

UNDER PRESSURE:
MEASURING CONSTITUENT ATTITUDES ON IMMIGRATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON
LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

Immigration is a highly contested topic that has divided political lines in much of recent history. Edwards and Gimpel (1999) show that immigration has not always been as polarized of an issue among voters, nor has it captivated as much partisanship in Congress as it has recently. This has led to the hypothesis that an increase in polarization among constituent attitudes surrounding immigrants has led to a decrease in bipartisanship in Congress on immigration legislation. To answer this question, the study will employ two tactics: First, this study will examine public opinion on immigrant sentiments using survey data extracted from the General Social Survey (GSS) over the time series 1994-2016, expanding upon the limited constituent anti-immigrant sentiment time series initiated by Butz and Kherberg (2016). After which, this study will combine the survey data with decennial Census data from years 1990, 2000, and 2010 in a multilevel regression and post-stratification model (MRP) (Butz and Kherberg, 2016), creating a state-level breakdown of constituent attitudes towards immigrants. Second, to correlate constituent attitudes to Congressional bipartisanship, I will measure immigration bill co-sponsorship over the same time series (1994-2016). To properly assume that an increase in polarization among constituent attitudes leads to a decrease in Congressional bipartisanship, I expect to see bipartisan bill co-sponsorship on immigration legislation decrease over the time-series, as the measure produced by the MRP show a progressive uptick in constituent polarization. These findings help contribute to the literature by providing new measures of state-level constituent attitudes on immigration, which can be correlated with legislative behavior to determine if Congressional policymaking accurately reflects public opinion.

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Contents

1. Background and Literature Review.....	6
2. Public Opinion on Immigrants and Elite Congressional Behavior.....	20
3. Research Design and Methodology.....	35
4. Analysis and Findings.....	43
5. References.....	68

Figures

1. Gallup Survey Data on Immigration, 2013.....	9
2. 89 th Congress DW-NOMINATE Score Plot, 1965-1967.....	26
3. 104 th Congress DW-NOMINATE Score Plot, 1995-1997.....	27
4. Public Anti-Immigrant Sentiment by State, 1994-2016.....	45
5. Average Bipartisanship of Immigration Bills Introduced in the U.S. Congress by State, 1994-2016.....	49
6. Bipartisanship of Benefit Immigration Bills Introduced in the U.S. Congress by State, 1994-2016.....	52
7. Bipartisanship of Enforcement Immigration Bills Introduced in the U.S. Congress by State, 1994-2016.....	54

Tables

1. General Social Survey Data, 1994-2016.....	33
2. Sample Statistics Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment with Standard Deviations, 1994-2016.....	56
3. Sample Statistics Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment with Standard Errors, 1994-2016.....	57
4. Covariance Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, 1994-2016.....	58
5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, 1994-2016.....	59
6. Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression Model for Immigration Benefit Legislation in the U.S. Congress, 1994-2016.....	61
7. Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression Model for Immigration Enforcement Legislation in the U.S. Congress, 1994-2016.....	62

Chapter 1: Background and Literature Review

1.1: Introduction

Immigration and the basic question of who the United States opens the gates for has been a fiercely debated policy topic for much of our nation's history. Since the birth of the United States, many Americans have been at best "...ambivalent about immigration...", including most of our founding fathers, who questioned the ability of new immigrants to properly uphold republican ideals (Tichenor 49, 2002). Flashforward to present day America and immigration is still a deeply divisive topic, with partisan gridlock over the issue throughout the Legislative and Executive branches of government. 2018 Midterm Election polling conducted by Gallup asked the question "How important will each of the following issues be to your vote for Congress this year?", which showed that immigration stands at second place with 78% of Americans surveyed viewing the issue as "Extremely/Very important" (Newport 2018).¹ With very few comprehensive and bipartisan immigration legislations passed by Congress since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), as well as the historical precedent set for public saliency towards the issue of immigration, I can hypothesize that an increase in polarization among constituent attitudes surrounding immigrants has led to a decrease in bipartisanship in Congress on immigration legislation.

Congress must come to a consensus on any piece of legislation before sending it to the president. Typically, the House will pass their version of a bill and the Senate theirs; then the House and Senate will meet in conference committee to create a combined bill supported by both chambers. Congress, however, has been consistently incapable of passing a truly bipartisan

¹ <https://news.gallup.com/poll/244367/top-issues-voters-healthcare-economy-immigration.aspx>.

solution to immigration since the restrictionist insurgence led by then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and conservative Republicans passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 (Tichenor 2002). This conundrum, coupled with American public's continued saliency towards immigration policy, begs the question as to why Congress has ultimately failed the democratic representative process defended by the Constitution. As my hypothesis alludes to, gridlock and lack of a bipartisanship consensus within the Legislative branch is a likely answer.

One can look at the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 (S.744) as a prime example of the institutional gridlock that resulted in yet another failed attempt at passing comprehensive immigration reform in the 21st century (Congress.gov).² S.744 was a bipartisan immigration reform bill crafted by the “Gang of Eight” Senators representing both Republican and Democratic interests. The legislation's key components included funding \$46.3 billion in border security and enforcement procedures, pathway to citizenship for eleven million undocumented immigrants, a mandatory E-Verify employment verification system, and a cap increase to H-1B workers, among other objectives (American Immigration Council).³ The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that S.744 would save the nation an estimated \$1 trillion over a twenty year time period, along with numerous pro-economic impacts (Congressional Budget Office).⁴ The bill, after numerous amendments, passed the Senate and awaited a similar House proposal; however, the House Republicans, who were in the majority, refused to consider immigration legislation, allowing S.744 to expire at the end of the Congressional session. House Republican members argued that

² <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/744>.

³ <https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-s744-understanding-2013-senate-immigration-bill>.

⁴ <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/44346-immigration.pdf>.

the Senate bill “...amount[ed] to nothing more than a breach of the rule of law...”, citing the Senate’s proposed pathway to citizenship for the eleven million undocumented immigrants as the fissure (Parker 2014).⁵ What is most shocking about the failure of Congress to pass S.744 is that public opinion was largely in favor of all the proponents in the bill. Gallup reports that 87% of Americans polled supported a pathway to citizenship, 83% supported tightening U.S. border security, 77% supported an E-Verify system, and 53% supported economic-based adjustments to low-skilled immigrants migrating for employment (Newport and Wilke 2013).⁶ This strikes at the core democratic principle within the United States, that constituents elect elites on the condition that these women and men faithfully represent the desires of those who put them into office. If the public deems that immigration policy should be dealt with in a comprehensive affair (which polling data shows to be accurate), then the fact that Congressional members have failed to fully encompass those desires since the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) shows an extreme disconnect in responsiveness between the elite and the body-politic at large.

⁵ <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2014/08/04/the-real-reason-why-the-house-wont-pass-comprehensive-immigration-reform/>.

⁶ <https://news.gallup.com/poll/163169/immigration-reform-proposals-garner-broad-support.aspx>.

Figure 1: Gallup National Public Opinion Poll on Immigration Legislation, 2013

*Next, suppose that on Election Day you could vote on key issues as well as candidates.
Would you vote for or against a law that would ... ?*

	Vote for %	Vote against %
Allow illegal immigrants living in the U.S. the opportunity to become citizens after a long waiting period if they paid taxes and a penalty, pass a criminal background check, and learn English	87	12
Tighten U.S. border security and provide the Border Patrol with increased technology, infrastructure, and personnel	83	15
Allow engineers and scientists from other countries who earn graduate degrees in the U.S. to remain in the U.S. to work	78	19
Require U.S. business owners to check the immigration status of any employees they hire, with stiff fines and penalties for employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers	77	21
Allow employers to hire immigrants if it can be demonstrated that they were unsuccessful in recruiting an American to fill an open position	55	40
Vary the number of lower-skilled immigrants allowed to enter the country depending on how the U.S. economy is doing	53	42

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1.2: Public Opinion and Legislative Behavior on Immigration: A Theoretical and Historical

Analysis

Political scholarship measuring public opinion and legislative behavior on immigration is sporadic but cohesive in carrying similar narratives throughout historical timeframes. In short, there typically are a few main groups in public discourse split between a restrictionist and nativist view on immigration, and an expansionist pro-business view on immigration. In this section, I examine recent literature measuring public opinion surrounding immigration to build a foundation for my hypothesis. I also examine what the literature implies about legislative behavior and the contributors to the ever-increasing partisan gridlock in Congressional affairs regarding immigration policy.

The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform by Gimpel and Edwards (1999) gives an accurate view of immigration sentiments on both a macro and micro scale. In discussing public opinion, the novel primarily focuses on measuring sentiment levels post-1965 Hart-Cellar Act (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). The Hart-Cellar Act revolutionized immigration laws in the United States by removing racial and ethnically-restrictive quotas placed on migrants and replacing them with a visa allotment system (Tichenor 2002). In doing so, the racial background of new immigrants entering the United States changed from predominantly Caucasian Western Europeans to Asians and Mexicans. With racial quotas eliminated, Gimpel and Edwards note that “immigrant admissions mounted in the 1970’s and 1980’s...”, resulting in a new era of restrictive public sentiment towards immigrants (Gimpel and Edwards 27, 1999). The predominate reason for the public’s turn towards restrictive opinions on immigrants, the book professes, is national backlash against redistributive policies believed to favor the plethora of new migrants (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).

In measuring public opinion throughout the 1980’s, the literature provides data from a 1986 *CBS News/New York Times* Monthly Poll which asked respondents their percentage of supporting increasing or decreasing legal immigration to the United States, to which 51.7% proposed decreasing and only 11% supported increasing visa allotments (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). When breaking down the survey data further, one can see how economic fears played an important factor in support levels, with individuals categorized as making below \$15,000 supporting decreases in legal immigration 58.2% to 9.2% (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Individuals surveyed whose income was greater than \$50,000 still largely favored decreases in legal immigration, however, only at 44.2% to 11% (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Measuring public support for the immigration of refugees seeking asylum in 1981, Gimpel and Edwards

note that "...forty-one percent of respondents favored the admission of Northern Europeans, while only 17 percent favored admitting Iranians, 21 percent for Mariel Cubans, 30 percent for Vietnamese, and 32 percent for Haitians", implying an obvious racial and ethnic preference on behalf of Americans regarding refugee admissions (Gimpel and Edwards 32, 1999). Turning towards attitudes over immigrants in the 1990s, the literature cites an *American National Election Studies* poll showing percentages supporting decreases/increases in legal immigration from 1992, 1994, and 1996 (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). In 1992 48.8% favored decreases to 8.1%, in 1994 65.3% favored decreases to 5.3%, and in 1996 57.6% favored decreases to 5.3% (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Gimpel and Edwards find, however, that "...immigration is not an issue that motivates people to vote", which creates reason to believe that if the public isn't voting on immigration as an issue, elected officials have more free-reign to do as they please within immigration policy (Gimpel and Edwards 42, 1999).

