where the rebels have a weak local connection and consequently a low probability of establishing control, the civilian population is not likely to be perceived as a potential supplier of support; instead, the rebels are likely to regard it as a representation of government power. Violence against that population, then, can be understood as an instrument for destabilising the government — a strategy of killing and destruction that demonstrates the power to hurt and consequently weakens the power of the government (p. 824).

In that respect, insurgents' use of violence against civilians does more than just ensuring the flows of resources. Civilian victimization is also a frequently employed tactic to change the incumbents' policies.

In sum, the combatants' success in conflicts depends on their ability to control territory and ensure civilian support for their cause (Kalyvas, 2006), as a result of which combatants might gather food, money or shelter, and obtain information about the adversary and recruit youths as soldiers. Therefore, civilian victimization is an effective and frequently applied tool by the combatants to deter civilian defection and ensure civilian support. Besides, targeting civilians might also help combatants to coerce the other warring parties into concessions (Balcells, 2011).

Given the frequency of civilian targeting in conflicts, the protection of civilians is among the primary responsibilities of the UN peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping operations protect civilians by separating warring groups and reducing battlefield activities that might trigger civilian victimization (Hultman et al., 2013). In addition to that, peacekeepers ensure civilians' protection behind the battle lines through monitoring, policing and patrolling frequently. More importantly, peacekeepers create conditions conducive to negotiations that significantly reduce the risk of civilian targeting (Hinkkainen Elliott et al., 2021).

While the negotiated peace settlements accompanied by UN peacekeepers are believed to be less treacherous, the risk of conflict-recurrence or targeting civilians still persists. Such settlements are complex for two main reasons. First, the combatants have an incentive to misrepresent their capabilities and demands. Second, the rebels have the fear that the government will not stay committed to peace deals. The commitment problem is the most pressing since it is always the rebels that need to lay down their weapons at the end of conflicts (Powell, 2006; Mattes and Savun, 2009; Kathman and Benson, 2019). Peaceful forms of resolution and the protection of civilians are then only possible when UN peacekeepers help the warring groups overcome their commitment problems by providing security guarantees (Hultman et al., 2014). Howard (2019) acknowledges that security guarantees "prevent security dilemma spirals and overcome credible commitment problems" (p. 13). To successfully provide these security guarantees and fulfill their mandates, however, the peacekeepers need to follow the orders of the UN, not their home governments.

In the case that the peacekeeping personnel fail to carry out the orders of the UN, it gives the idea that 'they are not doing their job' among local people and warring groups. "Local actors generally deduce that the United Nations people [have] many problems themselves, that they were mixed up in endless contradictions and they [do] not always know what they [are] supposed to do" (Pouligny, 2006, p. 121). When missions face serious commitment problems to the UN's ideals and plans, the consequences can be fatal. Take the example of UNTAC. By the time UNTAC was deployed to Cambodia in February 1992, it had the mandates of ensuring a ceasefire, organizing a free and fair election, and assisting with the repatriation of refugees. While UNTAC was successful

in fulfilling its mandates to a certain degree, it failed to ameliorate the root causes of the conflict and bring the peace to Cambodia. One major reason for that was, of course, the fact that peacekeepers did not carry out their tasks. “The Khmer Rouge [saw] that the gentlemen of UNTAC [were] very kind. If there [was] a fight somewhere UNTAC [didn’t] intervene. On the contrary, it withd[rew] (p. 124). Eventually, UNTAC’s lack of ideational commitment to the UN did nothing but encourage the Khmer Rouge to continue their actions, leaving civilians in a more vulnerable situation.

That being said, for the UN to be successful in reducing civilian victimization by the warring groups, troop-providers need to demonstrate full ideational commitment to the UN. So that, the UN can prevent security dilemma spirals and help warring groups overcome their commitment problems. In sum, I expect that when troop-providers align with the UN, the peacekeeping operations will be more effective in reducing civilian victimization by the combatants.

Hypothesis 3 *As troop-providers’ ideational commitment to the UN increases, the levels of civilian victimization by the warring groups decreases.*

Having troop-providers ideationally committed to the UN on the ground is just one source of security guarantees. Another aspect of peacekeeping that helps combatants overcome their credible commitment problem is the size of the peacekeeping deployments. I assume that larger peacekeeping deployments will signal to the combatants that ending violence is a priority for the international community (Phayal and Prins, 2020). In addition to that, large numbers of peacekeepers can better monitor the warring parties, patrol frequently, serve as a military deterrent, and provide more resources. Therefore, as they will have more resources and capabilities that increase the cost of continuing fighting, larger peacekeeping forces might better combat the violence when they are deployed in conflict zones.

One pitfall of large deployments, however, is the fact that conflict-of-interest among troop-providers might be more ubiquitous and intractable. The force commanders will find it harder to control the peacekeepers operating in large numbers. Thus, the UN will tackle to be accountable for the actions of its peacekeeping personnel. Additionally, it will be more difficult to detect

the misbehaving personnel and deter others from not aligning with the UN's orders and plans. UNPROFOR illustrates the pervasiveness of the conflict-of-interest among troop-providers in large deployments. In mid-1995, the UN deployed around 22,500 peacekeepers in Bosnia, making it one of the largest deployments of its time (Rieff, 1996). No matter how much effort was paid to end violence in Bosnia, the UN-led humanitarian approach actually paved the way for unintended consequences such as a wider war and prolongation of siege in Sarajevo through feeding warring groups and enriching both Serb and Bosnian black marketeers, and eventually triggering civilian targeting (Melander, 2009). The combatants were empowered because certain groups operating under UNPROFOR were misusing their 'UN cards', giving them the privileged access to sieged zones, which facilitated the black-market activities. This was, undoubtedly, not the intention of the UN, but "the UN soldiers were making themselves and Sarajevo mafia rich" every day (Andreas, 2011, p. 46). The example shows that ensuring ideational commitment of troop-providers to the UN becomes more critical in larger deployments. In sum, the more peacekeepers are on the ground, the more effective UN peacekeeping operations will be on the condition that the troop-providers align with the UN.

Hypothesis 4 *The effect of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN will be greater in larger deployments.*

IV. DATA

Dependent Variables

In Chapter 5, I use survival analysis to examine the factors affecting the survival distribution of UN missions. The *time* until a UN mission terminates and the *time* until a post-conflict election are the two dependent variables used in Chapter 5. The former tests the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the time required to terminate UN missions (Hypothesis 1), while the latter is used to test the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the time required to hold first post-conflict election (Hypothesis 2).

Civilian victimization is the outcome variable analyzed in Chapter 6. It comes from the version 20.1 of UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020; Sundberg and Melander, 2013) and measures the number of civilians killed by the warring groups (Högbladh, 2020). The outcome variable is measured at the mission-month level with a range from 0 to 506,486. The highest number of civilian victimizations belongs to the Rwandan genocide that occurred between April and July 1994 in the midst of the Rwandan Civil War. Throughout the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which lasted from 1993 to 1997, the peacekeepers strived to prevent violence against civilians that had an average of 737 monthly killings (excluding April 1994). However, when the mass killings of Tutsis erupted in April 1994, the death tolls suddenly increased to 506,486 from 25 in the previous month. Assessing its intensity, McNamee (2021) refers to the genocide as “unprecedented in human history” (p. 382), in which Hutus exterminated nearly the whole Tutsi population in Rwanda. Considering the extremity taking place in this small African country, Rwanda does undoubtedly constitute an outlier.¹¹

¹¹Earlier studies also evaluated the Rwandan case as an outlier and found that the inclusion of Rwanda in the analysis might give way to ambivalent findings. For instance, in his research Kocher (2014) re-analyzes Hultman et al. (2013)'s data and claims that larger deployments' negative association with the violence against civilians is largely driven by a single outlier that is Rwanda. Following Kocher's strategy, I exclude Rwanda in the main panel data analyses.

Key Independent Variable

The key variable of interest, *Commitment to UN*, is created using three key pieces of information about the internal composition of peacekeeping missions: (1) number of peacekeepers contributed by each country, (2) TCC's voting preferences at the UNGA on human rights issues, and (3) number of peacekeepers operating under blue helmets for each mission and time point. I gather data on peacekeeping contributions from the IPI Peacekeeping Database (Perry and Smith, 2013). The dataset provides monthly information on peacekeeper contributions by each country for all UN peacekeeping missions from 1990 to 2018.


I assess the primary interests of TCCs using UNGA voting data by Strezhnev and Voeten (2013), in which I limit my attention solely to the votings on human rights resolutions. UN General Assembly has long offered a convenient forum for comparing the foreign policy orientations of its members on a number of distinct policy areas ranging from economic development and human rights to technical issues such as admission of new members and budget. Voeten (2013) puts that compared to other sources of data, the use of votes at the UNGA has many advantages. For instance, it allows to assess policy affinities between pair of countries even though there is no formal alliances among them. Besides, there is no other data source that provides the policy positions of member countries over such a long period of time.

Critiques of using voting patterns at the UNGA for assessing foreign policy orientations hold that there is no instrumental benefit in the General Assembly given that resolutions are almost always adopted with sizeable majorities and because of that member states' individual votes are trivial. On the contrary, Boockmann and Dreher (2011) claim that there is indeed an instrumental benefit from voting. "The larger the majority with which international norms have been adopted, the higher is their degree of moral dignity. By contrast, if a resolution had received only a slight majority, it may lack moral force and be easily disrespected . . . [In addition to that,] by voting against, it may discourage other states from bringing forward future draft resolutions, and ultimately decrease the chances of future public condemnation" (p. 449). For that reason, it is assumed in this project that member states are aware of the fact that each vote counts, and thus reflect their own policy


preferences while they are casting their votes.

Whether a member state is for or against a UNGA human rights resolution is not quite straightforward when the raw UN data ‘Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly’ by Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) is analyzed. The data provides the information on whether the member states’ votes are ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘abstention’ for a given resolution. However, increased or decreased trend of agreeableness does not give a clue about member states’ stance towards human rights. Figure 3 displays the top twenty countries with the highest and lowest mean levels of agreeableness for resolutions on human rights.¹² It is seen in the figure that the highest percentages of yes votes for resolutions on human rights belong to developing countries instead of the developed countries. For example, Honduras, a developing country in Central America, has the highest mean level of agreeableness with a score of .936. On the contrary, countries that have the lowest mean level of yes percentages include some developed countries such as Switzerland with a score of .282 and the United States with .377. Such a trend raises suspicion and necessitates a further inquiry.

¹²The data used to generate this plot is limited to the votings for human rights issues in the post-1990 period.



(a) Top 20 Countries with the highest mean level of agreeableness



(b) Top 20 countries with the lowest mean level of agreeableness

Figure 3: Mean Levels of Yes Percentages for Human Rights Resolutions

The ambiguity regarding ‘yes’ votes is illustrated in the example of Agenda item 27 of the sixty-fifth plenary meeting at seventy-first session of General Assembly.¹³ The draft report A/71/477 named ‘Advancement of Women’ is brought by the Sudanese Delegation. Although the name of the draft report gives the impression that Sudanese Delegation has a supportive stance towards women’s rights, a closer investigation of the proposal shows the opposite. The Sudanese Delegation requests the deletion of the fifteenth preambular paragraph in the report that is prepared by the Third Committee as an attempt to weaken International Criminal Court (ICC)’s jurisdiction on gender-related crimes. The proposed draft amendment was supported by countries such as Eritrea, Yemen, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Oman, Cameroon and China which struggle giving jurisdiction to ICC. As a contrary, countries such as Estonia, Finland, United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany voted against the proposal. The example, in this respect, displays the fact that ‘yes’ votes on human rights issues do not always mean respect/support of human rights.

One way to overcome this problem is selecting benchmark countries which are renowned for their advocacy for liberal human rights and openly display their support at the UNGA. The Nordic countries namely Sweden, Norway and Denmark are chosen as benchmark countries. Given their propagation for human rights, global security and their historic contribution to UN peacekeeping missions, the voting outcome of these three countries are assumed as what is in favor of human rights. As also used in Boockmann and Dreher (2011), when at least two of the Nordic countries voted ‘yes’ or ‘no’, the outcome becomes the benchmark. When it is not the case, abstention is selected as the benchmark. The distribution of benchmark votes is given in Appendix A in Figure A1.

The so called ‘Nordic Model’ is frequently used as a point of reference by policy makers and scholars in academia while referring to the practice of human rights (Langford and Karlsson Schaffer, 2015). For many, the epithets like ‘moral superpowers’ and ‘global good Samaritans’ as described in (Dahl, 2006; Brysk, 2009) are indeed germane to the current and past foreign policy orientations of the Nordic countries. In Brysk (2009)’s words “the activities of global Good Samaritan states

¹³Monday, 19 December 2016, 10 a.m. New York

help to construct and expand the international human rights regime, the thin layer of international understandings, institutions, and exchanges that seek to protect individual human dignity from abuses of power” (p. 4). As such principled countries, Nordic countries set the gold standard for the practice of human rights in foreign policies through being an ardent advocate of decolonization and third-world democratization, not to mention their strong historic commitment and contribution to the mediation initiatives and peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. It is a well known fact that, when it comes to their voting behavior in the UNGA, the Nordic countries historically coordinate their policies to a certain extent (Rosas, 1988). A quantitative analysis of the voting patterns of the Nordic countries through the Third Committee of the General Assembly (1961-1985) demonstrates that “of the 156 roll call votes, the Nordic group was split on 18 resolutions only” (p. 429). Although 18 out of 156 roll call votes already attest to a small share of distinction in terms of foreign policy orientation, since the analysis does not differentiate among policies voted on, it is not possible for us to see the consolidation among Nordic countries on human rights issue. Nevertheless, it shouldn’t be wrong to expect that voting distinction for human rights issues among these three countries be extremely minimal.


The key independent variable *Commitment to UN* measures the ideational commitment of troop-providers to the UN. As I need information on the human rights attitudes of troop-contributing countries, I first code the Nordic countries’ voting preferences for human rights issue (excluding Middle East issue) as the benchmark, and then calculate the index of voting cohesion (IVC) between the benchmark countries and all other troop-providers. I calculate the IVC using Lijphart’s Rice-Beyle method, which is also used by Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) to calculate the pact alignment scores of countries with the US, Russia, China and Brazil, the formula of which is;

$$IVC = \frac{f + \frac{1}{2} \cdot g}{t} \quad (1)$$


where f denotes the number of identical votes between country A and B (e.g if we assume that two countries voted ‘yes’ identically for 5 times, ‘no’ for 10 times and abstained for 15 times, then f is

30), g denotes the number of votes that A and B shows partial cohesion (e.g country A votes no and country B abstains), and finally t is the total number of votes that A and B simultaneously casted in a given UNGA session.

Figure 4 demonstrates the top twenty countries with the highest and lowest mean levels of IVC scores. As opposed to the pattern captured in Figure 3, the pattern in this figure shows more consistency and meets the expectations better. As seen in the figure, those that have the closest voting cohesion to the benchmark countries are the advanced countries from Western and Northern Europe. For instance, Iceland is the one that has the highest voting cohesion with a score of .993. Contrarily, those that have the lowest IVC are seem to be the developing nations from the Global South. Swaziland, as an example, has the lowest IVC with a score of .201. The distribution of IVC is illustrated in Figure A2 in Appendix A.



(a) Top 20 Countries with the highest mean level of IVC scores



(b) Top 20 countries with the lowest mean level of IVC scores


Figure 4: Mean Levels of Index of Voting Cohesion

Finally, the *Commitment to UN* is created taking the weighted average of TCCs' contribution to peacekeeping operations and the voting cohesion scores of each contributor country. In their


study, Haass and Ansorg (2018) analyze the troop quality by looking at the countries' military spendings. The formula that they use is also suitable to create my key variable of interest which eventually assigns an overall ideational commitment score for each UN mission in a given month. Therefore, the following formula is used to calculate the ideational commitment to the UN scores in peacekeeping missions;

$$\text{Commitment to UN}_{m,t} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N ivc_{i,t} * peacekeepers_{i,m,t}}{\sum_{i=1}^N peacekeepers_{m,t}} \quad (2)$$

where for mission m in month t , Commitment to UN is calculated by multiplying the number of peacekeepers for each country i by the sum of Index of Voting Cohesion and dividing it by the sum of all peacekeepers contributed in a given month and mission. The variable is measured at the monthly level. It assigns an overall ideational commitment score to each mission in a given month, taking into account the composition of troop-providers, their voting preferences for human rights resolutions at the UN General Assembly, and the level of participation by each troop-contributing country. The variable is an index between 0 and 1. The mean levels of *Commitment to UN* across all UN missions are demonstrated in Figure 5, where 0 indicates the lowest ideational commitment to the UN and 1 indicates the highest ideational commitment to the UN. In other words, high values of *Commitment to UN* demonstrate the existence of troop-providers opting for public interests instead of private interests.



(a) Top 20 missions with the highest mean level of commitment



(b) Top 20 missions with the lowest mean level of commitment

Figure 5: Mean Levels of Commitment to UN

Other Covariates

Among the mission-level control variables; there are several diversity measures such as proportion of female peacekeepers, size of military forces, troop quality, fiscal capacity of the troops, and number of troop-providers. I also control for many factors believed to affect the duration of UN peacekeeping missions and the violence perpetrated by the combatants against the civilians as well as troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN.

