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DISPOSITIONAL ATTRIBUTIONS AND DETERIORATION OF TRUST
FOLLOWING TRANSGRESSION:
THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED INTENT AND OUTCOME SEVERITY

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By

Ksenia O. Krylova

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DISPOSITIONAL ATTRIBUTIONS AND DETERIORATION OF TRUST
FOLLOWING TRANSGRESSION:
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Approved:

Teri Elkins Longacre,
Associate Professor of Management
Chairperson of Committee

James S. Phillips,
Professor of Management

Steve Werner,
Professor of Management

David J. Francis,
Professor of Psychology

Latha Ramchand, Dean
C.T. Bauer College of Business

DEDICATION

Моим родителям. Авай-ачайлан. To my parents.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My thanks by Helen Steiner Rice

People everywhere in life
From every walk and station,
From every town and city
And every state and nation
Have given me so many things
Intangible and dear,
I couldn't begin to count them all
Or even make them clear...
I only know I owe so much
To people everywhere
And when I put my thoughts in verse
It's just a way to share
The musings of a thankful heart,
A heart much like your own,
For nothing that I think or write
Is mine and mine alone...
So if you found some beauty
In any word or line,
It's just your soul's reflection
In proximity with mine.

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In Russian the word ‘gratitude’ (благодарение) literally translates as ‘giving the blessing’. Being grateful does not stop at appreciating things you have, it also means an additional step of ‘giving the blessing’ in return to the world.

Gratitude can change the lives of the one who is being grateful and those whose benevolence is being appreciated. Gratitude allows us to see the beauty of the present moment, be mindful and kind to ourselves and others and always realize that nothing is permanent in this world, and whatever we have IS life and happiness and we have to thank God for it!

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Abstract

Research to date has shown that trust and trustworthiness are among the most damaged positive states of a relationship when transgressions occur (Robinson, 1996; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Across studies, scholars from different disciplines have relied largely on an investigator-imposed distinction between transgressions stemming from a lack of integrity or a lack of competence to understand how and when trust can be restored. While not suggesting that this distinction between integrity and competence transgressions is either unimportant or artificial, the proposed research will address a fundamental precursor to victims' reactions to the differences between them. The dissertation will attempt to understand how an offended party's underlying causal attributions about a transgressor's integrity and competence are formed. To address this issue, the study will attempt to answer the basic question of whether there are other more natural distinctions between transgressions that determine its consequences for trust. More specifically, the dissertation posits that two key variables (perceived intent and outcome severity) substantially determine whether a particular transgression is attributed to a transgressor's integrity or to competence. And, subsequently, these two variables will provide supplemental predictive power for understanding post-transgression levels of trust.

Hypotheses were tested using a 3x2 factorial design that manipulated intent (intent, no intent) and outcome severity (mild, moderate, severe). Results of analysis of variance indicated that intent had an overwhelming effect on perceived integrity and trust. Unexpectedly, it had an effect on perceived competence as well; however, the results of analyses that compared dependent Cohen's *d* measures of effect sizes

unambiguously showed that the influence of intent on perceptions of integrity was significantly stronger than its influence on perceptions of ability. Outcome severity did not have any significant effect on the outcomes, nor did it moderate the relationship between intent and trust.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In exploring the effect of different trust restoration strategies, researchers often distinguish between competence based and integrity based transgressions (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, Dirks, 2004; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, Ferrin, 2006; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, Dirks, 2007; Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, 2011). The distinction between competence and integrity violations and their importance for understanding the effectiveness of accounts comes from the seminal article by Mayer, Davis, and Shoorman (1995), in which the authors proposed a model of trust that takes into account characteristics of the trustor and trustee. They suggested that since the core element of trust is the trustor's expectations of the trustee's future behavior, trustor's attributions of trustee's characteristics, such as ability (competence), integrity, and benevolence, will play a major role in determining post-transgression levels of trust. Using this fundamental premise as a starting point, it has been shown that a victim's attributions with regards to an offender's ability and integrity are of critical importance in explaining and predicting the victim's trusting intentions (Kim et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006; Ferrin et al., 2007; Dirks et al., 2011). But what contributes to the offended party's perceptions of transgressors' integrity and ability? From a methodological standpoint, most of the previous research on trust has predetermined what constitutes an integrity-based or a competence-based transgression

through the nature of the experimental manipulations. Existing research has generally assumed that participants will perceive the experimentally-manipulated trust violation to which they are exposed in a manner consistent with these a priori, experimenter-defined causal types (integrity v. competence). And while this methodological strategy has yielded a number of robust and interesting conclusions about the effectiveness of trust restoration strategies, little if any research has attempted to understand *how* participants' perceptions of transgressions' causal sources are formed, rather than presupposing their correspondence with an experimental manipulation.

The present study attempts to further enhance our understanding of post-transgression levels of trust by more directly examining when and how victims attribute certain actions to transgressors' integrity or ability. Are there any other attributions that drive victims' perceptions of transgressors' integrity and ability? Are there other more natural distinctions among victims' perceptions of transgressions that define trust following the transgression?

In order to attempt to answer these and conceptually related questions surrounding the formation of victims' attributions of offenders' trustworthiness (integrity/ability), I turn to Heider's model of attribution (1958) and his commonsense psychology. Heider (1958) distinguishes between 'impersonal causality' – a cognitive assessment model that people apply to *unintentional* human behaviors, and 'personal causality' – a cognitive assessment model that people apply to *intentional* human behaviors. Therefore, according to Heider (1958), the fundamental defining element of peoples' perceptions of social behavior is the concept of intentionality. Cognitive and social psychologists have researched this concept and its relation to blame, judgments of

responsibility and morality (Cushman, 2008; Guglielmo, Monroe, & Malle, 2009; Malle, 2006; Malle & Knobe, 1997); however, it has never been directly and explicitly examined in the context of trust and post-transgression states.

The present research will examine the relationship between perceived intent and victims' perceptions of transgressors' integrity and competence, and consequently its effects on trust. There are reasons to believe that in transgression assessments, victims' attributions of transgressors' intent will be the driving force behind their post-transgression levels of trust through an effect on perceived integrity. I am not, in any way, suggesting that the distinction between integrity and competency transgressions is either unimportant or artificial. Rather, the present study will attempt to determine if there are reliable precursors to when each of these potential causes of a transgression is invoked by a victim.

Additionally, the present study will examine the effect of outcome severity on post-transgression levels of trust. Previous research has not paid enough attention to the concept of outcome severity and its potential importance for shaping victims' attributions about transgressors and/or their actions. It is reasonable to believe that the victim's perceptions of a transgression, an offender's trustworthiness, and subsequent trusting beliefs will differ depending on how severe the harm from the transgression is to the victim. This study will examine the effect of outcome severity on trust, and the moderating effect that outcome severity might have on the relationship between perceived intent and trust.

This research seeks to contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, it contributes to the growing research on trust and trustworthiness by suggesting an

important antecedent to victim's attributions of transgressor's trustworthiness – perceived intent. Second, it contributes to the trust violation and trust restoration literatures by offering an explanation of how victim's perceptions of the nature of transgressions are formed through the assessments of a transgressor's intent. Finally, it contributes to the body of extant literature on post-transgression states and assessments of transgression-related outcomes by identifying outcome severity as a contextual factor that affects post-transgression levels of trust.

The importance of understanding how victims' perceptions of integrity and competence are formed lies in the fact that post-transgression states, such as trust and forgiveness, are determined substantially by these attributions. This is particularly true for perceptions of a transgressor's integrity. Post-transgression levels of trust and forgiveness are crucially dependent on the attributions that victims make about a transgressor's integrity. Research has shown that once a transgression is perceived to have resulted from a lack of integrity, the effects it has on trust and forgiveness are extremely detrimental and frequently irreversible; they are much stronger and more harmful compared to the effects that competence-based transgressions have. Therefore, an enhanced understanding of how perceptions of integrity are formed may facilitate the articulation of better ways to control and mitigate the detrimental effects that such attributions often have on levels of trust; ideally, this can lead to the development of strategies to restore/preserve trust following any transgression, but most importantly following a transgression that victims believe resulted from a lack of integrity. If victims' perceptions of a transgressor's intent are the key to understanding how people form

perceptions of integrity, then we are one step closer to understanding what can be done to restore/preserve trust in such situations.

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, the literatures on trust, trustworthiness, outcome severity and perceived intent are reviewed (Chapter 2). Next, the hypotheses on the relationship between these variables are developed and presented (Chapter 3). The methodology for the study is explained in Chapter 4. The results are presented in Chapter 5. The dissertation ends with the discussion and conclusion (Chapters 6, 7).

Chapter 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The present study is predicated on an expectation that following transgressions, trust will be a function of perceived intent, perceived integrity and outcome severity. The study posits that attributions of intent will be the key determinant of a victim's perceptions of the nature and underlying cause of a transgression. If a transgressor's actions are perceived as intentional, then the transgression will be perceptually defined by the victim as a violation stemming from a lack of integrity, and as such, will lead to a dramatic decrease in trust. Additionally, outcome severity is expected to play a critical role in defining victims' levels of post-transgression trust, primarily through its moderating influence on the effects of intent.

Trust, trust violation, and trust repair

Trust and trustworthiness. Trust is a core element of interpersonal relations. Over the past decade, it has received increased research attention in different fields, including management, ethics, sociology, and psychology. Organizational researchers are examining trust on both individual and organizational levels as a main component of individual, group or organizational performance and success (for a meta-analytic review, see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Trust is a complex multifaceted phenomenon, and researchers

have been trying to conceptualize it and find an adequate definition for it. One of the widely used definitions was proposed by Mayer et al. (1995): “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (p.712). Rousseau et al. (1998) viewed trust as a “psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395).

A majority of researchers generally agree that trust is comprised of two main facets: intention to accept vulnerability and positive expectations of future behavior (Colquitt, Scott & LePine, 2007). These two components were linked to the conceptualization of trust through trusting intentions (willingness to be vulnerable) and trusting beliefs (beliefs about the qualities of the person that lead to the positive expectations about his/her behavior). Mayer et al. (1995) called beliefs about future behavior ‘trustworthiness’ and have identified three important characteristics of people that are typically considered during an assessment of their trustworthiness: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability is defined as a “group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain” (p.717). Integrity is present when the trustee is believed to adhere to “a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (p.719), usually ethical and moral rules. And finally, benevolence represents the “extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” (p. 718). Mayer et al. (1995) proposed that trust will be a function of the trustor’s perceptions of these three trustee’s characteristics. Colquitt et al. (2007) have shown that each of these three characteristics

predict trust in a significant and unique way. Empirically, however, only two types of trust violations have been commonly used in research on trust and trust repair – ability and integrity. Due to the tight link between integrity and benevolence and conceptual ambiguities between the two, researchers have been comfortable with a focus on these two major categories, while deferring investigations of benevolence for future inquiries. For the purposes of the present study, I too will focus only on integrity and ability as parts of victims' assessments of offenders' trustworthiness.

Integrity- and competence-based violations. In several different studies, Kim et al. have conceptualized transgressors' offending behavior as violations of either competence or integrity (competence-based vs. integrity-based) (2004, 2006). In these investigations they have referred to competence as “the degree to which one possesses the technical and interpersonal skills required for a job”, and integrity as “the degree to which one adheres to a set of principles that is considered acceptable” (Kim et al., 2006: 51).

In one of the studies Kim et al. (2006) found that trust was repaired more successfully when the offender apologized with an internal attribution following the competence-based transgression, and apologized with an external attribution after an integrity-based transgression. In an earlier study Kim et al. (2004) also examined the choice of apology vs. denial for repairing competence- vs. integrity-based trust violations. They concluded that apologies are effective means for repairing trust following violations of competence where there is subsequent evidence of guilt. Denial has been shown to be an effective means for violations concerning matters of integrity, and in situations when there is evidence of innocence. The same effect was observed in a group context: although it is much harder to repair group trust, groups (similar to individuals) were less

trusting when trustees denied responsibility (rather than apologizing) for a competence-based violation or apologized (rather than denied responsibility) for integrity-based violation (Kim, Cooper, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2013).

