THE INFLUENCE OF MORALITY-BASED INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND

INTERPERSONAL POWER ON ETHICAL DECISION MAKING

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the C.T. Bauer College of Business

University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Managers have awakened to the potential dangers that unethical decisions can have in the workplace. As such, it has become increasingly important for managers to hire, and promote into leadership positions, those who are morally inclined. Behavioral ethics research has contributed to this effort by examining an array of individual difference variables (e.g., locus of control) and contextual factors (e.g., magnitude of consequences) that play a role in morality. However, past research has focused mostly on direct causal effects and not so much on the processes (including mediation and moderation) through which different factors lead to ethical decisions.

The purpose of the current research is to examine the process, which includes both automatic and conscious decision pathways, through which an emergent concept, moral attentiveness, influences ethical decisions. In particular, the impact of interpersonal power on ethical prototypes (i.e., the automatic pathway) and moral awareness (i.e., the conscious pathway) is examined. The findings of two studies reveal that moral attentiveness, in addition to both accurate ethical prototypes and moral awareness of the situation, positively influences the ethical decision-making process. Thus, moral attentiveness represents a promising area of study because it suggests that there is explanatory value in simply recognizing the extent to which individuals consider morality and moral content in daily experiences (i.e., perceptual moral attentiveness) and decisions (i.e., reflective moral attentiveness). In addition, whereas power was not found to play a strong role in the ethical decision-making process, results demonstrate that while the possession of power usually engenders a sense of entitlement, its consequences for ethical decision making are not always predictably negative.

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INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of corporate scandals has pushed business ethics research to the forefront of study across multiple disciplines, including management, behavioral economics, psychology, and sociology (Elm & Radin, 2012; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). While it is important to assess these scandals at a corporate level, it is also essential to understand how leaders' underlying psychological motivations play a role in these transgressions because their decisions rest at the core of these calamities (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Zhong, 2011). Thus, academics have been contributing to a growing body of research on behavioral ethics that seeks to understand ethical[1] decision making from a variety of perspectives, including the examination of individual-level and contextual factors that may affect ethical conduct (Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2008; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006; Woiceshyn, 2011). However, researchers have focused most of their efforts on describing the direct relationships between different individual-level and contextual factors on morality and not so much on the actual ethical decision-making process (including mediation and moderation). Recent research suggests that the examination of both mediating mechanisms (e.g., Welsh & Ordóñez, in press) and moderating variables (e.g., Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) will help move the behavioral ethics field forward. In addition, the relevance of morality-based individual difference variables in the ethical decision-making process also provides a promising area of study and warrants further investigation (Reynolds, 2008).

Bearing the current limitations of the field in mind, the current research seeks to contribute to the behavioral ethics field in a number of ways. The first is to examine the process of ethical decision making in more detail; this process includes both automatic (more subconscious) and conscious (more cognitive or deliberate) pathways. The examination of this

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[1] This paper treats the root words *ethical* and *moral* as synonyms.

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process will help describe *how* ethical decision making occurs and will be conceptually and empirically investigated through mediation analyses (cf. Hayes, 2012). This more integrative approach, examining both automatic and conscious decision pathways, provides a novel perspective on understanding how morality-based individual differences influence ethical choices. This is so because normative decision theories, which assert that moral decisions and behaviors are a result of rational, conscious deliberation, have dominated the field of behavioral ethics. For example, Kohlberg's (1981) cognitive moral development approach has heavily influenced research on moral judgment (Treviño et al., 2006) and asserts that as individuals reason through moral problems, they progress through certain stages of moral development that utilize a developing cognitive framework. This foundation for ethical decision making came out of John Rawl's *A Theory of Justice* which was rooted in principles from the cognitive revolution that began in the 1950s. Building on this framework, ethical decision making theories throughout the late 1900s, such as Treviño's (1986) person-situation interactionist model and Rest's (1986) four-stage model of ethical decision making, have also followed this cognitive tradition towards understanding moral functioning.

However, at the turn of the 21st century, scholars of behavioral ethics started to research other mechanisms that could impact moral judgments, such as intuitive and affective processes. For example, Haidt (2001) argued that reasoning about a moral choice takes place after the decision has already been made by using moral intuitions. He believes that moral intuitions, including their affective valence (whether good or bad), can suddenly appear in consciousness of a moral judgment. Moreover, Reynolds' (2006a) neurocognitive model of the ethical-decision making process suggested that ethical decisions involve two interrelated yet functionally distinct cycles: a reflexive pattern matching cycle (the more intuitive and retrospective aspect of the

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process) and a higher order conscious reasoning cycle (the more cognitive, reasoned analysis aspect of the process). In fact, cognitive psychology now widely accepts this dual process approach to making judgments and solving problems and this is becoming more accepted for moral functioning as well. As recommended by Zhong (2011, p. 6):

> Rather than viewing the formation of moral judgments as applying a set of neatly derived, universally applicable laws of logic, recent research on moral intuition and embodied morality proposes a messier picture in which morality is grounded in our flesh and bones and intertwined with emotions, tactile sensory input, and other concrete somatic experiences.

Consequently, it is important for behavioral ethics research to continue exploring this more automatic (reflexive) side of ethical decision making as well as how it relates to more conscious (cognitive) decision pathways. The current research addresses this need by describing the importance of accurate ethical prototypes (part of the automatic pathway because they emphasize information processing) and moral awareness of the situation (part of the conscious decision pathway because it emphasizes introspection and action) in the ethical decision-making process.

In addition to investigating the process of ethical decision making, the second contribution that the current research seeks to make is to examine the role of a specific morality-based individual difference variable – moral attentiveness – in ethical situations. Past research in the behavioral ethics field has focused its attention on describing how individual-level variables, normally unrelated to ethics, including personality, cognitive prerequisites, and demographic characteristics, influence ethical choices – an exception is Kholberg's (1981) cognitive moral development theory which is often studied in this literature (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). According to Reynolds (2008) though, there is explanatory value in recognizing the extent to which individuals pay attention to matters of morality in their daily experiences and decisions; this phenomenon is defined as moral attentiveness. Since what individuals pay attention to influences their decisions and behavior (Bandura, 1986; Fiske, 1993), moral attentiveness

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represents a promising construct to investigate. Not only is moral attentiveness chronically accessible (similar to personality traits), which means that it is a relatively stable trait, it also involves both an automatic component (when individuals process the incoming information they encounter on a daily basis) and a more conscious component (when individuals reflect on the specific decisions they made throughout the day). Thus, moral attentiveness provides an integrative approach to understanding morality-based individual difference variables because it is a function of both automatic and conscious properties.

The third contribution that the current research seeks to make is to understand *when* individuals are more likely to make ethical choices by examining a specific contextual factor that may moderate (cf. Hayes, 2012) the relationship between morality-based individual difference variables and ethical decisions. This particular contextual factor, which has witnessed a rejuvenation in scholarly attention, is interpersonal power, and whether or not it corrupts and/or enables individuals' ethical decision-making processes (e.g., DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; Koning, Steinel, van Beest, & van Dijk, 2011). Power is a basic force in social relationships (Russell, 1938) and is pervasive throughout business interactions; it also represents a paradox to organizations with regards to corruption. For example, not only did Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh (2001) find that exchange-oriented individuals given power acted in a self-serving manner, they also found that communally oriented individuals given power acted in a more altruistic fashion. Thus, it seems that the possession of power can change the powerholder and that individual or cultural-level variables may determine how power is ultimately expressed (cf. Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). This notion that power can present dual properties is something that has interested philosophers for centuries. Plato (1901) believed it important to exclude from office individuals who would be tempted to use power for self-serving reasons;

only those with a highly developed sense of justice should be allowed to exercise power. For Plato, leaders should be carefully chosen and developed to exercise power, because those who seek it as an end would be easily corrupted.

Scholarly examination of the properties and outcomes of power has only recently begun in management studies though. Moreover, much of the research on power has focused exclusively on the declarative content of the powerholder judgments while neglecting the importance of subjective and more automatic experiences that accompany the experience of power, such as feelings and bodily sensations (Weick & Guinote, 2008). Also, most of the research has focused on the negative outcomes of power. As a result, power's consequences on individuals' decision making capabilities and social interactions are not fully understood.

In summary, as illustrated in Figure 1, it is expected that ethical decisions involve an automatic and a conscious decision pathway (including the mediating mechanisms of accurate ethical prototypes and moral awareness of the situation), morality-based individual differences (e.g., moral attentiveness) and moderating contextual factors (e.g., interpersonal power). By examining how moral attentiveness leads to ethical decisions, the current research seeks to shed light on whether or not power corrupts or enables individuals while also explaining the situations in which moral attentiveness will be associated with more or less ethical decisions; this will be accomplished by examining the mediating mechanisms through which moral attentiveness links to morality in order to understand how the process influences individuals' sensitivity to ethical dilemmas.

The current research contributes to the extant literature in three key ways. First, it contributes to the budding research on the impact of morality-based individual difference variables on ethical decision making and identifies an important antecedent that influences

ethical decisions (i.e., moral attentiveness). Second, it contributes to the power and behavioral

ethics literatures by describing when power leads people to behave either ethically or unethically

thus helping elucidate the somewhat disparate findings in the field. Finally, it contributes to the

vast body of literature in psychology and management that characterizes decisions between

ethical and unethical alternatives as including both automatic and cognitive aspects, by the

application of a neurocognitive model of ethical decision making on the emergent concept of

moral attentiveness.

Figure 1

Different Components of the Ethical Decision-Making Process

Ethical decision

Contextual factor
(e.g., interpersonal
power)

Automatic and
conscious decision
pathways (e.g.,
ethical prototypes and
moral awareness)

Morality-based
individual difference
variable (e.g., moral
attentiveness)

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, the case for investigating moral attentiveness in relation to ethical conduct is described with the intent of explaining why it is important for organizations to be cognizant of individuals, especially those in leadership roles, who are morally inclined, specifically in regards to the attention they pay to matters of morality. Next, the automatic and conscious decision pathways in which moral attentiveness leads to ethical decisions are examined. In particular, ethical prototypes and moral awareness are discussed. Third, the literature on the influence of interpersonal power on individuals is reviewed in order to develop the theorizing regarding the role of individual difference variables in facilitating ethical or unethical choices in the presence of power; this theorizing is based on past and recent theoretical and empirical developments. A cognition-affect-behavior (CAB) approach to the experience of power is taken to explain how the possession of power can change the powerholder in systematic ways. Following this theoretical foundation, hypotheses are developed in regards to the relationships among these morality-based individual differences and ethical decision making, and power is identified as a possible moderating variable in some of these relationships. Lastly, the design and results of two studies that were conducted to test the hypothesized relationships are discussed. This paper concludes with a discussion of the current research and suggests possible avenues for future research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

An ethical decision is a decision that is morally acceptable (in terms of right or wrong) to the larger community (Jones, 1991). In the current research it is expected that ethical decisions will be a function of morality-based individual differences, including moral attentiveness, and power; whether individuals are high (or low) on moral attentiveness for example, will help explain why ethical choices are made. According to Kish-Gephart and colleagues' (2010) meta-analysis, unethical behavior is defined as any organizational member action that violates widely accepted (societal) moral norms. Unethical behaviors in the workplace can include lying to customers, theft, misrepresentation in financial reports, and sabotage, and many are considered to be illegal. Elm and Radin (2012) suggested that the behavioral ethics literature normally addresses unethical choices in the form of misconduct, deviance, and counterproductive behavior while tending not to emphasize proactively positive behavior; the methodological design of the current paper seeks to examine both ethical and unethical decisions.

Morality-Based Individual Differences

Given current levels of corruption in the workplace, managers are reevaluating their methods for promoting morality in organizations and are heavily investing their financial resources towards finding new methods to encourage ethical conduct (Treviño et al., 2006). One such method is to hire, and promote into leadership positions, those who are cognitively inclined toward moral behaviors (Reynolds, 2008). Therefore, it has become increasingly prudent for managers to pay attention to individual difference variables that are associated with morality. Consistent with this logic, ethics scholars have identified two morality-based constructs that showcase individuals' consideration of moral matters: moral awareness and moral sensitivity.

Moral awareness is an individual's determination that a situation is a moral situation (Rest, 1986; Reynolds, 2006b), and moral sensitivity is an individual's ability to recognize that a decision-making situation has ethical content – representing the ability to achieve moral awareness (Sparks & Hunt, 1998); "both of these constructs, however, are products of a cognitive developmental approach to ethics […] that treats information as an objectively moral exogenous factor" (Reynolds, 2008, p. 1027). As a result, these constructs limit our ability to fully understand how individuals attend to moral matters because they tend to be dependent on specific events and do not account for how individuals naturally construct moral matters in their minds on a daily basis (see Reynolds, 2008 for a more detailed discussion). When trying to understand how people form ethical judgments, it is important to identify possible consequences of frequently paying attention to moral aspects of experience (Reynolds, Owens, & Rubenstein, 2012). In order to address this attentional issue, Reynolds (2008) proposed the emergent concept of moral attentiveness, which represents the extent to which an individual chronically perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experiences.

Moral attentiveness. Reynolds (2008) utilized social cognitive theory in order to develop the construct of moral attentiveness. In particular, Reynolds focused on the accessibility element in the social cognitive model in order to illustrate how moral attentiveness is distinct from other constructs that depend on exogenous events and situational characteristics, such as moral awareness and moral sensitivity. Social cognitive theory assumes that behavioral outcomes are a function of individuals, stimuli, and the interaction of the two (Bandura, 1986). As such, individuals give varying levels of attention to different aspects of incoming information based on the vividness, salience, and accessibility of the information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). When this theory is applied to moral reasoning, it suggests that individuals vary in the amount of attention

they devote to matters of morality in their experiences and decisions (Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds, et al. 2012).

The theorizing behind the conceptualization of moral attentiveness is that it is chronically accessible (compared to normal sources of accessibility that are more temporary), which means that it is more likely to play a dominant role in how individuals interpret stimuli and process incoming information. Similarly to personality (which is an oft studied source of chronic accessibility), moral attentiveness operates on an on-going basis. Furthermore, Reynolds (2008) argued that morality constitutes a distinct category in people's cognitive frameworks (which are used to recognize stimuli); these frameworks can be applied in the recognition and encoding of stimuli (Wurthmann, 2012) and demonstrate how moral attentiveness is independent of a specific context (i.e., it exists on its own and is not a response to a specific situation).

Moral attentiveness draws on a more general category of moral content than specific types of moral frameworks, such as formalism or utilitarianism (Wurthmann, 2013). As such, it helps individuals make sense of incoming stimuli because it naturally categorizes stimuli as either moral or amoral as opposed to moral or immoral. Gunia et al. (2012) argued that "right-wrong" (i.e., ethical) decisions usually distinguish a moral value (such as integrity) from self-interest (such as cheating to get ahead). Moral attentiveness on the other hand, operates first as a lens to recognize and interpret incoming information. Because general ethical conduct is in part informed by repeated automatic behaviors and moral attentiveness emphasizes morality in a general sense, chronic attention to matters of morality can impact more automatic decisions and behavior. Through this process however, moral attentiveness does engender a system of analysis and reflection of the incoming information that eventually leads people to examine the morality of their own experiences. Thus, moral attentiveness engages two dimensions of attention: a

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perceptual aspect, which is more automatic, and a reflective aspect, which is more intentional and used as a point of introspection.

Perceptual moral attentiveness. Individuals who are perceptually morally attentive recognize moral aspects in everyday experiences. For example, individuals who are high on this trait may notice moral matter on their daily drive to work. They may perceive other drivers' actions (whether they signal before changing lanes, speed or drive under the limit, cut someone off or let someone in, etc.) as involving morality. Compared to reflective moral attentiveness, perceptual moral attentiveness is associated with behaviors that primarily entail information coding (as opposed to those that involve action). Reynolds (2008) found that perceptually morally attentive individuals were better able to recall information and to report a greater occurrence of morality-related behaviors than those who were less perceptually morally attentive.

Reflective moral attentiveness. Reflective moral attentiveness represents the extent to which an individual regularly considers and reflects upon moral matters, especially in regards to his or her own personal decisions (Reynolds, 2008). Thus, compared to perceptual moral attentiveness, reflective moral attentiveness emphasizes action (and not the processing of information). Similarly to perceptual moral attentiveness though, reflective moral attentiveness is chronically accessible, which means it increases the availability of ethically salient stimuli in cognitive frameworks. According to social cognitive theory (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991), chronic accessibility of a specific stimulus, such as morality for those who are reflectively morally attentive, reinforces awareness of categories associated with the stimulus (i.e., morality). In the case of reflective moral attentiveness, individuals pay attention to the morality of their decisions and is thus used as a point of introspection and reflection (Reynolds, 2008).