Troop size measures the number of military personnel operating in UN peacekeeping missions. The data come from the IPI Peacekeeping Database, and the variable is used in logged version. The same dataset is also used in the creation of *Troop-providers*, which measures the number of troop-providers for a particular mission in a given time period. *Troop quality* and *Fiscal capacity* are the confounders that assess the quality of the missions. In their study, Haass and Ansorg (2018) conclude that the existence of high-quality militaries in peacekeeping missions helps the UN more effectively deter violence in conflict countries mainly by raising the cost of military response. Therefore, controlling for the share of troops from countries with high-quality militaries is essential, but not sufficient. Much of the public goods in states are funded by their fiscal capacities, and these public goods include health, infrastructure development, and education, which are essential to state-building and development. The existence of high-fiscal capacity countries in peacekeeping missions is accompanied by a set of public good opportunities for conflict countries that help with the state-building, which would eventually increase the costs associated with the continuation of the war. I apply the same formula, which I have used to calculate the *Commitment to UN*, to create *Troop quality* and *Fiscal capacity*. I first multiply military expenditure and fiscal capacity scores with the number of peacekeepers sent by each country, then divide it by the total number of peacekeepers in the mission at a given time period. Military expenditure comes from the World Bank Data in the form of current US Dollar value, and fiscal capacity of troop-providers comes from the version 11.1 of the V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al., 2021).

The participation of women in peacekeeping operations comes with a number of benefits. Female peacekeepers are found to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS, decrease the number of brothels near

the UN camps, and prevent SEA by male peacekeepers through altering the behaviors of male peacekeepers (Simić, 2010). In addition to that, female peacekeepers are more effective in building trust and improving the reputation of the UN missions as they interact with the local population more (Bridges and Horsfall, 2009). Therefore, suspecting that pro-human rights TCCs might be more likely to deploy female peacekeepers, I control for *Female PKs*, which measures the proportion of female peacekeepers in a mission at a given time point. The number of female peacekeepers come from IPI Peacekeeping Database as well.

The intimidation and obstruction that peacekeepers encounter might hinder peacekeepers' functionality in protecting civilians and increase the time required to terminate UN missions. In addition, it is likely to see TCCs with public interests withdraw from UN missions following an attack committed against their peacekeepers, which will decrease the overall ideational commitment scores of troop-providers. According to Duursma (2019), peacekeepers are targeted strategically by the armed forces to prevent them from fulfilling their tasks. Beyond intimidation and obstruction, it is known in the literature that the rebel groups can also target peacekeepers to make the peacekeepers leave the conflict zones and secure victory (Salverda, 2013). In the light of this debate, I control for *Peacekeeper fatality*, which measures the number of peacekeepers died in a mission at a given time point. The variable comes from the Peacekeeping Fatalities Open Data.¹⁴ *Civilian protection* is a binary variable controlling whether the mission has the mandate of civilian protection. The existence of civilian protection mandate signals a really challenging case. For the coding of this variable, I rely on Mullenbach (2017). *New missions* measures the number of new UN missions at a given time period. The UN might cut short the existing missions to be able to transfer the equipment and troops to the new missions. With this in mind, I find the control for the new missions essential.

Suspecting that some other factors at the host country level might also be influential on the length of UN missions and civilian victimization; I control for the rural population, GDP per capita, and the polity score of the country, the number of peace accords that the country has ratified and

¹⁴Available from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/peacekeeper-fatalities>.

are in effect, ongoing civilian targeting, the cost of conflict in terms of civilian violence before the peacekeeping operations begin, and the conflict duration. These factors are also believed to be effective on TCCs' decisions to participate to a peacekeeping operation, therefore, impact the troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN. In their study, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that where cost of rebellion is low, the likelihood of seeing a conflict is higher. Low cost of rebellion and rebels' opportunities for predation not only increases the risk of conflict onset, but also the continuation of the war (Young, 2016). To account for the cost of rebellion, I control for the *Rural population*, the ratio of rural population to the total population in the host country, and *GDP per capita*. The variables are acquired from the World Bank Data.¹⁵

The importance of economic growth in preventing the continuation of conflicts is well-acknowledged in the literature (Thyne, 2016). Foreign aid, in this respect, is found to be effective in promoting economic growth in war-torn countries Hoeffler (2012). "To mitigate the risk and impact of war while servicing their own foreign policy interests, wealthier states and international organizations frequently make use of foreign aid —public assistance with a grant or concessional component administered to promote development" (Findley, 2018, p. 360). However, it is true that many of these aid-recipient countries are failed-states that cannot redistribute these foreign aid to their citizens efficaciously (Chauvet et al., 2011). Therefore, concessional aid distributed by the traditional donor organizations such as OECD-DAC and EU institutions is known to be more effective as they opt to mitigate the deleterious effects of negative aid flows when they are strictly controlled by the aid providers. In this respect, variables *DAC aid* and *EU aid* measure the concessional resource flows from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member states and the EU institutions to host countries, while *Non-DAC aid* measures the resource flows from 'non-traditional' emerging donors. The data is acquired from the OECD.Stat.¹⁶ All foreign aid variables are utilized in their logged versions.

The regime types have utmost importance in determining whether countries may fall into the conflict trap; therefore, might have an effect on the length of UN missions. Democracies are

¹⁵ Available from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS>

¹⁶ Available from <https://stats.oecd.org>

argued to have a lower likelihood of experiencing a civil war since their citizens may resolve their problems through more peaceful channels (DeRouen Jr and Sobek, 2016; Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989). Therefore, I control for the level of democracy in host countries. The variable *Polity scores* is acquired from Polity 5 Project (Marshall and Gurr, 2020) and controls for the democratic performance of the host countries. Similarly, the successfully implementation of a peace agreement can minimize the time required to terminate a peacekeeping mission. Therefore, I control for peace agreements in effect between the warring groups. *Peace accords* is acquired from the version 19.1 of UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Pettersson et al., 2019), and controls for the total number of peace accords in effect in a given host country-time.

Compared to interstate wars, bringing civil wars to an end is extremely difficult given the fact that the warring groups have to coexist within the same borders once the conflict terminates (Linebarger and Enterline, 2016). It is majorly the commitment problem between the warring groups that increases the duration of intrastate conflicts, particularly in the absence of a third-party intervener (Fearon, 1994). In this respect, the duration of conflict signals the intensity of the commitment problem among the warring groups. The variable *Conflict duration* is the length of the conflict during a peacekeeping mission. The confounder is measured at host-country-year level, and coded 0 if the conflict ends before the deployment of peacekeepers in the conflict country. The variable comes from the version 20.1 of UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002). The dataset includes all conflicts' start and end dates, which I've used to code the total months of conflicts in mission countries for each corresponding year. The longest duration of conflict belongs to Colombia with 624 months. The conflict between the government of Colombia and the guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC—*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL—*Ejército Popular de Liberación*) and the National Liberation Army (ELN—*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*) began in December 1964 and ended in December 2016 when all warring groups signed the Final Agreement (LA, 2016).

Finally, *Cost of conflict* comes from the version 20.1 of UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset

(GED) (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020; Sundberg and Melander, 2013). The variable measures the civilian death toll before the peacekeepers arrive.

The number of observations, mean value, standard deviation, first and third quartiles along with minimum and maximum values of each variable used in the empirical estimations at both levels can be found in Appendix A. Table A1 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables analyzed in Chapter 5, while Table A2 introduces the variables analyzed in Chapter 6.

V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS I: Ideational Commitment to the UN and the Length of Missions

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the duration of peacekeeping missions, a topic which has been overlooked to date. The success of peacekeeping has been evaluated from many different aspects. Conflict recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004, 2008; Gromes, 2019), conflict termination or reducing the intensity of violence (Kreps and Wallace, 2009; Hultman et al., 2013; Haass and Ansorg, 2018; Fjelde et al., 2019; Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2020), and preventing the spill-over effect of conflicts (Beardsley, 2011) are among the areas that have been frequently visited by the scholars. The duration of peacekeeping missions is, however, understudied. In Diehl's words, "if peacekeeping forces contribute to conflict resolution, their presence in the area should ideally be brief [as] peacekeeping operations are designed to be temporary measures" (1994, p. 39). Thus, a successful mission can be argued to be the one with shorter duration. On the contrary, lengthy peacekeeping operations signal that the desired outcome has not been achieved and it is too risky to terminate missions as the violence is still present. In sum, analyzing the factors that affect the length of UN missions, this particular chapter contributes to the peacekeeping literature bringing a new perspective in assessing the 'success' in peacekeeping operations.

Another contribution that this chapter brings to the peacekeeping literature is the consideration of private interests as factors that increase the time required to terminate missions. The empirical evidence in this chapter supports the theoretical expectations that lengthy missions are favorable to particular countries that generate benefit from deploying troops to the peacekeeping operations. Therefore, shorter missions might not be more desirable. On the other hand, when troop-providers are ideationally committed to the UN, the time required to terminate a mission is diminished; suggesting that in the absence of conflict-of-interest among the troop-providers, the mandates are fulfilled in a shorter amount of time.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I test the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the time required to terminate UN missions (Hypothesis 1), the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the time required to hold first post-conflict election (Hypothesis 2), and the conditional effect of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the prior institutional maturity of conflict countries on the time required to hold first post-conflict election (Hypothesis 2.1) After I present the empirical findings, I perform a number of robustness checks. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications for the UN.

Methods

Testing these hypotheses requires four key pieces of information about UN peacekeeping missions: (1) levels of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN, (2) their engagement in UN missions, (3) start and end dates of UN missions, and (4) dates of the post-conflict elections. I operationalize the test of all hypotheses at the mission-month level from 1991 to 2019, conducting a duration analysis with time-varying covariates.

Survival analysis is used to examine the relationship between the survival distribution and covariates. Not having a baseline log-hazard $\alpha(t)$ and leaving it unspecified as $\log h_0(t)$, Cox Model allows the baseline hazard to take any form:

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \dots + \beta_3 x_{i3}) \quad (3)$$

The model is semi-parametric given that baseline hazard can take different forms, and the covariates, x_{i1} , x_{i2} and x_{i3} (where i is a subscript for case) enter the model linearly (Fox and Weisberg, 2002).

In addition to the Cox Model, I also use time-series-cross-sectional analysis with binary dependent variable (BTSCS) at mission-month level. According to Beck et al. (1998), "BTSCS data are identical to grouped duration data" (p. 1264). And, logit may be used as an event history

method for BTSCS, once corrected with the addition of natural cubic spline. Logistic estimations are found to be particularly useful in the analysis testing Hypotheses 2 and 2.1 since it facilitates the interpretation and demonstration of the interaction terms in the models.

The data used to test Hypothesis 1 include all UN peacekeeping missions starting from 1991, except the ones that are withdrawn due to a veto at the UN Security Council.¹⁷ The data set is right censored in December 2019, and it covers 61 active and terminated UN missions to that date. I acquire missions' start and end dates from the websites of each UN peacekeeping operation. For instance, the duration of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) is introduced as from April 1998 to February 2000.¹⁸ The shortest missions, in the data set, are the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICAH) and the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), lasting only two months. The longest lasting mission, on the other hand, is the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) with 340 months. MINURSO was established on 29 April 1991 by the Security Council Resolution 690. The dataset comprises 3,764 observations at mission-month level.

In order to test Hypotheses 2 and 2.1, I use a dataset that includes the dates of the elections in the host countries. The dates of the post-conflict elections are acquired from the Database of Political Institutions (Scartascini et al., 2018). I measure the time required to hold these elections starting the data from the first day of the UN missions and ending them on the election day. If the country does not hold any election throughout the UN missions, the data is right censored on the last day of the missions. The dataset includes 33 active and terminated UN missions that solely have a mandate of electoral assistance. I determine which missions have the mandate of electoral assistance utilizing the Dataset on UN Peace Mission Mandates (1991-2020).¹⁹ The mission that required the least time to organize an election is the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) with four months, while the longest time required to organize an election belongs to the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) with 83 months. The

¹⁷For instance, the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) is withdrawn on 28 February 1999, after China vetoed the renewal of the missions' mandate following North Macedonia's decision to recognize Taiwan.

¹⁸<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minurcaF.html>

¹⁹Available at: <https://www.peacemissions.info>

dataset comprises 774 observations at mission-month level.

Results for the Time Required to Terminate UN Missions

Due to the nature of the dependent variable, I use an event history model. Table 1 reports the results from the Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) models that analyze the effect of ideational commitment of troop-providers to the UN on the time required to terminate a peacekeeping mission. In Cox PH estimations, the coefficients display the hazard rate. A positive coefficient, for example, indicates that the estimated factor has an increasing effect on the hazard rate of *Mission Termination*. Since a positive coefficient increases the hazard rate of termination of a mission, that means there is a decreasing effect on the expected duration. On the contrary, a negative coefficient means that there is an increasing effect on the length of UN missions.

Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazards Model of the Durability of UN Peacekeeping Missions

	Risk of Mission Termination	
Commitment to UN	0.015 (0.011)	0.079** (0.032)
Commitment to UN \times log(Time)		-0.021** (0.010)
Peace accords	-0.007 (0.040)	0.001 (0.042)
Troop size	0.035 (0.063)	0.023 (0.066)
Troop-providers	-0.075*** (0.017)	-0.076*** (0.017)
Cost of conflict	-0.112* (0.063)	-0.158** (0.068)
Peacekeeper fatality	0.051 (0.178)	0.035 (0.199)
Female PKs	-0.020 (0.041)	-0.033 (0.048)
Civilian protection mandate	-0.031 (0.531)	-0.041 (0.562)
Polity score	0.041 (0.038)	-0.168 (0.105)
Polity score \times log(Time)		0.068** (0.033)
Observations	3,275	3,275
Log Likelihood	-115.762	-111.331
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

In the first model, the variable of interest is found to be in the expected direction; however, its coefficient is not statistically significant. Both these ambivalent findings in the first model and crossing Kaplan Meier curves as in Figure A3 in Appendix B indicate the existence of non-proportional hazards (Bouliotis and Billingham, 2011). Generally, if the PH assumption is satisfied, a graph with parallel curves should emerge when the survival function is graphed versus the survival time. I, therefore, check for the proportionality assumption and detect that *Commitment to UN* and *Polity score* are time dependent in this particular specification. One solution to the violation of PH assumption is to interact the coefficient that breaks the assumption with the log of time and explore the time-interactive effects (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). To do so, I depend on *simPH* package in R, which creates the interaction terms between the two variables and the log of time. The second model in Table 1 includes two of the log-time interactions along with the corresponding linear terms. The linear term allows to understand the immediate effect of a particular variable, while the log-time interactions yield the results for longer-time effects.

The results in Model 2 are mainly in line with the earlier theoretical expectations. The variable of interest seems to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the risk of the termination of UN peacekeeping operations. However, the log-time interaction of *Commitment to UN* has a negative and statistically significant effect. The results show that missions dominated by the troop-providers that are ideationally committed to the UN have higher likelihood of ending earlier by 8 percent in the short run, but in the long run this effect is attenuated and starts to increase the time needed to terminate a mission. Moreover, the results show that higher number of troop-providers in a mission and the cost of conflict are associated with an increased time of UN mission. The coefficients of both variables suggest that time required to terminate a mission would be longer in tough conflicts. On the other hand, polity score of the host country is found to have a decreasing effect on time in the long run.

Contrasting findings for the linear and interaction terms of *Commitment to UN* necessitate a more in-depth investigation to better comprehend at what time point the decreasing effect of the factor on the duration of missions is attenuated. Consequently, plotting the effect of the interaction

will be effective. Figure 6 demonstrates the simulated relative hazards of Commitment to UN over the full range of time²⁰.




Figure 6: Relative Hazards of Commitment to UN over Time

The figure visualizes the findings from the Cox PH model, where the immediate and long-term effects of *Commitment to UN* on the duration of missions are captured with the linear and interaction terms. As shown in the figure, although ideational commitment to the UN has a decreasing impact on the duration of UN missions in the first period, in the long run its effect becomes counter-intuitive and it starts to increase the time it takes to terminate missions. With a closer inspection, it can be seen that the first period, in which *Commitment to UN* has decreasing impact, ends approximately at the end of the first year of the missions. Above all, it is an important finding that the duration analysis supports the expected association between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the duration of peacekeeping missions. However, this finding should be

²⁰Figure A4 in Appendix B shows the effect over a nested time frame for 30 months so as to detect better where the first period ends.

interpreted over two periods. The empirical results show that while the existence of troop-providers that are ideationally committed to the UN reduces the time needed to terminate a mission in the first period, it has completely adverse effect in the second period. In other words, that means even troop-providers motivated by public benefits might lose their interest in coordinating with the UN as the peacekeeping operations last longer than anticipated. Such a finding is in line with the Netherlands' desire but inability to leave the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). On June 15, 2018, the Ministry of Defense announced the Netherlands' desire to halt its contribution to MINUSMA by May 2019. By the time the announcement came, there were 250 Dutch soldiers at the UN camp near the city of Gao. The Ministry claimed that the decision of withdrawal came as a result of four Dutch soldiers who died in the mission, and the UN's ineffectiveness in providing equipment and training to the peacekeepers on the ground.²¹ Interestingly enough, on June 13, 2018, NL Times initially reported that the Dutch contribution would come to an end by December 31, 2018.²² However, the withdrawal was later postponed to May of 2019 to give other troop-providers sufficient time to take over Dutch troops' duties.

It is apparent that, regardless of their primary motivations, troop-providers might lose their interest in peacekeeping operations and want to withdraw from missions. One major factor that triggers this decision is the threats of violence against peacekeepers (Clayton et al., 2017, 8). As troop-contributing governments are accountable for the malfeasance that their personnel encounter, withdrawal may be an effective way of protecting their soldiers. However, as we see in the Dutch example, this decision is not made immediately after the unexpected incidents encountered during the missions. Being a responsible actor, the Netherlands gives one-year notice to the UN before a complete withdrawal from MINUSMA in order not to diminish the effectiveness of the mission.