The differences between the effects of apologies for integrity-based and competence-based violations are considered robust findings (Kim et al., 2013). They are based on and explained by the schematic model of dispositional attributions (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). This theory suggests that people weigh information differently when making judgments about another person's competence vs. integrity. It has been shown that in matters of integrity negative information has more diagnostic value than positive information; in contrast, in matters of competence, positive information is given more weight than negative information. Consequently, admitting guilt in an apology following integrity-based violations will be perceived as a signal of one's lack of integrity and will outweigh the beneficial effects of that apology, i.e. conveying remorse, regret, and sincere intent to avoid future violations of similar kind. This is because people tend to believe that a person with high integrity will not commit dishonest acts under any circumstances, whereas those with low integrity may act honestly or dishonestly depending on the situation (Kim et al., 2011). The logic is different for assessing somebody's competence. People tend to believe that those with high competence can exhibit many levels of performance depending on situational factors, whereas those with low competence can only perform up to levels commensurate with their abilities. Therefore, mistakes are not necessarily seen as signals of a lack of competence. And apologies can be effective tools for creating positive images after competence failures.

But how do victims determine whether a violation emanates from another's competence or integrity? What makes a particular act one that is integrity-based or one that is competence-based? Although prior research has generally assumed that these two types of offenses are categorical in nature, objectively defined, and relatively exclusive of one another, I am suggesting that attributional processes are important determinants of how a transgression is cognitively classified by victims. More specifically, in the abovementioned research, the nature of the trust violation was fixed and prescribed by the researchers on behalf of the participants. It was experimentally pre-determined that a given transgression should be considered either an indicator of a lack of competence or a lack of integrity. However, the question of how the victims arrive at their own conclusions about an offender's trustworthiness and about what particular trustee characteristic contributed to the violation has never been answered.

Trust betrayal as an example of integrity violation. A wide variety of transgressions occur in organizational settings that can lead to perceived violations of trust "when evidence disconfirms the confident positive expectations regarding another's conduct and redefines the nature of the relationship in the mind of the injured party" (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004: 167). One of the trust violations that has the most detrimental effect on post-transgression states is trust betrayal. It has been defined as "a voluntary violation of mutually known pivotal expectations of the trustor by the trusted party (trustee), which has the potential to threaten the well-being of the trustor" (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998, p. 548). Researchers have looked at trust betrayal from both offenders' and victims' perspectives (see, for instance, Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Morris and Moberg, 1994) and have agreed that one of the characteristics of trust betrayal

that distinguishes it from other violations of trust is that it deals directly with personal trust (Morris & Moberg, 1994), unique sets of expectations and risks in a specific personal relationship between a trustor and a trustee. The act of betrayal occurs only when personal expectations of a specific trustor toward a specific trustee, rather than just norms, are violated. These expectations need to be perceived as pivotal to the relationship. Scientists also agree that one of the defining characteristics of the betrayal is its intentional nature (Morris & Moberg, 1994; Chan, 2009). The victim will perceive an event as a betrayal only when it is voluntarily (intentionally) committed by the offender and it does not conform to the expectations of the trustor or it violates these expectations. If the violation is not voluntary, then it is not considered a betrayal (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).

Elangovan and Shapiro (1998) emphasize the importance of intent criterion as a part of their attempts to identify the various types of betrayals and for developing their classification of betrayal behavior. In fact, their typology of betrayal in organizations is based on two facets of intent: presence of intent and timing of intent. The first dimension of betrayal behavior distinguishes between intentional and unintentional violations of trustor's pivotal expectations. Although the violation of trust needs to be voluntary to be considered a betrayal, there might be some situations when the action of the trustee is voluntary but not intended to violate the expectations. Such violations are called accidental betrayals and are different from the ones where the trustee intentionally commits the transgression. Based on the timing of intent, intentional betrayals are subdivided into premeditated betrayals – when the trustee enters the relationship with the aspiration to betray trust at a later time, and opportunistic betrayals – when the trustee

decides to violate trust in a specific situation after considering the implications of betraying versus maintaining trust (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).

Extending the classification, Chan (2009) categorizes betrayals into incidental betrayals and intentional betrayals that in turn have further sublevels labeled egoistic and ideological betrayals (incidental betrayals), and personalistic and reciprocal betrayals (intentional betrayals). The difference between incidental and intentional betrayals is defined by the goals of the offender. Incidental betrayals occur when offenders violate victims' expectations in the course of pursuing other non-victim related goals. They could be defined by self-interest (egoistic) or 'superordinate' (Chan, 2009, p.264) values or goals (ideological betrayals) like in the case of whistle-blowing or disclosing a friend's secret in order to get help. In contrast, intentional betrayals are means designed to cause harm to victims. It can be a goal of harming a particular victim (personalistic, "out-to-get" the victim betrayal) or taking revenge for a previous betrayal committed by the victim (reciprocal).

Chan's (2009) model of interpersonal betrayal is based on the attribution theories of Heider (1958) and Jones and Davis (1965) and suggests that when victims experience transgressions, they will first determine whether the event was caused by a person or by the situation, and then proceed to make attributions about the offender's intent (Chan, 2009). After engaging in these critical attributional processes, victims arrive at conclusions about offenders' trustworthiness. Because betrayal implies that the offenders committed transgressions voluntarily, perceptions of integrity and benevolence as well as trustworthiness on a larger scale will suffer. In fact, the ability dimension of trustworthiness might not be relevant to the assessments of trust and notions of betrayal at

all since ability is considered to be out of a person's control (Weiner, 1985). Betrayal is a specific type of trust violation that is strongly tied to the notion of intent and volition, and, consequently, with attributions of integrity and benevolence. Researchers are inclined to suggest that betrayal causes damage only to the integrity and benevolence dimensions of trustworthiness (Chan, 2009; Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998). However, studies to date have not explored the interconnectedness of the notions of volition/intent and integrity/benevolence. Instead, as mentioned above, the components of trustworthiness (ability, integrity) were used to identify the types of trust violations and their subsequent effects on trust.

Perceived intent.

When people believe that another person has committed a transgression against them (defined as an action that violates rules of conduct and is offending in nature), they will engage in a series of sense-making assessments and attributions to attempt to understand the reason and the cause of the offending behavior, and to determine the motives of the transgressor. Folk psychology or theory of mind suggests that when assessing and explaining human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional acts. Researchers believe that people ascribe intentions to each other; therefore, judgments of intentionality define social interactions (Malle & Knobe, 1997).

Heider was one of the first theorists to introduce the concept of commonsense psychology, and a simple distinction that people rely on when perceiving behavior of others. Although in most of the literature on Heider's attributions theory, scientists describe this distinction as the dichotomy between person (internal) attributions and situation (or external) attributions, not everyone believes that this distinction was

Heider's principal concern. Malle (2011), for example, argues that Heider (1958) distinguishes between two models of assessment – the model of “impersonal causality” applied to unintentional behavior, and the model of “personal causality” applied to intentional behavior. Therefore, the fundamental distinction in peoples' social perception is between intentional and unintentional actions, and the core element of social cognition is the concept of intentionality.

It is quite possible that when assessing another person's behavior -- in the present context a transgression that might be a violation of trust -- the first and the most important assessment victims may make is to try to understand whether the action was committed intentionally or not. As Malle (2011) notes, all humans are considered agents - entities that have a mental capacity to aim and act intentionally. When another person identifies an agent, he/she becomes “sensitive to face, gaze, and motion patterns that reveal whether the agent's behavior is intentional” (Malle, 2011). And from these inferences of intent, the perceiver proceeds to analyze the behavior and the context to arrive at the conclusions of specific goals, beliefs, and emotions (Malle, 2005). Therefore, as Malle (2011, p. 305) emphasizes,

The intentionality concept is the hub of the folk-conceptual framework. It separates the entire realm of behavior into intentional and unintentional events, guides perceptual and cognitive processes (such as inference and explanation), and influences judgments of praise, blame, and moral responsibility (Cushman, 2008; Guglielmo, Monroe, & Malle, 2009; Malle, 2006; Shaver, 1985).

The scientific exploration of the concept of intentionality started with a number of experiments involving children. Considerable work within developmental and social

psychology has been done to understand when and how children acquire the concept of intent (e.g., Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Moses, 1993; Shultz, 1980; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Phillips, 2001; Woodward, 1998; Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001; Astington, 2001; Wellman & Woolley, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Additionally, however, Malle & Knobe (1997) conducted a series of studies on adults' concepts of intentionality. They were able to show that people have a high level of agreement of what constitutes an intentional action (intentionality judgment). They also developed and tested a model of the folk concept of intentionality that consists of five components: desire for an outcome, belief about the causal link between the action and the outcome, intention to perform the action, skill to perform it, and awareness (Malle & Knobe, 1997). For a behavior to be clearly perceived as an intentional act, observers should see all five of these elements in the actor's behavior and its contextual surroundings.

Exploring how people arrive at judgments that a transgression was an intentional act might be a promising stream of research. It is, however, beyond the scope of my proposed research. My interest is how perceptions of intent contribute to judgments of an offender's trustworthiness, and consequently the effects of these perceptions on trust following a transgression. Although this relation has not been observed directly, some guidance can be found in research on judgments of responsibility and blame. Specifically, research that has focused on the determinants of blame and the assignments of responsibility and punishment for negative outcomes should be instructive. In this regard, two potentially useful and prominent theories of blame and responsibility are those that were introduced by Shaver (1985) and Alicke (2000).

Shaver's theory (1985) is built on the work of Heider (1958) and Kelley (1973) in social psychology, and also on work by legal theorists (Hart & Honore, 1985) and philosophers (e.g., Austin, 1961; Collingwood, 1940). He introduces a prescriptive theory of blame proposing how the ideal observer/participant ought to make judgments of responsibility and blame. According to Shaver (1985), prior to attributions of responsibility, the observer should assess a number of interrelated factors including the presumed causality between an actor's actions and their outcomes; the actor's knowledge of consequences; the actor's intention to create the event; factors that contributed to actor's coercion into the action; and the actor's understanding of the moral implications of the actions. Of these five dimensions, Shaver believes that causality is the most important one and it is comprised of four levels that connect the actor to the outcome. One of these levels is intentionality, which Shaver differentiates from the intentionality that serves the aforementioned judgments of responsibility. Building on the concept of augmentation (Kelley, 1973), Shaver explains that an intentional action is considered more causal than an unintentional one, even if they both lead to the same outcome. When causality is established, people are blamed more and held more responsible for the outcomes. As a sub-component of causality attributions, intentionality plays only marginal role, whereas it is critical to judgments of responsibility and blame. Therefore, according to Shaver's model, intentionality plays a double role in determining responsibility and blame for a negative action. Although providing a comprehensive framework on responsibility and blame, Shaver's theory is considered problematic (Lagnado & Channon, 2008), mostly because of its prescriptive nature and its inability to provide an account of what people actually do.

Alicke (2000) has offered a theory that describes the processes and attributions people go through while assessing actions and assigning responsibility and blame. The culpable control model is based on two central assumptions: “1) that people assess potentially blameworthy actions in terms of the actor’s personal control over the harmful consequences; and 2) that people make spontaneous evaluations of these actions that encourage blame rather than mitigation” (Lagnado & Channon, 2008, p. 756). Through the concept of personal control, Alicke (2000) integrates the three main factors of the research on attributions – causality, intentionality and foreseeability. Actions high in personal control – caused by the agent, intentional and foreseeable – will increase blame; actions low on personal control will decrease blame and responsibility. Moreover, Alicke (2000) argues that people assess the degree of causality, intentionality and foreseeability, rather than just perceiving each of them as dichotomous states.

Alicke’s model is considered a descriptive theory of responsibility and blame in that it includes the spontaneity element of human judgmental processes. Spontaneous evaluations represent the deviation from the rational behavior described by Shaver. They usually have distorting effects on judgments but represent the real picture of how attributional processing occurs. Despite the difference in the nature of the theories, both perspectives consider intentionality and foreseeability as two main factors in assignments of responsibility and blame for negative outcomes.

Outcome severity.