Automatic and Conscious Ethical Decision Pathways

Given the unique nature of moral attentiveness (as implied by the preceding discussion), this construct can be used to predict ethical conduct in a variety of contexts and can produce research with greater external validity (Reynolds, 2008). As a result, moral attentiveness represents an important variable in the behavioral ethics literature and it was studied in more detail in this paper by the examination of the psychological processes through which it operates, including ethical prototypes and moral awareness.

Ethical prototypes. A prototype is a pattern of neural electrochemical units that encapsulates the sensory experience to create a material imprint of the external world (Reynolds, 2006a). If a prototype contains moral content, then it is defined as an ethical prototype. Prototypes are multidimensional in form and are triggered by the mere presence of stimuli (not by deliberate thought). For instance, when someone sees another person's pet, the incoming information is automatically compared to a prototype that the individual has about pets, which can include an amalgamation of multiple properties including physical animals such as dogs or cats but also terms like love, care, and loyalty. As such, theorizing in the literature proposes that prototypes do not necessarily refer to actual targets of the information (such as sounds, objects, language, situations, complex social interactions, etc.) but instead represent theoretical exemplars of these targets (e.g., Prinz, 2002). This is especially evident in leadership categorization theory (Lord, Foti, & DeVader, 1984) which describes leadership perception as a process in which relevant leader prototypes are activated and then matched to a target stimulus in order to facilitate understanding about an individual's leadership. When an individual has characteristics that are consistent with characteristics of a follower's leader prototype, then this individual will be perceived as a leader (Lord, Foti, & Phillips, 1982). As a result, leader prototypes are dynamic

and flexible and can be informed by an array of properties including context, personal qualities of the follower and the leader, group histories, tasks, and so forth.

Moral awareness. Moral awareness represents the critical first step in Rest's (1986) cognitive model of the ethical decision-making process (i.e., recognizing a moral issue leads to making a moral judgment which then leads to establishing moral intent and ultimately, engaging in moral behavior). Moral awareness can be defined as a person's determination that a situation contains moral content and legitimately can be considered from a moral point of view (Reynolds, 2006). Much of the past research in the behavioral ethics field that has examined the ethical decision-making process has emphasized the importance of this cognitive process of moral awareness. Because moral awareness is dependent on specific events, it is different from moral attentiveness that emphasizes attention to morality in daily experiences.

In summary, the scholarly examination of morality-based individual difference variables such as moral sensitivity (Sparks & Hunt, 1998), ethical predispositions (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007), and moral identity (DeCelles et al., 2012; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011) is becoming more popular in the behavioral ethics field. The current research contributes to this scholarly effort by examining how perceptual moral attentiveness relates to ethical prototypes (representing the automatic ethical decision pathway) and how reflective moral attentiveness relates to moral awareness (representing the conscious ethical decision pathway) in terms of ethical choices.

Interpersonal Power

In addition to answering the call to understand how morality-based individual difference variables impact morality, the current research is also interested in addressing ethical decisions through the examination of the moderating effect of interpersonal power (henceforth power) (cf.

Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Thus, this paper focuses on the micro-oriented psychological and

interpersonal processes related to the possession of power, as opposed to more structural and

institutional considerations of power. This is so, because power represents an important

contextual factor in organizations. As evidenced in the following section, the possession of

power can change people in systematic ways but it also triggers action consistent with the

powerholder's dispositions, desires, goals, and needs (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Chen et al.,

2001; Malhotra & Gino, 2011; Weick & Guinote, 2008). Accordingly, it seems that the

possession of power can lead to unethical (e.g., corruption) and ethical choices since it can both

change and strengthen who a person is. Power is thus an important variable to address in regards

to morality-based individual differences because it is important to know whether power truly

corrupts a person (regardless of whether they have a high moral awareness for example) or

strengthens ("illuminates") who they are, which would further support the need to consider

morality-based differences in research and practice.

Defining power. Power plays a vital role in the architecture of people's social hierarchy

and is conceivably one of the most omnipresent forces in organizations (Magee & Galinsky,

2008; Rucker & Galinksy, 2008). Despite the long-recognized experimental study of power

across the social sciences, there is still some conceptual confusion that needs to be addressed in

order to appropriately manipulate and measure this construct (Sturm & Antonakis, 2014). For

example, power has been defined in terms of antecedents, actor's intentions, target's responses,

units of analysis, and outcomes of interest, and it has been measured in terms of dependency,

resistance, influence, and the modification of other's states (cf. Keltner et al., 2003). Thus, the

goal of this section is to first provide conceptual clarity of what power is and then to explain how

the experience of power can influence individuals, thereby building the case for why morality-based individual differences are important to study in regards to ethical decision making.

From a sociological perspective, Weber's (1947) definition of power as the probability that a person can carry out his or her own will despite resistance has provided the initial foundation for most conceptualizations of power. This definition suggests that power could represent an ability of a person – the ability to influence others and make them do things they would not do otherwise. Whereas individuals represent the locus of Weber's definition of power, other sociological conceptualizations of power take a more "structuralist" (i.e., Marxian) approach. This perspective emphasizes how "power centers" (i.e., leaders) of the organization attempt to influence others as well as the resulting social coercion and conflict between powerholders and others that is provoked (Etzioni, 1964). The focal point may shift in these differing operationalizations of power; however, it is apparent that power is a force for social influence (Lewin, 1951/1997).

Power exists in social relations because it involves the relative state of dependence between two or more individuals or groups (Magee & Galinksy, 2008). According to Emerson (1962, p. 32), the power of an actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A. Therefore, Emerson operationalized power as the extent to which actor B is dependent upon actor A for scarce and valuable resources. Thus, A becomes more powerful when B is more dependent on him or her. Consequently, power does not represent an individual's ability but is more accurately conceptualized as a property of a social relation (Emerson, 1962); it is not static, but instead is a force that interacts with contextual factors, individual difference variables (such as personality), and relationship orientation (Chen et al., 2001). Power, therefore, is characterized by relationships between two or more parties.

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Power is also characterized by agency and some sort of asymmetric control (Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Sturm & Antonakis, 2014). This control could be in terms of valuable resources (Rucker, Galinsky, & Dubois, 2012; Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2011) or from referent or symbolic sources (Etzioni, 1961). In addition, this asymmetric control can include French and Raven's (1959) bases of power which are: reward, coercive, referent, expert, and legitimate. According to French and Raven for example, one's position in a formal hierarchy (i.e., legitimate authority) is a sociostructural variable which can lead to power (e.g., head coaches of NFL teams have power over their players due to their position as coach). Some of these bases of power, such as reward and expert, relate directly to control over valued resources – a manager controls a subordinate's salary and a doctor controls a patient's diagnosis and future medical treatment because of his or her expertise, while others (e.g., referent) do not. Moreover, power is different from status, authority, and dominance (refer to Keltner et al., 2003 for a more detailed discussion), which can all be deemed as potential determinants of power.

Following in line with recent theorizing, the current paper defines power as having the discretion and means to asymmetrically control entities (Sturm & Antonakis, 2014). Discretion involves agency and having the degrees of freedom to make a decision that might control another entity, and the means through which this control occurs can include charisma, information, rewards, expertise, and so forth. Whereas it is broad, this definition of power is one of the most inclusive. It illustrates the interactive property of power as a social process (when applied to interpersonal situations), allows power to become available through multiple sources (because it involves a "means"), and it takes into account the element of control and discretion that powerholders have over others. Furthermore, it suggests that power does not need to be activated

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with respect to the actual personal or social subcomponents of the transactional relationship in order to have an effect (Rucker et al., 2012); this is so, because the definition does not require that there even is an interpersonal relationship between the individuals concerned (e.g., political leaders). For example, power over others can operate from a distance (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002; Shamir, 1995). Also, merely cognitively priming individuals with power can influence them and their social interactions (Rucker et al., 2012). Hence, the psychological experience of power can be very strong.

The experience of power. When individuals possess power, they experience changes. According to Jordan et al. (2011), these changes can produce systematic effects on individuals' thoughts and actions. In addition to cognitive and behavioral changes, powerholders' affect (and emotions) can be transformed as well. There is a growing body of research that is interested in examining how some of these changes can lead individuals to make unethical choices, thus corrupting them. Before the relationship between power and morality can be addressed though, it is important to more fully understand how the possession of power changes the powerholder in general in order to signify the value of examining individual difference variables (especially those that are morality-based) in this line of research. The following section presents a CAB (cognition-affect-behavior) approach to understanding how power transforms individuals' thoughts, emotions, and actions. Table 1 summarizes this approach.

Table 1

The Influence of Power on Cognition, Affect, and Behavior

Source	Date	Experience of power	Defining property		
			Cognition	Affect	Behavior
Emerson	1962	When individuals have power, they depend less on others			x
Kipnis	1972	Power appears to engender a sense of entitlement	x		
Erber & Fiske	1984	Powerful individuals are less motivated to pay attention to others	x		x
Kemper	1991	Power influences emotional display		x	
Fiske & Dépret	1996	Power promotes stereotypical social perceptions	x		
Gonzaga et al.	2001	Powerholders approach others at inappropriate social distances			x
Overbeck & Park	2001	Powerful individuals are better at remembering individuating info.	x		
Anderson & Berdahl	2002	Powerful individuals act objectively in more variable ways	x		x
Guinote et al.	2002	High power promotes more touching behavior			x
Galinsky et al.	2003	High power participants are more likely to act			x
Keltner et al.	2003	Powerholders are more likely to approach rewarding outcomes			x
Vescio et al.	2003	Powerholders use stereotypes when they're relevant to the context	x		
Anderson & Galinsky	2006	Experiencing power increases optimism and risk-taking behavior		x	x
Berdahl & Martorana	2006	Powerholders are inclined to experience and express positive affect		x	
Galinksy et al.	2006	Power can reduce the taking of additional perspectives into account	x		
Hall et al.	2006	Power can increase perspective taking	x		
Overbeck & Park	2006	Power promotes stereotypical social perceptions	x		
Smith & Trope	2006	Power leads to global processing and prevents distraction by details	x		
Briñol et al.	2007	Power increases perceptions of confidence	x		
Guinote	2007	Power induces a selective processing of information	x		
Magee et al.	2007	Powerholders exhibit a greater propensity to initiate a negotiation			x
van Kleef et al.	2008	Powerholders experience less compassion towards others' suffering		x	
Weick & Guinote	2008	Power promotes individuating and ease of information retrieval	x		
Fast et al.	2009	Power increases optimism and the perception of personal control	x	x	
Lammers & Stapel	2009	Power is associated with rule-based moral thinking	x		
Inesi	2010	Power reduces loss aversion	x		
DeWall et al.	2011	Power motivates self-regulation toward effective performance			x
Malhotra & Gino	2011	The pursuit of power leads powerholders to experience entitlement	x		
Rucker et al	2011	Powerful individuals spend more money on themselves			x
Bendahan et al.	2013	High power individuals are more prone to being corrupt			x
Magee & Smith	2013	High power individuals feel more distant from others		x	x
Mourali & Yang	2013	Powerholders demonstrate less normative behavior			x

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Power and cognition. A majority of the past research examining power's influence on powerholders has examined how power impacts cognition. Guinote's (2007) situated focus theory of power stated that power induces a selective processing of information that is bound to social, physical, and cultural contexts. As such, the factors that drive individuals' thoughts, including expectancies, inner experiences, and properties of the environment, are instrumental to powerholders' judgments; this selective processing can have numerous effects on how powerholders think and process information. For example, research has found that power promotes reliance on the ease of retrieval (Weick & Guinote, 2008).

In addition, Fiske (1993) and Fiske and Dépret (1996) linked power to stereotypical social perceptions when stereotype-consistent information was present in the environment. Given that power tends to decrease the powerholder's attention to others (Erber & Fiske, 1984), this finding might help explain why power encourages stereotyping judgments. Building on this line of research, Vescio, Snyder, and Butz (2003) showed that high power individuals only used stereotypes about their subordinates when stereotypes were relevant to the context (e.g., women in masculine domains) and informed the social influence strategies of high power individuals. Moreover, Overbeck and Park (2006) suggested that power promotes stereotypical social perceptions when stereotypes are essential to the individual's current goals. These past findings illustrate that although power can encourage stereotypes, this relationship is more complex. According to Weick and Guinote (2008), powerful individuals use momentary subjective experiences to form their judgments, thus, stereotypical perceptions are dependent on momentary experiences in the absence of external cues.

In six experiments, Smith and Trope (2006) demonstrated that power leads to more global processing and prevents distraction by details. They found that priming individuals to

experience power led to a greater focus on the important, central aspects of an event or object and enabled powerholders to "better see the forest beyond the trees." Thus, they suggested that high-power individuals are better at extracting the gist from incoming information compared to low-power individuals.

Power has also been linked to perspective taking but such findings are mixed. For example, Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and Gruenfeld (2006) had participants write the letter "E" on their foreheads; participants primed with high power wrote the letter in the correct direction for themselves but the letter was backwards for everyone else (those primed with low power wrote the letter in the correct direction for everyone else and backwards for themselves). These authors concluded that power reduces the tendency to take additional perspectives into account. Other research, however, has suggested that power can increase perspective taking (Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005; Hall, Murphy, & Schmid Mast, 2006).

Moreover, scholars of power have found power to be associated with rule-based moral thinking compared to outcome-based moral thinking, which was found to increase in the powerless (Lammers & Stapel, 2009). Hence, high power individuals tended to emphasize moral rules but were less inclined to make exceptions to those rules than low power individuals were. In another study exploring the possession of power and its relationship to moral content, Lammers, Stapel, and Galinsky (2010) found power to increase moral hypocrisy. That is, powerholders were more likely to impose strict moral standards on others and to judge others more strongly while practicing less strict moral behavior themselves. The authors explained though that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depended on another variable, the legitimacy of the power, which acted as a moderator in this relationship.

Finally, using a more economic-oriented lens to study power and decision making, Inesi (2010) found power to reduce loss aversion. Inesi demonstrated that powerholders were less loss averse because power reduced the anticipated threat associated with loss (thus, it reduced the negative anticipated value of losses but did not increase the anticipated value of gains). In another article examining power and decision making, power was found to lead to overconfident decision making (Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012). Overconfidence represents an inflated sense of confidence in the accuracy of one's knowledge and/or cognitive estimates (Fast et al., 2012, p. 25). Fast and colleagues explained however that the effects they found were only present when there was a moderating variable; specifically, only when objective power lead individuals to feel subjectively powerful did it engender overconfident decision making. Furthermore, power engenders a sense of entitlement (Kipnis, 1972; Malhotra & Gino, 2011). In their study, Malhorta and Gino (2011) found that as people pursued power through the investment in outside options, they experienced feelings of entitlement as a result of sunk cost bias, which ultimately lead to self-interested behavior.

In summary, there is ample research to suggest that power influences individuals' thoughts and how they process information. Specifically, power makes people cognitively lazy by inducing a simplified processing orientation that emphasizes single sources of information as well as reliance on ease of retrieval (Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; Lammers & Stapel, 2009).

Power and affect. Whereas cognition places a greater emphasis on information, affect represents a discrete reaction precipitated by a specific event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996, p. 41) and primarily involves energy transformations, such as those from chemicals at the sensory level to motor output. Even though individuals' "first level of response to the environment is

affective" (Ittelson, 1973, p. 16), this area is understudied when it comes to power. Only a handful of studies have examined how power influences individuals' emotions. Kemper (1991) linked power to emotional display and found that sadness (compared to anger, fear, and joy/happiness) was more difficult to detect in powerholders. Furthermore, van Kleef and colleagues (2008) found power to be associated with a decrease in reciprocal emotional responses to another person's suffering (i.e., high power individuals felt less distressed even though the other person was distressed) and with reduced complementary emotion (i.e., high power individuals had less compassion).

Powerholders are also inclined to experience and express positive affect (Keltner et al., 2003). Berdahl and Martorana (2006) for instance found that those randomly assigned to lead discussion groups about a controversial social issue experienced more positive emotions, such as happiness and interest, compared to low power participants who reported experiencing more negative emotions such as discomfort and fear. Moreover, another study using a fraternity hierarchy to identify high versus low power individuals (active brothers were defined as having high power while recent pledges were defined as having low power), found that powerful individuals were more likely to display smiles of pleasure than were low power individuals (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998). Additionally, research suggests that experiencing power increases optimism (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). To conclude, there is evidence to suggest that power influences individuals' affect.