Talking about the effectiveness, it is high time that we discussed how the operationalization of UN missions gets affected after troop-providers announce their withdrawal decisions. In her study, Salverda (2013) states that threats of violence against UN personnel do not always lead to an immediate and complete withdrawal from the missions. Instead, some troop-providers might

²¹<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2018/06/15/netherlands-end-mali-minusma-contribution/>

²²<https://nltimes.nl/2018/06/13/dutch-govt-put-end-military-mission-mali-report>

opt for some risk-avoiding strategies. For instance, peacekeepers may avoid locations of clashes and stay in the UN camps until heavy fighting is over, which eventually encourages the rebels continue their fighting. Ultimately, this might explain why *Commitment to UN* tends to increase the time needed to terminate a UN mission after the first year of the peacekeeping operations.

Results for the Time Required to Hold Post-Conflict Elections

Electoral assistance mandate is an important component of the UN peacekeeping missions. The UN peacekeepers also play an influential role in electoral processes. As explained above, the complexity of the electoral processes in post-conflict countries is linked to troop-providers' willingness to fulfill this particular mandate. The following empirical estimations analyze the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the time required to hold first post-conflict election.

Table 2: Cox duration and the BTSCS analyses of Commitment to the UN and the time required to hold post-conflict election


	Risk of Holding Post-Conflict Elections	
	<i>Cox PH</i>	<i>Logistic</i>
Commitment to UN	−0.018 (0.027)	−0.022 (0.026)
Polity _{Mission−1}	−0.740* (0.424)	−0.903** (0.447)
Commitment to UN × Polity _{Mission−1}	0.011* (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)
Troop quality	−0.061 (0.077)	−0.080 (0.076)
Fiscal capacity	0.430 (0.718)	0.610 (0.736)
Peace accords	0.009 (0.124)	−0.004 (0.127)
Troop size	0.024 (0.169)	0.031 (0.167)
Troop-providers	−0.006 (0.025)	−0.008 (0.025)
Cost of conflict	−0.276** (0.111)	−0.325*** (0.115)
Peacekeeper fatality	−0.014 (0.102)	−0.001 (0.103)
Female PKs	−0.049 (0.080)	−0.057 (0.080)
Rural population	3.940** (1.876)	4.523** (1.922)
t		0.574*** (0.153)
t^2		−0.016*** (0.005)
t^3		0.0001*** (0.00004)
Constant		−22.192** (8.703)
Observations	668	668
Log Likelihood	−46.405	−80.190
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 2 demonstrates the results both from the Cox PH model and logistic regression. As the PH assumption is not violated in this particular specification, an interaction with log of time is not needed. Contrary to prior expectations, the results show that the variable of interest does not have an influence on the time required to hold post-conflict elections. Therefore, neither Cox PH nor Logit model yield any supportive result for Hypothesis 2. Beyond that, Table 2 reports


a number of interesting findings. For instance, host countries' lack of institutional maturity or electoral experience is associated with longer time to hold an election.²³ So is the cost of conflict, which signals that the conflict was too bloody; and therefore, assigns too many mandates to the peacekeepers. Interestingly, an increase in rural population is associated with decreased time to hold an election. What that means is that when the rural population do not seek refuge in other countries, the post-conflict election is held sooner since the peacekeepers do not lose time with the repatriation of refugees.

On the other hand, the interaction between *Commitment to UN* and the polity score of the host country before the peacekeepers arrive increases the risk of holding post-conflict elections. In other words, the time required to hold an election decreases, which is supportive to Hypothesis 2.1. The findings suggest that the decreasing effect of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN on the time required to hold an election is conditional on the prior institutional capacity or electoral experience of the host countries. Figure 7 visualizes the marginal effect of *Commitment to UN* for multiple levels of polity score on the time required to hold post-conflict elections. Figure 7a is generated from the Cox PH model, while Figure 7b is generated from the logit model. Both figures show a similar pattern, suggesting that troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN solely has decreasing effect on time when host countries possess certain levels of democratic experience. Figure 7b also demonstrates the distribution of prior democratic experience of the host countries. As seen in the figure, the majority of the host countries are on the left hand side of the polity scale, explaining why *Commitment to UN* does not have a direct effect on the time.

²³The variable $Polity_{Mission-1}$ is the last polity scores before the peacekeepers are deployed, and it is a proxy for the electoral experience.



(a) Cox Proportional Hazards Model



(b) Logit Model

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Commitment to UN for Multiple Levels of Polity Score

Robustness Check

Appendix B contains a series of robustness checks. I first check whether the findings are still robust to the addition of new controls, and then I further investigate why Hypothesis 2 could not be empirically supported. To that end, I run a logistic regression to examine the factors influencing troop-providers' decision to participate to UN missions.

In Table B1, I repeat the Cox Proportional Hazards models with the addition of a number of mission and host country level controls. In each model, I check for the proportionality assumption. The variables that are tested to be time dependent are then interacted with the log of the time. In each specification, time dependence of variables shows a difference. Nevertheless, in all models *Commitment to UN* is found to be statistically significant in the expected direction.

Models 5 and 6 of Table B1 are the most inclusive specifications. The only difference between the two models is that one model includes polarization as a control of diversity in peacekeeping operations, while the other includes fractionalization. Both variables come from Bove and Ruggeri (2016). The former particularly measures “the probability of two randomly selected individuals belonging to different groups”, and the latter captures “how far the distribution of the groups is from a bipolar distribution” (p. 689). Interestingly, a unit increase in the diversity among peacekeepers and the number of troop-providers is associated with extended time of peacekeeping operations. The results show that lack of conflict-of-interest among troop-providers is the main determinant of a shortened UN mission, and a more diverse composition of peacekeepers can actually increase the time required to terminate a mission.

The fact that Hypothesis 2 could not be empirically supported necessitates further investigation. While Figure 7 in the main empirical part demonstrates that troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN decreases the time required to organize post-conflict elections only when the conflict countries possess certain levels of democratic experience, I further evaluate where these countries deploy peacekeepers. Table B2 in Appendix B reports the results of the logistic estimations that analyze the factors influencing troop-providers' decision to participate to UN missions. As seen in the results, countries that have a higher voting cohesion with the benchmark countries

are less likely to deploy peacekeepers. Last but not least, Figure B1 visualizes the interaction term in Model 1 of Table B3. The plot demonstrates that troop-providers with higher voting cohesion with benchmark countries are more likely to participate to UN missions where the host countries has no democratic experience, and less likely to participate when the conflict country has certain levels of past democratic experience.

Conclusion

This part of the project reaches the conclusion that the primary motivations of troop-providers have a great influence on how peacekeepers fulfill their mandates; and therefore, the length of UN peacekeeping operations. The findings support the argument that when troop-providers are ideationally committed to the UN, the time required to terminate a UN mission decreases. However, the empirical results show that the argument is only valid in the first year of the UN missions. When peacekeeping operations take longer than anticipated, troop-providers that are initially committed to the UN's ideals might lose their interest in peacekeeping operations and want to withdraw from the missions. A quick withdrawal from the mission might not be always possible. In this respect, countries might have to wait until they are replaced by another troop-provider. During this time, troop-providers that are seeking a withdrawal can adopt risk-avoiding strategies, which actually contradict the UN's ideals, and unintentionally might increase the time required to terminate a mission.

Another important finding is regarding the first post-conflict elections. UN peacekeepers take on an important role in electoral assistance, as well. Therefore, this study evaluates whether troop-providers' *raison d'être* affects the time required to hold the first post-conflict election. While the empirical estimations cannot support the argument that troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN has a direct decreasing effect on time, they do demonstrate that its decreasing effect on the time required to hold elections is conditional on the prior democratic experience of the host countries.

The policy implications associated with these findings should not be neglected. Firstly, the

cost of peacekeeping, in terms of financial burden and peacekeeper casualties, is really high. There may also be new UN missions that cannot attract sufficient attention, equipment and man-power due to the ongoing peacekeeping operations. The costs associated with peacekeeping operations keep increasing throughout the missions. Therefore, in order to minimize these costs and shorten the length of the missions, the UN needs to ensure the participation of troop-providers that are willing to collaborate with the UN. While doing so, the UN needs to provide troop-providers with a precise timeline as the results show that even countries that align with the UN might lose their interest in the peacekeeping operations as the missions last longer than anticipated. In the case that a clear timeline cannot be provided, the UN needs to ensure that troop-providers which are opting for a withdrawal are promptly replaced by other countries in order to prevent them from adopting risk-avoiding strategies.

Along with the policy implications that this project offers, it also opens up a number of interesting questions. First of all, it puts forward that the length of UN peacekeeping operations can be considered as another indicator of ‘success’ in UN missions. Future studies might utilize the length of peacekeeping operations to explain the effectiveness of peacekeepings. Moreover, troop-providers’ ideational commitment to the UN can also be utilized to explain durability in peace settlements. As private interests of troop-providers affect the functionality of peace operations, they can give way to a very fragile peace settlement.

VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS II: Ideational Commitment to the UN and Peacekeeping Effectiveness in Reducing Civilian Victimization

Introduction

This chapter examines the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the civilian victimization by the combatants. By doing so, the chapter contributes to the peacekeeping literature bringing a new perspective on evaluating the composition of UN peacekeeping missions (Bove and Ruggeri, 2016; Haass and Ansorg, 2018; Phayal, 2019; Bove et al., 2020). As introduced in earlier chapters, the literature on the composition of peacekeepers rather focus on the military personnel's individual performance in reducing the violence against civilians. The empirical findings in this chapter, however, shows that the national interests of their home governments should not be underestimated.

The chapter finds that the size of deployments and troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN have an interactive effect on the civilian victimization. The results show that ideational commitment to the UN becomes more pivotal when peacekeepers are deployed in large numbers, suggesting that conflict-of-interest among troop-providers is even more rampant in large deployments. In this respect, the findings suggest that peacekeeping operations can be effective provided that the UN overcomes the conflict-of-interest among troop-providers.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I test the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the levels of civilian victimization by the warring parties (Hypothesis 3) and the conditional effect of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the size of peacekeeper deployments on the levels of civilian victimization (Hypothesis 4). Following the main empirical analyses, I perform a number of robustness checks. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications for the UN.

Methods

The data that I use to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, on the other hand, include information on (1) the levels of troop-providers' ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping, and (2) the counts of civilians died in conflict countries.

To test the hypotheses, I examine mission-month observations from November 1990 to December 2019. The data used in the analysis are unbalanced panel data, meaning that not every UN mission is observed every month. For instance, the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) lasts from March 2004 to March 2017, while the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has lasted for the last 43 years and is covered in the data set between the years 1990 and 2019. The data set initially comprises 6,088 observations at the mission-month level. In order to account for the mission heterogeneity that doesn't vary over time, I use mission fixed effects that control for characteristics of missions in all models.

Results for the Civilian Victimization

Table 3 shows the results from the panel data estimations that analyze the effect of ideational commitment of troop-providers to the UN on the levels of civilian victimization by the armed groups. All models are negative binomial regressions with mission fixed effects. Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity (see Figure A5), I present the coefficients along with robust standard errors. First two models are to assess the direct effect of the main explanatory variable on civilian victimization. Models 3 and 4, on the other hand, analyze the interaction effect of the size of UN military personnel and troop-providers' commitment to the principles of UN peacekeeping.

The results in the first two models demonstrate that there is a statistically significant negative association between troop-providers' commitment to the UN and civilian victimization by the combatants. That suggests that when missions include the peacekeepers of countries with public interests that align with UN's principles and ideals, the ongoing violence in a conflict country is better managed. Therefore, the results in model 1 and 2 are in line with Hypothesis 3.

Table 3: Mission Fixed Effects with Heteroskedasticity-consistent Standard Errors

	DV: Civilian victimization			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged DV		0.005*** (0.001)		0.005*** (0.001)
Commitment to UN	-3.498*** (0.728)	-3.042*** (0.648)	0.725 (1.253)	0.502 (1.287)
Troop size	-0.211** (0.096)	-0.223** (0.096)	0.176 (0.133)	0.096 (0.135)
Commitment to UN \times Troop size			-0.716*** (0.182)	-0.585*** (0.184)
Fractionalization	1.154* (0.657)	1.350** (0.539)	1.547*** (0.579)	1.453*** (0.558)
Troop quality	0.039 (0.032)	0.040 (0.035)	0.067** (0.031)	0.062* (0.035)
Fiscal capacity	0.282 (0.422)	0.063 (0.402)	0.249 (0.424)	0.036 (0.403)
DAC aid	3.354*** (0.412)	2.731*** (0.433)	3.464*** (0.435)	2.811*** (0.451)
Peacekeeper fatality	0.028 (0.043)	0.019 (0.039)	0.017 (0.040)	0.013 (0.036)
Rural population	-0.237*** (0.072)	-0.222*** (0.067)	-0.219*** (0.072)	-0.203*** (0.066)
Troop-providers	-0.079*** (0.020)	-0.059*** (0.021)	-0.080*** (0.019)	-0.061*** (0.021)
Conflict duration	0.022*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)
Peace accords	-0.142*** (0.047)	-0.093** (0.045)	-0.164*** (0.046)	-0.117*** (0.045)
Polity score	0.021 (0.030)	0.038 (0.028)	0.035 (0.029)	0.054* (0.028)
Observations	3,442	3,416	3,442	3,416
Log Likelihood	-9,295.8	-9,074.4	-9,286.8	-9,068.2

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The first two models also present a number of interesting findings. Looking at the results, it can be interpreted that the coordination problem in highly fractionalized peacekeeping missions increases the anti-civilian violence perpetrated by the combatants. On the other hand, sizeable PKOs along with more troop-providers better deter the attacks on civilians. Beyond that, as acknowledged in the literature, more civilians die in more extended conflicts, and the peace accords signed by the warring groups are effective in reducing the violence against civilians.

Models 3 and 4 demonstrate the interaction effect of the size of UN military personnel and troop-providers' commitment to UN on civilian victimization. As seen in the table, the coefficient

of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that troop-providers' ideational commitment to UN PKOs becomes more important in large deployments.




Figure 8: Estimated Coefficient of Commitment to UN on Civilian Victimization by the Size of Military

Figure 8 presents the marginal effect of the interaction term between Commitment to UN and the size of military personnel on civilian victimization by the combatants. As interpreted from the above findings, it seems that as the size of the UN military personnel increases, troop-providers' commitment to UN peacekeeping becomes more essential. In other words, sizeable peacekeeping missions that follow the highest standard of the UN are found to be the most compelling missions in dealing with the violence against civilians, supporting Hypothesis 4.

In the figure, it is apparent that the interaction effect of troop-providers' ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping and the size of military personnel becomes statistically significant when the size of troops exceeds approximately 3 thousand blue helmets. More specifically, a PKO with around 3 thousand peacekeepers from ideationally committed TCCs would decrease the occurrence

of civilian violence by a quarter. From that point on, as the size of troops gets larger, troop-providers' ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping also becomes more important, signaling that large troops can only be successful when there is no conflict-of-interest among the troop-providers.

Given that peacekeeping deployments today can reach up to several thousands, the substantive significance of this finding should not be overlooked. In April 2021 alone, the UN has deployed more than 14 thousand military personnel to South Sudan, and around 12 thousand military personnel to Mali and the DR Congo.²⁴ Current peacekeeping operations are the largest deployments in UN history and continue to grow even larger with the contribution of the new donors. In this respect, overcoming the decreased capability of UN in providing security guarantees to the combatants due to their home countries' divergent interests should be the UN's primary concern to ensure the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions.

Robustness Check

Appendix B contains a series of robustness checks. In order to verify that the findings are not driven by the variables added to the main model, I first check the bivariate relationship between the main independent variable and the outcome variable, and then add additional controls. Next, I include the outlier and repeat the analysis over the full sample. Finally, I check for reverse causality to rule out the possibility that ideationally committed countries do not deploy to hard cases.

Table B4 demonstrates the bivariate relationship between the key explanatory variable and the dependent variable. Commitment to UN is found to have a statistically significant negative impact on civilian victimization in both nested (excluding Rwanda) and full samples in the absence of other controls. Due to a correlation between troop quality and the key explanatory variable (as shown in Figure A6), I then exclude the main independent variable and re-run the regression analyses in full and nested samples in Table B5. I compare the coefficients of fractionalization, troop quality and fiscal capacity to the results in Table 3. Similar to earlier findings, fractionalization has a statistically significant positive impact, while no statistical significance is captured for troop

²⁴<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>

quality and fiscal capacity.

As explained earlier, I exclude Rwanda —the outlier— from the sample used for the main analyses. I therefore run a negative binomial regression over full sample in Table B6. The findings are still robust to the inclusion of the outlier to the sample.

While I utilize fractionalization as the control for troop diversity in the main models, I repeat the main analyses replacing fractionalization with polarization in Table B7. The findings are robust to the addition of polarization as control. In Table B8, I further include controls for the size of police forces and observers, and other types of foreign aid such as aid distributed by the EU and non-DAC countries. Even after the addition of these controls, the key independent variable and the interaction term are found to be in the expected direction with statistical significance. In Table B9, I also take the log of the dependent variable in order to run a linear panel regression with mission fixed effects and compare the results to prior negative binomial regressions. Commitment to UN is found to be negative and statistically significant in all models. In addition, similar findings are also captured for the interaction term.

Earlier works suggest that countries that are high on human rights indices might adopt risk-averse strategies and hesitate to contribute their personnel to hard cases (Autesserre, 2019). Young (2019)’s study, for instance, demonstrates that Canada sends only a token of peacekeepers when the prime ministers are concerned about peacekeeper casualties. Therefore, suspecting that overall ideational commitment to UN would be lower in missions when there are high levels of civilian victimization, due to the risk-averse nature of particular troop-providers, I evaluate the existence of reverse causality avoiding other troop-level controls in Table B10. I regress *Commitment to UN* on the lagged *Civilian victimization* and lagged *Peacekeeper fatality* over full and nested samples. The findings show that neither previous civilian victimization nor peacekeeper targeting scare troop-providers motivated by public interests, suggesting that reverse causality does not constitute a problem.

