

RESPONSIBILITY

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of Political Science

University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Raymond Lew

August, 1972

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ABSTRACT

It is argued that the contemporary age is faced with a crisis of responsibility and that such a crisis is of the greatest immediacy for democracy because of the emphasis it places on the individual in the political processes. The normative position of the establishment of a viable participatory democracy is taken and articulated. An analysis of the concept of responsibility is offered. The existing empirical evidence relating to responsibility is assembled. Prescriptions and policy implications are considered.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. DESIGNS AND DISCLAIMERS	14
3. THE IDEA OF RESPONSIBILITY	21
4. RESPONSIBILITY AND REALITY	43
5. RESPONSIBILITY AND DEMOCRACY	79
APPENDIX	84
BIBLIOGRAPHY	87

INTRODUCTION

Man exists and this existence is such as to find its realization in thought and action. Furthermore, man's existence usually takes place in the context of political society. The condition of man in political society may be viewed as the underlying concern unifying all political inquiry. In what follows I intend to address myself to this condition through an examination of the concept of political responsibility, in both its theoretical and empirical aspects, and to deduce its implications for democracy.

If it is true that the identification of an era can be made in terms of the crisis that pervades and overrides all other crises in that period, then the contemporary epoch can be identified in terms of a crisis of responsibility. This is not to say that previous times did not experience a crisis of responsibility.¹ On the contrary, the very nature of man's existence raises the question of responsibility. Such a crisis, though, gains utmost importance in the present age largely because of the conflicting motivations generated by two factors distinctive of the age. First, there is the factor of increasing complexity. New technologies, rapid change, mass populations, an exponentially increasing body of knowledge--

¹See Appendix.

these are all manifestations of increasing complexity. This complexity has given rise to a greater degree of uncertainty about the effects of one's actions. It has traditionally been the case that one could never know with certainty what the consequences of one's actions will be, but this fact has been magnified by complexity. Lest he become responsible for some unforeseen evil modern man tends to hold a narrow conception of his responsibilities. Moreover, complexity with its accompanying uncertainty have contributed to the emergence of a nonredemptive world.² In such a world the probability of redemption, of being delivered from one's feelings of guilt is minimal. Responsibilities are rejected because it becomes too risky to accept them, the unacceptable risk being an unexorcizable guilt. Thus, "modern man engages in a kind of 'preventive innocence'; that is, he carefully limits his responsibilities, accepting in so far as he must his private guilt, but denying his responsibility for a common, public world. He cannot escape being the private man, but he sees no need to enter into the gratuitous responsibilities of the public man. Whether one is citizen or officeholder, the important point is to retain one's innocence."³

It is revealing to juxtapose the following two passages, the first from Smith's article and the second from Robert Lane's Political Ideology,⁴

²Roger W. Smith, "Redemption and Politics," Political Science Quarterly, 86(1971), 205-231.

³Smith, pp. 207-208.

⁴Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

showing the congruence between a metaphysical and empirical discussion of the question of responsibility in the modern age:

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the truly modern form of government is "bureau-crazy," the rule of "nobody," whereas all previous forms of government were rule by persons--the one, the few, or the many. With the division of labor that limits one's responsibility to specific tasks and with the anonymity that pervades bureaucracy, personal guilt is neutralized organizationally. Innocence, in other words, has now been institutionalized. Guilt, on the other hand, is, at most, a quality of the system, and the system is beyond the control of any single person or even group of persons. Thus no one in particular can be blamed for not changing the system--anonymity emerges at a more general level. (228-229)

Often it is hard to distinguish between an analytical attribution of cause, an assignment of responsibility, and a fixing of blame. But in instance after instance, it appeared that the least fruitful questions were ones of "Whose fault was it?" "Who is to blame?" and within the body of the free-flowing discussion the level of indignation about the failures of men and groups to perform as the Eastportians thought they should was at a very low level indeed.

. . . Often asked "Who is to blame?" the men of Eastport, to a surprising degree, answered in terms of "what." Queried on the missile lag, their most frequent answer was an anonymous American failure to support science and education; on the decline of business in downtown Eastport, they said the fault was the growth of the suburbs; only in the Little Rock crisis of desegregation (1957) did many men find a person to blame, in this case Governor Faubus. (330)

The contrary motivating force, one which prompts the acceptance of responsibilities, results from the widespread desire for democracy, and specifically for that form of democracy which can be identified as par-

ticipatory democracy or citizenship democracy.⁵ This desire, almost clamor, is distinctive of the modern age.⁶ In a democratic, as opposed to a nondemocratic, society the individual assumes a greater role in the decision-making processes. His public role is more pronounced. His responsibilities multiply and are colored by the significance of the enterprise as a whole. For a viable participatory democracy to exist the individual must accept his responsibilities, both private and public.⁷ The recent increase in political action and political consciousness questions the assertion that modern man has rejected his responsibilities and abandoned the ideal of democracy.

Theodore Roszak believes that the adults of the World War II period have succumbed to the motivation to reject, but that the youth of today have not.⁸ Herbert Muller agrees that contemporary youth have not rejected their responsibilities, but adds a note of concern about their

⁵Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), esp. pp. 22-44; Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), esp. pp. 1-29.

⁶Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 8-9.

⁷Lane seems to suggest that it is sufficient for the type of democracy that America presently has that the individual assume his personal responsibilities (which he concludes most Eastportians do), and that although it would be nice if the individual assumed a broader conception of his public responsibilities, especially responsibility for others, it is not necessary (Political Ideology, pp. 94, 459). But it should be noted that American democracy is a closer approximation of democratic elitism than it is of participatory democracy.

⁸The Making of a Counter Culture (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1969), p. 22.

ability to execute those responsibilities:

All who are resolutely saying No to their elders, resisting the demands for conformity required by professional success, and themselves demanding that our society practice the ideals it preaches are assuming responsibilities for which they are not prepared by age and experience. Although the dissenters seem to me by no means so immature as their critics say, nor the whole youth movement a mere "children's crusade," they are not and cannot be expected to be thoroughly mature, or simply to know enough yet to create an adequate counter culture.⁹

It is precisely because neither motivating force has gained a clear ascendancy over the other that the crisis is a crisis. It then becomes possible, given an accurate picture of what is involved and necessary, to take action which will sublimate the motivation to reject, and thereby, contribute to the conditions which make a viable democracy possible.

But the task is not so straightforward. There is not only the explicit danger that the motivation to reject will gain ascendancy, and thus, usher forth something less than a participatory democracy (at the least, a pure democratic elitism and at the worst, a fascist state), but there is an insidious turn inherent in the motivation to accept. This subtlety can be explicated by considering the nexus between freedom and responsibility. Much has been made of modern man's quest to escape from freedom.¹⁰ But I would submit that it is not so much freedom itself that

⁹In Pursuit of Relevance (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1971), p. 243.

¹⁰For example, see Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1941).

man seeks to escape as it is the responsibilities that freedom brings. To escape from freedom and to escape from the responsibilities that freedom brings are not the same thing.¹¹ To embrace freedom while ignoring the responsibilities is possible and is just as dangerous as an outright rejection of freedom for the security of authoritative pronouncements. Consider the contemporary phenomenon of "doing your own thing." The expression implies, and it would appear that many people who profess to be guided by it have so interpreted it, that one is free to do whatever one wants and more importantly, that because what one does is somehow unique to him, he is not responsible to anyone for what he does. This is no doubt unfair. I take it that the originators of the expression meant it to be taken in the light of something like the Aristotelian tradition, which calls for the individual to actualize his particular human potential. This is a noble course of action. But, sadly, denotation and connotation are hardly ever the same. And in this case I fear that the denotation has been lost completely. Thus, one deludes oneself to thinking that one can have one's freedom without the responsibilities. The motivation to accept is misdirected. For the resultant freedom is an anarchic freedom, an irresponsible freedom. And such a freedom is reactionary.¹²

¹¹Cf. Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 247-249; Muller, In Pursuit of Relevance, p. 99.

¹²See Benjamin R. Barber, Superman and Common Men (New York: Praeger, 1971); Jacques Ellul, Autopsy of Revolution, trans. Patricia Wolf (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

Questions of responsibility arise in a variety of situations for each individual. Many of these situations are of a quality unique to him and his circumstances. The remainder he shares in common with others. Several of these commonly shared incidents suggest the main questions involved in any discussion of responsibility. I want to sketch out two such incidents and state the questions which I think they raise. These questions will provide the direction and the broad framework in which this paper will proceed.

The tragedy of the Vietnam War is for contemporary man a most alarming affair. For my purposes one aspect of the war deserves some special attention: that of the war atrocities and the ensuing war crimes trials. This element of the war raises several questions. One is the question of the transferring of responsibility. Under what conditions is the transfer of personal responsibility possible and justified? This question arises as a result of the public reaction to the trial of Lt. Calley for the My Lai massacre.¹³ Kelman and Lawrence, in their national survey conducted several months after the trial's end, found a pronounced division among the respondents over the question of whether or not Calley should have been held responsible for the massacre. Of the 989 respondents, 34% approved of Calley's having been brought to trial and 58% disapproved.¹⁴ Over half of the disapprovers (58%, n = 306)

¹³For an account of the massacre, see Seymour M. Hersh, My Lai 4 (New York: Random House, 1970).

¹⁴Herbert C. Kelman and Lee H. Lawrence, "Assignment of Responsibility in the Case of Lt. Calley: Preliminary Report on a National Survey," Journal of Social Issues, 28(1972), 177.

gave as the most important reason why Calley should not have been held responsible for the massacre (and therefore, not liable to be brought to trial) the fact that he had only done his duty.¹⁵ He had been in a situation of legitimate authority, had accepted that authority, and had thereby given up personal responsibility for his actions, even though it was the case, and Calley acknowledges that it was the case, that it had been his intention to kill the inhabitants of the village. Calley and many of the respondents believe that because one is in a situation of legitimate authority, one is absolved of personal responsibility for acts performed under the direction of that authority.¹⁶ The prosecution also believed this and based their argument on the following: Either Calley acted without orders, in which case he must be held personally responsible; or, if he did receive orders, those orders were illegitimate, and Calley should have realized they were. Because he did not, he could be held responsible.¹⁷

Slightly more than half of the approvers (53%, n = 162) gave as the most important reason why Calley should have been held responsible a version of the proposition that one cannot transfer personal responsibility.¹⁸ For them, a situation of legitimate authority does not

¹⁵Kelman and Lawrence, p. 188.

¹⁶Kelman and Lawrence, pp. 179-182.

¹⁷Kelman and Lawrence, p. 180.

¹⁸Kelman and Lawrence, p. 188.

alter the personal responsibility of the individual. These respondents, conclude Kelman and Lawrence, hold that "the individual citizen cannot transfer responsibility for his personal actions, totally and automatically, to the authorities" (208).

Which is the true and correct position? Can responsibility be transferred? If so, under what conditions is it justified to do so? Does the existence of a legitimate authority count as one of the justifying conditions?

It seems to me that the crisis of responsibility that I have alluded to is reflected in the fact that over half of the total respondents to the survey (52%, n = 521) mentioned some reason other than the question of responsibility as the most important reason for either approving or disapproving of the trial. These ranged from the good/bad effects the trial would have on the morale of the army to opposition/support of the war effort. This absence of a widely intense concern with responsibility is revealing given the explicitness of the act and the acknowledgment of the intention to commit the act. It is as though the quality of the individual is ignored for the success of the enterprise as a whole, forgetting the intimate nexus between the two.

A second question raised by the war crimes and, more generally, by the war itself is the question of collective responsibility. Is there such a thing? Many, among whom I include myself with some reservations, think there is. For example, Edward Opton, Jr. participating in the

Congressional Conference on War and National Responsibility states:

America's citizens share in the responsibility for My Lai, for there has been available to all ample evidence that the United States has been committing large-scale war crimes in Vietnam. A will to disbelieve, a self-serving reluctance to know the truth, just plain indifference, as well as failings in our ethics and our educational system, have prevented our electorate from influencing politicians whose policies allow for crimes against humanity.¹⁹

Most of the participants in the Conference agree with him. I would venture a guess that many individuals, both Americans and non-Americans, share similar sentiments.