Gimpel and Edwards offer a few explanations for legislative behavior surrounding immigration policy in the United States. The scholars point out that Congressional membership in high immigrant populated states (California, Texas, Florida, New York, etc.) intrinsically requires legislators to uphold to the dominant public opinion of the state, noting that public opinion on immigrants within these states dictates their position on policy (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Redistributive benefits for immigrants, Gimpel and Edwards summarize, is the primary reason for an increase in Congressional partisanship, noting that "as the immigrant-related costs to society through government expenditures have increased, the immigration issue has become more partisan" (Gimpel and Edwards 297, 1999). In measuring this phenomenon, *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform* showcases a regression model on roll-call votes between the 89th and 104th Congressional sessions. The model graphs a stark positive uptick in

partisanship beginning with the 96th Congress, which continues up to the 104th Congress (Gimpel and Edwards 299, 1999). Based on the fact that within the 96th Congress, Democrats initiated a “...generous resettlement assistance program...” for migrants, it can be inferred that economic indicators and redistributive policies do play a role in the exponential increase in Congressional partisanship over immigration policy (Gimpel and Edwards 298, 1999). In order to solidify the rise in partisanship as a result of negative opinions on redistributive policies, Gimpel and Edwards attempt to devalue arguments that the disappearance of Southern Conservative Democrats and party realignment were the primary contributor to Congressional partisanship. The scholars point out that “even if many of the Southern Republicans had been Democrats, the votes on immigration measures would have divided...along party lines” (Gimpel and Edwards 300, 1999). To further back their claim, the scholars created a simulated 104th Congress with southern Democrats and correlated partisan vote chances with the actual 104th Congress. The results showed that in the simulated model 31% of Democrats and 87% of Republicans supported the restrictive Smith bill, while in the actual model 24% of Democrats and 83% of Republicans supported the Smith bill (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Such a negligible percentile difference between the simulated and actual models bode well to Gimpel and Edwards primary argument throughout the novel that redistributive policies enforced the rise of partisan gridlock in Congress.

The Politics of Immigration by Tom Wong (2017) provides updates to the understanding of partisanship and public opinion while maintaining a broad overview of immigration history in the United States. Wong begins by showcasing a time-series documenting the use of phrases “immigration restrictions” and “nation of immigrants” to provide a qualitative measure on public sentiment towards immigrants (Wong 1, 2017). The time-series is set from 1880-2010 and

definitively shows that the phrase “immigration restrictions” has historically been used more frequently than “nation of immigrants”, peaking in 1930, late-1970’s, and in 2000 (Wong 2, 2017). These peaks in the use of the phrase “immigration restrictions” follows negative economic market periods (Great Depression, economic stagnation, and dot-com bust respectively). As such, economic indicators continue to be a leading contributor in public discourse regarding immigration, however, Wong notes that “...changes in immigration policies are not neatly predicted by broad economic trends” (Wong 4, 2017). This implies that though the public views economic trends and redistributive policies in relation to their opinion on immigrants, Congressional members potentially draft immigration legislation without regard to economic indicators.

Wong differs in the argument set forth by Gimpel and Edwards, that opinions on redistributive policies promotes partisanship in Congress, citing “...the alignment of Republican legislators with opposition to permissive immigration policies...” as one of the leading cause of partisanship in Washington, which becomes hypothesis one (H₁) (Wong 13, 2017). In defending this claim, *The Politics of Immigration* provides a CBO estimate on economic factors regarding S.744 (discussed earlier) which reports a positive and robust economic impact if the comprehensive immigration reform bill were to be put into law, removing some of the fuel to the redistributive argument (Wong 2017). Wong operationalizes this claim further by dissecting roll-call votes throughout Congress on immigration legislation from the 109th to 113th sessions. In his findings, Republican House members voted yea on restrictive legislation 96% of the time, while Democratic House members voted yea only 23% of the time (Wong 2017). Turning towards the Senate, Wong found that “...Republican senators are...1.6 times more likely than Democratic senators are to vote yea” on restrictive immigration legislation (Wong 163, 2017). As the data

presented is all statistically significant, this reinforces the argument made in H₁, that partisan increases in Congress can be attributed to the Republican Party's alignment with restrictive immigration bills, not redistributive opinions alone. Wong (2017) also sets out four other hypotheses for legislative behavior on immigration legislation: foreign-born population increases leads to a decrease in legislator likelihood of voting yea on restrictive policies (H₂); naturalized citizen increases leads to a decrease in legislator likelihood of voting yea on restrictive policies (H₃); size of foreign-born population should not affect legislator behavior in the same way naturalized citizen population size does (H₄); and foreign-born population increases decreases both Democratic and republican legislator likelihood of voting yea for restrictive policies (H₅) (Wong 2017). In response to the remaining hypotheses, Wong finds that:

“Large foreign-born populations are significantly related to decreased support for these [restrictive] policies, even among Republican legislators in some cases. This effect holds when analyzing the naturalized citizen population, which lends evidence to support the electoral mechanism. And the foreign-born noncitizen population does not decrease support for restrictive immigration policies, which lends evidence to support the counterfactual” (Wong 183, 2017).

In conclusion, Wong found his tested hypotheses to be proven accurate in predicting legislative behavior on immigration policy from the 109th to the 113th Congressional sessions. This adds more theoretical principles to my analysis of public opinion and its effects on legislative behavior.

Daniel Tichenor's *Dividing Lines* provides a wholesome account of immigration history in the United States. The novel's focus is to breakdown primary immigration policy periods and provide public sentiments within each generation that led to various legislation being enacted. Tichenor separates public opinion on immigration into four main groups: “Cosmopolitans” who support expansive immigration policies while also support expanding alien rights; “Free-Market

Expansionists” who support maintaining immigrant rights but wish to restrict immigration policies; “Nationalist Egalitarians” who wish to expand immigration policies though restrict migrant rights; and “Classic Exclusionists” who are both restrictive in immigration policies and alien rights (Tichenor 36, 2002). These camps can generally be broadened into those who wish to restrict immigration or restrictionists, and those who wish to provide for a robust nation of immigrants or expansionists. *Dividing Lines* describes how restrictionist public opinion tends to form during periods in which, ironically, “...political hostility towards federal government activism has been at its zenith...”, while the very formation of expansionist public opinion periods is paradoxical considering historically “...mass publics in the United States typically oppose new immigrant admissions” (Tichenor 16-17, 2002).

In describing the public sentiment towards immigrants, Tichenor describes how the majority of Americans, since the nation's inception, pride themselves on their immigrant heritage yet scornfully write-off expansionist policies (Tichenor 2002). To defend this argument, public opinion data is extracted from the hyper-restrictive period shortly after the Immigration and National Origins Act of 1924 became law to the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The data measures the percent of Americans surveyed who oppose expanding immigrant admissions. In 1938 the percent opposing “...emergency increases in immigration quotas...” was 86%; in 1946 the percent opposing allowing more Europeans to enter than in previous years stood at 83%; and in 1965 opposing the idea that national immigration totals should be increased was at a healthy (but decreased in comparison to previous years) 72% (Tichenor 18, 2002). As *Dividing Lines* spans the full historical scope of the United States, public opinion models are not the focus of Tichenor's work. However, *Dividing lines* does contribute economic factors as well as a resurgent nativist ideology as the leading causes of

partisan gridlock in Congress regarding immigration legislation (Tichenor 2002). These theoretical positions have been fluid throughout the literature on immigration politics in the United States.

In measuring what drives legislative behavior throughout the 109th and 110th Congressional sessions, Casellas and Leal's *Partisanship or population? House and Senate Immigration Votes in the 109th and 110th Congresses* attempts to determine what influences racial and ethnic minority population groups have on legislative votes regarding immigration, as well as what personal characteristics Congressional members carry that may influence immigration policy positions (Casellas and Leal 2013). Casellas and Leal theorize that Republican opposition to comprehensive approaches to immigration reform will be rooted in their support of tighter redistributive and economic policies towards immigrants (Casellas and Leal 2013). This is very similar to previous literature associating the Republican Party with opposing redistributive nature of immigration reform. In analyzing this theory, the scholars measure three hypotheses: larger Latino constituent population will lead to more support for comprehensive reform and less support for tougher immigrant sanctions (H₁); larger African American constituent population and correlation with negative vote chance on expansionist immigration reform (H₂); legislator characteristics (gender and religion, etc.) contribute to an increased likelihood of supporting comprehensive immigration reform and a decreased probability in supporting restrictionist policies (H₃) (Casellas and Leal 2013). These measurements are represented in both the House and Senate. On the subject of party identification and support for comprehensive immigration reform, Casellas and Leal find support that "...House Republicans...are more likely to support restrictionist bills and amendments", while also finding Senate Republican support for restrictionist immigration policies to be equally

statistically significant (Casellas and Leal 58, 2013). This partisanship correlation is consistent with previous literature in finding support that Republican Congressional members are likely to steer towards redistributive and economic fears when casting votes on immigration legislation. Results of H₁ confirmed that larger pools of Latino constituents lead to an increased probability of House members, however, the Senate resulted in a lower correlation (Casellas and Leal 2013). Both House and Senate models regarding H₂, or racial competition threat between Latinos and African Americans proved to be insignificant in their ability to accurately conclude that Congressional members take larger black populations into consideration when voting on immigration legislation. Legislator characteristics played only modest roles in both chambers on whether it ultimately contributed to Congressional member probability in voting for comprehensive immigration reform (Casellas and Leal 2013).

Overall, *Partisanship or population? House and Senate Immigration Votes in the 109th and 110th Congresses*, showcases new models on legislative behavior that ultimately conclude that partisan preferences is the primary explanation for the decay of comprehensive immigration legislation in recent Congressional sessions (Casellas and Leal 2013). This provides further reinforcement to previous literature as well as compliments this paper's goal of correlating public discourse on immigrants to the rise of partisanship in Washington.

1.3: Challenges of Current Studies and Approaches

Though recent literature has added tremendous scholarship in analyzing national public opinion data, as well as providing thorough evidence in support of numerous variables that have ultimately contributed to the rise of partisanship in Congressional affairs regarding immigration, scholarship that analyzes state-level public sentiment towards immigrants is scarce. For Gimpel and Edwards (1999), their primary focus, in regard to public opinion, was to promote the

redistribute variable as the primary reason for the growth of partisan gridlock in Congress. And even such, the scholars contributed to public opinion research with nationally conducted polls. As such, there was no state-level public opinion measures to correlate with redistributive policies being the conducive reasoning for the meteoric rise in partisanship. Wong's (2017) research falls short in this scenario as well. The scholarship uses little public opinion data in operationalizing his hypotheses regarding legislative behavior. The data that is used by Wong (2017) is not conducted on a state-level measure either. In *Dividing Lines*, Tichenor does provide a historical account of public opinion towards immigrants at large, however, his analysis shows that public sentiment had little effect on immigration policy in Washington (Tichenor 2002). Nor does Tichenor provide any state-level analysis of public opinion data. Casellas and Leal start their research by alluding to the fact that "...much of political science research on immigration has dealt with attitudes towards immigration reform and immigrants rather than congressional policymaking" and opt to focus their research primarily on variables that contribute to legislative behavior on immigration bills, similar to Wong's analysis (2017) (Casellas and Leal 2013). Butz and Kherberg have recently authored scholarship modelling public opinion on immigrants at the state-level, where they combine Census and American National Election Studies/General Social Survey data from 2004-2008 into a multi-regression and post stratification (MRP) model to statistically represent public sentiment towards immigrants (Butz and Kherberg 2016). However, though their work offers a rare glimpse into state-level opinion, the time-series measured does not fully operationalize the full scope of public sentiment survey data available.