Conclusion

Extant work on the composition of peacekeepers has focused primarily on the individual performance of peacekeepers, without much attention to the primary motivations of their home governments. This part of the project showed that troop-providers' willingness to align with the UN is an important factor of success in UN peacekeeping operations. Shifting attention from the coordination problem among peacekeepers to conflict-of-interest among troop-providers, this paper opened up a new dimension of evaluating how peacekeeping operations are composed. In short, the study argues that the pursuit of private interests diminishes troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN. Their presence and actions spoil the functionality of the UN missions. Ultimately, the UN missions become ineffective in providing security guarantees to the combatants and help them overcome their credible commitment problem, which results in prolonged war duration and increased civilian victimization.

The findings in this part support the main expectations that high levels of ideational commitment to the UN in peacekeeping operations are associated with better civilian protection. Beyond that, findings also show that ensuring ideational commitment to the UN is more essential when troops are deployed in large numbers. The policy implications associated with these findings should not be neglected. First, one can deduce that large deployments reduce civilian victimization by the combatants by posing physical costs to the armed groups and monitoring the spoilers of the peace settlements. Therefore, the UN needs to ensure that sufficient numbers of peacekeepers are deployed to conflict areas. And second, since conflict-of-interest in large deployments is more prevalent, the UN needs to encourage the contribution of traditional-donors more than the Global South countries that have difficulty in aligning with UN's ideals and directives. Finally, in case the Global South countries keep outnumbering the personnel contributions of the traditional-donors, the UN needs to ensure that troop-providers "stop interfering with the operations on the ground and instead tell their officers to respect the UN chain of command" (Autesserre, 2019, p. 110).

Along with the policy implications that this part offers, it also opens up a number of interesting

questions. Future studies might utilize troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN to explain the consent of the host state for UN peacekeeping operation, local legitimacy of the operations and the phenomena of targeting peacekeepers. For instance, that the Turkish battalion's popularity in Lebanon at the beginning of UNIFIL decreased due to the Government of Turkey's rapprochement with Israel and its hostile attitude towards the Shia population in Syria (Bove et al., 2020) demonstrates that troop-providers' divergence from UN ideals might diminish the local support for the UN peacekeepers. Similarly, on deploying peacekeepers to Bosnia under UNPROFOR, Turkey was suspected of taking the side of the Bosnian Muslims²⁵, accompanied by a number of protests by the Bosnian Serbs. In short, the examples show that locals and warring groups are aware of the primary motivations of troop-providers, which might trigger decreased support for the UN, peaceful and non-peaceful protests against the peacekeepers, and even violence against peacekeepers.

²⁵<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/57dce0954d404293e8f3352a793e1b3d>

VII. CASE STUDY: Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The previous two chapters tested my main theoretical expectations as to why some peacekeeping missions last longer and are ineffective in preventing the civilian victimizations perpetrated by the warring groups. In sum, I argued that primary motivations of troop-providers are influential on the overall effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions as they create conflict-of-interest within UN missions. When troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN, the functionality of UN peacekeeping operations becomes controversial. This chapter examines the effect of *Commitment to UN* on the violence against civilians with a specific focus on the peacekeeping deployments in the DRC. This case study attempts to demonstrate the mechanisms leading to the expectation that troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN will decrease the levels of civilian victimization by the warring groups. The case study approach adopted in this chapter allows for a closer examination of UN camps in the DRC and the ideational commitment scores of these contingents. Therefore, the chapter examines whether high levels of *Commitment to UN* in contingents are associated with reduced or lack of violence in the villages around the UN camps.

The structure of the case analysis is as follows. First, the justification for the case selection is provided. Then I introduce the purpose of the case study analysis and outline my theoretical expectations. Next, I provide a historical background of the UN peacekeeping in the DRC, and introduce the UN camps in the country and the troop-providers. Then, I conduct a descriptive analysis to determine whether ideational commitment to the UN at contingent level is influential on the civilian victimization around the UN camps. Finally, conducting a weekly sentiment analysis over the local tweets about UN peacekeepers, I attempt to understand how an incident suggesting troop-providers' lack of ideational commitment to the UN affects the local support towards the peacekeepers.

Case Selection

Case studies are frequently employed in international relations and comparative politics. The advantages of using case studies are numerous. Conducting case studies, for instance, researchers might gain an in-depth insight on the political phenomena. As Halperin and Heath (2020) state, “the great advantage of the case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined” (p. 234).

It is true that case studies or qualitative inquiries, in general, are often useful when the research is still at the nascent stage. Thus, researchers might make use of case studies in developing a new concept or a new hypothesis. In other words, “qualitative data are ideal for explanatory analysis” (Gerring, 2017, p. 20). However, that qualitative analysis comes before a quantitative analysis is not the only direction of the sequence. It is also possible for a case or qualitative analysis to follow quantitative analysis. In doing so, researchers are able to “confirm patterns found in the quantitative analysis” (p. 20). In short, in addition to providing in-depth knowledge on the phenomena, the use of case studies enables researchers to not only see the real world application of theory, but also comprehend the limits to which results of statistical analysis apply to cases (Laitin, 2002). To that end, case studies help to assess whether a theory developed in a particular context also works in another context.

Of the six case study types that Lijphart (1971, p. 691) introduces in his seminal work, “atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming and deviant case studies”, this chapter employs the theory-confirming case study approach, which is the “analysis of single cases within the framework of established generalizations” (p. 692).

The case analysis attempts to confirm the patterns found in the previous chapters. To that end, it visualizes the bivariate relationship between ideational commitment to the UN in contingents and civilian violence around UN camps. Additionally, the sentiment analysis approach adopted in this chapter attempts to confirm the argument that local perception changes when contingents do not carry out their mandates, and instead engage in misconduct.

Having introduced the case design, I now turn to explain why I selected the DRC as the case to

be analyzed in this chapter. First, I choose the DRC as the case because MONUSCO is one of the few missions that is included in the *Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset* by Cil et al. (2020). The dataset provides information on subnational deployments of troop-contributing countries in particular missions. To that end, using the dataset, it is possible to see which countries send peacekeepers to which locations in the DRC. The UN has built around 30 camps in the DRC in the locations as demonstrated in Figure 9. All of the camps are contributed by different countries or include different combination of troop-providers. For instance, in September 2018, while the UN camp in Mavivi is contributed by Tanzania and Nepal only; in December, Nepal withdraws its personnel from the camp but South Africa, Bangladesh and Indonesia begin deploying their peacekeepers. The camp in Lubumbashi, on the other hand, does not have such diversity; both in April and September 2018, the camp is contributed only by Benin. The full map of deployment in September 2018 can be found in Figure A7 in Appendix A.




Figure 9: Locations of UN Camps in the DRC

Terminating a peacekeeping mission might take longer time than anticipated as Chapter 5 has shown. One good example to a lengthy UN missions may be UNFICYP, which was founded in 1964. Even though there is no active violence in Cyprus, the high risk of conflict-recurrence

deters the UN from terminating the mission in Cyprus. MONUSCO, founded in 2010 replacing the earlier peacekeeping mission the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), can also be counted among the lengthy peacekeeping missions. However, unlike UNFICYP, MONUSCO still deals with the active violence in the DRC. Therefore, having a variation in the independent variable *Commitment to UN* and in the dependent variable *Civilian victimization* has made the DRC a good case to study the effectiveness of peacekeeping on reducing violence against civilians.

Another reason why I focus on the peacekeeping operation in the DRC is to address possible spurious factors. As introduced earlier, in their seminal work, Haass and Ansorg (2018) argue that peacekeeping operations contributed by countries with high military spending are better able to reduce civilian violence. Keeping in mind that public interest-seeking countries which have higher levels of alignment with the UN might be the advanced democracies that also have higher military budgets, in Chapter 5 and 6, I addressed this issue adding *Missions' Military Spending* as a confounder in the empirical models. Addressing spurious factors in case studies, however, is not as easy as in quantitative analyses. The contribution by advanced democratic troop-providers to UN camps might increase contingents' ideational commitment scores and reduce violence against civilians. However, this negative correlation might stem from the better military capabilities that these advanced democracies bring to the contingents. The peacekeeping mission in the DRC does not possess this potential spurious correlation. Kochani (2021) states that among the contributors of MONUSCO, there is no military-advanced nation. As shown in Cil et al. (2020)'s Geo-PKO dataset, Belgium has been the only developed and advanced democracy contributing to MONUSCO, while the last time that Belgium contributed to mission was on February 2014. Ever since that date, there has been no advanced nation sending peacekeepers to MONUSCO. In sum, the lack of potential spurious correlation can also be listed among the reasons why I selected the DRC as a case study.

Empirical Expectations

Having introduced the design of the case study and the rationale behind selecting the DRC as the case to be examined, I now present my main expectations regarding the effectiveness of MONUSCO in the DRC.

The primary assumption is that troop-providers have different interests in deploying peacekeeping personnel to UN missions. Whilst some countries seek public-interests, others seek private-interests. A conflict-of-interest occurs when private-interest-seeking countries disobey the UN's plans and orders, and do not align with the UN. In missions where the levels of ideational commitment to the UN are low, peacekeepers tend to be more responsive to their home governments than the UN, as they are not permanently recruited by the organization. Anecdotal evidences suggest that private-interest-seeking countries might use their military personnel to collaborate with certain warring groups and generate an income through illegal sources. These kind of behaviors contradict the UN peacekeeping's founding principles of neutrality, impartiality and even non-use of force. Consequently, when these principles become questionable, warring groups will see it as an opportunity to campaign against the UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore, UN peacekeepers will lose their effectiveness in reducing the violence perpetrated by the warring groups against the civilians. Earlier, Chapter 6 empirically validated these theoretical expectations. In this chapter, I limit my focus on a single conflict country, the DRC, that hosts a UN peacekeeping mission, and I expect that the analysis on subnational deployments of peacekeepers in the DRC will demonstrate that contingents including troop-providers that are not ideationally committed to the UN will be less effective in reducing the violence around the UN camps.

Case Study: Democratic Republic of Congo

The relationship between how peacekeepers are composed and the civilian victimization around the UN camps in the DRC will be examined in the following analysis. Before getting into the descriptive analysis, I first introduce the past and present of the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, MONUSCO.

A Brief History of First and Second Congo Wars

Ever since it gained its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the DRC has been home to disorder, violence and repressive leaders. What we know as the DRC today was not indeed founded in the same year of Belgium's withdrawal. Right after the independence, there were a number of state-building attempts. For example, the Congo Republic which was founded in 1960 lasted only eleven years, and later replaced by Zaire that survived from 1971 to 1997. The latest of these state-building attempts is the Democratic Republic of Congo, also known as Congo-Kinshasa. In 1997, the First Congo War comes to an end with Tutsi and anti-Mobutu rebels' capture of the capital city, Kinshasa. Laurent-Desire Kabila becomes the new president and the DRC replaces the former Zaire (Mkhize, 2015).

The First Congo War, which started in 1996 as a rebellion in Zaire and spread to Sudan and Uganda, is indeed an example of a proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union and has its roots in the Cold War. By the time the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Congo Republic became Patrice Lumumba, the Soviet Union extended support for Lumumba's administration while the United States did not see Lumumba as the legitimate leader (Shekhawat, 2009). The viewpoint of the United States was that Lumumba administration would easily fall under the Soviet domination and the Western world might have lost the economic benefits they had had in the country for a very long time. As acknowledged in McNulty (1999, p. 27), "at independence, the Belgians handed over political but not economic control, so that the new dominant class based its power on control of the state, while ownership of the economy remained in the hands of the big foreign mining and plantation companies," which drove the Congo into a proxy war in the midst of the Cold War.

In addition to conflicting foreign interests in the country, the turmoil and violence that started right after its independence and still persists, also partly stemmed from the fact that the political elites in the Congo lacked administrative skills and dragged the country into bad governance immediately. As explained in McNulty (1999),

Unlike Africa's other major colonial powers Britain and France, Belgium had done little to promote a local elite to govern on its behalf and assume the reins of state power. As a result, there was not the smooth transition to Western-favoured regimes which largely characterized independence elsewhere; instead, the Congo began rapidly to implode, the new administration faced with mutiny and multiple secessions which foreign interests did much to foment (p. 57).

Therefore, immediately after Patrice Lumumba became the Prime Minister, his authority began to be challenged by the United States and Belgium-backed army general Mobutu Sese Seko, who staged a coup d'état and assassinated Lumumba in 1961 (Mkhize, 2015).

In 1971, Mobutu changed the country's name to Zaire and ruled the country as an autocracy until mid-1990s. During his autocratic rule, Zaire suffered from extreme poverty, repression, bad governance, and corruption, which also caused a discontent among the neighboring countries like Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. These countries believed that Mobutu regime offered its borders as sanctuary for the rebels fighting against themselves, and therefore, Mobutu had to be eliminated for their own security (Williams, 2013). Then, the First Congo War began in 1996 between the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL—*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*) and the Mobutu regime. AFDL was consisted of a number of exiled Congolese parties, and was led by Laurent Desire Kabila who was able to overthrow Mobutu and assumed power in May of 1997.

Kabila's triumph did not last long. That he could not separate himself from the external influence of Rwanda and Uganda, and the Rwandan troops were still present in Kinshasa enraged the Congolese civilians and turned them against the Kabila regime. As explained in Williams (2013), "rather than a liberating force, Rwandan troops were increasingly seen as a force of occupation, and Kabila as a puppet of the Rwandan and Ugandan leaders who had empowered him" (p. 88). Ultimately, with an attempt to restore his legitimacy in his own country, Kabila started to distance himself from Rwanda, Congolese Tutsis, and Uganda by establishing good relations with Sudan and requesting the Rwandan forces exit Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC. Following this request,

one of the DRC's military units stationed in the city of Goma, located in eastern DRC at the border of Rwanda, denounced its commitment to Kabila regime, which later triggered the entrance of Rwandan army into the DRC and the start of another war in 1998 (Weiss, 2000).

The Second Congo War is also known as the African World War, given that it is accepted as the world's most bloody conflict contributed by many different internal and external actors since the end of the World War II. The Second Congo War was different from the First Congo War in two ways. While in the First Congo War, all of the neighboring countries were in consensus that the Mobutu regime should be eliminated, in the Second Congo War, the Kabila regime was backed by countries such as Zimbabwe and Angola, which offered extensive military support during the war. Secondly, President Kabila was such a leader that enjoyed a great amount of domestic support, something that his predecessor did not have. In Shekhawat (2009)'s words, "the internal and external factors colluded and pushed the country towards a Second Congo War . . . From 1998 to 2003 the country suffered hugely with fighting between the Congolese government supported by Angola, Chad, Sudan, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and on the other side Congolese rebels backed by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda" (p. 8). The war officially came to an end in 2003 with a Pretoria Peace Agreement that installed a transitional government. However, neither the peace agreements and the efforts to install democracy nor the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission in 1999 were not effective in completely eliminating the violence in the country.

Background on MONUSCO in the DRC

By the time MONUSCO took over the earlier peacekeeping mission in the DRC in July 2010, MONUC had been operating in the country since 1999. Although the Security Council established MONUC primarily to ensure the implementation of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the mission was later assigned the mandate of civilian protection as the peace agreement did not stop the civil war in the DRC, given that there were demands to change the agreement by different groups. Beyond that, among the tasks carried on by MONUC, there existed disarming warring groups, establishing a new integrated army and police force, reforming the judiciary system, observing elections and

providing humanitarian assistance (Neethling, 2011).

MONUC, however, was not the first UN involvement in the DRC. In June 1960, the UN deployed the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) for a period of four years to prevent the occurrence of civil war and ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the then Congo Republic. Due to the UN's strong support for the incumbent government, the impartiality of ONUC became questionable, which turned ONUC into a controversial involvement (Murphy, 2016). Having the legacy from a controversial predecessor, when MONUC was deployed in the DRC in late 1990s, it experienced challenges from all parties; the government and the rebel groups. Therefore, MONUC performed a very low profile in the early years of the mission. However, it does not mean that MONUC was not mandated to protect civilians. In fact, it was the troop-providers that were unwilling to combat violence and protect civilians whenever they were targeted by armed forces. Even though the UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1291 (2000), published in February 2000, made it clear that MONUC may employ all necessary actions to protect civilians, the mission was not able to meet the expectations and replaced by MONUSCO in July 2010.

Subnational Analysis of Civilian Victimization


Different than its predecessors ONUC and MONUC, MONUSCO was formed with a very robust civilian protection mandate. This section examines the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to UN and the anti-civilian violence at the subnational level.

Figure 10 shows the bivariate relationship between *Commitment to UN* and civilian victimization by the combatants in three subsequent time points in the DRC. The size of the bubbles increases with the intensity of the civilian victimization, while the color of the bubbles lightens as the ideational commitment scores of contingents increase. Ideally, lighter bubbles are expected to be smaller, and darker bubbles are expected to be larger in size. In other words, civilian victimization by the warring groups should be less in regions where the contingents have higher scores of ideational commitment to the UN.


To begin with, the majority of the UN contingents are stationed to the eastern part of the

country, where there are frequent instances of civilians being targeted. One clear distinction between the UN camps in the northeastern and southeastern portions of the country is the ideational commitment scores of the contingents. It can be seen that the contingents in the southeastern portion have higher ideational commitment to the UN than the northeastern portion. That being said, it can be argued from the figures that when UN contingents are more ideationally committed to the UN, they are more successful in preventing violence against civilians in their periphery. For instance, in the southeastern portion of the DRC, civilians are not targeted from April to September 2018. On the contrary, around the UN contingents in Kinshasa (west) and Tshikapa (mid-south), where the ideational commitment to UN is lower, approximately 30 civilians are killed from April to September 2018.