Research to date has not looked at the relationship between outcome severity and perceived intent. However, research has demonstrated that outcome severity and attributions of responsibility have a reciprocal impact on one another (Skarlicki & Kulik,

2005). An extrapolation of these findings suggests that outcome severity and perceived intent might also have an interesting reciprocal relationship with one another. In particular, it has been found that as the severity of victims' harm increases, the likelihood increases that transgressions will be perceived as intentional, and that offenders are responsible for causing this harm (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966). The reciprocity is reflected in the fact that once an attribution of responsibility is made, it impacts the perceived severity of the outcomes. Skarlicki & Kulik (2005) describe this reciprocity in their model of third-party perceptions of employee mistreatment:

The intentional offender can be seen as demonstrating contempt for the victim or the victim's social group, as though asserting superiority over the victim's beliefs or value system (Miller & Vidmar, 1981). As a result, intentional wrongdoing is seen as more severe and unfair than unintentional mistreatment because the former threatens the social order and can predict future offences (Heider, 1958; Miller & Vidmar, 1981). Once a third party concludes that the organization or its agents intended to harm the victim, these social wrongs are included in the third party's assessment and add to the third party's impressions of the severity of the victim's negative outcomes. And as the perceived severity of the victim's outcomes mounts, the more intensely the third party will search for a responsible party, and see the organization or wrongdoer as firmly "on the hook" and accountable for the victim's negative experience (p.195).

The relationship between outcome severity and trust can be understood through the contributions of the research that has explored outcome severity in relation to assignments of blame, assignments of responsibility, punishment, and forgiveness. As early as 1966, Walster (1966) demonstrated that ascriptions of responsibility for unintentional acts increase as objective damage increases. It was posited that the more severe the consequences become, the harder it is for observers to accept that similar events could occur to them. In order to maintain a belief that they can avoid similar

things happening to them, they assign more responsibility to the person at fault.

Researchers have named this effect 'defensive attribution' (Shaver, 1970). Fiske and

Taylor (1991, p.85) explain it as follows:

As the consequences of an action become more severe, they become more unpleasant, and the notion that they might be accidental becomes less tolerable: the fear that the same thing might involve the self becomes a realistic possibility. Seeing the actions as avoidable and blaming a person for the occurrence makes the actions more predictable and hence avoidable by the self.

Several early studies testing the notions of defensive attributions have yielded mixed results: some of the studies found the relationship between severity of the outcomes and assigning the responsibility, such that more severe outcomes led to more responsibility assigned to the transgressor (Walster, 1966; DeJoy & Klippel, 1984; Gleason & Harris, 1976; Wilson & Jonah, 1988); however, some other studies either failed to find the same effect, or found the opposite influence (Walster, 1967; Shaw & McMartin, 1977; Thomas & Parpal, 198 Shaver, 1970a, 1970b). The theory has gone through refinement process since those mixed findings. Shaver (1970a) suggested that defensive attributions are not triggered unless the situation is relevant to the observer personally or contextually: personal similarity occurring when the observer a specific characteristic with the harm-doer, and situational similarity occurring when the observer can easily imagine him/herself in the same circumstances as the harm-doer. Shaw and McMartin (1977) have shown that attributions of responsibility were positively correlated with outcome severity when observers lacked personal similarity, and negatively correlated when they had high personal similarity. The personal similarity had such an effect only when the situation similarity was high as well. More recently, Kouabenan,

Gilibert, Medina, and Bouzon (2001) have found support for Shaver's defensive attribution theory by showing that individuals assigned responsibility for the serious offenses to external factors when assessing behavior of members of their own group, and attributed responsibility to internal factors for members of the other group. Robennolt (2000) has used meta-analysis to examine 31 studies that used attributions of responsibility as the dependent variable. These meta-analytic results suggest that across studies individuals have attributed greater responsibility for severe outcomes than for minor outcomes.

In the context of post-transgression states, outcome severity has been studied in relation to forgiveness, effectiveness of trust restoration strategies, and service-failure recovery (Boon & Sulsky, 1997; Weun, Beatty, and Jones, 2004; Fincham, Jackson, and Beach, 2005; Fehr and Gelfand, 2010, etc.). In this research outcome severity is commonly operationalized as the magnitude of harm associated with actions (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). In other words, it is an indicator of the size of the loss experienced by the victims due to the transgression. Greater harm is usually associated with less favorable victims' reactions. For instance, when transgressions lead to severe outcomes transgressors are seen more negatively and as more hostile (Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, & Tedeschi, 1978) and, their apologies or explanations are less likely to be accepted (Ohbuchi, Kameda & Agarie, 1989; Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry, 1994). Individuals who are harmed by a transgression report more anger, a stronger desire for punishment, less forgiveness, less sympathy, and lower morality ratings of the transgressor than those individuals who are not harmed (Gold & Weiner, 2000). People are also more willing to

reconcile a relationship after a broken promise when their magnitude of harm is small rather than large (Tomlinson et al., 2004).

Nevertheless, collectively the research on outcomes severity and its relationship to trust is limited, and the findings are still mixed. Boon and Sulsky (1997), for instance, have shown that assessments of outcome severity did not play a role in assigning blame to a partner after a failure in a romantic relationship; in contrast, decisions to forgive were based heavily on judgments of the severity of the outcomes. Fehr and Gelfand (2010) examined the impact of harm severity on the relationship between self-construals and apologies. Having offered competing hypotheses about this three-way interaction and the role of harm severity in forgiveness relationships, their data indicated no significant relationship between harm severity and matching self-construal to apology components. Harm severity, however, exhibited a direct negative correlation with forgiveness across participants. In the context of service failure, Weun et al. (2004) have explored the relationship between service failure severity and organizational post-failure outcomes, such as trust, commitment, and negative word-of mouth. They have found that, in fact, severity of the transgression negatively influences post-transgression trust, organizational commitment, and encourages negative word-of-mouth.

Chapter 3.

RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

The proposed research model can be seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Research model of the effect of intent and outcome severity on trust.

Beliefs about intent and trust.

Research has only recently begun to explore the influence of perceived intent on post-transgression states, such as trust, forgiveness, and relationship repair. In one of the few studies conducted thus far, Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, and Uchiyama (2008) have shown that the effect of an apology on forgiveness was different depending on whether the transgression was committed intentionally or not. They have found that forgiveness was less likely following an apology when the transgression was committed intentionally than when it was an accident, and they have shown that this effect was explained by the victim's impression of the transgressor (Struthers et al., 2008). Interestingly, this finding is concordant with the finding that apologies are less effective after integrity-based violations compared to competence-based violations (Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Similarly, Kim et al. (2004, 2006) have shown that it is not a good idea to apologize after an integrity-based violation due to the effect of an apology on the perceived integrity, which can be attributed to the victim's impression of the transgressor. These findings suggest that attributions of intent are strongly linked to attributions and beliefs about others' integrity.

To understand this linkage, it is important to establish a definitional and conceptual foundation of integrity. In most of the organizational and psychological research, integrity is presumed to be linked to numerous values-related constructs including ethics, morality, honesty, and sincerity. In fact, in Webster's New World Dictionary integrity is defined as "the quality or state of being of sound moral principle; uprightness, honesty, and sincerity". Looking at the origins of the concept and the term, however, gives us a more inclusive and philosophical view of integrity. Originating from

‘integer’ (Latin: whole, complete), integrity represents the quality or state of being complete, whole, unbroken, unimpaired (Webster’s New World Dictionary). In other words, integrity is defined as completeness of character, consistency in actions, principles, and values.

Erhard, Jensen, and Zaffron (2013) believe that defining integrity through morality and honesty, in fact, confounds the distinctions among the concepts. They present a model of integrity as a positive phenomenon, i.e. objective state or condition, and define it as “a state or condition of being whole, complete, unbroken, unimpaired, sound, perfect condition” (Erhard et al., 2013, p.4). In this model personal integrity is understood through the concept of a “person’s word” (p.10) that is whole, complete, unbroken, sound, and perfect. This ‘word’ defines who the person is in the matter of integrity. It represents both the word to yourself and the word to the people around you, and is a crucial element of positive integrity. The word can take different forms: what you said; what you know; what is expected; what you say is so; what you stand for; and moral, ethical and legal standards (Erhard et al., 2013). The latter -- morality, ethics, and legality -- is included as a part of one’s word as normative values (as compared to positive states). Erhard et al. (2013) define integrity as honoring one’s word in any form, which includes both keeping one’s word and taking steps to protect integrity when it is not possible to keep the word. The authors propose that honoring one’s word has a power of building almost perfect relationships and trust.

Simply put, when I give my word to another, that act creates various conditions of “counting on” or “reliance on”, in the relationship between me and the other. Given that one’s word creates the relationship, it follows that when one’s word is whole and complete, the aspect of the relationship it creates is whole and complete. In a critical sense, who I am for another is my word, i.e., my expression of myself. For a relationship to have

integrity (to be whole and complete), one's word must be whole and complete (p.51).

When others know that I honor my word, they cannot help but trust my word. The long pathway to achieving trust is generally thought to involve people spending time together, getting to know each other, and sharing experiences, but the foregoing no matter how long it is carried out does not work if the people involved do not honor their word (p.91).

Therefore, breaking one's word damages the state of being whole and complete and has a detrimental effect on the relationship and trust. Logically, victims' beliefs about the intentionality of an act are major contributors to perceptions that one's word has been broken. This assertion follows directly from a belief that adherence to the normative virtues of morality, ethics, and legality are inalienable parts of the concept of one's word and integrity. Inherent in belonging to a larger collective known as a society, groups of people create expectations that others will conform to the moral, ethical, and legal standards of that group or the larger society. Thus, any intentional act of violating these shared norms represents an attack on a given person's integrity. Intentional violations significantly impair interpersonal trust since the clear implication is that the word has been broken; integrity has been damaged.

The abovementioned connection between intentional actions and integrity is not necessarily true for perceptions of one's ability (competence). Competence is generally defined as the ability to do something well, having requisite abilities or qualities to perform a task (Merriam-Webster). Competence has more to do with the presence of necessary resources in order to maintain a relationship on a functional level. It captures the "can-do" element of the relationship – the ability to act in an appropriate fashion, whereas integrity represents the "will-do" part (Colquitt et al., 2007). Therefore, although

competence might include some interpersonal skills and general wisdom to succeed in a group or society as a part of the necessary set of skills and abilities, it does not include moral assessments of fairness, justice, consistency, and promise fulfillment.

Consequently, there is no reason to assume that intentions to break promises and rules and commit transgressions will have effects on perceptions of competence in the manner that they should influence perceptions of integrity. Hence,

Hypothesis 1a. Victims' beliefs about the intent to commit an act will be negatively related to perceptions of the transgressor's integrity.

Hypothesis 1b. Victims' beliefs about the intent to commit an act will have no relationship to perceptions of the transgressor's competence.

Hypothesis 2. Victims' beliefs about the intent to commit an act will be negatively related to perceptions of trust.

Hypothesis 3. There will be a positive relationship between victims' perceptions of a transgressor's integrity and trust.

Direct and moderating effects of outcome severity.

The literature on the formation of moral judgment provides insights into the potential roles that outcome severity and perceived intent may play on determining perceptions of trust. Two streams of research have emerged in response to finding an answer to the perplexing question of how human moral judgment is formed. These two streams differ in their assignment of the primary role of either causal responsibility or intentional factors on forming human moral judgment. Attribution scientists have suggested that moral judgment starts with the analysis of harmful consequences and

causal responsibility and only subsequently proceeds to an analysis of intentionality; hence, absent any negative outcomes, beliefs about intentions are insufficient to trigger moral judgments (Cushman, 2008).

The cognitive development literature, on the other hand, emphasizes the essential role of intentional factors in forming moral judgments; harmful intentions are sufficient to trigger the assessments of responsibility even in the absence of any harmful consequences (Cushman, 2008). Cushman (2008) through a series of experiments has shown that the explanations of these two theories are not competing, but complementary; moral judgment consists of two processes – one triggered by harmful consequences and another triggered by an analysis of intentionality. The assessment of consequences and causal responsibility leads to judgments of deserved punishment, and the assessment of intentionality that consists of the assessment of mental states such as beliefs, desires, and motives leads to judgments of moral wrongness of a behavior.

Cushman (2008) proposed a two-process model of moral judgment that suggests that, in comparison to a single-process model of moral judgment where “causal and intentional factors are integrated prior to the output of a single valenced response” (p.378), “separate valenced responses are computed on the basis of each factor and then act competitively to determine judgments of wrongness, punishment, etc.” (p.378). In other words, the consequence-based attribution processes are augmented by an analysis of mental states in formation of moral judgments; the attribution theory and the propositions of developmental cognition research on moral judgment are understood not as a competing accounts of a single phenomenon, but as complementary accounts of distinct phenomena (Cushman, 2008).