On the other hand, K. R. Minogue thinks that talk about collective responsibility for My Lai or anything else is "nonsense" because it results in the trivialization of important moral ideas, such as guilt and innocence.²⁰ If the notion of collective responsibility is granted, then these terms become vacuous. For, "if everybody is guilty, then, logically no one is guilty."²¹ Along these same lines and in terms of the motivation to reject, Jacques Ellul argues that to accept the idea of collective or universal responsibility is just in fact to succumb to the motivation to reject:

To consider oneself responsible for the tortures in Algeria while actually being a professor in Bordeaux,

¹⁹Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, eds., War Crimes and the American Conscience (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 118.

²⁰"On the Fashionable Idea of National Guilt," American Scholar, 39 (1970), 211-218.

²¹Minogue, p. 212.

or for all hunger in the world, or for racist excesses in various countries is exactly the same thing as to reject all responsibility. What characterizes this attitude is impotence in the face of reality: I really cannot do anything about these things except sign manifestos and make declarations or claim that I act through political channels and establish a just order with the help of some abstraction. To say that we are all murderers means, translated, that nobody is individually a murderer, i.e., that I am not a murderer. To admit that I am co-responsible for all the evil in the world means to assure a good conscience for myself even if I do not do the good within my own reach.²²

Is the notion of collective responsibility in fact a sophisticated ploy for the motivation to reject? And if it is not, how can it be reconciled with the fears of Minogue, Ellul, and others?

A second area of common concern is that of crime and its rise. The Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has stated 'with some justification that "Society insists that individuals are responsible for their actions, and the criminal process operates on that assumption. However, society has not devised ways for ensuring that all its members have the ability to assume responsibility."²³ There is the flavor of a social deterministic position underlying this passage. And yet it has traditionally been taken that determinism and responsibility are incompatible. For example, it would appear that B. F. Skinner is arguing the position that they are:

²²The Political Illusion, trans. Konrad Kellen (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 186-189.

²³Quoted in Richard Harris, The Fear of Crime (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 16.

The real issue is the effectiveness of techniques of control. We shall not solve the problems of alcoholism and juvenile delinquency by increasing a sense of responsibility. It is the environment which is "responsible" for the objectional behavior, and it is the environment, not some attribute of the individual, which must be changed.

. . .
The concept of responsibility offers little help. The issue is controllability. . . . What must be changed is not the responsibility of autonomous man but the conditions, environmental or genetic, of which a person's behavior is a function.

. . .
The mistake . . . is to put the responsibility anywhere, to suppose that somewhere a causal sequence is initiated.²⁴

C. R. Jeffery, an adherent of Skinnerian psychology, gives a somewhat clearer statement of what is involved:

If a person makes a response not acceptable to society, he must be held responsible. The only way to control behavior is to control the variables producing the behavior. This control is called responsibility. The difficulty with the system now in operation is that we apply the concept unsuccessfully. The legal system is quite right in maintaining a concept of responsibility. The crucial issue is, of course, how this concept is applied. We now blame individuals for their behavior, assuming they could have behaved otherwise. Once we understand that [sic] contingencies controlling behavior, however, we can control these contingencies so as to alter the behavior. We hold people responsible for their behavior not because of free will but because, when we attach contingencies, we control the behavior. . . . The critical issue, then, becomes not one of determinism versus responsibility but the responsible use of punishment by society to safeguard itself. Such use involves

²⁴Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 74, 75, 76.

applying the knowledge of what variables maintain behavior.²⁵

The propositions put forth by Skinner and Jeffery raise a number of the basic questions concerning responsibility. What does it mean for one to be responsible for something? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for one to be responsible for something? If a responsible person is determined by certain environmental factors, what are these factors and what is the contribution of each to the final product? What of the sense of responsibility that Skinner pooh-poohs?

As mentioned earlier, these questions will guide the following inquiry. I doubt that I will provide a satisfactory answer to all, or even any, of them; but, I do hope to shed some new light on this topic. The questions which have been raised revolve around two concerns. First, there are the questions concerned with what is involved in the idea of responsibility and the politically responsible person. Second, there are the questions concerned with how to bring about, actualize if you will, this politically responsible person. It is to these two tasks that this paper is devoted. But before turning to either, a few preliminaries are in order.

²⁵Criminal Responsibility and Mental Disease (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1967), pp. 280-281. See also Jonathan Glover, Responsibility (New York: Humanities Press, 1970).

DESIGNS AND DISCLAIMERS

It would be judicious to articulate several of the value positions upon which this paper rests. A comprehensive statement of these positions is, I think, unnecessary. However, I intend to present a sufficient enough account of these positions so that the reader can ascertain without too much difficulty how the paper is colored by them. My remarks pertain to the nature of democracy, the relation between politics and ethics, and the idea of social responsibility. Also, I want to suggest my underlying methodological stance.

There has been in recent years a controversy over the nature of democracy and its possibility in the modern age. This dispute has revolved around two forms of democracy and their relative merits. One form is what has been referred to variously as classical democracy, participatory democracy, and citizenship democracy. By classical democracy is meant that form of democracy which finds its roots in the Greek practice. Emphasis is placed on the maximum participation of the individual in the processes of government. Among the theorists associated with this form of democracy are J. S. Mill, Rousseau, G. D. H. Cole, John Dewey, and Harold Laski.¹

¹ See Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970); Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970); Henry S. Kariel, ed., Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New York: Random House, 1970), Part One.

The other form of democratic theory is known as democratic elitism. It is, in a sense, a revision of the classical theory guided by the findings of contemporary empirical research. The emphasis here is displaced from the participation of the individual to the role of elites and the stability of the system. In fact, the argument is advanced for a minimum of participation by the "masses" and relegating their public roles solely to that of voter. Democratic elitists conclude, from their empirical studies, that mass participation is undesirable because it threatens the stability of the system. The important element is the elite. There is elite competition and voters choose from among the competing elites. The classical formulation is Schumpeter's: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote."² Other people associated with and expounding this line of thought are Robert Dahl, Giovanni Sartori, and many behavioralists.

It seems to me that the major differences between the classical theory and democratic elitism are the following:³

² Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), p. 269; quoted in Kariel, Frontiers of Democratic Theory, p. 40.

³ The following list is gleaned from the articles contained in Part Three, "Challenges to Democratic Revisionism," in Kariel, Frontiers of Democratic Theory. See especially the articles by Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes, Lane Davis, and Jack L. Walker.

Classical Democracy

1. It is desirable to have as much active participation as possible.
2. Mass consensus on basic democratic values is not only desirable, but necessary for the existence of a viable democracy.
3. What is good is determined by reference to the fulfillment of the needs of the individual.
4. Without active participation the development of the human potential is impossible.

Democratic Elitism

1. It is undesirable to have as much active participation as possible.
2. Elite consensus, not mass consensus, is necessary for the existence of a stable democracy. Mass consensus is undesirable because of 1.
3. What is good is determined by reference to the fulfillment of the needs of the system as a whole.
4. It is possible to develop the human potential without active participation in the decision processes.

Two general criticisms of the democratic elitists have been advanced. First, they have misunderstood the classical theory. The classical theory is prescriptive, not descriptive. Any attempt to make it descriptive by making it more isomorphic with reality is to replace and not revise (as they attempt to do) the classical theory. The second criticism is that the findings of empirical research do not really support their contentions. To say that at a particular time t_1 a particular state of affairs does not exist is not to say that it cannot exist. To say that a particular state of affairs cannot exist is to say that it is impossible (logically impossible; logically possible, empirically impossible) for it to exist. Given that a particular state of affairs is logically possible, how does one go about proving that it is empirically impossible?

Since I look upon myself as an adherent of sorts to the classical theory I find these criticisms valid. However, I must agree with Peter Bachrach that a vindication of the classical theory cannot be accomplished solely by showing the democratic elitists to be mistaken.⁴ It may be necessary, but hardly sufficient. A further task is that of showing how the classical theory can be made viable given the characteristics of the modern age. In a sense, this paper is a contribution to this task.⁵

By approaching the study of politics through the concept of political responsibility the common ground between politics and ethics comes into view. My position on the question concerning the relation between these two realms of inquiry is that, although they may not be completely identical, they overlap to a greater degree than some have supposed.⁶ The question of responsibility makes this clear. Such a question cannot arise unless one has in mind a theory of the good and the right. And if the notion of political responsibility is meaningful at all, then it follows that politics and ethics are not discrete realms of inquiry. The practical implications of this position is that empirical concerns are subsumed by

⁴The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 6.

⁵For pertinent remarks on this subject, see Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy, 2nd ed. (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1972), pp. 373-387.

⁶For a history of this dispute, see C. E. M. Joad, Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1947).

and interpreted in the light of a normative framework.⁷ The moral norms guiding this paper are the norms traditionally associated with western humanism. These include the dignity of the individual, social justice, and human self-realization.

In discussing the idea of responsibility and specifically, the idea of political responsibility, I do not want to be construed as discussing just the idea of social responsibility. The idea of responsibility has a social dimension to it, but this dimension does not have the pre-eminence implied by the phrase "social responsibility." Social responsibility has a conservative ring to it. It implies adherence to the conventional wisdom and support for the status quo.⁸ Political responsibility acknowledges social obligations, but is not identical with just a sole concern with social obligations. This will become clearer in the analysis chapter.

A final point needs consideration. This concerns method. I take it that the fullest explanation of human behavior possible will include cultural, social, psychological, and biological variables. Thus, in terms of method, I take an eclectic approach. I hope that my eclecticism does not result in a hodge-podge of facts and propositions.

With respect to philosophical method I view myself as following, in a general way, the anglo-american analytic tradition. However, I do not

⁷For a detailed statement of such a position, see Donald S. Lutz, The Normative Framework of Political Inquiry (Unpublished manuscript, 1972).

⁸Cf. Leonard Berkowitz and Lenneth C. Lutterman, "The Traditional Socially Responsible Personality," Public Opinion Quarterly, 32(1968), 169-185.

feel constrained by the tradition. In this regard I agree with Stuart Hampshire when he states that:

In philosophy, as in other inquiries, it has been the discipline of this time to answer separable questions separately, to analyse complex difficulties into elementary difficulties. The rewards of this discipline have been very great: accuracy, clarity, and sometimes even conclusiveness. But it is possible that there are purposes and interests which require that accurate and step-by-step analysis should not always be preferred to a more general survey and more tentative opinions, even in philosophy. It is possible that some moral and political interests, which, if pressed far enough, certainly lead into philosophy, are of this character: that they require more general statements of opinions, a summary of a philosophical position, in addition to the detailed analysis of particular problems.⁹

Two basic assumptions are made throughout this paper. No justification or proof in the formal sense of those words is offered for them. Instead, I rely for their proof on the arguments of others, e.g., Carole Pateman and J. S. Mill. However, I do feel that my remarks on the nature of democracy suggest how one can go about justifying them. First, I assume that a higher sense of responsibility in general leads to a higher sense of political responsibility. This assumption is similar to propositions concerning leadership ability, which state that experiences in early life with leadership positions and duties (e.g., boy scout training) lay a foundation for leadership ability in later life (e.g., political leadership).

⁹Thought and Action (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), pp. 9-10.

Second, I assume that a higher sense of political responsibility is crucial for popular control of government or democracy. The spirit of this assumption is captured by the following passage:

A distinguishing mark of the democratic society is its greater capacity for responsibility. Through the machinery of government, institutions, and numerous public and private programs the people of a functioning democracy are responsible for giving sympathetic and critical consideration to the needs, wants, preferences, aspirations, arguments, fears, problems, and cues of one another. Implicit in this normative use of "responsible" are ideals and values. A person, government, tradition, institution, or agency is responsible in the normative sense only if his (or its) behavior is guided by these ideals and values. Furthermore, these ideals must themselves be responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. . . . A society is democratic only to the extent that the government and other agencies of human responsibility work by a "feedback loop" that allows for maximum sensitivity and responsiveness.¹⁰

I take it that the background moral norms that I have assumed meet the requirements of responsiveness. These norms, as will be recalled, are those traditionally associated with western humanism.