Finally, the vast numbers of civilian victimization in the north-east also supports the expectations. Overall, the highest levels of civilian victimization and lowest scores of commitment to UN co-exist in this part of the country, suggesting that UN contingents contributed by private-interest-seeking countries are not effective in deterring or soothing violence in their periphery.



(a) April 2018



(b) June 2018



(c) September 2018

Figure 10: Effect of Commitment to UN on Civilian Victimization in the DRC

In sum, the figures show that not all UN peacekeeping contingents are equally successful in minimizing violence around their camps. The bivariate relationship between the key explanatory variable and civilian victimization in the DRC demonstrates that troop-providers' ideational commitment to UN is influential on the violence around the camps where their peacekeepers are stationed. Next, I investigate how conflict-of-interest within UN contingents damage the founding principles of UN peacekeeping, and fail to deter warring groups from attacking the civilians.

Anti-MONUSCO Protests in Beni

The example of UNTAC in Chapter 3 demonstrated that the UN mission failed to provide security guarantees and deter the Khmer Rouge from committing violence. The experience in Cambodia suggests that peacekeepers need to have local actors and civilians' support in order to be successful in providing the security guarantees.

As Autesserre (2014, p. 53) claims, "UN missions can successfully fulfill their mandates only when they learn from local populations". However, locals can do more than solely providing information. Local and international actors possess complementary resources, and peace is achievable only when international actors seek to gain locals' trust and attempt to cooperate with them. In the absence of local support, on the other hand, international actors might not receive any kind of service from the locals, stay in hotels or served in restaurants, set aside any collaboration for peace. Aside from not providing any service or information, when peace workers lose their impartiality and legitimacy, the locals might even be "more likely to resist, defy, or undermine the authority of a peacekeeping force and consequently spoil the peace" (Mironova and Whitt, 2017, p. 8). Therefore, the lack of ideational commitment to the UN in peacekeeping operations damages the impartial stance of peacekeepers in local perception, and hinders their ability in providing security guarantees.

On November 25, 2019, angry protests against the UN peacekeepers started in the city of Beni, where protesters attacked the vehicles and offices of the UN asking MONUSCO to leave the country. The angry crowd was mobilized by certain local actors who were frustrated with MONUSCO's

inability to protect civilians from the attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (Levine-Spound, 2019). The protests lasted days and turned violent, during which a protester was shot and killed by a peacekeeper on November 27, 2019.

Below I demonstrate the local sentiments towards UN peacekeepers during the November protests, which are created conducting sentiment analysis over the *tweets* on MONUSCO peacekeepers from the DRC. The tweets are acquired from Twitter data accessed through *Twitter API Full Archive Search*. The glossary²⁶ that captures all tweets from the DRC on MONUSCO peacekeepers downloads 1,396 tweets (188 of which are in English). To conduct sentiments analysis over the cleaned tweets from the DRC, I depend on *syuzhet* package’s ‘get_nrc_sentiment’ function in R, which implements the NRC Emotion Lexicon by Mohammad and Turney (2010). The authors define emotion lexicons as “a list of emotions and words that are indicative of each emotion” (p. 26), which make them useful to identify emotions in tweets on MONUSCO peacekeepers. Given that English and French are the two languages used by the Twitter users in the DRC when they express their opinion or share information about MONUSCO peacekeepers and the UN, I first conduct sentiment analyses separately over the tweets in English and French, then combine the count of sentiments in both languages. The ‘get_nrc_sentiment’ function calculates ten different sentiment categories.²⁷ Assuming that local support is best assessed through trust sentiments, I take the ratio of trust sentiments by dividing the total count of trust sentiments by the total count of all other estimated sentiments.

In Figure 11, it can be seen that the local trust towards peacekeepers began to decrease following the ADF’s attack near Goma on November 20, 2019, during which 19 civilians died and numerous people were kidnapped (Reuters, 2019). The ADF’s attack starts the days-lasting protests against MONUSCO. As mentioned earlier, a UN peacekeeper shoots and kills a protester on November 27, 2019.²⁸ As a result, the ratio of trust sentiments in tweets on MONUSCO and UN peacekeepers decreases sharply in the last week of November, and reaches to historic low in the following week.

²⁶I do query using the following keywords; MONUSCO, peacekeeper, peacekeeping, forces de l’ordre, casque bleu, soldats de la paix.

²⁷Anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, negative, positive, sadness, surprise, trust.

²⁸The week is pointed out with a solid line in the figure.




Figure 11: Weekly Sentiment Analysis

The unfortunate incident in Goma confirms the expectation that when peace workers fail to do their job, their impartiality becomes controversial. Eventually, warring groups or other local actors that are frustrated with these international actors become tempted to mobilize locals against them to force them leave the country. Even though anti-UN protests would not lead to a complete withdrawal of the international actors as desired by the local actors, it would be successful in diminishing the civilian support for the peace workers. Finally, with the decreased local support, peace workers would lose their opportunity to acquire information from the civilians and fail to provide security guarantees that would end the conflict and the violence against civilians. In sum, troop-providers' willingness to align with the UN and their personnel's commitment to the UN's orders are directly related to the direction of the conflict and the levels of violence perpetrated against civilians.

Potential Limitations

Representivity issues and restricted access to internet are two main limitations to conducting sentiment analysis in conflict countries. Even though those who tweet are not representative of the whole population in countries of interest, Twitter data have long attracted scholarly attention from various disciplines such as marketing, computer science, sociology, psychology and political science. The data help scholars analyze how users tweet about certain events or goods. Moreover, sentiment analysis over Twitter has been conducted to investigate public opinion in various countries towards global crises such as Syrian refugee crisis (Öztürk and Ayvaz, 2018; Gökçe et al., 2021) or certain events such as the chemical attack in Syria (Bashir et al., 2021), Brexit (Ilyas et al., 2020), U.S. presidential election in 2012 (Karami et al., 2018) or 2016 Ukraine referendum in the Netherlands van Klinger et al. (2020).

One way to overcome concerns about representativeness of Twitter data would be to compare the trust sentiments calculated using the tweets from the DRC with a similar measure generated from a survey data. A survey data entitled “Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Surveys” by Vinck et al. (2019) has been conducted twice a year since 2013 in the DRC, and provides information about how the respondents in the DRC perceive MONUSCO as a security actor. In Figure 12, I compare the trust sentiments acquired from the survey data and Twitter data. The blue line in the plot represents the respondents’ confidence in MONUSCO (as of %) to ensure security, and the red line represents the trust sentiments calculated using the tweets on MONUSCO peacekeepers. While the two lines show difference in magnitude, the trends are generally similar in terms of direction. The figure is, therefore, helpful in addressing concerns related to the representativeness of Twitter data to a certain degree.




Figure 12: Survey Data vs. Twitter Data

Is internet less accessible in conflict countries? Contrary to the common belief that internet is less accessible and people are less exposed to social media in conflict countries, studies show that social media actually helps protesters disseminate information, ensure coordination (Shirky, 2008) and increase participation in protests (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). It is true that incumbent governments might choose to implement internet blackouts in order to prevent activists from leaking possible military operation plans, sharing pictures and videos of people killed or injured during counterinsurgency operations and to decrease rebels' capabilities to successfully coordinate against the government (Gohdes, 2015). However, internet outages in the country not only affect the rebel groups but the whole nation, severely affecting the functionality of the communication services, e-commerce and future foreign investments. In her seminal work, Gohdes (2015) writes that "obstructing (or even just partly obstructing) accessibility can contrarily provide incentives for a neutral population to participate in antigovernment protest" (p. 356). For that reason, Twitter

users in countries that host peacekeeping operations, including the DRC, can still access to internet and social media even during the insurgent attacks and counterinsurgency operations, which makes Twitter data invaluable when analyzing public opinion even in these regions. Related to this point, Figure 13 demonstrates the frequency of tweets on MONUSCO peacekeepers in the DRC for November 2019. As can be seen in the plot, Twitter users in the DRC tweet about the peacekeepers the most in the last week of November, coinciding with the killing of a local protester by a UN peacekeeper. Therefore, it can be deduced from the plot that locals can access to internet and social media, and tweet freely about UN peacekeepers when they see necessity.




Figure 13: Count of Tweets on MONUSCO peacekeepers in the DRC

In sum, different than traditional surveys which are hard and expensive to conduct, particularly in conflict zones, Twitter data have proved to be a “cost-effective way to survey a large number of participants in a short period of time” (Karami et al., 2018, p. 2). Moreover, measuring the local perspective on certain issues or events both retrospectively and systematically is only possible using Twitter data.

Conclusion

This chapter attempted to test the relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the levels of civilian victimization by the warring groups (Hypothesis 3) introduced in Chapter 3, adopting a case study approach in the DRC. The descriptive analyses in this chapter were conducted to confirm two expected patterns. First, when peacekeepers fail to do their job, they lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the local actors and civilians. Second, there is a negative relationship between troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN and the civilian victimization by the combatants near the UN camps. The analyses find a support for both of them.

The case study in the DRC demonstrates that there exists a link between how peacekeepers are composed and the civilian victimization near the UN camps. The chapter finds that the local viewpoint on the UN peacekeeping operations affects peacekeepers ability to combat violence. When locals suspect that peacekeepers' home governments pursue their own agenda, they are not ideationally committed to the UN and their peacekeepers hesitate to fulfill their mandates, their support for the UN missions decreases. Suffering from the lack of support at the local level, peacekeepers can no longer gather information and collaboration from the civilians. Consequently, in the absence of information on the capabilities of warring groups and their willingness to continue fight, peacekeepers can no longer provide security guarantees that help the combatants overcome their credible commitment problems.

By showing that lack of ideational commitment to the UN at the contingent level can increase civilian victimization near the UN camps, the chapter successfully confirms the theoretical expectations in Chapter 3. However, the chapter's contribution goes beyond that. By examining the local trust for UN peacekeepers, the chapter also helps to understand how peacekeepers' ability in providing security guarantees is hindered. Therefore, the findings suggest the UN that it has to ensure the contributions of troop-providers that align with the organization, which will eventually affect civilians' perception on the peacekeeping operations and their willingness to collaborate with the peacekeepers.

While the literature on the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations claims that legitimacy (local support) is key for success, we only have evidence from the field interviews (Pouligny, 2006; Autesserre, 2014) and a single survey study in Haiti (Gordon and Young, 2017). The final contribution of this chapter is to employ a novel methodological approach that allows the measurement of local support for peacekeepers both retrospectively and systematically in the DRC. Future studies can use this methodology to calculate the weekly or monthly sentiments on peacekeepers in the DRC and other host countries.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Summary

The earlier literature evaluating the internal composition of military forces in peacekeeping operation focuses too much on the peacekeepers' individual performance, while underestimating the private interests of their home governments. The objective of this dissertation project has been to demonstrate that troop-providers can pursue their own private interests in UN peacekeeping missions, and when their interests contradict the UN's ideals and plans, the UN missions fail to fulfill its basic mandates and become ineffective in combatting violence. The pursuit of private benefits is harmful to peacekeeping operations as peacekeepers have a higher tendency to carry out the orders of their home governments, instead of the UN's.

This project has presented two main negative externalities of conflict-of-interest in UN peacekeeping missions. The first issue in the presence of a conflict-of-interest is the extended time periods to fulfill the mandates assigned to the UN missions. Chapter 5 has provided the empirical support to the expectation that when troop-providers tend not to align with the UN, it takes longer time to terminate missions. In addition, the chapter has also examined the organizational time frame of post-conflict elections in host countries as an alternative outcome, and found that when troop-providers are ideationally committed to the UN, it takes less time to organize elections. However, this relationship is found to be conditional on the prior democratic experience of the host countries.

The second issue associated with clashing interests in UN missions is peacekeepers' reduced capability to prevent violence against the civilians. The empirical analyses in Chapter 6 has demonstrated that troop-providers' lack of ideational commitment to the UN increases the civilian victimization by the warring group, instead of deterring them from committing violence. The overall findings have supported the theoretical expectations that when conflict-of-interest arises, the UN missions lose their impartial image among local groups and fail to provide security guarantees that help the combatants to overcome their credible commitment problem.

The case study approach adopted in Chapter 7 to analyze the relationship between the internal

composition of the contingents of MONUSCO and civilian victimization around the UN camps has both confirmed the theoretical expectations and showed how the local groups can turn against the UN peacekeepers. The case study chapter employed two empirical strategies. First, re-calculating the ideational commitment to the UN and the local violence perpetrated against the civilians at the sub-national level in the DRC, the chapter provided the spatial visualizations of the bivariate relationship between the ideational commitment to the UN and the civilian victimization around the UN camps. The chapter concluded that contingents that have the higher ideational commitment to the UN combat and deter the violence against civilians committed by the warring groups more effectively. Second, through conducting a sentiment analysis over a limited time period that coincides with a peacekeeper misconduct, the chapter contributes to the understanding of how UN loses its impartial image and gives the warring groups the opportunity to start a campaign against the UN. Eventually, when the UN loses its impartial and neutral image, it fails to provide security guarantees to local groups and help them overcome their credible commitment problems.

Contributions and Implications

The contribution of this dissertation to the literature on UN peacekeeping is manifold. To begin with, this project has introduced and employed a novel measurement of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN. By focusing on three Nordic countries, which are known for their commitment to the UN and human rights, I have compared each troop-providers' voting behavior on human rights issues with that of the selected Nordic group. After determining each troop-providers' voting cohesion scores, I have calculated the mission level *Commitment to UN* variable, which is weighted by the size of the peacekeepers deployed by troop-providers. The key explanatory variable that measures troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN has been used to explain the overall length of UN missions, the organizational time frame of post-conflict elections, and the civilian victimization at the aggregate level over a large-n sample and the subnational level in the DRC.

In addition, Chapter 5 has introduced two novel outcome variables to assess peacekeeping

effectiveness, *length of UN missions* and *organizational time frame of post-conflict elections*. The findings in the chapter have showed that the primary motivations of troop-providers have a great influence on how peacekeepers fulfill their mandates, and therefore, on the overall time it takes to terminate missions or simple mandates such as election organization. In short, when troop-providers are not ideationally committed to the UN, the length of UN missions increases. The policy implications associated with these findings should not be neglected. Firstly, the cost of peacekeeping, in terms of financial burden and peacekeeper casualties, is really high. There may also be new UN missions that cannot attract sufficient attention, equipment and man-power due to the ongoing peacekeeping operations. The costs associated with peacekeeping operations keep increasing throughout the missions. Therefore, in order to minimize these costs and shorten the length of the missions, the UN needs to ensure the participation of troop-providers that are willing to collaborate with the UN.

Chapter 6's contribution to the literature is the argument that conflict-of-interest in UN missions is an issue as serious as the coordination problem that is frequently visited in the literature. Since high levels of ideational commitment to the UN in peacekeeping operations are associated with better civilian protection, the findings suggest that the UN needs to ensure the contributions of countries that align with the UN the most. Alternatively, given that the domination of the Global South countries in UN peacekeeping operations is inescapable, the UN needs to redesign its control mechanism over troop-providers and their peacekeepers to ensure that they carry out the UN's orders. Moreover, the findings in Chapter 7 suggest that locals' collaboration with UN peacekeepers is a key to success. Through providing intelligence to UN peace workers on the rebel activities, locals play an important role helping peacekeepers bring the conflict to an end. For that reason, the UN needs to employ strategies that would strengthen peacekeeper-civilian relations and cultivate local support for the UN missions. Including civilians into peace dialogues, explaining local actors their mandates in details, and providing public services and goods can be the examples to the strategies that UN peacekeepers must employ to increase the local support for their presence.

Limitations

As with any study, this dissertation project is not free from limitations. The most important limitation is the absence of a direct measurement of the conflict-of-interest in peacekeeping operations. In other words, while lower levels of troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN suggest that peacekeepers on the ground might follow the orders of their home governments rather than the UN, such a measurement does not necessarily guarantee that peacekeepers do not follow the force commanders' orders. A better data collection on peacekeepers being accused by force commanders for not following their orders as in the leaked report of General Jetley, the force commander of UNAMSIL, would be more straightforward to measure the conflict-of-interest. However, accessing these kind of confidential reports would not be an easy task, and the provision of data would be restricted by the UN.

Another limitation with the availability of data is the lack of a time-series and cross-sectional data set on the sub-national deployments of UN peacekeepers. It is true that *Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset* by Cil et al. (2020) provides data on sub-national deployments in various peacekeeping host countries. However, the dataset is not complete for all months and misses particular UN missions. That's why I could not conduct a duration analysis at the sub-national level that would analyze troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN on the time required to close a UN camp in certain regions. For the same reason, it has not been possible to conduct a quantitative analysis that regresses civilian victimization on troop-providers ideational commitment to the UN at the sub-national level. However, a case study in the DRC that employs a series of descriptive analyses has attempted to compensate for this limitation.

Finally, the case study chapter makes use of Twitter data to assess public opinion on UN peacekeepers. Even though Twitter data have long been used in various disciplines and over different samples with an aim of analyzing public opinion, one needs to acknowledge that representivity issues and restricted access to internet are two main concerns when conducting sentiment analysis in conflict countries. It is true that those who tweet might not represent the whole population in countries of interest and the incumbent government can restrict access to internet or social media

for particular reasons. However, the use of social media data has still its advantages. Given its near-zero cost and simplicity to use in the world's most dangerous regions, the social media data that give more extended temporal coverage in desired regions might be more useful than using experiment data, particularly in conflict countries.

