

STRATEGIC PHILANTHROPY: THE FORD AND ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN GLOBAL REFORM

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of History

University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Stephanie M. Kelly

December, 2013

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Stephanie M. Kelly

APPROVED:

Thomas F. O'Brien, Ph.D.
Committee Chair

John Mason Hart, Ph.D.

Natalia Milanesio, Ph.D.

Lois Parkinson Zamora, Ph.D.
Departments of English, History, and Art

John Roberts, Ph.D.
Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the role of two of the most influential private U.S. foundations operating in Latin America during the post- World War II years, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation. The activities of these two foundations in Latin America are situated within a much broader global reform agenda promoted by the United States government that sought to modernize underdeveloped countries and integrate these economies into a global capitalist economic system led by the United States. Latin America would be the first regional testing ground for this agenda and, it was hoped, a model for reform in other regions of the world. The study focuses on the period between 1950 and 1975, when ideas about social and economic development drew upon a vast array of new social science literature and research that suggested the United States could direct the process of development in countries around the globe and prevent the instability inherent in the modernization process. It also examines the role of the foundations as private partners in this global mission and highlights the close collaborative efforts between the United States government and private actors in pursuit of foreign policy goals. The core of the analysis centers around foundation projects in university reform, building the social sciences, modernizing agriculture and controlling population growth and looks at the interplay between foundation officials and the Latin American elites with whom they collaborated. The outcomes of reform projects promoted by the foundations in Latin America were often determined by this interplay. Finally, the dissertation examines the long term significance of these projects initiated in the post war years in light of accelerating globalization and continued global instability.

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Introduction/Chapter One

"A New and Noble Adventure:" Strategic Philanthropy and Global Reform¹

Driving through Chile's central valley of Limari at end of the 20th century one could attest to the transformative nature of globalization. Gone are the subsistence and communal agricultural practices of the rural peasantry that existed for centuries, replaced by stretches of vineyards, fruit trees and packing houses that are part of a technology-intensive commercial farming system linked to the global agricultural system.² The dramatic changes that occurred in this valley have produced mixed results owing largely to the complex nature of agricultural modernization that creates both winners and losers.³ As Colombian economist Jaime Garcia Parra notes, "You must realize that agrarian reform destroys first and then creates."⁴ In the central valley of Chile the destruction of old structures of agricultural production and the creation of new, technology intensive production made peasant farming one of the casualties of modernization. Development theorists Denis Goulet argues that the process of development is simultaneously creative and destructive and necessarily contested.⁵ When North American reformers from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation venture into Latin America during the twentieth century to modernize the region the outcomes were just this: creative,

¹ The phrase "New and Nobel Adventure" is the title of the opening section of a report issued by The President's Task Force on International Education which describes the needed efforts to reform the educational systems of underdeveloped countries as part of an overall reform agenda. Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 10 (1411), folder: McPherson: International Education.

² for a discussion of the transformation of Chile's central valley from 1960 to 1990 see Robert N. Gwynne and Jorge Ortiz, "Export Growth and Development in Poor Rural Regions: a Meso-Scale Analysis of the Upper Limari," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 16:1 (1997), pp. 25-41.

³ for the impact of this transformation on various groups see Warwick E. Murray, "Competitive Global Fruit Export Markets: Marketing Intermediaries and Impacts on Small-Scale Growers in Chile," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (1997) 16:1, pp. 43-55 and Lovell S. Jarvis, "Changing Private and Public Roles in Technological Development: Lessons from the Chilean Fruit Sector," in Jock Anderson, Ed., *Agricultural Technology: Current Policy Issues for the International Community*, (Wallingford: CAB International, 1994).

⁴ Interview with Jaime Garcia Parra, March 29, 1995, cited in Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerdaun and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2008, p. 173.

⁵ Denis Goulet, "Development: Creator and Destroyer of Values," *World Development* (1992) 20:3, pp. 467-475.

destructive, and necessarily contested. The story of what happened in Chile's central valley and many other regions in Latin America is part of the larger story of how two North American philanthropic foundations partnered with the United States government in an attempt to integrate traditional economies and cultures into a modern global economy and how these activities intersected with domestic reformers in Latin American countries to accelerate globalization.

The activities of the Rockefeller and Ford foundations in Latin America during the post-World War II years are situated within a much broader global reform agenda promoted by both public and private organizations in United States. Though many of these organizations saw the development decade of the 1960s as a "new and noble adventure", the desire to bring American culture and values to the rest of the world has its roots in the 19th century. Determined to reform what were seen as backward nations in a way that would reinforce American economic and political hegemony, U.S. businesses and private groups such as Protestant missionaries ventured abroad during the late nineteenth century, especially to Latin America.⁶ By the 1950s, the forces that had been at work since the 19th century attempting to spread American values through exporting American institutions and technology to the rest of the world began to coalesce into a highly coordinated and broad agenda for social and economic reform in developing countries. Latin America would become a testing ground for this comprehensive project emanating from the United States which used development aid, both public and private, as a tool in remaking the less developed countries of the world and tying them into a global capitalist economy and culture.

The focus of this study is the period from 1950-1975, when ideas about social and economic development drew upon a vast array of new social science literature and involved comprehensive efforts to direct change at all levels of a society. Of course, attempts at social reform and economic

⁶ for a discussion of the relationship between the United States and Latin America in the 18th and 19th century, especially as it relates to the way the United States saw themselves as "missionaries of civilization," see Thomas F. O'Brien, *Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), p. 75-96.

development in other countries preceded the period this study covers. Indeed, the postwar years were but a continuation and expansion of a mission to Americanize the world.⁷ The efforts also continued after the great disillusionment with development projects that began in the 1970s, and they can still be seen today in various projects in the Middle East and Africa. But the 1950s and 1960s represented the ideology of development and global reform when it was most comprehensive in its application and when the partnership between the U.S. government and private foundations was at its apex.

This dissertation examines the activities of two of the most influential private foundations operating abroad, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation. Private initiatives in global reform coming from these foundations did not just add additional resources to U.S. government activities. They often provided intellectual justifications through their support of research, open doors in foreign countries that the government could not and were seen by many (though not all) as less politically motivated than the U.S. government. Though there would be other important partners in global reform, notably private businesses, universities and religious missionaries, none of them individually could match the breadth and complexity of projects that Ford and Rockefeller would initiate. Like the Protestant missionaries that preceded and inspired them, Rockefeller and Ford would venture into foreign lands bringing with them all the tools and scientific knowhow, as well as cultural biases, to modernize struggling nations.

The projects spanned from university development to agricultural modernization to population control and beyond. Each area targeted for reform was linked to another area in crucial ways. So, for example, while university reform and agricultural modernization were technically separate initiatives, agricultural modernization depended on research coming out of the universities which in turn depended on remaking the universities to become more research oriented. While the success of projects varied

⁷ For this idea see Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), O'Brien, *Making the Americas*, or David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

from field to field and country to country, I argue that the consequences of foundation activities in Latin America were much more significant than accomplishments in any one area in three ways. First, the institution building that was central to all of the projects, no matter the area, was successful in creating a general consensus about the role of technocrats in the government, thus institutionalizing the idea that science, not politics, should guide policy. This development of so-called "human capital" is probably the most significant accomplishment of the foundations, one that today continues to impact Latin American development. Above all else, this has had the most far-reaching effects, building on earlier investments. Second, foundation activities worked together to accelerate Latin America's integration into the global economy and a Western conception of modernity. The outcome of this process is difficult to assess, mostly because this process is not complete and in many ways still being contested. Development did occur, and where this occurred there were economic benefits, but the process of development was uneven and did not bring the majority of Latin Americans into the fold of a modern capitalist state. Along the way, the relationships between the United States and Latin American governments were transformed. It was a period of optimism on both sides about what collaboration between the regions could accomplish, but also of growing resentment over heavy-handed interventions into Latin American affairs by the U.S. government. Finally, these efforts at global reform reflected an ideology of development that emphasized collaboration between the state and private organizations, with the state planning and directing economic development. While at times the foundations sought private partners to work within their host countries, a large part of the reform agenda involved the state as a willing partner. This collaboration, involving the same type of partnerships that created economic prosperity and political stability in the United States in the early twentieth century, fell out of vogue by the 1980s when neoliberalism began dominating policy making in many Latin American countries. Yet today in Latin America we see the re-emergence of the type of state led development that existed during the years this study focuses on. The successes and failures of the

period can thus shed some light on the various models of development proposed in Latin America today, most of which see a more active role for the state.

While the global reform agenda this study explores was initiated and promoted by North Americans, reform in its various incarnations- development, modernization, progress- was promoted from within Latin American countries as well. Many of the same areas that the foundations became involved in, from the university system to agricultural, were targets of reform efforts by Latin American elites well before North American organizations became active in the process. When Rockefeller and Ford committed to a program of modernization in Latin America these domestic elites became crucial partners in putting their plans into action. The scope and intensity of the reform projects required committed and capable partners in Latin America as the process was meant to be a top-down approach to change, managed and led by educated and skilled individuals.⁸ The relationship between political and economic elites in Latin America and U.S. reformers often determined the outcome of the process. Where this relationship was good, reform efforts became more institutionalized, and where this relationship faltered, foundation goals were often frustrated. This relationship revolved around and was shaped by a number of factors including the offer of development aid, which often had strings attached, and the rising tide of nationalism in Latin America. These two factors sometimes combined to create tensions between reformers on both sides. While many of the domestic elites and politicians working with North American reformers shared similar views about how reform and modernization should proceed, Latin Americans resisted attempts by North Americans to call all the shots just because

⁸ These elites were quickly dubbed "technocrats" for the way they would use their technical expertise (and supposed scientific approach) to ground their policy and claim to take the politics out governing. While the incredible rise of technocrats through Latin America is one of the hallmarks of post war global reform, the claim to governance through scientific means was not new to Latin America, having its roots in the dissemination of positivist thought in the late nineteenth century (a point I will address further in the chapter).

they were the bankers, sometimes with foot dragging and other times with rejecting aid linked to specific demands.⁹

The very concept of development is one rife with cultural and ideological assumptions, and the concept of development *aid* carries with it additional complications.¹⁰ At its most basic, the concept of national development in the twentieth century included an increasing reliance on technology and industry for economic growth, infrastructure such as roads and power grids to support the growth and increasing levels of income, savings and literacy.¹¹ Development aid then was supposed to address these fundamental areas and provide the inputs necessary for countries to progress to modern, industrial states. The concept of development as it concerns foreign lands, however, dates well before the twentieth century when Western countries sought to "civilize" the non-white regions of the globe, bringing Christianity and Western culture to those groups they saw as savage and inferior. It was this strain of thought, grounded in Western superiority and North American Protestant thought, that informed the twentieth century mission to develop and reform other countries.

Twentieth century efforts at global reform added a new dimension to the process: development aid. The ideology of development aid which drove post-war projects for reform contained both progressive and reactionary impulses which created inherent contradictions in how development aid

⁹ For example, the Rector of Universidad de Chile, Juan Gómez Millas, famously rejected a U.S. government offer to train economists under a U.S. government contract. See Juan Gabriel Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Also see interview with Chilean economist Sergio Molina in which he says of U.S. aid to Chile, "Little by little, USAID became more demanding and the Chilean bureaucracy became more resistant," cited in Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerda and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, p. 100.

¹⁰ See Denis Goulet's discussion of the problems with the concept and terminology of development Goulet, "Development: Creator and Destroyer of Values."

¹¹ Barbara H. and Stanley J. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays in Economic Dependence in Perspective*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Stein and Stein defined an "underdeveloped" country as one plagued by primitive technology, low levels of income and savings, high levels of illiteracy, and having a "closed" system where heredity was the basis for advancement and not achievement. Development can also include changes in political structures to create a more egalitarian society, but these concerns were low priority in terms of what development aid targeted. Rising incomes, as opposed to expanded democracy, was suppose to eventually create more equality.

played out around the globe.¹² This ideology was too self-serving to be charity, yet not imposing enough to be tyranny. The paradoxes of development aid are perhaps best revealed in a statement by the Ford Foundation's international division, "the task in Latin America is 'modernization' more than 'development'."¹³ Was modernization not supposed to be a by-product of development? Was modernization qualitatively different than development? Certainly creating political stability and maintaining open markets was at the core, but global reform based on the development ideology went beyond this to promote cultural change meant to ensure Western approaches to science, technology, and economics dominated. What the United States hoped most to achieve with global reform was to create a consensus about economic and social problems that was situated in an American perspective, thus ensuring the solutions to problems that arose around the globe were handled in ways that were friendly to U.S. interests. The aim was not necessarily to replicate North American society by creating a thousand "shining cities upon a hill", but rather to make sure all nations shared basic assumptions about growth and stability that were grounded in classic liberal economic and political theory. This would ensure development proceeded along capitalist lines and that the upheavals caused by modernization would not result in a challenge to North American hegemony. Instability arising out of the modernization process was seen as a potential threat and development was the answer to that threat.

The first part of the twentieth century witnessed two world wars and a crushing economic depression that created global instability. The emergence of the Cold War and the nuclear weapons race threatened to make the second half of the twentieth century even more menacing. Most importantly, the anti-colonial movements of the early post-war period were producing new nations that were seen as ill equipped to handle their newfound freedom, and the one region that had been

¹² for a discussion of the ideology behind post-war development aid see Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Aid Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Sciences*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) and Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000).

¹³ Information Paper, "The Ford Foundation's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean," International Division, September, 1967, p.1.

independent of colonial rule for over a century, Latin America, was struggling to modernize. Latin America became the logical test case for global reform. The United States emerged from World War II positioned like no other nation to influence the direction of world affairs. For a short period the United States was the sole nuclear power, but more importantly, the U.S. economy, rather than laying in ruins like many countries in Europe, was ready to supply the world with the materials, capital, and technical expertise needed to rebuild the global political and economic structures. The United States seized upon this opportunity not just to help rebuild Europe, but to create a post-war global economic system that would create currency stability and position the U.S. as the leader of the capitalist world economy.

The core of this plan was hammered out in 1944 at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire where forty-four Allied nations met to decide the future of the global capitalist economy. The resulting agreement, known as the Bretton Woods System, pegged the value of participating nations' currencies to the U.S. dollar and included the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or today the World Bank) and the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade (GATT- precursor to the World Trade Organization). This system was meant to be the bedrock of the new global economy that functioned on the basis of currency stability and open markets. The three institutions together would provide guidelines and rules that governed the commercial and financial relations between nations and regulated the international monetary system. They would also, according to critics, set the parameters of what was possible and acceptable, thereby creating a powerful hegemonic system that primarily served the interest of the core Western nations, in particular the United States.¹⁴ The IMF, whose main job was to promote currency stability, and the World Bank, established to promote development and sustained investment in countries, would become important tools for North American reformers in their modernizing mission.

¹⁴ For a critical look at the Bretton Woods System and its institutions see Richard Peet, *Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank, and WTO*, (London: Zed Book, 2003) or Gerald Meier, "The Bretton Woods Agreement-Twenty-five Years After," *Stanford Law Review*, 23 (January, 1971), pp. 235-275.

John Maynard Keynes, the main architect of the Bretton Wood system, understood the missionary nature of what these institutions would undertake. Having created the charters for the institutions that would build the new international economy, Keynes ended the conference in Bretton Woods by remarking, "We have reached this evening a decisive point. But it is only the beginning. We have to go from here as missionaries, inspired by zeal and faith. We have sold all this to ourselves. But the world at large still needs to be persuaded."¹⁵

In addition to the Allied countries present at Bretton Woods, the United States government had many important domestic partners who helped facilitate "persuading" the world. Though not all of them agreed on domestic policy, they all believed in the mission to spread American economic and cultural ideals far and wide. These partners included an array of private citizens who supported state power as a means of advancing America's global hegemony and exhibited "state spirit." According to scholar Inderjeet Parmar, the Gramscian concept of "state spirit" led these private citizens to "take personally the concerns of the nation and state and to subordinate narrow economic and political interests to the broader, long-term interests of the state/nation as a whole."¹⁶ Whether business leaders, missionaries or academics, the private citizens that led efforts to modernize underdeveloped regions of the world often exemplified this "state spirit."

This study of strategic philanthropy will paint a broad picture of reform efforts by Ford and Rockefeller situated in the context of expanding American influence in global affairs and in attempts by various Latin American countries to create prosperous and more equitable nations. The analysis and theoretical underpinnings owe much to previous scholarship that took the study of foreign relations in new directions, reflecting the increasing awareness of the complexity of international relations and the importance of non-governmental actors in the process. In the 1980s, scholars began to link the private

¹⁵ Quoted in Roy Harrod, *The Life and Times of John Maynard Keynes*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1983, p. 583.

¹⁶ Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power*, (New York: Columbia Press, 2012), p. 23.

sphere and the public sphere where foreign policy was concerned and illuminate the shared interest between the two. Emily Rosenberg's *Spreading the American Dream* focuses on the evolving partnership between private enterprise and the American state in the first part of the twentieth century, examining how private business and foreign relations were inextricably linked as globalization accelerated.¹⁷ Part of this process, as Rosenberg points out, was cultural. Maintaining or building U.S. hegemony necessitated exporting American culture. According to Rosenberg, culture was not only a valid area of investigation for scholars of foreign relations, but an important one to properly explain the many facets of U.S. policy. Several studies after Rosenberg's work did just this. For example, in *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War* Reinhold Wagnleitner details how the U.S. government used culture, in this case American consumer culture, to unify Europe and align it with the U.S during the Cold War.¹⁸ Looking at non-governmental actors in Latin America, Thomas F. O'Brien in *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945* reveals how private businesses operating in Latin America in the first half of the twentieth-century attempted to "Americanize" Latin American business and work culture.¹⁹ Following this work the word "mission" became a new way to talk about America's role in global affairs.²⁰ It implies not just a sense of deliberateness, but also a level of planning and coordination that scholars in the 1980s were just beginning to examine. In recent scholarship the idea of an American mission abroad, whether economic, political, or cultural, has become widely accepted as a lens through which to interpret the larger process of globalization.²¹

This dissertation takes a similar frame of analysis as the above mentioned literature and applies it to the activities of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundation in Latin America during the second half of the

¹⁷ Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*.

¹⁸ Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the U.S. in Austria after the Second World War*, (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1994).

¹⁹ O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission*.

²⁰ In addition to O'Brien and Wagnleitner, Emily Rosenberg used the concept in her later book, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

²¹ The most recent examples of this being Thomas F. O'Brien, *Making the Americas*, David Ekbladh's *The Great American Mission* and Ian Tyrell's *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire*.

twentieth century, highlighting the shared interests between the foundations and the U.S. government and the mutual goal to spread American culture, inclusive of beliefs, ideas, and material culture, to the less developed countries of the world. Private philanthropic foundations were an ever present arm of U.S. foreign policy after World War II, but it wasn't until a general disillusionment with America's mission set in during the 1970s that scholarly attention to private foundations and their relationship to foreign policy increased. Early work on philanthropic foundations tended to be either written by former foundation officials or laudatory works that highlight the benevolence of philanthropy.²² Two seminal works marked a period of critical analysis of private foundations and their activities abroad. Robert Arnove's edited volume *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad* and Edward Berman's *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* uncovered the not-so altruistic motivations of major foundations and their role in helping to maintain American hegemony at the expense of developing countries. These early studies highlighted how foundation activity reinforced North American economic hegemony under the guise of development aid. Short discussions of major private foundations also began appearing in the expanding literature on U.S. foreign aid, suggesting the important ties between development aid and foundations.²³ By the 1990s the scale of foundation involvement in foreign policy through development aid was undeniable, and scholars began assessing country specific projects and revealing a more nuanced look at foundation activity.²⁴

²² see for example Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation* and Robert Bremner, *American Philanthropy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

²³ See Steve Weissman, *Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, (Ramparts Press, 1975), Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), and Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*.

²⁴ See for example two of the most important works in this regard Marcos Cueto, ed., *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) and Juan Gabriel Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). The most recent is Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*.

While a number of studies have looked at the role of foundations in specific fields of reform²⁵, few studies of foundations abroad have attempted to step back and analyze their diverse projects in relation to one another and as part of a larger comprehensive attempt at what might be called cultural colonization, or a process that targets social institutions as fundamental purveyors of knowledge and ideas in order to achieve cultural hegemony.²⁶ This study looks at one of the most important avenues in which cultural colonization takes root- institution building. The projects I've chosen to discuss, university reform, agriculture, the social sciences, and population control are linked together in a multitude of ways that support and reinforce one another in obvious and not so obvious ways. In addition, they all involve a level of institution building and state involvement in the development processes that is at the heart of post-war development aid.

Though I examine each area separately in its own chapter, I have provided a context for seeing them as part of the same broad agenda followed by the numerous public and private North American organizations working to accelerate development in Latin America. Indeed, each area was seen by foundation officials as being intricately tied to the other. This is how they would be judged as well, not just as individual achievement in one area, but by how much the "successes" contributed toward the ultimate goal. The pitfalls inherent in a study this broad (which examines multiple fields of reform in multiple countries) are many, but the value of understanding the interconnectedness of the various fields and how they were seen not as an end to themselves but as a means to a larger end warrants a study of this nature. Taken individually, the projects examined here had specific goals like increasing

²⁵ for examples of studies in specific fields see Cueto, *Missionaries of Science* for agriculture and medicine, in university reform see William Lee Magnusson, "Reform at the National University of Columbia (sic)," PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1970 and Daniel Levy, *To Export Progress: The Golden Age of University Assistance in the Americas*. On population control see Judith Nagelberg, "Promoting Population Policy: The Activities of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Population Council, 1959-1966," PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1985.

²⁶ In his most recent book, *Foundations of the American Century*, Inderjeet Parmar uses a Neo-Gramscian perspective to explain how the major foundations acted on behalf of the United States in order to maintain U.S. cultural and economic hegemony. This study uses a similar analytic framework to understand foundation projects in Latin America.

agricultural production, reducing the birth rate, training more social scientists and creating modern, research oriented universities. But these narrow goals obscure the much larger goal that linked all the projects together. North American reformers, more specifically U.S. government and foundation officials, wanted to transform Latin American countries into societies that embraced free markets, republican political culture, an individual ethos, and a consumer culture that coveted the products of the industrial age.²⁷ Furthermore, they wanted to build a consensus on how to define and address the problems of the industrial age. This would ensure hemispheric stability and would integrate Latin America into a global economy and culture that was led by the United States.

Today one can see both the success and failures of these attempts. Latin America is more integrated into the global economy than ever before, yet this integration is highly contested. The anti-globalization movements of the twenty-first century and the left leaning nature of many Latin American governments since the turn of the century suggests not all in Latin America benefitted from the rapid advancement of globalization. In addition, an examination of these reform efforts in Latin America can provide some clues as to why the turn of the century marked a new period of contestation of American hegemony. Latin Americans from various countries engaged with U.S. development aid (and continue to do so) in a complex manner. They simultaneously resisted and accommodated various development projects promoted by North Americans. Views of modernization and the means to that end were highly contested in a region struggling to compete with the industrialized economies of western European and North America. Competing visions of how to achieve a modern, independent economy meant a consensus was hard to come by, thus creating myriad responses to offers of North American assistance. Though conceptions of modernization embraced by Latin American elites often aligned with those of North American reformers, development assistance was often complicated by the historically heavy-handed and patronizing interventions in Latin American affairs by the United States government. In

²⁷ This point is made in O'Brien, *Making of the Americas*, p. 5.

addition, Latin American reformers envisioned a role for the state that was sometimes at odds with what North American reformers wanted. The most significant example of this involved Latin America's embracement of the doctrine of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) after the 1930s, which involved state led policies to protect and foster domestic industries in order to accelerate industrialization and lessen their reliance on exporting.²⁸ While North American reformers believed the state should take a leading role in development, they also saw the statism of Latin American countries as troubling, preferring instead to emphasize making the export sector more productive, efficient and responsive to market demands. Adding to those tensions, the popular classes in Latin America often resisted the elitist nature of the modernization projects and frustrated domestic politicians and technocrats in their reform efforts.

The Historical Roots of Development and Global Reform in the Americas

In his recent book *The Americas: A Hemispheric History*, Felipe Fernández-Armesto states "The modern story of the Americas is one of transition from north-on-south to south-on-north dependency. At the heart of that story is the late emergence-against the long-run of history- of a hegemonic state, which became a superpower, in the north."²⁹ For the majority of the past one could not speak of a "developed" North America and an "underdeveloped" South America because the opposite was true. The developed economies and societies of the pre-colonial period were located in present day Mexico (Aztec Empire) and the Andean region (Inca Empire), and the inhabitants of North America lagged far behind their southern counterparts in terms of economic and cultural development.³⁰ Conquest and globalization would change all this. Europeans who came to make their fortunes in what was

²⁸ for a short history of ISI in Latin America see Werner Baer, "Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 7 No. 1 (Spring, 1972), pp. 95-122.

²⁹ Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *The Americas: A hemispheric History*, New York: Modern Library, 2003, p.57.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, for a complete and updated version of the Americas before Columbus see Charles C. Mann, *1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus*, (New York: Knopf, 2005).

considered virgin land free for the taking brought with them a host of diseases to which the native inhabitants of the Americas had little resistance. The great American empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, so powerful at their peak but plagued with the type of disunity that accompanies vast empires, crumbled in the face of disease and European steel.³¹ In North America, the lack of densely settled populations and established indigenous empires made for a more complete ethnic cleansing, though centuries would pass before this was accomplished. The sixteenth century then marks one of those transition periods in history for the Western Hemisphere in more ways than one, yet the South would remain for quite some time more developed (in terms of large cities and economic activity) and populated than North America as Spanish and Portuguese rule spread to new areas.

The Spanish colonies would outpace early British and French colonies in North America for the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century. Through the 18th century Spain's empire in Central and South America produced an economy far larger than that of the British colonies in North America. Culturally too, the educational institutions and cultural productions in the arts were superior to those of North America. However, the economic and social institutions particular to Spanish colonialism planted the seeds for later development problems in the national period and beyond.³² The British colonies in North America had developed largely under a colonial policy of salutary neglect where there was less state control which fostered individual initiative. The Spanish colonies, however, remained under tight economic control by the Spanish authorities, directing most economic activity to benefit Spain. In their classic work on the roots of development problems in Latin America, Stanley and Barbara Stein identify certain factors in the colonial period that bear primary responsible for the

³¹ See Mathew Restall, *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Restall argues for the primacy of disease, steel, native disunity, and the culture of war in examining why the conquest was successful.

³² For a comparative work on British and Spanish colonialism that discusses the similarities and divergences see J.H. Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

underdevelopment of the region in later centuries³³. The Steins implicate the export oriented economies and the large landed estates such as the hacienda and the plantation in laying the foundations for underdevelopment. The great landed estates, that developed first in response to local markets then in response to global demand, not only reinforced feudal-like social relations but also created entrenched land-owning based political power in many regions.³⁴ Thus, by the time of independence Central and South America's land tenure system did not resemble the free-holder society that had developed in North America. The peasant agriculture system in many Latin American countries that continued after independence would pose a challenge for national development.