Accordingly, the assessments of outcome severity (harmful consequences) and perceived intent (intentionality) are two separate processes that lead to distinct moral judgments – deserved punishment and moral wrongness. These two processes are based on different factors and complement each other in forming a moral judgment after a transgression. One can reasonably, therefore, also extend this model to aid in the understanding of perceptions of trust following a transgression.

Admittedly, outcome severity itself might be perceptual in nature. Any number of individual and/or contextual factors might, in other words, influence victims' perceptions of the severity of consequences associated with a particular outcome. Not only might there be enduring personality correlates of outcome severity, victims' experiences could also have potential effects on their perceptions. However, generally speaking, an attribution theoretical perspective suggests that, one can expect that in the cases of either low or high severity outcomes, the judgment of moral responsibility and, consequently, perceptions of trust will primarily be influenced by an assessment of consequences. Given the importance that victims should attach to outcomes under either of these conditions, there should be no difference in trust levels after intentional and non-intentional violations. Any differences in trust will be determined by the main effect of outcome severity. Specifically, trust will be lower after transgressions that have led to severe outcomes than after transgressions associated with trivial outcomes, namely those of low severity.

The situation might, however, be different for transgressions with moderately severe outcomes. When the outcomes attributed to a given action are either trivial or of profound significance, victims may not be motivated to engage in any cognitively

complex or deep mental assessments. Trivial outcomes may not warrant the effort and profound outcomes may have caused such irreparable harm that victims' have no interest in seeking understanding. However, the ambiguity that moderately severe outcomes can create may motivate victims to engage in more of a sense-making process designed to answer the question, "Why did the transgressor do this to me"?

Under these moderately severe outcome conditions victims' needs to understand the transgressors' mental states (did the transgressor intend to do harm?) could easily act as an augmenting factor in the victims' causal attribution judgments. Any assessment of intentionality, might therefore, invoke a defensive attributions cognitive assessment. When the transgression causes moderately severe outcomes, the victims cannot just base their judgments of responsibility and trust on the assessments of consequences; the outcomes were significant enough to cause concern but they were not so overwhelming to be irreparable. Given the need to understand transgressors' motivations under these uncertain outcome conditions, victims' assessments of intent will potentially become especially salient. Moderately severe outcomes might maximize the victims' need to understand why, and as such they need to determine to what an assignment of blame should be made. Only then will they be able to assess whether the transgressor can or should be trusted in any future interactions. In other words, if the transgression that led to moderately severe outcomes is perceived to be an intentional act, then trusting intentions will be lower than when such a transgression is perceived to be unintentional. Hence,

Hypothesis 4. There will be a main effect for outcome severity on trust such that trust will be lower under conditions of severe outcomes.

Hypothesis 5. However, outcome severity will also moderate the relationship between victims' beliefs about intent and their perceptions of trust; under conditions of either low or high severity of outcomes the relationship will be weaker than when the outcomes are moderately severe.

Chapter 4

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 281 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory management courses at a large university located in the southwestern United States. The sample consisted of 156 females and 119 males. The average age of the participants was 24 years old. Fifty-one percent of the subjects reported that they were employed part-time. The students received class credit for participation. Each student was randomly assigned to one of the six scenarios sets.

Procedure

The data reported in this dissertation were collected as part of a larger research project. Decisions about what measures to include in the present analyses were all made a priori. However, it is important to acknowledge that other data were collected at the same time.

Part 1 of the dissertation survey included questions about participants' demographics and several personality scales that were not the focal point of the present

study. These demographic measures were distributed during class time but were completed by participants on their own time. Appendix A contains the complete survey.

Approximately one week after the demographic measures were distributed in class, the second part of the experimental materials consisting of the scenarios set and the dependent variables questionnaire were completed in class. Participants had been instructed to bring their demographic questionnaire with them to class. Thus, both parts of the experimental materials were collected at the end of the class.

Each participant was randomly assigned to one of six scenario sets that contained the intent and outcome severity manipulations. Within each set were three different scenarios each of which described a transgression. These three scenarios differed in terms of the context in which the transgression occurred; one occurred in a student group project setting, one described a coworker's transgression, and the third involved two friends interacting at a party. Intent and outcome severity were manipulated between scenario sets, but within each scenario set, the levels of intent and outcome severity were held constant. Thus, intent and outcome severity were completely crossed, between subjects independent variables. However, since the dependent variables of interest were averaged responses across these three contexts, there was no attempt to counterbalance their order of presentation.

For each scenario, participants were asked to imagine that they were actually experiencing the situation that was being described. After reading each of the scenarios, the participants completed a 28 item questionnaire. As such, each subject responded to three scenarios on a total of 84 survey items. Each set of 28 items included manipulation check questions, measures of perceived integrity, competence, and finally a measure of

willingness to risk (trust). Where appropriate and necessary, the precise wording of items was adapted to fit the context of a given scenario. Appendix B contains all 28 items.

Independent variables

Intent

Each subject received one of six scenarios sets in which the transgressor's intent to commit the act in question was manipulated. In the *No Intent* condition participants were told that the person described in the scenario had absolutely no intention of causing any problems, and that the act was an accidental occurrence. In the *Intent* condition the participants were told that the person described in the scenario had every intention of causing problems, and that the act in question was committed purposefully.

Outcome severity

Following Gonzales, Manning and Haugen (1992), the levels of outcome severity were established as mild, moderate, and severe. The specific consequences that logically ordered themselves from mild to severe for a specific situation were created by the researcher in collaboration with a senior faculty member who was familiar with the current state of research on outcome severity. The specific outcomes were different for each of three situational contexts within a given scenarios set, but the levels of severity were held as constant as possible across contexts. Although no attempt was made to quantitatively index each level of severity, the two scenario developers had 100% agreement on the rank ordering of the outcomes that constituted the severity manipulation within each scenario context.

Dependent variables

Manipulation checks. Three factual questions were presented to subjects after each of the three contexts within a scenario set. The questions were related to the nature of the offensive act committed (intent-no intent), the outcomes associated with the act, and the identity of the person who committed the act.

Perceived integrity. Participants' beliefs about the transgressor's integrity for each of the three scenarios were measured with a three-item scale that had been adapted from Kim et al. (2006). The scale contained the following items with wording adaptations where necessary: 1) My work colleague has a great deal of integrity. 2) Sound principles seem to guide my work colleague's behavior. 3) I like my work colleague's values. Participants rated these items on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree). The reliability of the scale is .88.

Perceived competence. Participants' beliefs about the transgressor's competence in each scenario were assessed with a three-item scale that had also been adapted from Kim et al. (2006). Respondents rated these items on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree). The scale contained the following items with appropriate wording adaptations: 1) I feel very confident in my work colleague's skills as a professional person. 2) My work colleague has considerable knowledge about the work that she is doing. 3) I think that my work colleague is very capable of performing her job. The reliability of the scale is .80.

Trust. Trust was operationalized through a measure of willingness to risk. As suggested by Kim et al. (2006), this measure should be interpreted as a proxy for trusting intentions toward the transgressor. In an attempt to improve the questionable reliability of the

measure that was used by Kim et al., two additional items were written by the researcher and included with adaptations of their original items. With these additional items, the scale contained the following 5 items with wording adaptations to fit each of the three scenarios within a set: 1) If I did have to work with this same work colleague in the future, I would keep a very close eye on them. 2) I would feel comfortable working with this same work colleague again in the future. 3) I would give this same work colleague another task that was critical to me, even if I could not carefully monitor her actions. 4) I would only allow this work colleague to help me on a similar task in the future if I could keep a close watch over them. 5) If I had a choice, I would not let this work colleague have any influence over issues that are important to me. Respondents rated these items on 5-point Likert scales (0 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree). The internal consistency reliability of these 5 items indicated that the current measure was no more reliable than the one offered by Kim and colleagues ($\alpha=.69$). However, factor analysis of the items indicated that the elimination of one of the original items (4. I would only allow this work colleague to help me on a similar task in the future if I could keep a close watch over them), the reliability of the scale improved dramatically. For purposes of the present study, the final measure of willingness to risk included 4 items with a coefficient alpha of .81.

For analytical purposes, participants' responses to these measures were averaged across scenarios in order to gauge peoples' typical responses to transgressions committed with or without intent that varied in terms of the severity of outcomes that they caused. For the present study, there was no attempt to counterbalance these scenarios. As such, differences in participants' reactions that may have stemmed from a context-specific

factor cannot be fully addressed, although some exploratory analyses of possible context differences will be presented.

Chapter 5

RESULTS

Manipulation checks, descriptive statistics

Since participants had responded to three manipulation check questions after each scenario in the set, there were nine items that assessed whether they had been sufficiently engaged in the experimental task to correctly recognize the experimental conditions to which they were assigned. Of the two hundred and eighty one participants, only eighteen subjects answered two or more out of nine manipulation check questions incorrectly. Given this small number (6%), it was decided that overall, subjects were engaged with the written scenarios. As such, all participants were included in the analysis, consistent with an intent-to-treat analysis in intervention research.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and inter-correlations of the study variables. Table 2 reports variables means and standard deviations by condition.

Table 1. Means, SD, reliabilities, and inter-correlations

Variable	M	SD	α	1	2
1. Perceived integrity	1.26	.77	.88		
2. Perceived competence	1.60	.72	.80	.69**	
3. Willingness to risk	1.08	.77	.81	.72**	.57**

** $p < .01$

Table 2. Number of observations, means, and SD by condition

Intent	Outcome severity	N	Perceived integrity		Perceived Competence		Willingness to risk	
			M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
No Intent	Mild	48	1.73	.59	1.68	.64	1.38	.58
	Moderate	45	1.68	.58	1.81	.71	1.33	.54
	Severe	47	1.71	.65	1.71	.73	1.31	.60
Intent	Mild	48	.76	.52	1.51	.64	.79	.43
	Moderate	44	.93	.73	1.61	.87	.91	.54
	Severe	48	.72	.67	1.30	.65	.75	.45

Tests of Hypotheses

Analysis of Variance was the general analytical framework dictated by the design of the study. Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was first conducted and then follow-up univariate analyses of variance were used to analyze the data. The results of the analyses can be seen in Tables 3-6.

Hypothesis 1a, b. Recall that hypothesis 1 had predicted that there would be a significant effect for the intent/no intent manipulation on perceptions of integrity but no similar effect on competency. An examination of the overall MANOVA indicated that there was a significant main effect for the intent manipulation (Wilks' Lambda = .54, $F(3, 270) = 76.09$, $p < .001$; $\eta^2 = .46$) on the dependent variable set. More importantly, the follow-up univariate analyses indicated that the effects of intent were significant for perceived integrity ($F(1, 272) = 144.636$, $p < .001$; $\eta^2 = .347$). An examination of the means further indicates that this effect was in the predicted direction inasmuch as ratings of integrity were significantly lower under conditions of intent ($M = .80$) than under conditions of no intent ($M = 1.71$). Thus, hypothesis 1a was clearly supported.

Contrary to expectation, however, there was also a significant univariate effect on perceived competence ($F(1, 272) = 8.484$, $p = .004$; $\eta^2 = .030$). An examination of the mean ratings for competence indicated that participants also rated the transgressors' competence lower when they acted intentionally ($M = 1.48$) than when the act was not intentional ($M = 1.73$).

Although one can never prove the null hypothesis, the existence of this significant effect on competence appears to be inconsistent with hypothesis 1b. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, the effects (gauged as simple mean differences) for intent on integrity

and competence suggest that integrity was a far more important key to understanding participants' reactions to intent than was competence.




Figure 2. Mean Differences in Perceived Integrity and Perceived Competence Within Intent Condition.

To more precisely determine whether the magnitude of the effect that intent had on competence was smaller than the size of effect it had on integrity, procedures outlined in Gleser and Olkin (1994) were utilized.