Having made these preliminary remarks, I will now turn to the tasks that I have assigned myself. In Chapter 3 I will discuss what is involved in the idea of responsibility. A sense of responsibility construct will be offered. Chapter 4 will be a discussion of several factors that induce and enhance this sense of responsibility.

¹⁰J. E. Barnhart, "Democracy as Responsibility," Journal of Value Inquiry, 3(1969), 283-284.

THE IDEA OF RESPONSIBILITY

In this chapter I intend to take a close look at the idea of responsibility. My concern will be with several of the distinguishing features of the idea and with those aspects of the idea that lead one into the realm of political responsibility. First, I want to consider the meaning of the word "responsibility." What does it mean to say that someone is responsible? Further, for what is one responsible and to whom? This leads into a consideration of the conditions of responsibility. Among these are intention, knowledge, and ability. Then the arguments for and against the possibility of collective responsibility will be examined. After this, I want to look at the notion of political responsibility itself and specifically, at the tension between individual and collective responsibility and how the two can be reconciled. It seems that this tension is what is unique to the idea of political responsibility over and beyond the substantive issues involved. Finally, I want to offer some comments on the sense of political responsibility.

As would be expected, diverse answers have been given to the question "What does it mean to say that someone is responsible?" A brief listing of several of these answers shows not only their diversity, but

also their seeming inconsistency with one another. Jean-Paul Sartre takes responsibility, in its ordinary sense, to mean "consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object."¹ After considering various usages of "responsibility," J. Roland Pennock states:

It is fair to say that "responsibility" has two primary meanings, or that what I have called the core of meaning has two facets, (a) accountability and (b) the rational and moral exercise of discretionary power (or the capacity or disposition for such exercise), and that each of these notions tends to flavor the other. In any particular application, either one may be dominant, but the other remains in the background.²

H. L. A. Hart distinguishes four varieties of responsibility and remarks that the unifying element among them is that to say of someone that he is responsible is to require him to answer or rebut accusations or charges, which, if established, carry liability to punishment or blame or other adverse treatment.³ Arnold Kaufman disagrees and argues that one cannot equate responsibility with blameworthiness or liability to punishment because one who is said to be responsible can also be praised.⁴ A broad interpretation of the liability element in responsibility is seconded by

¹Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1953), p. 707.

²"The Problem of Responsibility," Responsibility, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), pp. 13-14.

³Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 264-265.

⁴"Moral and Legal Responsibility," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The MacMillan Company & The Free Press, 1967). VII, 183.

George Schrader. He notes that the English term "responsibility" means, literally, the liability for making a response.⁵ Finally, Ludwig Freund offers three meanings of responsibility which he says are "subtly inter-linked": (1) personal accountability, (2) responsibility as a sense, or an acknowledgment, of obligation, and (3) responsibility as a consideration of the consequences of one's actions.⁶

The absence of a consensus on the meaning of responsibility is not the only characteristic of the responsibility literature. A second is that authors usually discuss responsibility in terms of its dimensions or elements. An author will say, "There are n dimensions to the concept of responsibility" or "Responsibility has m elements." A summary listing of the items that have been offered as dimensions or elements of responsibility may be useful and instructive in getting clear about the meaning of the word. My reading of the literature suggests the following list:

(1) Choice. It is through this dimension that freedom is associated with responsibility. Choice makes its presence felt in at least two ways. First, there is the choice of accepting and caring about the values and weight of ascriptions of responsibility and being responsible.⁷ Unless

⁵"Responsibility and Existence," Responsibility, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 43.

⁶"Responsibility--Definitions, Distinctions, and Applications in Various Contexts," Responsibility, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), pp. 28-29.

⁷Herbert Fingarette, On Responsibility (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 6, 17-45.

an individual accepts and cares, discussion in terms of responsibility has little impact and seems inappropriate. "Anyone who conducts himself this way, whatever the reason, or even if there be no reason at all, is not morally responsible. If he simply will not accept responsibility and really does not care, then whatever the reason for his attitude, he has effectively made it pointless to consider him or to treat him as genuinely morally responsible. And as a practical matter, this is how we do respond to such cases."⁸ Choice also enters in the selection of moral criteria. It is involved in how one responds to action directed at oneself.⁹

(2) Social solidarity. The expression is H. Richard Niebuhr's. It refers to the fact that responsibility makes sense only in the context of a continuous relationship among individuals. Such a relationship is not one of random action and reaction but is at least minimally structured.¹⁰ McKeon refers to this dimension as the comprehensive or reciprocal dimension of responsibility "in which values are ordered in the autonomy of an individual character and the structure of a civilization."¹¹ It is this dimension that Fingarette identifies as "forms of life"--that which pro-

⁸Fingarette, p. 27.

⁹H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 61.

¹⁰Niebuhr, p. 65.

¹¹Richard McKeon, "The Development and the Significance of the Concept of Responsibility," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 39(1957), 5.

vides the form and content of responsibility,¹² and that Gwynn Nettler calls the "characterizing" dimension.¹³

(3) Reason. This is one of the elements Pennock notes. It is the exercise of discretion which encompasses the consideration of the consequences of one's response to a situation. The importance of consequences to responsibility is acknowledged. For example, both William L. Blizek and John Ladd have argued that consequences are what one is responsible for.¹⁴ Further, the importance of reason becomes clearer if it is viewed as interpretation. How one responds to a situation depends on how he defines and interprets that situation.¹⁵ And interpretation involves the exercise of reason and discretion.

(4) Liability. This is the other element mentioned by Pennock. It is the most widely recognized dimension of responsibility. As noted above, this liability has been interpreted both narrowly and broadly. In this essay liability will be taken as liability to both praise and blame. Also, liability and accountability will be used interchangeably.

(5) Causality. It is not clear to me how causality enters into responsibility. Rem Edwards argues that causation is one of two basic

¹²Fingarette, p. 6.

¹³"Shifting the Load," American Behavioral Scientist, 15(1972), 364.

¹⁴William L. Blizek, "The Social Concept of Responsibility," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 9(1971), 107-111; John Ladd, "The Ethical Dimensions of the Concept of Action," Journal of Philosophy, 62(1965), 633-645.

¹⁵Niebuhr, pp. 61-63.

meanings of responsibility.¹⁶ Blizek, on the other hand, distinguishes between a causal concept of responsibility and a social concept of responsibility.¹⁷ The issue seems to turn on the distinction between a descriptive use and an evaluative use of "responsibility."¹⁸ Edwards argues that responsibility qua liability is related to the evaluative use of the word while responsibility qua causality is related to the meaning of the word.¹⁹ I do not want to enter into a discussion of the controversy over the distinction between meaning and use. Such a discussion would lead too far afield and I think that the problem is not so immediate that it prevents me from continuing.²⁰ I might also add that I don't feel entirely competent to discuss it. For the present, I will state, perhaps dogmatically, that one is responsible (in the evaluative sense) only if one is a significant causal factor (responsibility in the causal sense). Significant causal factor may mean that one is either a necessary factor or that one is a sufficient factor.

Two other dimensions or elements have been frequently mentioned in

¹⁶Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 56-69.

¹⁷Blizek, pp. 109-110.

¹⁸Edwards, pp. 57-60; Harald Ofstad, An Inquiry into the Freedom of Decision (Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1961), pp. 263-265, 296-297.

¹⁹Edwards, pp. 59-60.

²⁰For a discussion of these issues, see Thomas M. Olschewsky, ed., Problems in the Philosophy of Language (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), pp. 114-194.

connection with responsibility. While they are important, I think that they are implied by the dimensions listed thus far. These elements are:

(6) Obligation. Many have taken responsibility and obligation to be different sides of the same coin. This is true. Moreover, obligation is implied by the dimension of social solidarity. Social solidarity refers to the interdependent relationships among men. And interdependence implies obligation.

(7) Criteria. There must be criteria for applying and ascribing responsibility. Also, there must be someone or something that applies this criteria. But the existence of criteria follows from choice. The choice dimension includes the choosing of the criteria and their application in specific instances. Reason is the force that applies the criteria.

Before offering an answer to the question "What does it mean to say that someone is responsible?", one further point needs to be raised. What kind of thing is responsibility? Is responsibility an entity? Is it a property of an agent?²¹ of a situation? Or is it a relation between agents? I take responsibility to be a relation between agents which can be attributed to any given agent when the relevant conditions are fulfilled. It is a reflexive relation and this reflexivity has two senses. First, responsibility is a self-reflexive relation. An agent

²¹ I use "agent" instead of "individual" so as not to preclude the possibility that collectivities may be responsible and subject to moral judgments. "Agent" can, therefore, be taken as individuals or collectives.

is responsible to himself for himself.²² Second, responsibility is reflexive between agents. As Mckeon puts it:

The concept of responsibility relates actions to agents by a causal tie and applies a judgment of value to both. It involves assumptions, therefore, about the agent and about the social context in which he acts. The agent may be an individual or a group acting in the context of a society or a political state, or an individual, group, or community acting in the looser association of free individuals or independent communities or states whose actions effect each other. In either situation, responsibility is a reflexive relation: the responsibility of the individual and the responsibility of the community of which he is a member are interdependent, and independent communities assume responsibilities with respect to each other which constitute a kind of inclusive community. A society or a nation develops responsibility externally in its relations to other corporate bodies and internally in the structure of its institutions and of the actions of the individuals who compose it. (26)

With these comments about the various dimensions and elements of responsibility in mind and with the idea that responsibility is a reflexive relation, I offer the following as an answer to the question "What does it mean to say that someone is responsible?":

"X is responsible" means that X is liable to praise/blame for making/not making the appropriate (reasonable) response to a given action or situation in which he was a significant causal factor.

This is no doubt rather vague. In any given situation there can be disagreement over whether or not X was a significant causal factor;

²²Schrader, pp. 48-49.

over whether or not there are more than one appropriate response; and over whether or not certain conditions are met by X. Despite these and other shortcomings of the formulation, I offer it, if not as the Truth, then as a useful way of viewing the subject-matter.

The question of what an individual is responsible for deserves some attention. It would seem that this aspect of the problem of responsibility would have been satisfactorily solved by now given the immediacy in practical matters of determining what one is responsible for. This is, as with most philosophical problems, not the case. As noted earlier, Blizek and Ladd take the position that one is responsible for the consequences of one's actions. Ladd's position is somewhat stronger than this. He states:

The focus on responsibility usually involves the rather curious notion that a person can be responsible for his actions. This notion seems to me not only linguistically odd, but also ethically wrong. Responsibility, I shall argue, attaches to states of affairs rather than to actions. If M tells a lie to N, it is not only odd to say that M is responsible for lying, but it is a misapplication of the category of responsibility. Rather than being responsible for lying, he is responsible for the consequences of his lying. (635)

This position is contrary to that taken by W. D. Falk. In Falk's words:

When we say that a man is responsible for his actions what exactly is he responsible for? Mr. Barnes says, not for his actions in the wide sense which includes their unforeseen implications, but for all his actions proper (in his use of the term), or which he considers the same, for his intentions. I should say, directly, neither for his actions in the wide sense, nor strictly even for his actions proper (in my use of the term),

but only for his intentions.²³

I do not intend to discuss the arguments advanced for either position. My purpose in raising the issue is to indicate that one needs to give some thought to it in developing a theory of responsibility.²⁴ Also, if one plans to do empirical research in this area, one cannot assume a consensus among one's subjects about what one is responsible for. Further, this issue points to the dangers of the researcher imposing his own conceptual framework of responsibility on his subjects. For if there is a difference between his conception and theirs, then he may arrive at the misleading conclusion that they are irresponsible. (This problem is analogous to that of concluding that the voters are irrational when in fact they are perfectly rational.) My own position is that one is responsible for (1) one's intentions, (2) the consequences of one's actions when these are intended, and (3) the consequences of one's actions when these are not intended but cannot be excused by an appeal to a lack of knowledge or some other acceptable excusing condition. This list is not exhaustive, but I think that such a list would include at least these three items.

The notion of excusing someone from being held responsible raises

²³Winston H. F. Barnes, W. D. Falk, A. Duncan-Jones, "Intention, Motive and Responsibility," The Aristotelian Society, Supp. 19(1945), pp. 252-253.