Free from the monopolistic trade arrangements under colonialism, but starved for capital and plagued with what was considered inefficient modes of production, Latin America countries looked for a model of development that would propel the region to prosperity. This search brought about a struggle between competing groups in Latin America over how best to organize their new nations. War and the rise of powerful regional caudillos consumed the decades immediately following independence and complicated the transition from colony to nation for many regions of Latin America. As the debates over political structures and economic policies took shape, two competing political parties emerged. The Conservatives sought continuity with colonial rule in terms of social structure and the power of the Catholic Church. The liberals rejected the absolutism of colonial rule and, drawing inspiration from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, attacked monarchical structures and Church privilege. Drawn to the ideas of free trade, a limited representative government, and individual liberty, Liberals sought to promote economic development through trade liberalization and foreign investment. In truth, the degree to which Conservatives resisted the opening of trade and markets was more in rhetoric than in

³³ Stein and Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America*.

³⁴ For a discussion of this process see Nils Jacobsen, *Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano 1780-1930*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

practice, for their economic policies were often quite similar to Liberals in terms of embracing foreign investment and free markets.³⁵

In North America the 19th century was a period of industrialization and impressive economic growth, catapulting the United States onto to global stage as a world power by the end of the century. Due to the establishment of a large class of yeoman farmers and middle-class merchants and the constant availability of new land that served as a pressure release for the white landless population, the United States experienced a relatively easy transition from colony to nation. The Civil War ended the South's reliance on slave labor and empowered small farmers and industrialists in the North. Of course, the phenomenal growth the United States experienced in the late nineteenth century was made possible by the almost complete eradication of the indigenous population and the subjugation of the black population. This experienced informed their initial views of both the Western part of the country, where they fought native Indians and Mexicans to take the land, and of Latin America. North Americans saw the non-white populations of the Western United States and of Latin America as racially, religiously and culturally inferior to the Anglo-Saxon Protestant population of North America. The initial relationship between the U.S. and Latin America was shaped by these views.

Economic expansion through trade and investment grew exponentially after the Civil War and took precedence, if only momentarily, over territorial expansion. As the needs of big business increasingly dictated domestic and foreign policy in the United States, Latin America became more important. While securing the needed protective tariffs to ensure their industries grew at home, North American companies sought to grow abroad by getting other countries to lower or eliminate tariffs for goods and commodities. The ascendancy of Liberal regimes throughout Latin America by the late nineteenth century, though by no means universal, would prove a fortunate turn of events for American

³⁵ see Lowell Gudmundson and Héctor Lindo-Fuentes, *Central America, 1821-1871: Liberalism before Liberal Reforms*, (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995) and Paul Gootenberg, *Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

businessmen in this regard. So too would the way in which the liberal doctrine was being transformed by Latin American elites from an egalitarian doctrine based on guaranteed liberties and free trade economics into one increasingly concerned with centralized control and limiting popular participation.

It was during the late 19th century that the precursors to the Latin American technocrats of the post-World War II period emerged. In attempt to develop their countries, many nineteenth century Latin American elites and intellectuals embraced an ideology known as Positivism. This 19th century theory elucidated by French theoretician Aguste Comte "held that the world was rationally ordered with laws of social development and interaction that might be discovered by rational thought and study."³⁶ According to Positivist thought, particularly important to the development of a nation were the ideas of order and progress. From order came progress, which sometimes required the curtailment of individual liberty for the benefit of society as a whole. The doctrine also held that the application of scientific solutions to national problems is best carried out by an elite group of skilled and educated men. The influence of Positivism was significant in many countries, but especially in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile.³⁷ Bureaucrats espousing positivist thought, known as *científicos*, championed many modernizing reforms such as those in education but also justified elite rule based on dismissing the liberal doctrine of popular sovereignty as opening the door to anarchy. The Latin American technocrats that would lead post-war modernization shared much in common with these earlier *científicos* that guided development in the

³⁶ Miguel Jorrín and John D. Martz, *Latin American Political Thought and Ideology*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), p. 122.

³⁷ for an examination of the influence of Positivist thought in Latin America see Ralph Lee Woodward, ed., *Positivism in Latin America, 1850-1900: Are Order and Progress Reconcilable?*, (Lexington: DC Heath and Company, 1971). For Mexico see Charles Hale, *The Transformation of Liberalism in Late-Nineteenth Century Mexico*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) or Leopoldo Zea, *Positivism in Mexico*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974). For Brazil see Ronald Schneider, *Order and Progress: A Political History of Brazil*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). For Peru see Paul Gootenberg, "Order[s] and Progress in Developmental Discourse: The Case of Nineteenth Century Peru," in Eduardo Posada-Carbó, ed., *In Search of a New Order: Essays on the Politics and Society of Nineteenth-Century Latin America*, (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998), and for Chile see Thomas Bader, "Early Positivist Thought and Ideological Conflict in Chile," *The Americas*, 26:4 (April 1970), pp. 376-393.

late nineteenth century, most significantly the belief in the application of science to solve social, political, and economic problems.³⁸

As nineteenth century Latin American elites began developing their visions for development and modernization, the United States was busy becoming a global empire. With this empire building the United States was developing a sense of its own greatness due to its exceptional development. The feelings of racial and cultural superiority that permeated American society quickly manifested into a missionary impulse to share with the world the religious and cultural values that Americans had embraced. This led to explicit efforts at reforming those societies that Americans came into contact with and that were perceived to be inferior to the United States. At the start of the twentieth century the United States began to embrace the idea of technocratic governance based on scientific principles. Progressive Era reformers believed that economic instability and social problems could be solved through new technologies, an emphasis on efficiency and the application of scientific thought to social problems. The belief that humanity had the capabilities to make society not just more prosperous, but more just pervaded American society at the turn of the century, and many sought to export these ideas to foreign lands. Often this missionary impulse went hand-in-hand with an aggressive foreign policy that solidified U.S. domination in the Western Hemisphere through raw force. This raw force was justified with paternalistic claims that U.S. intervention and occupation were a civilizing and modernizing force in Latin America.³⁹ Protestant missionaries and organizations like the YMCA were often operating

³⁸ For two works that connect the post war technocrats with late nineteenth century and early twentieth century reformers see Frank Safford, *The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia's Search for a Technical Elite*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976) and Pamela Suzanne Murray, "Forging a Technocratic Elite: A History of the Escuela Nacional de Minas of Medellín, 1887-1970," PhD Dissertation, Tulane University, 1990.

³⁹ For an examination of the cultural, religious, and racial justifications of various occupations see Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) and Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

in the very countries that became U.S. colonies or saw a strong U.S. business presence in an effort to bring moral reform in addition to political and economic dominance.⁴⁰

The dawn of the twentieth century saw the United States government become more involved in this missionary impulse as the need to consolidate and justify its newly acquired empire emerged. In addition, as U.S. businesses were expanding their operations into more and more countries the U.S. government was forced to take a more activist role in guiding and defending this commercial expansion, becoming what Emily Rosenberg calls the "promotional state."⁴¹ The emergence of the promotional state also coincided with a period of major interventions into Latin American affairs and U.S. government programs to modernize and reform countries like Haiti, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, and Cuba.⁴² Whether it was due to a formal occupation by the U.S. military or a major expansion of U.S. business operations, the increasing American presence in Latin America in the early twentieth century was supplemented by a host of private organizations such as religious groups, educational institutions and philanthropic foundations, all with the goal of reforming, in one way or another, their host countries. It was in this context, with Progressive Era ideas of the perfectibility of society and America's rise as a global power, that the large philanthropic foundations are born. They were in almost every regard a product of the time.

Meanwhile, population growth and rapid urbanization in Latin America was placing strains on economies that had failed to develop an industrial base sufficient to meet these challenges. Though limited industrial development and high commodity prices had produced healthy economic growth, they had also laid bare the inherent problems in the modernization process. In 1950 a new paradigm for

⁴⁰ for a discussion of Protestant missionaries and the YMCA as "moral reformers" supporting American imperialism see Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire*. Also see Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, pp. 28-33.

⁴¹ Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 38-62.

⁴² for an examination of the U.S. presence in these countries see Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti*, Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule*, and Louis A. Pérez Jr., *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

understanding Latin American development and accelerating industrialization emerged in academic and political circles. In 1948 the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or CEPAL for the Spanish acronym) was founded under the auspices of the United Nations to identify economic trends and address problems using a Latin American perspective. Under its director Raúl Prebisch, CEPAL promoted Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) as a way for Latin American countries to industrialize and become more self-sufficient and less dependent on damaging fluctuations in commodity prices. Far from radical, ISI as a means of achieving full industrialization was the basis for development in the United States and many Western European countries.⁴³ And much like the Positivist approach of the late 19th century, ISI was a state led policy of development that relied on a growing group of skilled and trained elite, now dubbed "technocrats," to apply scientific knowledge to national problems.

As Latin American countries employed ISI to varying degrees and with varying success, the U.S. government and private organizations, responding to the post-war instability in Latin America, initiated the most comprehensive reform project yet. The development paradigm North American reformers embraced during this period shared the same elitist worldview that many Latin American reformers held, and this provided a certain amount of convergence between plans for development. However, the paradigm adopted by North American reformers also contained particular ethnocentric components conditioned by the history of U.S.- Latin American relations and the development history of United States. One of the overarching goals for North American reformers was to create a global consensus on how to view development problems and thus a consensus on how to attack them. The ethnocentrism of the development paradigm made building a consensus more difficult, but if a consensus could be reached in a region as large and diverse as Latin America then the United States would have a model for the rest of the developing world.

⁴³ Baer, "Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America."

Structure of the Study

The focus of this study is foundation activity in Latin America during the post-World War II years with specific attention paid to four main areas of involvement: efforts to reform the system of higher education, modernize agriculture, build the social sciences and reduce population growth. Though both Ford and Rockefeller dabbled in areas outside these main fields, the majority of money and effort was spent on these "pillars of modernization." Thus, the chapters are organized thematically not chronologically to address these four areas. It is my intent, however, to highlight the interrelatedness of each area to the other to show just how broad and complex the project of reform was during this period. It also my objective to demonstrate how closely foundation projects aligned with the objectives of the United States government where Latin America was concerned, further dispelling the myth that these foundations were apolitical and independent.⁴⁴ The level of cooperation and coordination was so omnipresent as to be taken for granted by North American reformers much of the time. Though cognizant of Ford and Rockefeller being separate entities from the U.S. government, Latin American reformers understood the connections. Chilean statesman Ruy Barbosa described the relationship as such, "The Rockefeller Foundation was always looked at as a completely independent entity in Chile. Nevertheless, in all these things the State nexus existed, so we always had access...the same connecting strands to the United States existed."⁴⁵ For Latin Americans this separate but connected existence proved useful as the foundations had the outward appearance of being separate and thus did not provoke the degree of nationalist opposition that U.S. government agencies did. A final objective of the study is to explore the crucial relationship between North American reformers and Latin American elites and the degree which their agenda for development and modernization aligned with one another.

⁴⁴ This has most recently been addressed in Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*. Parmar only spends one chapter on Latin America, examining the role of the foundations in the field of economics in Chile.

⁴⁵ Interview with Ruy Barbosa, March 18, 1995, cited in Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerdau and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2008), p. 44.

Chapter two begins with the antecedents to post-war global reform, describing the factors that gave rise to the belief in social engineering and detailing the rise of important private philanthropic foundations. During the first half of the twentieth-century private wealth created large foundations in the United States in an effort to solve the persistent problems of labor unrest and poverty. In a land of plenty such problems belied the idea that capitalism was a system that benefited everyone. These years marked an increasing amount of cooperation between the government and the large foundations and established the technocratic and elite driven approach to social reform that became the hallmark of projects in later years. This chapter aims to highlight the continuity in government and foundation thinking on development from their earliest foray into overseas development to the massive expansion of this area after World War II and in response to the Cold War. While development theories emerging in the 1950s, particularly Modernization Theory, provided a lens through which to see third world development, this lens was only a manifestation of the traditional-versus-modern dichotomies of development projects that began much earlier.⁴⁶ The modernization paradigm impacted development projects in some obvious ways that reflected the particular time period, but the paradigm also reflected long-standing conceptions about development that had their roots in what Louis Hartz called "the liberal tradition in America."⁴⁷ American exceptionalism drove development ideals because in the United States development and progress was relatively easy and generally avoided the radical tendencies of other revolutions. This historical experience led to more than a few flawed assumptions about third world development.

In chapter three I begin my analysis of projects with foundation efforts to remake the university system in Latin America. Universities and research institutions were the most important social institutions in the process of cultural colonization. The foundations would make use of the U.S. government's massive post-war buildup of the American university system, and together they would

⁴⁶ See Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future* and Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*.

⁴⁷ See Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World*.

employ thousands of American university professors and researchers to apply their expertise to Latin American development. Reform in Latin American countries depended on creating a technocratic elite to guide countries through the process, and the universities and research institutions were the center of knowledge production in modern society. In one sense foundations felt all other changes would come from creating a university system modeled after the system in the United States. The problems with agriculture, governance, high fertility, and poverty could all be solved with increased attention to scientific research and experimentation in these areas and the technocratic application of reform based on this research. The university system would be the engine of reform and modernization, providing the trained people needed to lead and manage a modern economy. This approach took for granted that problems and solutions would be easily identified based on shared economic and cultural assumptions. However, university reform in Latin America had a history long before the foundations became involved, and Latin American visions for reform often collided with that of North American reformers. Even where there was consensus about reform, the realities of implementing changes produced mixed results at best.

Chapter four discusses foundation efforts to modernize the agricultural sector of Latin America. During the early to mid-twentieth century the Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in agricultural modernization spurred a Green Revolution in Mexico which increased crop yield and productivity. This chapter examines the continuation and expansion of these efforts during the second half of the twentieth century, when Rockefeller was joined by Ford and others in the mission to modernize Latin American agriculture. Following Rockefeller's success in Mexico, the United States government, especially after the creation of U.S. AID, dramatically increased resources devoted to agricultural reform overseas. Increasing productivity through the introduction of scientific farming methods, new technologies and the establishment of agricultural research centers was seen as the answer to agricultural problems throughout the underdeveloped world. In addition, the transfer of scientific

knowledge was seen as the solution to the highly politicized issue of land reform in Latin America. Rockefeller and Ford felt most comfortable with this approach because it fit within the broader ideological assumptions about capitalist development and modernization that privileged increased efficiency over any type of redistribution of land. North American reformers believed agricultural reform was needed to ensure cheap food prices for emerging industrial workers as modernization progressed. Universities, and especially research institutions, were crucial to not just research on crop yields but to extension efforts aimed at disseminating new methods and technologies to farmers. However, the overly simplistic solutions to the issue of agricultural development pushed by the foundations did little to solve the persistent problems with the unequal distribution of land and the plight of the small farmer.

Chapter five looks at the role of the social sciences in the process of global reform. The social sciences became increasingly important to technocratic states in the twentieth century as a tool for describing, diagnosing, and hopefully preventing social unrest and instability. Major American foundations were indispensable to developing the social sciences and promoting their usefulness in government policy making in the United States. Seeking to apply this same type of utility to development problems in Latin America, Ford and Rockefeller began building up the social sciences in Latin American universities. The disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology received the most attention as these disciplines were essential for managing social change and understanding instability. The examination of this component to global reform focuses on the ideological nature of the social sciences and the ways in which these fields could facilitate the promotion of the reform agenda and American values. Key to the process of development in the eyes of North American reformers was the promotion of theories in the social sciences that reinforced free-market principles in economics and stressed political moderation over radical politics.

The final component to reform, population control, is examined in chapter six. Foundations believed that programs in agriculture and university reform would accelerate economic growth and contribute to rising standards of living for the majority of the people. However high rates of population growth in Latin American countries exacerbated many of the problems that foundation grants and programs tried to solve, especially in agriculture. Creating a middle-class revolution that would benefit the majority of Latin Americans and de-radicalize politics depended heavily on keeping population growth in check. While the need to curb population growth in Latin America was a recognized issue among U.S. policy makers, the sensitive nature of the issue in a largely Catholic region meant the foundations would take the lead in opening doors to projects in this area. When medical breakthroughs in limiting fertility proved inadequate in the cultural climate of Latin American countries, the foundations looked to the social sciences and to grassroots organizations to promote family planning as one way to obtain economic security and "do your part for your country." Like efforts to improve agricultural productivity, projects in population control were channeled through research centers and universities in order to build institutions supportive of family planning and promote the issue within the government. However, foundations also found it necessary to support grassroots organizations to bring about a popular acceptance of family planning and to "institutionalize" it on a cultural level.

In the conclusion I look at the various outcomes in relation to the overall goals. The immediate goal was modernization, not necessarily development. This implied there could be a faster, easier, less messy path to solving the problems that caused political and economic instability, a non-revolutionary path. The various areas of reform each had their own outcomes, for example population control was more successful than university reform measured against the foundation's own objectives, but they also impacted each other in ways that were unexpected. A long-term goal was the development of a consensus on economic and political development that was rooted in the experience of the United States through the building of social institutions that would disseminate that consensus and thus fully

integrate Latin American economies into the global, capitalist economy. The concluding chapter examines the extent to which this was successful and what the impact of this unprecedented effort in Latin America meant for the world. Finally, the conclusion examines the debates about the role of the state in national development, both during the period of the study and today, seeking to examine the impact of past development paradigms on current ideas of development.

Chapter Two

From Progressivism to Modernization: Foundations and Social Engineering

During the early to mid-twentieth century large philanthropic foundations in the United States, imbued with an abiding belief in the ability of social engineering to ameliorate the worst effects of industrialization on the lower classes, ventured into less developed countries around the globe to apply newly found ideas of scientific philanthropy. The idealism of American foundations in their global reform efforts was rooted in the successful application of technocratic planning and scientific philanthropy to problems of instability in the United States during the early twentieth century and into the New Deal. The end of the nineteenth century in the United States saw the rise of labor militancy and political movements that threatened the system of corporate capitalism. The appeal of radical solutions to the problems of the industrial age manifested itself in a variety of ways, from the popularity of Edward Bellamy's socialist utopian novel *Looking Backward* published in 1887 to the rise of the Populist Party in the 1890s. Not coincidentally, large charitable foundations, and specifically the general purpose foundation, emerged in the United States during the tumultuous decades straddling the 19th and 20th century. Founded by wealthy industrialists and financiers, general purpose foundations were a response to the instability of late 19th century laissez-faire capitalism, and they strove to bring order and stability to society through social engineering. Often referred to by scholars as a "genuine American invention", the general purpose foundation would become a conduit for private wealth to affect social reform in the 20th century at home and abroad while reducing new federal tax burdens on their founders.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ most recently this was stated in Oliver Zunuz's *Philanthropy in America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), but it can also be found in earlier works on American philanthropy including Robert Arnove, ed. *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at home and abroad*, (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980), Robert

This chapter will examine the antecedents to philanthropic activities in Latin America in the post-World War II years and the growing cooperation in both domestic and foreign policy between the U.S. government and private foundations by tracing the evolution of large private foundations during the first part of the twentieth century. Many of the ideological assumptions and approaches to reform that foundations applied to Latin America after World War II had their genesis in the changing ideas about government intervention in the economy, American power, and philanthropy in early 20th century America. As I will show, these assumptions and approaches had changed very little when Rockefeller and Ford embarked on an ambitious mission to modernize Latin America. To make sense of the mutually beneficial relationship between large private foundations and the government during the period this study focuses on, it is necessary to examine the many ways in which they worked together in domestic reform and analyze their shared worldview with regards to global reform. The development ideology embraced by both the United States government and private foundations like Rockefeller and Ford is best summed up by scholar Emily Rosenberg's phrase "liberal-developmentalism." According to Rosenberg, "liberal-developmentalism merged nineteenth-century liberal tenets with the historical experience of America's own development, elevating the beliefs and experiences of America's unique historical time and circumstances into development laws thought to be applicable everywhere."⁴⁹ This worldview held that governments should support the full development of the free enterprise system through the promotion of capital investment in export industries and the development of areas vital to growth such as transportation, communication, education and banking, among others.⁵⁰ The faith in this path to modernity linked America's past to the blueprints for global reform in the twentieth century.

Bremmer, *American Philanthropy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, and Richard Magat, *Unlikely Partners: Philanthropic Foundations and the Labor Movement*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

⁴⁹ Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 7.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

The Gilded Age's paradox of unprecedented wealth accumulation alongside the growing economic insecurity of an impoverished working class exposed the flaws of laissez-faire capitalism and led to rising tensions and violence between labor and capital. By the dawn of the twentieth century the impulse for moderate reform was gaining traction against the backdrop of radical challenges to the capitalist system. Though the Populist Party had fractured and disintegrated as a national party by 1900 and labor had been effectively repressed, the conditions that gave rise to these challenges persisted. The myriad responses to this instability launched what is known as the Progressive Era, a period of two decades of social and economic reform that sought to smooth out the rough edges of Gilded Age capitalism using science and rational thinking as a guide. The impetus for this reform came from many corners, from political elites who claimed to be the "steward of the people," to intellectuals who would promote social engineering to theologians and ministers who would link Christianity with social reform. Intellectuals like Walter Lippmann in his book *Drift and Mastery* proclaimed that humans could apply science and rationality to government to reduce and potentially eliminate the social problems brought on by industrialization.⁵¹ Baptists ministers like Walter Rauschenbusch, who had worked in the poorest parts of New York City and seen poverty and its consequences up close, urged fellow Christians to put Christian idealism into practice through actions that would uplift the lower classes into middle class respectability.⁵² It didn't take long before the notion that government could and should take a more active role in directing social and economic reform prevailed.⁵³ As the idea of laissez-faire gave way to social engineering private organizations joined the growing number of intellectuals, ministers and politicians who sought to create a more just and stable system. Large philanthropic foundations were born in this climate.

⁵¹ Walter Lippmann with introduction by William E. Leuchtenburg, *Drift and Mastery*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).

⁵² Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, (New York: Macmillan, 1907).

⁵³ For a look at how the Progressive Era embraced the idea of scientific management to ameliorate social ills see Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1880-1920*, (Chicago, 1964).

Particularly important to the emergence of the general purpose foundations and their eventual vision for global reform were the ideas emanating from the Social Gospel movement which advocated for the application of the Protestant faith and missionary zeal to solving the social problems plaguing the country. The movement helped justify social and economic reforms on religious principles, but also contained strong undercurrents of Protestant Anglo-Saxon superiority. Applied to domestic reform the Social Gospel sought to uplift immigrant populations and non-white populations of the American West specifically by schooling them in the Protestant faith and work ethic. Applied to the growing overseas missionary movement, the Social Gospel promoted the idea of spreading American Anglo-Saxon culture to the rest of the world.⁵⁴ One of the movement's most prominent spokespersons, Josiah Strong, implored American Protestants to missionize the American West and beyond, arguing in his book *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis*, "This [Anglo-Saxon] race is destined to dispossess many weaker ones, assimilate others, and mold the remainder, until, in a very true and important sense, it has Anglo-Saxonized mankind."⁵⁵ Though philanthropic foundations would emerge first in response to domestic problems, it would not be long before they ventured overseas to apply a secular version of Strong's vision and "mold" foreign populations in the image of their American benefactor.

From Charity to Social Engineering: The Emergence of Strategic Philanthropy

Various factors contributed to the emergence of a more rationalized and systematized type of charity in the United States beginning in the late nineteenth century, but wealth accumulation at an unprecedented level, the rise of scientific approaches to business management, and changing ideas

⁵⁴ For an examination of how the Progressivism and the Social Gospel was employed by the YMCA overseas see Jun Xing, *Baptized in the Fire of Revolution: The American Social Gospel and the YMCA in China: 1919-1937*, (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1996).

⁵⁵ Josiah Strong, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis*, (New York: Baker and Taylor Publishing, 1893).

about social progress were chief among them.⁵⁶ The great amounts of wealth amassed by men such as John D. Rockefeller, Russell Sage, Andrew Carnegie, Andrew Mellon, and others far outpaced the ability to spend on conspicuous consumption and cried out for a legacy to mitigate the negative image of the "robber baron". While charitable giving had always been a part of the religious tradition of American elites, the most successful millionaires sought a more systematic way of disposing of their great wealth that would contribute to ameliorating the problems of American capitalism that led to class tensions.⁵⁷ Motivated by more than just altruism or image cleansing, men like Carnegie and Rockefeller wanted to have the same type of transformative impact in their philanthropy that they had in their respective industries.⁵⁸

The Gilded Age industrialists who spearheaded the concept of scientific philanthropy, or the rationalization of charity through the application of rules and broad social goals in charitable giving, would be influenced in their ideas by the rise of scientific approaches applied to the business world. Alongside the changes in social relations brought about by the industrial revolution, the growth of large corporations and the increased complexity of the market economy require new methods of management. No longer could family run businesses rely on simple forms of management, bookkeeping, and marketing if they wanted to compete with larger companies that were developing numerous ways to increase the efficiency of their industries. The application of systematic and scientific methods to business management came from industrialist like Andrew Carnegie and industrial

⁵⁶ Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*, p. 4.

⁵⁷ The interest of the private sector in creating stability in the labor market through investigation on industrial relations is seen especially in the early work of the Rockefeller Foundation in their grant making to set up the National Bureau of Economic Research and the at the Russell Sage Foundation, responsible for funding the seminal "Pittsburgh Study".

⁵⁸ for discussions of the motives that drove Rockefeller and Carnegie in their philanthropy see Ben Whitaker, *The Philanthropoids: Foundations and Society*, (New York: William Morrow, 1974), chapter 2, and Joel L. Fleishman, *The Foundation: A Great American Secret: How Private Wealth is Changing the World*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), chapter 1, Robert Bremner, *American Philanthropy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), chapter 7, or for a neo-Marxist interpretation see Edward Berman, *The influence of Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), chapter 1.

consultants like Fredrick Winslow Taylor. Carnegie's contributions to management techniques in large corporations, including a focus on vertical integration and cost control, made him one of America's richest men by the early twentieth century. But it was Frederick Winslow Taylor who revolutionized the business management field with his theories on scientific management.⁵⁹ "Taylorism," as his approach would be called, focused on increasing the efficiency and output of industrial production by scientifically analyzing each stage in the production process to standardize the most productive techniques. Both Carnegie and Taylor symbolized the new modern approach to business management that relied heavily on the application of scientific investigation to industrial production. This focus on increased efficiency and science would soon be the basis for the new philanthropy.⁶⁰

The concept of scientific philanthropy was also significantly shaped by a shift in thinking about the ability of humans to control and manage social progress. As the ideologies of the Gilded Age, which viewed social inequalities as a natural and therefore justifiable product of biological differences, gave way to a new era of social reform, philanthropy would take on a new purpose.⁶¹ Even those who opposed the expansion of the state for the purposes of social and economic planning saw potential in social science investigation and research for creating a more stable society.⁶² Philanthropists like John D. Rockefeller, Russell Sage, and Andrew Carnegie, while generally anti-statist, nonetheless developed

⁵⁹ See Taylor's theory in Frederick Winslow Taylor, *The Principle of Scientific Management*, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1911), also see monographs about Taylor in Daniel Nelson, *Frederick W. Taylor and the Rise of Scientific Management*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980) and Robert Kanigel, *The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency*, (New York, Viking Press, 1997).