Also limited in literature is the coupling of public opinion survey data at the state-level and its influences on legislative behavior. Neither Butz and Kherberg (2016) or any of the aforementioned scholars contribute recent state-level public opinion on immigrants to the fall in

Congressional bipartisanship on immigration legislation. This area is highly underdeveloped in political science scholarship, especially state-level models, and would bring timely democratic representation questions into the field. As such, my contribution, that an increase in negative public sentiment towards immigrants has led to the decrease in bipartisanship in Congress, contributes to political science scholarship by bringing to light a more holistic approach to modelling state-level public opinion data and correlating it with legislative behavior. This paper also provides answers to questions rooted in democratic theory; notably, do elected officials fully represent their constituent's opinions on immigration policies in the United States? This is a question Tichenor believed to be false in the preceding century, however, the historic rise of partisanship in Congress since the passage of the IRCA of 1986 has had little association with public opinion (Tichenor 2002). This paper's goal is to provide a state-level analysis of public opinion on immigrants from 1994-2016, combining Census and survey data, to determine whether there is a measurable impact on bipartisanship levels throughout Congress; providing much needed answer on if legislators disregard democratic representation and operate independent of public discourse.

Chapter 2: Public Opinion on Immigrants and Elite Congressional Behavior

2.1: Do Constituents Matter?

America, as a democratic state, holds certain natural ideological positions that are above party politics and changing generational opinions. One of these predispositions is the mutual understanding that elected elites (local, state, federal) are ultimately governed by the public at large. By this I mean that American citizens vote to elect their representatives and with that expression of power comes certain expectations on behalf of the electorate. The primary belief is that, as citizens, one elects a Congressional representative to listen to and vote with the general will of their constituents. In understanding this basic tenement of democratic theory, the answer to whether constituents' matter is a simple yes. However, the question of whether legislators hold the same democratic principle is one that is at the precipice of political scholarship. With a December 2018 Gallup poll showing that, when asked the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?", 75% of the Americans stated that they disapprove of the job Congress is doing, with only 18% approving (Gallup 2018). The extremity found in Congressional approval rating ultimately requires this paper to look into whether legislators articulate constituent opinions in Congress. One must also look at the factors involved in shaping the relationship between Congressional members and their constituents. By analyzing this information, the goals of determining the levels of influence public opinion has on legislative votes on immigration bills will become clearer.

A good place to start in determining whether constituents' matter is defining what factors shape the relationship between constituents and elected officials. Public knowledge, as it relates to policy affairs, is a rational place to begin analyzing the relationship between elected officials and constituents. Constituent knowledge on Congressional legislation plays an important role in

democratic theory, as one cannot influence their elected official with limited legislative knowledge, nor would elected officials take constituents with limited information seriously in the Congressional process. Knowledge, I believe, also plays an important role in immigration legislation, as many Americans are either ill-informed or live far away from immigration hubs that the level of information on the subject may be too limited to properly incite influence; or, legislators may be more willing to disregard constituent opinions on immigration due to their lack of expertise on the subject. Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo, and David Lazer conducted a field experiment in 2006, where they tested the influence Congressional members had on public knowledge when holding constituent discussion sessions on immigration legislation (Esterling, Neblo and Lazer 2011). The scholars conclude that when constituents received immigration policy information from their Congressional members they were more motivated to enhance their political knowledge outside of the informational session (Esterling, Neblo and Lazer 2011). These findings on constituent knowledge are an important factor in the relationship between legislator and constituent, as the scholars allude to:

“This dynamic capacity for learning is central to deliberative democratic theory, since it is citizens’ (often latent) capacity to become informed that induces representatives to exercise judgment on their constituents’ behalf” (Esterling, Neblo and Lazer 2011).

In the United States there is an obvious two-party system, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party; it would be beneficial then, to consider whether party identification can be considered a factor in shaping the relationship between the public and legislators. Joshua Clinton’s analysis of the relationship between legislator and constituents in the 106th Congress provided some keen results on whether party identification offers a significant contribution to legislator-constituent relations. Clinton weighs Congressional roll call votes and constituent

opinion to determine how much the public matters in the legislative process (Clinton 2004). He finds that on the topic of party identification, Republican members of Congress were more likely to be influenced by same-party constituents, with 37% of all roll call votes conducted in the 106th session being based on Republican-minded constituent influences (Clinton 2004). This information would confirm that at least for Republicans, same-party identification of their constituents is a contributing factor in the legislator-constituent relationship. For Democratic Congressional members, Clinton found that "...Democrats are most responsive to weighted nonsame-party constituents...", with 55% of roll call votes being casted in support of non-Democratic constituencies (Clinton 406). One would anticipate that party unison would play a strong role for both major Congressional parties, however, Democrats being more likely to include the voices of non-party constituents is quite interesting and can create inferences regarding which political party is more inclusive of all constituents in the democratic process.

Another factor to be considered in determining the relationship between constituents and Congressional members is the level of public saliency towards a specific piece of legislation. When the public becomes aware of legislation in Congress that is not what they intend their representative to vote for or against, they begin to voice their opposition or support. As public saliency raises, media elites typically enhance the issue to nationalized television audiences. It can be inferred, therefore, that if saliency levels on specific legislation is high enough, Congressional members would opt for or against the bill in relation to their constituents' opinions. In *Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House*, Clinton seeks to measure this factor's significance on legislator-constituent relations by operationalizing roll call votes on various controversial pieces of legislation (likely to have high levels of saliency) (Clinton 2004). He finds, however, that there is no relationship between the

level of saliency towards legislation and Congressional member representation of their constituents' opinions (Clinton 2004). As immigration legislation is considered a controversial issue likely to receive heightened media attention and as a result, higher public saliency, implying that Congressional members may not accurately represent their constituents' opinions on immigration bills. This, of course, will be examined later in my hypothesis analysis.

Now, after examining the factors that contribute to the legislator-constituent relationship, it would be beneficial to determine if there is a historical precedent of Congress articulating the opinions constituents bring to the table. Just because there are factors that encourage a relationship does not mean that an association actually exists. In an early empirical study, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes set out to determine the levels of influence constituents had on House members during the 1950's. Their goal was to determine whether Congressional House members voted on the basis of their constituency on three salient objectives, social welfare, foreign policy, and (at the time) Civil Rights (Miller and Stokes 1963). Miller and Stokes found that House members did in fact vote in unison with their constituents' views on these policy issues, with social welfare correlating a 0.7, foreign policy a 0.6, and civil rights a 0.9 (which the authors both agree was extremely "persuasive" to their experiment's conclusion) (Miller and Stokes 51, 1963). Both scholars allude to, however, that this correlation may be happenstance, considering Congressional House members also voted in favor of the administration during the period examined, therefore public opinion influences may just boil down to a spurious variable (Miller and Stokes 1963). It is also important to note that the empirical study was conducted during a period where party identification and ideology had many overlaps, therefore, it may have been easier to meet constituent demands on policy issues. Not to mention the study (as many do) only focuses on the House and does not include the Senate, which could skew the

correlation model in either direction; however, as the Senate incorporates a larger constituency, it can be inferred that they would be less likely to cast votes in favor of their constituents at high levels.

As one can see, there are numerous factors that contribute to the relationship between legislator and constituents. Also, research has shown that there is a measurable level of influence constituents had on final floor votes, at least for the House of Representatives. This would imply that democratic theory is important to both constituents and Congressional members alike.

2.2: Polarization and Immigration: Congress and the Public

In order to properly analyze whether an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment prompted a decrease in bipartisanship in Congress, we must first assess what polarization is (broadly) and its effects on both Congress and the public at large. Polarization can typically be defined as the unravelling of political ideologies from center or moderate levels. This phenomenon can occur to both the general public and Congress, as one typically has an effect on the other and vice versa. First, Congressional polarization will be analyzed, then this paper will turn to examining the public.


To many onlookers today, Congress can be viewed as a wrestling match between the two parties to determine what legislative path is best for the American public. However, Congressional politics has not always been so polarized. It was not until the beginning of President Reagan's first term that Congress became further removed from the center of the ideological spectrum (Bonica, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2013). Democratic majorities were gainfully enjoyed throughout the entire American institution system following President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal politics, though this became unraveled as Reagan ushered in a new era of

conservatism that caught on throughout the public domain (Bonica, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2013). The diminishing role of intra-party ideological intersections (i.e. conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans) also played an important role in polarization increases in Congress. Scholars have also shown that internal Congressional mechanics and a stronger bend towards party loyalty by leadership in Congress has prompted the rise in partisanship (Carson, Crespin, Finnocchiaro and Rohde 2004). To measure polarization, Poole and Rosenthal created a Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-step Estimation (DW-NOMINATE) spatial model that measures ideological positions over time using spatial maps (Lewis, et al. 2019). The spatial model weighs legislator distance on a conservative to liberal scale, but also measures party positions on highly-salient issues such as civil rights (Lewis, et al. 2019). Before moving on to partisanship in relation to constituents, we should look at one of the primary factors cited as contributing to rising partisanship, as well as partisanship in correlation to immigration legislation in Congress.

On the topic of immigration in Congress, the question of growing partisanship levels was largely ignored until the 1990s. One of the last major immigration legislations passed was the 1996 IIRIRA and realistically, the last major comprehensive immigration reform bill was President Reagan's infamous 1986 IRCA. The lack of comprehensive immigration legislation passed in the last twenty-three years, I argue, is due to partisanship level increases in Congress. After the passage of the 1965 INA large pools of Hispanic and Asian foreigners migrated into the United States, with the majority forming along the coastal states and the south near the Mexican border. As such, many northern, Midwest, and central-mountain states' Congressional members were largely able to ignore or remain neutral on immigration legislation (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). However, as the question of monetary expenses paid towards immigrants became a salient

issue with rising immigration rates that saturated electoral-rich states such as Texas, California, and New York, Congressional partisanship on the topic began to substantially rise (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Republicans and Democrats in the 89th House, in which the 1965 INA was passed, carried a lot of ideological overlap, with both parties being less clustered and closer to the center, as DW-NOMINATE plots in figure 2 shows Congressional House members partisanship spectrum (Lewis, et al. 2019).⁷

Figure 2: DW-NOMINATE Ideological Plot from the 89th House, 1965-1967




Immigration opposition was minimal during this time period and was primarily voiced by conservative Republicans and southern Democrats as a result of fearing Communists would immigrate from Eastern Europe into the United States (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). However, as Republicans “...eventually realized that the changes wrought by immigration policy in the 1960s had inadvertently led to the expansion of the welfare state...”, conservative-minded Congressional members solidified behind the Republican Party and for restrictive immigration

⁷ <https://voteview.com/congress/house>, 89th Congressional session (1965-1967) House ideological spectrum. Senate models not chosen due to geographical range in which the Senate members operate under in comparison to House members.

policies (Gimpel and Edwards 21, 1999). DW-NOMINATE scores from the 104th Congress' House members, which passed the fairly restrictive IIRIRA, can be seen in figure 3 below (Lewis, et al. 2019).⁸ In comparison to the 1965 INA, the 1996 IIRIRA experienced significantly less conservative Democrats, as well as a more compacted and partisan Republican Party, where the majority party (Republican) carried the votes needed to pass the bill without minority (Democrat) support

Figure 3: DW-NOMINATE Ideological Plot From the 104th House, 1995-1997



(Lewis, et al. 2019). Both parties had also shifted further liberal (Democrats) and conservative (Republicans) since the 89th Congressional session (Lewis, et al. 2019). There have been obvious partisan shifts in the legislative branch since the 1960's. Therefore, it is not surprising that immigration policymaking would be affected by partisanship growth. Next this paper will

⁸ <https://voteview.com/congress/house>, 104th Congressional session (1995-1997) House ideological spectrum. Senate models not chosen due to geographical range in which the Senate members operate under in comparison to House members.

examine whether the American constituency has become polarized over a similar time-period and will also examine if this trend correlates with immigration legislation.