Future Research

While the abovementioned limitations might constrain this dissertation project's potential to a certain degree, future scholars can see them as an opportunity to extend our understanding on how peacekeeping works. Along with the policy implications that this dissertation project offers, it also opens up a number of interesting questions.

Future studies might utilize troop-providers' ideational commitment to the UN to explain the incidents of peacekeeper misconduct and SEA in UN missions. When troop-providers are ideationally committed to the UN, the peacekeepers tend to follow the UN's orders. With that in mind, it would not be wrong to expect that the occurrence of misconduct such as bribery, theft, corruption or sexual abuse would be lower when troop-providers align with the UN. In addition, the key explanatory variable of this project can also be used to explain the consent of the host state for UN peacekeeping operation and the local support for the UN missions. In other words, when the internal composition of UN missions gives an impartial image to host governments and local actors, they would be more willing to extend their consent for the peacekeeping missions. Ultimately, peaceful and non-peaceful protests, and even the violence against the UN peacekeepers can be prevented. Therefore, future studies might also utilize *Commitment to UN* to explain the intimidation and obstruction that UN peacekeepers encounter in peacekeeping operations.

Finally, as Chapter 7 demonstrated Twitter data is invaluable when analyzing public opinion in UN peacekeeping operations. Given its potential to analyze Twitter users opinions in various countries both retrospectively and systematically, future studies might consider to extend my initiative to measure the local trust sentiments in the DRC to a more extended time period including other peacekeeping host countries. From a different point of view, future studies can also make use of

Twitter data in analyzing public opinions in TCCs to determine whether their domestic audience influences the decisions of TCCs when they deploy peacekeepers to conflict countries.

REFERENCES

- (2000). [Resolution 1291 (2000) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4104th meeting, on 24 February 2000]. Accessed April 6, 2021, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f24d30.html>.
- (2010). [Resolution 1925 (2010) / adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 28 May 2010]. Accessed January 5, 2022, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/683422?ln=en>.
- (2011). [Resolution 1991 (2011) / adopted by the Security Council at its 6568th meeting, on 28 June 2011]. Accessed March 7, 2022, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/706072?ln=en>.
- (2021). [S/RES/2612 (2021) / adopted by the Security Council on 20 December 2021]. Accessed March 7, 2022, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3951983>.
- Abiola, S., C. de Coning, E. Hamann, and C. Prakash (2017). The large contributors and un peacekeeping doctrine. In *UN Peacekeeping doctrine in a new era*, pp. 152–185. Routledge.
- Albrecht, P. and S. Cold-Ravnkilde (2020). National Interests as Friction: Peacekeeping in Somalia and Mali. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14(2), 204–220.
- Almutawa, A. (2020). Designing the organisational structure of the un cyber peacekeeping team. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 25(1), 117–147.
- Andreas, P. (2011). *Blue helmets and black markets: The business of survival in the siege of Sarajevo*. Cornell University Press.
- Asmussen, J. (2015). United nations peacekeeping force in cyprus (unficyp). In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford University Press.
- Autesserre, S. (2010). *The trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding*, Volume 115. Cambridge University Press.
- Autesserre, S. (2014). *Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention*. Cambridge University Press.

- Autesserre, S. (2019). The crisis of peacekeeping: Why the un can't end wars. *Foreign Aff.* 98, 101.
- Balcells, L. (2011). Continuation of politics by two means: Direct and indirect violence in civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3), 397–422.
- Balch-Lindsay, D. and A. J. Enterline (2000). Killing time: The world politics of civil war duration, 1820–1992. *International Studies Quarterly* 44(4), 615–642.
- Bashir, S., S. Bano, S. Shueb, S. Gul, A. A. Mir, R. Ashraf, N. Noor, et al. (2021). Twitter chirps for syrian people: Sentiment analysis of tweets related to syria chemical attack. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 102397.
- Beardsley, K. (2011). Peacekeeping and the contagion of armed conflict. *The journal of politics* 73(4), 1051–1064.
- Beardsley, K. (2012). Un intervention and the duration of international crises. *Journal of Peace Research* 49(2), 335–349.
- Beardsley, K., D. E. Cunningham, and P. B. White (2019). Mediation, peacekeeping, and the severity of civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(7), 1682–1709.
- Beardsley, K. and K. S. Gleditsch (2015). Peacekeeping as conflict containment. *International Studies Review* 17(1), 67–89.
- Beber, B., M. J. Gilligan, J. Guardado, and S. Karim (2017). Peacekeeping, compliance with international norms, and transactional sex in monrovia, liberia. *International Organization* 71(1), 1–30.
- Beber, B., M. J. Gilligan, J. Guardado, and S. Karim (2019). The promise and peril of peacekeeping economies. *International Studies Quarterly* 63(2), 364–379.
- Beck, N., J. N. Katz, and R. Tucker (1998). Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. *American Journal of Political Science* 42(4), 1260–1288.

- Bell, S. R., M. E. Flynn, and C. Martinez Machain (2018). Un peacekeeping forces and the demand for sex trafficking. *International Studies Quarterly* 62(3), 643–655.
- Boockmann, B. and A. Dreher (2011). Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the united nations? *Public Choice* 146(3-4), 443–467.
- Bouliotis, G. and L. Billingham (2011). Crossing survival curves: alternatives to the log-rank test. *Trials* 12(S1), A137.
- Boutton, A. and V. D’Orazio (2020). Buying blue helmets: The role of foreign aid in the construction of un peacekeeping missions. *Journal of peace research* 57(2), 312–328.
- Bove, V. and L. Elia (2011). Supplying peace: Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(6), 699–714.
- Bove, V., C. Ruffa, and A. Ruggeri (2020). *Composing Peace: Mission Composition in UN Peacekeeping*. Oxford University Press.
- Bove, V., C. Ruffa, and A. Ruggeri (N.d.). What do we know about un peacekeeping composition and its consequences?
- Bove, V. and A. Ruggeri (2016). Kinds of blue: Diversity in un peacekeeping missions and civilian protection. *British Journal of Political Science* 46(3), 681–700.
- Bove, V. and A. Ruggeri (2018). Peacekeeping effectiveness and blue helmets’ distance from locals. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M. and C. J. Zorn (2001). Duration models and proportional hazards in political science. *American Journal of Political Science*, 972–988.
- Brancati, D. and J. L. Snyder (2011). Rushing to the polls: The causes of premature postconflict elections. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3), 469–492.

- Bridges, D. and D. Horsfall (2009). Increasing operational effectiveness in un peacekeeping: Toward a gender-balanced force. *Armed Forces & Society* 36(1), 120–130.
- Brysk, A. (2009). *Global good Samaritans: human rights as foreign policy*. Oxford University Press.
- Carnegie, A. and C. Mikulaschek (2020). The promise of peacekeeping: protecting civilians in civil wars. *International Organization* 74(4), 810–832.
- Chauvet, L., P. Collier, and A. Hoeffler (2011). The cost of state failure and the limits to sovereignty. *Fragile States: Causes, Costs, and Responses*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Cil, D., H. Fjelde, L. Hultman, and D. Nilsson (2020). Mapping blue helmets: Introducing the geocoded peacekeeping operations (geo-pko) dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 57(2), 360–370.
- Clayton, G., J. Kathman, K. Beardsley, T.-I. Gizelis, L. Olsson, V. Bove, A. Ruggeri, R. Zwetsloot, J. van der Lijn, T. Smit, et al. (2017). The known knowns and known unknowns of peacekeeping data. *International Peacekeeping* 24(1), 1–62.
- Coleman, K. P. (2014). The political economy of un peacekeeping: Incentivizing effective participation. *Providing for Peacekeeping* 7(7), 1–44.
- Coleman, K. P. and B. Nyblade (2018). Peacekeeping for profit? the scope and limits of ‘mercenary’ un peacekeeping. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(6), 726–741.
- Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford economic papers* 56(4), 563–595.
- Coppedge, M., J. Gerring, C. H. Knutsen, S. I. Lindberg, J. Teorell, N. Alizada, D. Altman, M. Bernhard, A. Cornell, M. S. Fish, et al. (2021). V-dem dataset v11. 1.
- Costalli, S. (2014). Does peacekeeping work? a disaggregated analysis of deployment and violence reduction in the bosnian war. *British Journal of Political Science* 44(2), 357–380.
- Cunliffe, P. (2013). *Legions of peace: UN peacekeepers from the Global South*. CH Hurst & Co.

- Dahl, A.-S. (2006). Sweden: Once a moral superpower, always a moral superpower? *International Journal* 61(4), 895–908.
- David Mason, T., M. Gurses, P. T. Brandt, and J. Michael Quinn (2011). When civil wars recur: Conditions for durable peace after civil wars. *International Studies Perspectives* 12(2), 171–189.
- DeRouen Jr, K. and D. Sobek (2016). State capacity, regime type, and civil war. *What do we know about civil wars*, 59–74.
- Di Salvatore, J. (2019). Peacekeepers against criminal violence—unintended effects of peacekeeping operations? *American Journal of Political Science* 63(4), 840–858.
- Di Salvatore, J. (2020). Obstacle to peace? ethnic geography and effectiveness of peacekeeping. *British Journal of Political Science* 50(3), 1089–1109.
- Diehl, P. F. (1994). *International peacekeeping*. JHU Press.
- Diehl, P. F. (2016). Breaking the conflict trap. *What do we know about civil wars*, 139–156.
- Diehl, P. F. and D. Druckman (2015). Evaluating peace operations. In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, pp. 93–108. Oxford University Press.
- Document A/3943 (1958, October). UNEF: Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: report of the Secretary-General. Accessed February 1, 2022, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/594711?ln=en>.
- Doyle, M. W. and N. Sambanis (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American political science review*, 779–801.
- Doyle, M. W. and N. Sambanis (2006). *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton University Press.
- Duursma, A. (2019). Obstruction and intimidation of peacekeepers: How armed actors undermine civilian protection efforts. *Journal of Peace Research* 56(2), 234–248.

- Esen, O. and A. Oğuş Binatlı (2017). The impact of syrian refugees on the turkish economy: Regional labour market effects. *Social Sciences* 6(4), 129.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Ethnic war as a commitment problem. In *Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association*, pp. 2–5.
- Findlay, T. (2002). *The use of force in UN peace operations*. SIPRI.
- Findley, M. G. (2018). Does foreign aid build peace? *Annual Review of Political Science* 21, 359–384.
- Fjelde, H., L. Hultman, and D. Nilsson (2019). Protection through presence: Un peacekeeping and the costs of targeting civilians. *International Organization* 73(1), 103–131.
- Fjelde, H. and H. M. Smidt (2021). Protecting the vote? peacekeeping presence and the risk of electoral violence. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–20.
- Forsberg, E. (2016). Transnational dimensions of civil wars. *What do we know about civil wars*, 75–90.
- Fortna, V. P. (2004). Does peacekeeping keep peace? international intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. *International studies quarterly* 48(2), 269–292.
- Fortna, V. P. (2008). *Does peacekeeping work?: shaping belligerents’ choices after civil war*. Princeton University Press.
- Fox, J. and S. Weisberg (2002). Cox proportional-hazards regression for survival data. *An R and S-PLUS companion to applied regression 2002*.
- Gaibullov, K., J. George, T. Sandler, and H. Shimizu (2015). Personnel contributions to un and non-un peacekeeping missions: A public goods approach. *Journal of Peace Research* 52(6), 727–742.

- Gaier, M. (2016). From local actor to global threat. *The So-Called Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung International Reports, The Globalisation of Terrorism* (1).
- Gent, S. E. (2008). Going in when it counts: Military intervention and the outcome of civil conflicts. *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4), 713–735.
- Gerring, J. (2017). Qualitative methods. *Annual Review of Political Science* 20, 15–36.
- Gilligan, M. J. and E. J. Sergenti (2008). Evaluating un peacekeeping with matching to improve causal inference. *QJ Polit. Sci* 3(2), 89–122.
- Gleditsch, K. S. (2007). Transnational dimensions of civil war. *Journal of peace research* 44(3), 293–309.
- Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. *Journal of peace research* 39(5), 615–637.
- Gohdes, A. R. (2015). Pulling the plug: Network disruptions and violence in civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 52(3), 352–367.
- Gökçe, O. Z., E. Hatipoglu, et al. (2021). Syrian refugees, public attitudes, policy areas and political parties in turkey: A systematic analysis of twitter data. Economic Research Forum (ERF).
- Goodwin, J. and T. Skocpol (1989). Explaining revolutions in the contemporary third world. *Politics & Society* 17(4), 489–509.
- Gordon, G. M. and L. E. Young (2017). Cooperation, information, and keeping the peace: Civilian engagement with peacekeepers in haiti. *Journal of Peace Research* 54(1), 64–79.
- Gromes, T. (2019). Does peacekeeping only work in easy environments? an analysis of conflict characteristics, mission profiles, and civil war recurrence. *Contemporary security policy* 40(4), 459–480.

- Haass, F. and N. Ansorg (2018). Better peacekeepers, better protection? troop quality of united nations peace operations and violence against civilians. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(6), 742–758.
- Halperin, S. and O. Heath (2020). *Political research: methods and practical skills*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Hartzell, C., M. Hoddie, and D. Rothchild (2001). Stabilizing the peace after civil war: An investigation of some key variables. *International organization*, 183–208.
- Hegre, H., L. Hultman, and H. Nygård (2010). Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of un peacekeeping operations. In *National Conference on Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala*, pp. 9–11.
- Henke, M. (2018). Robust mandates and malicious acts: Examining the deadly link. *International Peace Institute Global Observatory* 21.
- Hinkkainen Elliott, K., S. M. Polo, and L. E. Reyes (2021). Making peace or preventing it? un peacekeeping, terrorism, and civil war negotiations. *International Studies Quarterly* 65(1), 29–42.
- Hoeffler, A. (2012). Growth, aid and policies in countries recovering from war.
- Högbladh, S. (2020). Ucdp ged codebook version 20.1. *Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University*.
- Howard, L. M. (2019). *Power in peacekeeping*. Cambridge University Press.
- Howard, L. M. and A. K. Dayal (2018). The use of force in un peacekeeping. *International Organization* 72(1), 71–103.
- Hultman, L. (2009). The power to hurt in civil war: The strategic aim of renamo violence. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35(4), 821–834.

- Hultman, L. (2013). Un peace operations and protection of civilians: Cheap talk or norm implementation? *Journal of Peace Research* 50(1), 59–73.
- Hultman, L., J. Kathman, and M. Shannon (2013). United nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4), 875–891.
- Hultman, L., J. Kathman, and M. Shannon (2014). Beyond keeping peace: United nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting. *American Political Science Review* 108(4), 737–753.
- Hultman, L., J. D. Kathman, and M. Shannon (2016). United nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33(3), 231–249.
- Ilyas, S. H. W., Z. T. Soomro, A. Anwar, H. Shahzad, and U. Yaqub (2020). Analyzing brexit’s impact using sentiment analysis and topic modeling on twitter discussion. In *The 21st Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research*, pp. 1–6.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (1999). Wanton and senseless? the logic of massacres in algeria. *Rationality and Society* 11(3), 243–285.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press.
- Karami, A., L. S. Bennett, and X. He (2018). Mining public opinion about economic issues: Twitter and the us presidential election. *International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS)* 9(1), 18–28.
- Karim, S. and K. Beardsley (2016). Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions: The role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(1), 100–115.
- Kathman, J. and M. Benson (2019). Cut short? united nations peacekeeping and civil war duration to negotiated settlements. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(7), 1601–1629.
- Kathman, J. D. (2013). United nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 1990–2011. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5), 532–549.

- Kathman, J. D. and M. M. Melin (2017). Who keeps the peace? understanding state contributions to un peacekeeping operations. *International Studies Quarterly* 61(1), 150–162.
- Kathman, J. D. and R. M. Wood (2016). Stopping the killing during the “peace”: peacekeeping and the severity of postconflict civilian victimization. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12(2), 149–169.
- Kirschner, S. and A. Miller (2019). Does peacekeeping really bring peace? peacekeepers and combatant-perpetrated sexual violence in civil wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(9), 2043–2070.
- Kochani, L. (2021). Does higher quality peacekeepers equal better civilian protection?: A qualitative research study on un-peacekeeping effectiveness in mali and the drc.
- Kocher, M. A. (2014). The effect of peacekeeping operations on violence against civilians in africa: A critical re-analysis. *Available at SSRN 2522997*.
- Koops, J., N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, and P. Williams (2015). Introduction: Post-cold war peacekeeping: 1988–1998. *KOOPS, Joachim et al.*
- Kreps, S. E. and G. L. Wallace (2009). Just how humanitarian are interventions? peacekeeping and the prevention of civilian killings during and after civil wars. *Peacekeeping and the Prevention of Civilian Killings during and after Civil Wars*.
- Krishnasamy, K. (2003). Bangladesh and un peacekeeping: The participation of a’small’sstate. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 41(1), 24–47.
- Kydd, A. (2003). Which side are you on? bias, credibility, and mediation. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4), 597–611.
- Kydd, A. H. and S. Straus (2013). The road to hell? third-party intervention to prevent atrocities. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3), 673–684.