Power and behavior. Although it is important to examine both cognitive and affective aspects of how power impacts individuals, practicing managers are normally more interested in how power influences people's actions. In general, research has shown that power increases an

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action orientation and thus leads directly to the taking of action for those who possess it (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Gonzaga, Keltner, Londahl, & Smith, 2001; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Magee et al. (2007) found that powerful individuals exhibited a greater propensity to initiate a negotiation and made the first move in competitive situations. Galinksy et al. (2003) found that participants in positions of high power were more likely to act and move an annoying fan during an experiment even though it was unclear whether or not they were allowed to do so. Related to this, research has demonstrated that powerholders are more likely to engage in touching behavior (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002) and are inclined to flirt more (Keltner et al., 2003). That is, power affords individuals more degrees of liberty in behavior.

In addition to having the propensity to act, high power individuals tend to depend less on others (Emerson, 1962), feel more distant from others (Magee & Smith, 2013), and sometimes withhold effort from tasks they deem unworthy, hence performing poorly at times (DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs, 2011). Also, research has found that individuals overreacted to gains in power, in that they markedly increased their demands following an increase in power (Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008). In a marketing context, Rucker, Dubois, and Galinsky (2011) found that high power consumers spent more money on themselves; the researchers examined not only consumers' intentions to spend but also the actual amount of money they spent in an experimental auction setting.

Power has also been linked to risk-seeking behavior. Anderson and Galinsky (2006) showed that participants with a high power mind-set took more risks in a face-to-face negotiation by disclosing their interests because they perceived the chances of success as greater. In addition, high power individuals were more prone to being corrupt, that is, they took advantage of their

power to violate social norms and served themselves to the detriment of the common good

(Bendahan, Zehnder, Pralong, & Antonakis, 2013). Thus, to conclude, it is apparent that the

possession of power can impact behavior in a variety of ways, both good and bad. For example,

power can enable individuals to take action and negotiate what they desire; concurrently, power

may make people less motivated to pay attention to those of lesser status and might hinder

possible learning opportunities and performance.

        Power, individual differences, and morality. One of the major themes emerging from

the literature exploring how power influences people is that power triggers action consistent with

one's goals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Malhotra & Gino, 2011). Thus, those who experience

power are more likely to act in accordance with their own desires and to satisfy their own needs

(Galinsky et al., 2003). Moreover, power appears to magnify responses in line with dispositions

of the person (Chen et al., 2001; Weick & Guinote, 2008). Taken one way, this helps explain

how power can corrupt people because it can lead people to place greater importance on their

own self-interests. Kipnis (1976) argued that repeated exercise of power can lead to vainglorious

self-concepts while Lord Acton asserts "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts

absolutely" (Acton & Himmelfarb, 1948, p. 335-336). According to Moore and Loewenstein

(2004), when people rely on their expectations to address an issue, they may overlook the ethical

implications of that issue because their expectations at work often do not include moral criteria.

        Taken another way though, this self-anchoring characteristic of power (Overbeck &

Droutman, 2013) suggests that the experience of power changes individuals in ways that can be

either positive or negative in the workplace by activating individuals' underlying traits or

attributes; hence, power may actually facilitate ethical choices if people are morally inclined. For

example, DeCelles et al. (2012) found the psychological experience of power to be associated

with less self-interest for individuals who had a strong moral identity. Accordingly, it is important for management scholars to investigate morality-based individual differences (e.g., ethical prototypes and moral awareness) in the presence of power to determine if power really corrupts people or enables dispositions they already possess – the relationships among these variables are discussed in more detail in the following section and Table 2 provides a summary of these variables.

Table 2

Summary of Variables and Definitions

Variable	Decision Pathway	Definition	Source
Perceptual Moral Attentiveness	Automatic	Perceptually morally attentive individuals screen for and focus on moral dimensions of information.	Reynolds (2008)
Reflective Moral Attentiveness	Conscious	Reflective moral attentiveness is the more intentional reflective aspect of moral attentiveness by which the individual uses morality to reflect on and examine past decisions.	Reynolds (2008)
Accurate Ethical Prototypes	Automatic	Accurate ethical prototypes represent a pattern of neural electrochemical units that encapsulates the sensory experience to create a material imprint of the external world that matches societal moral norms.	Reynolds (2006a)
Moral Awareness	Conscious	Moral awareness can be defined as a person's determination that a situation contains moral content and legitimately can be considered from a moral point of view.	Reynolds (2006b)
Power	Both	Power is having the discretion and means to asymmetrically control entities.	Sturm & Antonakis (2014)

Note. The term "both" in the above table means that the variable can be applied to both the automatic and conscious decision pathways.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

There are mixed findings regarding whether automatic or intuitive decision making leads to more ethical judgments compared to conscious or deliberate decision making. Zhong (2011) argued that conscious deliberation may overshadow the influence of implicit, intuitive forces on moral decisions while Gunia et al. (2012) asserted that "decisions made immediately are ethically perilous and that contemplation can promote ethical decisions by facilitating access to moral values" (p. 16). Reynolds (2006a) however, suggested that the ethical decision-making process involves both intuitive and conscious aspects; he proposed an interactionist approach to the ethical decision-making process that describes the process as engaging two interrelated yet functionally distinct cycles, one that is more automatic and one that is more conscious. In this neurocognitive model of ethical decision making, as Reynolds defined it, the automatic decision pathway operates first and is quick – it involves the matching of incoming stimuli to ethical prototypes. The conscious or deliberate pathway is accessed after in order to either rationalize an immediate, intuitive decision or to apply moral rules if higher order conscious reasoning is needed (Reynolds, 2006a). The current research investigated both of these decision making pathways in terms of how they relate to ethical decisions.

Two research models are presented in order to investigate the automatic and cognitive decision pathways that influence ethical choices. Specifically, the morality-based mediating mechanisms through which moral attentiveness leads to ethical decisions as well as how power interacts with some of these relationships is described. Following Reynolds' (2008) operationalization of moral attentiveness, there are two dimensions of this construct that are illustrated in these models. The first dimension is perceptual moral attentiveness and this links to the more automatic pathway of ethical decision making, which will be examined first in this

paper (the cognitive decision pathway will be examined second). Figure 2 illustrates this first

research model and it includes perceptual moral attentiveness, accuracy of ethical prototypes,

and power, which together, represent the more automatic ethical decision pathway.

Figure 2

Research Model of Perceptual Moral Attentiveness and Power on

[Automatic] Ethical Decision Making

Perceptual Moral Attentiveness and Automatic Ethical Decisions

It is expected that perceptual moral attentiveness plays a role in the more automatic

aspect of the ethical decision-making process, which Reynolds' (2006a) termed the reflexive

pattern matching cycle, because it emphasizes information coding in which incoming

information is automatically screened for moral content as it is encountered (Reynolds et al.

2012). This reflexive cycle consists of accepting stimuli from the external world, followed by

transmitting and organizing this incoming information as neural patterns, so as to compare and

match these patterns to ethical prototypes. Ethical prototypes represent previously formulated

[neurological] "base patterns" of experiential moral content.

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While the concept of prototype has overlapping characteristics consistent with other constructs found in the management forum, including schemas, plans, implicit theories, and heuristics, it is different from these constructs because it is not a metaphor but instead refers to a literal representation in the mind (Reynolds, 2006a). Ethical prototypes, then, do not merely describe ethical decision-making methods but are instrumental to the actual process. Reynolds' (2006a) claimed that automatic decision making may be the most common form of ethical decision making and as such, prototype matching represents an integral aspect of this process. In order to generate ethical decisions from this reflexive process, ethical prototypes must be accurate, that is, they must match widely accepted (societal) moral norms. If an individual's ethical prototypes are inaccurate with regards to recognition, evaluation, or instruction, then this can lead to unethical decisions (Reynolds, 2006a).

This more automatic pathway of matching stimuli to prototypes operates under the radar of conscious deliberation and is relatively cost efficient according to an evolutionary perspective. Woiceshyn (2011) asserted that human cognition is founded upon this forming and using of concepts which he described as mental integration. Since the ethical decision-making process in general starts with this more automatic pathway, it is important for behavioral ethics scholars to identify and understand what factors are influencing this process in implicit and reflexive ways; perceptual moral attentiveness could be one such factor since it is associated with stimulus recognition and the coding of incoming information (Wurthmann, 2013). For example, Reynolds (2008) found that individuals who were perceptually morally attentive were able to recall and report a greater occurrence of morality-related behaviors in others. Accordingly, the current research postulates that individuals who are perceptually morally attentive will be more likely to

activate accurate ethical prototypes because these individuals can more appropriately screen for moral content.

Hypothesis 1: Perceptual moral attentiveness will be positively associated with accurate ethical prototypes.

Although ethical prototypes are initially informed by the five senses (sight, touch, sound, smell, and taste), they integrate additional information so as to provide guidance for future action (Reynolds, 2006a). Specifically, ethical prototypes include both normative evaluations (i.e., relating incoming information to widely accepted moral standards) and prescriptive recommendations (i.e., how individuals should adapt to this information). For example, a blackmail prototype not only activates an individual's understanding of what is acceptable or not, but it also provides a way in which the individual can act upon or cope with the ethical information. Blackmail refers to a crime involving unjustified threats to make a gain or cause loss to another unless a specific demand is met (taken from the Merriam-Webster's dictionary of law). When an individual is confronted with a blackmail situation, the blackmail prototype will facilitate an understanding of the situation in a descriptive manner as well as suggests how society views the situation and subsequently, what the appropriate action is; "thus, ethical prototypes are dynamic constructs holding descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive information in one configuration of neural network signals" (Reynolds, 2006a, p. 739). This prescriptive quality is what sets ethical prototypes (and decisions) apart from other kinds of prototypes (and decisions).

Given that ethical prototypes include archetypal information coupled with guiding principles composed of societal moral norms, it is expected that individuals who have more accurate ethical prototypes will make more ethical decisions. This is so because the extent to

which individuals can achieve accuracy in their ethical prototypes will inform how correct they are in perceiving morality in scenarios and this in turn will impact the ethicality of the decisions they make. Hence,

> *Hypothesis 2: Accurate ethical prototypes will be positively associated with ethical decisions.*

Although important to our understanding of ethical decision making, the mediating mechanisms through which automatic processes ultimately shape ethical decisions have not yet received much theoretical discussion or empirical investigation in the literature (Welsh & Ordóñez, in press). The current research seeks to explore this automatic process more fully by making the first empirical attempt to describe how accurate ethical prototypes act as a mediating mechanism that can influence moral conduct. Neuroethics scholars suggest that moral functioning operates similarly to the faculty of language in that people possess a moral grammar that enables the attainment of some sort of ethical judgment almost immediately (Salvador & Folger, 2009). It is expected that this "moral grammar" can exist within individuals' ethical prototypes and can be activated by perceptual moral attentiveness.

Individuals who are perceptually morally attentive are likely to screen for and focus on moral aspects of information (Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds et al., 2012). As such, these individuals are more mindful of the potentially ethical content of day-to-day experiences. Furthermore, research has found a positive association between perceptual moral attentiveness and moral imagination (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013). "Moral imagination is a requisite component of responsible moral judgment as it enables one to disengage from a situation in order to consider new possibilities and evaluate these possibilities in terms of their moral worth and potential for positive impact" (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013, p. 62).

In addition, perceptual moral attentiveness facilitates chronically accessible moral concepts and individuals who are high on this trait are more prone to recognizing moral trends across stimuli and from incoming information compared to those who are low on this trait (cf. Taylor, 1981); hence, perceptual moral attentiveness has a positive influence on accurate ethical prototypes. As evidenced by the preceding discussion, there is evidence to suggest that perceptual moral attentiveness leads to ethical decisions in a variety of ways – not only because individuals who possess this trait devote attention to moral issues (Reynolds, 2008) and are more morally imaginative (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013) but because they can generate accurate ethical prototypes as well.

> *Hypothesis 3: Perceptual moral attentiveness will be positively associated with ethical decisions through the partial mediation of accurate ethical prototypes.*

Power's Influence on Automatic Ethical Decisions

In addition to examining how the more automatic pathway of ethical decision making operates, the current research seeks to understand power's influence on this process. It is expected that power interacts with an individual's accuracy of ethical prototypes to determine whether the individual makes a decision that is more or less ethical. This is so, because accurate ethical prototypes increase the accessibility of cognitive concepts related to morality which impacts how individuals make decisions (Reynolds, 2006a); this becomes pronounced in situations where an individual perceives himself or herself to be autonomous or powerful because power has been shown to increase responses in line with dispositions of an individual (Chen et al., 2001; Guinote, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003).

Individuals who have more accurate ethical prototypes as a result of chronically accessing morality in daily experiences should have moral concepts more readily available in

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their mental structures, which will be what power activates. As a result, power will positively

moderate the relationship between accurate ethical prototypes and ethical decisions. However, if

individuals do not possess accurate ethical prototypes, it is theorized that power will weaken the

positive relationship between accurate ethical prototypes and ethical decisions. This opposing

interaction is expected because if an individual's ethical prototypes are inept at identifying,

evaluating, or prescribing morality (i.e., they are inaccurate) then this can lead to unethical

decisions (Reynolds, 2006a), which can become magnified with the possession of power.

> *Hypothesis 4: There will be an interactive effect of having power and accurate ethical*
>
> *prototypes on ethical decisions. Specifically, power will strengthen the positive*
>
> *relationship between ethical prototypes and ethical decisions when the ethical prototypes*
>
> *are accurate and weaken the relationship when the ethical prototypes are inaccurate.*

While the aforementioned hypotheses examined the more automatic aspects of ethical

decision making in relation to perceptual moral attentiveness, accurate ethical prototypes, and

power, this paper is also interested in the more conscious aspects of ethical decision making.

This more conscious pathway (refer to figure 3) considers how the second component of moral

attentiveness (i.e., reflective moral attentiveness), in addition to moral awareness and power, can

also influence ethical decisions.

Figure 3

Research Model of Reflective Moral Attentiveness and Power on

[Conscious] Ethical Decision Making

Reflective Moral Attentiveness and Conscious Ethical Decisions

Reflective moral attentiveness represents a more general sensitivity to moral topics that could exist in any situation (Reynolds, 2008), regardless of whether that situation has the explicit characteristics of moral issues (Jones, 1991). Thus, an individual who is high in reflective moral attentiveness does not focus on specific issue characteristics or elements of morality such as harm or the law. Instead, reflective moral attentiveness shapes an individual's assessments of behavioral options and guides the individual toward moral behavior. Since reflective moral attentiveness promotes action, it is expected that this construct is positively related to moral awareness, which also portends action (Kohlberg, 1981).

According to Kohlberg (1981), moral awareness is not just about recognizing moral matters in a particular situation but it invokes a process of considering and reflecting on alternative choices. As such, it is hypothesized that reflective moral attentiveness will be positively associated with moral awareness. Reynolds (2008) originally hypothesized that moral awareness would be positively related to perceptual moral attentiveness but he did not find this

to be the case. However, in exploring his data further, Reynolds found that moral awareness was positively associated with reflective moral attentiveness and therefore, this paper hypothesizes the following:

Hypothesis 5: Reflective moral attentiveness will be positively associated with moral awareness of the situation.

Reynolds (2006a) suggested that moral awareness occurs after individuals automatically search and structure incoming information in order to compare it to existing ethical prototypes. The results of this process will then be presented to the more conscious cycle of ethical decision making which applies higher-order cognitive reasoning to the situation at hand. Moral awareness fits into the middle part of this neurocognitive model, thus after the pattern matching cycle but before either the rationalization of ethical intent or active judgment commences. Accordingly, moral awareness plays an important role in the ethical decision-making process because people must be able to identify ethical issues before they can transform their thoughts into actions; moral awareness provides this link between identification of morality and action (Kohlberg, 1981). As suggested by Rest (1986), moral awareness is a necessary precursor to moral conduct.

Consistent with research that suggests that moral awareness is positively associated with ethical conduct (DeCelles et al., 2012; Gino et al., 2011; Rest, 1986; Treviño et al., 2006), it is expected that moral awareness will be positively associated with ethical decisions in the current research. In DeCelles and colleagues' (2012) examination of moral identity, they found moral awareness to be associated with less self-interested decisions. Gino et al. (2011) were interested in how initial acts of self-control depleted individuals' self-regulatory resources in such a way so as to lead to unethical conduct. The results of their second study demonstrated that depletion of

individuals' self-regulatory resources decreased their moral awareness and as a result, they cheated more when they were provided with the opportunity to cheat. Hence,

Hypothesis 6: Moral awareness of the situation will be positively associated with ethical decisions.