The general public's level of saliency towards political issues has waxed and waned throughout the history of the United States. As such, partisanship among constituents has been a byproduct of the saliency levels of political issues within any specific generation. Party-affiliation and the strength of that particular party also go a long way towards partisanship growth in the American public. As such, a good way to determine whether constituents have polarized over recent political history is to look at the ideological scores of the Democratic and Republican Parties throughout the contemporary era.

For the purposes of maintaining cohesiveness with the partisan plots for Congressional members aforementioned, I will discuss party ideology correlations from the 89th Congress and the 104th Congress as well. During the 89th Congressional session, the Democratic Party correlated a -0.32 on a scale of +1.0 (very conservative) to -1.0 (very liberal liberal) (Lewis, et al. 2019).⁹ This information shows that the Democratic Party at-large would be considered to be moderately-liberal. Therefore, it can be inferred that American constituents voting within the Democratic Party also expressed a moderately-liberal ideology. The Republican Party during the 89th Congress measured a +0.25 on the same ideological scale (Lewis, et al. 2019).¹⁰ Taking this information into account, it can be interpreted that constituents voting within the Republican Party were fairly moderate-conservatives and could be construed as being a swing vote ideologically speaking. In relating this to immigration policy, we can see how the 1965 INA

⁹ <https://voteview.com/parties/100/democratic-party>, ideology correlation measured from the 89th Congressional session (1965-1967).

¹⁰ <https://voteview.com/parties/200/republican-party>, ideology correlation measured from the 89th Congressional session (1965-1967).

came to fruition, as both parties experienced fairly moderate ideological scores which can be associated with expansionist immigration views. Now measuring the ideological spectrum of the parties during the 104th Congress, I find that Democrats experienced a correlation of -0.36 (Lewis, et al. 2019).¹¹ In relation to the 89th Congress, the Democratic Party shifted further liberal by -0.04. This would imply a modest shift to the left by constituents in the Democratic base. The Republican Party in the 104th Congress expressed an ideological measure of +0.38, which is a 0.13 shift to the right in relation to the 89th Congressional session (Lewis, et al. 2019).¹² It can be construed that Republican constituents, therefore, experienced a quite large shift in expanding their conservative ideology. Relaying this back to immigration policy, the 1996 IIRIRA, which was a fairly restrictive immigration bill, passed Congress during a resurging conservative ideology within the Republican Party, who also had control of both chambers of Congress. On the question of partisanship growth within the American constituency, I show that in relation to their respective political party, the general public has grown further apart ideologically between the passage of a massive expansion of immigration policy (INA of 1965) to what is considered one of the last immigration reform bills passed by Congress (IIRIRA of 1996). This demonstrates that the American constituency has grown more polarized over the last fifty-four years, which as for now, correlates (causation measured later) with the decrease in comprehensive immigration legislation passing Congress.

2.3: Bipartisanship in the Legislature: Has Bipartisanship Declined?

¹¹ <https://voteview.com/parties/100/democratic-party>, ideology correlation measured from the 104th Congressional session (1995-1997).

¹² <https://voteview.com/parties/200/republican-party>, ideology correlation measured from the 104th Congressional session.

A question that has made headways throughout popular political media outlets and public opinion polls alike is determining whether bipartisanship levels have decreased throughout the contemporary Congressional era. Laurel Harbridge's "*Is Bipartisanship Dead?*" attempts to answer the question posed in her book title by examining the role of agenda setting, analyzing roll-call votes, voice votes, and cosponsorship percentages, as well as determining if responsiveness has declined by reviewing the House's governing from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s. Harbridge's findings are relevant to my examination of public opinion and its effects on legislative behavior as responsiveness is a key focal point of this paper, as well as the role cosponsorship plays in my analysis in determining whether Congressional members have polarized on the issue of immigration.

Roll call votes have been a consistent measure of bipartisanship in Congress for academics and political commentators alike. Roll call votes are typically the most visible part of the legislative process, which allows for Congressional members to display to their districts and the nation their view on the issue being voted upon on the floor. As Harbridge has pointed out, roll call votes have continuously declined in bipartisanship levels throughout her time-series measured (Harbridge 2015). Harbridge points to agenda setting by House leadership as a plausible reason for the decline, noting that "...leadership decisions further drive the shift from a bipartisan agenda to a partisan agenda after committees report bills" (Harbridge 76, 2015). Bipartisanship levels fell on roll call votes between the 93rd House and the 104th House, with the 104th House changing strategy to be more inclusive of bipartisan measures after facing electoral backlash for lack of proper governance (Harbridge 2015). When comparing roll call votes to voice votes, however, Harbridge notes that an interesting relationship form. While roll call votes allow leadership to display partisan-ques to the public, voice votes often allow for true

bipartisanship levels to show (Harbridge 2015). Harbridge points to voice votes as a way for party leadership to enact "...non-controversial bipartisan legislation" for showing the public that Congressional output (i.e. bills sent to the president) is high (Harbridge 84, 2015).

Intriguingly, Harbridge finds that while roll-call votes have polarized over the time-series analyzed, bipartisanship levels have maintained a higher percentage at the bill cosponsorship stage (Harbridge 2015). This is pertinent to my hypothesis, as this paper seeks to operationalize bipartisanship levels in Congress on immigration legislation using the cosponsorship percentage. Harbridge points to the validity of using bill cosponsorship as a measure, suggesting that "agreement on legislation at the cosponsorship stage can signal the likely voting patterns of the chamber as a whole...", noting that of all cosponsored bills with bipartisan support, 81 percent received a bipartisan final passage (Harbridge 43-44, 2015). Bill cosponsorship is also taken seriously by Congressional members who agree to sign on to the legislation in question, with the average cosponsorship withdrawal percentage between the 93rd and 112th Congress sitting at just 0.14% (Harbridge 2015). This research enhances my paper's usage of cosponsorship data as a key measure of bipartisanship levels on immigration legislation, as they have shown to be a stronger indicator that bipartisanship does occur in Congress as well as the strength of validity held in cosponsorship at large.

Party agenda setting, in the context of political conditions, also helps explain the extent of bipartisanship in Congress. Harbridge analyzes the district sorting percentage (district sorting is measured by the level of support for a particular party in-district) and juxtaposes it with the likelihood legislators will support bipartisan legislation. Bipartisanship decreases among districts that contain a higher level of sorting, prompting a rise in partisanship bills receiving a roll call vote in the House, Harbridge finds (Harbridge 2015). In applying district sorting to political

leaders' pursuit of bipartisan legislation, "*Is Bipartisanship Dead?*" offers a similar finding as aforementioned. Party leaders are more likely to pursue bipartisanship legislation on the roll call agenda when there are "...few sorted districts and many members are at risk of being cross-pressured between their constituents and their party" (Harbridge 109-110, 2015).

As mentioned earlier, my hypothesis is rooted in democratic theory, suggesting that elected officials are beholden to the public therefore, their responsiveness to public opinion is an important factor to weigh when measuring Congressional success. Decreases in bipartisanship naturally prompts a decrease in responsiveness to certain groups now alienated by the new partisan driven agenda. Harbridge attempts to measure how responsive House members are by looking at roll call votes and cosponsorship levels and correlating it with district preferences in presidential elections. She finds that for roll call votes casted between the 93rd and 108th Congresses responsiveness has decreased (implying that House members voted against their district's preferences as set by the vote share casted in presidential elections); however, bill cosponsorship has measured an increase in responsiveness in relation to district preferences (Harbridge 2015). This research implies that House members are transitioning to supporting more partisan bills in roll call votes and using bill cosponsorship history to show constituents that they attempt to reach out to create a bipartisan consensus, providing an electoral benefit for the member.

As you can see, "*Is Bipartisanship Dead?*" provides a plethora of scholarship on the question of bipartisanship in Congress. Harbridge shows that roll call votes do show a decrease in bipartisanship over her period measured, however, bill cosponsorship allows for House members to offer more bipartisan support for legislation; district sorting plays a big roll in agenda setting, as party leaders will prioritize bipartisan legislation when there is fewer House

members with sorted districts and will prioritize partisan legislation when there is more sorted House districts represented; lastly, responsiveness of House members is naturally higher at levels of increased bipartisanship. House members show a negative relationship with responsiveness on roll call votes, however, they display a positive relationship with responsiveness on bill cosponsorship. This scholarship is important to laying the framework of the hypothesis tested in my paper, that an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment correlates with a decrease in bipartisanship in Congress on immigration legislation, as Harbridge helps explain the multi-dimensional picture of bipartisanship found in Congress.

2.4: Constituents, Partisanship, and the Decline of Bipartisanship: My Hypothesis Reinforced

Throughout the chapter I have explored whether American institutions, notably Congress, hold up to basic democratic theories on constituent-legislator relations. I have shown the factors that help develop this relationship, as well as determined that constituents do matter to congressional members on roll-call votes in the House (at least on three salient issues to the American public). This chapter has also explored the question of partisanship in the United States. Exploiting the growth of partisanship in Congress through DW-NOMINATE plots, as well as showcasing the progressive polarization of the American constituency. I then formulated a relationship between bipartisanship in bill cosponsorship and immigration legislation to explore whether an increase in partisan bill cosponsorship correlated with the decrease in immigration legislation (and the type of legislation proposed). As my hypothesis is that an increase in negative public opinion on immigrants causes a decrease in bipartisanship in bill cosponsorship in Congress on immigration legislation, measures of democratic theory, partisanship levels in Congress, and the constituency at-large are important factors contributing to my theory. Bipartisanship is a byproduct of legislators' willingness to compromise

ideologically and secure the passage of comprehensive legislation. In following democratic principles, this willingness to compromise is rooted in constituent opinions. It can be assumed, therefore, that partisanship growth would induce a decrease in willingness and as such, demote bipartisanship levels in Congress. Partisanship is a reflection of constituent polarization levels which is based off of saliency toward specific policies within any given period. I can conclude through this chapter that partisanship in Congress has steadily increased along with a decrease in proposed comprehensive immigration bills. Political parties as well, have public bases that have splintered and grown further conservative (Republican) and liberal (Democrat). If the democratic theory which states that constituents do matter in the legislative process holds true as explained previously, this information coupled with partisanship growth only reinforces my hypothesis, that an increase in negative constituent opinions on immigrants has led to a decrease in bipartisanship on immigration bills, which will be explored in further detail in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

3.1: Compilation of Survey and Legislative Data

In order to test my overarching theory, I need to delve into testing how the hypotheses explain the theory. My first theory (H_1) is that there has been an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment since the passage of the IRCA of 1986. I believe this increase in anti-immigrant sentiment will be seen most critically in border states, states with high levels of foreign-born populations, as well as states with a higher correlation of ideologically conservative constituents. My second theory (H_2) is that bipartisanship in Congress has dissolved on immigration legislation since the passage of the IRCA of 1986. The first theory necessitates reliable state-level public opinion measures for anti-immigrant sentiment. To measure this, I will rely upon Census data and survey data. Next, I will evaluate how public opinion shapes congressional action. To assess congressional action on immigration, I will rely upon a measure of bill bipartisanship developed by Belco, Clark, and Sipole (2016). The Congressional legislation on immigration is also decomposed further to model levels of enforcement bills and benefit bills. First, I will begin with an overview of my first theory and an explanation of the design and methodology.