²⁴For discussions of the role played by intention in responsibility, see Herbert Morris, ed., Freedom and Responsibility (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 155-230.

the question of what conditions must be fulfilled before an ascription of responsibility is justified. I want to consider two of these conditions: knowledge and ability. I focus on these two not only because they are intimately related to responsibility but also because they seem amenable to empirical research. Concerning knowledge. How are knowledge and responsibility related? Or, in what sense does ignorance excuse one from responsibility? Aristotle made the distinction between actions due to ignorance and acting in ignorance.²⁵ Actions due to ignorance are justifiable excuses from responsibility, while acting in ignorance is not. His example of a man acting in ignorance is a man who is drunk and does not know what he is doing. He is acting in ignorance, but his actions are not due to ignorance.²⁶ An individual can be excused from responsibility if he acts due to ignorance and his ignorance is of any of the following aspects of his actions: (1) who the agent is, (2) what he is doing, (3) what thing or person is affected, (4) the means he is using, (5) the result intended by his actions, and (6) the manner in which he acts.²⁷ Thus, knowledge is related to responsibility through the various circumstances of one's actions and responses. Ig-

²⁵Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), p. 55.

²⁶Aristotle, p. 55.

²⁷Aristotle, p. 56.

norance of fact can excuse one from responsibility.²⁸ What this suggests for empirical research seems to be the following. If one is attempting to discover and correlate various levels of knowledge with senses of responsibility, then the instrument used to tap the subject's knowledge should be sensitive to the various modes of knowledge involved.

Another condition required for responsibility is ability. Lack of ability is the excusing condition noted by the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.²⁹ Following Kaufman, I take ability to mean the following:

"A has the ability to x" means "A is in a certain condition, C (C being the appropriate state of the organism brought to a certain pitch of development), such that, given opportunity, C causes A to succeed in x'ing an appropriate percentage of the time (where the appropriate percentage is determined by the unspecified complexity of C), if he should try to x."³⁰

In terms of empirical research, the constructs of political efficacy and alienation seem relevant. For one may perceive opportunity and yet feel incapable of acting effectively. In a sense, one perceives a lack of ability on one's part. There may be a corresponding diminishing of one's sense of responsibility.

²⁸For a defense of this position, see Laurence D. Houlgate, "Knowledge and Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly, 5(1968), 109-116.

²⁹See p. 11.

³⁰Arnold Kaufman, "Ability," Journal of Philosophy, 60(1963), 546.

Thus, there are excusing conditions of responsibility. The question then becomes "What is the relation between the empirical correlates of these conditions and one's sense of responsibility?" Before turning to this, though, several more items pertaining to an analysis of responsibility must be examined.

I suggested earlier that one of the distinguishing features of the idea of political responsibility is the tension between individual responsibility and collective responsibility. Before elaborating this point, it is necessary to inquire into the meaningfulness and status of the idea of collective responsibility. This is necessary, because, as noted earlier, many have denied that this phrase has any meaning. Two questions can be asked. First, does collective responsibility make sense, in the sense that it is responsibility which attaches to collectives and cannot be reduced to or equated with the sum of individual responsibilities of the members of the collective? I think that it does. Second, if a collective is denoted as responsible, does it follow that the individual members who make up the collective are individually responsible? My answer is a tentative sometimes yes, sometimes no.

It has been thought that if it were possible to reduce statements ascribing collective responsibility to statements about individuals, then the notion of collective responsibility would be shown as having no substantive content of its own. It is only short-hand for numerous individual responsibilities. Methodological individualists have not only made such a claim, but have argued that such a reduction is possible. They, thus,

conclude that collective responsibility has no sense over and beyond that of individual responsibility. A formal reconstruction of such an argument would be the following:

- (1.1) If it is possible to deduce statements ascribing collective responsibility from statements about individuals, then collective responsibility is reducible to individual responsibility.
- (1.2) It is possible to deduce statements ascribing collective responsibility from statements about individuals.
- ∴ (1.3) Collective responsibility is reducible to individual responsibility.

D. E. Cooper thinks that the argument is unsound.³¹ One can grant (1.2), but still deny that (1.3) is true. The mistake is to accept (1.1) as it stands. A further proposition must be granted. This is:

- (1.4) The statements about individuals from which are deduced the statements ascribing collective responsibility ascribe responsibility to the individuals.

However, Cooper argues that the conjunction of (1.2) and the denial of (1.4) is not self-contradictory. And if this is the case, then not all instances of collective responsibility can be reduced to individual responsibility. That this is the case can be seen by considering the following proposition:

- (2.1) It is possible that collective responsibility is divisible or indivisible.

³¹"Collective Responsibility," Philosophy, 43(1968), 258-268. The argument that I discuss appears on pp. 261-263.

To say that collective responsibility is divisible is to say that there exist a set of statements about the members of the collective such that these statements ascribe responsibility to the individuals. This idea is illustrated by the following example from the theory of descriptions. To say that stamp collection S is old is to say that stamp s_1 in S is old, s_2 in S is old, To say that collective responsibility is indivisible is to say that there does not exist a set of statements about the members of the collective such that these statements ascribe responsibility to the individuals. Again the illustration is from the theory of descriptions. To say that the stew is delicious is not to say that ingredient x is delicious, ingredient y is delicious, There are, in fact, instances of indivisible collective responsibility. Cooper's example is that of holding the tennis club responsible for its failure without holding any individual member responsible for the club's failure. Therefore, not all instances of collective responsibility can be reduced to individual responsibility.

A further argument for the possibility of collective responsibility is presented by Robin Attfield.³² Certain opponents of collective responsibility have granted that propositions about the capacities of collectives are irreducible to propositions about individuals. From this admission Attfield concludes that collective responsibility is also irreducible to statements about individuals. His argument is:

³²"Collective Responsibility," Analysis, 32(October, 1971), 31-32.

- (3.1) The capacity of a collective to bring about a state of affairs x is irreducible.
- (3.2) A collective is said to be responsible for bringing about x only if it has the capacity to bring about x.
- ..(3.3) Statements ascribing collective responsibility depend on statements about capacities.
- ..(3.4) Statements ascribing collective responsibility are not reducible to statements about individuals.

Thus, I conclude that the idea of collective responsibility makes sense.

But, if a collective is responsible, does it follow that the individual members of the collective are individually responsible? Cooper's idea of divisible and indivisible collective responsibility suggests a sometimes yes, sometimes no answer. A more precise answer presents itself if the nature of the collective is considered. Virginia Held offers such a consideration.³³ She distinguishes a random collection of individuals from a nonrandom collection of individuals. The distinguishing feature of the latter is that it has a decision method for taking action.³⁴ It is with reference to nonrandom collections of individuals that she agrees with Cooper's idea of indivisible collective responsibility:

. . . from the judgment "Collectivity C ought (ought not) to have done A," judgments of the form "Member M of C ought (ought not) to have done A" cannot be derived. From our attribution of an action, and moral responsibility, to a collectivity, it does not

³³"Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?," Journal of Philosophy, 67(1970), 471-481.

³⁴Held, p. 471.

follow that the collectivity's members are morally responsible for the action of the collectivity. It is quite possible that other judgments may be supplied indicating that the members are indeed morally responsible or that the members may be morally responsible for the quite different actions of having joined or of retaining membership in the collectivity in question, but judgments about the moral responsibility of its members are not logically derivable from judgments about the moral responsibility of a collectivity. (475)

Thus, if one conceives of the United States as a nonrandom collection of individuals, then it does not follow from the judgment that the United States is morally responsible for engaging in some reprehensible deed, such as an unjust war, that the individual Americans are morally responsible for that deed. They may be morally responsible for not doing something to end the war, but this is not the same thing.

A random collection of individuals can be morally responsible for the nonperformance of some action when the action called for in a given situation is obvious to the reasonable person and the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable.³⁵ An example of this is passengers on a subway coming to the aid of a fellow passenger who is being attacked. Also, a random collection of individuals can be held morally responsible for not forming itself into an organized group capable of deciding on a course of action.³⁶ Held also notes that if a random collection of

³⁵Held, p. 476.

³⁶Held, p. 476.

individuals is morally responsible for some failure, then each member of the collection is morally responsible (though, perhaps, in differing proportions) for the failure.³⁷ The difference is due to the absence of a decision process.

Thus, it would appear that whether or not responsibility flows from the collectivity to each individual member would depend upon the nature of the collectivity. And the important element is the absence or presence of a decision process.

That the tension between individual responsibility and collective responsibility turns on the absence or presence of a decision process points to its central place in the idea of political responsibility. For politics is, in an important sense, concern with and about decision-making processes. It is a concern with the how and why of decisions and their consequences.

The prominence of this tension between individual responsibility and collective responsibility in political responsibility becomes clearer through a consideration of the fundamental problem of politics and political philosophy. This problem is that of an individual's obligation to the state. Whence does this obligation arise? How is it justified? The tension between individual responsibility and collective responsibility is pronounced when the individual is an individual human being and the collective is a state. Hence, the problem of political responsibility

³⁷Held, p. 480.

can also be viewed as a fundamental problem of politics. And for reasons indicated earlier, it is a major problem for democracy.

I now want to make some comments on the sense of political responsibility. B. F. Skinner has pooh-poohed talk about a "sense of responsibility,"³⁸ mainly because he has taken determinism and responsibility to be inconsistent with one another. But a view that pits the strawman of determinism against the strawman of freedom must be transcended. One can still accept a deterministic account of human behavior without denying the validity of talking about freedom and one's sense of responsibility. What determinists like Skinner have overlooked is what John Platt has called the existential basis:

Each of us--as an experimenter on the outside world--starts with some kind of primary totality This is "the canvas upon which the picture is painted" or the "existential-I," as discussed by Mach, and Schrodinger, and Bridgman, and Bohm, and other operationalist philosophers of science. This total framework, this existential-I of being, and action, and reaction, precedes anything else that can be said about the world. And it is within this subjective and almost solipist sphere that each of us listens, decides whether the determinism is correct, and acts to manipulate the behavior of these other objects or people.³⁹

With these justifying comments in mind, I want to offer a conceptual construct which I call "the sense of political responsibility." The pur-

³⁸See pp. 11-12.

³⁹"A Revolutionary Manifesto," The Center Magazine, 5(March/April, 1972), 46-47. However, I do not agree with Platt that statements about the objective and subjective world have no bearing on each other.

pose of this construct is to measure one's sense of political responsibility. It can serve either as a variable-of-interest or as an explanatory variable. The sense of political responsibility can be analyzed in terms of the following five dimensions:

- (1) SCOPE: For what am I responsible? When am I responsible? If I am not responsible for something, who is?
- (2) INTENSITY: How responsible am I for a particular state of affairs? If I fail to fulfill my responsibilities, what are the consequences? If I fulfill my responsibilities, what are the consequences?
- (3) DIRECTION: To whom am I responsible?
- (4) JUSTIFICATION: Why am I responsible for something (or even anything)?
- (5) CONSISTENCY: Are my actions consistent with my views of responsibility?

It seems possible to devise scales and questions that tap these dimensions. The questions could be administered in a questionnaire which might include other relevant questions. Examples of the kind of questions I have in mind are:

(1) SCOPE: From "I am responsible for nothing" to "I am responsible for everything." Items could be constructed to ask for the respondent's views on who is responsible for certain states of affairs, e.g., the war, corruption in government, poverty. There could also be questions about how the respondent views his own actions and those of certain groups, e.g., his family, peers, elected officials.

(2) INTENSITY: From a light-hearted attitude to a very serious attitude. Items relevant to this dimension would include the respondent's views on the penalties and rewards of fulfilling one's responsibilities, duties, and obligation.

(3) DIRECTION: From completely inner-directed to completely other-directed. Items should be included so that it can be determined whether the respondent feels responsibility to himself or to others and to what degree he does so.

(4) JUSTIFICATION: From very intuitive, vague justifications to very rational and complex ones. Items relevant to this dimension would ask for the respondent's views about the grounds of his and other's responsibility.