⁶⁰ For a discussion of the concept of efficiency and its impact on economic and social development see Jennifer Karns Alexander, *The Mantra of Efficiency: From Waterwheel to Social Control*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008).

⁶¹For a look at the bureaucratic rationalization of the Progress Era see Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), for different interpretations of the Progressive Era see Steven J. Diner, *A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916* (New York, 1963), Allen F. Davis, *Spearheads for Reform: The Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement, 1890-1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

⁶² See for example Guy Alchon's analysis of the rise of the technocratic state in *The Invisible Hand of Planning: Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s*,(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

an abiding belief in the potential of social engineering and would use their wealth to pursue what historian Guy Alchon called the "techno-corporatist state," or a process in which "national management was to be achieved not by an enlarged government but by one contained and redirected toward the creation of public roles for technically informed private authorities."⁶³ Central to this type of system was the rethinking of the role of charitable organizations in society, from alms-givers to problem solvers.

The idea of creating a more systematic approach to charity had its genesis in charitable organizations operating during the second half of the nineteenth century. After the Civil War civic leaders and elites attempted to systematize private charity by establishing rules that would govern relief giving and by creating central clearing houses (called Charity Organization Societies) that would determine who was worthy of relief and who was not.⁶⁴ Society could then distinguish between the "deserving poor" and mere imposters who did not deserve assistance. By the end of the nineteenth century philanthropists big and small "took the 'do's' and don'ts' -especially the latter-handed down from generations of charity reformers, organized them into a comprehensive system of rules, and applied them more rigorously than ever before in American history."⁶⁵ But it was philanthropists like John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and Olivia Sage that would take scientific philanthropy to a whole new level with the establishment of general purpose foundations.

Olivia Sage, heir to the fortune her husband Russell Sage made as a financier, established the first general purpose foundation in 1907. While both Rockefeller and Carnegie had already established organizations focused on specific goals in education and health, Olivia Sage's general purpose

⁶³ Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁴ For a discussion of these early private charity organizations see Scott J. Myers-Lipton, ed. *Social Solutions to Poverty: America's Struggle to Build a Just Society*, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006).

⁶⁵ Robert Bremner, *American Philanthropy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 91.

foundation was the next logical step in the evolution of scientific philanthropy.⁶⁶ More so than the others, the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) was a Progressive Era innovation, owing on part to Olivia's inclinations and in part to her choice of advisors.⁶⁷ After her husband's death Olivia selected longtime progressive reformer Robert de Forest to advise her on how to distribute the vast wealth her husband had left her. De Forest would come to have significant influence over the direction of Mrs. Sage's philanthropy beginning with the very idea of a foundation for broad social betterment which gave its trustees wide latitude in determining the types of projects to fund. The collaboration between Olivia Sage and Robert de Forest would lead to a foundation established to "investigate and study the causes of adverse social conditions, including ignorance, poverty, and vice, to suggest how these conditions can be remedied or ameliorated, and to put in operation any means to that end."⁶⁸ The Russell Sage Foundation would go on to fund surveys and research on social and industrial conditions as well as projects in public health and child welfare, contributing to the development of the modern welfare state. Not long after the RSF was established it would be followed by other general purpose foundations with even broader visions and larger endowments.

When the RSF was established in 1907 Andrew Carnegie was already well on his way to disposing of his great wealth through a variety of philanthropic ventures, but he had yet to establish the largest and most influential of his philanthropic organizations, the Carnegie Corporation of New York.⁶⁹ Well known for his gifts to libraries, museums, universities, and industrial schools, in 1911 Carnegie

⁶⁶ precursors to the general purpose foundation during this period include the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research (1901), Rockefeller's General Board of Education (1902), the Rockefeller Sanitation Commission (1903), and the Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching (1905).

⁶⁷ For a treatment of the foundation with its founder at the center see Ruth Crocker, *Mrs. Russell Sage: Women's Activism and Philanthropy in Gilded Age and Progressive Era America*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

⁶⁸ memorandum from Robert de Forest to Olivia Sage, 1906, quoted in Crocker, *Mrs. Russell Sage*, p. 220.

⁶⁹ about Andrew Carnegie and the age in which he lived see David Nasaw, *Andrew Carnegie*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), Louis Hacker, *The World of Andrew Carnegie, 1865-1901*, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Robert McCloskey, *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise, 1865-1910: A Study of William Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field, and Andrew Carnegie*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

consolidate his giving by establishing the Carnegie Corporation, whose mission was to "promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding."⁷⁰ The foundation's broad vision and large endowment (at \$135 million dollars the largest at that time), however, did not translate into any expansive efforts to address the problems of the lower classes as the RSF had done. In fact, under Carnegie's oversight until his death, the foundation concerned itself largely with issues in American education, and especially after World War II, higher education. It would be substantially less responsive to the large structural and social problems plaguing American society than many other general purpose foundations.⁷¹ Yet with its embracement of scientific philanthropy and its emphasis on "private initiative for the public good," the Carnegie Corporation epitomized the twentieth century model of philanthropy.⁷²

In 1913 John D. Rockefeller would follow Carnegie's example and set up his own general purpose foundation which would eventually surpass the Carnegie Corporation in scope and influence. Rockefeller's philanthropy originated from his strong belief in religious stewardship, and his early philanthropy tended to be rather traditional in that it was directed to established organizations for specific causes. The direction of his philanthropy, however, changed in 1892 when he hired Frederick T. Gates, prominent Baptist minister, to advise him on philanthropic matters. From this point forward, encouraged by Gates, Rockefeller began to establish his own institutions and engage in "wholesale philanthropy."⁷³ The first ventures in this direction included the Rockefeller Institution for Medical Research (1901), General Board of Education (1903), and Rockefeller Sanitation Commission (1909), which all addressed rather narrow, but different problems in society. The successes of these

⁷⁰ The original mission still stands as the mission today, see <http://carnegie.org/about-us/mission-and-vision/>

⁷¹ Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

⁷² The evolution of the Carnegie Corporation's grant making is examined in Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, and Nielsen sees a gradual shift from elitism to being more responsive to the problems of the poor. Nielsen argues this shift does not happen until the late 1960s. The quoted phrase is from an essay by President of the foundation John Gardner that appeared in the Carnegie Corporation's annual report in 1964.

⁷³ Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 48.

organizations led Rockefeller to believe "the most effective way of accomplishing the results he had in mind was to place funds at the disposal of an independent board of trustees, made up of the most experienced men he could find."⁷⁴ To this end, he took the bulk of what remained to be given away from his wealth and created the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913.⁷⁵ The bill to incorporate the foundation laid out the broadest of missions:

To promote the well-being and to advance the civilization of the peoples of the United States and its Territories and possessions and of foreign lands in the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge; in the prevention and relief of suffering; and in the promotion, by eleemosynary and philanthropic means, of any and all of the elements of human progress.⁷⁶

Unlike the Carnegie Corporation, whose mission was geographically restricted to the United States, Britain, and British colonies by its charter, the Rockefeller Foundation had a global vision from its earliest days. The inclusion of "foreign lands" in its charter was no casual decision. John D. Rockefeller's closest advisor on his philanthropic endeavors, Frederick Gates, envisioned a mission that combined economic and religious motivations into a broad agenda "to promote the well-being" of mankind throughout the world. For Gates, a former Baptist minister, "the world" was important to the United States because, as Gates pointed out to Rockefeller:

From the point of view of means of subsistence for Americans, our import trade, traceable mainly to channels of intercourse opened up by missionaries, is enormous. Imports from heathen lands furnish us cheaply with many of the

⁷⁴ Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*, p. 11.

⁷⁵ Rockefeller's initial gift to the foundation of 34 million dollars was only part of the 182 million he would end up giving by 1927.

⁷⁶ A Bill to Incorporate the Rockefeller Foundation, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, H.R. 21,532, As Introduced by Mr. Peters, March 8, 1912, Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1913-14, on-line at <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/812e6b1a-4785-4d58-b2e3-77eb3f5a2b0d-1913-1914.pdf>, accessed 02/14/2012

luxuries of life and not a few of the comforts, and with many things indeed, which we now regard as necessities.⁷⁷

Many Americans link the success of capitalism in the United States with the Protestant faith, believing the Protestant work ethic was central to America's growth and prosperity and that religion and development went hand in hand. Gate's religious background no doubt impacted his ideas about global reach. John D. Rockefeller, too, was influenced by his Protestant religious convictions. This was the age in which American Protestant missionary zeal turned its attention to faraway lands and sent missionaries to spread the Christian faith alongside American capitalism.⁷⁸ The early work of the Rockefeller foundation reflected this same evangelical spirit mixed with an overall concern for the broad and long term needs of United States economy.⁷⁹

It would be in the arena of public health that the Rockefeller Foundation would establish its grandiose visions, not just to solve problems, but to establish permanent state and private institutions devoted to social engineering. After a brief but disastrous attempt to devote resources to the social sciences, the foundation began to focus more and more on the medical field.⁸⁰ The earliest grants the foundation made went to improving medical education and public health due to the belief that disease was a fundamental cause of human suffering. Within a year of the establishment of the foundation the

⁷⁷ quoted in E. Richard Brown, "Public Health in Imperialism: Early Rockefeller Programs at Home and Abroad," *American Journal of Public Health*, (September 1976)Vol. 66, no. 9 pp. 897-903. memo from F.T. Gates to J.D. Rockefeller, Jan. 31, 1905, RAC, RG 1, Letterbook no. 350. See Brown's longer treatment of this subject in *Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

⁷⁸ for a discussion of this see Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*. This theme is also covered in Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*.

⁷⁹ for a discussion of how early projects reflected industrial needs see Brown, *Rockefeller Medicine Men*. Also on this subject also see Edward Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).

⁸⁰ The Rockefeller Foundation found itself the target of public and government scrutiny in 1914 after seeking the services of William King to produce an impartial study on industrial relations for public consumption. King, however, was in no way impartial, having advised Rockefeller on public relation after a Rockefeller owned company (Colorado Fuel and Iron Company) was involved in the infamous Ludlow massacres during the Colorado Coal Miners' Strike of 1913-1914. The study was seen by many as an attempt by Rockefeller to sway public opinion and justify the actions of the company against the coal miners. For an interpretation of this see Sheila Slaughter and Edward T. Silva, "Looking Backwards: How Foundations Formulated Ideology in the Progressive Period," in Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*.

Rockefeller Sanitation Commission(RSC) merged with the foundation's operations and became the International Health Board (IHB, later the International Health Division, IHD). Building on the success of the RSC in controlling hookworm in the Southern states, the IHB attacked diseases such as hookworm, tuberculosis, yellow fever, and malaria around the world.⁸¹ Under the direction of Wickliffe Rose the IHB would pursue advancements in public health on a global scale and push for institutionalizing these advancements in the host countries. Establishing a *modus operandi* that would continue into the 1960s, Rose sought working relationships with foreign governments and insisted on local commitments to supplement and continue the advancements his division would spearhead. According to Raymond Fosdick's history of the foundation, Rose felt "Underlying all efforts to protect people from hookworm or malaria or tuberculosis, there must be official agencies, set up on a full-time basis, staffed with thoroughly trained men, and equipped with modern facilities."⁸²

The interest of the Rockefeller Foundation in pursuing global reform in public health went beyond mere altruistic philanthropy. Much like the foundation's earlier but disastrous forays into industrial relations, the arena of global public health had direct relevancy for business, especially large international corporations.⁸³ Industrialization brought with it a reliance on a stable, compliant, and healthy labor force, and research on disease helped ensure an ample supply of healthy and productive workers. From the hookworm eradication efforts in the Southern United States to the projects in attacking yellow fever, worker productivity was often cited as an important result by foundation

⁸¹ for a history on the foundation's hookworm program see John Ettlig, *The Germ of Laziness: Rockefeller Philanthropy and Public Health in the New South*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), and Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*, for a history of the IHB see John Farley, *To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*,

⁸² Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*, p. 38.

⁸³ for a discussion of the value of fighting disease to the British and American empire see John Farley, *Bilharzia: A History of Imperial Tropical Medicine*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Armando Solorzano, "The Rockefeller Foundation in Revolutionary Mexico: Yellow Fever in Yucatan and Vera Cruz," in Marcos Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*.

officials.⁸⁴ The founders and trustees of these large foundations saw the opportunity to strengthen and stabilize the system of industrial capitalism through improving the health and welfare of workers at home and abroad as a win-win situation. From their viewpoint improving human welfare and strengthening capitalism went hand in hand. In addition, where these programs were applied overseas they served the broader purpose of exporting American style modernity in the form of western medicine and educational institutions.

The Rockefeller Foundation led the way in the application of scientific philanthropy abroad. Nothing epitomized the broad goals foundations had for exporting reform oriented philanthropy more than Rockefeller's early projects in China. China had long been coveted by expanding empires for its abundance of raw materials and as a potential new market for Western goods. However, a nationalist rebellion targeting foreigners, known as the Boxer Rebellion, demonstrated the volatility inherent in foreign domination. At the time of the Boxer Rebellion, the American commercial presence was limited relative to other global and regional powers including Britain, Germany, and Japan. The most visible American presence was that of protestant missionaries who had established a foothold in China by the end of the 19th century.⁸⁵ American missionaries saw in China the opportunity to spread Christianity while simultaneously reaping the material benefits of opening trade.⁸⁶ In fact, the convergence of religious and material interests in China prompted John D. Rockefeller Sr. to give generously to early missionary activity in China even before the foundation began its work. When the Rockefeller Foundation created the China Medical Board in 1914 to export western medicine to China it marked a

⁸⁴ E. Richard Brown, "Rockefeller Medicine in China: Professionalism and Imperialism," in Robert F. Arnove, ed., *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*. For example, in reference to the hookworm campaign Brown cites a Rockefeller Foundation report from 1918 entitled, "Economic Value of the treatment of Hookworm Infection in Costa Rica."

⁸⁵ Private groups like missionaries, the YMCA, and philanthropic organizations, more so than the U.S. government spearheaded efforts to penetrate China during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*.

⁸⁶ For a recent treatment of missionary activity abroad and how it intersected with commercial interests see Ian Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

new trajectory in American philanthropy, and it established a focus on institution building in overseas programs that would be the hallmark of modernization projects in the post war period.⁸⁷

Early ideas for foundation activity in China recognized the potential of educational institutions for spreading western ideas and culture. The timing of the foundation's entry into China happened to coincide with the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and a fracturing of state power which created opportunities for increasing American influence despite popular nationalistic sentiments.⁸⁸ Education would supplant religion as the conduit for western values and culture to be transmitted to the Chinese people. Unlike the Christian missionaries, who were easily denounced as a tool of foreign imperialism, education, especially medical education, could be promoted at culturally neutral. Originally, Frederick Gates envisioned the establishment of an American university in China "teaching all that is taught in Western universities, offering itself as a model for the Chinese government and raising up teachers for the new Chinese education."⁸⁹ However, this plan was scaled back in light of Chinese nationalism and the unacceptable condition that the Chinese government would have ultimate control over any such institution. Instead the Foundation settled on one aspect of education that aroused the least suspicion among nationalists: Western medicine.

In 1915 the Rockefeller Foundation purchased the grounds and buildings of the Union Medical College, which was at that time owned and operated by the London Missionary Society. After four years and much more money than initially anticipated, The Peking Medical Union College (PUMC) opened its doors to train the next generation of Chinese elites in modern medical science and

⁸⁷ for a critical examination of the Foundation's role in China see e. Richard Brown, "Rockefeller Medicine in China: Professionalism and Imperialism," in Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*. For a more positive look at both the Foundation's role in China and the Rockefeller family's activities in China see Mary Brown Bullock, *The Oil Prince's Legacy: Rockefeller Philanthropy in China*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) and Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*. Brown Bullock is currently a trustee of the China Medical Board and Fosdick was president of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1936-1948.

⁸⁸ Brown Bullock, *The Oil Prince's Legacy*, p. 16-17 and 47-48.

⁸⁹ quoted in Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*, p. 80, from an undated memorandum, The Gates Papers, "The China Medical Board."

techniques. As anticipated, the PUMC became in a little over a decade a regional leader, the best medical school in all of Asia. But just how influential a medical facility that schooled only the elite and taught medical techniques that were out of reach for the vast majority of Chinese people was remained to be seen. By design the school only trained a small number of urban physicians each year despite the great need for lower level health care workers to deliver services to rural areas. While the foundation had hoped the PUMC would be the catalyst for a complete westernization of medicine in China this goal depended on a strong committed Chinese government to fund and expand this model. The Rockefeller Foundation never intended, nor could it have afforded, to finance this expansion. Yet even with its limited reach, the PUMC stood as a symbol of American modernity and influence, and after the facilities were looted and abandoned in the course of World War II Rockefeller invested another ten million in 1946 to restore it to its prewar condition. The PUMC was a model for western medicine in China, but with its focus on elite education and institution building it was also a model for overseas philanthropy in the years to come.

Another growing interest within the Rockefeller Foundation, agriculture, would experience early success that would influence postwar programs abroad. By 1930 agricultural extension programs had been carried out in the southern United States and in China by other Rockefeller philanthropies including the General Education Board and the International Education Board.⁹⁰ These programs convinced foundation trustees of the value of such work to developing countries, and in 1941 the RF started discussions with the Mexican government to launch an agricultural program in Mexico with the goal of improving crop quality and increasing yield. This program would be a departure from the strategy of supporting knowledge for knowledge's sake (i.e. research) and was more similar to its hookworm and yellow fever programs. Like the programs in public health that promoted the application of research results, the agricultural program in Mexico would not only involve research on crop

⁹⁰ The IEB was operated, financed and run by the Foundation.

productivity and quality but also promote the extension of this knowledge to local farmers.⁹¹ The Mexican Agricultural Program, or MAP, would also be directed and operated by the foundation in conjunction with the Mexican government. The success of MAP reinforced the optimism of those at the forefront of global reform in the postwar years and significantly expanded the Rockefeller Foundation's commitment in Latin America.

The Rockefeller Foundation experienced marked successes in the fields of public health, medicine, and agriculture at home and abroad, but their early attempts at venturing into the social sciences did not prove fruitful. The neglect of the social sciences in programming had much to do with Gate's influence during the early years. His unyielding belief in the power of medical science and in his distrust of certain social sciences led to a privileging of the hard sciences and a focus on medicine and public health.⁹² But the Progressive Era had revealed how useful, if not necessary, the social sciences could be for social engineering. In addition, World War I had exposed the lack of knowledge in areas relevant to fighting a war and maintaining peace. Creating a new global order that solved disputes between nations diplomatically would require new knowledge about political systems, economic systems, sociological phenomenon and the human psyche. At the same time the U.S. government became increasingly receptive to private organizations and "volunteerism" to assist with and make sense of the human costs of such unimaginable destruction.⁹³ Though it would never be their priority, the Foundation would begin to give more attention to the social sciences during the depression years. The incorporation of the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial Fund (LSRM) into the Rockefeller Foundation in 1928 provided the catalyst for this change. John D. Rockefeller Sr. created the memorial

⁹¹ For an examination of MAP see Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*.

⁹² Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*, p. 193.

⁹³ See Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere, 1890-1930", *Minerva*, 19, Summer 1981. Karl and Katz examine the role of private philanthropy during the WWI period. For an examination of the rising influence of the social sciences in government during WW1 see Gene Martin Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

fund in 1918 as a tribute to his wife and her philanthropic endeavors. Unlike the Rockefeller Foundation, the LSRM had a more narrow mission devoted to public welfare and the application of research to social problems. Throughout the 1920s the LSRM involved itself in issues related to child and social welfare, interracial relations (Mrs. Rockefeller came from an abolitionist family), general education, emergency relief, public health and religion.⁹⁴

When the memorial fund and the Rockefeller Foundation merged in 1928, the Foundation went through a reorganization of its divisions and created a Social Science Division to manage the projects and money inherited from the LSRM. Their approach, however, remained fairly conservative considering the tumultuous decades of the 1930s and 1940s, and the production of research in the areas of international relations, economic stabilization and public administration became the focus. Foundation trustees were quick to extend medical and agricultural research to real and productive uses, but in the field of social science no such desires existed until well into the Great Depression. That is not to say foundation support in this area did not significantly contribute to the development of the social sciences at an array of universities and research centers, but the application of this knowledge was not a major focus for Rockefeller during the dark days of the Depression.⁹⁵ The economic crisis of the 1930s together with the approaching war in Europe would cause a reconsideration of the importance of

⁹⁴ Under the leadership of Beardsley Ruml the LSRM decided to make the social sciences its primary mission in 1923. Ruml is often cited as the father of the social sciences in the United States for his efforts to bring a more scientific approach to the various disciplines and for his success in increasing the professionalism and respectability of the social sciences. See Donald Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science Research Council*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

⁹⁵ This is a relative statement when the Foundation's programs in medicine and agriculture, both of which involved application of research to solve medical and agricultural problems, are compared with the early programs in the social sciences. The research produced by foundation grants to universities and research centers was in fact applied in many cases, but the Foundation was usually not directly involved with its application. For example, grants to the research centers like the National Bureau of Economics(NBE) and the Social Science Research Council(SSRC) impacted government policies. see Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation* and Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences*. The NBE and the SSRC and their impact on government policy are examples of what Guy Alchon refers to as the "creation of public roles for technically informed private authorities." Alchon, *The Invisible Hand of Planning*, p. 5.

applied research in the social sciences among foundation trustees.⁹⁶ Yet the increased interest in the value of the social sciences did not manifest itself in a change in strategy. The Foundation stayed the course in terms of its approach and made grants to university and research centers to churn out data and analysis of economic, political and social phenomenon.

The Thin Line Between Public and Private: Foundations and State Collaboration in Social Engineering before World War II

From 1909 to 1953 three federal congressional hearings took aim at private philanthropic foundations and the potential harmful effects they had on American Society.⁹⁷ In 1914 Congress investigated foundation activity to determine the extent the Rockefeller Foundation was being used to white wash the activities of a Rockefeller company involved in the Ludlow massacres during the Colorado Coal Miners' Strike of 1931-14. Later in 1952, and again in 1953, amidst the anti-communist hysteria sweeping the nation, conservatives in congress accused private foundations like Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller of supporting subversive activities and engaging in un-American acts. To listen to the rhetoric of these hearings one could only conclude that the foundations and government had an antagonistic relationship since their inception. The congressional attacks, however, obscure the fundamental mutual interests the state and most private foundations shared, namely the preservation and strengthening of liberal democratic capitalism at home and the protection of U.S. interests abroad. The links between large foundations and the government were extensive, complex, and most importantly, necessary for the broad, ambitious goals of foundations to be realized.

Foundations established by wealthy industrialists during the Progressive Era appear at first to be a paradox: members of the ruling class contributing to their own demise by funding progressive projects

⁹⁶ Also a factor in strengthening the social sciences after 1936 was the appointment of Raymond Fosdick to head the RF. Fosdick was an advocate for the use of social sciences in solving problems. See Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, p. 34

⁹⁷ The 1969 Tax Reform Law also directly attacked foundation privileges and imposed added regulation and taxes on foundations deemed as "private foundations."

that undermined the free market system that made them rich. This paradox is seen in the fact that these early industrialists turned philanthropist were decidedly conservative and identified more with the Republican party of the 1920s than with the Progressives. Yet, an examination of the major foundations established by these philanthropist shows them to have been predominately liberal in their grant making decisions.⁹⁸ True, a few wealthy philanthropists did worry about the direction foundations had taken. Most famously, Henry Ford II lamented the creation of the Ford Foundation and felt it undermined the very system that funded it.⁹⁹ However, by and large the founders and trustees engaged in more self-congratulatory reflection than in self-criticism for the projects they were a part of. The large foundations of the early twentieth century shared with the state a vision of American exceptionalism and an interest in advancing American interests abroad that transcended domestic politics.

The coming of age of the private philanthropic foundation occurred simultaneously with the growth of a technocratic state at home and the growth of American economic, political, and military power abroad. Private foundations played a complex role in social change during these years. In his study of American foundations, Joel Fleishman identified three roles that foundations play in the process of social change: driver, partner, and catalyst.¹⁰⁰ The roles differ in the degree to which the foundation is involved in the implementation of a strategy to solve a social problem. For example, in the driver role foundations are intimately involved with the implementation of research, as in the hookworm programs and Mexican Agricultural Project. At the other end of the spectrum, when foundations serve as a catalyst they are usually focused only on planting the intellectual seed for an idea or supporting a

⁹⁸ In *Giving for Social Change: Foundations, Public Policy, and the American Political Agenda*, (Westport: Praeger, 1994) Althea Nagai, Robert Lerner, and Stanley Rothman examine the major foundations and their history of grant making with regard to political ideology. Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie all make the list of the top ten "liberal" foundations where their grants were concerned.

⁹⁹ See interview with Henry Ford II, August 1, 1973, Ford Foundation Oral History Project, FFA.

¹⁰⁰ Joel L. Fleishman, *The A Great American Secret: How Private Wealth is Changing the World*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), p. 3-5.

particular avenue of research that they hope will be picked up by others. The efforts to implant neo-liberal economic ideas in Latin American universities exemplify how foundations can serve as catalysts for larger changes. Changes in the role of government and new ideas about social reform created new roles for private charitable organizations.

The twentieth century marked a departure from the traditional separation of charitable foundations and government in which "welfare" was by and large reserved for private charities.¹⁰¹ The Progressive Era and the expansion of government planning brought an end to that separation and both government and foundations came to "represent parallel means of serving the social, educational, scientific, and cultural needs of society."¹⁰² Foundations and the government not only engaged in "parallel" processes but also dependant processes. The early public health programs of the Rockefeller Foundation worked *through* governments both in the U.S. and abroad. The hookworm projects would not have had the impact they did without the active support of local, state, and foreign governments.¹⁰³ Interested mostly in "high impact" grant giving, the foundations actively pursued government support for their initiatives in order to ensure the grants would yield significant impact. For example, in their push to expand public schools in the South the General Education Board (a Rockefeller philanthropy) engaged in significant government lobbying to enlist support for its aims.¹⁰⁴

While the government slowly expanded social services during the first half of the twentieth century to help lessen the economic and social disparities in society, the foundations became one of the main producers of knowledge that drove this expansion through the funding of public think tanks and social science research. Some of the first few endeavors in this direction were the creation of the National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER), the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the

¹⁰¹ on this see Waldemar Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

¹⁰² Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, p. 380.