In addition to moral awareness being linked to ethical conduct, reflective moral attentiveness has also been proposed as having an impact on general moral conduct (Reynolds, 2008), including positively influencing moral imagination (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013) as well as perceptions that ethics and social responsibility are important for business effectiveness (Wurthmann, 2013). For the purpose of the current research, the mediating mechanism through which reflective moral attentiveness leads to ethical decisions is explored because this represents the more conscious decision pathway. Specifically, it is theorized that moral awareness partially mediates the relationship between reflective moral attentiveness and ethical decisions.

This interaction between reflective moral attentiveness, moral awareness, and ethical decisions is expected to manifest for a number of reasons. The first is that prior research has empirically investigated moral awareness as a valuable mediation variable. For example, moral awareness was found to mediate the relationship between self-regulatory resource depletion and unethical behavior (Gino et al., 2011). It also played a role in explaining how moral identity and self-interested behavior interacted (DeCelles et al., 2012) because individuals with a weak moral identity were less morally aware which lead to more self-interested behavior. The second reason is that reflective moral attentiveness chronically accesses the moral implications of individuals' decisions thus making morality more salient as well as increasing individuals' ability to recognize and reflect on decision alternatives related to morality; thus, reflective moral attentiveness precedes and therefore influences moral awareness (Reynolds, 2008). Lastly,

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reflective moral attentiveness and moral awareness both employ mechanisms of reflection which can be transformed into action. Hence,

Hypothesis 7: Reflective moral attentiveness will be positively associated with ethical decisions through the partial mediation of moral awareness of the situation.

Power's Influence on Conscious Ethical Decisions

Because the possession of power can change the powerholder in systematic ways (Keltner et al., 2003) and facilitates self-anchoring behavior in powerholders (Overbeck & Droutman, 2013), it is important to determine whether power enhances or weakens the relationship between moral awareness and ethical decisions. Similar to the aforementioned fourth hypothesis, power is expected to behave as a moderating variable on the conscious ethical decision pathway. In particular, since power enhances self-related attributes (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Weick & Guinote, 2008) and these attributes can be construed in the moment on the basis of subjective experience, it is hypothesized that power will enable ethical decision making when individuals have a high moral awareness of the situation. This is so because these individuals will have reflected on the moral components of the situation and power should illuminate this. However, if individuals have a low moral awareness of the situation, then it is expected that power will weaken the moral awareness-ethical decision relationship because individuals are not considering the morality of the situation. Hence,

Hypothesis 8: There will be an interactive effect of having power and moral awareness of the situation on ethical decisions. Specifically, power will strengthen the positive relationship between moral awareness and ethical decisions when moral awareness is high and weaken the relationship when moral awareness is low.

The final hypothesis concerns whether power enables one decision pathway (either automatic or conscious) more so over the other. As previously discussed, behavioral ethics research presents mixed findings associated with whether or not automatic decisions are more prone to ethicality compared to those decisions that are more cognitive and deliberate (e.g., Zhong, 2011; Gunia et al., 2012). The current research suggests that power will play an important role in enabling one of these pathways towards ethicality more so than the other.

Specifically, it is expected that power will enhance the automatic decision pathway more than the conscious pathway. This is expected because automatic processes lead to more clear, polarized, and integrated representations in memory; that is, automatic processes can better categorize incoming information faster than conscious thought which would require an individual to deliberately attend to everything going on around him or her, including sights, noises, smells, and so forth (Dijksterhuis, 2004). From an evolutionary perspective, this automatic pathway is relatively cost efficient (Woiceshyn, 2011) because it allows individuals to cognitively concentrate on new or important incoming information without getting distracted by all of the other information being encountered (e.g., what color the hallway is), which is organized subconsciously. This more automatic pathway that involves matching stimuli (incoming information) to prototypes operates under the radar of conscious deliberation and tends to make the differences between preferences more clear-cut and extreme (Dijksterhuis, 2004).

According to Nordgren, Bos, and Dijksterhuis (2011), individuals engage in periods of both subconscious and conscious thought when making a complex decision, such as an ethical decision (Reynolds, 2006a), because both decision pathways have their advantages: automatic thought is better suited for integrating numerous decision attributes whereas conscious thought

can follow strict rules (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). In addition, the automatic decision

pathway provides consciousness with minimal yet necessary information since it would be

cumbersome and inefficient for individuals to cognitively process information related to all of

the stimuli that they encounter on a daily basis (Reynolds, 2006a).

If individuals have accurate ethical prototypes that enable them to appropriately

recognize ethical situations automatically and if these representations are clearer and more

polarized in memory (cf. Dijksterhuis, 2004), it is expected that power will illuminate this

process in greater strength compared to the more cognitive (moral awareness and ethicality)

relationship. This is so because power promotes reliance on the ease of retrieval (Weick &

Guinote, 2008), more global processing (Weick & Guinote, 2008), and increases the propensity

for one to act in accord with his or her desires (Galinsky et al., 2003). In addition, power

enhances emotional display (Kemper, 1991) and emotions tend to accompany the more

automatic decision pathway (Zhong, 2011); because ethical prototypes are associated with these

properties that power can promote, it is expected that power will be a stronger moderator of the

relationship between accurate ethical prototypes and ethical decisions. Hence,

> *Hypothesis 9: Power has a stronger moderating effect on the accuracy of*
>
> *ethical prototypes-ethical decision relationship compared to the moral awareness of the*
>
> *situation-ethical decision relationship.*

STUDY 1

In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, two studies were conducted. The first study manipulated the psychological experience of power and examined ethical decision making through scenarios while the second study manipulated actual state power and measured cheating behavior. Study 1 is discussed below.

Methods

Participants. Participants were 347 undergraduate students recruited from a total of 529 students (for a response rate of 65.6%) from a large southern university; students received extra credit in their class for participating. The choice of a university sample is a methodological choice that was made carefully rather than conveniently and is useful for testing the hypothesized relationships. First, undergraduate students in a university context are more likely to share the truth about their moral decisions compared to an employment context which might lead to individuals distorting their answers in fear of possible career consequences. Second, since the current research is interested in exploring individual differences and psychological mechanisms underlying ethical decision making, research suggests that dispositions are presumably well established by the time individuals have reached their college years (Gunia et al., 2012) and that most, if not all people have reached the peak of their moral development by their late teens (Kohlberg, 1981). Third, while many college aged students have some work experience, only some have been fully socialized into the workplace in ways that could be considered major influences on their thoughts or actions (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008).

The sample was 49.6% male and participants were 22 years old on average ($SD = 3.56$). Approximately 77% of the participants spent their first 18 years of life in the United States. The

average of the participants' self-reported GPAs was 3.40[2] (*SD* = .38) and 52.9% were full-time students (compared to the other 47.1% who were either full time or part time students as well as full time or part time workers). In addition, the participants were majoring in a variety of disciplines (e.g., accounting, psychology, finance, architecture, supply chain management).

Procedure. Between subjects experimental methods were chosen for this study in order to increase control and to test specific theoretical hypotheses. Prior research (cf. Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) provides well-developed laboratory-based paradigms that were adapted for this particular study in order to understand both the automatic and conscious aspects of ethical decision making. During the first phase of Study 1, participants were invited by the principal investigator to take part in a study. Specifically, participants were told that the first part of the study would take place at a location of their choosing (e.g., at home) and that the second part of the study would commence a week later in their classrooms; participants were asked to bring their completed surveys for part 1 to class with them for the second part of the study. The survey for Phase 1 consisted of a cover letter (ensuring anonymity), the measure of moral attentiveness, and the control variables. One week later, the principal investigator met the participants in their classroom to conduct a short survey and an experiment for Phase 2 of the study.

During this second phase, half of the participants' accuracy of ethical prototypes was examined first while the other half of participants were asked to wait patiently. All of the participants were then asked to take part in an unrelated filler task (e.g., Lammers & Stapel, 2009). The unrelated filler task (i.e., relatively simple math problems) was selected from a different domain and was used to ensure that the procedure (i.e., having half of the participants

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[2] Given the more sensitive nature of the study materials (i.e., asking participants about cheating and their ethical decisions), the data collection procedures were anonymous and personal identifiers (i.e., student ID numbers) could not be collected for each participant. Thus, the principal investigator asked participants to self-report their GPA (which could contain some errors) instead of being able to look up their "true" GPA with their student ID number.

report their ethical prototypes) was not influencing the results in a systematic way (Haugtvedt, Herr, & Kardes, 2008).

Following this unrelated filler task, power was then manipulated by an episodic recall prime (Galinsky et al., 2003). The episodic recall priming task took about 5 minutes and asked participants in the power condition to recall an episode of high power and to describe on a blank sheet of paper what happened and how this made them feel (those in the control condition were asked to describe their day yesterday). Whereas there are possible limitations with this power manipulation (see Sturm & Antonakis, 2014 for a discussion), this task has been validated and used in an array of power studies (e.g., Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007; DeCelles et al., 2012; DeWall et al., 2011; Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011; Lammers & Stapel, 2009; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; Rucker et al., 2011; Weick & Guinote, 2008); participants completed this power prime under the guise of a memory task (i.e., the task was ostensibly about the language people use to describe past events). Participants were then asked to complete the rest of the survey which consisted of reading and answering questions related to six ethical decision scenarios. Those participants who were not asked to report their ethical prototypes earlier in this phase were asked to report their moral awareness during this final stage through the inclusion of moral awareness items following each of the six scenarios. Table 3 summarizes the procedure for this study.

Table 3

Summary of the Procedure for Study 1

	Task during week 1 (i.e., Phase 1)	Task during week 2 (i.e., Phase 2)	Ordering of occurrence	Length of time
Research Model I (automatic pathway):				
	Perceptual moral attentiveness survey		First	5 minutes
	Control variables survey		Second	5 minutes
		Accuracy of ethical prototypes scale	Third	2 minutes
		Unrelated filler task	Fourth	5 minutes
		Psychological experience power prime	Fifth	5 minutes
		Ethical decision (UBD scenarios) survey	Sixth	20 minutes
Research Model II (conscious pathway):				
	Reflective moral attentiveness survey		First	5 minutes
	Control variables survey		Second	5 minutes
		Unrelated filler task	Third	5 minutes
		Psychological experience power prime	Fourth	5 minutes
		Ethical decision (UBD scenarios) survey	Fifth	20 minutes
		Moral awareness survey	Sixth	10 minutes

Note. UBD connotes unethical business decision.

Measures

Moral attentiveness (Phase 1). Reynolds (2008) utilized a series of studies with undergraduates, MBA students, and managers in order to create and validate a reliable multidimensional scale of moral attentiveness. The scale consists of 12 items answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Of these 12 items, seven represent perceptual moral attentiveness (e.g., "My life has been filled with one moral predicament after another") and five represent reflective moral attentiveness (e.g., "I regularly think about the ethical implications of my decisions"). Appendix A includes all 12 of these items. Reliability for the seven perceptual moral attentiveness items was calculated at $\alpha = .87$ and reliability for the five reflective moral attentiveness items was calculated at $\alpha = .84$.

Accuracy of ethical prototypes (Phase 2). Following Reynolds' (2006a) recommendations for future research, Study 1 employed a measure from an article that examined gender differences and ethical sensitivity of accounting students in order to examine participants' accuracy of ethical prototypes. The 12 items that were used were adapted from Ameen, Guffey, and McMillan (1996) and are presented in Appendix B. This measure asked students "to what extent do you think each of the following represent cheating?" on a scale ranging from 0 (*not cheating*) to 5 (*definitely cheating*). Sample items include "Asking someone who has already taken an exam what the questions are" and "Taking a test for a friend." The *higher* the individuals rate these items (in terms of cheating), the *more accurate* their ethical prototypes.

This measure describes ethical prototypes because it emphasizes identification of morality (Reynolds, 2006a). According to the code of conduct at the university where the data was collected, all of these items include immoral implications and for the most part, are considered cheating. Thus, in order for individuals to be accurate in how they assess these items,

they must observe that these items are considered cheating (i.e., chose option 5 which represents "definitely cheating"); thus, the higher their average composite score on these items, the more accurate their ethical prototypes are. Participants had two minutes to complete the items. Reliability was calculated at $\alpha = .86$.

Power manipulation (Phase 2). Participants took part in an episodic recall priming task that asked them to write a narrative essay in which they recalled a particular incident in their lives. By random assignment, participants were assigned to one of two conditions: high-power or control. Following Galinskly et al. (2003), those participants assigned to the high-power condition were instructed as follows: "Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, how you felt, etc." (p. 458). Those participants who were assigned to the control condition were instructed as follows: Please recall your day yesterday – what happened, how you felt, etc. (DeCelles et al., 2011; DeWall et al., 2011). Participants were given 5 minutes and a sheet of paper with 19 lines to complete this task.

Power manipulation check (Phase 2). In order to ensure that the power manipulation worked as intended, two graduate research assistants who were unfamiliar with the study and blind to the manipulation coded the essays with a number reflecting how much power the person had in the situation described, from 1 = *very little power* to 7 = *a lot of power* (Galinsky et al., 2003). Since a different half of the essays were coded by each research assistant, the principal investigator asked one of the research assistants to code 25% of the essays coded by the other research assistant and then calculated inter-rater reliability, which was relatively high at 90.5%.

To further test that the two research assistants' scores did not differentially impact the data in a systematic way, the results from an independent samples t-test reveal that there was no difference between how each of the research assistants coded the power scores in relation to the dependent variable of ethical decision making, $t(167) = .28$, $p = .78$. Therefore, the power scores were reliable and appropriate to use in the analyses.

As a manipulation check, the principal investigator tested whether participants in the experimental condition had higher power scores than those in the control condition. The manipulation was successful – those who wrote about a time in which they had power over another person were rated by coders as having more power ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.63$) than participants in the control condition ($M = .98$, $SD = 1.10$), $t(345) = -23.88$, $p < .01$. Following past research (e.g., DeCelles et al., 2012; Galinsky et al., 2003), the power measure was ultimately dichotomized for the analyses, with "0" representing the control condition and "1" representing the power condition.

Dependent variable of ethical decision (Phase 2). Six scenarios adapted from Ashton and Lee's (2008) Unethical Business Decisions (UBD) scale was used to test ethical decision making. This scale represents a valid measure in the literature and it has been used in prior behavioral ethics research (e.g., Hershfield, Cohen, & Thompson, 2011). Although it can be argued that these scenarios describe intent more so than actual behavior, Reynolds' (2006a) neurocognitive model considers both ethical intentions and ethical behaviors as good indicators of ethical choices, thus, this scale is appropriate for the current research. The scale items were adapted because the original scenarios included terms such as *manager* or *executive* that could interfere with the power manipulation. While participants were not asked to reflect on a particular role when they read each of the scenarios, power primes in past research have asked

participants to read a description of either a low-power (employee) or a high-power (boss) individual (e.g., Inesi et al., 2011). In order to make sure that these scenarios did not interfere with the power manipulation, any possible power identifiers in the scenarios were removed, thus making them more general in nature. Appendix C includes the six scenarios.

Each of these scenarios represents a morally questionable situation that can realistically confront individuals in organizations. At the end of each scenario, participants were asked if they would vote on, recommend, etc. a specific action. Response formats originally ranged from 1 (*definitely not*) to 4 (*definitely yes*), with higher scores indicating greater *un*ethical decision making. However, to aid in interpretability of the results, this response format was reversed after collecting the data so the new range was: 1 (*definitely yes*) to 4 (*definitely not*), with higher scores indicating greater ethical decision making. Participants were given 20 minutes to complete these scenarios. Responses to these scenarios were averaged to create the composite score and reliability was calculated at $\alpha = .65$.

Moral awareness (Phase 2). To test individuals' moral awareness of each of the six UBD scenarios, Reynolds' (2006b) validated three-item moral awareness scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) was utilized. The three items are: "There are very important ethical aspects to this situation"; "This matter clearly does not involve ethics or moral issues" (reverse scored); "This situation could be described as a moral issue". In order to minimize the chance of potential data contamination, participants were asked to complete these items after they reported their responses to each of the scenarios. Responses to these items were averaged across the six scenarios and the resulting mean represents participants' moral awareness of the situation. Reliability was calculated at $\alpha = .80$.

Control variables (Phase 1). The control variables of this study include measures that have repeatedly been linked to ethical constructs including gender and age (Detert et al., 2012; Reynolds, 2008; Wurthmann, 2013). Participants' self-reported GPA was also included as a control since moral reasoning in general has been associated with mental ability (Rest, 1986).