As mentioned earlier, H_1 states that there has been an increase in negative public opinion towards immigrants since the passage of the IRCA of 1986. To test this theory, I chose to expand upon state-level models of public sentiment towards immigrants created by Butz and Kherberg (2016). In order to replicate and extend their MRP model, I first collected Census and survey data. There are numerous national public surveys compiled at various periods; some annually, some during Midterm Elections (every two years), some during Presidential Elections (every four years). I chose to use the General Social Survey (GSS), which incorporated both Midterm

Election data and Presidential Election data. The GSS surveys provided the most accurate (as far as I could find) and stable measure of public opinion on immigrants and immigration. Ideally, I wanted to measure public opinion over the time-series of 1986-2016; however, survey data was scarce and unreliable up until 1994. I chose to redraw the boundaries of my time-series from 1994-2016, which still provides a remarkable expansion of state-level public sentiment towards immigrants in comparison to Butz and Kherberg (2016). To operationalize public opinion, I had to find a question surveyed that summarized how American constituents viewed immigrants entering the United States. This question also had to have continuity throughout the time-series so that it did not include any spuriousness. I chose to use the following question surveyed by the GSS for my measurement of public sentiment towards immigrants:

“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?” (General Social Survey 1994; 1996; 2000; 2004; 2008; 2010; 2012; 2014; 2016).

The question was asked over a continuous period including 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016. I chose this question specifically as it questions Americans on whether they want to increase or decrease the numerical value of foreign-born immigrants entering the United States. Increasing or decreasing immigration ceilings has always been a salient issue to American constituents and has been the primary motivator behind numerous immigration policies such as the quota system initiated in the early twentieth century. The data extracted from the GSS question is provided in Table 1 below (General Social Survey 1994; 1996; 2000; 2004; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2012; 2014; 2016):

Table 1: GSS Survey Response Data, 1994-2016

Year:	Increase a lot:	Increase a little:	Same as now:	Decreased a little:	Decreased a lot:
1994	2.51%	3.79%	28.27%	29.13%	36.29%
1996	2.89%	5.70%	27.17%	29.71%	34.53%
2000	3.79%	5.61%	46.43%	21.32%	22.84%
2004	3.78%	6.56%	34.49%	28.24%	26.93%
2006	3.91%	8.74%	34.81%	23.86%	28.69%
2008	3.63%	8.11%	34.62%	23.72%	29.91%
2010	4.45%	9.91%	35.10%	24.77%	25.77%
2012	4.60%	9.27%	40.02%	22.82%	23.30%
2014	4.68%	10.22%	40.27%	23.09%	21.74%
2016	5.85%	11.82%	40.22%	22.71%	19.40%

As one can see, the level of survey respondents who indicated that immigration levels should “increase a lot” steadily increased from 2.5% in 1994 to 5.9% in 2016. The number of survey respondents who responded that immigration numbers should remain the “same as now” has increased from 28.3% in 1994 to 40.2% in 2016. Respondents signifying that immigrant numbers should be “decreased a lot” dropped by almost half, from 36.3% in 1994 to 19.4% in 2016. The significant reduction in the number of respondents who believed immigration should be “decreased a lot” is the most telling results from the GSS survey data. I believe that this drop correlates with the rise of immigrant respondents partaking in the survey. America has experienced dramatic increases in the foreign-born populations living within the states, as a result, it is natural to anticipate that as more of these immigrants participate in surveys, the results of questions surrounding increasing or decreasing immigration would began to skew more pro-immigrant than anti-immigrant. Though the number of individuals who wanted immigrant levels to “increase a lot” does not rise as dramatically as “decrease a lot” falls, increases in the number of individuals who wanted immigration to remain the “same as now” also expresses the likelihood of the addition of foreign-born members partaking in the GSS survey. In terms of

Congressional legislation that may have prompted these totals, the 1965 INA plays one of the largest roles, as the quota system's removal created a boom in net migration to the United States over my time-series measured (Batalova, Burrows and Zong 2019).¹³ Also, the Refugee Act of 1980 likely played a role in the fluctuation of GSS survey responses, as the Act solidified preferential treatment to Cuban Asylum seekers attempting to enter the United States (Batalova, Burrows and Zong 2019). The Immigration Act of 1990, which increased the number of immigrants from 500,000 to 700,000 among other objectives, also likely played a key role in the survey results interpreted from my time-series (Immigration Laws).¹⁴ Respondents becoming more pro-immigrant may also be a result of the harsher stance Congress took in the mid-1990's towards immigration with the passage of the 1996 IIRIRA, which sought to decrease the social welfare benefits illegal immigrants could receive. Another factor that can be examined as contributing to the responses of the GSS survey can be the geopolitical and economic conflicts during the time-period (Batalova, Burrows and Zong 2019). At the beginning of my time-series, the Cold War had concluded, resulting in millions of displaced former Communist populations who sought refugee in the United States and other nations. As these populations migrated, it can be expected that they eventually contributed to the survey's change from an anti-immigrant stance to a more pro-immigrant one.

Generating reliable state-level estimates of opinions on immigration or immigrants from national survey data can be tricky due to the lack of a large sample size within each given state as well as question consistency over time. To overcome some of these challenges, I utilize multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP) (Lax and Phillips 2009). This approach

¹³ <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#Now>, accessed 3/24/2019.

¹⁴ <https://immigration.laws.com/immigration-act-of-1990>, accessed 3/24/2019.

involves two steps in which one must first estimate a multilevel model for individual responses using various demographic and geographic variables as predictors. These variables include race, gender, age, and education. In the second stage, MRP uses the estimates for each demographic-geographic “type” (from the first model) and weighs the estimates in accordance to the proportion of each type in the state populations, according to the latest US Census information. Thus, this enables the researcher to correct for over- or under-sampling of particular demographic categories (Lax and Phillips 2009).

To accurately model the MRP, I also included Census data that coincides with the survey responses listed above. I selected Census data from three of the most recent decennial years, 1990, 2000, and 2016. These years were highlighted in order to properly quantify state-level public sentiment in the MRP, due to the fact that it was necessary to have Census information from each decade which correlated with the years the surveys were conducted (i.e. 1990 Census corresponds with 1994, 1996, and 2000 survey responses). To operationalize public opinion and the Census data, I chose variables from each corresponding Census deemed important in indicating key population groups. These variables include: year, employment status, age, education, gender, race, region, foreign born, income, and religion.

My second theory, H_2 , states that bipartisanship in Congress has dissolved on immigration legislation since the passage of the IRCA of 1986. I chose the 1986 IRCA is a legislative indicator due to the bill being largely considered to be one of the (if not the) last comprehensive immigration reform bill passed in a bipartisanship fashion by Congress. However, as discussed previously, substantial public survey data on immigrants did not come to fruition until 1994. To maintain cohesiveness throughout my measurement, I chose to look at bipartisanship levels within the same time-series as my state-level public sentiment model (1994-

2016). Though smaller in scope than measurements from 1986, this will still provide an expanded view of bipartisanship levels on immigration legislation during changing demographic and party politics in Congress. To properly analyze bipartisanship levels, I examined co-sponsorship numbers on immigration legislation purposed by both House and Senate members. To denote a number to replicate bipartisanship, the total number of Democratic sponsors on a particular piece of legislation is divided by the total number of Congressional sponsors; then 0.5 is subtracted from the total, and finally this new amount is multiplied by 100 (Belco, Clark and Sipole 2016). The number produced by the formula is taken at its absolute value, therefore all measurements of bipartisanship are positive numbers. The formula is shown below:

$$\left(ABS \left(\left(\frac{Total\ Democratic\ Sponsorship}{Total\ Congressional\ Sponsorship} \right) - 0.5 \right) * 100 \right)^{15}$$

Bipartisanship is then quantified on a scale of 0-50, where 50 is equivalent to completely partisan and 0 implies complete bipartisanship (Belco, Clark and Sipole 2016).

To examine the relationship of partisanship to state-level public opinion on immigrants further, I also analyzed the immigration legislation based on enforcement bills and benefit bills. An enforcement bill is purposed legislation that has restrictionist subject material within the bill, such as border security funding, limits to birthright citizenship, or social welfare reductions. Benefit bills are pieces of legislation that contain expansionist or pro-immigrant material, such as increasing protection to certain illegal immigrants or enhanced worker programs. Each piece of

¹⁵ Bipartisanship formula produced in Excel Spreadsheet with codes of immigration legislation from 1994-2016. Total Democratic Sponsorship is coded AG2. Total Congressional Sponsorship is coded AF2 (Belco, Clark, Sipole 2016).

immigration legislation from 1994-2016 was coded with either a 0 or a 1 to signify the specific bill type (benefit or enforcement) (Belco, Clark and Sipole 2016).¹⁶

3.2: Difficulties Encountered in Research

Though the data acquired, and methods tested provided ample models to test my hypothesis, there were a few difficulties encountered when conducting research on the theory. As mentioned earlier, my original test for H_1 was to measure survey data dating back to 1986, to properly measure public sentiment from the IRCA to present. However, severe limitations in the consistency of and word choice used in surveys conducted before 1994 prevented me from expanding H_1 . The American National Election Survey (ANES) offered survey responses similar to the question I chose from the GSS; however, continuity issues arose as the ANES sporadically surveyed participants on their opinions on immigrants, as well as the questions used to acquire survey data changed each time the subject was measured. The GSS had similar issues as well prior to 1994, though after they remained consistent in both wording and years in which the subject was surveyed. Another issue encountered while conducting research on survey data involved the question asked. Both the GSS and ANES offered only one question type that measured respondents on their support for increasing or decreasing immigration into the United States. There were no survey questions which asked how respondents felt about immigrants already living within the United States (at least not consistently asked), nor were there any survey questions that did not lead with the topic regarding opinions held towards foreign born immigrants, which is likely to simulate higher amounts of disapproval in an age where all forms of immigration are associated with illegal immigrants.