Normally, a Z statistic can be utilized in a straightforward manner for comparing two effect sizes that have been indexed by Cohen's d . Specifically, to compare two effect sizes that have been generated by independent samples, one can calculate $Z = (d_1 - d_2) / \sqrt{\text{Var}(d_1 - d_2)}$. However, in the present study Cohen's d for integrity and Cohen's d for competence are not statistically independent since the two measures were obtained from the same subjects and they are, in fact, significantly correlated (.69). When two d values are not statistically independent, as in the present study, then the Z test must compensate for the covariance between the outcome variables in order to correctly estimate the variance of the difference in d [$\text{Var}(d_1 - d_2)$]; when the outcome measures are correlated, ignoring the dependence among the effects sizes results in biased estimation of the variance, with the variance being overestimated in the case of positive covariance and underestimated in the case of negative covariance.

According to Gleser and Olkin (1994), an appropriate way to compensate for the dependency involves adjusting the denominator of the Z statistic by the covariance of the d values for each of the outcome measures. Using this adjustment strategy (p. 350), the Z associated with the predicted difference in effect sizes between integrity and competence in the present study was 8.59, $p < .001$.

To further confirm this significant difference in the strength of the two effects, confidence intervals were constructed around Cohen's d for integrity (1.47) and Cohen's d for competence (.35) to determine the extent of overlap between the two distributions.

The 95% confidence interval around each of these effect sizes indicated that there was essentially no overlap in two intervals. That is, the 95% confidence interval for integrity was (1.72, 1.22) while the same interval for competence was (.59, .11). While these intervals treat the effect sizes as independent, given the positive covariance between the two estimates ensures that the lack of overlap can be meaningfully interpreted as signaling that this lack of overlap in the intervals is unlikely if the population values of the effect sizes were indeed equal.

Together, these analyses lend considerable support to the underlying logic of hypothesis 1b. Thus, in spite of the fact that there was a significant effect on competence for intent, the strength of that effect was quite small in comparison to the size of effect for integrity.

Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 predicted a significant effect for intent on trust. The univariate ANOVA for this effect indicated support for the hypothesis, ($F(1, 272) = 66.596, p < .001; \eta^2 = .197$). Moreover, the effect was in the predicted direction inasmuch as trust was lower when the action was intentional ($M = .82$) than when it was unintentional ($M = 1.34$). However, it should also be noted that even when the act was believed to be unintentional, participants' average trust across scenarios was below the midpoint of the scale (2.0). Thus, trust suffered regardless of the transgressors' intent; but it suffered significantly less following not intentional acts.

Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 posited a positive relationship between perceived integrity and trust. As shown in Table 1, there was a significant correlation between these two outcomes, $.72, p < .01$. Thus, hypothesis 3 was supported.

Hypothesis 4. Looking again at the overall MANOVA, outcome severity did not have a significant multivariate effect on the dependent variable set (Wilks' Lambda = .98, $F(6, 540) = .92$, $p = .48$; $\eta^2 = .010$). The follow-up univariate analysis further indicated that outcome severity had no significant effect on trust, $F(2, 272) = .75$, $p = .48$; $\eta^2 = .005$). As such, there was no support for hypothesis 4. Interestingly, outcome severity did have a marginal univariate effect on perceived competence, ($F(2, 272) = 2.28$, $p = .10$; $\eta^2 = .017$) but given the absence of a statistically significant multivariate effect and its marginal nature, no conclusions about this effect can be reliably drawn.

Hypothesis 5. Outcome severity was predicted to moderate the relationship between intent and trust such that the effect of intent was expected to be weaker when the outcomes were either mild or severe, and stronger when the outcome was of moderate severity. The MANOVA revealed that the intent by outcome severity interaction was not significant (Wilks' Lambda = .98, $F(6, 540) = 1.06$, $p = .39$; $\eta^2 = .01$). As such, there was no statistically significant evidence that outcome severity was moderating the relationship between intent and trust.

Table 3. Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Effects of Manipulated Variables on Dependent Variables

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	Perceived Integrity	58.763 ^a	5	11.753	29.876***	.355
	Perceived Competence	7.637 ^b	5	1.527	3.093**	.054
	Willingness to Risk	19.826 ^c	5	3.965	14.210***	.207
Error	Perceived Integrity	107.000	272	.393		
	Perceived Competence	134.332	272	.494		
	Willingness to Risk	75.897	272	.279		
Corrected Total	Perceived Integrity	165.764	277			
	Perceived Competence	141.969	277			
	Willingness to Risk	95.722	277			
IntentCond	Perceived Integrity	56.897	1	56.897	144.636***	.347
	Perceived Competence	4.190	1	4.190	8.484**	.030
	Willingness to Risk	18.582	1	18.582	66.596***	.197
OutcomeCond	Perceived Integrity	.410	2	.205	.521	.004
	Perceived Competence	2.275	2	1.138	2.303	.017
	Willingness to Risk	.416	2	.208	.746	.005
IntentCond *	Perceived Integrity	.782	2	.391	.994	.007
OutcomeCond	Perceived Competence	1.011	2	.506	1.024	.007
	Willingness to Risk	.507	2	.253	.908	.007

a. R Squared = .355 (Adjusted R Squared = .343)

b. R Squared = .054 (Adjusted R Squared = .036)

c. R Squared = .207 (Adjusted R Squared = .193)

p < 0.01; * p < 0.001

Table 4. Analysis of Variance: Effects of Manipulated Variables on Perceived Integrity

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	58.763 ^a	5	11.753	29.876***	.355
Error	107.000	272	.393		
Corrected Total	165.764	277			
IntentCond	56.897	1	56.897	144.636***	.347
OutcomeCond	.410	2	.205	.521	.004
IntentCond * OutcomeCond	.782	2	.391	.994	.007

a. R Squared = .355 (Adjusted R Squared = .343)

*** p< 0.001

Table 5. Analysis of Variance: Effects of Manipulated Variables on Perceived Competence

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	7.704 ^a	5	1.541	3.088**	.053
Error	137.240	275	.499		
Corrected Total	144.944	280			
IntentCond	4.860	1	4.860	9.739**	.034
OutcomeCond	1.920	2	.960	1.924	.014
IntentCond * OutcomeCond	.828	2	.414	.830	.006

a. R Squared = .053 (Adjusted R Squared = .036)

** p< 0.01

Table 6. Analysis of Variance: Effects of Manipulated Variables on Willingness to Risk

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	20.115 ^a	5	4.023	14.452***	.208
Error	76.553	275	.278		
Corrected Total	96.668	280			
IntentCond	19.077	1	19.077	68.530***	.199
OutcomeCond	.354	2	.177	.637	.005
IntentCond * OutcomeCond	.405	2	.202	.727	.005

a. R Squared = .208 (Adjusted R Squared = .194)

*** p< 0.001

Exploratory analysis: Scenario contexts.

An exploratory analysis was conducted to investigate the effect of context on the relationships of interest. As noted elsewhere in the present dissertation, many of the landmark investigations of apologies, forgiveness, and trust repair have been conducted within single-scenario research designs. For example, in two noteworthy investigations of trust repair, Kim et al. (2004, 2006) utilized an employment setting in which a prospective applicant apologized to an interviewer for having transgressed against a former employer. Similarly, in an often-cited investigation of the relationships among self-construals and apology components, Fehr and Gelfand (2010) used a single hypothetical friend scenario. And, while there is absolutely nothing wrong with utilizing any given scenario context within a broader research stream, one does wonder about the boundaries to which the results of these otherwise excellent investigations generalize. In other words, there are potential issues about the extent to which the results of these studies were context-specific. As such, one's conclusions about how and when victims make attributions about transgressions and whether trust repair is possible are limited to the context in which any particular study was conducted until generalizability can be demonstrated.

In order to begin addressing this constraint on the interpretation of the existing literature, a strategic decision was made at the outset of the present investigation to employ a research design that involved multiple contexts. The three contexts that were chosen (work colleague, student project, friend) were intentionally chosen to be representative of the frequently used contexts in the existing literature. However, a decision was also made to average responses across these three contexts.

In part because there was a surprising lack of effect for outcome severity in the present study, however, exploratory analyses were used to more closely examine the results to see if there might be evidence that different contexts were differentially affecting participants' reactions to violations of trust. To do so, a mixed design repeated-measures MANOVA was conducted in which scenario context was treated as a within-subjects, repeated-measures independent variable while intent/no intent and outcome severity were retained as between subjects factors. The dependent variables for this analysis were perceived integrity, perceived competence, and willingness to risk.

The results of this analysis indicated that there were multivariate main effects for context, (Wilks' Lambda = .468, $F(6, 267) = 50.50$, $p < .001$) which is suggestive of an order effect in the presentation of the scenario contexts. However, there was also a multivariate interaction between scenario context and the intent/no intent manipulation (Wilks' Lambda = .668, $F(6, 267) = 22.16$, $p < .001$) which cannot be explained merely as an order effect. The perception of intent was clearly being influenced by the particular context in which the transgression occurred; and, this joint effect of context and intent was significantly influencing judgments of the dependent variable set.

In order to more clearly isolate the interaction effects that existed between context and intent, univariate ANOVA's were conducted on each of the three dependent variables. Tables 7, 8, and 9 summarize the results of these three repeated measures analyses. As can be seen in the tables, there was a main effect for scenario context as well as a statistically significant interaction between Intent/No intent and Scenario context for each of the dependent variables, Perceived Integrity, Perceived Competence, and Willingness to Risk (Trust). The nature of these three significant interactions can be seen

in Figures 3, 4, and 5. An overall assessment of the three interactions suggests that victims' reactions to transgressors' intent versus no intent was functioning differently depending on whether the participants were reacting to an act committed by a work colleague, a school project partner, or a friend. The evidence suggests that context does matter.

Table 7. Repeated measures Analysis of Variance: Effects of Context on Perceived Integrity

Effect	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Context	6.342	2	3.171	10.072***	.036
Context* Intent	12.615	2	6.308	20.035***	.069
Context*Outcome Severity	1.997	4	.499	2.586	.012
Context*Intent* Outcome Severity	.134	4	.033	.106	.001
Error	171.270	544	.315		

*** p< 0.001

Table 8. Repeated measures Analysis of Variance: Effects of Context on Perceived Competence

Effect	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Context	35.215	2	17.607	38.981***	.124
Context* Intent	44.738	2	22.369	49.523***	.153
Context*Outcome Severity	1.322	4	.330	.732	.005
Context*Intent* Outcome Severity	1.116	4	.279	.618	.004
Error	248.429	550	.452		

*** p< 0.001

Table 9. Repeated measures Analysis of Variance: Effects of Context on Willingness to Risk

Effect	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Greenhouse- Geisser
Context	108.226	2	54.113	151.551***	p<.001
Context* Intent	10.180	2	5.090	14.255***	p<.001
Context*Outcome Severity	1.697	4	.424	1.118	p=.315
Context*Intent* Outcome Severity	.772	4	.193	.5541	p=.694
Error	196.383	550	.357		

*** p< 0.001




Figure 3. Interaction Effect of Context and Intent on Perceived Integrity.




Figure 4. Interaction Effect of Context and Intent on Perceived Competence.




Figure 5. Interaction Effect of Context and Intent on Willingness to Risk.

Chapter 6

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to shed light on the antecedents of people's attributions about transgressors following an act of trust violation. Generally those attributions deal with attempts to clarify the uncertainty that inevitably surrounds a violation of one's trust. Following transgressions, the world and the relationship between the victim and the transgressor are not and will not be the same. Moreover, research has often demonstrated the difficulty associated with trust restoration and repair.

Clearly, trust is altered after a transgression since the act in question highlights a victim's vulnerability to the behavior of a transgressor. This vulnerability stems from the fact that the victim's expectations about the transgressor's integrity and goodwill were not met, thereby leading the victim to question the relationship. The victim engages in a sense-making process during which the situation, the transgression, and the transgressor are considered. The goal of this process is to arrive at some justifiable conclusion regarding the incident and, as a result, the victim can adjust their existing perceptions

about the transgressor's character and motivation. The cognitive "black box" of this sense-making process is the core target of interest that motivated the present study. As such, the study was designed to be an important early step toward an understanding of these complex social-cognitive processes.

Hypotheses Testing

Table 10 summarizes the results of the statistical analyses that were conducted to test the a priori hypotheses proposed in this study. Greater support was clearly found for the effects of Intent/No Intent than for outcome severity. Each of these hypothesized determinants of victims' reactions to transgressions will, however, be discussed below.