(5) CONSISTENCY: From complete inconsistency to complete consistency. Items here would tap the respondent's views of his own situation, the qualifications he might offer about a failure on his part to fulfill a responsibility.

Besides specific questions, hypothetical or historical situations can be presented to the individual. He would be asked to make judgments about these situations. For example, Who is responsible? Why? By asking others who are in a position to know about the behavior of the individual the consistency dimension can be measured further. Thus, one should not rely solely on a straightforward questionnaire in arriving at an accurate picture of one's sense of responsibility.

The purpose of the sense of responsibility construct and of the suggestions on how to measure it is to measure and arrive at an accurate picture of the prevailing sense of responsibility of a given populace. By arriving at some accurate assessment of the sense of responsibility possessed by a given people the degree that a participatory democracy is actualized can be indicated. Of course, this is not to say that it is the only indicator. Institutional factors would need to be considered also. But the prevailing sense of responsibility seems to be an important variable. If it is concluded that the sense of responsibility is too low or deficient in certain respects, then action can be taken to correct such deficits. Also, by doing cross-cultural investigations with the sense of responsibility construct, it may become possible to determine what distinguishes one form of government from another in terms of this characteristic or attribute of the various populaces. For example, C. K. Yang has reported that the people of Communist China have a high sense of civic responsibility.⁴⁰ How does this sense of responsibility differ from that possessed by the populaces of supposed democracies such as the United States, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries? Such comparisons seem not only possible, but also quite interesting.

⁴⁰ At the 1972 World Issues Conference: China and the World Community, University of Houston, April 24-26, 1972.

RESPONSIBILITY AND REALITY

Using the sense of political responsibility construct as a guide, I want to look at some of the empirical literature that deals with the phenomenon of responsibility. Before beginning my research I thought that there would be an abundance of literature and studies dealing specifically with this subject. However, this view was mistaken. Thus, not only will I look at the more important studies that do exist, but I want also to suggest directions in which future research can go.

Unfortunately, the literature on responsibility, like many other areas of inquiry today, reflects a schizophrenia. On the one hand, there exists a sizable body of philosophical and theoretical literature treating the idea of responsibility. Some of this literature was reviewed in the last chapter. On the other hand, there is a smaller and more modest body of literature dealing with responsibility empirically. These studies have been concerned mainly with determining the empirical correlates of responsibility and the causal factors that give rise to it. What is disquieting about all this is that each proceeds as though the other were non-existent. The philosophical literature seems not to benefit from the findings of the empirical literature, while the empirical literature continues uninformed by the valuable distinctions and clarity of the philosophical literature. I came across only one empirical study

that made explicit and conscious reference and use of the philosophical literature.¹

To say that the empirical literature does not inform itself with the insights of the philosophical literature is not to say that the empirical literature proceeds without a theoretical foundation. On the contrary, there is a theoretical formulation of the problem of responsibility which prevails in the empirical literature. It is this formulation that does not draw from the philosophical literature. One of the initial impulses of this formulation is found in Jean Piaget's discussion of the subject in The Moral Judgment of the Child.² There he is concerned with the how and why of children's attributions of responsibility. He distinguishes between an objective and subjective conception of responsibility. Objective responsibility is the attribution of responsibility which takes into consideration solely the act's conformity with supposedly objective moral criteria of right and wrong, good and bad. It is an important element of what Piaget calls moral realism:

[M]oral realism [is] the tendency which the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself.

[M]oral realism induces an objective conception of responsibility. We can even use this as a criterion

¹Robert Hogan, "A Dimension of Moral Judgment," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 35(1970), 205-212.

²The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. Marjorie Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1932).

of realism. For since he takes rules literally and thinks of good only in terms of obedience, the child will at first evaluate acts not in accordance with the motive that has prompted them but in terms of their exact conformity with established rules. (111-112)

Objective responsibility is involved when the attribution of responsibility depends solely on the material consequences of the act. Subjective responsibility, on the other hand, is the attribution of responsibility which takes into account only the motive or intention of the individual who performed the act.

Piaget is not absolutely certain how these two conceptions of responsibility are related. He notes that with the sample of children he was working with he did not find a definite instance of objective responsibility after the age of ten. From this he cautiously concludes that the two conceptions of responsibility are not successive stages in a single process. Instead, they represent two distinct processes:

These two attitudes may co-exist at the same age and even in the same child, but broadly speaking, they do not synchronize. Objective responsibility diminishes on the average as the child grows older, and subjective responsibility gains correlatively in importance. We have therefore two processes partially overlapping, but of which the second gradually succeeds in dominating the first. (133)

Thus, Piaget posits two conceptions of responsibility. The first is based on consequences, while the second evaluates in terms of intentions. Further, while the two conceptions are not mutually exclusive, one does nevertheless gain prominence over the other in the moral development of

the child.

The prevailing theoretical formulation of responsibility in the empirical literature derives from Fritz Heider's The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.³ Heider's account of responsibility is a refinement of the distinctions made by others, especially Piaget. He posits five levels of causality, which provide the bases for increasingly sophisticated attributions of responsibility. These five levels are:⁴

(1) Association: A person is held responsible for each effect that is in any way connected with him or that seems in any way to belong to him. For example, a person may be congratulated for the success of his school's football team.

(2) Commission: A person is held responsible for anything he causes, even though he could not have foreseen the consequences of his acts. This corresponds to Piaget's objective responsibility.

(3) Foreseeability: A person is held responsible for anything he might have foreseen, though it was not his intention to cause it. This is similar in some respects to Aristotle's "acting in ignorance."

(4) Intentionality: A person is held responsible only for the consequences he intended. This corresponds to Piaget's subjective responsibility.

³The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

⁴Heider, pp. 112-114. See also, Marvin E. Shaw, "Attribution of Responsibility by Adolescents in Two Cultures," Adolescence, 3(1968), 23-32.

(5) Justification: A person is held responsible for consequences caused intentionally, but not justifiably excused. For example, a person may be excused of responsibility because of the presence or absence of certain environmental factors.

It is this account of responsibility which provides the conceptual framework in which most of the empirical studies are conducted. These studies have usually been concerned with finding the social and psychological correlates of each level of causality and determining whether or not these correlates are causal factors. The previously cited study by Shaw is an example of this line of research.⁵

This account of responsibility pays heed to the various important constituents of responsibility. For example, ability and knowledge are taken into account. My criticism of this formulation is not that it ignores these constituent parts, for in fact it does not; instead, it is ignorance of the developments associated with these elements and their relation to responsibility as enunciated in the philosophical literature that is the focus of my criticism.

Though attribution theory is important and interesting, I want to direct my attention to those studies that say something about the factors that either contribute to or hinder the acceptance and carrying out of responsibility. Two lines of research on this subject exist. Both are

⁵See also, Marvin E. Shaw and Jefferson L. Sulzer, "An Empirical Test of Heider's Levels in Attribution of Responsibility," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69(1964), 39-46.

a series of experimental studies carried out in a laboratory setting. The first deals with the relationship between the perception of dependency and the acceptance and execution of responsibility. The second concerns what is called the diffusion of responsibility phenomenon.

Leonard Berkowitz and Louise R. Daniels posit an intimate relation between dependency and responsibility.⁶ Reacting to the thesis that an individual will help another only if he expects something in return, they set forth what they call a social responsibility norm. An important part of this norm is that people will help others who they perceive as dependent on them for the attainment of their goals without expecting anything in return. "The perception of the dependency relationship presumably arouses feelings of responsibility to these others, and the outcome is heightened instigation to help them achieve their goals" (430). To test this thesis, they set up an experimental design with two conditions: high dependency and low dependency. Subjects in the high dependency situation were told that their performance would effect the evaluation of a fellow subject. Subjects in the low dependency situation were told that their performance would have no effect on the evaluation made on fellow subjects. The specific hypothesis was:

If subject has interiorized the obligation to aid others who are dependent upon him for their rewards, the subject should exhibit a relatively high level of motivation to help a dependent peer even when this person would not learn of the subject's performance until much later, if at all. (430)

⁶"Responsibility and Dependency," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66(1963), 429-436.

The results demonstrated a significant difference between the performance of subjects in the high dependency condition and the performance of subjects in the low dependency condition. As predicted, the former were motivated to give a better performance.

Daniels and Berkowitz replicated the experiment to test both the generality of the results and the effects of liking.⁷ They hypothesized that "the greater the person's degree of liking for those who are dependent upon him for their goal attainment, the greater will be his willingness to expend effort in order to help them reach their goal" (141). The results were consistent with those of the first study. Further, the liking hypothesis was supported. However, the authors add a note of caution about this latter fact:

The previous paper in this series argued that there is a general prescription in our society insisting that the individual should render aid to those in need of his help, i.e., to those who are dependent upon him for their goal attainment. High liking for the dependent person could have heightened conformity to this norm. In addition, however, the Ss with high liking for their dependent peer conceivably could have regarded him as a friend and, as a consequence, felt under some obligation to help him. Friends are supposed to aid each other, and such a belief could also have been in operation. (147)

Further investigation suggest evidence for the proposition that past or prior help given to an individual increases the salience of the

⁷"Liking and Response to Dependency Relationships," Human Relations, 16(1963), 141-148.

social responsibility norm for that individual in his relations with others.⁸ If this is true, then the social responsibility norm is, in a sense, self-perpetuating. Further evidence for this proposition is advanced by Richard Goranson and Leonard Berkowitz.⁹ They conclude that prior help, especially when it is voluntary as opposed to compulsory or no help at all, does increase the salience of the social responsibility norm.

Another factor influencing the salience of the social responsibility norm is prior success or failure. Berkowitz and William H. Connor hypothesize that:

people who have just had success experiences should display a greater willingness to help someone the more dependent this person is upon them. By contrast, those persons who had just failed to reach a goal would exhibit greater resentment the more someone else needed their assistance.¹⁰

Employing an experimental design similar to those of the previously mentioned studies with the addition of the success-failure variable, they find support for the hypothesis. Prior success does increase the salience of the social responsibility norm, while prior failure decreases its prominence.

⁸ Leonard Berkowitz and Louise R. Daniels, "Affecting the Salience of the Social Responsibility Norm: Effects of Past Help on the Response to Dependency Relationships," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68 (1964), 275-281.

⁹ "Reciprocity and Responsibility Reactions to Prior Help," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3(1966), 227-232.

¹⁰ "Success, Failure, and Social Responsibility," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4(1966), 664-669.

This line of research suggests the following propositions. Given that an individual has internalized an obligation to others or has accepted a social responsibility norm, then the probability that responsibilities will be accepted and executed will increase (1) when the individual perceives that the other is dependent on him for the successful attainment of the other's goals, (2) when the individual himself has received prior help, thus reinforcing his own adherence to the social responsibility norm, and (3) when the individual has experienced prior success as opposed to prior failure. These factors can be viewed as facilitating mechanisms. They point to some of the more important circumstances under which an individual's disposition to responsible behavior is most likely to come into play. These items are facilitating factors only on the assumption that an obligation or social responsibility norm has been internalized. How this comes about and the processes involved will be considered shortly. Now I want to turn to the second line of research.

That there are situational factors that inhibit the acceptance of responsibility is acknowledged. A program designed to facilitate such an acceptance must take into account these variables. It has been maintained that the presence of others is among these inhibiting factors. John M. Darley and Bibb Latane were among the first to advance this thesis.¹¹ Intervention in emergencies can be viewed as instances of accepting responsibility. Circumstances exist that facilitate or inhibit intervention.

¹¹"Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(1968), 377-383.

As Darley and Latane note:

In certain circumstances, the norms favoring intervention may be weakened, leading bystanders to resolve the conflict in the direction of non-intervention. One of these circumstances may be the presence of other onlookers. (377)

They set up an experimental situation in which subjects were measured in terms of their speed of reporting that a fellow subject was suffering from a "seizure." The subjects were led to believe that they were either the only other person participating in the experiment or that there were several other participants (two or four others). The specific hypothesis was "the more bystanders to an emergency, the less likely, or the more slowly, any one bystander will intervene to provide aid" (378). Their findings supported this hypothesis. This phenomenon was denoted as a diffusion of responsibility. With others present, each takes a "Why me?" attitude toward the emergency.