- LA, T. (2016). Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera. Accessed May 30, 2021, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Colombia%20Nuevo%20Acuerdo%20Final%2024%20Nov%202016_0.pdf.
- Laitin, D. (2002). Comparative politics: The state of the subdiscipline.-political science: The state of the discipline. *NY: Norton* (Y).
- Lake, D. A. (2016). *The Statebuilder's Dilemma*. Cornell University Press.
- Langford, M. and J. Karlsson Schaffer (2015). The nordic human rights paradox: Moving beyond exceptionalism. *University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper* (2013-25).
- Levin, A. (2020). Whitewashing and extortion: why human rights-abusing states participate in un peacekeeping operations. *International Interactions*, 1–27.
- Levine-Spound, D. (2019). Backlash in beni: Understanding anger against the un peacekeeping mission in the drc. *Center for Civilians in Conflict*.
- Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. *The american political science review* 65(3), 682–693.
- Linebarger, C. and A. Enterline (2016). Third party intervention and the duration and outcomes of civil wars. *What do we know about civil wars*, 93–108.
- Longobardo, M. (2019). Robust peacekeeping mandates: An assessment in light of jus post bellum. *The Justice of Peace and Jus Post Bellum*, 1–23.
- Lundgren, M. (2017). Which type of international organizations can settle civil wars? *The Review of International Organizations* 12(4), 613–641.
- Marshall, M. G. and T. Gurr (2020). Polity5: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2018. *Center for Systemic Peace*. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018.pdf>.

- Mattes, M. and B. Savun (2009). Fostering peace after civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design. *International studies quarterly* 53(3), 737–759.
- McNamee, T. (2021). Such a long journey: Peacebuilding after genocide in rwanda. In *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa*, pp. 379–395. Springer.
- McNulty, M. (1999). The collapse of zaire: implosion, revolution or external sabotage? *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 53–82.
- Melander, E. (2009). Selected to go where murderers lurk? the preventive effect of peacekeeping on mass killings of civilians. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(4), 389–406.
- Mironova, V. and S. Whitt (2017). International peacekeeping and positive peace: Evidence from kosovo. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(10), 2074–2104.
- Mkhize, M. C. (2015). Peacebuilding in the democratic republic of congo. *African Frontiers: Insurgency, Governance and Peacebuilding in Postcolonial States*, 167.
- Mohammad, S. and P. Turney (2010). Emotions evoked by common words and phrases: Using mechanical turk to create an emotion lexicon. In *Proceedings of the NAACL HLT 2010 workshop on computational approaches to analysis and generation of emotion in text*, pp. 26–34.
- Morrison, A., J. Kiras, and S. A. Blair (1996). Un peacekeeping reform: Something permanent and stronger. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 3(1), 95–110.
- Moskos, C. C. (1976). *Peace soldiers: The sociology of a United Nations military force*. University of Chicago Press Chicago.
- Mugabi, I. (2021). Why UN peacekeeping missions have failed to pacify Africa’s hotspots. Deutsche Welle, June 3. Available from <https://p.dw.com/p/3u02n>.
- Mullenbach, M. (2017). Third-party peacekeeping missions (version 3.1). *Harvard Dataverse*.

- Murphy, R. (2016). Un peacekeeping in the democratic republic of the congo and the protection of civilians. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 21(2), 209–246.
- Neack, L. (1995). Un peace-keeping: In the interest of community or self? *Journal of Peace Research* 32(2), 181–196.
- Neethling, T. (2011). From monuc to monusco and beyond: Prospects for reconstruction, state-building and security governance in the drc. *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18(1), 23–41.
- Öztürk, N. and S. Ayvaz (2018). Sentiment analysis on twitter: A text mining approach to the syrian refugee crisis. *Telematics and Informatics* 35(1), 136–147.
- Pape, R. A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American political science review* 97(3), 343–361.
- Patrick, S. (2017). Civil wars & transnational threats: Mapping the terrain, assessing the links. *Dædalus* 146(4), 45–58.
- Perkins, R. and E. Neumayer (2008). Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: Explaining the geographies of post-cold war peacekeeping. *Political Geography* 27(8), 895–914.
- Perry, C. and A. Smith (2013). Trends in uniformed contributions to un peacekeeping: A new dataset, 1991-2012. *Chris Perry and Adam Smith, Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping: A New Dataset 2012*.
- Pettersson, T., S. Högladh, and M. Öberg (2019). Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements. *Journal of Peace Research* 56(4), 589–603.
- Pettersson, T. and M. Öberg (2020). Organized violence, 1989–2019. *Journal of peace research* 57(4), 597–613.
- Phayal, A. (2019). Un troop deployment and preventing violence against civilians in darfur. *International Interactions* 45(5), 757–780.

- Phayal, A. and B. C. Prins (2020). Deploying to protect: the effect of military peacekeeping deployments on violence against civilians. *International Peacekeeping* 27(2), 311–336.
- Poulin, B. (2006). *Peace operations seen from below. UN missions and local people*. Hurst.
- Powell, R. (2006). War as a commitment problem. *International organization* 60(1), 169–203.
- Quinn, J. M., T. D. Mason, and M. Gurses (2007). Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence. *International Interactions* 33(2), 167–193.
- Raghavan, S. (2014). Record number of UN peacekeepers fails to stop African wars. Washington Post, January 3. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/record-number-of-un-peacekeepers-fails-to-stop-african-wars/2014/01/03/17ed0574-7487-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html.
- Reilly, B. (2008). Post-war elections: uncertain turning points of transition. Cambridge University Press.
- Reuters (2019). Suspected islamist militants kill 19, burn church in eastern dr congo. *Reuters*.
- Rieff, D. (1996). *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*. Simon and Schuster.
- Rosas, A. (1988). The nordic countries and the international protection of human rights. *Nordic J. Int'l L.* 57, 424.
- Rost, N. and J. M. Greig (2011). Taking matters into their own hands: An analysis of the determinants of state-conducted peacekeeping in civil wars. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(2), 171–184.
- Ruggeri, A., H. Dorussen, and T.-I. Gizelis (2018). On the frontline every day? subnational deployment of united nations peacekeepers. *British Journal of Political Science* 48(4), 1005–1025.
- Ruggeri, A., T.-I. Gizelis, and H. Dorussen (2013). Managing mistrust: An analysis of cooperation with un peacekeeping in africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(3), 387–409.

- Salehyan, I. (2008). The externalities of civil strife: Refugees as a source of international conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4), 787–801.
- Salehyan, I. and K. S. Gleditsch (2006). Refugees and the spread of civil war. *International organization* 60(2), 335–366.
- Salverda, N. (2013). Blue helmets as targets: A quantitative analysis of rebel violence against peacekeepers, 1989–2003. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(6), 707–720.
- Scartascini, C., C. Cruz, and P. Keefer (2018). The database of political institutions 2017 (dpi2017). Washington, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
- Sheehan, N. (2011). *The economics of UN peacekeeping*. Routledge.
- Shekhawat, S. (2009). Governance crisis and conflict in the democratic republic of congo. *University of Mumbai, Working Paper* 6, 7–17.
- Shirky, C. (2008). *Here comes everybody: The power of organizing without organizations*. Penguin.
- Simić, O. (2010). Does the presence of women really matter? towards combating male sexual violence in peacekeeping operations. *International Peacekeeping* 17(2), 188–199.
- Smidt, H. (2020a). Mitigating election violence locally: Un peacekeepers’ election-education campaigns in côte d’ivoire. *Journal of peace research* 57(1), 199–216.
- Smidt, H. (2021). Keeping electoral peace? activities of united nations peacekeeping operations and their effects on election-related violence. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38(5), 580–604.
- Smidt, H. M. (2020b). United nations peacekeeping locally: enabling conflict resolution, reducing communal violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64(2-3), 344–372.
- Stojek, S. M. and J. Tir (2015). The supply side of united nations peacekeeping operations: Trade ties and united nations-led deployments to civil war states. *European Journal of International Relations* 21(2), 352–376.

- Strezhnev, A. and E. Voeten (2013). United nations general assembly voting data. *IQSS Dataverse Network* (<http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml>).
- Sundberg, R. and E. Melander (2013). Introducing the ucdp georeferenced event dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4), 523–532.
- Thakur, R. C. (1984). *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission*. University of Alberta.
- Theofilopoulou, A. (2015). United nations mission for the referendum in western sahara (minurso). In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*.
- Thyne, C. L. (2016). The legacies of civil war: Health, education, and economic development. *What do we know about civil wars*, 157–175.
- Tsagourias, N. (2006). Consent, neutrality/impartiality and the use of force in peacekeeping: their constitutional dimension. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 11(3), 465–482.
- Tufekci, Z. and C. Wilson (2012). Social media and the decision to participate in political protest: Observations from tahrir square. *Journal of communication* 62(2), 363–379.
- Valentino, B. (2000). Final solutions: the causes of mass killing and genocide. *Security Studies* 9(3), 1–59.
- Valentino, B. A. (2014). Why we kill: The political science of political violence against civilians. *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, 89–103.
- van Klinger, M., D. Trilling, and J. Möller (2020). Public opinion on twitter? how vote choice and arguments on twitter comply with patterns in survey data, evidence from the 2016 ukraine referendum in the netherlands. *Acta Politica*, 1–20.
- Vinck, P., P. Pham, and T. Kreutzer (2019). Peacebuilding and reconstruction polls eastern democratic republic of the congo. *August, www.peacebuildingdata.org/drc* (accessed September 2022).

- Voeten, E. (2013). Data and analyses of voting in the united nations general assembly. In *Routledge handbook of international organization*, pp. 80–92. Routledge.
- Von Billerbeck, S. B. (2016). *Whose peace?: Local ownership and United Nations peacekeeping*. Oxford University Press.
- Walter, B. F. (2002). *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Weiss, H. F. (2000). *War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Nordic Africa Institute.
- Williams, C. (2013). Explaining the great ear in africa: How conflict in the congo became a continental crisis. *Fletcher F. World Aff.* 37, 81.
- Wood, R. M., J. D. Kathman, and S. E. Gent (2012). Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research* 49(5), 647–660.
- Young, G. (2019). Political decision-making and the decline of canadian peacekeeping. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 25(2), 152–171.
- Young, J. K. (2016). Antecedents of civil war onset. *What do we Know about Civil War*. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 33–43.
- Zhang, S. (2021). Trade potential and un peacekeeping participation. *International Peacekeeping*, 1–28.

APPENDICES

Graph Appendices




Figure A1: Distribution of Benchmark Votes




Figure A2: Index of Voting Cohesion

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables analyzed in Chapter 5

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
<i>Risk of Mission Termination</i>							
Length (in months)	3,764	71.048	68.610	1	18	106	340
Commitment to UN	3,764	56.757	16.452	21.639	42.951	67.435	100.000
Polarization	3,746	0.378	0.192	0.000	0.242	0.468	1.000
Fractionalization	3,746	0.787	0.247	0.000	0.805	0.926	0.962
Troop quality	3,764	15.494	10.187	0.000	0.000	22.876	25.916
Fiscal capacity	3,764	0.644	0.680	−0.332	0.000	1.207	2.525
Peace accords	3,764	3.372	5.383	0	0	5	24
Troop size (logged)	3,764	4.975	3.856	0.000	0.000	8.808	9.882
Troop-providers	3,764	32.014	18.402	0	14	48	74
Cost of conflict (logged)	3,764	6.660	3.419	0.000	4.920	9.436	10.837
Civilian victimization (logged)	3,764	1.173	1.761	0.000	0.000	2.398	7.902
Peacekeeper fatalities	3,764	0.604	2.106	0	0	1	96
New Missions	3,764	0.197	0.530	0	0	0	5
Female PKs	3,764	2.746	4.785	0	0	4.6	35
Civilian protection	3,764	0.338	0.473	0	0	1	1
Rural population	3,764	4.020	0.298	2.991	3.867	4.217	4.520
Polity scores	3,275	1.100	5.215	−9.000	−4.000	6.000	8.000
<i>Risk of Holding Post-conflict Election</i>							
Length (in months)	774	19.621	18.215	1	7	25	83
Commitment to UN	774	55.251	14.583	25.388	42.844	65.753	100.000
Troop quality	774	16.216	9.261	0	17.8	22.1	26
Fiscal capacity	774	0.499	0.532	−0	0	0.9	2
Peace accords	774	2.234	2.509	0	0	4	8
Troop size	774	5.129	3.693	0	1.1	8.7	10
Troop-providers	774	28.048	18.205	0	11	44	61
Cost of conflict	774	7.388	2.522	0.000	6.324	9.116	10.837
Peacekeeper fatality	774	0.707	1.665	0	0	1	17
Female PKs	774	1.269	4.383	0	0	0	33
Rrural population	774	4.012	0.295	3.026	3.935	4.171	4.520




Figure A3: Kaplan Meier Curves




Figure A4: Relative Hazards of Commitment to UN over Time

Table A2: Descriptive statistics of variables analyzed in Chapter 6

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
<i>Full sample</i>							
Commitment to UN	6,088	0.654	0.196	0.171	0.497	0.840	1.000
Civilian victimization	6,088	118.600	6,494.165	0	0	6	506,486
Civilian victimization _{t-1}	6,045	119.063	6,517.167	0.000	0.000	6.000	506,486.000
Peacekeeper fatalities	6,088	0.481	1.868	0	0	0	96
Peacekeeper fatalities _{t-1}	6,005	0.483	1.878	0.000	0.000	0.000	96.000
Troop quality	6,088	15.021	10.628	0.000	0.000	23.189	26.092
Fiscal capacity	6,088	0.417	0.444	-2.207	0.000	0.795	1.356
Troop size	6,088	4.806	3.836	0.000	0.000	8.446	10.554
Troop size _{t-1}	6,005	4.822	3.836	0.000	0.000	8.464	10.554
Police size	6,088	3.082	3.127	0	0	5.9	9
Observer size	6,088	3.292	2.331	0	0	5.3	7
Fractionalization	6,077	0.434	0.388	0.000	0.000	0.825	0.959
Polarization	6,077	0.343	0.320	0.000	0.000	0.642	1.000
Troop providers	6,088	26.423	18.086	1	10	41	74
Peace accords	5,769	2.774	5.087	0.000	0.000	4.000	24.000
Polity score	5,339	1.716	5.821	-9.000	-4.000	6.000	10.000
Polity score _{t-1}	5,318	1.712	5.823	-9.000	-4.000	6.000	10.000
Conflict duration	6,088	31.051	94.822	0	0	4	625
DAC aid	5,529	8.429	0.437	0.550	8.309	8.543	9.297
DAC aid _{t-1}	5,496	8.425	0.445	0.550	8.303	8.539	10.106
Non-DAC aid	5,182	7.044	0.234	6.904	6.967	7.024	9.049
EU aid	5,472	6.515	0.180	6.240	6.373	6.623	7.335
GDP per capita	5,521	4,626.132	8,128.111	102.598	519.816	4,640.379	43,592.080
GDP per capita _{t-1}	5,508	4,461.110	7,879.048	102.598	514.295	4,579.460	41,719.720
Rural population	6,084	50.038	20.087	7.499	40.300	65.207	92.687
Rural population _{t-1}	6,084	50.317	20.166	7.582	40.413	65.611	93.712
<i>Rwanda excluded</i>							
Commitment to UN	6,058	0.655	0.196	0.171	0.499	0.841	1.000
Civilian victimization	6,058	32.051	149.996	0	0	6	2,703
Civilian victimization _{t-1}	6,016	31.892	148.032	0.000	0.000	6.000	2,703.000
Peacekeeper fatalities	6,058	0.479	1.868	0	0	0	96
Peacekeeper fatalities _{t-1}	5,976	0.481	1.877	0.000	0.000	0.000	96.000
Troop quality	6,058	14.988	10.644	0.000	0.000	23.193	26.092
Fiscal capacity	6,058	0.418	0.445	-2.207	0.000	0.797	1.356
Troop size	6,058	4.792	3.840	0.000	0.000	8.441	10.554
Troop size _{t-1}	5,976	4.809	3.839	0.000	0.000	8.464	10.554
Police size	6,058	3.081	3.133	0	0	6.0	9
Observer size	6,058	3.282	2.331	0	0	5.3	7
Fractionalization	6,047	0.800	0.211	0.000	0.757	0.927	0.965
Polarization	6,047	0.421	0.211	0.000	0.248	0.559	1.000
Troop providers	6,058	26.451	18.123	1	10	41	74
Peace accords	5,739	2.789	5.096	0.000	0.000	4.000	24.000
Polity score	5,309	1.760	5.807	-9.000	-4.000	6.000	10.000
Polity score _{t-1}	5,289	1.755	5.810	-9.000	-4.000	6.000	10.000
Conflict duration	6,058	31.137	95.039	0	0	3.8	625
DAC aid	5,499	8.430	0.438	0.550	8.308	8.544	9.297
DAC aid _{t-1}	5,466	8.426	0.446	0.550	8.303	8.541	10.106
Non-DAC aid	5,152	7.045	0.235	6.904	6.967	7.025	9.049
EU aid	5,442	6.516	0.180	6.240	6.374	6.623	7.335
GDP per capita	5,491	4,650.347	8,143.663	102.598	522.644	4,655.425	43,592.080
GDP per capita _{t-1}	5,478	4,484.287	7,894.349	102.598	519.816	4,579.460	41,719.720
Rural population	6,054	49.836	19.930	7.499	40.300	65.064	90.861
Rural population _{t-1}	6,054	50.110	20.000	7.582	40.300	65.397	91.092