¹⁰³ on these projects see Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*.

¹⁰⁴ Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, p. 382, also see Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*.

funding of the influential publication *Recent Social Trends*. The NBER, established in 1920 with grants from the Carnegie Corp and the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, came out of discussion on labor unrest and industrial relations held by prominent business men and philanthropists.¹⁰⁵ Established in order to engage in scientific investigations of the economy, the NBER responded to the government's call to provide data for President Hoover's 1921 conference on unemployment and for the later Committee on Unemployment and the Business Cycle.¹⁰⁶ Another influential think tank established in the 1920s, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), elevated the social sciences to a new level of influence by promoting the idea that social sciences could be subjected to rigorous scientific validation. The creation of independent research centers like NBER and SSRC offered foundations, if not true autonomy from the business world they emerged from, then at least a modicum of detachment from elite interests and the ability to "pursue social issues 'cleanly' through a growing community of experts."¹⁰⁷

Research organizations like NBER, SSRC, and others started by private foundations far surpassed the research capabilities of the government when it came to investigation of social issues. As a result, the government frequently called on foundations and think tanks to provide data and research. In 1929 President Hoover called on Rockefeller to lead a social science research project that would identify social problems and illuminate the causes. The resulting report, *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, gave a comprehensive overview of American society and exemplified the type of research that would be the basis for planning in a new technocratic society. The Great Depression brought an even greater reliance on social science research, and nowhere was the apparatus for research greater than in foundation funded think tanks. Commenting on the influence of foundations during the New Deal, two scholars of

¹⁰⁵ The idea of an institute for economic studies came out of discussions held 1912 between prominent and wealthy businessmen about the need to address rising labor militancy and unrest. See Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy*, (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), chapter three.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 63-64.

¹⁰⁷ Richard Magot, *Unlikely Partners: Philanthropy and the Labor Movement*, p. 54.

American philanthropy note, "Even the hostility towards private business that ultimately dominated the New Deal did nothing to stop the expansion of influence by privately supported research on the making of government policy."¹⁰⁸ Of course, the New Deal greatly expanded the powers of government and resulted in new government run organizations dedicated to the investigation of social problems as well, but the large foundations could always be found behind the scene. Despite the enlarged capacity of the U.S. government, foundations and their offshoots dominated the research scene. The growing ties between foundations and government in the social sciences and the success of the New Deal in social reform became the basis of postwar collaboration on overseas reform.¹⁰⁹

Collaboration between foundations and the government in the realm of domestic policy became firmly established by the end of the depression and would continue to grow during the war years. Cooperation on international projects, however, was just starting to take shape. Before the emergence of the United States as a colonial power in the late 19th century "global reform" efforts were for the most part the purview of religious missionaries intent on not only bringing Christianity to non-Western countries but also spreading Western culture.¹¹⁰ This would begin to change as the United States acquired colonies and with them a rationale and motivation for nation building. The foundations, careful not to expose themselves as being too political, began supporting private organizations that could advise the government on foreign policy matters. Following in the wake of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that ended World War I a group of prominent diplomats, generals, financiers, and lawyers formed what would become the most influential foreign policy think tank in America, the Council on

¹⁰⁸ Barry D. Karl and Stanley Katz, "The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere, 1890-1930", *Minerva*, 19, (1981, Summer), pp. 268.

¹⁰⁹ On the origins of global reform efforts being in the New Deal see David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). On the origins of U.S. government overseas development Ekbladh argues that "Concepts necessary to actually implement such development emerged from a collection of sources, particularly New Deal reform and non-governmental activity." p. 4. On this topic also see Michael Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Col War to the Present*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

¹¹⁰ Some exceptions to this are examined in Merle Curti and Kendall Birr, *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838-1938*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1954).

Foreign Relations. Membership on the Council was by invitation only and included recognized experts on foreign policy matters in order to study problems and advise the U.S. government on matters of national security and foreign relations. The CFR would become an influential direct line to the State Department and policy makers in the U.S. government, and eventually important foundation officers would come to serve on the Council. The Rockefeller Foundation got onboard with supporting CFR projects early on, funding the important War-Peace Studies Project in 1939, which advised the U.S. government on the coming war and, perhaps more importantly, the peace that would come after. In addition to these more obvious efforts at collaboration with the U.S. government on creating policy towards other nations, the foundations began actively assisting countries where the American military was present.

Missionaries, followed by foundations, took the lead in efforts to reform education and agriculture in China without much collaboration with the U.S. government. However, in places where the U.S. military was actively engaged the U.S. government spearheaded reform efforts. In countries like Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the U.S. military initiated a set of reforms as part of their occupation of these countries. Basic "nation building" reforms in the areas of infrastructure, schools, public health and political institutions were meant to promote Western ideas of a modern society and ensure colonies would remain open for U.S. investment and trade. It would not be long before the foundations began to take interest in countries strategically important to the United States. During the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1930 the Rockefeller Foundation provided medical school fellowships to Haitian students as part of their international public health program and supported the creation of a new medical school.¹¹¹ In 1920 the Rockefeller Foundation also initiated a much more extensive public health campaign to eradicate yellow fever in Yucatan and Veracruz, a location of strategic importance to U.S. economic investment and U.S. policy toward Mexico during the Mexican

¹¹¹ See Curti and Birr, *Prelude to Point Four*, p. 135-136 and Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, p. 24.

Revolution.¹¹² The international interests of private foundations grew steadily with America's global power.

The first half of the twentieth century would witness the birth and maturation of private philanthropic foundations alongside an increasing role for the United States in international affairs. Foundations, emboldened by Progressive Era reforms, sought to create an apparatus based on scientific research to direct social reform and strengthen liberal democratic capitalism at home and protect and expand American interests abroad. Internationally minded foundations such as Carnegie and Rockefeller often acted in advance of the U.S. government to affect change in other countries. In the immediate aftermath of World War II the scattered priorities and projects of foundations coalesced into a more focused agenda abroad, and with the onset of the Cold War global reform and modernization became a shared mission of the large foundations and the U.S. government.

**"All Good Things Go Together":
Overseas Development, U.S. Foreign Policy and
Philanthropic Foundations in the Cold War Era¹¹³**

As World War II came to an end two new challenges to American economic power abroad shaped U.S. foreign policy. In the immediate post-war years the United States would be confronted by the forces of communism drawing inspiration from the Soviet Union and rising nationalism as countries began to demand the colonial order be dismantled and replaced by self-determination. The most immediate concern for the United States was the fate of Europe. The postwar order, decided at the Yalta Conference, ceded eastern Europe to the Soviets, but Western Europe was by no means safe from communist ideology. Devastated by the war, many Western European economies were struggling and

¹¹² See Armando Solorzano, "The Rockefeller Foundation in Revolutionary Mexico: Yellow Fever in Yucatan and Veracruz," in Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*.

¹¹³ The quote "All Good Things Go Together" is taken from Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). Packenham designated "All Good Things Go Together" as one of four implicit assumptions of Louis Hartz' "Liberal Tradition in America."

the influence of communism and the non-communist left was on the rise. The United States acted quickly to ensure aid rushed to U.S. friendly governments and began a massive financial assistance program aimed at economic recovery and modernizing Europe's industrial capacities. By 1951 The Economic Recovery Program (ERP), better known as the Marshall Plan, had pumped 12 billion dollars into recovery in Europe. The ensuing economic boom that Western Europe experienced during the four years of the Marshall Plan assured a faith in aid programs that would lead to an unprecedented effort to replicate Europe's post-war growth through foreign aid in other parts of the world.

If the question of Germany and Europe had been settled by the early fifties, the question of new nations forming in the wake of de-colonization was just beginning to emerge. Once the European crisis diminished it was clear that the real battle for global hegemony would involve many small countries that had mattered little to the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In a few of these countries, Korea and Vietnam for example, the concerns would be answered with military action. But in the vast majority of them the Truman Doctrine and the ensuing policy of containment would provide numerous alternatives to military engagement. For the countries in eminent danger of yielding to nationalism or communism, the policy of containment would justify covert operations to overthrow unfriendly leaders or back authoritarian and dictatorial regimes with military and technical assistance. The core of the post-war order though, and the system that was supposed to help bring stability to the world, was the Bretton Woods System established by Allied nations at the end of World War II. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were institutions designed to provide friendly countries with assistance in stabilizing and developing their economies. These two organizations would be key to systematizing global reform around the world and bring economies into line under a hegemonic economic system. However, for all the success the United States government had in applying the policy of containment abroad, instability in the third world remained, linked as it was to underlying social and economic problems. Addressing this instability would be the next evolution in post-war U.S. foreign policy.

During the 1950s U.S. government officials with the help of academia sought ways of understanding and dealing with rapid changes in the world. The post-1945 years witnessed decolonization, rising nationalism, and the growing influence of communist and socialist parties in the third world. These changes threatened to alter America's economic and political leadership within developing nations. The paradigm that would come to crystallize thinking on how the United States could best deal with these changes while maintaining its economic and political superiority centered on the concept of modernization. According to historian Michael Adas, "the modernization paradigm supplanted the beleaguered civilizing mission as the preeminent ideology of Western dominance."¹¹⁴

The genesis of the modernization paradigm had its roots in wartime collaboration during the 1940s between academia and the government.¹¹⁵ After World War II many academics saw a chance to influence how the United States fought the Cold War. In the postwar years the concept of modernization as it applied to other nations became an important component of social science research and inquiry. Those theorists writing on modernization saw modern nations as "cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of change, and characterized by a complex division of labor."¹¹⁶ Ideas of modernization could not have existed, however, without a comparative counterpart. For this counterpart modernization theorists pointed toward the traditional society which "was inward looking, inert, passive toward nature, superstitious, fearful of change, and economically

¹¹⁴ Michael Adas, "Modernization Theory and the American Revival of the Scientific and Technological Standards of Social Achievement and Human Worth," in David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), p.35.

¹¹⁵ The intellectual origins of modernization theory go back to Talcot Parsons, a Harvard sociologist whose attempts to integrate the social sciences and develop a grand theory of society provided the basis for applying social scientific theory to social change. See Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), Chapter 3. For examples of social science collaboration with war efforts in the forties see Peter Buck, "Adjusting to Military Life: The Social Sciences Go to War, 1941-1950," in Merritt Roe Smith, ed., *Military Enterprise and Technological Change*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), p.203-252.

¹¹⁶ Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, p.5

simple.”¹¹⁷ Traditionalism, according to the modernization paradigm, created barriers to economic development and maintained the grossly unequal conditions that bred instability. The view that traditional societies contained culture deficits that prevented development was in many ways just a continuation of earlier views of non-Western societies being inferior due to the limits of their race. In the Modernization paradigm culture replaced race as an explanatory factor. Most important, at the core of the modernization paradigm stood an unyielding belief in the power of science and technology and a rationalization of society that sought to organize human behavior and the natural world for maximum efficiency and increased output.¹¹⁸ Modernization theorists saw the United States as representing the pinnacle of modernity and the mold for all aspiring traditional societies.

Modernization as a development ideology necessitated an interdisciplinary approach, drawing on economics, political science, sociology, and other fields, to provide an overarching theory of the process by which societies move from traditional to modern. According to historian Michael Latham, although the scholarship on modernization dealt with an array of issues and encompassed multiple disciplines, four assumptions underlay the paradigm. First, there was a clear delineation between modern and traditional societies. Second, social changes, political changes, and economic growth were interrelated. Third, development proceeded from traditional to modern in a relatively linear path. Fourth, contact with modern societies accelerated the development process for traditional societies.¹¹⁹

With an almost evangelical zeal to bring modernity to developing nations, academics in the field of economics, political science, and sociology began producing policy oriented research to be used by

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Thomas F. O’Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.2. O’Brien discusses the process of rationalization as it pertained to American business operating in Latin America. According to O’Brien, “Rationalization promoted previously unimagined levels of material output in the second industrial revolution. Entrepreneurs applied scientific knowledge directly to the production process, especially in new industries such as chemicals and electronics, and developed machines and work methods which replaced skilled workers, dramatically increased output and intensified the control which businessmen exercised over the workforce.” p.2.

¹¹⁹ Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*, p.4.

the United States government. With the ideological challenge of communism and a rapidly decolonizing world, U.S. policy makers eagerly embraced the modernization paradigm as a way to direct the development of the third world in what they believed would become a symbiotic relationship between academia and government.¹²⁰ Modernization theory jumped from the scholarly world to the world of foreign policy through various academic centers, and created a nexus in which academia, government, and private foundations converged to promote action oriented scholarship. Elite universities like Harvard, Yale, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) provided the institutional channels for this action oriented research.

One of the more important centers of modernization scholarship was the Center for International Studies (CIS) at MIT. Created in 1951, the Center for International Studies grew out of a top secret Cold War research project on political warfare financed by the U.S. government and involving MIT scholars. After the project wrapped up, MIT decided to establish a permanent research group to undertake the application of social scientific research to policy formation on developing nations.¹²¹ To head the center, MIT chose distinguished economist and former assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Max Millikan. Another economist, Walt Whitman Rostow, would join CIS and eventually become the public face of modernization theory with the publication of his seminal work, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Together, Millikan and Rostow would act as liaisons between policy makers and the world of academics, playing the part of objective researcher and advocate for U.S. intervention simultaneously.¹²²

¹²⁰ Ibid., Both Latham and Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, provide excellent accounts of the relationship between the government and American academia.

¹²¹ Ford was invited to be part of this project through funding proposals, Memo from Hans Speier to Rowan Gaither, September 18th, 1951, FFA, Grant files, 52-152.

¹²² Both Rostow and Millikan moved in and out of academic and government positions throughout their career. Millikan directed CIS from 1952 to 1969, and Rostow was a staff member at CIS from 1951-1961. In addition to his work with the CIA, Millikan served on President Kennedy's Task Force on Foreign Aid, was President of the

The publication most associated with modernization theory, Rostow's *Stages of Growth*, came out of work with CIS and laid out how the modernization paradigm applied to developing nations. According to Rostow, societies moved from a traditional existence to a modern one in a series of stages.¹²³ He also argued that contact with and assistance from modern nations could advance underdeveloped nations along the trajectory toward an advanced capitalist state.¹²⁴ Although Rostow based his stages primarily on economic changes in a society, other social scientists complemented his ideas with theories about how politics and culture interacted in the modernization process.¹²⁵

A New Force for International Development: The Ford Foundation's International Expansion

In 1950 a new force partnered with the well-established Rockefeller Foundation in the field of overseas philanthropy and together with the U.S. government would expand global reform efforts to an unprecedented level. In 1936 Edsel Ford, son of Henry Ford and heir to the Ford Motor Company fortune, established a philanthropic foundation with a gift of just twenty five thousand dollars. At that time the Ford Foundation hardly seemed like the type of organization that could take on solving the problems of global instability, world war, and reducing poverty. In the early years the Foundation largely restricted its philanthropy to local projects, such as the establishment of the Henry Ford Museum in Dearborn, Michigan. Two events, however, would transform the Foundation into an international organization that sought to address the world's most pressing problems and spread American ideas and culture around the globe. The first of these events occurred in the late 1940s when the foundation

World Peace Foundation, and was an advisor to Kennedy. Rostow's government work included National Security Advisor to Kennedy, and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State.

¹²³ W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Rostow identified these stages as the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption.

¹²⁴ According to modernization theorist, the path to modernity was not one that led exclusively to a capitalist liberal democracy. The communist system was also considered a modern society; however, it was viewed as a pathological or deviant form of modernity. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, p. 14.

¹²⁵ For example, political scientist Gabriel Almond wrote about civic culture and developed a typology of citizen participation which roughly correlates with conceptions of traditional and modern societies.

received a large donation of company stock from the Ford Motor Company upon the death of Edsel in 1943 and Henry in 1947. This bequest instantly made Ford the largest philanthropic foundation in the world, far surpassing the renowned Rockefeller Foundation. Faced with having to spend the new endowment quickly due to its tax-exempt status, the trustees commissioned a study that would place the Ford Foundation on the front lines of the building confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In 1948 the trustees of the Foundation selected a study committee to identify “critical areas where problems were most serious and where the Foundation might make the most significant contributions to human welfare.”¹²⁶ With such a broad mandate, the trustees opened the Foundation’s door to international expansion. The individuals selected for the study committee further assured that Ford would take on global issues and move to identify its goals with national interests. The head of the committee, Rowan Gaither, was a successful lawyer and investment banker whose resume reflected a strong belief in public/private collaboration in the realm of national security. During World War II Gaither headed the Radiation Lab at MIT, which worked under the direction of the National Defense Research Committee established by President Franklin Roosevelt. In 1948 Gaither helped found the Rand Corporation, which offered research and policy analysis to the U.S. armed forces. In addition to Gaither, the study committee included other academics who advised various government or military groups.¹²⁷ These men represented the type of public/private collaboration that would come to define the Foundation during the decades to come.

¹²⁶ *The Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program*, (The Ford Foundation: Detroit, 1949), p.9.

¹²⁷For example, Charles C. Lauritsen was a Professor of Physics and advisor to the Office of Naval Research. Donald G. Marquis was a Professor of Psychology and Chairman of the Committee on Human Resources for the National Military Establishment

The final report of the study committee not only addressed the trustees' desire to make significant contributions to human welfare, but also echoed government officials' growing anxiety over the threat to America's position in the world and the rapidly building tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to the committee, "the exigencies of the world crisis and of present political and economic problems required immediate attention," and these were the problems that the Foundation should direct its attention to.¹²⁸ The report made clear the link between developing nations and U.S. security:

As the tide of communism mounts in Asia and Europe, the position of the United States is crucial. We are striving at great costs to strengthen free peoples everywhere. The needs of such peoples, particularly in under-developed areas, are vast and seemingly endless, yet their eventual well being may prove essential to our own security. To improve their living standards they must import and use knowledge, guidance, and capital. The United States appears to be the only country able to provide even a part of the urgently needed assistance.¹²⁹

The study committee proposed five areas for foundation activities, three of which addressed global tensions and America's position in world affairs. Area one, the establishment of peace, area two, the strengthening of democracy, and area three, the strengthening of the economy, spoke directly to the tensions between competing ideologies and how foundation activities could help ensure the United States maintained its global leadership position.¹³⁰ In a nuclear age, the establishment of peace loomed large in the minds of the committee members. This peace, however, did not mean accepting communism as a viable alternative to the capitalist system for underdeveloped nations. Peace would prevail only with the triumph of capitalism over communism. To this end, the committee saw the

¹²⁸ *The Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation*, p. 50.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹³⁰ The fourth area, Education in a Democratic Society, had a domestic focus. The fifth area, Individual Behavior and Human Relations, would lay the ground work for the foundation's faith in the power of objective scientific research to solve the problems of underdevelopment

elimination of poverty, in their view a major cause of war, as a national security priority. The committee felt that poverty made populations more susceptible to communism and created instability in developing nations. Ending the conditions that gave communism its appeal in these nations was an immense undertaking, one that the study committee believed would require “improvement of the structures and procedures by which the United States Government, and private groups in the United States, participate in world affairs.”¹³¹

In 1950 the trustees of the Ford Foundation unanimously authorized the study report to be a blue print for Foundation activities and brought on Paul Hoffman to lead the foundation in its new, expanded mission. The choice of Hoffman as president of the foundation did as much to ensure Ford’s international agenda as the study report. Hoffman epitomized the type of private/public collaboration that the study committee envisioned for the Foundation. Prior to joining the Foundation, Hoffman was an executive at Studebaker and served as administrator for the Marshall Plan from 1948 to 1950.¹³² Even before his post with the Marshall Plan, Hoffman had developed a keen interest in America’s position in the world and the communist threat to free trade and private industry. Hoffman vigorously supported foreign aid programs, espousing an enlightened self-interested approach to international politics.¹³³ He promoted foreign aid “as an economic weapon in the ideological Cold War and a cheap way to prevent a hot war.”¹³⁴ In his 1951 book, *Peace Can Be Won*, Hoffman argued that military might alone, however necessary, could not reduce the communist threat and establish lasting peace. According to Hoffman, “Winning the Peace” required four fronts: military, economic, political, and the

¹³¹ *The Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation*, p. 52.

¹³² The Marshall Plan was a 13 billion dollar plan of technical and economic aid to Europe after World War II to rebuild the countries of Europe, tie them economically to the United States, and prevent communism from spreading.

¹³³ Alan R. Raucher, *Paul G Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid*, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1985), p.60.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

information front. The last three fronts could only be waged with a strong commitment to foreign aid.¹³⁵

Although Hoffman's tenure at Ford lasted until only 1952, under his leadership the Foundation established its overseas program.¹³⁶ In 1951 the Ford Foundation opened overseas operations in India and Pakistan, spreading to Burma and Indonesia by 1953. The foundation chose these countries due to the belief that Asia and the Near East represented "a major source of tensions that threatened world peace" and because the region "had a special strategic importance, lying as it did on the southern rim of the USSR and Communist China."¹³⁷ By 1959, the foundation would be involved in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, as well as supporting numerous anti-communist organizations in Europe and global organizations such as the United Nations. During the early postwar years Ford not only joined Rockefeller in global reform, but as the most well endowed private philanthropic foundation in the world Ford would take the lead in many areas.

The Ford Foundation became intricately linked to the modernization paradigm through its support of conduits for modernization theory like the Center at MIT.¹³⁸ In 1951 the provost at MIT, J.A. Stratton, wrote to the Foundation requesting financial assistance to set up a research center.¹³⁹ Not long after, the foundation made its first grant of \$125,000 to CIS, to be followed by four additional

¹³⁵ Paul G Hoffman, *Peace Can be Won*, (New York: Double Day, 1951).

¹³⁶ Hoffman brought with him to the Foundation the experience of a successful aid program in Europe and a belief that the Foundation's large resources could make a difference in the cold war. A foundation executive and colleague later commented that Hoffman's "own great personal interest was in the problems of foreign policy and peace" which would manifest itself in "an intense interest in the foreign aspects of the Foundation." Oral History, Milton Katz, Ford Foundation Oral History Project, June 22, 1972, interviewer Charles T. Morrissey, Session one, FFA

¹³⁷ Overseas Development Program Evaluation 1951-1961 and Statement of Current Objectives and Policies, p. 1, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 008897.

¹³⁸ There were many other conduits for modernization theory that the Foundation supported, including the Committee for Comparative Politics at The Social Science Research Council. The case of MIT's Center for International Studies is offered as one example of the foundation's collaboration with the modernization paradigm

¹³⁹ Letter from J.A. Stratton to Rowan Gaither, June 27, 1951, FFA, grant file 52-152.

grants throughout the 1950s totaling over \$2.5 million.¹⁴⁰ The links went beyond simple financial support, since the Foundation's ties to the scholars at MIT included both professional and personal relationships. The Foundation's first president, Paul Hoffman, had worked with both Millikan and Rostow in previous government positions and drew heavily upon their ideas in his own opinions about trade policy and economic aid to developing countries.¹⁴¹

Richard Bissell, a foundation employee in the early years who left in 1953 to join the Central Intelligence Agency, also had professional and intellectual ties to Rostow and Millikan. Having a very similar view of both economics and American foreign policy, Bissell and Millikan taught collaboratively at Yale in the late 1930s. In addition to being a student of Bissell's at Yale, Walt Rostow worked with both Hoffman and Bissell on the Marshall Plan.¹⁴² When MIT requested foundation support for the Center, Bissell proved instrumental in securing the first grant. In 1952 Bissell pushed for foundation support noting, the "Center has at its command a greater volume of competent and trained personnel to work on development problems than any other academic institution in this country."¹⁴³

This early collaboration between Ford and modernization theorists would set the stage for a relationship that would span two decades, cut across numerous institutional channels, and influence the way in which the Foundation carried out its development agenda. As Ford became more deeply involved in overseas development, it sought the expertise of some of the most well known and well connected modernization theorists. Men like Walt Rostow and Max Millikan served the Foundation as researchers and consultants for its overseas projects. Gabriel Almond, a political scientist who studied the evolution of political culture in developing countries, served as an advisor for the foundation's

¹⁴⁰ FFA, Grant files 52-00152, 53-00073, 54-00088, 56-00104, and 59-00351.

¹⁴¹ Raucher, *Paul Hoffman, Architect of Foreign Aid*, p.120

¹⁴² Richard M. Bissell, Jr, with Jonathon E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

¹⁴³ Proposal to the trustees, Research Program in Economic Development and Political Stability, FFA, grant file 52-152.

projects in Brazil. Edward Shils, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, and Lucian Pye, a political scientist associated with MIT's Center for International Studies, were both involved in numerous foundation grants as researchers and advisors.¹⁴⁴ The foundation's obsession with advancing human welfare through social scientific study provided a boon to modernization scholars seeking to produce action oriented research. In time, foundation assessments and projects would come to reflect the influence of this research. In 1967 the foundation's International Division noted, "the task in Latin America is 'modernization' more than 'development'."¹⁴⁵

In committing themselves to containing communism abroad through overseas development programs, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations relied on a close partnership with the United States government. Similar world views and the shared concern for underdeveloped countries and their susceptibility to communist ideology led to a close working relationship.¹⁴⁶ This relationship involved collaborative meetings and a cross-fertilization of staff in which individuals left government projects to work for the foundation and foundation employees left for government positions. Like Hoffman, many of the early Ford Foundation employees came straight from the Marshall Plan and had connections to various government agencies. Frequent meetings between foundation officers and the government took place to discuss what role the foundations could play in assisting the U.S. government with foreign policy objectives. As the U.S. government turned its attention to Latin America in the late 1950s, they sought the support of private philanthropic organizations to "allay the feeling that Americans are doing

¹⁴⁴ FFA, index files on individuals. The files contain a list of all Foundation projects that consultants worked on.

¹⁴⁵ Information paper, "The Ford Foundation's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean," International Division, September 1967, p. 1

¹⁴⁶ This relationship took many forms. In addition to the workforce "cross-fertilization" that took place between government agencies and the Foundation, Foundation employees and government officials would participate in conferences and exchange ideas, as well as meet with state department officials about program activities. Foundation presidents participated in committees to gather support for government programs and would offer policy advice to elected officials individually and through think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations. During the early 1950s this relationship also took the form of clandestine activities involving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using Ford as a funnel for money to CIA front groups working overseas.

nothing for Latin America."¹⁴⁷ In a 1958 meeting with Ford officer Alfred Wolf, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs impressed upon Mr. Wolf that he was "anxious primarily for a demonstration of concern by the Foundation in Latin American affairs" and offered to make the State Department's staff facilities available to the foundation.¹⁴⁸ Later, in the 1960s Ford would answer the call from the government to supply "topflight businessmen to administer the [government's] foreign aid program" by recommending foundation employees for government positions.¹⁴⁹ As for their part, U.S. government officials believed that "a close collaboration between the Ford Foundation and the federal government was important not only to the objectives of the society but to effective collaboration of the public and private sectors."¹⁵⁰

Latin America: A Model for Capitalist Development

Latin American elites had been selectively applying tenets of the Western model of development since the nineteenth century when liberal ideology held sway in many, if not most, countries. However, liberalism as an economic and political doctrine faced many challenges from both elite and popular groups who protested against the impacted of liberal policies on their livelihoods. Despite divergent elite views on how best to modernize and developed economically, a fair amount of development had occurred in many countries with respect to infrastructure, industrialization, education and the creation of a professional class. The embracement of liberalism among Latin American elites and the growing influence of Positivist ideology brought capital investment in transportation, ports and utilities to support the export sector and expanded educational opportunities to train the small but

¹⁴⁷ A.C. Wolf's recollections of meeting with Mr. R.R. Rubottom, Assistance Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Washington, D.C., April 22, 1958, minutes from meeting dated April 29, 1958, FFA, Heald Presidential Files, Box 7, folder 19.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Letter from Thomas Watson Jr. (White House staff) to Henry Heald, July 20, 1961, FFA, Heald Presidential Files, box 2, folder 19.