Study 1 Results

To ensure that everyone in the sample was properly exposed to the appropriate timing and ordering of materials required for the study, 18 participants (approximately 5%) were removed from the total sample ($n = 365$) due to either coming in late for the study or for completing Phase 2 before Phase 1. The final sample size for testing Model 1 in Study 1 was 178 participants and for testing Model 2 in Study 1 was 169. Table 4 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations among Model 1 variables; Model 1 investigated the automatic ethical decision pathway. Gender was significantly correlated with both ethical prototypes and ethical decisions with women tending to be more ethical than men. The positive correlations between gender, ethical prototypes and ethical decisions follows previous research that suggested that women's neurophysiology (e.g., having estrogen) enables them to be better at recognizing and matching prototypes in an ethically acceptable manner compared to men (Reynolds, 2006a).

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Overall Sample of Model 1 (Study 1)

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Gender	.55	.50	--					
2. Age	22.25	3.00	-.01	--				
3. GPA	3.37	.39	.06	-.04	--			
4. Perceptual moral attentiveness	3.85	1.24	-.05	.19*	-.05	--		
5. Ethical prototypes	3.91	.81	.23**	.03	.03	.06	--	
6. Power (manipulated)	.48	.50	-.05	.02	.10	-.00	-.03	--
7. Ethical decision	2.87	.53	.22**	.10	.13†	.01	.34**	-.11

Note. $N = 175$.
Gender, *male* = 0, *female* = 1.
Perceptual moral attentiveness, 7-point scale assessing extent of agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly disagree).
Ethical prototypes, 6-pont scale assessing extent to which the item represents cheating (0 = not cheating; 5 = definitely cheating).
Power (manipulated), *control* = 0, *power condition* = 1.
Ethical decision, 4-point scale assessing recommendation (1 = definitely yes; 4 = definitely no), with higher scores indicating more ethical decision making.
† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that perceptual moral attentiveness will be positively associated with accurate (i.e., a high level of) ethical prototypes. Following Cohen and Cohen's (1983) recommendation, this hypothesis was tested using hierarchical regression analysis in which accuracy of ethical prototypes was regressed onto the three control variables in model 1 and onto perceptual moral attentiveness in model 2. As shown in Table 5, perceptual moral attentiveness was not associated with accurate ethical prototypes, $\beta = .06$, $t(173) = .80$, $p = .43$, hence, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.

Table 5

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 1 (Study 1)

| | Ethical Prototypes | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.24**	.39 (.12)**	.24**	.39 (.12)**
Age	.02	.01 (.02)	.01	.00 (.02)
GPA	.01	.03 (.16)	.02	.03 (.16)
Perceptual moral attentiveness			.06	.04 (.05)
R^2 (df)		.06* (170)		.06* (169)
ΔR^2				.00

Note. $N = 174$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that accurate (i.e., a high level of) ethical prototypes will be positively associated with ethical decisions. Supporting this hypothesis, participants who had higher scores on the ethical prototypes scale were less likely to recommend taking part in an activity with immoral implications (such as opening a mine in a country where the native

inhabitants would have to be moved). As shown in Table 6, the more accurate (i.e., higher) participants' ethical prototypes were, the more ethical their decisions, $\beta = .28$, $t(173) = 3.87$, $p < .01$.

Table 6

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2 (Study 1)

	Ethical Decision			
	Model 1		Model 2	
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.22**	.23 (.08)**	.15*	.16 (.08)*
Age	.09	.02 (.01)	.08	.01 (.01)
GPA	.12	.17 (.10)	.12	.16 (.10)†
Ethical prototypes			.28**	.19 (.05)**
R^2 (df)		.07** (170)		.15** (169)
ΔR^2				.08**

Note. $N = 174$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that accuracy of ethical prototypes would partially mediate the relationship between perceptual moral attentiveness and ethical decisions. According to Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007), this hypothesis represents simple mediation because the model posits only a single mediator and thus, can be tested with standard least-squares routines using Hayes' (2012) PROCESS computational tool in SPSS. In general, this procedure is an extension of the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and is recommended over Baron and Kenny (1986) because it allows for more complex models to be tested (e.g., conditional process modeling) and does not assume a normal sampling distribution of indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008;

Williams & MacKinnon, 2008). Following Preacher and Hayes' (2008) recommendation, the

indirect effect using unstandardized coefficients was estimated through bootstrapping procedures

with 1,000 resamples to place 95% confidence intervals around the estimate of the indirect

effect. Bootstrapping provides evidence of mediation if the bias-corrected 95% confidence

interval does not include zero for indirect effects. The results demonstrate an insignificant

indirect effect of ethical prototypes (coefficient = .19, 95% CI = -.01, .03) on ethical decisions

because the bias-corrected confidence interval includes zero, thus Hypothesis 3 was unsupported.

Upon further investigation of the data in Table 7, the direct effect of perceptual moral

attentiveness on ethical decisions was not significant (p = .82), which helps explain why

mediation was not found.

Table 7

Results of Mediation Analysis for Hypothesis 3 (Study 1)

	Ethical Decision					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.22**	.23 (.08)**	.22**	.23 (.08)**	.15	.16 (.08)*
Age	.09	.02 (.01)	.09	.02 (.01)	.08	.02 (.01)
GPA	.12	.17 (.10)	.12	.17 (.10)	.12	.16 (.10)
Perceptual moral attentiveness			.00	.00 (.03)	-.02	-.01 (.03)
Ethical Prototypes					.28**	.19 (.05)**
R^2 (df)		.07** (173)		.07* (173)		.15** (173)
ΔR^2				.00		.08**

Note. N = 174. Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported along with standard errors in parentheses. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that there will be an interactive effect of having power and accuracy of ethical prototypes on ethical decisions. Specifically, it was hypothesized that power will strengthen the positive relationship between ethical prototypes and ethical decisions when the ethical prototypes are accurate (i.e., high) and weaken the relationship when the ethical prototypes are inaccurate (i.e., low).

According to Preacher et al. (2007), when the strength of the relationship between two variables is dependent on a third variable, then moderation is said to be taking place. Consequently, moderated regression analysis was chosen to test this hypothesis because it provides information about slope differences for various sub-groups (Aguinis and Stone-Romero, 1997). Model 1 included the main effects of power and ethical prototypes and model 2 included the interaction term (i.e., the product of its component variables: power and ethical prototypes). In order to minimize multicollinearity between the predictors and the interaction term, the predictor variables were mean centered and entered in the first model while original predictor values were multiplied to form the interaction term and entered in the second model (Aiken and West, 1991; Cohen and Cohen, 1983).

As shown in Figure 4, results from the moderation analysis demonstrate that the interaction term was very close to being significant, $\beta = -.68$, $t(176) = -1.92$, $p =. 057$. The change in R^2 between models 1 and 2 (which was .02) was also marginally significant ($p = .06$). However, the regression coefficient for the interaction term (i.e., the product of power and ethical prototypes) was negative, which suggests that the relationship between ethical prototypes and ethical decisions is weaker at higher levels of power than at lower levels; consequently, it seems that power does not necessarily act as a moderating variable that illuminates who a person is as originally hypothesized but instead, corrupts the more automatic ethical decision-making

process. This finding is not so surprising given the negative value of the correlations between power and ethical prototypes and decisions in Table 4 (i.e., the more power an individual has, the less accurate their ethical prototypes and decisions seem to be) and research that suggests that power corrupts people (Bendahan et al., 2013; Kipnis, 1972, 1976; Lammers & Stapel, 2011). Hence, Hypothesis 4 was unsupported.

Figure 4

Results of Moderation Analysis for Hypothesis 4 (Study 1)

Note. Numbers refer to unstandardized regression weights with standard errors in parentheses.
[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypotheses 5-8 tested Model 2, which represents the more conscious ethical decision pathway. Table 8 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations among Model 2 variables. Gender was significantly correlated with both reflective moral attentiveness and ethical decisions with women tending to be more ethical than men. Also, moral awareness was positively associated with ethical decisions.

Table 8

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Overall Sample of Model 2 (Study 1)

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Gender	.46	.50	--					
2. Age	22.26	4.07	-.07	--				
3. GPA	3.44	.37	.13	.16*	--			
4. Reflective moral attentiveness	4.68	1.20	.18*	.02	.02	--		
5. Moral awareness	5.77	.91	.13	$.15^{\dagger}$	.09	.12	--	
6. Power (manipulated)	.49	.50	.06	-.07	.19*	-.05	-.03	--
7. Ethical decision	2.93	.56	.22**	.09	.11	.04	.55**	-.06

Note. $N = 168$.
Gender, *male* = 0, *female* = 1.
Reflective moral attentiveness, 7-point scale assessing extent of agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly disagree).
Moral awareness, 7-pont scale assessing extent of agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly disagree).
Power (manipulated), *control* = 0, *power condition* = 1.
Ethical decision, 4-point scale assessing recommendation (1 = definitely yes; 4 = definitely no), with higher scores indicating more ethical decision making.
† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that reflective moral attentiveness will be positively associated with moral awareness of the situation. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis with moral awareness being regressed onto the three control variables in model 1 and then onto reflective moral attentiveness in model 2. As shown in Table 9, reflective moral attentiveness was not significantly associated with moral awareness, $\beta = .09$, $t(165) = 1.11$, $p = .27$, hence Hypothesis 5 was unsupported.

Table 9

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 5 (Study 1)

	Moral Awareness			
	Model 1		Model 2	
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.12	.22 (.14)	.11	.19 (.14)
Age	.15*	.03 (.02)*	.15[†]	.03 (.02) [†]
GPA	.05	.13 (.20)	.05	.14 (.20)
Reflective moral attentiveness			.09	.07 (.06)
R^2 (*df*)		.04 (165) [†]		.05 (165) [†]
ΔR^2				.01

Note. $N = 166$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that moral awareness of the situation will be positively associated

with ethical decisions. Supporting this hypothesis, participants who had a higher moral

awareness of each of the ethical decision-making scenarios were less likely to agree with a

recommendation that included unethical implications. As shown in Table 10, the more morally

aware participants were, the more ethical their decisions, $\beta = .52$, $t(164) = 7.76$, $p < .01$.

Table 10

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 6 (Study 1)

	Ethical Decision			
	Model 1		Model 2	
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.21**	.24 (.09)**	.14*	.16 (.08)*
Age	.09	.01 (.01)	.02	.00 (.01)
GPA	.07	.11 (.12)	.04	.06 (.10)
Moral awareness			.52**	.33 (.04)**
R^2 (*df*)		.06 (164)**		.32 (164)**
ΔR^2				.26**

Note. $N = 166$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in
parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 7 predicted that reflective moral attentiveness will be positively associated with ethical decisions through the partial mediation of moral awareness of the situation. Similarly to Hypothesis 3, Hayes' (2012) PROCESS computational tool in SPSS was used to test this hypothesis. As Preacher and Hayes (2008) have recommended, the indirect effect (i.e., moral awareness) was estimated through bootstrapping procedures with 1,000 resamples to place 95% confidence intervals around the estimate of the indirect effect. The results demonstrate an insignificant indirect effect of moral awareness (coefficient = .33, 95% CI = -.10, .06) on ethical decisions because the bias-corrected confidence interval includes zero, thus Hypothesis 7 was unsupported. As shown in Table 11, a closer look at the data reveals that the direct effect of reflective moral attentiveness on ethical decisions was not significant (p = .30), thus helping to explain why mediation was not found.

Table 11

Results of Mediation Analysis for Hypothesis 7 (Study 1)

	Ethical Decision					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.21**	.24 (.09)**	.22**	.25 (.09)**	.15*	.17 (.08)*
Age	.09	.01 (.01)	.09	.01 (.01)	.02	.00 (.01)
GPA	.07	.11 (.12)	.07	.11 (.12)	.04	.06 (.10)
Reflective moral attentiveness			-.03	-.01 (.04)	-.07	-.03 (.03)
Moral awareness					.52**	.33 (.04)**
R^2 (*df*)		.06* (164)		.06* (164)		.32** (164)
ΔR^2				.00		.26**

Note. N = 174. Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported along with standard errors in parentheses. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Hypothesis 8 predicted that there will be an interactive effect of having power and moral awareness of the situation on ethical decisions. Specifically, it was hypothesized that power will strengthen the positive relationship between moral awareness and ethical decisions when moral awareness is high and weaken the relationship when moral awareness is low. Similarly to Hypothesis 4 testing, moderated regression analysis was chosen to test this hypothesis because the strength of the relationship between two of the variables was dependent on a third variable. The variables were entered into the regression analysis in two models: model 1 included the main effects of power and moral awareness and model 2 included the interaction term (i.e., the product of its component variables: power and moral awareness). As before, the predictor variables were mean centered and entered in the first stage while original predictor values were multiplied to form the interaction term and entered in the second stage (Aiken and West, 1991; Cohen and Cohen, 1983).

As shown in Figure 5, results from the moderation analysis demonstrate that the interaction term was only marginally significant, $\beta = .58$, $t(167) = 1.35$, $p = .08$, using a one-tailed test. In contrast to the results from Hypothesis 4 though, the regression coefficient for this interaction term (i.e., the product of power and moral awareness) was positive, indicating that the relationship between moral awareness and ethical decisions is stronger at higher levels of power than at lower levels; consequently, in terms of the conscious pathway, it seems that power acts as a moderating variable that illuminates who a person is (as originally hypothesized). Hence, Hypothesis 8 was only weakly supported.

Figure 5

Results of Moderation Analysis for Hypothesis 8 (Study 1)

Note. Numbers refer to unstandardized regression weights with standard errors in parentheses.
[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, one-tailed.

Hypothesis 9 predicted that power would have a stronger moderating effect on the accuracy of ethical prototypes-ethical decision relationship compared to the moral awareness of the situation-ethical decision relationship. Given that the moderation hypotheses were not fully supported in the hypothesized direction in Study 1, this hypothesis could not be tested and is therefore unsupported. The preponderance of data though suggests that power may have a greater influence on the automatic decision pathway and this possibility is discussed in more detail in the discussion section.

Study 1 Discussion

Study 1 found full support for Hypotheses 2 and 6. Thus, aspects of the automatic and conscious decision pathways that lead to ethical decisions as described by Reynolds (2006a) do indeed play an important role in morality. Specifically, accurate ethical prototypes and moral awareness of the situation have strong, positive relationships with ethical decision making.

However, there is insufficient information to determine whether the automatic decision pathway is influenced more strongly by the possession of power compared to the more conscious decision pathway. While Hypothesis 8 was only marginally supported in the hypothesized direction, it provides some evidence that power may strengthen the positive association between moral awareness and ethical decision making when moral awareness is high. Hypothesis 4 (which investigated the automatic pathway) was more strongly supported but in a different direction than was originally hypothesized. According to the results, it seems that the relationship between ethical prototypes and ethical decisions is weaker at higher levels of power than at lower levels, which suggests that power may be corrupting the automatic pathway in contrast to "illuminating" the more conscious pathway. Future research should explore the influence of power on the automatic and conscious decision pathways in more detail to further tease apart the dynamic properties of power.

STUDY 2

In their meta-analysis of the behavioral ethics field, Kish-Gephart and colleagues (2012) assert that there is a pressing need for research on ethical decision making to examine more "real" situations compared to contrived scenarios or artificial vignettes. The same holds true for priming power compared to actually giving people power (Rucker et al., 2011; Sturm & Antonakis, 2014). Thus, the goal of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 in a more realistic fashion by using a state power manipulation and measuring actual unethical decision-making behavior (through the use of a cheating task).

Methods

Participants. Similarly to Study 1, Study 2 employed a university sample and a between-subjects experimental design. Participants were 199 undergraduate students (29.8% male) recruited from a total of 298 students (for a response rate of 66.8%) from a large southern university. Participants completed this study in exchange for extra credit in their class; in addition, participants were told that they would have an opportunity to earn some cash depending on their progress in an experimental task that they would later take part in. The average age of the participants was 23 years ($SD = 3.76$) and 85.9% of participants spent the first 18 years of their life in the United States. The average self-reported GPA for participants was 3.20 ($SD = .47$) and 44% were full-time students.

Procedure. As demonstrated in Table 12, this study was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, the principal investigator provided participants with a hard copy of the survey materials including a cover letter (ensuring anonymity), the moral attentiveness measure, and demographic questions (i.e., the control variables); these survey materials were completed on the participants' own time and location of choosing. Phase 2 commenced approximately one week

later when the principal investigator came to the participants' classes to conduct the experiment. Participants were addressed as a group at the start of class and were told that they would be participating in a separate study about memory and how people work together. Participants were told that the study will involve completing a series of questionnaires, a memory exercise, and a task with a same-sex partner. In reality, participants completed the entire experiment alone (cf. DeWall et al., 2011).