Figure A5: Residuals vs. Fitted plot




Figure A6: Correlation matrix with significant level stars



Figure A7: MONUSCO Deployment Map, 2018.
Source: Geospatial Information Section

Supplementary Empirical Results

Table B1: Cox PH Models

	Risk of Mission Termination					
Commitment to UN	0.031** (0.015)	0.025** (0.011)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.034** (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.025* (0.015)
Polarization		-3.946** (1.739)	-3.804** (1.691)	-4.275* (2.417)	-4.886** (2.438)	
Fractionalization						-2.762*** (0.925)
Troop quality		-0.0004 (0.029)	-0.084 (0.062)	-0.187** (0.086)	-0.306 (0.222)	0.015 (0.047)
Fiscal capacity			-0.387 (0.343)	0.148 (0.507)	0.257 (0.562)	0.686 (0.493)
Peace accords	-0.097* (0.050)	0.042 (0.038)	0.027 (0.038)	-0.086 (0.053)	-0.113** (0.057)	-0.122** (0.056)
Troop size	-0.277 (0.230)	-0.065 (0.113)	-0.065 (0.114)	0.089 (0.150)	0.608 (0.686)	0.005 (0.154)
Troop-providers	-0.126*** (0.024)	-0.053*** (0.016)	-0.063*** (0.017)	-0.112*** (0.023)	-0.122*** (0.025)	-0.080*** (0.025)
Cost of conflict	0.011 (0.080)	-0.169*** (0.058)	-0.145** (0.058)	-0.039 (0.084)	0.040 (0.092)	-0.012 (0.092)
Civilian victimization	0.761 (0.518)				0.404 (0.688)	0.377 (0.556)
Peacekeeper fatalities	0.021 (0.216)	0.163 (0.122)	0.173 (0.125)	-0.095 (0.274)	-0.102 (0.291)	-0.083 (0.264)
New missions				0.304 (0.295)	0.326 (0.300)	0.382 (0.286)
Female PKs	0.004 (0.036)	-0.026 (0.040)	-0.025 (0.039)	-0.015 (0.048)	-0.013 (0.047)	0.021 (0.044)
Civilian protection mandate	0.091 (0.658)	0.359 (0.471)	0.625 (0.506)	-0.001 (0.700)	0.127 (0.719)	-0.180 (0.687)
GDP per capita	1.864** (0.949)			0.928 (1.006)	0.833 (1.035)	1.354 (0.930)
Rural population	2.521 (2.747)			-2.160 (2.987)	-1.684 (3.241)	0.763 (2.890)
Polity score	0.038 (0.043)			-0.195 (0.144)	-0.204 (0.162)	-0.235 (0.145)
Polarization \times log(Time)		1.773*** (0.565)	1.615*** (0.556)	1.336 (0.834)	1.568* (0.845)	
Troop quality \times log(Time)			0.033* (0.017)	0.069*** (0.025)	0.099 (0.063)	
Troop size \times log (Time)	0.152** (0.072)				-0.139 (0.193)	
Civilian victimization \times log(Time)	-0.340** (0.163)				-0.261 (0.218)	-0.248 (0.176)
GDP per capita \times log(Time)	-0.493* (0.297)			-0.224 (0.316)	-0.189 (0.328)	-0.449 (0.284)
Rural population \times log(Time)	-0.093 (0.975)			1.577 (1.042)	1.273 (1.149)	0.323 (1.030)
Polity score \times log(Time)				0.083* (0.045)	0.085* (0.050)	0.095** (0.046)
Observations	2,973	3,746	3,746	2,956	2,956	2,956
Log Likelihood	-90.730	-126.180	-123.668	-86.647	-83.146	-86.016

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B2: Logistic Regression Modeling of Parameters Influencing Participation to UN Missions

	Participation to UN Missions			
Voting Cohesion	-0.487*** (0.166)	-0.011 (0.223)	-0.037 (0.223)	-0.067 (0.248)
Distance	-0.266*** (0.072)	-0.279*** (0.079)	-0.264*** (0.080)	-0.264*** (0.080)
EU member		-0.425*** (0.143)	-0.406*** (0.144)	-0.439*** (0.154)
AU member		0.167 (0.150)	0.172 (0.150)	0.183 (0.154)
Colonial ties	2.338*** (0.548)	2.558*** (0.555)	2.588*** (0.555)	2.597*** (0.555)
Count of troop-providers	0.081*** (0.004)	0.081*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.004)	0.084*** (0.004)
Count of missions participated _{t-1}	0.195*** (0.023)	0.203*** (0.023)	0.207*** (0.023)	0.204*** (0.023)
Size of participation to other missions _{t-1}	0.216*** (0.028)	0.213*** (0.029)	0.214*** (0.029)	0.210*** (0.029)
(National) Military personnel _{t-1}	0.046 (0.031)	0.047 (0.035)	0.044 (0.035)	0.060* (0.033)
(TP) Cost of soldier	-0.000** (0.000)			-0.000** (0.000)
Peacekeeper casualties _{t-1}	0.244*** (0.077)	0.245*** (0.077)	0.224*** (0.076)	0.219*** (0.076)
(TP) GDP per capita _{t-1}				0.006 (0.044)
Total trade _{t-1}	-0.00001 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	-0.00000 (0.0001)
(TP) Military expenditure _{t-1}		0.001 (0.037)	0.0001 (0.037)	
Civilian protection mandate			-0.389*** (0.130)	-0.387*** (0.130)
Peace accords	-0.096 (0.069)	-0.109 (0.069)	-0.111 (0.069)	-0.112 (0.069)
Polity score _{t-1}	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.015)
Total violence _{t-1}	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.035 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.025)
Outgoing refugees _{t-1}	-0.069* (0.036)	-0.060* (0.036)	-0.085** (0.037)	-0.087** (0.037)
(Host) Military expenditure _{t-1}	0.024*** (0.008)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.022*** (0.009)
Constant	-0.970 (0.799)	-1.257 (0.954)	-1.039 (0.958)	-1.182 (0.983)
Observations	3,004	2,990	2,990	2,992
Log Likelihood	-1,420.093	-1,414.980	-1,410.458	-1,408.190

Note: TP = troop-provider level

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B3: Logistic Regression Modeling of Parameters Influencing Participation to UN Missions

	Participation to UN Missions			
Voting Cohesion	-0.599*** (0.173)	-0.128 (0.230)	-0.169 (0.231)	-0.215 (0.257)
Voting Cohesion \times Polity score _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.088** (0.038)	-0.076** (0.038)	-0.084** (0.038)	-0.087** (0.038)
Distance	-0.270*** (0.072)	-0.281*** (0.079)	-0.265*** (0.080)	-0.267*** (0.080)
EU member		-0.404*** (0.144)	-0.382*** (0.145)	-0.420*** (0.154)
AU member		0.162 (0.150)	0.167 (0.150)	0.181 (0.154)
Colonial ties	2.352*** (0.552)	2.562*** (0.559)	2.593*** (0.559)	2.601*** (0.559)
Count of troop-providers	0.081*** (0.004)	0.081*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.004)	0.084*** (0.004)
Count of missions participated _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.197*** (0.023)	0.205*** (0.023)	0.209*** (0.023)	0.206*** (0.023)
Size of participation to other missions _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.212*** (0.028)	0.209*** (0.029)	0.210*** (0.029)	0.206*** (0.029)
(National) Military personnel _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.047 (0.031)	0.047 (0.035)	0.044 (0.035)	0.060* (0.033)
(TP) Cost of soldier	-0.000** (0.000)			-0.000** (0.000)
Peacekeeper casualties _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.241*** (0.077)	0.243*** (0.076)	0.220*** (0.076)	0.215*** (0.076)
(TP) GDP per capita _{<i>t</i>-1}				0.011 (0.044)
Total trade _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)
(TP) Military expenditure _{<i>t</i>-1}		0.0004 (0.037)	-0.0003 (0.037)	
Civilian protection mandate			-0.408*** (0.130)	-0.407*** (0.131)
Peace accords	-0.082 (0.069)	-0.097 (0.070)	-0.098 (0.070)	-0.097 (0.070)
Polity score _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.038 (0.028)	0.031 (0.029)	0.033 (0.029)	0.035 (0.029)
Total violence _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.033 (0.025)	-0.039 (0.025)	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.025)
Outgoing refugees _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.074** (0.036)	-0.065* (0.036)	-0.091** (0.037)	-0.093** (0.037)
(Host) Military expenditure _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.025*** (0.008)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.009)	0.022*** (0.009)
Constant	-0.805 (0.805)	-1.107 (0.959)	-0.860 (0.963)	-1.016 (0.988)
Observations	3,004	2,990	2,990	2,992
Log Likelihood	-1,417.362	-1,412.989	-1,408.041	-1,405.589

Note: TP = troop-provider level

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure B1: Marginal Effect of Voting Cohesion for Multiple Levels of Polity Score on Participation to UN missions

Table B4: Bivariate Regression Analysis: Mission FEs with Heteroskedasticity-consistent SEs

	Civilian victimization	
	Rwanda excl.	Full sample
Commitment to UN	-2.357*** (0.649)	-2.455*** (0.650)
Observations	4,334	4,364
Log Likelihood	-12,414.9	-12,564.6
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table B5: Key Explanatory Variable Omitted: Mission FEs with Heteroskedasticity-consistent SEs

	Civilian victimization			
	Rwanda excl.	Full sample	Rwanda excl.	Full sample
Fractionalization	1.188* (0.631)	1.158* (0.638)		
Polarization			0.416 (0.526)	0.465 (0.527)
Troop size	-0.163* (0.092)	-0.209* (0.093)	-0.245** (0.087)	-0.288** (0.087)
Troop quality	0.037 (0.031)	0.040 (0.031)	0.050* (0.026)	0.052* (0.027)
Fiscal capacity	0.406 (0.424)	0.585 (0.427)	0.187 (0.392)	0.365 (0.391)
DAC aid	3.848*** (0.426)	3.831*** (0.430)	3.787*** (0.434)	3.772*** (0.439)
Peacekeeper fatality	0.011 (0.035)	0.072* (0.042)	0.017 (0.037)	0.077* (0.042)
Rural population	-0.222** (0.068)	-0.217** (0.067)	-0.213** (0.067)	-0.208** (0.067)
Troop providers	-0.076*** (0.020)	-0.076*** (0.020)	-0.056** (0.017)	-0.056** (0.017)
Conflict duration	0.027*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.005)
Peace accords	-0.116* (0.046)	-0.120* (0.047)	-0.092* (0.045)	-0.096* (0.045)
Polity score	0.039 (0.029)	0.041 (0.029)	0.040 (0.029)	0.041 (0.029)
Observations	3,442	3,472	3,442	3,472
Log Likelihood	-9,313.9	-9,454.9	-9,316.0	-9,456.7

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B6: Full Sample: Mission FEs with Heteroskedasticity-consistent SEs

DV: Civilian victimization				
Lagged DV		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
Commitment to UN	−3.673*** (0.724)	−4.512*** (0.682)	0.203 (1.264)	−0.818 (1.321)
Commitment to UN × Troop size			−0.655*** (0.182)	−0.606** (0.187)
Fractionalization	1.126* (0.660)	1.768*** (0.527)	1.476* (0.585)	1.900*** (0.533)
Troop size	−0.257** (0.097)	−0.328** (0.099)	0.099 (0.132)	0.016 (0.133)
Troop quality	0.042 (0.032)	0.059 (0.037)	0.068* (0.032)	0.079* (0.035)
Fiscal capacity	0.439 (0.424)	0.513 (0.428)	0.417 (0.427)	0.511 (0.429)
DAC aid	3.318*** (0.417)	3.461*** (0.424)	3.420*** (0.439)	3.567*** (0.443)
Peacekeeper fatality	0.090* (0.044)	0.086* (0.044)	0.083* (0.044)	0.081* (0.044)
Rural population	−0.232** (0.071)	−0.196** (0.072)	−0.215** (0.071)	−0.185* (0.073)
Troop providers	−0.079*** (0.019)	−0.072*** (0.019)	−0.079*** (0.019)	−0.074*** (0.019)
Conflict duration	0.024*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)
Peace accords	−0.147** (0.047)	−0.125** (0.045)	−0.167*** (0.046)	−0.149** (0.045)
Polity score	0.022 (0.030)	0.019 (0.030)	0.035 (0.029)	0.031 (0.029)
Observations	3,472	3,445	3,472	3,445
Log Likelihood	−9,435.4	−9,359.5	−9,428.1	−9,354.0

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B7: Polarization Controlled: Mission FEs with Heteroskedasticity-consistent SEs

DV: Civilian victimization				
Lagged DV		0.005*** (0.001)		0.005*** (0.001)
Commitment to UN	-3.493*** (0.729)	-2.996*** (0.653)	0.270 (1.195)	0.456 (1.260)
Commitment to UN \times Troop size			-0.634*** (0.178)	-0.575*** (0.180)
Polarization	0.180 (0.535)	-0.178 (0.494)	0.190 (0.497)	-0.333 (0.495)
Troop size	-0.291*** (0.094)	-0.288*** (0.092)	0.042 (0.124)	0.034 (0.127)
Troop quality	0.052* (0.029)	0.051 (0.033)	0.080*** (0.028)	0.073** (0.032)
Fiscal capacity	0.086 (0.400)	-0.125 (0.381)	0.003 (0.399)	-0.166 (0.379)
DAC aid	3.341*** (0.429)	2.705*** (0.446)	3.421*** (0.452)	2.778*** (0.463)
Peacekeeper fatality	0.033 (0.044)	0.026 (0.041)	0.024 (0.043)	0.019 (0.039)
Rural population	-0.225*** (0.071)	-0.222*** (0.067)	-0.208*** (0.072)	-0.205*** (0.067)
Troop providers	-0.061*** (0.018)	-0.048** (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.017)	-0.051*** (0.020)
Conflict duration	0.021*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.004)
Peace accords	-0.118** (0.047)	-0.083* (0.045)	-0.134*** (0.046)	-0.109** (0.045)
Polity score	0.022 (0.030)	0.040 (0.028)	0.034 (0.029)	0.056** (0.028)
Observations	3,442	3,416	3,442	3,416
Log Likelihood	-9,298.4	-9,291.2	-9,428.1	-9,072.1

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B8: Extra Controls: Mission FEs with Heteroskedasticity-consistent SEs

DV: Civilian victimization				
Lagged DV		0.005*** (0.001)		0.005*** (0.001)
Commitment to UN	-2.478*** (0.674)	-2.562*** (0.663)	1.547 (1.386)	0.970 (1.423)
Commitment to UN \times Troop size			-0.693*** (0.200)	-0.582*** (0.203)
Fractionalization	0.786 (0.654)	1.500*** (0.529)	1.054* (0.625)	1.594*** (0.552)
Troop size	-0.242** (0.112)	-0.254** (0.111)	0.081 (0.153)	0.019 (0.154)
Police size	-0.159* (0.089)	-0.184** (0.090)	-0.204** (0.091)	-0.217** (0.091)
Observer size	0.106 (0.092)	0.187** (0.089)	0.135 (0.090)	0.205** (0.088)
Troop quality	0.045 (0.034)	0.061 (0.037)	0.074** (0.035)	0.085** (0.038)
Fiscal capacity	0.599 (0.407)	0.190 (0.423)	0.502 (0.422)	0.121 (0.436)
DAC aid	2.704*** (0.452)	2.642*** (0.470)	2.871*** (0.464)	2.757*** (0.482)
Non-DAC aid	4.704*** (0.458)	1.493*** (0.380)	4.576*** (0.463)	1.416*** (0.383)
EU aid	-4.455*** (0.744)	-2.892*** (0.786)	-4.544*** (0.752)	-2.958*** (0.784)
Peacekeeper fatality	0.016 (0.039)	0.011 (0.033)	0.014 (0.039)	0.011 (0.034)
Rural population	-0.368*** (0.069)	-0.297*** (0.067)	-0.345*** (0.067)	-0.280*** (0.066)
Troop providers	-0.068*** (0.022)	-0.060** (0.024)	-0.064*** (0.022)	-0.057** (0.024)
Conflict duration	0.010* (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)
Peace accords	-0.124** (0.057)	-0.048 (0.056)	-0.132** (0.055)	-0.060 (0.055)
Polity score	0.057* (0.034)	0.065** (0.032)	0.078** (0.033)	0.084*** (0.031)
Observations	3,193	3,173	3,193	3,173
Log Likelihood	-8,752.8	-8,614.6	-8,745.8	-8,609.9

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B9: Logged Dependent Variable: Linear Panel Regression with Mission FEs

<i>DV: Civilian Victimization (logged):</i>				
Lagged DV		0.575*** (0.012)		0.569*** (0.012)
Commitment to UN	-4.458*** (0.199)	-2.052*** (0.172)	-1.759*** (0.374)	-0.882*** (0.312)
Commitment to UN \times Troop size			-0.479*** (0.056)	-0.210*** (0.047)
Fractionalization	0.960*** (0.208)	0.519*** (0.173)	0.928*** (0.207)	0.504*** (0.173)
Troop size	-0.062*** (0.024)	-0.022 (0.020)	0.201*** (0.039)	0.094*** (0.032)
Troop quality	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.013* (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)
Fiscal capacity	0.010 (0.094)	-0.001 (0.077)	-0.077 (0.094)	-0.038 (0.077)
DAC aid	0.146*** (0.042)	0.054 (0.034)	0.152*** (0.041)	0.058* (0.034)
Peacekeeper fatalities	0.010 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)	0.006 (0.007)
Rural population	-0.036*** (0.011)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.009 (0.009)
Troop providers	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.003)
Conflict duration	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Peace accords	-0.053*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.075*** (0.018)	-0.032** (0.015)
Polity score	0.008 (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)
Observations	4,719	4,684	4,719	4,684
Adjusted R ²	0.122	0.420	0.135	0.423

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B10: Reverse Causation: Mission FEs with Heteroskedasticity-consistent SEs

	<i>DV: Commitment to UN</i>	
	Rwanda excl.	Full sample
Civilian victimization _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Peacekeeper fatality _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
DAC aid _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)
Rural population _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
GDP per capita _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.00000 (0.00001)	-0.00000 (0.00001)
Troop-providers _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Peace accords	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Conflict duration	-0.0003* (0.0002)	-0.0003* (0.0002)
Polity score	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)
Observations	4,176	4,205
Adjusted R ²	0.127	0.126
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	