Darley and Latane also note that personality variables, such as alienation, depersonalization, etc., which have conventionally been taken to be explanations of instances of non-intervention, are insufficient by themselves and, in fact, misleading to a certain degree. The personality variables that they looked at were not useful in predicting how the subjects would react to the emergency. Further, to place the emphasis in one's explanation of non-intervention on personality variables implies a dichotomy between interveners and non-interveners based on personality. Such a categorization is unwarranted and leads to the ignoring of salient situational variables. They conclude:

The explanation of bystander "apathy" may lie more in the bystander's response to other observers than in presumed personality deficiencies of "apathetic" individuals. Although this realization may force us to face the guilt-provoking possibility that we too might fail to intervene, it also suggests that individuals are not, of necessity, "non-interveners" because of their personalities. If people understand the situational forces that can make them hesitate to intervene, they may better overcome them. (383)

Subsequent studies have attempted to confirm the hypothesis. The tendency with these studies is to support the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis while noting the effects of certain intervening variables. For example, Charles Korte investigated the effects of group communication on the diffusion of responsibility phenomenon.¹² He found that no communications among group members facilitated acceptance of individual responsibility, while communication, of either a realistic or minimizing nature, contributed to the diffusion process. He suggests that communications acts as a feedback process whereby individuals determine the need for action. No communications prompts one to act since he does not know what the others will do, while communications contributes to non-decision. Finally, in terms of personality structures, Korte notes that interveners tended more to describe themselves as unrestrained by conventionality than did non-interveners.

Shalom H. Schwartz and Geraldine Tate Clausen argue that the sexual composition of the bystander group may be an important intervening varia-

¹²"Effects of Individual Responsibility and Group Communications on Help-giving in an Emergency," Human Relations, 24(1971), 149-159.

ble.¹³ This is due to the different role expectations of males and females. Also, the perceived competence of other bystanders was a significant factor. They conclude:

The present analysis of the intentions and actions of subjects suggests that one should not generalize from these studies that the presence of other bystanders reduces the probability that any one will intervene directly in an emergency. The simple addition of bystanders did not affect direct action either for females or for males. It did reduce reporting, however, significantly for females and substantially although not significantly for males. The effect of number of bystanders on reporting, but not on direct action, suggests that the presence of others is important for understanding responses to emergencies in which most people feel normatively obligated to report to authorities (e.g., armed assault). Where direct intervention is normative (e.g., helping a person who has fallen), the number of bystanders may not matter. (309)

Schwartz and Clausen also point to the value of looking at personality variables. Their position is that an individual brings to any given situation certain dispositions and personality characteristics. These items are important determinants of the individual's vulnerability to situation forces. In this respect, Schwartz and Clausen should not be viewed as holding a position inconsistent with that of Darley and Latane, who, as noted earlier, had argued against placing undue emphasis on personality variables to the exclusion of situation variables. All seem to be saying that both personality and situation variables are important and that a full understanding of the phenomenon in question cannot be obtained if either is ignored.

¹³"Responsibility, Norms, and Helping in an Emergency," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16(1970), 299-310.

At this point it might be appropriate to interject some thoughts on future research on this phenomenon. There is in the social psychological literature a line of research that deals with the effects of the presence of others. It is known in some circles as group facilitation. Allport, Dashiel, Che, Rassmussen, and others have studied the effect that the presence of others has on an individual's behavior. The conclusion of this line of research is that the presence of others has a motivating force on the individual. Old and dominant responses are enhanced and facilitated in the presence of others, while the learning of some new response is inhibited in similar circumstances. This effect of the presence of others may have an important role in the acceptance of responsibility when others are present. In order to test the truth of these remarks, it will be necessary to inquire into whether or not subjects have a dominant response to accept responsibility and help. This in turn leads to a consideration of the individual's personality and the socialization processes he underwent. Schwartz and Clausen, with their scale measuring how people attribute responsibility, and Korte, with his findings on how interveners and non-interveners describe themselves, show that the first task is not impossible. Various works in the socialization literature (some of which will be considered shortly) demonstrate the fruitfulness of the second task. Also, if, as Berkowitz and his associates have argued, there is a cultural norm called the social responsibility norm and since most, if not all, research in this area has been done in the United States, then it would be extremely useful to do some

cross-cultural investigations. The true role of such a norm in the processes associated with responsibility could be ascertained more accurately by looking at cultures where such a norm is absent and cultures where such a norm has an increased presence.

It is not clear what conclusions one can draw from the diffusion of responsibility research. There does seem to be evidence for the diffusion of responsibility thesis. However, as several authors have pointed out, there are a number of intervening variables that must be taken into account. Once these have been taken into account, it would appear that the presence of increased others affects only some types of responses to an emergency. Direct help seems not to be affected, while reporting of an emergency is affected.

Since both that line of research dealing with the relationship between responsibility and dependency and that line of research dealing with the diffusion phenomenon are of recent origin, it can only be expected that there have been few attempts to integrate their findings. An example of such an attempt is Harvey A. Tilker's experimental design.¹⁴ He hypothesized that:

if a person is forced to "get involved" or "feel responsible" for the safety or well-being of another person, and is receiving enough feedback from the victim regarding his condition, then he will be most likely to react in a socially responsible manner and, in some way, attempt to alter the course of events. (95)

¹⁴"Socially Responsible Behavior as a Function of Observer Responsibility and Victim Feedback," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14(1970), 95-100.

The first part of the antecedent is derived from the responsibility-dependency research, while the second part finds its roots in the diffusion of responsibility research. Tilker's design is essentially the same as that used by Milgram in his obedience studies, with the necessary modifications and additions to measure the variables of interest. His findings supported the hypothesis. "On the basis of the present results it is clear that total responsibility for another person's well being and maximum feedback from that person regarding his condition are major determinants of socially responsible behavior" (99).

All the studies reviewed in the last several pages are experimental studies, performed in a laboratory setting. What implications and extrapolations can be made with respect to their conclusions from the lab to the field? In particular, what can be said about political situations in the light of these studies? In general, connections between lab and field studies are possible and have been made.¹⁵ The responsibility-dependency research seems most amenable to political interpretations. It can be hypothesized that the greater the degree of the perception of dependency among individuals in a political society, the greater will be their sense of responsibility. The perception of dependency is manifested, for example, in alternative views of political society. Greater dependency seems to be implied in an organistic view of society, while lesser dependency is suggested by an atomistic or individualistic view of society.

¹⁵For a discussion of these connections, see Martin Grossack and Howard Gardner, Man and Men (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Haddon Craftsmen, 1970), pp. 28-54.

I am less clear about how to take the diffusion of responsibility literature. This is due partially to the absence of an adequate analogue in political situations to the idea of emergency and crisis and partially to the inconclusiveness of the findings of these studies. At this point I can only offer some cryptic remarks. The situations considered in the experimental studies deal with aspects of a helping situation. Perhaps there are helping situations in a political context where the concerns of this line of research are relevant. Further, the types of collectives studied lack a decision-making procedure. What happens to the diffusion phenomenon when a collective with a decision-making procedure is faced with an emergency or helping situation?

One must be aware and not forget the limitations imposed by the situations in which this research was conducted. The hypotheses that find support in the experimental setting cannot be generalized a priori to the natural setting. Verification of these hypotheses must proceed in terms of testing these propositions in the actual natural setting.

The concern up to this point has been with several of the factors that facilitate or hinder the acceptance of responsibility. It was pointed out, though, that these factors have this characteristic only on the assumption that the individual has accepted or internalized a norm of social responsibility. I want now to turn to a consideration of the processes involved in the internalization of a sense of responsibility.

The concern now is with several of the factors that give rise to one's sense of responsibility. The sense of responsibility is to be understood in the light of the comments of the previous chapter. It can be conveniently viewed as a moral norm. Thus, a concern with the development of a sense of responsibility is part of a larger concern with the moral development of the individual. This in turn is subsumed under a concern with the socialization processes that the individual undergoes. Hence, if one wants to consider the factors that lead to the development of a sense of responsibility, then one needs to consider the general processes involved in the acquiring of norms.

Socialization will be taken to refer to "the process by which individuals acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions that enable them to participate as more or less effective members of groups and the society."¹⁶ Thus, socialization, broadly conceived, is concerned with the how and why of interpersonal relations.

Of the diverse theoretical approaches that have been offered of socialization processes, three will now be considered. The main consideration in choosing these particular three for comment is that they are each widely expounded. These approaches are the psychoanalytic, social learning, and the cognitive-developmental. Drawing on Freud's writings, the psychoanalytic theory of socialization:

¹⁶David A. Goslin, "Introduction," Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 2.

proposes a series of [universal] stages, specifies the adult's practices associated with each, postulates the maturation and timing of the child's capacities, and proposes some relationships between experiences at each stage and the child's motivation, perception, and learning. The theory is original in its linking of early parental practices in socializing the infant's bodily functions with later attributes of personality. Also original are the complex analyses of subjective states, both conscious and unconscious, which are used to explain the differential reactions of children to the same objective events.¹⁷

Several of the basic assumptions of this theory are (1) the maturational stages of development are universal, (2) there exist inherent functions that mature at various stages, (3) the basic mental structure of an individual results from an innate patterning, (4) subjective experience is the basic key to an explanation of behavior, and (5) learning is permanent.¹⁸ According to this theory, early childhood experiences are crucial in the socialization of the individual.

The failings of this theory are that the relationships that it posits, e.g., between individual differences and early experiences of restraint or gratification of certain drives, between individual differences and method of moral discipline, and between parental attitudes and individual differences, have not been substantiated by the empirical evidence. "In summary, neither early parental handling of basic drives

¹⁷Daniel R. Miller, "Psychoanalytic Theory of Development: A Re-Evaluation," Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 481-482.

¹⁸Miller, pp. 482, 485, 489, 493.

nor amount of various types of discipline have been found to directly correlate with moral attitudes or behavior in the studies surveyed."¹⁹

Social learning theory builds upon the basic stimulus-response model of behavioral psychology. Learning is seen as the association of outside events with behavioral responses. The emphasis here, as contrasted with the psychoanalytic approach, is on the environment and its effects on the individual. Some branches of the social learning approach deny that there can be structural change in development. What changes is behavior; the basic structure of the individual remains the same.²⁰ A basic assumption of social learning theories is that the basic mental structure of an individual is the result of the patterning or association of events in the outside world.²¹ The shortcoming of social learning theories is that, by themselves, they are incomplete accounts of socialization. They do not take into account the structural aspects of development.²²

The stage is thus set for an explication of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. The cognitive-developmental approach avoids the excesses of both the psychoanalytic and the social learning theories, while incorporating their respective advantages.

¹⁹Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 363.

²⁰Kohlberg, pp. 404-409.

²¹Kohlberg, p. 352.

²²Kohlberg, p. 408.

The cognitive-developmental approach is an interactionalistic approach to socialization in that it assumes that the basic mental structure of the individual is the result of an interaction between certain organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world.²³ The approach affirms the basic validity of the psychoanalytic concern with internal processes and the social learning concern with the environment without denying the importance of either as these latter theories tend to do. The basic assumptions of the cognitive-developmental approach are:²⁴

(1) Basic development involves basic transformations of cognitive structure which cannot be defined or explained by the parameters of associationistic learning, and which must be explained by parameters of organizational wholes or systems of internal relations. This assumption presupposes a distinction between behavior changes or learning in general and changes in mental structure.

(2) Development of cognitive structure is the result of processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the structure of the environment, rather than being the direct result of maturation or the direct result of learning.

(3) Cognitive structures are always structures of action. While cognitive activities move from the sensorimotor to the symbolic to

²³Kohlberg, p. 352.

²⁴Kohlberg, pp. 348-349.

verbal-propositional modes, the organization of these modes is always an organization of actions upon objects.

(4) The direction of development of cognitive structure is toward greater equilibrium in this organism-environment interaction, i.e., of greater balance or reciprocity between the action of the organism upon the (perceived) object (or situation) and the action of the (perceived) object upon the organism.