First, half of the participants' accuracy of ethical prototypes was measured while the other half of participants were asked to wait patiently for the next survey. Then, all participants took part in an unrelated filler task (e.g., Lammers & Stapel, 2009) that involved solving simple math problems. After the unrelated filler task, the principal investigator assigned each participant a role (either high-power or control) that they will have for the upcoming partner task. Prior research that has employed this power role manipulation (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Rucker et al., 2011) has followed Anderson and Berdahl's (2002) procedure of having participants believe that they are assigned to a specific role (whether it is high-power, low-power, or control) because of their answers to some sort of leadership assessment they took prior to role assignment. Since participants completed this phase of the study in a classroom setting (instead of individually), the principal investigator had each of the participants first average their scores on one of the demographic surveys they took a week earlier (which assessed how dominant they were in relationships) before they received their role assignment. This was done in order for participants to believe that the role assignment they received correlated with their supposed leadership potential; in reality, participants were randomly assigned a role.

Then, participants in the control condition (which was designated with a survey packet that included a blue cover sheet) were asked to leave the classroom for a few minutes, while

participants in the power condition (which was designated with a survey packet containing an orange cover sheet) were asked to stay. The principal investigator then separately explained the role that each of the groups of participants will be in (addressing the power group first in the classroom and then the control group second out in the hallway). During this time, participants were told that they will be building a structure called a tanagram out of a box of Lego toys; tanagrams are puzzles that consist of multiple parts that need to be rotated in the correct way in order to reach the appropriate solution. They were also explained their role assignments in more detail, which is described further in the measures section.

After giving both groups of participants (i.e., the experimental group and the control group) their instructions, all of the participants were brought back into the classroom and were told that they will be taking part in a "memory exercise" first, which was described to them as a prerequisite for the upcoming partner task. This exercise, which was ostensibly about memory, actually tested unethical decision making, because participants had an opportunity to cheat in order to earn cash (the details of this exercise are explained more thoroughly in the following section). After this exercise, the half of participants who were not asked to originally report their ethical prototypes earlier in the study were then asked to report their moral awareness during this final stage (i.e., these participants were asked to answer three additional questions before they turned in their surveys). After all of the participants turned in their survey materials, they were debriefed and Study 2 was concluded.

Table 12

Summary of the Procedure for Study 2

	Task during week 1 (i.e., Phase 1)	Task during week 2 (i.e., Phase 2)	Ordering of occurrence	Length of time
Research Model I (automatic pathway):				
	Perceptual moral attentiveness survey		First	5 minutes
	Control variables survey		Second	10 minutes
		Accuracy of ethical prototypes scale	Third	2 minutes
		Unrelated filler task	Fourth	5 minutes
		Manipulation of state power	Fifth	5 minutes
		Unethical decision (i.e., cheating) task	Sixth	15 minutes
Research Model II (conscious pathway):				
	Reflective moral attentiveness		First	5 minutes
	Control variables		Second	10 minutes
		Unrelated filler task	Third	5 minutes
		Manipulation of state power	Fourth	5 minutes
		Unethical decision (i.e., cheating) task	Fifth	15 minutes
		Moral awareness survey	Sixth	5 minutes

Measures

Moral attentiveness (Phase 1). In the initial phase, the same twelve-item measure of moral attentiveness (Reynolds, 2008) as reported in Study 1 was administered. Reliability for the seven perceptual moral attentiveness items was calculated at $\alpha = .89$ and reliability for the five reflective moral attentiveness items was calculated at $\alpha = .88$.

Accuracy of ethical prototypes (Phase 2). Accuracy of ethical prototypes was measured the same way as in Study 1. Reliability was calculated at α = .91.

State power manipulation (Phase 2). In order to make the findings of this study more robust, Study 2 was interested in power as a state (rather than merely being psychologically induced) as well as actual behavior (compared to intent). Therefore, the goal of this study was to manipulate actual power as well as the outcome participants received. Participants were randomly assigned to either a high or no power (i.e., control) role in a dyad with a member of the opposite sex. Simulating actual power situations in an organizational context, the principal investigator informed high-power participants that they would be responsible for directing the upcoming partner task. Following in line with previous behavioral ethics research (e.g., DeWall et al., 2011, p. 51), participants in the high-power condition were told that they would be deciding how to structure the process for building the tanagram, would be asked to provide an anonymous evaluation of their partner (the partner will not be allowed to evaluate them), and they will decide how a $15 bonus would be divided between themselves and their partner. The principal investigator added that the participant was responsible for motivating their partner and that the task would be judged on its quality and the time it takes to complete. Conversely, participants in the control condition were told that they will build a structure called a tanagram using Lego toys with a partner and that they will be informed of their role assignment later on.

Whereas there are possible limitations to this manipulation of power (see Sturm & Antonakis, 2014 for a discussion), this manipulation was appropriate for the current study because it fits the definition of power presented earlier in the text. Specifically, a majority of the manipulation concerned asymmetrical control over another but also included elements of

personal power (e.g., the powerholder's evaluations of their partner will also affect their own bonus) (Galinksy et al., 2003).

Power manipulation check (Phase 2). To check whether the state power manipulation worked, participants responded to two items using 7-point Likert scales (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*): "Right now I feel I have a great deal of power over the upcoming task" and "Right now, I feel like my wishes don't carry much weight (reverse scored)" (Krauss, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). As a manipulation check, the principal investigator tested whether participants in the experimental condition had higher power scores than those in the control condition. The manipulation was successful – those who were told that they were going to be in charge of the upcoming partner activity had more power (*M* = 5.39, *SD* = 1.03) than participants in the control condition (*M* = 4.77, *SD* = 1.33), *t*(197) = -3.62, *p* < .01. As in Study 1, power was dichotomized (with *0 = control; 1 = power*) for the analyses.

Dependent variable of unethical decision (Phase 2). Because Study 2 was interested in more realistic situations, a task that allowed participants to cheat was employed in order to test participants' unethical decision making; this was done in an effort to test actual unethical decision making, as opposed to reported ethicality of decisions as was tested in Study 1. In the cheating task, adapted from Cameron and Miller (2009), participants were asked to solve eight anagrams. Anagrams are scrambled groupings of letters that must be unscrambled to form English words. Participants were told that they will start out with $4.00 (which will be located in an envelope on the desk in front of them), and that for each anagram they solved, in order, they will receive $0.50. Notably, participants were told that they must complete the anagrams in order and thus, they cannot move onto the second anagram until they solved the first anagram, and so forth. The specific anagrams that the participants were given (presented with solutions) were:

EFLORW (flower), ADELMN (menald), ELLOWY (yellow), DEINNR (dinner), AEHMMR (hammer), BMOOTT (bottom), ACCIPR (capric), and CEEEHS (cheese). Anagrams 2 and 7 are intended to be unsolvable given that their solutions are extremely rare words. "Indeed, in the original Cameron and Miller (2009) study, not a single participant was familiar with the words "menald" and "capric" during a pilot test" (Hershfield et al., 2011, p. 306). Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the anagrams and then they were asked to report their answers.

In order to remove any barriers that could prevent dishonesty and immorality (cf. Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), participants were asked to mark the anagrams that they were able to solve on a tracking sheet separate from the anagrams themselves, and they were told that their payment would be based solely on what they wrote on the sheet. This means that participants did not have to worry about whether or not the principal investigator would check over any questionable (or nonexistent) answers they might have had (e.g., Cameron & Miller, 2009). In addition, the principal investigator interrupted participants a few minutes before the 15 minutes expired, to advise them that she needed to prepare for another study down the hall. The principal investigator asked participants to do her a favor and "just pay themselves" and to hand in only their tracking sheet with the rest of their survey packet to their professor when complete.

Unethical decision making was operationalized by counting the number of times participants misrepresented their performance on the task. Participants could not earn more than $0.50 without cheating, as the second anagram was essentially unsolvable and they had to solve the anagrams in order. To earn $3.50 or more, participants would have stated that they solved the unsolvable seventh anagram as well, hence, cheating the most. Overall, less than half of the participants (42%) took either $0 or $.50 and thus, did not cheat. About half of the participants

(51%) cheated a little and only 6% cheated the most, which follows previous research related to cheating behavior (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008).

Past research utilizing similar cheating paradigms have coded the dependent variable of cheating as either continuous (by counting the amount of cash taken) or ordinal, using the following coding scheme: "0" if the participant reported solving zero or one anagrams in order; "1" if the participant claimed to have solved two to six anagrams in order; and "2" if the participant claimed to have solved seven or more anagrams in order (e.g., Cameron & Miller, 2009; Hershfield et al., 2011). The current research could not conduct ordinal regression though because there were not enough data in the third category (the one that represented the most amount of cheating) to conduct meaningful analyses. Given that nearly all of the participants reported that they had "solved" a number of anagrams that corresponded to the amount of money they took, the current research treated cheating behavior as a continuous variable, ranging from 0-8, with higher scores indicating more unethical decisions (i.e., the more anagrams that the participants solved "correctly," the more they cheated)[3]; this was done in order to aid in interpretability of the results. Cheating behavior was also operationalized as a dichotomous variable (with "0" representing no cheating and "1" representing cheating); using this measure, the results from the main analysis (which used the number of anagrams that participants claimed they solved) were replicated with logistic regression.

Moral awareness (Phase 2). Moral awareness was measured with the same three 7-point scale items as in Study 1. Participants were asked to complete these items after they took part in the cheating task. Reliability was calculated at $\alpha = .87$.

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[3] Only one person said they did not solve any anagrams correctly so even though "0" and "1" both represent non-cheating, these values were not combined because only one person scored a zero.

Control variables (Phase 1). As in Study 1, age, gender, and self-reported GPA were all included as control variables.

Study 2 Results

To ensure that everyone in the sample was properly exposed to the appropriate timing and ordering of materials required for the study, 11 participants (approximately 5%) were removed from the total sample ($n =210$) due to either coming in late for the study or for completing Phase 2 before Phase 1. The final sample size for testing Model 1 in Study 2 was 99 participants and for testing Model 2 in Study 2 was 100 participants. Table 13 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations between Model 1 (automatic pathway) variables in Study 2. As shown in the table, perceptual moral attentiveness was found to have a positive correlation with accurate ethical prototypes.

Table 13

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Overall Sample of Model 1 (Study 2)

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Gender	.68	.47	--					
2. Age	22.95	3.86	-.21*	--				
3. GPA	3.18	.49	-.14	.12	--			
4. Perceptual moral attentiveness	3.80	1.30	-.01	-.13	-.18	--		
5. Ethical prototypes	3.83	.94	-.04	-.05	.02	.30**	--	
6. Power (manipulated)	.52	.50	-.07	-.04	.02	.02	-.02	--
7. Cheating behavior	3.68	2.58	-.02	-.08	.08	.16	$-.18^{\dagger}$	.14

Note. $N = 99$.

Gender, *male* = 0, *female* = 1.

Perceptual moral attentiveness, 7-point scale assessing extent of agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly disagree).

Ethical prototypes, 6-pont scale assessing extent to which the item represents cheating (0 = not cheating; 5 = definitely cheating).

Power (manipulated), *control* = 0, *power condition* = 1.

Cheating behavior, number of anagrams (out of eight) purportedly solved, with higher scores indicating more *un*ethical decision making.

$^{\dagger} p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.$

Hypothesis 1 predicted that perceptual moral attentiveness will be positively associated with accurate (i.e., a high level of) ethical prototypes. As demonstrated in Table 14, the results of hierarchical regression analysis found support for this hypothesis, $\beta = .28$, $t(90) = 2.60$, $p < .01$.

Table 14

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 1 (Study 2)

| | Ethical Prototypes | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	-.08	-.16 (.22)	-.05	-.10 (.22)
Age	-.08	-.02 (.03)	-.05	-.01 (.03)
GPA	.02	.04 (.21)	.07	.14 (.21)
Perceptual moral attentiveness			.28*	.20 (.08)*
R^2 (df)		.01 (90)		.08 (.90)
ΔR^2				.07*

Note. $N = 91$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* $p < .05$.

Support was also found for Hypothesis 2, which predicted that accurate (i.e., a high level of) ethical prototypes will be positively associated with ethical decisions. As shown in Table 15, the more accurate (i.e., high) participants' ethical prototypes were, the less likely they were to cheat, $\beta = -.23$, $t(90) = -2.20$, $p = .03$.

Table 15

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2 (Study 2)

| | Cheating Behavior | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	-.28	-.28 (.60)	-.07	-.38 (.59)
Age	-.07	-.07 (.07)	-.13	-.09 (.07)
GPA	.45	.45 (.58)	.09	.48 (.56)
Ethical prototypes			-.23*	-.63 (.29)*
R^2 (df)		.02 (90)		.07 (.90)
ΔR^2				.05*

Note. $N = 91$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that accuracy of ethical prototypes would partially mediate the relationship between perceptual moral attentiveness and ethical decisions. Following Preacher and Hayes' (2008) recommendation, the relationship between the mediator of ethical prototypes and the dependent variable of cheating behavior was tested while controlling for the independent variable of perceptual moral attentiveness; 1,000 bootstrap samples were used to locate the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval around the estimate of the indirect effect. This analysis revealed that the relationship between perceptual moral attentiveness and cheating behavior was mediated by accurate ethical prototypes (coefficient = -.78, 95% CI = -.29, -.05) because the bias-corrected confidence interval did not include zero. The direct effect of perceptual moral attentiveness on cheating behavior remained marginally significant ($p = .05$), when the measure of ethical prototypes was added to the model providing evidence of partial mediation. Thus, as illustrated in Table 16, Hypothesis 3 was supported.

Table 16

Results of Mediation Analysis for Hypothesis 3 (Study 2)

| | Cheating Behavior | | | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | |
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	-.05	-.28 (.60)	-.04	-.19 (.61)	-.05	-.27 (.59)
Age	-.11	-.07 (.07)	-.10	-.06 (.07)	-.11	-.07 (.07)
GPA	.09	.45 (.58)	.11	.59 (.59)	.13	.70 (.57)
Perceptual moral attentiveness			.13	.27 (.22)	.21	.42 (.22)
Ethical prototypes					-.29**	-.78 (.29)**
R^2 (df)		.02 (90)		.04 (90)		.11 (90)
ΔR^2				.02		.07**

Note. $N = 91$ Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that power will strengthen the positive relationship between ethical prototypes and ethical decisions when the ethical prototypes are accurate (i.e., high) and weaken the relationship when the ethical prototypes are inaccurate (i.e., low). Results from moderated regression analysis illustrate that the interaction term was not significant, $\beta = -.14$, $t(98) = -.32$, $p =. 75$, thus, as shown in Figure 6, Hypothesis 4 was unsupported. The change in R^2 between models 1 and 2 (which was .00) was also not significant ($p = .75$).

Figure 6

Results of Moderation Analysis for Hypothesis 4 (Study 2)

Note. Numbers refer to unstandardized regression weights with standard errors in parentheses.

Hypotheses 5-8 tested Model 2, which represents the more conscious ethical decision pathway. Table 17 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations among Model 2 variables. As shown in this table, moral awareness was positively associated with reflective moral attentiveness and negatively associated with cheating behavior.

Table 17

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Overall Sample of Model 2 (Study 2)

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Gender	.73	.49	--					
2. Age	23.23	3.66	-.15	--				
3. GPA	3.22	.46	.01	-.05	--			
4. Reflective moral attentiveness	4.58	1.29	-.09	.10	.09	--		
5. Moral awareness	5.29	1.37	-.12	.03	-.04	.21*	--	
6. Power (manipulated)	.51	.50	.12	-.07	.02	.15	.09	--
7. Cheating behavior	3.76	2.49	.13	-.03	.01	.04	-.28**	.09

Note. $N = 96$.
Gender, *male* = 0, *female* = 1.
Reflective moral attentiveness, 7-point scale assessing extent of agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly disagree).
Moral awareness, 7-pont scale assessing extent of agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly disagree).
Power (manipulated), *control* = 0, *power condition* = 1.
Cheating behavior, number of anagrams (out of eight) purportedly solved, with higher scores indicating more *un*ethical decision making.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that reflective moral attentiveness will be positively associated with moral awareness of the situation. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis with moral awareness being regressed onto the three control variables in model 1 and then onto reflective moral attentiveness in model 2. As shown in Table 18, reflective moral attentiveness was found to be significantly associated with moral awareness using a one-tailed test, $\beta = .21$, $t(91) = 2.00$, $p = .03$, hence, supporting Hypothesis 5.