Table 10. Summary of the hypotheses and findings.

Hypothesis	Finding
Hypothesis 1a. Victims' beliefs about the intent to commit an act will be negatively related to perceptions of the transgressor's integrity.	Supported
Hypothesis 1b. Victims' beliefs about the intent to commit an act will have no relationship to perceptions of the transgressor's competence.	Not supported
Hypothesis 2. Victims' beliefs about the intent to commit an act will be negatively related to perceptions of trust.	Supported
Hypothesis 3. There will be a positive relationship between victims' perceptions of a transgressor's integrity trust.	Supported
Hypothesis 4. There will be a main effect for outcome severity on trust such that trust will be lower under conditions of severe outcomes.	Not supported
Hypothesis 5. However, outcome severity will also moderate the relationship between victims' beliefs about intent and their perceptions of trust; under conditions of either low or high severity of outcomes the relationship will be weaker than when the outcomes are moderately severe.	Not supported

Intent and trustworthiness. The present study examined conditions under which victims attribute transgressors' actions and hence their worthiness for continued trust to important traits typically presumed to be related to one's character, in particular integrity and competence. Although these two aspects of trust have been frequently studied in an apology context, there has been very little empirical evidence in the organizational and related literatures about the characteristics of transgression that focuses victims' attributions on either the transgressors' integrity or on their lack of competence.

Although research has demonstrated that trust repair following integrity violations is far more difficult than following competence violations (e.g., Kim et al., 2004, 2006), little is known about when victims will attribute a transgression to integrity or to competence. A vast majority of the existing research on trust has relied on experimental designs in which experimenters have predefined whether a given transgression is integrity-based or competence-based. However, victims' assessments of the cause of the transgression are, logically, a critical precursor to their reactions. What isn't known from the existing literature is why and how victims decide for themselves whether a transgression represents a lack of integrity or a lack of competence. Yet, the research is clear inasmuch as it has demonstrated that victims' reactions are substantially different depending on which of these factors is presumed to have caused the transgressor to act. Within this broader research context, the foremost goal for the present study was to determine the extent to which victims' beliefs about transgressors' intent to do harm shaped their post-transgression perceptions of integrity.

The results of the present study clearly indicated that significantly greater damage is done when transgressors intend to do harm than when their actions can be construed as

unintentional. Victims' perceptions of integrity and trust were significantly lower under conditions of intent than under conditions of a not intentional occurrence. Based on this study's findings, one can logically conclude that beliefs about transgressors' intent are, in fact, critical determinants of the victims' attributions about the transgressor. This effect was substantial in the present study and, in some ways, it appears to have overwhelmed any potential effects that outcome severity may have had on the same attributions. Specifically, as shown in Table 3, transgressors' intent to commit an act was a major determinant of victims' reactions (19 % of variance explained in dependent variables on average) compared to outcome severity that explained ~ 1% of variance in dependent variables on average.

Although perceptions of intent unexpectedly also influenced victims' attributions about transgressors' competence (H1b not supported), the results of the analyses of effect sizes unambiguously showed that the influence on perceptions of integrity was dramatically stronger than the influence on perceptions of ability. The pattern of results averaged across three different contexts suggests that intentional violations of trust lead to a generalized decrease in victim's favorable attributions about transgressors. In the present study, this tendency was manifested in decreased perceptions of both integrity and competence when victims believed that an act was intentional. But, as had been predicted, beliefs about intent were predominantly manifested in reduced perceptions of integrity, and subsequently in victims' unwillingness to risk interacting with the transgressor in the future.

Interestingly, and supportive of this interpretation of the results is that the levels of perceived integrity and perceived competence were virtually identical in the non-

intentional experimental conditions (see Figure 2). Assuming that these unintentional conditions represented the baseline decrement for any transgression like those that were manipulated in the present study, it seems quite clear that intent was being used to a far greater degree to assess the transgressors' integrity than their competence.

Outcome severity. As is also readily apparent from Table 10, outcome severity did not have any statistically significant effects on perceptions of integrity, competency or willingness to risk (H4), nor did it moderate the relationship between intent and the abovementioned outcomes (H5). As previously mentioned, it is possible that the manipulation of intent was so strong that once the participants believed that the violation was intentional, it no longer mattered what particular consequences the violation caused. In other words, once participants' intention beliefs were solidified, then most sense-making activities ceased. It might be, however, premature to dismiss or to disregard the possible differences that can exist between a violation that leads to a minor consequence and a violation that has more serious and more detrimental effects, thereby causing genuine and perhaps irrevocable harm. Based on the evidence from previous research on outcome severity and the two-process model of moral judgment proposed by Cushman (2008), one can continue to posit that consequences of the violation matter. For example, it might well be the case that in a more natural setting victims use the severity of the consequences of an act as inputs into their assessments of intent. The completely crossed nature of the independent variables in the current study did not allow for such a causal or temporal assessment of the relationship between intent and outcome severity. However, such a possibility should be more thoroughly examined in future research. At a minimum, it would be interesting to treat perceptions of intent as a measured, intervening variable in

the outcome severity to trust relationship rather than simultaneously manipulating intent and outcome severity.

Exploratory Analyses: Transgression Context.

Prior research on trust repair following integrity and competence violations has often relied on a single context. And, the context that has often been used has involved relatively new and transient relationships between the victim and the transgressor. Moreover, many studies of trust repair have drawn their conclusions from situations where the victim is actually a third-party; they are not the person who experienced the transgression first hand. While these studies have yielded a number of interesting and important conclusions regarding trust repair, the boundaries of the generalizability of their results is still relatively unknown.

The present study utilized three different scenario contexts as a means of increasing the generalizability of the results. Participants' responses to the transgressions were averaged across contexts in order to gauge a typical relationship between intent, outcome severity, and trust.

The current experimental design precluded any systematic examination of between-context differences but logically, there are differences that might have idiosyncratic effects on how a transgression is evaluated. Exploratory repeated measures analyses of variance indicated that context of the violation mattered for the perceptions of transgressor's trustworthiness and willingness of the victim to risk (trust). Although the results should be interpreted with caution, they suggest that there was a difference in how people handled the expectations of future behavior with a transgressor who was a friend compared to transgressors who were either professional or school acquaintances. When

an intentional transgression was committed by a friend, it had less of a detrimental effect on perceptions of integrity and overall trust compared to other contexts. Moreover, the difference in perceived integrity and willingness to risk after intentional and non-intentional violations committed by a friend was always smaller compared to other contexts with one exception. In the school scenario the differences in trust between the intent and no intent conditions were almost unobservable and were at very low levels. Given how relevant the school context was to the particular population from which the current sample was drawn, the lack of effect deserves some additional attention. In a highly transient situation such as a temporary class-related student project, it is quite possible that victims will not invest the cognitive and affective resources necessary to assess a transgressor's intent following an act that results in harm. Given the transient nature of the relationship, the victim is easily able deal with any uncertainties associated with a transgressor's future behavior simply by terminating the relationship. The question of whether the transgressor intended to violate trust becomes moot and carries very little salience since the odds of future interactions can be reduced to near zero by the victim. As such, there is little to no cost to the victims if they choose not to give the transgressors any benefit of the doubt. It becomes too simple a matter to just assume that the transgressors are not trustworthy.

The context-specific exploratory analyses also revealed an interesting pattern in the levels of perceived competence in the friend context. Although an intentional act lowered perceptions of competence in both the work and the school contexts, there was actually a slight tendency for competence perceptions to increase with intent when the transgressor was a friend (scenario 3).

Despite the design limitations (i.e., small number of items per scale within scenario and the fixed presentation order of the scenarios) preventing any definitive conclusions about between-scenario differences, these results are suggestive of one particular variable that might be of a great importance in determining matters of trust following a transgression – the relational distance between a transgressor and a victim. Both the work and the school scenarios portrayed the transgressor as someone with whom the victim was familiar (member of student work-group; colleague at work) but obviously, participants might have seen these relationships as less enduring than when the transgressor was characterized as a friend.

Work and school relationships are also generally more transient than relationships involving family or friends; therefore, trust violations can be more easily dealt with by psychologically withdrawing from the transgressor than relationships based on family or friends. Logically, any uncertainty about the future behavior of a transgressor in a transient relationship can quickly and easily be handled just by no longer trusting the transgressor or by simply deciding that it is not worth the cognitive effort to decide whether the transgressor is trustworthy. Such may not be the case with more enduring relationships where the costs of not trusting the transgressor are far greater. Under these more enduring situations, victims might want to or need to exert greater restorative efforts since the threat of losing a friend after a trust violation is much more salient than the threat of losing a coworker or a study partner. Moreover, enduring relationships by definition provide victims with more data points against which to compare a transgression. How the impact of the transgression is weighed might logically be affected

by decision-making heuristics such as availability or representativeness (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1974).

Although particular context differences were not the focus of the present study, and, consequently, there was no attempt to counterbalance the order of presentation of the scenarios, future research should seriously consider the limitations of the generalizability of the existing research which, in the organizational literature, has relied predominantly on transient relationships between victims and transgressors. Future research should more systematically explore the role of the context and its influence on the outcomes.

Future Research

Many general limitations of scenario-based research apply to the present study to the same degrees that they are relevant to any such study. One can always question the psychological realism of asking participants to read a description of a particular role and then emotionally respond to that role. It goes without saying that both the internal and the external validity of the present study need to be corroborated with additional research that extends the methods that were used here. At the same time, the present study represents an interesting early attempt to better understand how and when beliefs about intent are created, and, how those beliefs help to determine victims' reactions to transgressions. And, one distinct advantage that the present study does have over many other scenario-based investigations of trust is the inclusion of multiple, diverse scenario contexts. The effects of intent can, therefore, at least be generalized across settings unlike many extant studies in which results are context and scenario specific, thereby making generalizations to other settings nearly impossible.

The strength of effects for intent detected in the present study strongly suggest that in order to further advance the understanding of trust repair, future research needs to examine from a more developmental perspective how beliefs about intent are formed. In order to address the fundamental role that beliefs about intent play in these cognitive processes, a decision was made to experimentally manipulate intent. The black box of sense-making can be crack opened even more if the formation of intentionality perceptions is allowed to unfold in a more natural manner. That is, future studies will want to determine how victims generate beliefs about intent that are independent of an experimenter's control, and therefore, more purely a result of the victims' own cognitive processing. A more natural unfolding of intention beliefs might also reveal a different picture of the importance of outcome severity and its possible interactions with intent.

Future research should also begin to systematically investigate how contextual and relational factors influence victims' reactions to transgressions. The exploratory analyses presented in this dissertation clearly suggest that context does matter. Research cannot assume that results will automatically generalize from one transgressor-victim relationship to all others. In order to properly assess how factors such as relational distance might affect trust repair efforts, quantitatively equivalent outcomes for trust violations across contexts need to be created. Although the rank ordering of outcome severity used in the present study was sufficient to test the current hypotheses, more detailed comparisons between-contexts will need to be able to draw interval and/or ratio comparisons within a given level of severity; the definitions of mild, moderate, and severe outcomes need to be quantified in these future investigations. Absolute rather than

just comparative equivalency of outcomes will help researchers to better understand the effects of outcome severity and its possible interactions with intent and context on trust.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

The present investigation has provided important insights into the cognitive processes that might underlie the often demonstrated difficulty associated with repairing trust following integrity-based transgressions. When intent is inferred, trust violations will, apparently, be attributed to transgressors' integrity to a far greater extent than to their competence. Thus, once victims determine that an act was intentional, serious damage to trust should be anticipated and it is precisely this type of damage that is the most difficult to repair. Although this should not be interpreted as a prescriptive recommendation since it will potentially create relationships based on deception, the results of the study nevertheless suggest that transgressors might, therefore, want to consider ways through which their justifications for having transgressed will be seen by victims as unintentional occurrences rather than intentional attempts to inflict harm. If transgressors can successfully redirect victims' attributions away from intent, then the potential for trust repair can be better maximized.

APPENDIX A

Part 1 Survey

Part 1 Survey

Section 1. Attitudes and Beliefs.

The items in the following section assess your beliefs about a variety of issues. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement using the following scale: Use spaces 1 – 84 on the scantron form to record your answers.