¹⁵⁰ Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Summary of Ford Foundation-Government Meeting, April 7, 1965, p.1, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 010581

growing working and middle classes in the skills needed for an industrial economy. This development was, however, largely in the major urban centers while many rural areas remained seemingly untouched by the technological and social advances of the twentieth century.

Latin American elites found that, unless they wanted to engage in radical restructuring of the socio-economic order, foreign technology and capital would be needed to modernize. Thus, cooperation between the United States and Latin American elites in the area of technical assistance and financing of public works projects greatly expanded in the twentieth century. Many times this cooperation involved Latin American governments offering generous concessions to U.S. corporations to invest in core industries and improve communication and transportation systems to modernize those industries. Many countries saw new direct investment in mining, railroads, the sugar industry, the oil industry and the electrical power industry that brought advanced technologies to ailing industries and built modern communication and transportation systems.¹⁵¹ In addition to direct investment in industries, American capital provided loans to government wanting to upgrade and modernize their infrastructure. In Colombia, for example, U.S. capital investment to finance public utilities and other infrastructure projects came alongside U.S. direct investment in industries such as oil, cattle ranching, mining, coffee and mining. Colombian elites, despite being bitterly divided between Conservatives and Liberals, generally agreed on the need and importance of U.S. capital to modernize the country.¹⁵² In Chile, U.S. investment helped revitalize the export industries in copper and nitrates and modernize the

¹⁵¹ For an look at the processes and outcomes of the growing direct investment in Latin America by U.S. businesses during the early twentieth century in Central America, Cuba, Peru and Mexico see Thomas F. O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), or for a look at this process in Mexico see John Mason Hart, *Empire and Revolution: Americans in Mexico Since the Civil War*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

¹⁵² Stephen Randall, *The Diplomacy of Modernization: Colombian-American Relations, 1920-1940*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).

electric system, but the price for such investment was overwhelming foreign influence and control and nationalist backlashes against foreign-owned industries.¹⁵³

The influence of Positivism in government circles during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the so-called *Científicos* who believed science should be the basis for government and economic growth, led to new efforts to expand the educational system in many countries. The labor demands sparked by technological advancements in key industries, whether they were railroad, mining, oil or others, further encouraged the expansion of educational facilities, especially technical education to meet the growing demands for technically skilled labor. New faculties in medicine and engineering grew to supplement the more traditional schools of theology and law.¹⁵⁴ Technical schools emerged to meet to growing demand for engineers in the mining and oil sectors.¹⁵⁵ These schools helped create a growing middle class of professionals but did little to elevate the educational level of many who remained illiterate and poor.

Development in the fields of public health and medicine also owe a great deal to Positivist ideology among Latin American elites and to the emerging partnership between Latin American governments and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Rockefeller Foundation's interest in training Latin Americans in public health and medicine was an outgrowth of their successful work in the U.S. South controlling hookworm and building up medical schools combined with an interest in combating anti-American sentiments in Latin America with "good-neighbor" projects that brought the benefits of Western medicine.¹⁵⁶ In 1916 the Rockefeller Foundation conducted a medical survey of Latin American

¹⁵³ For a look at the nationalist backlash in various countries see O'Brien, *Revolutionary Mission*, or for Mexico see Hart, *Empires and Revolution*.

¹⁵⁴ Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, eds., *The Latin American University*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979).

¹⁵⁵ for a look at how new schools responded to the need for technically skilled labor see Pamela Suzanne Murray, "Forging a Technocratic Elite in Colombia: A History of the Escuela Nacional de Minas de Medellín, 1887-1970," PhD Dissertation, Tulane University, 1990.

¹⁵⁶ Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*.

countries to assess the region for assistance in the area of public health and medicine. This led to Rockefeller assistance to the medical school in Sao Paulo, Brazil (University of Sao Paulo) and a major hookworm eradication campaign in Brazil.¹⁵⁷ These early, very successful projects in public health and medicine, which eventually expanded to other countries, were crucial to the relationship Rockefeller would have with Latin American elites when foundation activities expanded beyond these areas. Governing elites embraced cooperative projects in public health and medicine because, where they were successful, the projects served to enhance the image of the state and the scientific community.¹⁵⁸ These elites also modified North American reform projects to suit the particular needs of their society.

Advancements in all of these areas, however, was largely contained to major urban centers or special economic enclaves run by foreign capital which resulted in large segments of the population who were not seeing the benefits of development. In addition, the deluge of foreign capital and its accompanying control over resources and politics set off periodic waves of nationalism and attempts by Latin American elites to lessen the dependence on foreign technical assistance. It was the growing hostility to U.S. influence and the nationalistic rhetoric espoused by elites, who occasionally managed to reverse foreign domination of resources, that began to worry U.S. policy makers and private foundations by the middle of the twentieth century.

A 1955 Ford Foundation Trustees Review noted several changes in the world since 1946 including the emergence of a "drive toward nationalistic self-determination... particularly in those less developed countries with non-Western cultural patterns."¹⁵⁹ While Rockefeller had been active in underdeveloped countries since its inception, other foundations began a shift to the third world as a direct response to the perceived threat of both communism and nationalism. Latin American countries

¹⁵⁷ Marcus Cueto, "Visions of Science and Development: The Rockefeller Foundation's Latin American Surveys of the 1920s," in Cueto, ed., *Missionaries of Science*.

¹⁵⁸ Joseph Cotter, "The Rockefeller Foundation's Mexican Agriculture Project: A Cross-Cultural Encounter 1943-1949," in Cueto, ed., *Missionaries of Science*.

¹⁵⁹ Dean Rusk, 1955 Trustees Review, FFA.

were a particular concern due to their close proximity and the fact that they had been free of colonial rule for over a century and were still struggling to develop into modern industrial economies. In 1955, President of the Ford Foundation Dean Rusk warned "the world situation in the second half of this century would be largely determined by what happens- politically, economically and culturally- in Latin America, Africa, the Middle-East and non-Communist Asia."¹⁶⁰

Overseas foundation activities in the 1950s focused on areas that seemed particularly important to preventing the spread of communism or areas where rising nationalism threatened to supplant U.S. allied governments with ones that took a more neutral stance in the Cold War. Though the decade of the fifties saw increasing resistance to U.S. hegemony in Latin America, Washington's policy of supporting anti-communist dictatorships over neutral democracies had managed to keep a lid on the growing demands for reform and change. However, the success of Fidel Castro's revolutionary army against Fulgencio Batista (a long time ally of the United States) in 1959 suddenly made Latin America a foreign policy priority for the U.S. government. Castro rode to power amid widespread nationalist sentiments and the belief that the United States had been a detriment to Cuban development. The Cuban revolution provided other Latin American countries with a viable alternative to capitalist development and modernization, an alternative that the United States saw as unacceptable. A survey of Latin America conducted by the CIA for the White House warned "Cuba's experiment with almost total state socialism is being watched closely by other nations in the hemisphere; and any appearance of success there could have an extensive impact on the statist trend elsewhere in the area."¹⁶¹

The Cuban revolution created a sense of urgency within the United States government to address economic and social problems in Latin America. The major foundations would get support and encouragement for their operations in Latin America from a massive foreign aid program called the

¹⁶⁰ Dean Rusk, 1955 Trustees Review, FFA.

¹⁶¹ Central Intelligence Agency, Survey of Latin America, April 1964, p. 7. LBJ Library, Papers of LBJ, NSC File, country file, Latin America, Box 1, folder: National Security File-Country File.

Alliance for Progress. Prior to 1960, the United States channeled aid to Latin American countries through military agreements, lending institutions and a few other modest technical assistance programs aimed primarily at promoting trade and containing unrest.¹⁶² The Alliance for Progress, however, represented a bold new initiative to accelerate Latin America's development in order to prevent the Cuban revolution from spreading.¹⁶³ President Kennedy understood the limits of the counter-insurgency approach the United States had taken up to this point. Though unwilling to discard old tactics, Kennedy wanted to add a large carrot to the stick in hopes of creating a middle-class revolution across Latin America.

Participating nations signed the Alliance for Progress into existence in 1961 and agreed to work toward meeting economic, political and social goals in return for almost \$20 billion in U.S. aid. Economic growth was central to Alliance goals, but social goals such as the elimination of adult illiteracy, land reform, housing, and a more equitable distribution of income spoke to the underlying causes of unrest. A new government agency established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (United States Agency for International Development-USAID) had the task of administering the aid that would flow to participating nations. Aware of the importance of supplementing their relatively meager resources committed to overseas development, the foundations eagerly supported Kennedy's call for increased foreign aid through the Citizens' Committee for International Development, a private lobby group that promoted the Foreign Assistance Act in Washington.¹⁶⁴

Concern for Latin America was also emerging at the Ford Foundation, where officials had been considering operations in Latin America prior to 1959 as part of an overall expansion in its overseas

¹⁶² The Point Four Program provided such moderate assistance. Also see Curti, *Prelude to Point Four*.

¹⁶³ Two excellent works on the Alliance For Progress are Jerome Levinson and Juan De Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970) and Stephen Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

¹⁶⁴ Documents on the Citizens' Committee For International Development, Heald Presidential files, Box 2, folder 19.

development program.¹⁶⁵ In 1957 in an effort to “act in an anticipatory way” instead of “being suspected as a quasi-government agency acting at the behest of the State Department,” the foundation identified South America as one of “five new countries or regions which we believe will be important in the next five to ten years.”¹⁶⁶ In 1958 the Foundation commissioned a group of Yale University professors to prepare a background report on Latin America and suggest possible Foundation activities. The report recommended that “Foundation support should be oriented toward development of higher education, and toward basic training and research in selected problem areas.”¹⁶⁷

The Yale report’s focus on higher education and the Foundation’s embracement of this priority reflected elements central to the modernization paradigm. Modernization theorists argued that exposure to modern societies would accelerate the development of traditional societies. This “exposure” meant importing an array of modern technology, scientific knowledge, and expertise in government into less developing countries and also introducing leaders of these nations to the American way of life through visiting fellowships. Describing the importance of training Latin Americans through exchange programs, the Yale professors noted in their report, “In addition to the technical training which they acquire, exposure to American academic standards and ways of doing things can yield valuable indirect benefits.”¹⁶⁸ Elitist at its core, the modernization paradigm assumed that the process of development would be led by the educated elite in a society.¹⁶⁹ The modernization process involved training Latin American university students in modern social sciences and the latest technology utilizing

¹⁶⁵ Concern for Latin America prior to 1959 was at least partly due to discussions the foundation was having with the state department about foundation activities in Latin America. Foundation officer Alfred Wolf assured the Assistant Secretary of State that the foundation would keep in “very close touch” with him as the foundation developed activities. The Sec. of State offered to make the State Department available to the Foundation for collaboration. Minutes from meeting with R.R. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, April 29, 1958, FFA, Heald Presidential Files, Box 7, folder 82.

¹⁶⁶ Inter-Office memo from Robert H. Moulton, January, 9, 1957, “Proposed future approach to new overseas activities”, FFA, Heald Presidential Papers, box 8, folder 98

¹⁶⁷ Report, Latin America: A Preliminary Report of Development and Development Possibilities, Sidney W. Mintz, June 1958, p.10, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 00066

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 11

¹⁶⁹ Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, p. 8.

experts in the United States, then relying on these students to lead efforts at reform and modernization in their respective countries.

When the Ford Foundation opened its Latin American office in 1959, the link between university reform and modernization had already been established in the minds of foundation officers through their programs in other parts of the world. According to Frank Sutton, Ford's Vice President of the International Division, "You can't have a modernizing country without a modernizing elite... That's one of the reasons we've given a lot of attention to university education."¹⁷⁰ As Foundation officers saw it, economic development and social change was essentially a problem of individuals and institutions.¹⁷¹ Reforming Latin America's university system and building national research institutions would produce the required technocrats and modernizing elites to jump start development. Foundation priorities assumed "the development of an adequate system of educational and training institutions is not only basic to sustained development but of great urgency in the early stages of development."¹⁷² Targeted programs that trained future leaders and scientists sought to make the most out of the Foundation's limited resources.

Other organizations shared the Foundation's prediction about Latin America becoming an important battleground in the cold war. Soon after the Yale report outlined what Ford's priorities should be in Latin America, the Institute for International Education (IIE) invited Ford to fund and participate in a conference on the inter-American exchange of human resources.¹⁷³ The attendees at

¹⁷⁰ Frank Sutton, interview by David Ransom conducted between May 1968 and June 1970, taken from David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia," in Steve Weissman, ed. with members of the Pacific Studies Center and the North American Congress on Latin America, *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1975), p. 93-116.

¹⁷¹ Memo, F.F. Hill to Henry Heald, OD Policies and Organization-Discussion memorandum, February 19, 1958, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 010460.

¹⁷² Memo, OD Policies- A discussion Outline- Some Basic Propositions and Assumptions, 1960-1961, Heald Presidential files, Box 8, folder 9.

¹⁷³ Established in 1919 with goal of promoting educational exchanges between nations, The Institute of International Education (IIE) began working in Latin America in the forties alongside U.S. government agencies promoting cultural and educational exchanges. By the late fifties, IIE had become more involved in developing nations and

the conference held in Puerto Rico in October 1958 included over three hundred participants from U.S. government agencies, U.S. foundations, and representatives from both U.S. and Latin American universities.¹⁷⁴ Conference participants discussed the major problems in Latin American education and how public and private groups could assist in exchanging the technologies and innovations needed to modernize Latin America. Though conference organizers paid lip service to the importance of Latin American contributions to this exchange, the bulk of the conference addressed how the United States could export its knowledge and ideas to Latin America.¹⁷⁵ The conference adopted recommendations to increase technical and financial assistance to Latin America, increase the bi-lateral exchange of persons through fellowships and scholarships, and elicit the cooperation of private business and foundations in these endeavors. In March 1959 the Secretary General of the Organization of American States held a meeting in Washington, D.C. to put into effect the recommendations of the conference.

At the more established Rockefeller Foundation, concern for Latin America did not suddenly appear on the radar screen in 1959, but certainly their attention to the region greatly expanded in line with USAID, Ford, and a number of other U.S. based and multi-lateral agencies. One of Rockefeller's most successful initiatives, the Mexican Agricultural Program, began decades before the Alliance for Progress was launched. In the post-war years they sought to export their success in agriculture and health to other regions of the world while at the same time expanding into new areas like the field of economics. This expansion, beginning in Latin America in 1953, was part of an overall "shift in the

saw education as key to economic, political, and social development and to containing communism. IIE president Kenneth Holland warned conference participants that the Soviet Union's "diabolically efficient" education system would attract developing nations least the United States act to "help develop an educational system that provides each person in this hemisphere with the opportunity to rise to the height of his God given abilities." Kenneth Holland, Conference Address, p. 12.

¹⁷⁴ For a list of participants and their affiliation see Conference on Inter-America Exchange of Persons, Final List of Participants, FFA, grant file 59-108.

¹⁷⁵ Minutes from Conference on Inter-American Exchange of Persons, FFA, grant 59-108.

center of gravity of the foundation's programs toward the underdeveloped countries."¹⁷⁶ Thus, the Rockefeller Foundation, rather than opening up entirely new doors as Ford had done, was merely expanding what it had started decades before. Nonetheless, programs in Latin America would grow significantly in the 1960s as new funding sources from Ford and USAID made success appear more likely.

The foundations, working closely with the U.S. government (often sharing consultants), identified key countries in Latin America that had strategic or regional significance and offered the best chances for successful modernization. Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico all appeared to "contain great growth potential" and could potentially be pace-setters for the rest of Latin America.¹⁷⁷ These countries would receive the lion's share of foundation grants from 1960 to 1980.¹⁷⁸ Being the largest and most populous country in Latin America, Brazil topped the list of foundation grant assistance, and Chile came in second. The focus on Brazil and Chile reflected the pragmatic view that these countries were on the verge of "take-off" and, with assistance, could be held out as examples of the non-communist revolution.¹⁷⁹ Though both Ford and Rockefeller had projects in almost every country in Latin America, it was the most populous countries, the ones with potential to be regional leaders, that captured the most money and attention. In these countries the foundations took an integrated approach to development which saw university reform, agricultural modernization and population control as interrelated and dependent on one another.

Conclusion

We cannot fully understand the role of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations in Latin America in the post-war years without looking back at the role they played in technocratic social change in early

¹⁷⁶ Second Interim Report- A Brief History, 1972, RAC, RF, 3.2, 900, box 30, folder 162. There is a marked expansion of Latin American grants in 1953 and again in 1957- See Rockefeller Annual Reports on-line.

¹⁷⁷ Report- Latin America and the Caribbean-Summary, p.1, Heald Presidential files, box 7, folder 82.

¹⁷⁸ Out of a total of approximately 200 million in grants to Latin American from 1960 to 1980, these four countries received over 100 million. FFA, Annual Reports, 1960-1980

¹⁷⁹ Report, Latin America and the Caribbean- Summary, p.1, Heald Presidential files, Box 7, folder 82

twentieth-century America. The foundations emerged in response to the upheavals and inequalities created by industrialization and applied top-down reform in an attempt to solve social and economic problems. Some general purpose foundations, like Rockefeller, looked abroad almost immediately and sought to export American advances in medicine and health to support America's growing economic interests around the globe. Whether engaging in activities at home or abroad, the foundations operated in a unique space where private interests and public good intersected- or so foundation trustees argued. Collaboration between private foundations and the government grew in the interwar years, fostered by a new sense of America's place in the world and the potential benefits of exporting American culture to other countries. By the time World War II had ended, the interests of the United States government and large philanthropic foundations were almost indistinguishable. Global reform had long been the unwritten mandate of the Rockefeller Foundation, and when Ford joined forces with them in 1950 modernizing the third world appeared possible. If the foundations could succeed anywhere certainly it would be in a region where the United States had long held hegemony- Latin America.

In setting the agenda for projects in Latin America both foundations relied on the elitist model of social change evident in modernization theory. For Rockefeller, this was simply how they had always operated, and in many ways the trendy new development paradigm was already their *modus operandi*. At Ford, their embracement of modernization theory occurred simultaneously with their global expansion, and so the theory offered them direction and structure as they struggled with how to fulfill their mandate. The model of social change they promoted dictated the projects and fields they funded and explains the focus of the following chapters. The integrated approach North American reformers took meant economic and social problems would be attacked through numerous channels. University development and reform stood at the center of this model, as technocratic change from above necessitated educated and trained individuals to lead the country. In addition, education was central to the success of programs in agricultural modernization and population control programs, so universities

and research centers received much attention. The following chapter will examine efforts to remake Latin Americas university system, a reform central to all others.

Chapter 3

Institution Building and Technocratic Change: University Reform in Latin America

In 2011 university students in Chile and Colombia took to the streets in massive protests against the state of higher education in both countries, demanding a reversal of decades of privatization of higher education and asking for government action to increase the quality and lower the price of a college education.¹⁸⁰ This most recent student movement reveals much about the outcomes of the significant push by North American aid organizations to reform universities throughout Latin America, not the least of which is the failure of these efforts to adequately resolve the problems with higher education. Some of the student demands, like student representation on university councils, echo the calls of earlier student movements dating back to 1918. Other demands, like the end to privatization of higher education, are reactions to more recent trends. The mobilization of thousands in the street demanding educational reforms is a far cry from the top-down process envisioned by Ford and Rockefeller decades earlier. Popular uprisings resulting in bottom-up reform is what the foundations sought to avoid when they invested millions of dollars in Latin American universities in the post-war years. This chapter will examine the ideology, methods and results of foundation projects in university reform and analyze the interplay between domestic and international forces that shaped the outcomes. The efforts put forth by North American reformers to remake the university system in Latin America was part of the much larger agenda for global reform. Universities would be the conduit through which technocrats would be trained and ideology about capitalist development would be disseminated. However, the reforms pushed by the foundations sometimes unleashed new forces when combined

¹⁸⁰ "Grito de amor y de protesta," *Semana.com*, November 12, 2011, "Dump Colombia education reforms, thousands demand," *SFGate.com*, Friday, November 11, 2011, "Chile: Protest in Santiago Grows Violent," *New York Times*, August 9, 2011.

with increasing globalization, and many of the seeds of the current protests were planted during these years of great optimism about the potential of universities to be the engine of modernization.

Engines of Modernization: Latin American universities and national development

The first universities established in Latin America were not a catalyst for modernization but rather a bulwark against it. They were institutions that sought to preserve the authority of the Catholic Church in society and ensure Spain's cultural and economic dominance over the indigenous people. Universities served the Spanish Crown and Catholic Church in their colonization of the Americas by training elites in the traditional fields of theology, law, and medicine.¹⁸¹ Theology was privileged over law and medicine, as universities were first and foremost religious institutions that produced new members for the priesthood. A second important function of the universities however was to train civil servants for the expanding bureaucracy needed to run the colonies efficiently for Spain. Thus, law was a major faculty in most universities. Medicine was also taught, though ranked low in terms of prestige against the other two main faculties. For much of its existence the university system in Latin America was an inward looking institution designed to educate the children of elites in the traditional professions of law and medicine. Owing to the close relationship between Church and State during the colonial period the nature of the university was neither public nor private, rather it was a colonial institution that served the needs of the Spanish bureaucracy and Catholic Church.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ For background on the Latin American University see Harold R.W. Benjamin, *Higher Education in the American Republics*, (McGraw Hill, New York: 1965), Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, *The Latin American University*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), Darcy. Robeiro, *La Universidad Latinoamericana*, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Biblioteca de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1971), Orlando Albornoz, *Education and Society in Latin America*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

¹⁸² Daniel Levy, *Higher Education and the State in Latin America: Private Challenges to Public Dominance*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 28.

Independence from Spain brought the first major restructuring of the university system in Latin America. With an increasing need to create national unity, education became an important arena for political battles. This led to growing tensions between Church and State that would escalate into all out war in many countries. These conflicts played out on the political level as Conservatives and Liberals vied for the power to direct state development. The Conservatives, being the bearer of Spanish tradition, sought to maintain the state's close association with the Catholic Church and protect the Church's monopoly on education. The Liberals, seeing the Catholic Church as an impediment to modernization and development, made the legal disestablishment of the Catholic Church one of their primary concerns. By the late 19th century Liberals had gained the upper hand through most of Latin America and the public-private differentiation of universities came into being.¹⁸³

The anti-clericalism of 19th century liberalism dramatically altered the university system in Latin America, stripping the Church of its historical control over universities and creating public universities that were controlled and funded by the state. Furthermore, universities began orienting themselves toward more secular purposes such as the professions of law and medicine.¹⁸⁴ Latin American elites looked to the French model of the universities in restructuring higher education. The French model itself had undergone a significant metamorphosis during the French Revolution resulting in secularization, increased student participation in the power structure, and curriculum changes that made degrees more relevant to current society.¹⁸⁵ Latin American universities adopted only certain elements of the French model while jettisoning those elements that represented a radical departure from the traditional social purpose of the colonial university which mainly served to legitimize social

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Hanns-Albert Steger, "The European Background", in Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weathermore, *The Latin American University*, p. 93-94.

status.¹⁸⁶ This selective transfer of the French model downplayed the research function of the university and elevated teaching to singular importance within most universities. According to Maier and Weatherhead:

“In contrast to the French system, the curriculum in the universities of Latin America showed little sensitivity to the need of society. The professional training program was artificially superimposed on the colonial university. There was no concomitant process of industrialization to inspire professional education and to encourage vigorous scientific research to maintain and enhance its impetus.”¹⁸⁷

Without state or industry incentives to direct more energy toward research the privileging of the professions and the diminished status of research within the university became hallmark of the Latin American university going into the twentieth century. Teaching took precedence over the production of new knowledge and higher education focused on more practical curriculum demanded by the professions.

Other hallmarks of Latin American higher education in the early twentieth century included a dependence on the state for financial support combined with a general low level of funding and low or no tuition at national universities. Compared with the United States, Latin American governments historically exercised more control over their universities, especially the premier national universities.¹⁸⁸ Most national universities were funded overwhelmingly by the state, and universities, many of which did not charge tuition, had few independent or private sources of money. Private religious universities sometimes received state funding, though that varied from country to country. In Chile, for example, the Universidad Nacional received seventy percent of its funding from the state, ten percent from a

¹⁸⁶ For a discussion of the French and European influence on universities in Latin American see Steger in Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, *The Latin American University*.

¹⁸⁷ Steger in Maier and Weatherhead, p. 96-97.

¹⁸⁸ Harold R. W. Benjamin, *Higher Education in the American Republics*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965).

small tuition charge and services offered and twenty percent from private funding.¹⁸⁹ The Chilean state also funded private universities at about fifty percent.¹⁹⁰ In Argentina, where students at the National University paid no tuition, the state provided ninety-five percent of the funding.¹⁹¹ In Colombia, the state also provided the bulk of funding for public universities, though private universities didn't fare as well in government funding as they did in Chile.

While Latin American universities were historically dependent on the national government for their income, the general levels of funding for higher education remained comparatively low, even as demand began to increase by mid-century. For example, in the 1960s, when most Latin American governments had already begun a major increase in funding for education in general, government funding levels still only ranged from 1-3 percent of GNP.¹⁹² By comparison, the United States government, which had also embarked on a major increase in funding for education after World War II, was spending between 4-6 percent of GNP between 1960 and 1980. This difference became more marked by the fact that U.S. universities also had many more sources of independent (tuition) and private sources of income. The Latin American system was further hampered by its elitist nature. Government funding for primary education was severely lacking, and generally only the well off could afford to give their children the required secondary education needed to enter the universities.¹⁹³ While many universities were free of tuition, most poor Latin Americans could not get the secondary education needed to take advantage of this.

As the twentieth century dawned demands for a more egalitarian system that was more responsive to students and society would produce the second major shift in the university system. Long

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 57. figures reflect funding at mid 20th century

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., figures reflect funding at mid 20th century

¹⁹¹ Ibid., figures reflect funding at mid 20th century

¹⁹² William Adrian, "The Tuition Dilemma in the Latin American University," *International Review of Education*, 29:4 (1983), pp. 449-464. The outliers on this were Cuba at 7 percent of GNP and Peru at 5.1 percent of GNP.