The relevance of the cognitive-developmental approach to social development can be explicated more clearly by the following four additional assumptions;²⁵

(5) Affective development and functioning, and cognitive development and functioning are not distinct realms. "Affective" and "cognitive" development are parallel; they represent different perspectives and contexts in defining structural change.

(6) There is a fundamental unity of personality organization and development termed the ego, or the self. Social development is, in essence, the restructuring of the (1) concept of self, (2) in its relationship to concepts of other people, (3) conceived as being in a common social world with social standards.

(7) All the basic processes involved in "physical" cognitions, and in stimulating developmental changes in these cognitions, are also basic to social development. Social cognition also involves role-taking.

²⁵Kohlberg, p. 349.

(8) The direction of social or ego development is also toward an equilibrium or reciprocity between the self's actions and those of others toward the self.

The interaction between the organism and the environment leads to cognitive stages which form the core of the cognitive developmental approach. Cognitive stages refer to the transformation of simple early cognitive structures as they are applied and accommodated to the external world. Cognitive stages have several general characteristics. First, they imply qualitative differences in children's modes of thinking at different ages. Second, these stages form an invariant sequence or order. Factors can facilitate or hinder development through the sequence but the sequence itself cannot be changed. Third, each stage is a structured whole in that specific responses represent underlying thought organization. Finally, cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations in that stages are increasingly differentiated and integrated structures fulfilling a common function.²⁶

Finally, the interactional nature of the theory assumes that the move from one stage to the next depends on experience. In this regard:

an interactional conception of stages differs from a maturational one in that it assumes that experience is necessary for the stages to take the shape they do as well as assuming that generally more or richer stimulation will lead to faster advances through the series involved.²⁷

²⁶Kohlberg, pp. 352-353.

²⁷Kohlberg, p. 356.

In summary, the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization is an interactional account. The interaction between organism and environment gives rise to cognitive stages. These stages are ordered in a sequence characterized by increasing differentiation and integration. The passage from one stage to the next depends on experience.

Now it seems to me that the cognitive-developmental approach is a neat and useful (dare I say accurate) conceptualization of socialization processes. Thus, it is this perspective on socialization that informs the following discussion.

It was remarked earlier that a concern with the development of a sense of responsibility is part of a larger concern with moral development, and that the latter was subsumed under the general concern with the socialization of the individual. Given a general outline of the socialization processes involved in terms of the cognitive-developmental approach, what is involved in the specific case of moral development? Kohlberg himself has posited three levels and six stages in the moral development of the individual (See Table 1). As one can see from the descriptions of the various stages this scheme of moral development conforms to the general form of a cognitive-developmental approach.

Next, how does my concern with responsibility fit into this scheme of moral development? I will argue that my discussion of responsibility has been thus far implicitly couched at the level of Stage 6. This can be seen by the following considerations. Responsibility is liability to praise/blame for making/not making the appropriate (reasonable) response

TABLE 1*

CLASSIFICATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT INTO LEVELS AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

Levels	Basis of Moral Judgment	Stages of Development
I	Moral value resides in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.	<p>Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation, Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.</p> <p>Stage 2: Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally others'. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.</p>
II	Moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others.	<p>Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and judgment by intentions.</p> <p>Stage 4: Authority and social-order maintaining orientation. Orientation to "doing duty" and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.</p>
III	Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or shareable standards, rights, or duties.	<p>Stage 5: Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or right of others, and majority will and welfare.</p>

*Kohlberg, p. 376.

(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)

Stage 6: Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust.

to a given action or situation. It was assumed earlier that a higher sense of political responsibility is crucial for popular control of government or democracy. Now part of the sense of a "higher" sense of responsibility is the degree of appropriateness of one's response. And complete or maximum appropriateness of response is response made in the light of the universal principles definitive of Stage 6. Thus, I hope that what had been implicit has become explicit and has become so in a clear way.

According to the cognitive-developmental approach structural change depends on experience. I will shortly consider some of the kinds of experience that have been taken as advancing the individual through the various moral stages of development. First, though, I want to consider briefly the concept of internalization.

Broadly speaking, the concept of internalization is used to refer to the individual's adoption of social norms or roles as his own, and to the resulting control of its behavior by the most complex mediational

functions of cognitive and verbal processes.²⁸ In this way, internalization is seen as one mode by which social influence impinges on the individual. Of course, there are other modes of social influence. For example, Herbert C. Kelman has offered a conceptual scheme of social influence in which he posits three kinds of processes of social influence and points to their differences in terms of antecedent conditions and consequent modifications.²⁹ These three processes of social influence are compliance, identification, and internalization. Compliance refers to instances when an individual accepts influence from another person or from a group because he hopes to achieve a favorable response from the other. Identification occurs when an individual adopts behavior derived from another person or group because this behavior is associated with a satisfying self-defining relationship to this person or group. Internalization takes place when an individual accepts influence because the induced behavior is congruent with his value system.³⁰ It appears that there is a close parallel between Kelman's three processes of social influence and Kohlberg's three levels of moral development. This can be seen most directly by considering one of the antecedent conditions that

²⁸Justin Aronfreed, "The Concept of Internalization," Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 264.

²⁹"Processes of Opinion Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25(1961), 57-78.

³⁰Kelman, pp. 62-66.

Kelman takes as qualitatively distinguishing the three processes. This is the motivational system activated in the influence situation,³¹ If the individual is concerned with the social effect of his behavior, then influence will tend to take the form of compliance. This fits with Kohlberg's Level I of moral development in that the orientation there is a concern with the social effects of one's actions (trouble-avoiding set, awareness of relativism of values). If the individual is concerned with the social anchorage of behavior, e.g., a satisfying self-definition, then influence will tend to take the form of identification. This proposition seems not only consistent with Kohlberg's Level II of moral development, but definitive of it. For the orientation at this level is toward performing properly in one's role and maintaining the expectancies of others. Finally, if the individual is concerned with the value congruence of his behavior, then influence will tend to take the form of internalization. Again there is a close fit between this process of social influence and Kohlberg's Level III. There the concern is with conformity by the self to shared standards. But while Kelman allows for nonrational congruence between value and behavior, Kohlberg's scheme has a distinctively rational air to it. This juxtaposition of descriptions points to a close parallel between Kelman's and Kohlberg's schemes. The other antecedent conditions, e.g., source of power of influencing agent and manner of achieving prior distinguishing of induced responses, reflect a similar but

³¹Kelman, pp. 67-68.

less obvious congruence with Kohlberg's levels of moral development.

If one accepts this congruence and fit, which seems a plausible thesis, then the implication seems to be that internalization is distinctive of the higher stages of moral development. Kohlberg confronts this question directly:

We must ask, then, in what sense the internalization concept is useful in the definition of structural-developmental change. It is evident that natural moral development is grossly defined by a trend toward an increasingly internal orientation to norms. (411)

He argues that moral internalization cannot be equated with conformity to some cultural standard:

In practice, then, the developmentalist is arguing that we can tell whether the norm an individual is following is "moral" or "internal" by looking at the way in which the individual formulates the norm, i.e., its form, and without reference to a specific external cultural standard. . . . Our own position is that the only fully internal norm is a moral principle, and that a moral principle (our Stage 6) is definable according to a set of formal attributes which are culturally universal. (412)

. . . .
The distinction between moral principles and other cultural standards is just that one is not expected to have as fully an internalized orientation to other cultural orientations. (412)

. . . .
. . . internalization must imply cognitive as well as affective correlates. (412)

. . . .
In summary, then, there is a sense in which socialization agents hold as their goal the development of internalized moral standards in the young and there is also a sense in which the development of internalized moral standards is a "natural" trend regardless of the specific expectations and practices of socialization agents. Neither the expec-

tations of socialization agents nor the natural trends of development are well defined by a conformity conception of internalization, however. (413)

Thus, a concern with internalization is a concern with the internalization of moral principles. Internalization qua conformity to cultural norms is an inadequate view of socialization because it fails to describe correctly the natural development of the individual and the aims and expectations of socialization agents.³² Of course, one can reject this conceptualization of socialization, but this is another matter.

Returning now to the experiences involved in advancing through the sequence of moral stages (and correlatively, the internalization of moral norms), the empirical evidence suggests that the following experiences contribute to the progress through the various stages. First, there is experience with role-taking. If a person can assume the role of another, he is more likely to be able to develop into Stage 6 than one who cannot assume an other's role. This is so because "moral principles are formulated as universal principles of reciprocal role-taking."³³ Thus, moral development is stimulated and enhanced by the provision of role-taking opportunities.

Related to the idea of role-taking opportunities is the decision-making structures in which an individual finds himself. Kohlberg argues:

the centrality of the individual in the communication and decision-making structure of the group enhances

³²Kohlberg, p. 414.

³³Kohlberg, p. 398.

role-taking opportunities. The more the individual is responsible for the decision of the group, and for his own actions in their consequences for the group, the more must he take the roles of others in it. (399)

Kohlberg also notes that democratic decision-making structures provide more role-taking opportunities than autocratic decision-making structures.³⁴ As Kurt Lewin has pointed out, democratic atmospheres produce more co-operation, praise, and constructive suggestions than do autocratic atmospheres.³⁵ These qualities seem congruent with role-taking.

There also seems to be evidence for the proposition that inductive discipline advances moral internalization.³⁶ By inductive discipline is meant discipline that is less punitive in nature. Love-oriented discipline which uses the withdrawal of affection as punishment is of this type. This is contrasted with sensitization discipline which consists more of concrete reactions and tends to be punitive in nature. "Induction types of discipline have in common, then, that they tend to make the child's control of its behavior independent of external contingencies. In contrast, disciplinary habits of direct physical and verbal attack may be characterized as sensitization because they tend merely to sensitize the child to the anticipation of punishment."³⁷ Inductive discipline

³⁴Kohlberg, p. 399.

³⁵Resolving Social Conflicts (New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1948), p. 78.

³⁶Aronfreed, pp. 309-313; Kohlberg, p. 400.

³⁷Aronfreed, pp. 309-310.

offers role-taking opportunities and reflects a decision-making structure facilitating moral development.

The types of experience which advance an individual through Kohlberg's sequence of moral stages point to his debt to Piaget's earlier formulation of a model of moral development. This can be most clearly seen by returning to a consideration of the conceptions of objective and subjective responsibility posited by Piaget. Kohlberg's three levels of moral development correspond roughly to Piaget's objective responsibility, mixed objective-subjective responsibility, and subjective responsibility. Addressing himself to the factors which give rise to objective responsibility, Piaget states:

What is the origin of this initial predominance of judgments of objective responsibility, surpassing in scope and intensity what may have been done or said to the children by adults? Only one answer seems to us to be possible. The rules imposed by the adult, whether verbally (not to steal, not to handle breakable objects carelessly, etc.) or materially (anger, punishments) constitute categorical obligations for the child, before his mind has properly assimilated them, and no matter whether he puts them into practice or not. They thus acquire the value of ritual necessities, and the forbidden things take on the significance of taboos. Moral realism would thus seem to be the fruit of constraint and of the primitive forms of unilateral respect.³⁸

Subjective responsibility, however, results:

when the child is accustomed to act from the point of view of those around him, when he tries to please rather than to obey, [then] he will judge in terms of intentions. So that taking intentions into account presupposes cooperation and mutual respect.³⁹

³⁸Piaget, p. 135.

³⁹Piaget, p. 137.

These comments, which point to the effects of the presence or absence of role-taking, the kind of decision-making the individual is confronted with, make it quite clear that Kohlberg has built upon and refined Piaget's basic notions.

Role-taking opportunities, decision-making structures, and inductive discipline seem to be interrelated items that enhance moral development. Their specific applicability to my concern with responsibility is shown in the remarks of Kenneth Keniston in his study of young radicals:

[The young radicals] accounts of their parents in their early experiences point to a family emphasis on responsibility and "stick-to-itiveness," and to the early acquisition of these qualities in childhood.