0 = strongly disagree

1 = disagree

2 = neither agree nor disagree

3 = agree

4 = strongly agree

- 1) I thrive on opportunities to demonstrate that my abilities or talents are better than those of other people.
- 2) I have a strong need to know how I stand in comparison to my classmates or coworkers.
- 3) I often compete with my friends.
- 4) I feel best about myself when I perform better than others.
- 5) I often find myself pondering over the ways that I am better or worse off than other people around me.
- 6) I place a high value on my personal successes.
- 7) It is important for me that I succeed on the basis of my own merit.
- 8) I become upset when I fail to reach my personal goals.
- 9) I enjoy the time that I have to myself.
- 10) I find that I can accomplish more when I work on my own.
- 11) I would rather work alone on a project so that I receive more recognition for a good job.
- 12) I dislike the idea of having roommates or having to share an office with coworkers.
- 13) I am most comfortable in situations that do not emphasize social interactions.
- 14) I value friends who are caring, empathetic individuals.
- 15) It is important to me that I uphold my commitments to significant people in my life.
- 16) If a friend were having a personal problem, I would help him/her even if it meant sacrificing my time or money.
- 17) Caring deeply about another person such as a close friend or relative is very important to me.
- 18) Knowing that a close other acknowledges and values the role that I play in their life makes me feel like a worthwhile person.
- 19) My close relationships are unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.
- 20) Overall, my relationships have very little to do with how I feel about myself.
- 21) My close relationships are an important reflection of who I am.

0 = strongly disagree

1 = disagree

2 = neither agree nor disagree

3 = agree

4 = strongly agree

- 22) I think one of the most important parts of who I am can be captured by looking at my close friends and understanding who they are.
- 23) Making a lasting contribution to groups that I belong to, such as my school or work organization, is very important to me.
- 24) When I become involved in a group project, I do my best to ensure its success.
- 25) I feel great pride when my team or work group does well, even if I'm not the main reason for success.
- 26) I would be honored if I were chosen by an organization or club that I belong to, to represent them at a conference or meeting.
- 27) When I'm part of a team, I am concerned about the group as a whole instead of whether individual team members like me, or whether I like them.
- 28) If I were to describe myself to someone, a large part of the description would consist of the organizations and groups that I belong to.
- 29) I judge myself by the standards of the organizations or groups that I belong to.
- 30) When I think of myself, I often think of the groups (e.g., university students, businesswomen) that I belong to.
- 31) My most intense emotional reactions are typically the result of what people think of the groups (e.g., social, gender, religious) that I belong to.
- 32) I am rather sensitive to what people think of the groups that I belong to.
- 33) The kind of person someone is is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much.
- 34) People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed.
- 35) Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that.
- 36) I am confident I get the success I deserve in life.
- 37) Sometimes I feel depressed.
- 38) When I try, I generally succeed.
- 39) Sometimes when I fail I feel worthless.
- 40) I complete tasks successfully.
- 41) Sometimes, I do not feel in control of my work.
- 42) Overall, I am satisfied with myself.
- 43) I am filled with doubts about my competence.
- 44) I determine what will happen in my life.
- 45) I do not feel in control of my success in my career.
- 46) I am capable of coping with most of my problems.
- 47) There are times when things look pretty bleak and hopeless to me.

0 = strongly disagree

1 = disagree

2 = neither agree nor disagree

3 = agree

4 = strongly agree

- 48) Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.
- 49) If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.
- 50) I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.
- 51) I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
- 52) I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.
- 53) I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
- 54) When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
- 55) People close to me probably think I hold a grudge too long.
- 56) I can forgive a friend for almost anything.
- 57) If someone treats me badly, I treat him or her the same.
- 58) I try to forgive others even when they don't feel guilty for what they did.
- 59) I can usually forgive and forget an insult.
- 60) I feel bitter about many of my relationships.
- 61) Even after I forgive someone, things often come back to me that I resent.
- 62) There are some things for which I could never forgive even a loved one.
- 63) I have always forgiven those who have hurt me.
- 64) I am a forgiving person.
- 65) People should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree.
- 66) Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be.
- 67) The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.
- 68) One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
- 69) One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual.
- 70) If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
- 71) Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
- 72) The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important concern in any society.
- 73) It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
- 74) Moral behaviors are actions that closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action.

0 = strongly disagree

1 = disagree

2 = neither agree nor disagree

3 = agree

4 = strongly agree

- 75) There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any code of ethics.
- 76) What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another.
- 77) Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person.
- 78) Different types of morality cannot be compared as to "rightness."
- 79) Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or immoral is up to the individual.
- 80) Moral standards are simply personal rules that indicate how a person should behave, and are not be applied in making judgments of others.
- 81) Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.
- 82) Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment.
- 83) No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not permissible totally depends upon the situation.
- 84) Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.

Section 2. Demographics and Work Experience.

This information will not be used to identify a specific person. Please record your answers using spaces 85 – 89 on the scantron form.

85) Gender

- 1) Female
- 2) Male

86) Which of the following most accurately describes your ethnicity?

- 1) Asian/Pacific Islander
- 2) Black/non-Hispanic
- 3) Chicano/Mexican American
- 4) White
- 5) Other

87) What is your marital status?

- 1) Single
- 2) Married
- 3) Divorced
- 4) Separated

88) How much full-time work experience have you had?

- 1) None
- 2) Less than 6 month
- 3) 7 month and more
- 4) More than 1 year

89) What is your current employment status?

- 1) Employed full-time
- 2) Employed part-time
- 3) Not currently employed

APPENDIX B

Part 2 Survey

Part 2 Survey

In this study, we are examining a variety of issues related to peoples' attributions following an **accidental but questionable act**. We would like you to read three short scenarios, each one describes a situation that could happen to you. The scenarios represent things that might happen to you in three different contexts.

The first scenario is work-related, the second scenario is an incident that occurs in school, and the final scenario is between you and one of your friends. Although the situations differ a lot, all three scenarios have one important thing in common. The act that someone commits against you is totally accidental. Please try to assume that the person in the scenario had absolutely no intention of causing you any problems. In each scenario, however, although the person's behavior is completely accidental, you do experience consequences that stem directly from that other person's actions.

For each of these three scenarios, we want you to try to imagine that you are actually experiencing the situation that is being described. In other words, pretend that the situation that we are describing is actually happening to you.

Following each scenario we will ask you to complete a number of questions regarding your feelings toward the person who has accidentally done something to you. Some of the questions might seem repetitive to you. This is not by mistake or accident. Nevertheless, please answer each question irrespective of your answer to other questions. There is no right or wrong answer so please respond as honestly as you can about how you think you would actually feel if the person had *accidentally* done what was described in the scenario.

We appreciate your participation and candid responses.

Thank you!

Please proceed to the next page



Scenario 1.

In this first scenario, a work colleague promises to help you with an important project. However, completely by accident, the colleague does not do what they had promised. Their failure to help you is, however, completely unintentional but it does have consequences for you.

The setting: You work for a successful company. Your boss has given you the task of preparing an important report that he needs to present to the President of the company. Your boss makes it clear that he needs the finished report BEFORE you leave for an important overseas business trip.

While you are working on the report, some critical new data becomes available and your boss tells you to be sure that this new information is included in the report. You create a new chart that contains this extremely important new information but you do not have time to merge it into the document before heading to the airport. So, you contact a colleague of yours from the airport and ask them to replace the existing chart with your new one and then forward the document to your boss. This colleague agrees to help so you send them the new chart and the document and then board your flight.

The mistake: While your colleague is working on the document, they get distracted by another work-related assignment that they are responsible for completing. Immediately following this distraction, they accidentally open a computer file that contains an older version of the chart and data. Completely unintentionally, they insert this wrong version of the chart into your document rather than the new one that you sent them. They finish working on the document and forward it to your boss as you had asked, but now by mistake it contains the wrong data.

The consequences: When your boss realizes that the new information is not included in the report, he calls you immediately just as you are boarding your flight. He angrily tells you that he is disappointed because he had to insert the chart himself before he could give the report to the President. In other words, your boss is upset with you because of your colleague's accidental mistake.

Please proceed to the next page



Scenario 1.

In this first scenario, a work colleague promises to help you with an important project. However, completely by accident, the colleague does not do what they had promised. Their failure to help you is, however, completely unintentional but it does have consequences for you.

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The consequences: When your boss realizes that the new information is not included in the report, he tells the President that the report cannot be used because you have not included the new data. Your boss makes it clear that you are to blame for the report being inadequate and now it will be delayed. In other words, because of your colleague's accidental mistake, the President of the company now thinks that you were the person responsible for the deficiency in the report.

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The consequences: When your boss realizes that the new information is not included in the report, he expresses his dissatisfaction directly to you; and, he logs the entire incident so it will be included in your performance review. As a direct result of this incident, your boss drops your evaluation to a much lower score and he withholds over half of your annual bonus from you. In other words, because of your colleague's accidental mistake, you get a much lower performance evaluation than you expected and you lose a significant amount of money.

In this study, we are examining a variety of issues related to peoples' attributions **following an intentional, questionable act**. We would like you to read three short scenarios, each one describes a situation that could happen to you. The scenarios represent things that might happen to you in three different contexts. The first scenario is work-related, the second scenario is an incident that occurs in school, and the final scenario is between you and one of your friends. Although the situations differ a lot, all three scenarios have one important thing in common. The act that someone commits against you is totally on purpose and intended. Please try to assume that the person in the scenario had absolutely every intention of causing you problems. In each scenario, the person's behavior is not only completely intentional, you do experience consequences that stem directly from that other person's actions.

For each of these three scenarios, we want you to try to imagine that you are actually experiencing the situation that is being described. In other words, pretend that the situation that we are describing is actually happening to you.

Following each scenario we will ask you to complete a number of questions regarding your feelings toward the person who has intentionally done something to you. Some of the questions might seem repetitive to you. This is not by mistake or accident. Nevertheless, please answer each question irrespective of your answer to other questions. There is no right or wrong answer so please respond as honestly as you can about how you think you would actually feel if the person had *intentionally* done what was described in the scenario.

We appreciate your participation and candid responses.

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Please proceed to the next page



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The intentional act: This colleague intentionally opens a computer file that contains an older version of the chart and data. On purpose, they insert this wrong version of the chart into your document rather than the new one that you sent them. They finish working on the document and they knowingly forward it to your boss as you had asked, but now it contains the wrong data.

The consequences: When your boss realizes that the new information is not included in the report, he calls you immediately just as you are boarding your flight. He angrily tells you that he is disappointed because he had to insert the chart himself before he could give the report to the President. In other words, your boss is upset with you because of your colleague's intentional act.

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1. In the scenario that you just read, who did you ask to help you finish a report?
 - a. a friend
 - b. a work colleague
 - c. your boss
2. According to the scenario, the person you that you asked for help failed to insert the new chart into the report:
 - a. on purpose
 - b. accidentally
3. What happened to you as a result of the chart not being inserted properly?
 - a. nothing at all happened
 - b. you received an angry phone call from your boss
 - c. your boss reported your poor performance to the President
 - d. you were “written up” and you lost a large portion of your financial bonus

Now, we would like to know your impressions of the work colleague who you had asked to insert the chart into the report for you. With this work colleague clearly in mind, please rate each statement below using the following scale:

0: Strongly disagree

1: Disagree

2: Neither Agree nor Disagree

3: Agree

4: Strongly Agree

-
4. My work colleague has a great deal of integrity.
 5. My needs and desires are important to my work colleague.
 6. I feel very confident in my work colleague’s skills as a professional person.
 7. Sound principles seem to guide my work colleague’s behavior.
 8. My work colleague has considerable knowledge about the work that she is doing.
 9. I think that my work colleague is very capable of performing her job.
 10. My work colleague is concerned about my welfare.
 11. I like my work colleague’s values.