¹⁹³ for example see the case of Brazil in Jerome Levinson and Juan De Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 282-295.

before U.S. foundations pinned their hopes of a middle-class revolution on reforming the university system in Latin America, students in Latin American universities saw the potential for social change in radically restructuring the higher education system. The growing demands and frustrations over the elitist and hierarchical nature of universities in Latin America coalesced into a movement for university reform led by students. The University Reform Movement of 1918 had its genesis at the National University of Córdoba (UNC) in Argentina where students went on strike in 1918 to protest the closed, authoritarian and backward looking nature of the university system.¹⁹⁴ Their demands for more competent faculty hired on the basis of merit, student participation in university policy making and faculty hiring, and student choices in courses and professors among other things was an attack on a university system that had failed to modernize. The student protesters saw the university as the antithesis of all that was modern and democratic : an authoritarian, inward-looking institution controlled by elite families.

Soon the protests at UNC spread to other universities in Argentina and across Latin America, and the demands for reform at UNC were echoed elsewhere. While many of the specific demands revolved around student power vis-a-vis the administration and professors, some of the broader aims of the movement were geared toward changing the social function and basic mission of the university.¹⁹⁵ Instead of simply being a right of passage that conferred degrees to legitimate social status for the elite the Student Reform Movement sought to make the university into an institution that served broader society. According to José Luis Romero student reformers felt, "the university served society if it prepared men who would place themselves at its service-men who were aware of society's new

¹⁹⁴ For various interpretations of the University reform Movement see Richard Walter, *Student Politics in Argentina: The University Reform and Its Effects, 1918-1964*, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), Mark J. Van Aken, "University Reform before Córdoba," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 51, no. 2 (1969), 233-53, José Luis Romero, "University Reform," in Maier and Weatherhead, *The Latin American University*, Natalia Milanesio, "Gender and Generation: The University Reform Movement in Argentina, 1918," *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Winter 2005, pp. 505-529.

¹⁹⁵ Romero, "University Reform."

problems, who were sensitive to the restiveness and needs of the masses, and who accepted and identified with the process of change.”¹⁹⁶

The University Reform Movement had a varying degree of success across Latin America, enjoying its most marked success in the country that it originated in, Argentina. The reform period that spanned from 1918 to the 1930s saw increased participation by students in the decision-making structure, greater university autonomy and improvement in faculty competence through examination and competition.¹⁹⁷ One of the most lasting impacts of the movement on Latin American public universities was the idea of *cogobierno*, or student representation on the governing council.¹⁹⁸ Though not adopted uniformly in all countries or universities, *cogobierno* marked a significant shift in the power structure within the university, one that would have an impact on future reform efforts.

Despite some achievements, the University Reform Movement ultimately failed to fundamentally revolutionize the university system in Latin America. In many countries authoritarian regimes halted or rolled back reforms at national universities. When North American philanthropic foundations picked up the unfinished reform agenda in the post WW II years they had a more technocratic solution in mind. The Reform Movement of 1918 envisioned students leading the charge for democratization of education and a revamping of the university’s mission and purpose to serve society in a more productive way. The foundations also wanted to revamp the universities mission to serve the cause of national development, but they did not see the catalyst for this change in empowering the students, rather they envisioned a more top-down approach with foundation money

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Marcella Mollis, “Argentina”, in Philip G. Altbach, *Contemporary Higher Education: International Issues for the twenty-first century*, (New York: Garland, 1997), p. 155-56, also see Richard Walter, *Student Politics in Argentina: The University Reform and Its Effects*.

¹⁹⁸ This change was mostly seen at National public universities and less frequently at private and Catholic universities, which managed to resist most forms of power sharing with the students.

and North American examples being the catalyst for change. This approach reflected both the way in which American universities operated, without student input, and the overall hierarchical approach to reform taken in Latin America.

“No tenemos el tiempo para empezar con la “escuelita rural”¹⁹⁹

By the early 1960s North American reformers saw educational reform, particularly university reform, as an urgent matter. The explosive population growth was putting demands on an already inadequate system at all levels. Education would become a crucial part of U.S. global reform, and university development would be the essential conduit for social change, especially with regard to modernizing agriculture and promoting population control and family planning. Before Ford and Rockefeller had decided to focus attention on university development, the United States government had already begun broadening their limited technical assistance programs. Eventually they would embrace a "worldwide educational endeavor" that was "broad and long-range" in its vision.²⁰⁰

Assistance to Latin America in the first part of the twentieth century included fellowships to individuals who wanted to study in a U.S. universities and technical education primarily in the fields of public health and agriculture. In particular, American efforts in Cuba and Haiti to remake the educational system as part of their nation building and "Americanization" projects in those countries emphasized primary and technical training.²⁰¹ In Cuba, the U.S. government used primary education reform to indoctrinate Cubans into a world view that accepted the United States as a model for all other countries. They trained Cuban teachers in the United States, and Cubans learned the history of the United States and Cuba as told by North Americans.²⁰² In Haiti, U.S. military reformers focused educational reforms on

¹⁹⁹ Rudolph P. Atcon, *La Universidad Latino Americana*, (Bogotá: Editorial A B C, 1966), p. 11

²⁰⁰ Dean Rusk, Chairman of the President's Task Force on International Education, letter to President Johnson, L.B.J. Library, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 10 (1411), folder: McPherson: International Education.

²⁰¹ See Louis A. Pérez Jr., *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 159-161.

expanding technical education, believing Haitians were not capable of university training.²⁰³ By mid-century, North American reformers began to expand beyond primary and technical education with a focus on higher education, seeing it as key to reforms in other areas.

The Point IV program, initiated by President Harry Truman in 1950, dramatically expanded development aid to underdeveloped countries and announced to the world America's vision of global reform based on capital investment and the transfer of modern technology and institutions to countries stuck in more traditional economic and social arrangements.²⁰⁴ Under Point IV the strategy of "technical cooperation" would link North American universities with Latin American universities and governments that sought help with technical problems, not only in the more traditional fields such as medicine and agriculture but also in new fields such as education and public administration. In 1954, the public advisory board to the U.S. Director of the Foreign Operations Administration called for the most comprehensive program to date to assist Latin America:

In Latin America, United States technical cooperation is just completing its 13th year.* Here many of the cooperative techniques have been worked out which are being used throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world. ..When U.S. technical cooperation first got under way in Latin America (thirteen years ago), it was directed to the basic fields of agriculture, education and public health. While much was accomplished in these fields, the limitations of the cooperation were such that it could not create a corps of national technicians large enough to cope with the expanding problems confronting them now. The concept of balanced economic development, the implementation of which is being more and more recognized as essential, has pointed up the necessity for, and prompted a request for assistance in, a wider range of developmental activities, including industry, labor, transportation, power development, general economic planning, public administration, financial organization and statistics.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Rayford W. Logan, "Education in Haiti," *Journal of Negro History*, 15:4 (October 1930), pp. 401-460.

²⁰⁴ for an overview of Point IV see Walter M. Daniels, *The Point Four Program*, (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1951).

²⁰⁵ Public Advisory Board, Board Document, January 22, 1954, Latin America- Regional Summary, p. 1-3, NARA, RG 469, Executive Secretariate FOA, Public Advisory Board, Panel Meetings, Box 3, Folder: LA Regional Summary. The Public Advisory Board of the ICA was established as part of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. Its members are appointed by the president and consist of private individuals in American society that head important business and educational associations.

A 1958 report by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) entitled "World Wide Review of Education" put the problem more bluntly: "That in the developing countries the trained human resources required at any level for rapid economic, political and social development do not exist...and the real problem is the long range one of reshaping (and in some cases, creating) the necessary basic educational systems."²⁰⁶

This expanded assistance under Point IV (under which ICA administered much of the aid) relied heavily on contracts with North American universities to supply the needed technical help to Latin America. The ICA funded contracts between North American universities and Latin American governments and universities were deemed "integral parts of the overall U.S. technical assistance program in a given country," and required North American academics with a "certain degree of missionary spirit."²⁰⁷ The contracts included appropriations for " (a) provision of American professors to assist in curriculum building, research, extension, and teaching; (b) training of host country professors both in the country concerned and in the U.S.; and (c) provision of necessary books and equipment."²⁰⁸ By the early 1960s, the growing importance of higher education in U.S. aid was reflected in the percentage of overall education projects the U.S. had in Latin America, a jump from 28% devoted to professional and higher education in 1957 to 37% in 1960.²⁰⁹ While the early years of the Alliance for Progress focused on primary and secondary education, U.S. AID (the new name for the U.S. agency that handled foreign aid) still outspent Ford and Rockefeller in university development by a ratio of 4 to 1 and 6 to 1 respectively.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶ World-wide Review of FY 59-60 USOM Submissions on Education, December 18th, 1958, p. 2, NARA, RG 469, Mission to Cuba, Office of the Director, Subject Files 54-61, Box 8, Folder: Education (OVO).

²⁰⁷ "Technical Assistance Through Inter-University Contracts," by J. Russell Andrus, Deputy Chief, Education Division, no date (assumed 1956 due to other documents in folder), NARA, RG 286, Office of Technical Cooperation, Education files 58-63, Box 116, Folder: Education and Technical Assistance, p. 2 and p. 12.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁰⁹ U.S. Dollar Obligations for AID Education Projects FY 1957-1961, NARA, RG 286, Office of Technical Cooperation, Education files 58-63, Box 116, Folder: Education Program History.

²¹⁰ Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 39.

The new expanded mission of university development that U.S.AID embraced, as opposed to narrowly defined technical projects, also tied the work of the foundations closer to that of the U.S. government. Through the university contract program U.S. AID would work closely with foundation officials in their selection of universities (many times foundations were alerted to the potential of a university through U.S. agencies) and in their selection of projects at the university. Academics in U.S. universities also provided crucial links for collaboration between the foundations and the U.S. government, and in many cases academics would be recruited for positions within the foundations. On occasion, the collaboration between North American reformers included not only U.S. government agencies, U.S. universities and foundations but North American businesses as well. In one of the largest collaborative efforts to develop the civil engineering departments of eleven Latin American universities the cooperating entities on the North American side included Massachusetts Institute of Technology, U.S. AID, the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Creole Foundation, Shell Oil Company and Dow Chemical. The project included 75 M.I.T. staff members and approximately 150 Latin Americans.²¹¹ Most projects were not this large, but similar ties between governmental agencies, U.S. universities and the foundations were found in almost every Latin American university the foundations had programs in.

Unlike U.S. AID, which devoted significant resources to primary and secondary education, foundation officials knew they did not have the resources to directly attack the issue of basic education.²¹² In the 1960s only about one third of Latin American children enrolled in primary school finished their education, yet resolving this problem was not the focus of Ford or Rockefeller

²¹¹ *Inter-American University Cooperation: A Survey of Programs of Cooperation Between Institutions of Higher Education in the United States and Latin America*, Department of Educational Affairs, Pan American Union, (Washington: 1968).

²¹² for an example of AID's programs to develop primary and secondary education see Héctor Lindo-Fuentes, "Educational Television in El Salvador and Modernisation Theory," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 41, Nov., 2009, pp. 757-792.

philanthropic activity.²¹³ The foundations' vision for social change depended on having cooperative leaders in the country willing to push forward the reform agenda. In the eyes of Ford and Rockefeller the primary and secondary educational system would not improve without reform minded leaders who would pursue scientific research on the problems of the educational system. While foundation officers saw the lack of opportunities at the lower levels a large barrier to social progress, the real problem, one that fit within the foundations' idea of strategic philanthropy, was a lack of leaders and research to guide solutions. Thus, the less expensive route of training academics was also the most effective. Accordingly, foundation assistance was directed toward universities and training academics that would become technocrats, but with the assumption this would eventually lead to reforming the educational system at all levels and usher in a modern society. The foundations sought to transplant the U.S. model of a university, one that was controlled and managed by elites and not the popular classes, in Latin America and thus create institutions that mirrored the hierarchies in the United States.

This top down approach to education which privileged assistance to universities instead of primary education was pervasive in many agencies working on Latin American development. This isn't surprising given the dominance of modernization theory and its elitist model of change, but the top-down approach of change through training elites had been a mainstay of U.S. efforts to reform countries in the first half of the twentieth century and it was merely a continuation of beliefs about social reform. These earlier attempts at nation building always involved some type of cultivation and education of elites with only a marginal concern for the type of development that would reach the majority of the citizens.²¹⁴ This strategy emerged from a belief that a country's elite were the best route to stability

²¹³ This number only includes those enrolled in school. There were approximately 27 million children in 1967 not even enrolled in primary school. For a analysis of the problems in primary and secondary education and attempts by the U.S. government to improve literacy rates and school enrollments through the Alliance for Progress see Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way*.

²¹⁴ See for example the exclusionary nation building efforts by the United States and North American missionaries in Nicaragua in Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

given that structural changes that would benefit most would likely cause instability that would be difficult to contain. Thus, earlier technical assistance programs achieved more than just educating Latin Americans in technical skills, they also cultivated relationships with elite sectors and exposed them to American culture. The foundations too had long accepted this idea. From Rockefeller's forays into China medical education and Mexican agriculture to the university reform efforts of the 1960s, global reform would unfold under the direction of an educated elite. According to Ford Foundation officer Frosty Hill, "the central problem in economic development is the development of individuals and institutions."²¹⁵ Thus, university development that focused on both developing individuals *and* institutions was seen as the most expedient route to economic growth. In keeping with their focus on strategic philanthropy, foundations made explicit decisions not to be in the business of economic aid or welfare programs. For example, in the field of education Ford limited itself initially to "a) strengthening and reorienting of a few carefully selected existing educational institutions and b) to testing and demonstrating what might be prototypes of new kinds of educational institutions and programs."²¹⁶ With this approach Ford hoped to limit the scope of their programs in an effort to concentrate funding and be successful in the projects they funded.

Foundation assessments were remarkably similar to assessments in other North American organizations promoting educational reform in Latin America. Rudolph Atcon's influential *La Universidad Latino Americana*, first published in 1958, presents the argument of North American development specialists succinctly:

"Lógicamente, sería bonito si en la construcción de un sistema educativo pudiéramos comenzar por el principio, es decir, al nivel primario, y lenta pero seguramente construir de ahí para arriba un sistema nuevo y moderno de la educación en general. Pero ni vivimos en un vacío y no tratamos con un experiment de laboratorio, en que pueda ser montado lógicamente y entonces adaptado, paso por

²¹⁵ "OD Policies and Organization-Discussion Memorandum," F.F. Hill to Henry Heald, February 19, 1958, FFA, Heald Papers, 010460, p. 1.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4

paso, a las exigencias de una situación idealmente controlada. Estemos obligados a tartar con una humanidad viva, inquieta y creciente la que, en cada Segundo que pasa, sigue creciendo y creciendo en número, hambre, y necesidades.....Si logramos efectuar en la Universidad mutaciones controladas, de acuerdo con lineamientos deseados y no al azar, es probable que a su debido tiempo éstas sean transmitidas, de modo ordenado y armónico, a cada institución social y a todos los medios corporativos de producción, sin correr el peligro de chocar con el vigente cuerpo de creencias. Entonces habremos logrado lo que nos propusimos conseguir, sin violencia y con un espíritu genuino de ayuda técnica a los demás.”²¹⁷

Atcon's prescriptions for development were popular among North Americans working on problems of third world development.²¹⁸ They also spoke directly to those who embraced the modernization paradigm in hopes that controlled reform would prevent radical alternatives like the Cuba example.

Not all those studying educational reform embraced this elitist model, especially in Latin America itself. The Cuban model of educational reform after the revolution stood as the counter to prescriptions from North American reformers. In addition, there were Latin American academics and scholars who wanted to chart a different course between the U.S. model and the Cuban model. Probably the most well received analysis of the university system in Latin America in this regard was Darcy Ribeiro's *La Universidad Latinoamericana*. Ribeiro's critique of the university system was very similar to North American advisors, and many of his recommendations appeared to align with foundation assessments.²¹⁹ However, Ribeiro argued the process as carried out by foreign organizations resulted in a superficial modernization that only reinforced Latin America's dependency.

Still, enough Latin American reformers agreed with North American critiques to give the position domestic support. Many of those local reformers were people in positions to affect change, like rectors

²¹⁷ Rudolph Atcon, *La Universidad Latino Americana: Propuesta para un enfoque integralde desarrollo social, economico y educacional en América Latina*, (Bogotá: ECO Revista de la Cultura de Occidente, 1966).

²¹⁸ Atcon served as an advisor for UNESCO, the U.S. State Department, and OEA. In the early 60s he prepare a report on education for the Alliance for Progress. The resulting report later became *La Universidad Latino Americana*. And was distributed widely in Latin America.

²¹⁹ In 1962 he founded the University of Brasilia which was modeled in many ways after the U.S. university, including a two years basic studies program.

or politicians. Even before North American reformers had articulated their intentions to remake the university system, university administrators in Latin America had begun focusing on some of the same issues. In 1954, the rector of Colombia's National University, Jorge Vergara Delgado, noted the problems that were later echoed by Atcon:

The students here do not come to a university, they come to a faculty that teaches them a trade with which to gain a living..Not even within a single Faculty does there exist the indispensable integration of the various sciences that would give a complete professional development. The professors of the same Faculty do not have the opportunity to meet and integrate their disciplines, much less those of different Faculties. There are no actions of the University as a whole. Each Dean matriculates his own students and delivers his diplomas without the student having ever touched or felt the university in the normal course of his career.²²⁰

In addition to the lack of integration so common in North American universities, the dearth of full-time faculty also troubled Latin American university administrators. Colombia's National University rector, José Félix Patiño, called the over use of part-time faculty "the gravest evil that besets our university."²²¹ Regionally (Latin America), the percentage of full-time faculty averaged an abysmal 15 percent.²²² Some new private universities, like Colombia's Universidad de los Andes, made the improvement of this ratio a focus from the start and had close to 45 percent of its faculty listed as full-time. Chile's semi-private Universidad de Católica, however, had only two full-time faculty members in 1960. The reliance on professionals who taught classes "on the side" was systemic and seen by both North American reformers and South American reformers as a major problem.

²²⁰ Rector Jorge Vergara Delgado, "Problemas de la Universidad y sus soluciones a partir de 1955," (unpublished memorandum dirigido a la Presidencia de la República por el Rector, December 14,1954) quoted in Magnusson, "Reform at the National University in Colombia," p. 39.

²²¹ José Félix Patiño, *Hacia la Universidad del Desarrollo*, p. 64, quoted in Magnusson, "Reform at the National University," p. 108.

²²² Figures here come from Daniel Levy, *To Export Progress*, pp. 174-192

While the idea of academic exchanges of people was not a new idea in the 1960s, having been a large part of the U.S. government's Point IV aid program and existing on a smaller scale with numerous private organizations since the 1920s, the scale and scope of programs greatly expanded during the fifties.²²³ More importantly, massive efforts to not just train individuals but build institutions suggest a more systemic approach to the old idea of training elites. While educating elites in the United States often resulted in fellowship recipients absorbing American values, institutionalizing values and academic culture through university reform offered a more systemic and hopefully permanent approach. By the early 1960s the idea of targeting a few select universities in various countries for institution building as a cost effective way to produce change was gaining traction.

At the Rockefeller Foundation assistance to universities in Latin America was already occurring in the 1950s, a by-product of the foundations well established programs in agriculture discussed in the previous chapter and in health and medicine.²²⁴ Rockefeller grants to various countries during the 1950s focused primarily on projects in agricultural development or in the field of science and medicine, but by 1957 other areas were beginning to receive attention, most notably the field of economics. Much of the money coming from Rockefeller ended up flowing through various Latin American universities and research institution chosen by Rockefeller, but no coordinated effort to build up whole universities was in place. Discussions at the foundation during the late 1950s would change this.

²²³ Notable precursors to academic exchanges and technical training programs include the Rockefeller Foundation's activities in health and agriculture beginning in the 1920s, Latin American fellowship programs operated by The Institute of International Education beginning in 1929, the Kellogg Foundation programs in medical sciences in the 1940s, the International Educational Exchange Service operated by the U.S. Department of State after 1948, and finally, the Point IV Program for technical assistance after 1950. The official beginning of U.S. government involvement in technical training programs for foreigners dates to 1942 with a small program operated by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Point Program launched a much expanded program of technical assistance and training in the 1950s. For a general history of inter-American exchanges see "A summary review of the history of inter-American exchanges," Conference on Inter-American Exchange of Persons, San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 14-18, 1958, FFA, Grant Files, 59-108, p. 1-7.

²²⁴ For a history of the Rockefeller Foundation's activities in Latin America from the 1920s to the 1940s see Marcos Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*.

In 1960 the Trustees were convinced that a new operating program that focused on concentrating support to a few select universities was needed.²²⁵ These core universities would receive money to improve and reform the whole institution, not just specific departments, with the hope that they would then become pacesetters for the region. The University development program took shape in the early 1960s and was “based on the premise that the major barriers to social and economic goals in much of the world lay in an inadequate transfer of knowledge, methods, and materials.”²²⁶ Furthermore, foundation officials felt this transfer of knowledge must occur as rapidly as possible in order to close the widening gap between expectations and reality in developing countries. Universities in the United States had historically served as a place of innovation and new knowledge to guide American industrial development and help identify and redress social problem. Therefore, Rockefeller officers felt “universities must be reckoned with as a force without which progress is impossible.”²²⁷ In 1963 the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation included University Development as one of the five major program areas, selecting universities in Colombia and Chile for assistance under the program.

Similar discussions about the importance of Latin American universities were being held during the late 1950s at the Ford Foundation. In 1958 the Ford Foundation commissioned a group of Yale University professors to prepare a background report on Latin America and suggest possible foundation activities. The report recommended that “Foundation support should be oriented toward development of higher education, and toward basic training and research in selected problem areas.”²²⁸ The Yale

²²⁵ Up to the 1950s Rockefeller’s activities in Latin America had been almost exclusively concentrated on the medical sciences and agriculture. Rockefeller began offering fellowships for training Latin Americans beginning in 1917 and also began sending Americans to Latin America to oversee training in the 1920s. During the 1950s they began to broaden their range to include small grants in the fields of history, literature, and more substantial grants in agronomy and economics. They also greatly expanding the number of countries they had programs in. See Annual Reports, RAC, and on-line at <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/annual-reports>.

²²⁶ Report, “Evolution of the Foundation’s University Development Program,” November 1972, RAC, RF, R.G. 6, 3.2, series 900, Program and Policy, Box 63, Folder 350, p. 9..

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 13

²²⁸ Report: Latin America: A Preliminary Report of Development and Development Possibilities, Sidney W. Mintz, June 1958, p.10, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 00066.

report's focus on higher education and the foundation's acceptance of this focus reflected elements central to the modernization paradigm. Modernization theorists argued that exposure to modern societies would accelerate the development of traditional societies. This "exposure" meant importing an array of modern technology, scientific knowledge, and expertise in government into less developed countries and also introducing leaders of these nations to the American way of life through visiting fellowships. Describing the importance of training Latin Americans through exchange programs, the Yale professors noted in their report, "In addition to the technical training which they acquire, exposure to American academic standards and ways of doing things can yield valuable indirect benefits."²²⁹ Elitist at its core, the modernization paradigm assumed that the process of development would be led by the educated elite in a society.²³⁰ These men would be trained in modern social sciences and the latest technology by experts in the United States and then use their newly acquired skills to reform and modernize their respective countries.

When the Ford Foundation opened its Latin America office in 1959 the link between university reform and modernization had already been established in the minds of foundation officers through their programs in other parts of the world. According to Frank Sutton, Ford's vice president of the international division, "You can't have a modernizing country without a modernizing elite...That's one of the reason we've given a lot of attention to university education."²³¹ As foundation officers saw it, economic development and social change was essentially a problem of individuals and institutions.²³² Reforming Latin America's university system and building national research institutions would produce the required technocrats and modernizing elites to jump start development. Foundation priorities

²²⁹ Ibid., p., 11.

²³⁰ Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, p. 8.

²³¹ Frank Sutton, interview by David Ransom conducted between May 1968 and June 1970, taken from David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia," in Steve Weissman, ed. with members of the Pacific Studies Center and the North American Congress on Latin America, *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1975), p. 93-116.

²³² F.F. Hill to Henry Heald, OD Policies and Organization-Discussion memorandum, February 19, 1958, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 010460.

assumed “the development of an adequate system of educational and training institutions is not only basic to sustained development but of great urgency in the early stages of development.”²³³ Given the foundation’s limited resources (compared to the United States government’s foreign aid programs), targeted programs that trained future leaders and scientists gave the most bang for the buck. As the International Division explained:

We believe the Foundation’s resources will be used most efficiently if they are applied to leadership and other elite groups. This hypothesis leads us, for example, to support teaching, research, and application of economics and political science and to decline insistent appeals that the Foundation subsidizes community-development projects and youth groups.²³⁴

Though the Yale report commented on the major problems with secondary education in Latin America and the deficits in primary education could hardly go unnoticed, the foundation felt these issues would involve too great a commitment of foundation resources.²³⁵ Besides, the overseas development office did not often involve itself in programs for the popular classes, preferring the trickle-down theory of foreign assistance. When it did get involved in secondary education, the foundation did so through the universities and for the purpose of ensuring that students entering the universities had been properly prepared for instruction. According to the Yale report, “Secondary education thus

²³³ OD Policies- A discussion Outline- Some Basic Propositions and Assumptions, 1960-1961, Heald Presidential files, Box 8, folder 9.

²³⁴ Information Paper, The Ford Foundation’s Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, September 1967, p. 2, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 002409.

²³⁵ In the field of education, the most glaring and destabilizing issue was widely perceived to be the lack of access to primary education. Describing the educational system in Latin America as a “tinderbox,” Jerome Levinson and Juan De Onis point to Brazil where “only two-thirds of Brazilian children in the elementary school –age group (seven to eleven) are ever enrolled...No more than 19 percent of the children enrolled in the first grade between 1952 and 1955 reached the fourth grade.” Jerome Levinson and Juan De Onis, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972. p, 282-83. After a decade of U.S. government assistance and attention to the problem, the literacy rate for all of Latin America stood at only sixty-six percent in the late 1960s..

becomes a bottleneck limiting both the number of students who can go on to universities and the level of instruction which they are prepared to absorb.”²³⁶

By 1963 the task of institutional building that had started with a rather piecemeal approach had developed at both the Ford and the Rockefeller foundations into a focused effort to create several strong universities throughout Latin America that would set the bar for modern research oriented universities. The goal, however, was not simply building up the research abilities of these institutions. Foundation officials wanted to change the entire model of university culture and practice to emulate the university system in the United States. This was a much more complex undertaking given the quite different historical development of the universities in Latin America and the traditional social functions they served.