The sense of responsibility has an equally complex history in most of those interviewed. For some, one source lay in the parental expectation that they would be precociously responsible even as children. For others, the tendency to take responsibility was seen in early political activities, especially in high school, when many were leaders of activist groups. From an early age, most of these young men and women had grown accustomed to accepting responsibility. So when they were concretely confronted with injustice in American society, it was not a major step to feel "naturally" responsible for taking action. Without such a readiness, the most likely reaction to inequity that affects others is a defensive withdrawal into one's own private life.⁴⁰

I have been concerned with two aspects of an empirical concern with responsibility. One aspect encompasses those factors that facilitate or

⁴⁰Young Radicals (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. 134, 135.

hinder the acceptance of responsibility, given that a responsibility norm has been internalized. The second aspect deals with the processes involved in the internalization of moral norms in general and a responsibility norm in particular. I want now to suggest possible lines for future research dealing specifically with responsibility.

Johan Galtung has offered a matrix that relates various studies in terms of the number of units and the number of dimensions studied. This matrix is replicated below;⁴¹

Number of Dimensions	many			
	few			
	one			
		one	few	many

Number of Units

Case studies and depth psychology are examples of studies that center on one unit and many dimensions. Psychology proper investigates a few units on many dimensions. Sociology examines many units on a few dimensions. Opinion polls concern themselves with many units and their values on one dimension.

⁴¹Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967), p. 15.

Comprehensive research on the problem of responsibility can be organized with the aid of this matrix. Research designs can be constructed in terms of the characteristics of each cell. The Survey Research Center's election year studies are examples of designs approaching the many-many ideal. In this regard, questions concerning the individual's sense of political responsibility could be added on to the main questionnaire.

Herbert J. Spiro's notion of a "situation of responsibility" is an example of the few dimensions-many units cell.⁴² The situation of responsibility refers to the situation in which men find themselves responsible. It is measured in terms of three conditions or dimensions.⁴³ First, there are the alternatives from which a person chooses. Second, there are the resources with which a choice is implemented. Finally, there is the foreknowledge of the probable effects of the choice. Using this conceptual construct, Spiro compares various democracies in terms of the degree that they maximize each of these conditions.

The many dimensions-few units and the few dimensions-few units cells are exemplified by Robert Lane's Political Ideology and Keniston's Young Radicals. Concentration on a few subjects and their development and values in terms of responsibility would be very useful and important.

One cannot deny the importance of leadership and this is especially true in a democracy. If leadership is important, then the study of the

⁴²Government by Constitution (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 30-42.

⁴³Spiro, pp. 34-39.

determinants of responsible leadership is equally important. Studies can be conducted of individual leaders in terms of their sense of political responsibility. These studies can be of either a psychological or sociological nature.

Besides the attempt to order the study of the problem of responsibility, I want to suggest several variables that may be useful in such a study. These were mentioned earlier as related to the excusing conditions of responsibility. One variable is the level of political knowledge that an individual has. It would seem that how one views one's responsibilities would depend on his knowledge of the situation in which he found himself and of the options open to him.

Alienation is another variable that intuitively has a close relation to responsibility. Seeman's five dimensions of alienation overlap with the dimensions and conditions that I have set forth for responsibility.⁴⁴ His dimension of powerlessness is similar to the condition of ability that I have postulated before one can take responsibility or be held responsible. The meaninglessness dimension bears a resemblance to my dimension of justification. Both are concerned with the ought in a person's behavior. Personal efficacy would also be closely related to responsibility given the above remarks.

It seems to me not far-fetched to offer the notion of responsibility

⁴⁴For a discussion of Seeman's and others' discussions of alienation, see Jeanne N. Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), pp. 160-168.

as a clarifying and organizing concept of that group of concepts which includes alienation, anomie, efficacy, and participation. The primacy of responsibility in philosophy and theory should have an analogue in the empirical world.

RESPONSIBILITY AND DEMOCRACY

This essay has been concerned with the concept of political responsibility in both its theoretical and empirical aspects. But more basically it has been concerned with what I take to be an essential condition for the existence of a viable participatory democracy. This condition is the sense of political responsibility possessed by the individuals who make up the populace of a democracy. It was argued that the contemporary age is faced with a crisis of responsibility and that such a crisis is of the greatest immediacy for democracy because of the emphasis placed upon the individual in the political processes. For democracy to continue, its citizens must accept those responsibilities that attach to the citizenry in a democracy. The citizens must also possess the ability to execute those responsibilities.

I have taken a normative position in that I have proceeded with a view toward a particular end. That end was the establishment of a viable participatory democracy. Assuming political responsibility to be crucial for establishing a viable democracy, I have investigated in depth the notion of responsibility. Four exercises are involved in this endeavor. First is a clear articulation of the normative position taken. This I have attempted in Chapter 2. Second, the logical muddles surrounding the concept or idea must be cleared up. Chapter 3 presents my analysis of the

concepts of responsibility and political responsibility. Next, given the clarity gained through the analysis of the concepts, the empirical evidence was reviewed in Chapter 4.

Some have taken the position that these three tasks--the normative, logical, and empirical--can exist independently of each other and that only one, and not all, is the proper subject-matter of political science. My position is that one can grant that these tasks can be separated from each other and studied separately, but that the most valuable approach, that approach which leads to the greatest understanding and wisdom, is an integrated approach. Each task is informed by the insights of the other and only in this way can the unity of human experience be comprehended. Thus, though it seems that the contents of Chapter 3 proceed on a different plane from the contents of Chapter 4, both have as their destination an understanding of the concept of political responsibility.

The final exercise is a consideration of the policy implications and the prescriptions that follow from the conclusions of the three previous tasks. The empirical evidence suggests at least three propositions. The first concerns the relationship between responsibility and dependency. If it is the case that the acceptance of responsibility is enhanced by perceptions that others are dependent on oneself, then it would seem to follow that in order to facilitate the acceptance of responsibility it would be necessary to promote a view of man that sees him as mutually dependent on one another. In this sense, a view of man, such as a strict

individualism, that sees him as an independent and self-sufficient entity would be inconsistent with participatory democracy. As Philip Slater notes, "Individualism finds its roots in the attempt to deny the reality and importance of human interdependence."¹

The second proposition that seems to be reliably established is that early experiences with responsibility is necessary for the individual to develop an adequate sense of responsibility. Thus, the trend toward giving the young more options, choices, and responsibilities, while seemingly disruptive in the short run, may very well lay a foundation for participatory democracy in the future.

Finally, opportunities for role-taking must be provided the individual if he is to develop morally. The concern with responsibility is part of the concern with moral development. And an individual's sense of responsibility is adequate to the same degree that he has developed morally.

This essay has proceeded mainly with a view toward the responsible individual citizen. But everything that has been said is equally applicable to persons holding leadership positions. As noted in the last chapter, individual leaders can be studied using the framework I have suggested.

The sense of political responsibility that I have talked about refers to the dominant cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral responses of an individual with a view toward responsibility in political matters. It is a product not only of the socialization processes and the environment that

¹The Pursuit of Loneliness (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 26.

the individual is exposed to, but also of the individual's psychological needs. In this sense, the sense of political responsibility is malleable and, if attended to early enough, can be changed for good or evil.

I hope that it will be changed for the good. But, in a sense, much of what I have said in no way guarantees a change for the good. This is mainly because I have been concerned more with the form of responsibility than with any particular content. And as Arthur W. H. Adkins has put it:

[T]he concept of moral responsibility cannot take logical priority in any moral system. That is to say, it cannot assume some form to which all other concepts must adapt themselves. Quite the contrary: it is in virtue of other beliefs, whether moral, of value in general, or (apparently) factual, that the concept of moral responsibility takes the form which, in any society, it does take. . . . The question of responsibility may still be the most important question which can be raised, but only if the answers given implicitly or explicitly to these other questions allow this.²

Now it seems to me that the humanistic content that I have assumed allows this. I have suggested some aspects of this humanistic content which enhances participatory democracy. However, I do not feel prepared at this time to offer a systematic account of this content. Moreover, the problem of closure enters. Thus, I will only reiterate what I said earlier. The background moral values in which I have couched this analysis have been those generally associated with western humanism and especially secular humanism. Among these values are human dignity, social justice, and human self-realization. I take it that this collage of values when taken as a

² Merit and Responsibility (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 4.

whole is consistent with democracy. Whether or not it is deserves more attention than I can give it in this essay. In fact, a discussion of the content of responsibility is logically the next step in a concern with responsibility.

Many have pointed to the obstacles to democracy in the contemporary age. It must be granted that there are serious difficulties. But it does not follow from this admission that they are all insurmountable difficulties. There are difficulties of this latter sort, but it is not clear which they are. With foresight and wisdom, perhaps it will be possible to overcome enough of the surmountable obstacles so that democracy can in fact be a viable alternative for modern man.

APPENDIX

Previous times experienced and addressed themselves to the problem of responsibility, but not necessarily in the same terms that the modern discussion is couched in. The concept and the word are both of recent origin. Richard Mckeon reports that he was unable to find any philosophic treatment of responsibility prior to 1859.¹ The first recorded appearance of the word "responsibility" in both English and French occurred in 1787, the former being Hamilton's use of the word in Federalist No. 64 [63].² J. Roland Pennock points out that "responsibility" appeared at least eleven years earlier, in 1776, in Bentham's A Fragment on Government.³ The adjective "responsible" had an earlier debut: 13th century for the French, 16th century for the English, and 17th century for the German.⁴

Aristotle's account of voluntary actions has been taken by many to be one of the earliest treatments of responsibility. For example, Jonathan Glover argues that Aristotle's account of voluntary actions can be treated

¹"The Development and the Significance of the Concept of Responsibility," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 39(1957), 6-7.

²Mckeon, p. 8.

³"The Problem of Responsibility," Responsibility, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 5.

⁴Mckeon, p. 8.

as an account of responsibility, because the latter held that it is only with respect to voluntary actions that one can be praised and blamed and such a treatment of actions is definitive of responsibility.⁵ However, this view is not held by everyone. For example, Arthur W. H. Adkins argues that the idea of responsibility played a minor role in Greek moral thought and that Aristotle's account of voluntary actions cannot really be treated as an account of responsibility.⁶

McKeon notes that there are two, oftentimes opposing, ideas involved in the idea of responsibility. The first is that of accountability: to be responsible is to be held accountable, to be liable to punishment. The second is that of imputation: responsibility is implied in the conception of a reasonable free being, acts are imputed to free individuals.⁷ The seventeenth century illustrates this tension. Major efforts were made in this period to establish a science of human nature and the state. But there was no common agreement on a basic philosophy of human nature:

The major alternatives [of a philosophy of human nature] turned on a choice between accountability and imputation. If, on the one hand, the science of human nature and morals is based on the assumption that human actions are determined by a causality or necessity similar to that which determines physical change, no special moral cause or imputation is needed, and moral good and evil are defined

⁵Responsibility (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 4.

⁶Merit and Responsibility (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1960). For a discussion of the deficiencies of Adkin's account, see W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 123-125.

⁷McKeon, pp. 10-22.

by reward and punishment and identified by praise and blame. If, on the other hand, the science of law and practical reason is based on the assumption that the causality of human actions is free (as distinguished from physical necessity), since action depends on will and intellect, the basis of law and duty is found in human action, and the external accountability imposed by power or judged by pragmatic utility must be judged by an internal law recognized by conscience and reason.⁸

Hobbes, Locke, and Hume chose the first alternative, while Pufendorf, Wolff, and Kant chose the second.⁹ Skinner's account of responsibility is in the tradition of accountability.¹⁰ An example of an account of responsibility in the tradition of imputation might be Stuart Hampshire's Thought and Action.¹¹

Mulford Q. Sibley, in his Political Ideas and Ideologies,¹² takes the problem of responsibility to be one of the perennial problems of politics. He supports this contention by tracing the problem of responsibility from biblical times to the present and showing how it has been treated by the different theorists.¹³

⁸Mckeeon, pp. 14-15.

⁹Mckeeon, pp. 15, 16.

¹⁰See pp. 11-12 above.

¹¹Thought and Action (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), esp. 181-189.

¹²Political Ideas and Ideologies (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

¹³Sibley, pp. 25-26, 50-51, 98, 130, 329, 374, 411, 535, 545, 554-573, 588-589.

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