Table 18

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 5 (Study 2)

| | Moral Awareness | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	-.11	-.33 (.33)	-.10	-.30 (.32)
Age	.01	.00 (.04)	-.01	-.01 (.04)
GPA	-.04	-.11 (.31)	-.05	-.16 (.31)
Reflective moral attentiveness			.21*	.22 (.11)*
R^2 (df)		.01 (91)		.06 (.91)

Note. $N = 92$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
* $p < .05$, one-tailed.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that moral awareness of the situation will be positively associated with ethical decisions. Supporting this hypothesis, participants who had a higher moral awareness were less likely to cheat (i.e., say they solved more than one anagram in order). As shown in Table 19, the more morally aware participants were, the less unethical their decisions, $\beta = -.29$, $t(91) = -2.83$, $p < .01$.

Table 19

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 6 (Study 2)

| | Cheating Behavior | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.14	.76 (.58)	.11	.59 (.56)
Age	.01	.01 (.07)	.02	.01 (.07)
GPA	-.00	-.02 (.56)	-.02	-.08 (.54)
Moral awareness			-.29**	-.52 (.18)**
R^2 (df)		.02 (91)		.10 (.91) [†]
ΔR^2				.08**

Note. $N = 92$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 7 predicted that reflective moral attentiveness will be positively associated with ethical decisions through the partial mediation of moral awareness of the situation. Hayes' (2012) PROCESS computational tool in SPSS was used to test this hypothesis. Results from Table 20 reveal an insignificant indirect effect of moral awareness (coefficient = -.53, 95% CI = -.31, .48) on unethical decisions because the bias-corrected confidence interval includes zero, thus Hypothesis 7 was unsupported. A closer look at the data reveals that the direct effect of reflective moral attentiveness on cheating behavior was not significant ($p = .65$), thus helping to explain why mediation was not found.

Table 20

Results of Mediation Analysis for Hypothesis 7 (Study 2)

	Cheating Behavior					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Variable	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)	ß	b (s.e.)
Gender	.14	.76 (.58)	.14	.75 (.59)	.11	.60 (.57)
Age	.01	.01 (.07)	.02	.01 (.07)	.01	.01 (.07)
GPA	-.00	-.02 (.56)	-.00	-.01 (.56)	-.02	-.10 (.54)
Reflective moral attentiveness			-.02	-.03 (.20)	.04	.08 (.20)
Moral awareness					-.30**	-.53 (.19)**
R^2 (*df*)		.02 (90)		.02 (90)		.10 (90) †
ΔR^2				.00		.08**

Note. $N = 92$. Both standardized and unstandardized (along with standard errors in parentheses) beta coefficients are reported. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses for R^2.
† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 8 predicted that power will act as a moderating variable by strengthening the positive relationship between moral awareness and ethical decisions when moral awareness is high and weakening the relationship when moral awareness is low. The results of moderated regression analysis reveal that the interaction term was not significant, $\beta = .20$, $t(91) = .46$, $p = .64$. The change in R^2 between models 1 and 2 (which was .00) was also not significant ($p = .64$); thus, as illustrated in Figure 7, Hypothesis 8 was unsupported.

Hypothesis 9 predicted that power would have a stronger moderating effect on the accuracy of ethical prototypes-ethical decision relationship compared to the moral awareness of the situation-ethical decision relationship. Given that the moderation hypotheses in Study 2 were not supported, this hypothesis could not be tested and is therefore unsupported.

Figure 7

Results of Moderation Analysis for Hypothesis 8 (Study 2)

Note. Numbers refer to unstandardized regression weights with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Study 2 Discussion

Study 2 found support for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Thus, morality-based individual

differences (i.e., moral attentiveness, ethical prototypes, and moral awareness) positively

influence the ethical decision-making process. The findings support most of the automatic

decision pathway, particularly the mediating effect that accurate ethical prototypes has on the

relationship between perceptual moral attentiveness and ethical decisions. Thus, these results

build on Reynolds' (2006a) neurocognitive model of ethical decision making, because they

identify another important component – perceptual moral attentiveness – in the more automatic

decision pathway. Also, the results combined with previous research suggest that not only does

ethical decision making involve two distinct yet interrelated processes, but also that morality-

based individual difference variables (e.g., moral attentiveness) can also have two distinct yet

interrelated components (e.g., perceptual moral attentiveness is more automatic and reflective

moral attentiveness is more conscious). It would be interesting for future research to continue

examining individual difference variables (whether morality-based or not) that include dual components.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Unethical decisions can have devastating consequences for individuals and organizations. In order for scholars and practitioners to be better at identifying why, when, and how individuals make unethical (as opposed to ethical) decisions, the dynamic process through which ethical decision making occurs must be more fully examined (e.g., conscious and subconscious mediating and moderating effects must be examined in addition to direct casual effects). To answer the call for behavioral ethics research to more fully examine the process of ethical decision making (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Reynolds, 2006a; Welsh & Ordóñez, in press), the current research investigated the automatic and conscious mediating mechanisms through which a chronically accessible morality-based individual difference variable – moral attentiveness – leads to ethical decisions, as well as how power plays a role in this process. Accordingly, two dimensions of moral attentiveness, perceptual moral attentiveness and reflective moral attentiveness were examined in relation to accuracy of ethical prototypes and moral awareness of the situation respectively. In addition, power was conceptualized as a moderating variable that would strengthen (as opposed to corrupt) who an individual is in these relationships.

The results of the two studies confirm that ethical decisions occur in part due to morality-based individual difference variables. Specifically, accurate ethical prototypes and moral awareness of the situation were found to have positive associations to ethical decision making. An ethical prototype represents a previously formulated [neurological] "base pattern" of moral content and is triggered by the mere presence of stimuli (not by deliberate thought). Reynolds (2006a) asserted that ethical prototypes are unique compared to other prototypes because they

include both descriptive information (i.e., processing the details of incoming information according to societal moral standards) and prescriptive recommendations (i.e., how individuals should adapt to this information). Therefore, if an ethical prototype matches widely accepted moral norms with regards to recognition, evaluation, or instruction, it is said to be accurate (Reynolds, 2006a), and is positively associated with ethical decision making. Moral awareness on the other hand, is a more cognitive phenomenon and represents a person's determination that a situation contains moral content and can be legitimately considered from a moral point of view (Reynolds, 2006b). According to Kohlberg (1981), moral awareness provided the link between identification of morality and action, and thus, those who have a high moral awareness of a given situation are better at identifying the ethical aspects of the situation before turning their thoughts into actions, ultimately behaving more ethically.

Whereas moral awareness has been both theoretically and empirically linked to ethical conduct in past research (DeCelles et al., 2012; Gino, et al., 2011; Rest, 1986), I am unaware of any previous research that has specifically, empirically linked ethical prototypes to ethical decisions; Reynolds' (2006a) neurocognitive model of ethical decision making theoretically linked these two phenomena but did not empirically investigate this relationship. Thus, the current paper contributes to the literature by empirically examining the positive role of accurate ethical prototypes on ethical decisions and supports recent theorizing that some ethical behavior may be more automatic than previously assumed (Reynolds, 2006a; Welsh & Ordóñez, in press; Zhong, 2011).

In addition to accurate ethical prototypes and moral awareness of the situation playing a role in the ethical decision making process, the results of Study 2 suggest that moral attentiveness impacts the process as well given that it is positively associated with these two

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constructs. Moral attentiveness represents the extent to which an individual frequently perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experiences (Reynolds, 2008). An individual with high moral attentiveness frequently pays attention to morality and ethical issues. Similarly to personality, moral attentiveness is a relatively stable trait that is chronically accessible; it also acts as a lens to recognize and interpret incoming information as either moral or amoral. Moral attentiveness consists of two components: perceptual moral attentiveness which is associated with behaviors that primarily entail information coding and reflective moral attentiveness which is more intentional and is used as a point of introspection before taking action (Reynolds, 2008). Perceptual moral attentiveness was found to be positively related to accurate ethical prototypes and reflective moral attentiveness was found to be positively associated with moral awareness of the situation. Consequently, the findings from Study 2 demonstrate how a morality-based individual difference variable (e.g., moral attentiveness) can also have two distinct yet interrelated components – one that is more automatic and one that is more conscious – akin to the ethical decision-making process.

Given that the behavioral ethics field has traditionally treated the ethical decision-making process as conscious and deliberate, insufficient attention has been given to the mediating mechanisms through which automatic processes ultimately shape ethical decisions (Welsh & Ordóñez, in press). In order to understand this more automatic process of ethical decision making, the current paper examined the relationship between perceptual moral attentiveness, accurate ethical prototypes, and ethical decisions. Results from Study 2 reveal that accurate ethical prototypes partially mediate the relationship between perceptual moral attentiveness and cheating behavior, thus providing a successful empirical application of part of Reynolds' (2006a) neurocognitive model of ethical decision making; that is, the more accurate the individuals'

ethical prototypes were, the less likely they were to cheat. In general, this finding suggests that the ethical decision making process is more complex than previously thought because morality-based individual difference variables can include two interrelated yet conceptually distinct components that differentially impact the process of ethical decision making.

As evidenced by the findings of the two studies and the preceding discussion, both conscious and subconscious (i.e., automatic) processes interrelate to shape ethical decisions. Whereas research has established that behavior in general is often the result of both conscious and automatic processes (Chartrand & Bargh, 2002), how these two processes interact to influence ethical decisions remains unclear. For example, there are mixed findings regarding whether or not automatic or intuitive decision making leads to more ethical judgments (e.g., Zhong, 2011) compared to conscious or deliberate decision making (e.g., Gunia et al., 2012). In order to more fully understand how the automatic and conscious processes of ethical decision making interrelate, the interactive effect of power on these processes was examined. Power was found to only weakly influence the conscious decision pathway; that is, power was found to slightly strengthen the positive relationship between moral awareness and ethical decisions when moral awareness was high and slightly weakened the relationship when moral awareness was low. In terms of the automatic decision pathway though, a different story emerged. Specifically, the results of Study 1 suggest that the relationship between ethical prototypes and ethical decisions was weaker at higher levels of power than at lower levels; hence, power was changing individuals' decisions to be more unethical. Therefore, it seems that in contrast to emphasizing self-anchoring behavior (Overbeck & Droutman, 2013) as proposed by the conscious decision pathway, power appeared to be corrupting ethical decision making with regard to the more automatic decision pathway.

The findings related to the power moderation hypotheses are quite revealing and they offer some insight into why the effects of power appear to be paradoxical at times. Although past research has not separated the effects of power based on automatic compared to more conscious and deliberate decision pathways, the results from Study 1 suggest that power may differentially impact these two pathways of the ethical decision-making process. It seems that power may magnify responses in line with dispositions of an individual (Chen et al., 2001; Weick & Guinote, 2008) when it interacts with more cognitive decision-making processes as suggested by the finding that individuals with a high moral identity behaved more ethically when given power (DeCelles et al., 2012), but corrupt individuals when it interacts with more subconscious decision-making processes, as illustrated in Study 1.

In addition, whereas power was found to influence the automatic decision pathway more strongly, which was originally hypothesized, its effect was in the opposite direction. It was originally expected that power would enhance the automatic decision pathway more compared to the conscious decision pathway because unconscious thought leads to more clear, polarized, and integrated representations (Dijksterhuis, 2004) and power promotes reliance on the ease of retrieval (Weick & Guinote, 2008), more global processing (Weick & Guinote, 2008), and emotional display (Kemper, 1991). The results from Study 1 suggest that power may influence the automatic decision pathway more strongly than the cognitive pathway, but this influence appears to corrupt (instead of strengthen) who individuals are.

In summary, the current research contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. First, it describes the explanatory value of utilizing moral attentiveness in the behavioral ethics field. Second, this paper empirically examined the accuracy of ethical prototypes, which has yet to be methodologically applied in this particular manner (i.e., as an automatic mediating

mechanism). Third, the results illustrate the importance of exploring how power interacts with specific individual difference variables in regards to either corrupting individuals or illuminating who they are. Lastly, the current paper empirically examined the application of a neurocognitive model of ethical decision making (Reynolds, 2006a) on the emergent concept of moral attentiveness (Reynolds, 2008), thus providing support for the claim that ethical decision-making process involves two distinct, yet interrelated processes.

Limitations

Four limitations of this current research are worth noting. First, the data was collected in relatively large classroom settings (where the number of students in any one particular class ranged from 53-210 in Study 1 and 42-79 in Study 2) instead of individually bringing students into the lab to complete the study. Whereas I do not see this as a problem for Study 1 since the survey measures were relatively straightforward and could have been administered online, this data collection procedure might have been problematic for Study 2. Since Study 2 was interested in unethical conduct and provided an opportunity for participants to cheat in order to earn cash, it was very important for participants to have a complete understanding of the instructions during the study. For example, the most important instruction for the cheating task was that students had to solve the anagrams in order; this instruction was not only clearly written on the sheet containing the anagrams but was verbally reinforced to make sure the participants knew what was expected of them. However, given the relatively large size of the classrooms in Study 2, participants may have been distracted, may not have heard the instructions clearly, and so forth. Thus, the measurement of the dependent variable in Study 2 could reflect aspects of both cheating behavior as well as not following instructions carefully.

Second, both of the studies were conducted with experimental methods and thus, did not include field observations. The laboratory-based methods used in the current research though were adapted from prior well-developed behavioral ethics research and were valuable in terms of causality and the testing of the hypothesized explanatory mechanisms (cf. Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Furthermore, the independent and dependent variables were measured at different points in time. Thus, this methodology was beneficial to examining ethical decision making in the current context, and Study 2 even afforded participants with the opportunity to cheat (in exchange for cash), providing a more realistic measure of behavior. However, power is normally associated with leadership and is important to assess in field studies because it can be studied in situ; examples include: rating how much power romantic partners have and predicting their affective outcomes (Langner & Keltner, 2008) and how self-ratings of power interact with personality to predict work outcomes (Seppälä, Lipponen, Bardi, & Pirttilä-Backman 2012). Although the current paper did not study real power in the field, it can be difficult to unravel the effects of endogeneity in field settings (Sturm & Antonakis, 2014), and thus, at least the current design provided some methodological control in regards to the power manipulation.

As mentioned earlier, even though the manipulation of power used in the two studies (i.e., the episodic recall prime in Study 1 and the role-playing scenario in Study 2) have been used in an array of top tier research studies, they could also be problematic. More recent research suggested that these power manipulations may not be ecologically valid because they may induce demand effects (Sturm & Antonakis, 2014). Specifically, participants might have received cues "which communicate what is expected of [them] and what the experimenter hopes to find" (Orne, 2009: 112) and thus, the manipulations cannot establish that only power was manipulated. Bearing this limitation in mind, it is vital for future research on power to determine

whether or not the consequences of feeling powerful are distinct from the consequences of being powerful (Flynn, Gruenfeld, Molm, & Polzer, 2011) – while the disentanglement of the complexities associated with this power manipulation is outside the scope of the current paper, this represents a worthwhile area for future research investigation.

Lastly, there may be a limitation with the measurement (i.e., the six scenarios from the Unethical Business Decision scale, henceforth, UBD) of the dependent variable (i.e., ethical decision making) in Study 1. Whereas the reliability for the UBD is high in previous research (e.g., Hershfield et al., 2011), it was not as high in the current research, which perhaps may help explain why not all of the hypotheses were supported in Study 1.

Theoretical Implications

Despite any limitations, the current research has implications for several different literatures. First, the findings from two studies support the dual process model of ethical decision making while also opening doors to new areas of study in the behavioral ethics field. This paper empirically tested the application of Reynolds' (2006a) neurocognitive model of ethical decision making and found that ethical decision making consists of both automatic and conscious processes. In particular, moral awareness was found to have a positive relationship with ethical decisions, and the conceptualization of accurate ethical prototypes as a mediating variable was found to play an important role in determining how ethical decisions occur. Furthermore, the findings related to power's role as a moderating variable in the ethical decision-making process provide a unique expansion of both the power and behavioral ethics fields. Moreover, the empirical examination of the inter-relationships amongst morality-based individual difference variables, power, and ethical decisions through the examination of both automatic and conscious decision pathways, provides a foundation for fruitful future research efforts.

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Second, this research has implications for the conceptualization of social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) because it provides a deeper understanding of the ways in which a morality-based individual difference variable (i.e., moral attentiveness) impacts ethical behavior. Social cognitive theory assumes that behavioral outcomes are a function of individuals, stimuli, and the interaction of the two. According to this theory, it is important to understand what individuals focus their attention on in their daily lives (Bandura, 1986; Fiske, 1993) because this attention will ultimately manifest in behavioral outcomes; for instance, research has found that when individuals intentionally avoid displaying certain negative personality traits that they in turn are more inclined to deduce those traits from others' behavior (Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997). Bearing the importance of attention in mind, Reynolds (2008) operationalized moral attentiveness in consideration of the accessibility element in social cognitive theory (Fiske & Taylor 1991), and asserted that some individuals pay more attention to general moral concepts and their behavior is a function of their interaction with this incoming information (Reynolds, 2008).