Developing a Reform Agenda

Foundation assessments of the university system in Latin America could hardly escape the normative assumption that the Latin American university could and should be more like its U.S. counterpart. Consequently, in constructing a plan of action to address the inadequacies of the universities in Latin America, evaluators focused on reforms that would make the structure and function of the university as an institution more like universities in the United States. Foundation assessments linked problems with Latin American universities to the structures inherited from Europe noting, “reforms are hampered because the European tradition has imbued Latin American universities with features like the independence and isolation of faculties and with attitudes like the unwillingness to relate teaching to contemporary realities which are in sharp contrast to United States patterns. In

²³⁶ Report: Latin America: A Preliminary Report of Development and Development Possibilities, Sidney W. Mintz, June 1958, p.10, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 00066

addition, practices of part-time professorships, narrow professionalism, and little regard for students make many Latin American universities inferior to their European model.”²³⁷

Before the universities could produce the sort of elites that foundation officials hoped would lead their countries through the process of modernization, the universities themselves would have to become institutions dedicated to advancing research agendas that privileged socially relevant and policy-oriented research. In fact, the modernization of agriculture and the efforts to reduce population growth depended heavily on the universities producing new research and scientific breakthroughs on crop variety, demography and a host of other related activities that supported these fields. On the broadest level the goal of foundations and other organizations aiding university reform was to attack the corporatist structure of the university system in Latin America. According to scholar Daniel Levy’s analysis of U.S. aid organizations active in university reform during this period donors sought two main goals: pluralism and growth.²³⁸ The first, pluralism, was an attempt to break the monopoly of the national universities through inter-institutional diversification. Donors felt universities should have autonomy to challenge and diverge from large national universities. The second, growth, was based on the assumption that Latin America needed to greatly expand the number of college graduates and trained technical people if modernization was to occur.²³⁹ Since pluralism in higher education and expansion of educational opportunities was part of the U.S. experience, foundations, U.S. government

²³⁷ Information Paper: The Ford Foundation’s Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, International Division, The Ford Foundation, September 1967, FFA, Conference and Discussion Papers, #002409, p. 6-7.

²³⁸ In *To Export Progress: The Golden Age of University Assistance in the Americas* Levy analyses the activities of three of the largest U.S. “donors” to the university reform effort in Latin America: The Agency for International Development (AID), the International Development Bank, and The Ford Foundation.

²³⁹ The number of Latin Americans of college age (20-24) enrolled in an institute of higher education was only 4% in 1966, and this is after ½ a decade of increasing enrollments. This is compared with 44% of college age students in the United States. See Arthur Liebman, Kenneth N. Walker, and Myron Glazer, *Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 36.

agencies, and multi-lateral organizations involved in university reform pursued these goals in an attempt to replicate the successes of the American university system.²⁴⁰

Within this broader agenda, the officers at the Ford and Rockefeller foundations began to identify specific problems to address. The problems identified as barriers to this goal included the absence of a full-time professional faculty, the loose organization of universities and faculties within universities which prevented an integrated and collaborative environment, deficits in basic materials and research facilities and the lack of high quality graduate training programs in the technical fields and the social sciences.

Of the core problems mentioned above, both Ford and Rockefeller saw the lack of well trained academics as the crux of the problem in Latin American universities. Because Latin American universities focused on teaching and churning out professionals in the core fields of law, medicine, and to a lesser degree the technical fields, the research function of the university had been given short shrift. Thus the role of the university as a center for new knowledge production had almost ceased to exist. Most professors taught part-time while working a full-time job outside the university. They had little time to devote to students or research. In addition, the low pay was a constant problem in attracting qualified candidates. The foundations began attacking this problem with a two-pronged solution: training of faculty and pressuring universities to establish full-time positions where professors had protected time to devote to research.

The first of these solutions, training people, seemed to be the easiest to tackle, and the bulk of the grants that flowed to universities were aimed at this goal. One way to accomplish this was to bring

²⁴⁰ Levy refers to this ideal type of system as the U.S. export model of higher education which outside donors promoted in their efforts to reform the Latin American system, p. 77. According to Levy, the main characteristics of the North American university that donors sought to replicate in Latin America included autonomy and diversification (i.e. variety), a strong executive with academic departments, the existence of an initial general education program before specializing (basic studies), and the privileging of full-time professors engaged in both teaching and research.

Latin American students to the United States to study and have them return to their country of origin and share new knowledge and technical expertise. This method also appealed to foundations for its cultural impact. According to a Ford report on possible activities, "In addition to the technical training which they [Latin American Fellows] acquire, exposure to American standards and ways of doing things can yield valuable indirect benefits."²⁴¹

Another way to train individuals was to train them at their home institutions utilizing visiting professors from North American universities. Visiting professors would be given the task of teaching classes, training graduate students and other faculty and in many cases building new programs at universities and research institutions. This approach was seen as more beneficial in the long-run. The Yale committee, given the task of evaluating various approaches, noted to foundation officers, "we suggest it would be wise to place increasing emphasis on support of organizations within Latin America...activities conducted within Latin America leave residues and by-products of permanent value. Research conducted by Latin American scholars serves a valuable training function and increases the permanent research resources of the country."²⁴²

Training of professionals at home was used in tandem with fellowships to Latin American students to study abroad (mostly at U.S. institutions though there were some exceptions) to transfer new scientific knowledge in the technical and scientific fields and new theoretical models in the social sciences. Training individuals however was only part of the goal. To ensure these individuals could effectively use their new knowledge in the service of national development Ford and Rockefeller pursued institutional change at the universities they supported. Structural problems that stood out in foundation assessments were the lack of full-time professors, the lack of collaboration between various

²⁴¹ Report: Latin America: A Preliminary Report of Development and Development Possibilities, Sidney W. Mintz, June 1958, p. 11 FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 00066

²⁴² Ibid., p. 12

faculties within the university, and the weak position of rectors relative to students and faculty.

Changing these would be fundamental to their university reform efforts.

Training people and transferring knowledge was a process that involved heavy outlays of money and time up front but did not necessarily demand structural changes in the receiving institution. However, foundation officers were keenly aware that to make optimal use of the skills and knowledge obtained through fellowships and training, and perhaps more importantly to encourage the production of research, universities would need to significantly expand their full-time faculty. This type of reform would require long-term commitments from university administrations as well as a dependable source of funding. Rather than seek to impose this commitment on universities who were reluctant, Ford and Rockefeller usually sought out universities who were moving toward this goal already.²⁴³ As an incentive to expand the number of full-time faculty the foundations often underwrote faculty salaries for a limited and specific amount of time with the understanding the university would maintain the position once grant money ran out. Foundation officials thought this practice “might help to ‘prime the pump’ and to establish full-time teaching as a normal and respectable career.”²⁴⁴ By offering fellowships in needed areas (i.e. those deemed as important to the modernization process) and securing a commitment to increase full-time positions the foundations were furthering the broader goal of expansion of the system. It was also a change usually welcomed by receiving institutions that brought little in the way of resistance. Other changes, more structural in nature, would prove more involved and complicated but no less important for systemic reform.

Organizationally, Latin American universities were typically governed by a university council made up of, at minimum, a Rector and the deans of individual faculty. In many cases the university councils also included representatives from the ministry of education and representatives from the

²⁴³ Levy, *To Export Progress*, pp. 176-177

²⁴⁴ Report: Latin America: A Preliminary Report of Development and Development Possibilities, Sidney W. Mintz, June 1958, p. 19 FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 00066.

student body and alumni. The faculties in Latin American universities traditionally operated rather independently of one another, with little collaboration. The courses for each degree program offered were taught entirely within individual faculties. General study courses, where students would take courses offered in a variety of different faculties within the university was not something familiar in most universities. Foundation officers felt this type of structure hampered interdisciplinary collaboration, prevented institutional unity, and inhibited innovation. Consider the following description of the problems this created at Universidad de Chile in a Ford Foundation report:

“Since for all practical purposes, each Faculty is identified with a traditional profession, there has been little experimentation or nurture for academic programs not identified with a practicing profession. Physics is not physics, but Physics needed for Engineering, Chemistry for Medicine and Pharmacy, etc. This is a familiar pattern in Latin America. The reminder should be made in this connection that most students attend classes only in their own Faculty, and usually do not take work in a discipline—however useful it may be, or available elsewhere—unless the subject is taught in their own Faculty. The result has been substantial duplication of courses and facilities, considerable rivalry and competition among Faculties, different entrance requirements, and dilution of the opportunities for achieving excellence.”²⁴⁵

The creation of a general studies program would begin the process of breaking down the isolation and independence of the various Faculties, and would hopefully decrease the resistance to the creation of new Faculties aimed at diversifying what was seen as a narrow utilitarian approach to degree programs. In addition, without directly attacking the power of individual faculties, general studies would weaken individual faculties vis-à-vis the university administration and contribute toward centralization.²⁴⁶

Most of the assistance given by Ford and Rockefeller under the banner of university reform went directly to universities in the form of fellowships for its students or faculty, salaries for visiting professors, educational materials, new buildings, and other administrative costs. A few grants, however,

²⁴⁵ “Mission Report- University of Chile,” Reuben Frodin and J.L. Morrill, August 1, 1963, p.8. FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 000010.

²⁴⁶ Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 152-53.

were aimed at assisting related organizations that were deemed important to the university system. One such organization was ICETEX (Colombian Overseas Technical Specialization Institute) founded in the 1950s as a central clearinghouse for granting foreign scholarships and fellowships in high need fields related to national development (usually technical fields). Because ICETEX based its awards on merit, it caught the eye of the Ford Foundation who saw it as a modern system through which aid could be properly allocated.²⁴⁷ ICETEX received foundation assistance to become more efficient in the task of determining awards. The organization eventually began offering bank loans for study in domestic institutions as well as study abroad. The extension of credit for higher education on a national level was an important step in the expansion of enrollment among the middle and lower classes and made the system more like that of the United States.²⁴⁸

Ford and Rockefeller pursued their goals for university reform in numerous countries and a wide variety of universities, but the most concentrated efforts took place in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. These countries held certain potentials because of their size, regional influence, or pace of modernization.²⁴⁹ Keeping in mind the broad and more specific goals of the foundations discussed above, the cases of Colombia and Chile are particularly interesting when examining how the activities of foundations converged with the economic, cultural and political specificities in individual countries. While the foundations faced similar challenges in both countries, the history of each country altered outcomes. The case studies discussed here reveal how, despite ideas of uniform and linear change, foundation reformers were forced to respond to different political and economic situations in various countries. In addition, foundations themselves were not monolithic in their response to domestic

²⁴⁷ Progress Report on the Ford Mission to Colombia, J.L. Morrill, November 28, 1960, FFA, Henry Heald Papers, 2/18.

²⁴⁸ Richard R. Renner, "The Expansion of Educredit in Latin American Higher Education: Promise or Peril?" *Higher Education*, Vol. 3 (Feb. 1974), pp. 81-89.

²⁴⁹ For example, Ford identified Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for their growth potential and rapid pace of development and Colombia and Chile for their regional significance. "Latin America and the Caribbean: Summary," 1960, Heald Papers, 7-82.

politics. The Rockefeller Foundation reacted more conservatively to challenges it faced, while the younger Ford Foundation was more willing to take risks and adapt its philanthropy to domestic conditions.

State Run Universities and Nationalism in Colombia and Chile

Since gaining their independence from European colonial powers and divesting the Catholic Church of its monopoly on higher education Latin American countries sought to build up their national universities as symbols of national character and regional pride. The public university became a national institution enmeshed in politics and connected with national development, not so much through advancing knowledge and new technological breakthroughs but through building national and cultural identity. When the foundations arrived in the 1950s with their plans for reform they knew that revamping the large national universities would be essential for any real change. However, it was the large national universities that would prove most difficult in terms of structural changes and resistance to reform.

National universities in both Colombia and Chile served the majority of students and pulled from a more economically and socially diverse population than that of the private schools. In addition, student representation on university councils was usually much greater than in private schools, which often had no student representation on governing boards. These two particular factors when taken in the context of an increasing resentment among Latin Americans towards U.S. policy in the region often frustrated foundation projects at national universities.²⁵⁰ The student movement of the early twentieth

²⁵⁰ For example, Political ideology among students was decidedly more leftist at the National University in Colombia than at the private universities. About 59 percent of students scored high in a "Leftists Ideology Scale" compared to only 20 percent at the private Los Andes and only 14 percent at the Catholic Javeriana University. Also, about 56 percent of National students were "favorable to Fidel Castro's 'ideas and action'" while only 18 percent of Los Andes and 17 percent of Javerinana students responded the same. When asked whether they see foreign capital as more good than bad only 51 percent of National students said yes, whereas at Los Andes and Javeriana the percentages were 74 and 72 respectively. Survey data taken from Arthur Liebman, Kenneth

century did not just empower students not symbolically. Students had representation on university councils in many universities, despite attempts by various governments to curtail this, and they would use their power to alter what they saw as the undue influence of “Norteamericanos” in university reform.

Colombia

In order to understand the problems encountered by Ford and Rockefeller in Colombia, and why their programs had limited effects, it is necessary to go back to the context in which the foundations were operating in. Only then can the extent of student resistance and protests be understood. Student groups in Colombia were demonstrating their opposition to both domestic politics (much like the earlier student movement) *and* their opposition to U.S. policy in Latin America. Often these two issues overlapped and intersected in ways that intensified opposition.

Domestically, increasing student unrest in Colombia represented a reaction to long-standing social inequality and the failure of the National Front government to solve Colombia’s problems. The National Front, a compromise in 1958 between Conservative and Liberals that allowed for a rotating government shared between the two parties, represented Colombia's final answer to political battles that had swept through Latin American in the nineteenth century about how to best govern newly created countries. In Colombia, this battle lasted longer and perhaps exacted more blood than in any other country. Simón Bolívar, the famed independence leader, led Gran Colombia as its first president under a nominally liberal constitution. In the beginning, as in other countries, the political divide was between those favoring a more centrist government and those favoring a more decentralized government (called Federalist).²⁵¹ Soon after, those opposed to the Liberal anti-clerical agenda, most

N.Walker, and Myron Glazer, *Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. This study was funded in part by the Ford Foundation.

²⁵¹ For a brief history of this period see Geoff Simons, *Colombia: A Brutal History*, (London: SAQI Publishing, 2004).

importantly the Catholic Church and Centrists like Bolívar, were known as Conservatives. At the turn of the century a war was fought between the two factions (the War of a Thousand Days, 1899-1902) in which the Conservatives won, but this success failed to settle the dispute with any certainty. Conservatives dominated politics for the first two decades of the twentieth century, but they failed to modernize the economy despite healthy growth. The structural problems with land tenure and labor exploitation began to expose the reliance on growth-based modernization.²⁵² While the economy was expanding, few Colombians benefitted from this growth and the Conservative government responded harshly to labor organization. Despite an influx of foreign capital to develop the infrastructure of the country and spur industrialization, the vast majority of Colombians continued to live and work in rural areas (76% in 1925).²⁵³ In the 1930 presidential election the Liberals made a comeback with the election of Enrique Olaya Herrera. The Conservatives wrested back control in 1946, but their position was soon threatened by the popular reformist politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who drew his support from the lower classes.²⁵⁴ Gaitán, a populist who scared the traditional Liberals in the party as much as the Conservatives with his appeal to and mobilization of the lower classes, was assassinated in 1948. His assassination launched another civil war between the Conservatives and the Liberals (this one known as *La Violencia*), which lasted until 1958. The National Front that put an end to the civil war was thus the final solution to the century old battle. In the compromise the Liberals and Conservatives agreed to share national and regional power in a system which rotated the presidency between Liberals and Conservatives.

While the compromise reached between Liberals and Conservatives quelled the worst of the violence, it had not been so successful in creating a strong economy able to meet the demands of the

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Richard Sharpless, *Gaitán of Colombia: A Political Biography*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), p. 15.

²⁵⁴ for a biography of Gaitán see Sharpless, *Gaitán of Colombia*.

growing population. By the 1960s, Colombia's record on social equality was far from stellar: one of the most concentrated distributions of land in Latin America, a 3.2 percent population growth that surpassed most other Latin American nations, a literacy rate of only 60 percent and an educational system where only ten percent of elementary school students would go on to finish secondary school (of those less than one percent went to university).²⁵⁵ Much of the student unrest at universities had to do with the same issues the Córdoba movement sought to address, thus protests over university policies often spilled over to national politics. In addition, links between student organizations, teachers unions, and peasant organizations often made strikes and protests about more than specific issues in higher education.²⁵⁶

The radicalization of Colombian university students was also very much part of the broader international context which saw the rise of anti-imperial sentiments in former colonial possessions and a growing critique of U.S. foreign policy around the globe. After the 1954 U.S. orchestrated coup that overthrew the democratically elected president of Guatemala anti-American sentiments increased throughout Latin America. In addition, the effects of Castro's revolution in Cuba provided what looked like a viable alternative to both capitalism and U.S. domination and intervention. The United States' attempt to overthrow Castro in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion further increased hemispheric tensions. Against this backdrop several events in the 1960s further alienated already suspicious Colombian university students. In 1964, a dispute in Panama over the flying of the U.S. flag led to serious rioting that spread into the Canal Zone. This incident revealed the latent resentment Colombians felt over the fact that Panama was no longer part of Colombia thanks to U.S. intervention in 1901. One Rockefeller Foundation officer in Colombia noted the impact of the Panama riots in his reports writing, "The

²⁵⁵ Statistics taken from V. Alonzo Metcalf and Everet E. Peterson "Agricultural Development in Colombia," January 1967, FFA, Ford Consultants reports 015403.

²⁵⁶ For example the national strike in 1971 involved coordination between the Asociaciones de Usuarios Campesinos, the Colombian Federation of Teachers, and remnants of the National University Student Federation (outlawed in 1966). See Salomon Kalamnovitz, "Colombia: The March Outburst," NACLA, May 1971, no 3.

Panama fracas strengthened the anti-American sentiment which exists.”²⁵⁷ In 1965 the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic to ensure the pro-U.S. “loyalists” succeeded in their battle against the “Constitutionalists” who championed land reform and the reestablishment of democracy. This act of intervention was condemned by the Colombian Congress and university students alike.

Finally, much closer to home, an incident involving a U.S. government project aimed at studying insurgent activity and the effects of military and civic programs in rural Colombia increased suspicion of North American organizations working in Colombia and jeopardized the legitimacy of U.S. foundations working on university reform. Much like “Project Camelot” in Chile, “Project Simpático” was a social science research project funded by the United States government and carried out through contracts with American universities and local researchers. In the case of Simpático, the U.S. government contracted with American University to conduct a study on the effectiveness of military and civic action in rural areas of Colombia. American University sent two professors, Howard Kaufman and Norman Smith, to work on the project with Colombian researchers hired by a company called National Research of Colombia. The project became national news when a member of the Colombian Congress, Ramiro Andrade, exposed the connections to the U.S. government and demanded Congress investigate the project and terminate it because it was a violation of national sovereignty.²⁵⁸ A few weeks after the story broke, the government of Colombia acknowledged it knew about the project and defended the actions of both North American and Colombian researchers. Foreign Relations minister Cástor Jaramillo asserted the Colombian government was in control of the project and the data and declared the government’s intention of continuing the project with American University.²⁵⁹ The Panama riots, the Dominican intervention, and the revelations behind Simpático emboldened critics of North American organizations operating in Colombia.

²⁵⁷ Diary of Charles Hardin, January 27, 1964, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, box 46.

²⁵⁸ “Harán Debate Sobre ‘Proyecto Simpático,’” *El Tiempo*, January 26, 1966, page 21.

²⁵⁹ “El ‘Plan Simpático’ No Viola la Soberanía,” *El Tiempo*, February 9th, 1966, p. 4.

At the national level, and usually at the local level, student associations were inherently political, linking critiques of the university with parallel critiques of politics and the economy. Furthermore, they often linked problems in the political economy with imperialistic forces. Colombian student leaders decried the crisis in the universities as an outcome of foreign capital in the country stating "our country and our industry cannot progress, and this in turn restrains the development of our universities."²⁶⁰ More dogmatic language came from the national university student association (Federación Universitario Nacional) in their statements vowing to "struggle against North-American intervention in Latin America and against imperialistic penetration in whatever its new forms and pretensions."²⁶¹

It was in this context of rising opposition to the U.S. presence in Latin American countries that foundations sought collaboration with national universities. To add to the problems, despite the dependency on government funding, students at national universities often opposed the national government in ways that frustrated reformers. In Colombia, the national government eagerly embraced North American prescriptions for reform. In 1968 the government of Lleras Restrepo with the support of university rectors in Colombia adopted the Plan Básico de la Educación Superior, which was based on a University of California Berkeley advisory mission funded by AID. The Plan Básico called for many of the same reforms and changes that Atcon had called for in his *La Universidad de Latino Americana*. Colombia's national government showed a eagerness (at least superficially) to modernize the country with U.S. assistance. Though the Liberal and Conservative had fought each other violently in the preceding decades, both parties generally embraced foreign assistance. The foundations did not have to worry too much about the national government being vehemently anti-American no matter which party was in power. University students and faculty, however, were not as quick to embrace Plan Básico as

²⁶⁰ Quoted in Magnusson, "Reform at the University of Colombia," p. 140.

²⁶¹ Consejo Superior Estudiantil, *Universidad Nacional*, No. 2, 1965, quoted in Magnusson, Reform at the National University, p. 155.

the Congress and university administrators were, and student unrest, particularly at the National University, marked the Presidency of Lleras Restrepo.

In deciding which universities to target in Colombia, both Ford and Rockefeller faced a dilemma. Permanent systemic change would probably not occur unless large, public universities were reformed. Yet initial foundation appraisals of these institutions (both the National and the departmental (state) universities) noted, “Student strikes and pressures for commanding institutional control in the public universities (except at the University of the Valle and the Industrial University of Santander) are a deeply unsettling feature.”²⁶² Assessments of the National University were particularly bleak, noting “The National University presently seems to be not a viable institution...there is a patent lack of authoritative leadership.”²⁶³

Despite this pessimistic evaluation, ignoring state run institutions was not an option given their size and importance so foundations drew up recommendations and made grants to several of the most prominent public universities, including the National University.²⁶⁴ The presence of a cooperative rector at the National University was one factor mitigating an otherwise negative assessment of what could be accomplished. Jose Felix Patiño was named rector of the National University in 1964. Patiño was a graduate of Yale medical school and was eager to introduce the type of reforms foundations sought.

²⁶² “Progress Report on the Ford Foundation Mission to Colombia,” Nov. 28, 1960, Reuben Frodin, J.H. Rushton, J.L. Morrill, Henry Heald Papers, 2/18, p. 2.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Public universities supported by Rockefeller and Ford included Universidad de Nacional Colombia, Universidad del Valle, Universidad de Antioquia, and Universidad Industrial de Sandanter. Valle, Antioquia, and Sandanter are departmental (state) universities located in the cities of Cali, Medallín, and Bucaramanga respectively. The two main private universities that received support from the foundations are Universidad de los Andes and Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. For an analysis of support for private versus public universities among U.S. aid organizations see Daniel Levy, *To Export Progress*. Levy argues that U.S. donors were not “anti-national university” in their approach to assistance, rather after frustration with reform efforts at national universities, they turned more and more to the private universities because “national universities showed themselves to lack enough of the requisites for partnership with donors.” Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 84. His argument is opposed to many orthodox dependency adherents that argue North American actors sought to diminish the importance of National Universities through frontal attacks. Levy shows how this was not the case, rather donors sought to reform and strengthen national universities not diminish them. However, a more nuanced dependency argument that saw this as a way to co-opt national universities would not contradict Levy’s well argued point.

Immediately after taking office the new rector made a visit to the United States to seek out financial assistance for reforms at the university.²⁶⁵ In addition, the National University had an administrative structure that foundations found appealing with a Rector appointed by the President of the country, a willingness to move toward centralization and departmentalization, and pledges to provide full-time positions for anyone obtaining a foreign fellowship to study abroad.²⁶⁶

This enthusiasm on the part of the administration, however, could not negate the serious problems with student unrest. Administrative efforts to curb student strikes and protest had not been effective in quelling unrest. In 1952 the Executive Council of the National University outlawed student strikes by an edict cancelling the registration of any student participating in a strike against the university. Despite this, in 1954, and again in 1959 and 1962, students participated in strikes and confrontations with the police.²⁶⁷ The increasingly anti-imperialist aspect of these protests was exemplified in 1964 when students at the National University disrupted the university's inauguration of a research facility funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and attended by presidential candidate Carlos Lleras Restrepo and John D. Rockefeller 3rd. Students threw eggs and at least one tear gas bomb at the platform and prevented the two men from leaving the campus for at least an hour.²⁶⁸ The students' shouts of "Yankees out" and "Lleras out" demonstrated the dual opposition to domestic politics and U.S. organizations that had come to mark student organizations by the late 1960s.²⁶⁹ Thus, while both Ford

²⁶⁵ While Patiño did embrace foreign assistance, he did not always take the side of the Colombian government over students, resigning his post after President Lleras Restrepo passed a mandatory attendance law for university students intended to curb student strikes. Juan de Onis, "Colombia Regime Shuts University," *New York Times*, August 31, 1966.

²⁶⁶ Levy, *To Export Progress*, pp. 87-88.

²⁶⁷ "Colombian University Reopens," *New York Times*, August 13, 1954., "1,000 Stage Riots in Bogota Streets," *New York Times*, March 4, 1959, "Strike by Students in Bogota in Doubt," *New York Times*, August 20th, 1962.

²⁶⁸ "Students in Bogota Riot Against Lleras," *New York Times*, November 8th, 1964. Also, "Troops in Colombia Praised for Actions In Student Protests," *New York Times*, October 26, 1966.

²⁶⁹ Once elected as president Lleras Restrepo would move swiftly to repress student strikes and demonstrations. He spearheaded an act to require students to attend classes 80% of the time, which was aimed at preventing students from striking lest they lose their credit or get expelled. He also had ringleaders at the National University arrested in 1966.

and Rockefeller initially saw promise for affecting reform at the National University in Colombia, both foundations tempered their support as the decade of the 60s progressed and looked for other, more stable universities to collaborate with.

Among the departmental public universities a few looked promising for the type of reform projects the foundations wanted. Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia caught the attention of both Rockefeller and Ford for its lack of student unrest and its self-initiated progress in reform.²⁷⁰ Valle was founded in 1946, one of the many new universities that sprouted in the post war years to meet increasing demands on the higher education system. Rockefeller praised Valle for a governing system which at least gave the impression it was less beholden to national politics. The university was governed by a board of trustees made up of community groups (many of them business groups) and, though government representatives sat on the board, they did not control it. In fact this “community involvement” was exactly what foundations liked to see. Administrators at the university hoped to gain advice from the business community about programs that were needed, and Rockefeller officer Charles Hardin felt these associations “might free Del Valle a bit from political interference by the national government by rooting it in the vital forces of the community- the Church, the businessmen, the cattlemen and so on.”²⁷¹ Already underway was a deal whereby the university would offer a fellowship to an employee or son of an employee of a business that endowed a chair at the university. This entrepreneurial spirit in seeking funding sources not tied to the state impressed the foundations.