0: Strongly disagree

1: Disagree

2: Neither Agree nor Disagree

3: Agree

4: Strongly Agree

-
12. If I did have to work with this same work colleague in the future, I would keep a very close eye on them.
 13. I forgive my work colleague for what she did to me.
 14. My work colleague and I have similar beliefs about the proper way to act at work.
 15. My work colleague and I have similar attitudes toward work.
 16. I believe that my work colleague intentionally tried to cause harm to me.
 17. I would feel comfortable working with this same work colleague again in the future.
 18. I think that my work colleague is likely to do the same kind of thing to me in the future.
 19. My work colleague really looks out for what is important to me.
 20. Based on what they did to me, I feel a need to “get even” with this work colleague.
 21. I would give this same work colleague another task that was critical to me, even if I could not carefully monitor her actions.
 22. To be honest, I can see myself doing the same thing that my work colleague did under certain circumstances.
 23. I don’t think that my work colleague had any interest in hurting me.
 24. I would only allow this work colleague to help me on a similar task in the future if I could keep a close watch over them.
 25. Even though his/her actions hurt me, I still have goodwill for this work colleague.
 26. I will avoid this work colleague in the future.
 27. If I had a choice, I would not let this work colleague have any influence over issues that are important to me.
 28. Overall, my work colleague and I are similar kinds of people.

Scenario 2.

In this second scenario, a classmate and you are working on a term paper for one of your classes here at UH. Your partner accidentally violates some important rules established by the professor regarding the paper. Since it is considered a group paper, both of you are treated the same by the professor. Again, your partner didn't intend to break any rules; it was completely unintentional but there are consequences.

The setting: In one of your classes, the professor has assigned a term project but he is allowing students to work together on teams of two. The project is a significant part of your class grade. It will count for 50% of your final grade. So, you and one other student agree to work together for purposes of this assignment. Both you and your partner have written a different section of the paper that must be turned in to the professor by the two of you. About one week after the two of you have turned in your paper, the professor calls the two of you to his office. He tells you that according to Turnitin.com, large portions of your partner's section of the paper have been plagiarized. Your partner's section contains several passages that are word-for-word copies of material that appears in several published papers. According to the professor, this amount of duplication represents a possible case of plagiarism.

The mistake: Your partner explains that they had written down extensive notes on the research papers that she found on the internet. These notes included important passages from the papers. They say that they accidentally confused their own notes with some passages that they had written down from the published papers. They didn't realize that the paper accidentally included large amounts of word for word material from these other papers because they were working from the notes that they had taken.

The consequences: As a result of your partner's accidental violation of the rules, the professor decides that he will not penalize you but only if you are willing to write a new paper for him. If each of you individually turns in a new paper, then he will consider the matter closed. So, in order to avoid being penalized, you now need to write a new paper as a result of an accidental mistake that your partner made.

Please proceed to the next page



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The consequences: As a result of your partner's accidental violation of the rules, the professor decides to penalize both of you one full letter grade on your paper. Beyond this penalty, he will consider the matter closed. But, you now will have a significantly lower grade for this important class project (50% of your class grade) as a result of an accidental mistake that your partner made.

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The consequences: As a result of your partner's accidental violation of the rules, the professor decides to give both of you an "F" for the course. In addition, he has decided that he is going to formally charge both of you with academic dishonesty and make you go to a College-level hearing. So, you now need to retake the class and face the consequences of an academic honesty procedure, all as a result of an accidental mistake that your partner made.

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In this second scenario, a classmate and you are working on a term paper for one of your classes here at UH. Your partner intentionally violates some important rules established by the professor regarding the paper. Since it is considered a group paper, both of you are treated the same by the professor. Again, your partner breaks the rules on purpose; it was completely intentional and there are consequences.

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The intentional act: Your partner explains that they had written down extensive notes on the research papers that they found on the internet. But, also say that they intentionally supplemented their own notes with some passages that they had written down from the published papers. They realized that their section of the paper included large amounts of word for word material from these other papers but they turned it in even though they knew about the duplication.

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Please proceed to the next page



29. What was the Professor's accusation?
 - a. you cheated on a test
 - b. you and your partner plagiarized a paper
30. According to the scenario, your partner acted:
 - a. on purpose
 - b. accidentally
31. What did the professor do in order to punish you?
 - a. make you write a new paper
 - b. reduced your grade on the paper by one full letter grade
 - c. gave you an F in the class and charged you with academic dishonesty

Now we would like to know your impressions of the partner who helped to prepare the term paper for your class. With this class project partner clearly in mind, please rate each statement below using the following scale:

0: Strongly disagree

1: Disagree

2: Neither Agree nor Disagree

3: Agree

4: Strongly Agree

-
32. My class project partner has a great deal of integrity.
 33. My needs and desires are important to my class project partner.
 34. I feel very confident in my class project partner's skills as a student.
 35. Sound principles seem to guide my class project partner's behavior.
 36. My class partner has considerable knowledge about the project that we worked on.
 37. I think that my class project partner is a very capable student and project partner.
 38. My class project partner is concerned about my welfare.
 39. I like my class project partner's values.
 40. If I did have to work with this same class project partner in the future, I would keep a very close eye on them.

0: Strongly disagree

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41. I forgive my class project partner for what she did to me.
42. My class project partner and I have similar beliefs about the proper way to act at school.
43. My class project partner and I have similar attitudes toward school.
44. I believe that my class project partner intentionally tried to cause harm to me.
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48. Based on what they did to me, I feel a need to “get even” with this class project partner.
49. I would give this same class project partner another task that was critical to me, even if I could not carefully monitor their actions.
50. To be honest, I can see myself doing the same thing that my class project partner did under certain circumstances.
51. I don’t think that my class project partner had any interest in hurting me.
52. I would only allow this class project partner to help me on a similar task in the future if I could keep a close watch over them.
53. Even though his/her actions hurt me, I still have goodwill for this class project partner.
54. I will avoid this class project partner in the future.
55. If I had a choice, I would not let this class project partner have any influence over issues that are important to me.
56. Overall, my class project partner and I are similar kinds of people.

Please proceed to the next page



Scenario 3.

The third and last scenario involves you and a friend. The friend accidentally uploads some very embarrassing photos of you to their Facebook page. Although the photos were uploaded completely by accident, there are consequences for you now that the photos appear on Facebook.

The setting: You go to a party with one of your friends. Both of you are taking lots of pictures with your cell phones. Your friend takes a couple of very embarrassing pictures of you. You think they are funny but you ask them not to share the pictures with anyone.

The mistake: Later in the evening, your friend uses the “Select All” feature of their phone to upload all of the evenings’ pictures to a fairly public area of their Facebook page. Although they did not mean to do it, because they used “Select All” they accidentally have included the embarrassing photos that you had asked them not to share. So, completely by accident they have made the photos available to all of your Facebook friends.

The consequences: As a result of your friend having accidentally uploaded these photos, several of your other friends see the photos and they tease you the next time that they see you. In other words, because of the accidental mistake that your friend made, you are being teased by some of your friends and many other people now know about the embarrassing photos.

Please proceed to the next page



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The setting: You go to a party with one of your friends. Both of you are taking lots of pictures with your cell phones. Your friend takes a couple of very embarrassing pictures of you. You think they are funny but you ask them not to share the pictures with anyone.

The mistake: Later in the evening, your friend uses the “Select All” feature of their phone to upload all of the evenings’ pictures to a fairly public area of their Facebook page. Although they did not mean to do it, because they used “Select All” they accidentally have included the embarrassing photos that you had asked them not to share. So, completely by accident they have made the photos available to all of your Facebook friends.

The consequences: As a result of your friend having accidentally uploaded these photos, your parents see the photos and tell you that they are not going to support your party habits so they don’t send you any spending money for the next month. In other words, because of the accidental mistake that your friend made, you are left without financial support from your parents for the next month and this is money that you rely on.

Scenario 3.

The third and last scenario involves you and a friend. The friend accidentally uploads some very embarrassing photos of you to their Facebook page. Although the photos were uploaded completely by accident, there are consequences for you now that the photos appear on Facebook.

The setting: You go to a party with one of your friends. Both of you are taking lots of pictures with your cell phones. Your friend takes a couple of very embarrassing pictures of you. You think they are funny but you ask them not to share the pictures with anyone.

The mistake: Later in the evening, your friend uses the “Select All” feature of their phone to upload all of the evenings’ pictures to a fairly public area of their Facebook page. Although they did not mean to do it, because they used “Select All” they accidentally have included the embarrassing photos that you had asked them not to share. So, completely by accident they have made the photos available to all of your Facebook friends.

The consequences: As a result of your friend having accidentally uploaded these photos, your significant other sees the photos and gets so angry that they end their relationship with you. In other words, because of the accidental mistake that your friend made, you have lost your significant other and you are going through a painful break-up.

Scenario 3.

The third and last scenario involves you and a friend. The friend intentionally uploads some very embarrassing photos of you to their Facebook page. In other words, the photos were uploaded on purpose and now there are consequences for you because the photos appear on Facebook.

The setting: You go to a party with one of your friends. Both of you are taking lots of pictures with your cell phones. Your friend takes a couple of very embarrassing pictures of you. You think they are funny but you ask them not to share the pictures with anyone.

The intentional act: Later in the evening, your friend uses the “Select All” feature of their phone to upload all of the evenings’ pictures to a fairly public area of their Facebook page. They are aware that the embarrassing photos are going to be included but they upload them along with the other pictures on purpose. So, completely on purpose they have made the photos available to all of your Facebook friends.

The consequences: As a result of your friend intentionally having uploaded these photos, several of your other friends see the photos and they tease you the next time that they see you. In other words, because of your friend’s intentional act, you are being teased by some of your friends and many other people now know about the embarrassing photos.

Scenario 3.

The third and last scenario involves you and a friend. The friend intentionally uploads some very embarrassing photos of you to their Facebook page. In other words, the photos were uploaded on purpose and now there are consequences for you because the photos appear on Facebook.

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The consequences: As a result of your friend having intentionally uploaded these photos, your parents see the photos and tell you that they are not going to support your party habits so they don’t send you any spending money for the next month. In other words, because of the intentional act of your friend, you are left without financial support from your parents for the next month and this is money that you rely on.

Scenario 3.

The third and last scenario involves you and a friend. The friend intentionally uploads some very embarrassing photos of you to their Facebook page. In other words, the photos were uploaded on purpose and now there are consequences for you because the photos appear on Facebook.

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The consequences: As a result of your friend having intentionally uploaded these photos, your significant other sees the photos and gets so angry that they end their relationship with you. In other words, because of the intentional act of your friend, you have lost your significant other and you are going through a painful break-up.

57. Where were you when your friend took embarrassing pictures of you?
- at a party
 - at a football game
 - in your dorm room
58. According to the scenario, the embarrassing photos were posted to Facebook:
- accidentally
 - on purpose
59. What happened as a result of the pictures of you being posted to Facebook?
- nothing at all
 - your friends teased you
 - your parents stopped sending you spending money for a while
 - your significant other ended a relationship with you

Now we would like to know your impressions of the friend who accidentally uploaded the photos. With this friend clearly in mind, please rate each statement below using the following scale:

0: Strongly disagree

1: Disagree

2: Neither Agree nor Disagree

3: Agree

4: Strongly Agree

60. My friend has a great deal of integrity.
61. My needs and desires are important to my friend.
62. I feel very confident in my friend's skills using her camera and Facebook uploads.
63. Sound principles seem to guide my friend's behavior.
64. My friend has considerable technological knowledge about cell phones and uploading pictures to Facebook.
65. I believe that my friend knows what it takes to be a good friend.
66. My friend is concerned about my welfare.
67. I like my friend's values.
68. If I went to a party with this same friend again, I would keep a very close eye on them.
69. I forgive my friend for what they did to me.

0: Strongly disagree

1: Disagree

2: Neither Agree nor Disagree

3: Agree

4: Strongly Agree

-
70. My friend and I have similar beliefs about the proper way to act.
71. My friend and I have similar attitudes.
72. I believe that my friend intentionally tried to cause harm to me.
73. If I had a choice, I would not let this friend have any influence over issues that are important to me.
74. I would only allow this friend to take pictures of me in the future if I could keep a close watch over them.
75. I think that my friend is likely to do the same kind of thing to me in the future.
76. My friend really looks out for what is important to me.
77. Based on what they did to me, I feel a need to “get even” with this friend.
78. I would let this same friend do things for me in the future, even if I could not carefully monitor them.
79. To be honest, I can see myself doing the same thing that my friend did under certain circumstances.
80. I don’t think that my friend had any interest in hurting me.
81. I would feel comfortable interacting with this same friend again in the future.
82. Even though his/her actions hurt me, I still have goodwill for this friend.
83. I will avoid this friend in the future.
84. Overall, my friend and I are similar kinds of people.

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