¹⁶ Enforcement and benefit bills coded in Excel Spreadsheet. 0 denotes what the bill type is not and 1 denotes what bill type is.

Difficulties encountered in measuring legislative data correspond with the limited battery of survey questions offered. By having to reduce my time-series from the original 1986 IRCA beginning point, I limited a plethora of measurable immigration legislation in a time where, as aforementioned, partisanship was beginning to take its course within the American electorate as well as in Congress. Though the legislative data collected is sufficient to producing quantifiable models of partisanship growth, expanding the time-series to incorporate the 1980's would have allowed for a potential marker-point for when immigration became a polarizing issue in legislative affairs.

A third issue I encountered when attempting to measure public opinion on immigrants and its effect on legislative behavior was the limited amount of literature on the subject. There are numerous scholarly pieces on partisanship measures from both public opinion and Congressional perspectives; also, there is plentiful research on legislative behavior as it relates to democratic theory. However, when attempting to quantify the two separate political phenomena's in relation to immigration policy, scholarly works become sporadic and offer only a limited view on the subject. Though this is considered a deficiency in the field, it has allowed this paper to contribute new scholarly work on democratic theory, immigration, and legislative behavior. Also, by retracting away from national-level models on public sentiment towards immigrants, I offer a new and expansive measure of state-level opinions towards immigrants not seen in previous scholarly research.

Chapter 4: Analysis and Findings

4.1: Multilevel Regression and Poststratification

In order to accurately measure state-level public opinion towards immigrants, I estimated an MRP model, which follows the research of Butz and Kherberg (2016). MRP carries numerous advantages specifically with regard to measuring state-level opinions based on national surveys. Butz and Kherberg point out that “the advantage of MRP is that state-level public opinion can be estimated from as little as a single survey with a national sample in a two-step process” (Butz and Kherberg 2016). The first step in creating my model of public sentiment towards immigrants is to approximate a multi-level model for constituent responses using variables taken from geographic and demographic indicators (Butz and Kherberg 2016). As mentioned in Chapter three, these variables were collected from Census data measured from 1990, 2000, and 2010. What differentiates my model from Butz and Kherberg’s is that my model covers a time-series of 1994-2016, while Butz and Kherberg’s model is only from 2004-2008; also, their MRP only accounts for gender, race, age, region, Protestant or Mormon faith, and education as variables (Butz and Kherberg 2016). This study increases the variable load to include year, employment status, foreign born, income, as well as a fuller-spectrum of religion. This benefits scholarly research by further enhancing the pool of indicators computed in the MRP. The second phase of the MRP is to take the estimates of geographical and demographic variables and evaluate them in correlation with state-level populations (Butz and Kherberg 2016). National surveys, whether “...simple random...stratified sampling...[or] cluster sampling...” are then operationalized to originate MRP approximations (Butz and Kherberg 2016). A main concern, predominantly in cluster sampling surveys such as the ANES and GSS is that they do not accurately provide a wholesome measurement of representativeness, stability, reliability, validity, and utility (Butz

and Kherberg 2016). However, as Butz and Kherberg note, the post-stratification within the MRP helps alleviate the apprehensions brought on my cluster sampling (Butz and Kherberg 2016). Another complaint of evaluating state-level public opinion via an MRP is that the model may not accurately portray policy positions, specifically within geographic areas with low response rates; however, previous research (Buttice and Highton, 2013) supports using an MRP to estimate policy positions on immigration, noting that the model depicts immigration and other cultural/social positions “...more accurately than other policy preferences...” (Butz and Kherberg, 2016). Overall, through using the MRP model similarly to Butz and Kherberg, I believe that my results will show equal validity and reliability.

4.2: Modeling and Graphs

To begin with analyzing my hypothesis, that an increase in negative anti-immigrant sentiment leads to a decrease in bipartisanship in Congress, I first developed an MRP model on state-level anti-immigrant sentiment. Figure 4 presents the state-level estimates of anti-immigrant sentiment from the MRP analysis.

Figure 4: Public Anti-Immigrant Sentiment by State, 1994-2016

In examining the estimate from the MRP model, lower numerical values indicate broader pro-immigrant sentiment, while higher numerical values indicate negative anti-immigrant sentiment. The measure ranges widely, from .25 to .73, with a mean average of .54. This indicates that public attitudes towards the question, whether to increase or decrease the number of foreign-born immigrants allowed to enter the United States, varies widely among each state operationalized. When breaking down the measure further, we can highlight some interesting findings. California experienced the sharpest decline in anti-immigrant sentiment over the time-series measured, where in 1994 the state indicated a value of .52, by 2016 California measured a .25. The measure indicating that California has become more pro-immigrant over the series is of no surprise considering the massive immigrant population within the state, as well as California's

Democratic voting track-record as of late. However, as Tichenor discusses in “Dividing Lines”, California was one of the state’s leading the charge against immigrants during the period of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, as well as in 1994 when the state’s constituents passed Proposition 187, banning illegal immigrants from obtaining public benefits (Tichenor 2002).

Another interesting takeaway from the anti-immigrant sentiment estimates is how many “Old Northwestern” states have shown slight increases in negative connotations towards immigrants. For example, Ohio in 1994 had a quite high value of roughly .60 (.06 above the mean); however, by 2016, Ohio’s had increased to a high of .65. Pennsylvania is another Northwestern state to experience an increase in anti-immigrant public opinion. In 1994, Pennsylvania showed a value of about a .59, however, what is interesting is the state experienced a decline in anti-immigrant sentiment by the mid 2000’s, where the value is estimated to be at .55. By 2016 Pennsylvania had risen back to .58, an increase of .04. A third state to showcase increases in anti-immigrant sentiment is Arkansas. The state’s anti-immigrant sentiment hovered around .61 in 1994 and by 2016 it had risen to .67.

A trend that has risen overall in the exploring the data on state level public opinion towards immigrants is that states with a closer proximity to the border (California, Texas, New Mexico, etc.) and states with higher populations of foreign-born immigrants (New York, New Jersey, etc.) tend to experience the lowest overall anti-immigrant sentiment values, as well as have shown decreases in anti-immigrant sentiment over the time series measured. States that are further away from the border (Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Ohio, Kentucky, etc.) have shown either higher than the mean values levels and/or have increased in anti-immigrant opinions throughout the time-series. I believe that proximity to immigrant groups increases the likelihood that public discourse within the state will trend more positively towards foreign-born populations.


Ironically, many of the “Old Northwestern” states mentioned earlier that have trended upward on anti-immigrant sentiment were (and still are) home to many immigrant groups that experienced severe racism in the years shortly after our nation’s founding (namely Germans and Irish) (Tichenor 2002). Though not the focus of this paper, this phenomenon does beg the question of whether the increase in Mexican and Asian immigrants throughout my time-series has augmented the likelihood of these predominantly Caucasian states showing an increase in anti-immigrant opinions due to implicit (or explicit) racial bias.

I want to turn now to analyzing how these public opinion trends affect the legislative agenda in Congress. As mentioned throughout my paper, basic democratic theory implies that there is a relationship between elected officials and the public. Though there may be variations in how this representational relationship is structured (i.e. some constituents may prefer a delegate model, while others might prefer a trustee model), the overarching understanding is that the public elects’ Congressional members in a contract of sorts to enact legislation in the district’s best interests. If the legislator does not comply with the majority of the district’s interests, they are likely to get voted out of office in the next election and replaced with someone who will. In discussing how voters influence foreign policy legislation in democracies, Michael Tomz, Jessica Weeks, and Keren Yarhi-Milo analyze two ways in which public opinion can affect Congressional behavior: selection of legislators by the public and responsiveness of legislators to public opinion (Milo, Tomz and Weeks 2017). The scholars find that in terms of selection of legislators on foreign policy issues, “...voters awarded substantially less support to parties with distant foreign policy views, than to parties who concurred with them about foreign policy” (Milo, Tomz and Weeks 13, 2017). As a result, voters were found to be more tolerant towards foreign policy stances of those representing their interests, as opposed to opposite-party voters

who were more unsympathetic to the foreign policy legislation of the majority (Milo, Tomz and Weeks 2017). In measuring responsiveness of legislators to public demands, the authors conclude that "...decision-makers not only took public opinion into consideration when making decisions about the use of force, but also that they anticipated adverse political consequences for ignoring the public will" (Milo, Tomz and Weeks 27, 2017). Taking this information into account is why I hypothesize that anti-immigrant sentiment affects Congressional behavior on immigration legislation. Legislators have an incentive to be responsive to public discourse of their constituency; while the constituency has the incentive of electing members of Congress who best represent their interests, and to support like-minded legislation over opposing party viewpoints. To break my hypothesis down further, I believe that states which maintained lower and/or decreasing anti-immigrant levels will have elected officials who represent more benefit (pro-immigrant) legislation, while states with higher and/or increasing anti-immigrant sentiment will maintain elected officials who support more enforcement (anti-immigrant) bills in Congress. Also, in examining average state partisanship levels, I expect to find that states that have dramatically increased or decreased anti-immigrant sentiment will likely see higher levels of partisanship, while states that maintain medium levels of anti-immigrant sentiment will experience higher proportions of bipartisanship.

First, I will examine state-level partisanship trends as determined by cosponsorship percentages on immigration legislation found in the United States Congress. Figure 5 depicts these values below.

Figure 5: Average Bipartisanship of Immigration Bills Introduced in the U.S. Congress by State, 1994-2016



Partisanship levels in this graph are determined by bill cosponsorship percentages on immigration legislation at the federal level, with a .50 being perfectly partisan bills and a .00 being evenly bipartisan. Let's begin with the states mentioned previously with low and/or decreasing anti-immigrant sentiment. First, we will look at California, which experienced the most substantial drop in anti-immigrant sentiment. California's average partisanship level in 1994 hovered slightly below .50. Over the time series, California dropped numerous times to an estimated partisanship level of .25 before moving back towards the .50 marker by 2016. California experiences an extremely noisy bill bipartisanship level throughout the time-series in

large part due to the state's dramatic party realignment. In the 1992 Presidential Election, California voted Democrat for President Clinton with 46% of the popular vote (Leip).¹⁷ This percentage implies that more than half the state voted either Republican or third-party, which represented a contested state. By the 2000 Presidential Elections, California voted for presidential hopeful Al Gore with 53.4% of the popular vote, showing a partisan identity forming around the Democratic Party (Leip). In the 2016 Presidential Elections, the state voted overwhelmingly for Secretary Hillary Clinton, who received 61% of the popular vote (Leip). As you can see, the state has fluctuated between majority non-Democratic to majority Democratic, insinuating the static expressed in the partisanship graph. As the state moved from higher rates of anti-immigrant sentiment to lower rates of anti-immigrant sentiment, it was also experiencing partisan shifts that created some necessitated bipartisanship before ultimately moving back to nearly full partisanship.