Following Reynolds' (2008) theorizing of moral attentiveness, the current research empirically demonstrated the importance of this construct as an antecedent in how individuals receive, interpret, and reflect upon incoming information related to morality and how this ultimately impacts ethical decisions. Moreover, the moral attentiveness findings illustrate the importance of examining both conscious and subconscious aspects of processing and acting upon information (i.e., perceptual moral attentiveness and reflective moral attentiveness respectively), thereby building on past research related to social cognitive theory (e.g., Bandura, 1986).

Third, the current research contributes to the power literature in a couple of ways. The first contribution is that it extends the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007) by

examining how power can change people's affect and behavior in addition to their cognition. This was accomplished by taking a cognition-affect-behavior (CAB) approach to understanding how the possession of power can change the powerholder (Keltner et al., 2003). A majority of the past research that has addressed how the possession of power transforms individuals, has focused on how power produces systematic effects on individuals' thoughts and actions (Jordan et al., 2011); thus, paying insufficient attention to how powerholders' affect (and emotions) can be transformed as well. This paper reviewed and organized the field of interpersonal power through a CAB approach to better understand the intrapersonal dynamics of power. In addition, the current empirical findings that power can act as both an illuminating and corrupting moderating variable on ethical decision making, depending on which decision pathway is being investigated (either the automatic or conscious decision pathway), provides additional insight into the dynamic nature of power.

Practical Implications

According to Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004, p. 204), "Individuals do not "see" the moral components of an ethical decision, not so much because they are morally uneducated, but because psychological processes fade the "ethics" from an ethical dilemma." Following this assertion, the results of the current research go further than saying that unethical individuals are "bad." Instead, it suggests that there can be numerous reasons as to why "good" individuals make unethical choices, especially when they are given power. For example, if individuals' ethical prototypes are inaccurate (for whatever the reason), if they have low perceptual moral attentiveness, or if they are not aware that a situation contains moral content, it can help explain why unethical decisions occur. Hence, the current research contributes to practice by highlighting the importance of considering morality-based individual difference variables, such

as moral attentiveness, in selection, training, and promotion procedures in organizations; this is especially important in regards to leadership roles. Reynolds (2008) claimed that it may be advantageous for organizations to hire, and strategically place into pivotal roles, individuals who are cognitively inclined towards morality. Moreover, research suggests that organizational ethics initiatives that include individuals (e.g., leaders) modeling a set of ethical values, which ultimately become internalized by employees (e.g., part of their ethical prototypes) (Treviño et al., 2006; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999), may have wide-ranging positive impacts on the organization (Weaver & Treviño, 1999).

Additionally, since ethics education is possible (Reynolds, 2006a), the present research highlights the importance of ethical prototypes and moral awareness in regards to training for management. For example, ethical prototypes can be restructured and refined and appropriate moral rules can be emphasized in organizations; this refining and emphasis can occur across organizational levels. At an individual level, managers can explain what accurate ethical prototypes look like (e.g., blackmailing is wrong) to their employees. At a group level, managers can stress moral rules in regards to how group members treat each other in addition to the process in which they complete their assignment(s).

According to Zhong (2011, p. 18), "the finding that knowing a course of action is wrong is not enough to prevent individuals from engaging in the action unless the action also "feels" wrong may shed light on why codes of ethics have not been very successful in battling corporate scandals." For that reason, perhaps managers can incorporate intuition and emotion into their ethics training. For instance, at an organizational level, Welsh and Ordóñez (in press) proposed that the strategic use of slogans, images, stories, and symbols may offer a way of subconsciously priming ethical behavior in the organization. Also, managers can influence the attention

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employees pay to moral concepts by changing the organization's credo to evoke images of whom their customers are (i.e., parents, children, etc.). Building on this possibility, Welsh and Ordóñez suggested that directing attention towards morality may be especially pertinent in organizational contexts whereby employees have performance objectives that may distract them from moral issues. The authors provided evidence that subconscious priming attenuated unethical conduct even in an unmonitored competitive environment in which individuals were strongly committed to achieving demanding performance goals.

Whereas ethics training is possible, Reynolds' (2006a) neurocognitive model of ethical decision making indicated that the content and delivery methods should vary according to which cycle is being addressed. For instance, Reynolds argued that women may be better at recognizing and matching prototypes in a morally acceptable manner compared to men given their neurophysiology. Consequently, organizations may need to tailor their ethics education in accordance with gender by focusing on the automatic decision pathway (including perceptual moral attentiveness and accurate ethical prototypes) with men because they may be weaker in this area and emphasizing the cognitive pathway with women (including reflective moral attentiveness and moral awareness of the situation).

Future Research Directions

Future research can continue to explore the topics presented here in a number of ways. One way is to continue investigating moral attentiveness and its influence on decision making in general and ethical decision making in particular. Reynolds' (2008) original paper on moral attentiveness found this construct to be positively associated with general moral conduct. Other empirical research has since found this construct to be positively related to an individual's moral imagination (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013) and education in business ethics (Wurthmann, 2013).

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Whereas the current research hypothesized that moral attentiveness would "start" the ethical decision making process (since it is a chronically accessible individual difference variable), research has also identified it as playing other roles in relationships containing moral content. For example, research proposed it to be a moderating variable in the relationships of identity salience and moral stress and stakeholder salience and moral stress (Reynolds et al., 2012). In addition, research highlighted moral attentiveness as a mediating variable between education in business ethics (i.e., the individual had either taken a stand-alone course in ethics or taken a course in which ethics issues were integrated with the other course material as an important topic) and the "perceptions of the role of ethics and social responsibility" (PRESOR) stakeholder view through the more conscious component of reflective moral attentiveness (Wurthmann, 2013).

Although not extensive, the research examining moral attentiveness has tended to focus on the positive aspects of this construct; that is, it leads to some sort of ethical conduct (e.g., Reynolds, 2008; Wurthmann, 2013). However, according to Reynolds (2008), individuals who are perceptually morally attentive are likely to screen for and concentrate on moral aspects of information, resulting in inclinations to exaggerate the morality of their experiences; perhaps this exaggeration of morality can be negative. Reynolds found that the greater the perceptual moral attentiveness of the rater, the more critical was his or her assessment of the target individual. If morally attentive individuals are more critical of others (morality), this might actually lead to negative organizational outcomes. For example, this harsher judgment could spill over to performance appraisals in which disagreement across self and others' ratings of performance could occur. Also, the possible likelihood of exaggerating morality may make individuals have a skewed perception of justice in which they perceive that they are entitled to something (that they

really are not entitled too). Moreover, an interesting question is: how would perceptually morally attentive individuals act if they received conflicting ethical cues from their leader? It would be worthwhile for future research to examine the possible negative consequences of having high moral attentiveness.

In addition, future research can investigate how variables described in this paper (including the morality-based variables of moral attentiveness, accurate ethical prototypes, and moral awareness of the situation, as well as power) influence other prosocial behaviors besides ethical behaviors. For instance, Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) linked moral identity to charitable giving when social consensus of a moral issue was high and Seppälä and colleagues (2012) found that employees' self-rated sense of power interacted with their work unit identification and openness to change values to predict supervisor-rated change-oriented organizational citizenship behaviors. Whereas the six scenarios used as the dependent variable in Study 1 addressed mostly ethical decisions, it would be interesting for future research to examine how the variables assessed in the current research influence behaviors such as charitable giving, altruism, civic virtue, and voice.

Given the interplay between automatic (subconscious) and conscious (deliberate) characteristics of morality-based individual difference variables and decision-making processes, the examination of the neurological underpinnings of these phenomena would be both beneficial and intriguing. The physiological examination of ethical prototypes and moral awareness (through the use of fMRI or EEG studies) would facilitate further understanding of the neurocognitive model of ethical decision making (cf. Reynolds, 2006a). Also, determining whether perceptual and reflective moral attentiveness are differentially processed in the brain would provide further evidence that this variable does indeed have two interrelated yet

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functionally distinct components. Moreover, this paper described how the possession of power can change the powerholder in ways that produce systematic effects on cognition, affect, and behavior, but did not identify neurological effects. It would be interesting for example, to examine whether or not power weakens neurological connections in the brain that are normally associated with positive emotions, such as compassion towards others, or strengthens neurological connections that lead to feelings of entitlement.

Lastly it is important for future research to examine how emotions impact the ethical decision-making process in more detail. The topic of emotion has not been heavily emphasized in the behavioral ethics field, or in the power field. Considering that recent theorizing suggests that some moral conduct may be more automatic than previously assumed (Welsh & Ordóñez, in press) and emotions play a role in intuition and more automatic decision pathways (Zhong, 2011), it would be beneficial for behavioral ethics scholars to focus some of their future research efforts on emotion. In a similar vein, there is evidence to suggest that power influences individuals' emotions (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Fast et al., 2009; Kemper, 1991; Malhotra & Gino, 2011; van Kleef et al., 2008) and this represents a fruitful future research avenue as well.

Conclusion

This paper suggests that ethical decisions will be a function of morality-based individual difference variables, such as moral attentiveness, ethical prototypes, and moral awareness, and the contextual factor of interpersonal power. The goal of the current research was to more fully understand how (by examining mediating variables) and when (by examining moderated interactions) ethical decisions occur (cf. Hayes, 2012). Given that practitioners and scholars alike tend to concentrate their efforts on developing programs and measures to structure and institutionalize ethics in organizations (Reynolds, 2006b), the hope here was to demonstrate that a critical aspect of ethics resides at the individual level of analysis (Zhong, 2011). As such, it will be important for research and practice to address individual differences in regards to ethical decision making going forward and hopefully, in the words of Plato, individuals "whose view of the world is distorted by appetitive and honor-seeking desire" (Williamson, 2008, p. 402) will not be selected into leadership positions.

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APPENDIX A

Moral Attentiveness Scale

Moral attentiveness item	
1. In a typical day, I face several ethical dilemmas.	P
2. I often have to choose between doing what's right and doing something that's wrong.	P
3. I regularly face decisions that have significant ethical implications.	P
4. My life has been filled with one moral predicament after another.	P
5. Many of the decisions that I make have ethical dimensions to them.	P
6. I regularly think about the ethical implications of my decisions.	R
7. I think about the morality of my actions almost every day.	R
8. I rarely face ethical dilemmas. (reverse scored)	P
9. I frequently encounter ethical situations.	P
10. I often find myself pondering about ethical issues.	R
11. I often reflect on the moral aspects of my decisions.	R
12. I like to think about ethics.	R

Note. P = perceptual moral attentiveness; R = reflective moral attentiveness.
Response format, 7-pont scale assessing extent of agreement (1 = *strongly disagree*; 7 = *strongly agree)*

APPENDIX B

Ethical Prototypes Scale

Ethical Prototype item

1. Looking at another student's exam during the exam.

2. Having someone else to write a speech, report, or proposal for you after you have done the basic research.

3. Asking someone who has already taken an exam what the questions are.

4. Writing a speech, report, proposal, etc. for someone else.

5. Lying to an instructor about illness, etc., when an exam or assignment is due.

6. Failing to report grading errors, when the professor has not approved ignoring errors in the student's favor.

7. Copying homework from another student.

8. Not contributing one's fair share in a group project for which all the members will be given the same grade.

9. Visiting a professor after an exam with the sole intention of biasing one's exam grade.

10. Taking a test for a friend.

11. Obtaining a copy of the exam prior to taking it in class.

12. Giving answers to someone else during an exam.

Note. Response format, 6-pont scale assessing extent to which the item represents cheating (0 = *not cheating*; 5 = *definitely cheating)*

APPENDIX C

Scenarios from the Unethical Business Decision (UBD) Scale

1. Suppose that you are a member of a task force of a mining company. This company has recently identified major deposits of precious metals in a very remote region of a tropical country. These deposits are large enough that a mine would be extremely profitable.

However, the mining operations would cause serious long-term pollution of the region's water and soil, and would do heavy damage to the natural environment. Also, the native people who inhabit the region have expressed their opposition to any mining projects, and these people would need to be relocated by the country's government prior to the development of the mine. The government of that country is eager to profit from the mining operation, regardless of any impacts on the environment or on the local inhabitants; the government officials are ready to sign an agreement and to allow the mining to begin.

The mining operation would be very profitable for your company, and this would mean a significant pay raise for you. Your company is taking anonymous votes from the task force about the operation. Would you vote to have your company begin the mining operation?

      (1) Definitely Not   (2) Probably Not   (3) Probably Yes   (4) Definitely Yes

2. Suppose that you work in a department of a food processing company that handles new products. The research-and-development team in your department has come up with a new snack food, "Tastee Nuggets", which has received high marks in preliminary "taste tests".

Part of the reason for the good taste of Tastee Nuggets is the use of some flavorful new artificial sweeteners and oils. However, some laboratory tests performed by your company suggest that it is possible that these sweeteners and oils can have addictive properties similar to those of some drugs, and are also likely to increase the risks of obesity, heart disease, and cancer in people who consume large amounts of those substances.

Projections by your company's marketing team suggest that this product will be tremendously profitable, and this will almost certainly lead to more funds for your department's research-and-development team and a major promotion for you personally. It is now your chance to anonymously express whether or not Tastee Nuggets should be added to your company's product line, so that advertising and sales can soon begin. Would you recommend having your company add Tastee Nuggets to its product line?

      (1) Definitely Not   (2) Probably Not   (3) Probably Yes   (4) Definitely Yes

3. Suppose that you work for a major forest products company. In recent years, the timber production (and profits) of your company has been reduced somewhat by new conservation laws. These laws are intended to preserve some forests for logging in future generations, but also to preserve the natural environment by securing the habitats of various species and allowing "greenhouse gases" to be removed from the atmosphere.

Despite the new laws, it is very clear that the government has neither the resources nor the political will to enforce them. In fact, it is now obvious to you that your company could get away with cutting down several times more timber than the law allows.

Extracting the excess timber would be extremely profitable for your company (and for your stock options), because the wood is of excellent quality, and recent forest preservation

efforts have reduced worldwide supply, driving prices way up. Would you recommend that your company cut down timber beyond the legal amount?

    (1) Definitely Not   (2) Probably Not   (3) Probably Yes   (4) Definitely Yes

4. Suppose that you work in the sales department of a large corporation that exports telecommunications equipment to countries around the world. Recently, you have been trying to obtain the contract for supplying a new telecom system to Impoveria, a developing nation that has only recently begun to modernize.

    In negotiations with the president of Impoveria and his cabinet, you have learned that your company's bid is not the lowest; instead, two of your competitor companies have lower bids. However, the president and his cabinet members have told you that you can still have the contract, if you agree to send back 5% of the money received from the Impoverian government to their own personal bank accounts in Switzerland. It is clear to you that, even with this 5% ''kickback'', your company will still make a substantial profit on this contract, and that you will be seen as the person who made it happen. Would you recommend that your company agree to the conditions and sign the contract?

    (1) Definitely Not   (2) Probably Not   (3) Probably Yes   (4) Definitely Yes

5. Suppose that you are a lawyer for an industrial products company that sells equipment used in drilling for oil and natural gas. You are aware that the country of Petronia is interested in buying large amounts of equipment from your company. However, because Petronia's government has a very poor human rights record, it is illegal for any company from your country to do business with Petronia.

    Despite the laws against doing business with Petronia, you have discovered a legal loophole. If your company sets up a subsidiary company overseas – for example, in a small Caribbean island – then you can sell the equipment to Petronia through this company, and thereby avoid being prosecuted by your own government for breaking the law. This would result in large profits for your company and also a large raise and promotion for yourself. Would you advise your company about the loophole of setting up an overseas subsidiary?

    (1) Definitely Not   (2) Probably Not   (3) Probably Yes   (4) Definitely Yes

6. Suppose that you were recently hired to help manage a pension fund and are looking for good new investments to prove your worth to the firm. Recently, a violent new sport called TotalFighting has become fairly popular, with many people watching televised championship fights. Following the past few championship fights, rates of assault and homicide increased about 10%, nationwide, for several days.

    The company that runs the sport of TotalFighting has become very profitable, and is likely to become even more profitable in the future as similar sports are introduced into the market. Your pension fund now has the opportunity to buy some shares in this company, which would likely result in major gains in the value of the pension fund and also in your own commission payments. Would you recommend investing your pension fund's money in the company that runs this sport?

    (1) Definitely Not   (2) Probably Not   (3) Probably Yes   (4) Definitely Yes