New Jersey is another interesting state to look at in comparing overall partisanship levels with anti-immigrant sentiment. The state had experienced quite low anti-immigrant sentiment levels in 1994 and dropped even lower by 2016. In comparing partisanship levels, we find intriguing results. New Jersey experienced high partisanship levels in 1994, hovering near .50, however, by 2016 the state's partisanship levels had dropped to near .00, or perfectly bipartisan. The significant drop in partisanship levels correlate with the drop in negative anti-immigrant sentiment within the state. This is also true for New Mexico, a border state, which experienced similar anti-immigrant sentiment levels as New Jersey over the time-series measured. In relating

¹⁷ <https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html>, accessed 4/1/2019.

partisanship levels, New Mexico experienced an increase in partisanship in the mid-2000's before rapidly declining to lows near .00.

Changing directions to look at states with higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, we can first examine Ohio. The state, as mentioned previously, experienced an increase in negative anti-immigrant sentiment between 1994-2016. In looking at partisanship levels, I would expect that this would necessitate more partisanship within the state. I find that Ohio's partisanship levels rise from nearly perfectly bipartisan in 1994 to about .30 in 2016. As expected, the state experienced an increase in partisanship levels in relation with an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. The public within Ohio are more likely to elect officials who represent their interests. If more of the public supports negative anti-immigrant sentiment, their elected officials will support this as well in they are election-focused, creating natural partisanship. Now in examining Pennsylvania we notice an interesting trend. The state's anti-immigrant levels increased over the time-series measured, however, its partisanship levels began at nearly .50 in 1994 before dropping severely throughout most of the time-series, then increasing starkly to .50 by 2016.

Now I want to move towards examining U.S. Congressional benefit and enforcement legislation in correlation to anti-immigrant sentiment. Benefit legislation signifies whether members of the U.S. Congress are sponsoring more pro-immigrant (or anti-immigrant) bills. Enforcement legislation is the opposite, in which they signify whether members of Congress are sponsoring more anti-immigrant (or pro-immigrant) bills. I expect to find that states that have higher and/or increasing negative anti-immigrant sentiment will have representatives who support more enforcement legislation. Conversely, I expect states with lower and/or decreasing negative anti-immigrant sentiment to have representatives who support more benefit legislation. Figure 6 depicts state-level measurements on benefit legislation in Congress.

Figure 6: Bipartisanship of Benefit Immigration Bills Introduced in the U.S. Congress by State, 1994-2016




In analyzing the graph above, we can see some interesting results. First, as before, let's look at states with stark decreases in anti-immigrant sentiment. California experiences decent amounts of pro-immigrant (benefit) legislation over the time-series measured. In 1994 the state displayed a low of near .00, before experiencing noisy results that coincide with the partisanship levels. By 2016, the state's benefit levels hovered near .10, though it had risen as high as .20 in previous years. California's overall federal benefit legislation levels are not as high as their decline in negative anti-immigrant sentiment would lead on, however. New Jersey experienced relatively low levels of pro-immigrant legislation among elected officials. In 1994 the state

measured at .00, rising to a high of roughly .05 in the mid 2000's before tapering off back near .00 by 2016. New Mexico too experienced low levels of federal benefit legislation, hovering at or around .00 for much of the time-series measured. This abnormality might be explained by the states outlier in partisanship levels as expressed earlier. Both New Jersey and New Mexico experienced near perfect bipartisanship by 2016, as a result, seeing increases in federal benefit legislation may not be as starkly profound as states who have both low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and high partisanship. Overall, U.S. Congressional benefit legislation seems to show levels quite lower throughout most of the states measured.

In measuring enforcement legislation, I expect to see that states with higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment will be more predisposed to have higher levels of enforcement legislation in Congress. Figure 7 below shows state-level enforcement legislation over the time-series measured.

Figure 7: Bipartisanship of Enforcement Immigration Bills Introduced in the U.S.
Congress by State, 1994-2016



From the enforcement legislation estimates we can derive some intriguing insights. Ohio, for example, experienced both high partisanship levels and high negative anti-immigrant sentiment, which would imply that the state's elected officials should be executing more enforcement legislation. What I find, however, is that Ohio maintains a nearly .00 value for much of the time-series measured, insinuating no real relationship between higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and federal enforcement legislation. Looking next at Pennsylvania we also see a similar result, though not as dramatic as Ohio. The state shows a near .00 level of U.S. Congress enforcement legislation in 1994 and rises slightly to .10 around 2010 before falling

back to .05 in 2016. Though Pennsylvania experiences an increase in enforcement legislation, it is not at the levels I would anticipate to properly assume a relationship when you consider their state-level anti-immigrant sentiment levels.

What is most interesting about the enforcement legislation levels is the results of California and Texas. California showed a stark decline in state-level anti-immigrant sentiment yet experienced quite noisy partisanship and benefit legislation estimates at the U.S. Congressional level. Surprisingly, the state also experienced quite noisy enforcement legislation at the federal level, hovering as high as .20 in the mid-1990s before dropping to .00 by 2016. Though this does show the inverse, that states with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment would conversely experience lower levels of enforcement legislation, the stark graphical movements seem to relate more towards partisan conflict in the state and less with anti-immigrant sentiment. In looking at Texas, we see another intriguing trend. Texas experienced near-mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment while experiencing near perfectly .50 levels of partisanship. However, the state's U.S. Congressional enforcement legislation levels are quite noisy. In 1994, Texas indicated a value near .00 before beginning its cantankerous journey of peaks and valleys, peaking at around .25 in 2010 before again dropping dramatically to roughly .10 by 2016. The volatility of the graph would seem to indicate that states with near-mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment experience periodic fluctuations in the types of immigration legislation supported by their representatives, though there is little evidence to back this claim when examining most the states in the graph.

As you can see, there seems to be little correlation between state-level anti-immigrant sentiment and partisanship levels in Congress. States mentioned above such as California, have experienced significant drops in anti-immigrant sentiment while maintaining high levels of

partisanship. The inverse is similar with states that have experienced higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, I find that there does not seem to be a graphical relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and the type of bills supported by elected officials. Again, when looking at California, one would expect to see a stark increase in benefit legislation sponsored, yet we see the opposite effect take place. The inverse is true when measuring enforcement legislation. Ohio, for example, experienced no significant increase in enforcement legislation sponsored by the state's U.S. legislators, yet experienced an increase in already high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. To better operationalize my hypothesis, however, we now turn towards examining partisanship and anti-immigrant sentiment via descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and linear prediction models to determine if there is in fact a relationship between the two variables.

4.3: Hypothesis Testing and Results

Though the graphs displayed above show a macro-statistical scale of measuring anti-immigrant sentiment and partisanship, to reject or fail to reject my hypothesis I need to juxtapose my primary variables (anti-immigrant sentiment and bill bipartisanship) in a multi-variate regression analysis to determine what type of relationship exists. First, however, I want to begin with some basic descriptive statistics. Table 2 below is a simple summary statistics table with the mean and standard deviations from the mean.

Table 2: Sample Statistics Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment with Standard Deviations, 1994-2016

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Bill Bipartisanship	625	37.017	14.275	0	50
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	1,198	0.543	0.071	0.25	0.73

As you can see, there are 625 observations of bill bipartisanship and 1198 anti-immigrant sentiment observations. The mean for bill bipartisanship is roughly 37 (0-50 scale); while the mean for anti-immigrant sentiment is a .54, as discussed earlier. The standard deviations are the measured distance each unit within the variable is apart from the mean. For bill bipartisanship, the standard deviation is 14.27, while anti-immigrant sentiment's standard deviation is .07. This implies that the average distance from the mean for each observation measured in the bill bipartisanship variable is roughly 14, and the average distance from the mean in the anti-immigrant sentiment variable is roughly .5. I want to turn now to descriptive statistics measuring the standard error of the mean. Table 3 below depicts the standard statistics with the standard error of the mean replacing the standard deviation.

Table 3: Sample Statistics Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment with Standard Errors, 1994-2016

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Bill Bipartisanship	625	37.017	0.571	35.895	38.138
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	1,198	0.543	0.002	0.539	0.547

When looking at the standard errors we notice that bill bipartisanship carries a .57, while anti-immigrant sentiment is quite lower at .002. This is due to the number of observations for each variable. A larger sample size provides smaller standard errors, which in return provides tighter confidence intervals. This is not to say that we should disregard the results regarding bill bipartisanship; rather, this information provides us with the knowledge that bill bipartisanship will have larger confidence intervals in comparison to anti-immigrant sentiment. Looking at the variable's confidence intervals proves this to be true. Bill bipartisanship's 95% confidence

interval is from 35.89 to 38.13, while anti-immigrant sentiment's confidence interval is measured from .53 to .54. Bill bipartisanship's confidence interval distance is roughly 2.24 apart from each other, while anti-immigrant sentiment's confidence interval's distance is only less than .01 apart. Overall, we can gather from this information that the higher number of observations for anti-immigrant sentiment in comparison to bill bipartisanship proves anti-immigrant sentiment to have stronger confidence intervals than bill bipartisanship.

Moving away from general descriptive statistics, I want to begin to test my hypothesis using a covariance examination. Table 4 depicted below shows the covariance between my two variables.

Table 4: Covariance Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, 1994-2016

	Bill Bipartisanship	Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Bill Bipartisanship	1.0000	
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	0.0260	1.0000

Covariance is a statistical way of measuring general patterns of association between the two variables. Covariance is measured on a scale from -1 to 1, where a negative covariance indicates a negative relationship and a positive covariance indicates a positive relationship. Covariance of 0 indicate nether a positive nor negative relationship as the variables, in theory, cancel each other out. Both bill bipartisanship and anti-immigrant sentiment measured a covariance of 1, indicating a perfect positive slope. However, the covariance measured as an association between bill bipartisanship and anti-immigrant sentiment is 0.026. This is indicative

of a generally weak positive relationship between the two variables listed, as the covariance correlation is close to 0.

A more robust hypothesis test is measuring my variables using multi-variate analysis. A multi-variate test models the variables to determine the slope of the line between the independent and dependent variable. For our multi-variate test, the independent variable will be anti-immigrant sentiment and the dependent variable will be bill bipartisanship. Table 5 depicts the results of the regression model below:

Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model for Bill Bipartisanship and State-Level Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, 1994-2016

	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	-5.208 (8.017)
Constant	34.236 (4.318)
R-Squared	0.0007
Root MSE	14.281

* $p < 0.05$

From the model, we can interpret some interesting results when we regress bill bipartisanship and anti-immigrant sentiment. First, I want to look at the t -statistic to interpret if a relationship exists. To determine if a relationship between my variables exists, the t -value generated from the regression analysis must be larger than the critical value t . The number of observations for the model is 625, which implies a critical value t between 1.98 and 1.96 (where $p < 0.05$). My regression returned a $t = 0.65$, which is smaller than the critical value t . This would imply that a relationship between my independent variable and dependent variables does not exist, or that I reject my hypothesis and fail to reject the null hypothesis, that an increase in

negative anti-immigrant sentiment does not lead to a decrease in bipartisanship on immigration legislation. Another telling sign is that my p -value is greater than 0.05, which implies a lack of statistical significance in my model. In determining the goodness-of-fit within my model, I look at both the Root Mean Squared Error (Root MSE) and the R-squared statistic. In beginning with the Root MSE, or the measure of accuracy, the regression analysis calculated a correlation of 14.281. This implies that on average, my model is 14.3 points off in predicting the association of my dependent variable to my independent variable. This is relatively high, indicative of a higher probability that there is no relationship between bill bipartisanship and anti-immigrant sentiment. When looking at the R-squared metric, or the proportion of variance, my regression model provides a correlation of 0.0007 (or 0.07%). This implies that my model accounts for 0.07% of the variation in bill bipartisanship.

When measuring the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and types of bills sponsored by legislators, we find a difference story. To measure anti-immigrant sentiment and bill type (benefit or enforce), I need to run a Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression model (ZIP) due to the large quantity of zeros found within my dependent variable. For the ZIP, my dependent variable will be benefit legislation in table 6 and enforcement legislation in table 7. My independent variable found in both tables will be anti-immigrant sentiment. Table 6 shows the regression of anti-immigrant sentiment and benefit immigration legislation.

Table 6: Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression Model for Immigration Benefit Legislation in the U.S. Congress, 1994-2016

	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Benefit Legislation	-5.337 (0.399)*
Constant	3.636 (0.196)
Log-Likelihood	-1770.921
Prob>Chi2	0.000

* $p < 0.05$

Regressing anti-immigrant sentiment highlights some key findings that were alluded to earlier. First, the ZIP model shows the number of zeros observed in our dependent variable, which is equal to 726 out of 1,198 total observations. These zeros would have skewed our regression model if they were not accounted for by using this type of statistical hypothesis test. Second, when regressing the impact anti-immigrant sentiment has on benefit bills in Congress I find a $p - \text{value} = 0.00$ ($p < 0.05$), which implies that anti-immigrant sentiment does have a statistically significant relationship with pro-immigrant legislation over my time-series measured. The coefficient measure of -5.33 indicates that there is a negative slope between anti-immigrant sentiment (x-axis) and benefit bills (y-axis). This would imply that as negative anti-immigrant sentiment increases, the number of benefit bills sponsored by legislators from that state decreases. For example, states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, which have experienced increases in negative anti-immigrant sentiment, are likely to also show a decrease in benefit bills sponsored by legislators from that state over my time-series measured. Next, we will analyze immigration enforcement bills to determine the type of relationship with state-level anti-immigrant sentiment. Table 7 shows the ZIP model between anti-immigrant sentiment and enforcement legislation below.

Table 7: Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression Model for Immigration Enforcement Legislation in the U.S. Congress, 1994-2016

	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Enforcement Legislation	-4.543 (0.450)*
Constant	3.199 (0.232)
Log-Likelihood	-1455.915
Prob>Chi2	0.000

* $p < 0.05$

As the model shows, there was 833 zero observations for 1,198 total observations. Similar to regressing benefit bills, we again find that the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and immigration enforcement legislation is statistically significant, measuring a p – value = 0.00 ($p < 0.05$). I also find that enforcement legislation has a negative slope of -4.54. What differentiates this negative coefficient from the similar benefit legislation coefficient is that this negative slope implies that as negative anti-immigrant sentiment increases, the number of enforcement bills actually decreases. This does relate well to my discussions earlier in graphically comparing the two variables, primarily with Ohio and Pennsylvania; though, this goes against my general hypothesis and anticipated results, as one would expect that if negative anti-immigrant sentiment is increasing, the number of enforcement bills would also increase.

4.4: Discussion

I hypothesized that an increase in negative anti-immigrant sentiment leads to a decrease in bipartisanship on immigration legislation for two main reasons. First, since the 1986 IRCA there has been little comprehensive immigration reform passed in Congress. I believed that the lack of comprehensive immigration legislation passed in Congress was largely due to the rise in

partisanship levels as seen via roll call votes (Harbridge 2015). Yet, as mentioned earlier, roll call votes only capture part of the legislative process. Harbridge found that bipartisanship can be found in the committee process through the cosponsorship of legislation (Harbridge 2015). Since my data incorporated bill cosponsorship as a key indicator of partisanship, it is not out of the question to believe that immigration legislation over my time series was more bipartisan in nature than if I had examined strictly roll call votes. Second, immigration has been a highly contested issue in public discourse since our nation's founding (Tichenor 2002). After all, it was only less than 100 years ago that collectively, Congress enacted a quota system to significantly decrease the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States (Tichenor 2002). The 1980's and 1990's experienced large influxes of Mexican and Asian immigrants as a result of the 1965 INA, which I assumed would lead to rising tension among the American public about their demographic growth. Legislation in the mid 1990's targeting social welfare benefits received by foreign-born groups at both the state and federal level was also an indicator to me that the public may have been growing unruly with the growing immigrant population (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). When you juxtapose the lack of comprehensive immigration reform legislation passed with the perceived rise of enforcement legislation, I assumed that an increase in negative anti-immigrant sentiment was a likely cause. If democratic theory implies that Congress is beholden to the public, it would rationally make sense to hypothesize that an increase in negative anti-immigrant sentiment leads to a decrease in bipartisanship on immigration legislation.

After estimating statistical covariances and regressing anti-immigrant sentiment and bill bipartisanship, however, I find that there is little relationship to be gathered between the two variables. In analyzing the two variables separately, we may be able to determine why there is no relationship found. First, I anticipated that over my time-series there would be a large increase in

negative anti-immigrant sentiment at the state level. However, as expressed earlier, only a relatively small number of states experienced a significant increase in negative public opinion towards foreign-born populations. Many states experienced slight declines or maintained a relatively mean or neutral anti-immigrant sentiment level. A few states actually experienced dramatic declines in negative anti-immigrant sentiment. This was likely in part due to the state's proximity to the border of Mexico and the state's overall immigrant population. Therefore, part of my hypothesis was already disproven. Second, partisanship levels seemed to either be extremely noisy throughout the entirety of the time-series or maintained a high level of partisanship. A few states actually experienced dramatic declines in partisanship levels on immigration legislation as well (correlating with some of the states which experienced drops in negative anti-immigrant sentiment). As part of my hypothesis was that partisanship levels would increase throughout the states over my time-series, the noise, declines, and already high partisanship levels many states experienced proved the second part of my hypothesis to be refuted as well.

As it is not completely plausible to throw democratic theory out the window and announce that Congressional members do not care what their constituents think when it comes to immigration policy, I believe that a few theories might help explain why I rejected my hypothesis. First, my time-series only dates back to 1994, which, though an expansion on Butz and Kherberg's (2016) MRP, it may not be a large enough dataset to fully document anti-immigrant sentiment levels across the country. As a result, negative public opinion towards immigrants may have been at higher levels prior to the initiation of my measurement. This might have had an impact on Congressional partisan levels being higher at the beginning of my time-series, then experiencing fluctuations in extremities of partisanship.

Second, district-party sorting might also play a fundamental role in my hypothesis being rejected. Harbridge describes district-party sorting as when a Congressional district's constituents move more towards the polar ends of each respective party (Republican and Democrat), then they elect a legislator that represents this form of partisanship (Harbridge 2015). This, in theory, allows legislators to "...deepen [their] hold on portions of the country lean[ing] [their] direction" (Harbridge 99-100, 2015). As a result, both an increase and a decrease in negative anti-immigrant sentiment could potentially lead to hardening partisan positions by their legislator. As described earlier, California, Ohio, and Pennsylvania can all be examples states which experienced varying forms of anti-immigrant sentiment throughout my measurement (California decreased; Ohio and Pennsylvania increased) yet still saw high levels of partisanship on immigration legislation. What is not clear, however, is the effect this has on benefit and enforcement legislation. I would assume that hardening public discourse at either polar end would cause the elected official to support more of a specific bill type. However, though this seems to be true for benefit legislation, enforcement legislation regression estimates an opposite slope than the one hypothesized for the model. Therefore, in some cases district-party sorting seems to enable the types of immigration bills passed, yet in others there seems to be no relationship.

Third, agenda-setting by Congressional leaders likely also plays a role in the results of my hypothesis. Harbridge finds that divided governments and small majority-governments are more likely to promote bipartisan legislation than strictly partisan bills (Harbridge 2015). This is mainly a result of the increased difficulty in passing partisan legislation (Harbridge 2015). My time-series measures immigration legislation from the 104th-114th Congressional sessions, in which the 104th session was marked by the end of almost four decades of Democratic

dominance (Tichenor 2002). Beginning in the 104th Congress, Republicans held a majority in both the House and Senate, however, their majority was not substantial (Hillman 2017).¹⁸ This slender majority was maintained (to a greater extent in the House), until the 110th Congress when Democrats took control (Hillman 2017). However, including the 112th Congress, the legislative branch has experienced divided chambers in Congress in two of the three sessions remaining in my measurement (Hillman 2017). The plethora of slim majorities and divided governments during my time-series might be indicative of the lack relationship between my two variables.

4.5: Implications and Conclusion

Throughout my analysis of public opinion on immigrants and its effect on legislative behavior I have shown that anti-immigrant sentiment has either maintained average levels among the states, has slightly decreased, or has slightly increased. A nearly equal number of states experienced steep declines in negative anti-immigrant sentiment as did those which experienced an increase in negative anti-immigrant sentiment. In measuring partisanship levels through bill cosponsorship, we noticed that the majority of states experienced large amounts of noise throughout the time-series measured. Some states experienced declines in partisanship levels while others maintained high partisan identities throughout the entirety of the measurement. When I broke down immigration legislation into benefit and enforcement legislation to determine a relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and the types of bills cosponsored, my results showed that there was little relation to be had. Many states which experienced declines in negative anti-immigrant sentiment showed no reciprocating rise in pro-immigrant legislation. Conversely, states which experienced an increase in negative-anti immigrant

¹⁸ <https://web.education.wisc.edu/nwhillman/index.php/2017/02/01/party-control-in-congress-and-state-legislatures/>, accessed 4/4/2019.

sentiment also correlated low levels of enforcement legislation. Overall, I was unable to accept my hypothesis, that an increase in negative anti-immigrant sentiment leads to a decrease in bipartisanship on immigration legislation as regression models indicated that there was little, if any, relationship between my two variables measured.

The implications of these results can add value to future scholarly research, raising key questions about democratic theory and public discourse towards immigration. Throughout my paper, many scholars have been cited showing relationships between constituents and congressional members. Most of the scholarship, however, did not link state-level survey data on anti-immigrant sentiment to legislative behavior on immigration bills. Further, many scholars focused on other parts of the legislative process, such as roll call votes, in determining their respective hypothesis. My research expanded upon limited interpretations of public opinion and congressional behavior and found intriguing results that bring into question whether Congress is actually listening to public discourse at the state level. Potentially, Congress may be ushering in their own agenda and expecting constituents to follow suit, creating a reversal of basic democratic ideals where now legislators control the narrative instead of the public. My research also brings questions to the ongoing scholarly debate of determining the proper approach to measuring partisanship in Congress. Overall, though increasing levels of negative anti-immigrant sentiment did not cause a decrease in bipartisanship in Congress, I still believe that there is a relationship associated between public discourse and elite legislative behavior on immigration.

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