In addition to this type of community engagement, del Valle also promoted outreach programs to local secondary schools by having professors at the university provide curriculum advice and hold

²⁷⁰ Rockefeller had been involved with Valle since the early 1950s when several grants to build up their medical school and the natural sciences were initiated. Valle would become, after 1963, Rockefeller’s flagship project in university development in Latin America. It is most likely due to initial Rockefeller and AID involvement that Ford began grants to Valle in 1961.

²⁷¹ Dairy entry, Charles Hardin, January 24, 1961, meeting with Rector Alberto Carvaja and Guy Hays, University of the Vallley, RAC RF, 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, Box 46.

teaching demonstrations for the secondary teachers. This type of “trickle down” effect impressed those who saw higher education as the catalyst in the modernization process. Ford saw del Valle’s outreach as “a direct and effective method of assisting secondary education, and one of the first such opportunities presented to the Foundation in Latin America.”²⁷²

In addition to the attraction of del Valle as a university on the verge of modernization foundation officers viewed administrators at del Valle as “progressive officers” committed to reform.²⁷³ Del Valle's administration generally supported structural changes like the creation of a Basic Studies Program and departmentalization of the faculties. In addition, the rector, Alberto Carvajal, seemed to understand the potential of the university as a modernizing agent. In a meeting with Rockefeller officer Charles Hardin, Carvajal discussed the need to expand the universities programs to reach the “frustrated” middle class. According to Hardin, Carvajal felt the middle class was “one of the most important classes to try to integrate so that they will help defend against communism,” noting “although 8,000 a year are now eligible to attend the universities, only 80% of these can be taken by the universities and the rest are a frustrated and potentially dangerous group.”²⁷⁴ Thus, the leadership of del Valle appeared to be just the type of dynamic and committed administrators needed to push forward a bold restructuring of the university while also being committed to expanding educational access for Colombians.

In 1961 Ford began its support of del Valle with a grant to establish a program of basic studies, and in 1960 Rockefeller expanded its support to del Valle beyond the area of medicine to include the social sciences and general university development. In 1963, Rockefeller named del Valle a targeted institution in its newly launched University Development Program, the only university in Latin America

²⁷² Request for Grant Action, April 6, 1961. School of Basic Studies, University of the Valley, p. 2, FFA, Grant Files, 61-189, reel 3017.

²⁷³ Ibid. p. 1

²⁷⁴ Diary of Charles Hardin, January 24, 1961, Cali, Colombia, meeting with Alberto Carvajal and Guy Hayes, RAC, RF, 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, Box 46.

to be singled out for the program.²⁷⁵ Universidad de Valle would be a favored institution in Colombia for more than just the foundations as AID, IDB, and others would collaborate with Ford and Rockefeller to bring about desired changes. However, domestic politics and growing anti-American sentiments would thwart the efforts of the foundations and produce weak results.

Although initial assessments made Universidad de Valle look promising and student unrest looked better than at other schools, as the decade of the 1960s advanced administrative problems and student opposition beset foundation projects. It was the Basic Studies project and the grants to strengthen the economics and political science programs that revealed the limits of reform projects. The overall goal in implementing a basic studies program was to foster academic integration, “counterbalance the excessive professionalism”, and “to help students understand the relationship between the different fields of human knowledge.”²⁷⁶ Implementation of the program involved transitioning students to take two years of classes in a variety of disciplines (science, humanities, language, math, and social sciences) before moving into their specialty. As simple as this may have seemed to American educators, the program ran into several hurdles.²⁷⁷ Students tended to see the requirement of taking classes outside their field as extraneous and simply added their time in school. A similar lack of understanding about the philosophy behind a basic studies program led to most faculty seeing the program as a “tremendous failure.”²⁷⁸

²⁷⁵ The five countries or regions identified by Rockefeller in 1963 were Colombia, East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda), Nigeria, Philippines, and Thailand. Although substantial aid was also given to university development under the Chilean program to the National University and the Catholic University on Chile, these programs never reached the level of commitment given to Valle, and Rockefeller later pulled back on its support for the National University in terms of overall university development. See Rockefeller Annual Reports.

²⁷⁶ Rodolfo Low-Maus, “Evaluation of Grant 61-189 to the University of the Valley for Development of a School of Basic Studies and Improvement of Secondary School Science Teaching,” December 1970, FFA, Grant Files, 61-189, reel 3017. P. 4-5.

²⁷⁷ Despite the final evaluation noting the grant as failing to achieve its objects, some positive outcomes include advanced departmentalization and a marked improvement in the quality of the staff due to training provided by the grant. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p. 7.

Adding to the specific problems with the basic studies program, and perhaps owing partially to these problems, was a general crisis of authority at the university. The foundations walked into a situation in which battles involving student power vis-à-vis the administration and other issues espoused by the Córdoba Student Movement were still being fought. Like other public universities, del Valle was becoming an arena in which students would contest both university policy and national politics. In 1962, the students at del Valle went on strike in opposition to the dean of the faculty of economics, Antonio Posada. The University administration and the Rector yielded to student demands to replace the dean and appointed an interim dean, Anacleto Apadaca. This incident created a tension filled atmosphere in which students appeared to hold the upper hand. North American visiting professors, whether foundation appointed or under contact with AID or FAO, were complaining about the lack of discipline among students. Rockefeller officer Charles Hardin recounts what one foundation appointed professor, Carter Wheelock, reported to him:

The major problems, and they have indeed been serious, have been with discipline. The students here are immature. They do not take classes seriously. *Compañerismo* is a vice. It's a continuous battle to keep the students quiet, and when major infraction occurs, nobody will tell on another student even though what he did was criminal. For example, recently a three-or four-pound piece of tile was thrown through the door of one of their classrooms and narrowly missed hitting one of the students in the head.²⁷⁹

Visiting professors and foundation officials usually attributed student problems to their immaturity or to them coming from a poor background, and the solution was getting the administration to take a harder line against the students and expel them for major infractions. However, underlying the incidents of unruly behavior were political tensions as well as resentment of “gringos” at the university. Hardin reports students were critical of North American political science professor Cole Blasier “because they

²⁷⁹ Diary of Charles Hardin, May 24, 1963, Discussion with Carter Wheelock, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Charles Hardin, Box 49.

think his class is indoctrination in the ideas of the United States and they don't want indoctrination."²⁸⁰

In another incident relayed to Hardin, a North American woman was substituting for a sick professor and could not get the class to quiet down. She then told them they were nothing but animals, to which they replied, "you gringos are the animals."²⁸¹ Even the Colombian professors at the university had misgivings about the visiting professors. One commented to Hardin that the gringos "are on the verge of ulcers" at the university.²⁸²

More troublesome for long term goals than unruly behavior or the attitude North American professors was the power of students in the university to get professors fired and the voice they had on appointment of new deans. Students attempted to get rid of professors at del Valle on a number of occasions for a variety of reasons, the two biggest reasons being inept teaching and opposition to foreigners at the campus.²⁸³ Given the foundations' reliance on reform minded and cooperative rectors and deans to carry out projects, this last point was not insignificant. Faculty and dean appointments had to be approved by the administrative, the staff, and a representative group of students in the corresponding department or faculty. Students in the economics department would consistently be a thorn in the side of university and foundation efforts to find a new dean for the Faculty of Economics. Students used their power to demand Colombians who were trained as economists be appointed, and specifically opposed those candidates who had been trained in the U.S. because "they feel that anyone

²⁸⁰ Diary of Charles Hardin, October 15, 1963, Discussion with Anacleto Apodaca, p. 2, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, Box 49.

²⁸¹ Diary of Charles Hardin, October 16, Discussion with Carter Wheelock, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, box 49.

²⁸² Diary of Charles Hardin, May 24, 1963, Discussion with Carter Wheelock, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, Box 49.

²⁸³ In 1968 student opposition to a special course that would have been used to train North American Peace Corp volunteers resulted in the course being cancelled. See Salomon Kalmanovitz, "Colombia: The March Outburst," NACLA, May, 1971. No. 3. p. 19.

who has been trained in the United States will not be able to view the economic needs of Colombia sympathetically.”²⁸⁴

The power to approve appointments became the trigger point in what was one of the most violent and repressive actions by the Colombian government against del Valle students. When the rector, Alfonso Ocampo Londoño, unilaterally appointed an engineer to the vacant position of dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences (itself a creation of the foundations), del Valle students called a strike and demanded “the resignation of the president of the university, the democratization of the university government to the exclusion of all ‘outside forces’, and the reconsideration of the university’s ties to imperialist foundations and credit institutions for the financing and control of the university.”²⁸⁵ Soon after there was a national student meeting in Cali in which all 26 universities were represented. Taking this as a sign that a more coordinated national strike was in the making, President Pastrana ordered the invasion and occupation of del Valle and subsequently the city of Cali. The next day the president asked for the resignation of Rector Ocampo, meeting one of the students’ demands.²⁸⁶ However, following this the Colombian government launched a crackdown arresting many students and faculty. Already primed for a strike with grievance of their own, unions and workers around the country called a national strike.

A few months earlier, Ford had closed its grant for basic studies making no mention of the building tensions over the deanship of the Economics Faculty in its final evaluation. Rockefeller, having originally envisioned only a ten year program of support, was also in the process of phasing out its grants for university development to del Valle, though it would continue to support various projects in the medical and agricultural field. These two fields were vital to the ongoing reforms to modernize agriculture and reduce the population growth rate in Colombia. During this period the foundations were

²⁸⁴ Diary of Michael Todaro, Nov. 29-Dec. 5, 1970, p. 12, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, series 311, box 81, folder 760.

²⁸⁵ Kalmanovitz, "Colombia: The March Outburst."

²⁸⁶ "Renunció el Rector de la U. del Valle," *El Tiempo*, February 27, 1971, p1.

also becoming less enthusiastic for broad based university reform in Chile, and their experiences at the National University there would be even more humbling.

Chile

Chile's emergence as an independent nation brought the same battle between Liberals and Conservatives that much of Latin America experienced. However, by 1833 Chile had managed to create one of the most stable political systems in Latin America with a republican constitution under President Diego Portales. This was partly due to avoiding some of the regionalism that had affected other countries and the lack of a large indigenous population. In addition, Chile had discovered a source of wealth to exploit that would be the basis of growth. The second half of the twentieth century brought Chile into the global economy with the major expansion of copper and nitrate mines in the north.²⁸⁷ While the landed elite still controlled national politics, the explosive growth in mining led to the development of an urban middle class and a sizable working-class.²⁸⁸ With no large indigenous population to form the basis of the peasant village common elsewhere, Spanish colonization produced a largely mestizo society.²⁸⁹ However, there was a growing divide between rural peasants, the urban working class and the oligarchs, who resisted modernizing reforms that threatened their social and economic position.²⁹⁰ Consequently, the first few decades of the twentieth century the "social question," or questions about social, political and agrarian inequality, marked a new phase in Chilean

²⁸⁷ For a look at how these commodities impacted Chile and integrated the nation into the global economy see Thomas F. O'Brien, *The Nitrate Industry and Chile's Crucial Transition*, (New York: New York University Press, 1982).

²⁸⁸ Edwin Williamson, *The Penguin History of Latin America*, (London: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 485.

²⁸⁹ One exception to this would be the Mapuche, an indigenous group in southern Chile. By 1900 they represented only a small fraction of the population, but were similar with regard to their linguistic, ethnic and cultural cohesiveness to indigenous groups elsewhere in Latin America. For more on the Mapuche see Joanna Crow, *The Mapuche in Modern Chile: A Cultural History*, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2013).

²⁹⁰ Williamson, *The Penguin History of Latin America*

political history.²⁹¹ The emergence of more radical working-class and urban political parties began to challenge the oligarchy's control over politics. The working and urban classes managed to wrest concessions from the labor unrest of the period, especially under populist president Arturo Alessandri, and new social welfare programs in education, health and housing were established.²⁹² In addition, the alliance under Alessandri expanded the role of the state in managing the social and economic development of the nation. A right-wing reaction to this expansion ensued creating political instability during the period from 1924 until 1933 when constitutional rule was reestablished.

Following the world-wide depression of the 1930s an alliance between reform liberals, socialist and communists, gained momentum in Chilean politics and succeeded in advancing state-led capitalist development and economic nationalism.²⁹³ The Radical Party held the presidency from 1938 until 1952 and adopted interventionist policies to encourage industrialization and economic development. Despite the formation of strong labor-based political parties, the political and economic control of the oligarchy, though diminished from its 19th century level, remained a barrier to further development.²⁹⁴ Agricultural productivity was not keeping pace with the growing needs of the nation. The landed elite had not taken steps to modernize agriculture, clinging as they were to the traditional colonial social order in which the elite derived wealth and privilege from large landed estate whose economic and social system was based around a patriarchal order. The agrarian question, or the question of land tenure and agricultural productivity, began to play a larger role in Chile's economic problems, and by the 1960's it was a central issue in national elections. The failure of the Conservatives to address this issue adequately during the 1950s led directly to the election of the reformist Eduardo Frei Montalva as

²⁹¹ For a history of rural workers in Chile and the politics of the early 20th century with regard to land tenure see Brain Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

²⁹² For a history of the labor movement and their relationship to political parties in Chile see Alan Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

²⁹³ Williamson, *The Penguin History of Latin America*.

²⁹⁴ for the classic take in how the Oligarch inhibited modernization see Arnold Bauer, *Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest to 1930*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

president in 1964. Frei and his Christian Democratic party faced growing polarization of politics as his reforms were resisted by Conservatives in Congress and did too little to satisfy the growing demands for change from the rural and urban lower classes. The domestic politics in Chile during the 1960s would come to have significant consequences for foundation projects, and collaboration with the National University would become increasingly more difficult.

Though foundations operating in Chile faced some similar problems with their projects in terms of internal university politics that they had experienced in Colombia, the rapidly changing national situation in Chile had a more jarring impact on long term projects. In the 1950s, when the Rockefeller Foundation first began considering programs outside of the medical and health fields, Universidad de Chile looked promising for further development. In 1956 the Rockefeller Foundation began assistance to various departments within the university and considered adding the university to their core institutions in the University Development Program, though not without reservations and a warning that “grants to the University of Chile may create some certain local feeling in Chile.”²⁹⁵ The Ford Foundation sent an exploratory committee to evaluate the university for overall development in 1963. Based on the recommendations of the mission, Ford began funding projects with the goal of integrating the separate faculties that made up the university and creating a more centralized university system like existed in the United States.²⁹⁶ Foundation assessments reported that the University of Chile had “both a mediating and initiating role to play- and one of great influence for development and progress,” especially in the “rising interplay of forces” during the 1960s.²⁹⁷

One factor influencing the decision by Ford and Rockefeller to initiate broad university reform was the presence of a reform minded, respected, and independent rector, Juan Gomez Millas. He had

²⁹⁵ Letter, J. G. Harrar to Joe A. Rupert, June 15th, 1956, RAC, RF. RG 1.2, Series 309, box 21, folder 185. In 1957 Rockefeller expanded assistance to programs in economics, history, and basic sciences.

²⁹⁶ “Mission Report- University of Chile”, FFA, Reports and CF, 000010.

²⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 40.

already implemented some bold reforms at the university and had a good reputation not just in Chile but in other Latin American countries as well. Rector Gomez Millas also started an unprecedented regionalization of the university that would establish eight regional colleges in areas outside Santiago. One goal of the regional colleges, which resembled a cross between the California state system and community colleges across the United States, included improving general education by training teachers and creating opportunities in the provinces.²⁹⁸ In 1961, Ford would make an initial grant of 1.4 million dollars to Universidad de Chile for the purposes of developing the Regional University Colleges Program plus significant grants to the University of California and the Institute of International Education to provide advisors, academic support and fellowships for university faculty to train in the United States. Many of these fellowships went to train Latin Americans in fields related to agricultural modernization such as agronomy and economics. Thus, university reform projects, though certainly having goals related more specifically to how universities were organized and administered, also trained the pool of technocrats who would take the lead in agricultural development and population control. The plan for developing regional colleges also included the creation of a two year general studies program and career and technical classes meant to produce something equivalent to two-year degree. Most importantly, the Regional University Colleges offered access to Chileans who had previously been denied access to higher education because of competition to get into the National University.²⁹⁹

The collaboration between Ford, Universidad de Chile and the University of California was furthered in 1965 in an agreement -the so called Universidad de Chile- University of California Convenio- in which both universities agreed to exchange both students and professors and cooperate on research projects (mostly in agriculture). The *Convenio* was funded, at a cost of ten million dollars for ten years, by a grant from the Ford Foundation. It was the one of the more successful collaborations between a

²⁹⁸ Verne S. Atwater and Evelyn Walsh, [A Memoir of] the Ford Foundation, *the Early Years: An Insider View of the Impact of Wealth and Good Intentions*, (New York: Vantage Press, 2012).

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

Latin American university and a North American university, yielding an impressive and profitable reorientation of agricultural export products by the 1980s. Ford's role in the Regional University Colleges Program, which ultimately created eight regional colleges, and the Convenio in agriculture, which was instrumental in developing the very successful fruit export industry demonstrated the strategic way in which the foundations used their money. Yet, despite some of the success in this regard, students and faculty also had an agenda for reform, sometimes at odds with the type of university reform sought by North American reformers. In addition, by the late 1960s, university politics and national politics were beginning to mesh in ways that would prove detrimental to foundation goals.

In 1967 students at the University of Chile associated with Faculty of Philosophy and Education began a protest on campus to demand reforms. They did not seek changes like basic studies and departmentalization, but rather echoed the voices of the Córdoba movement in demanding democratization of the university administration and governing bodies.³⁰⁰ The students who led the protest were articulating demands for reforms that had been on the agenda of the left of center political parties for the last year, and now the university became an arena for battles that mirrored national politics.³⁰¹ Also at issue were the ways in which foundation supported reorganization of the faculties was going to negatively impact many in the Faculty of Philosophy and Education.³⁰² In the ensuing battle, the rector that replaced Gomez Millas, Euenio González, resigned and major changes came about the following year, including a reduction of the power of tenured faculty and a more democratically chosen administration.³⁰³ The democratization of the university governing body was actually in conflict

³⁰⁰ For an interpretation of this event see Iván Jaksic, "Philosophy and University Reform at the University of Chile: 1842-1973, *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1984), pp. 57-86.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² See description of this event in Rockefeller files, "General Statement on the University of Chile with emphasis on the Social Sciences," RAC, RF, RG 1.2, series 309, box 8, folder 49.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, According to Jaksic, the Rector Juan Gomez Millas had envisioned the university as a haven from politics where scientific research could blossom, the classic "ivory tower."

with the foundations' goal of centralization and hierarchy, and the "role" in public affairs (now taking a leftward turn) was presumably a much different role than what the foundations had sought.

While anti-Americanism was just as strong a force in Chile as it was in Colombia, and nationalism an even stronger one, foundation attempts at reforms like basic studies and departmentalization were thwarted not so much by direct attacks on "gringo" professors or faculty foot-dragging, but by a political situation that was radicalizing to the point of being beyond the control of reformers.³⁰⁴ By the 1960s the contradictions between an economy struggling to modernize within a neo-colonial structure brought about popular unrest that pushed even the right-leaning President Jorge Alessandri to initiate land reform. It proved too little too late in the face of an increasing stagnant economy and the elections of 1964 resulted in a victory for the center-left Christian Democrats. However, the Christian Democrats did not deliver on their platform of reform, and the 1970 presidential elections brought Salvador Allende's Unidad Popular (UP) to power, giving Chile a democratically elected socialist government. Rockefeller sensed the possibility of a more radical government coming to power by 1968 and began to take a wait and see approach to the Chilean case.³⁰⁵ Ford was more willing to stay the course as the political system moved left, but in 1968 university reform came from the bottom up instead of the top down.

The Rockefeller Foundation, already concerned they could not achieve much in the political atmosphere that prevailed, decided to pull out of Chile in 1969. Though the reason for this decision was not solely the radicalization of politics (Rockefeller was upset about an upcoming vote on taxation of foundations operating in Chile), their cautious approach to Chile after the mid-1960s suggests they

³⁰⁴ Chile had its own version of Project Simpatico, called Project Camelot, which actually preceded the Colombian scandal and was denounced by the Chilean Congress and caused much embarrassment to United States government programs.

³⁰⁵ Grants to University of Chile slowed considerably by 1968. Even though Rockefeller representative in Chile Jack Harrison remained "moderately optimistic concerning the future" in 1969 (RAC, RF, 1.2, RG 309, series 8, box 49), as early as 1968 Rockefeller Foundation officer Kenneth Thompson noted in his diary, "This does not seem the right moment for pushing ahead with a university development program in Chile. It would probably be best for the Foundation to withdraw the present staff at the end of their current assignment." RAC, RF, RG 1.2, RG 309, Series 8, Box 48.

were not as comfortable with the situation as the Ford Foundation.³⁰⁶ Officers at Ford, while concerned about how a socialist victory in 1970 would affect programs, did not pull the plug on assistance to Chile with Salvador Allende's victory in the 1970 elections. This surprised many Chileans working on Ford funded programs, who figured once Rockefeller left Ford was sure to follow. Ford was not totally unaffected by the political climate, however, as the program officer for Latin America told a Rockefeller officer Ford was "seriously considering cutting back their direct support to governments through technical advisory agreements" because of "a recent increase in anti-Americanism throughout Latin America."³⁰⁷ Public universities in Latin American, especially national ones, often reflected larger national political debates and became arenas for political battles. As an alternative the foundations looked to the few private institutions that existed, hoping to avoid the politics that plagued public universities.

Local Initiatives for Reform: The Private University Alternative

The disappointing experience Ford and Rockefeller had at public universities, both national and departmental, was in part due to the approach to reform taken. The elitist model of university reform assumed administrators had the political will and wherewithal to implement and enforce change from the top down. However, students and professors had their own visions of reform that ultimately were tied to broader social change, and this proved to be a bigger barrier to reform than foundations anticipated. Ford and Rockefeller would find less opposition at private universities where students came from the upper-classes and students and professors had much less say in the structure and function of the university. These institutions would produce some of the more important "success stories" of foundation assistance.

³⁰⁶ Rockefeller was watching with anticipation the passing of a tax law affecting foundations operating in Chile. Rockefeller officer Kenneth Thompson commented on Ford's "casual attitude" toward paying taxes to a foreign government they were trying assist, arguing this may lead to a reaction by the American people. Diary entry of Kenneth Thompson, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 49.

³⁰⁷ MPT diary entry, November 29, 1970, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, box 81, folder 760.

The Universidad de los Andes in Colombia was from the beginning a direct assault on the Latin American university model. Founded in 1948 by several young Colombians who had graduated from U.S. universities, Los Andes was a private institution that had a structure very similar to U.S. institutions.³⁰⁸ Basic studies, a two year humanities program before specializing, was implemented from the start. The university already offered degree programs in conjunction with the University of Illinois; programs in which the first two years of study was at Los Andes and the final two years were completed at Illinois. The leadership at Los Andes represented politics of the moderate wing of the Liberal Party, elitist yet committed to reform and modernization along capitalist lines. Its student population drew from the upper classes, yet the university espoused a mission to address inequalities in society. The mix of innovation and political reformism seemed an ideal match for foundation projects.

The founders of Los Andes also knew how appealing their innovation in higher education would be to North American reformers and businessmen. Almost immediately, the administration at Los Andes skillfully and carefully cultivated relationships with influential North Americans to secure its finances. Although it was a private university and charged tuition, it was also a new university lacking a reputation, and its finances remained precarious. In 1953 the rector of Los Andes, Dr. Zuleta Angel, and other university representatives reached out to the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund (a philanthropic organization set up in 1940 by five Rockefellers) to ask for financial assistance. Keenly aware of the international situation and the ideological battle being waged against communism, Los Andes representatives "made several discerning and pertinent comments" to representatives of the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund "about the relative strategic values of universities in Latin American

³⁰⁸ Founder Mario Laserna Pinzón was a graduate of Columbia University and also obtained a masters degree from Princeton University.

countries compared with those in other parts of the world and possibly serious errors of judgment on the part of North Americans in taking Latin Americans too much for granted."³⁰⁹

For organizational reasons the Brother's Fund could not offer support to the university (despite their admiration), but the rector was determined to use his personal relationship with Nelson Rockefeller to secure a novel solution: the creation of a foundation in the United States for the benefit of Los Andes. Personal relationships aside, Nelson Rockefeller actually did feel strongly about assisting Los Andes, remarking "No other technical assistance project for Latin America could produce quicker or more far reaching results than the development of this type of private university."³¹⁰ It was the kind of innovation, private and free of government control, that attracted North American sponsorship. The University of Los Andes Foundation, Inc. was established in 1957 with Nelson's backing. The board of directors, Norman Armour, Adolf Berle, Spruille Braden, J. Peter Grace to name a few, reflected the importance of Latin American universities to American foreign policy, and the donors reflected the commercial interests, International Petroleum Corp., International Mining Corp. and Eastman Kodak to name a few, in Colombia at the time. In 1958 Nelson made a personal appeal to U.S. corporations doing business in Colombia to donate money to the foundation. The university's progress was touted by benefactors such as Standard Oil, who praised Los Andes in a four page article in their quarterly magazine for challenging the European model of universities in the region and "marking new paths for education in Latin America."³¹¹ By 1961 Los Andes was receiving financial support from not only the Los Andes Foundation, but the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation and host of other U.S. corporate contributors. In this same year a significant sixty-one percent of total contributions to Los

³⁰⁹ Robert C. Bates, recollection of meeting with Dr. Zuleta Angel and Los Andes representatives, memo to Nelson Rockefeller and Fund files, January 22, 1953, RAC, RF, NAR Personal, RG Countries III, Series 4, Box 23, folder 181.

³¹⁰ Memo, NAR Personal, RG Countries III, Series 4, Box 23, folder 181. No date, but assumed 1953 based on other documents in this folder.

³¹¹ "University of the Andes," *The Lamp*, Fall 1959, Published by Standard Oil Company (New Jersey).

Andes came from U.S. aid organizations or corporations. This represented a sizable part of its operating budget and was crucial to its development.

While Los Andes would remain relatively free from student unrest as it tended to serve mostly upper class students, foundations found they faced other obstacles in creating a model university. First, Los Andes would be plagued by constant financial problems. In addition, foundation officials discovered that proposals made for programs by the administration were often highly sanguine and did not reflect the realities of getting new programs off the ground. This was the case in Political Science at Los Andes, which had much support from the rector when it was initially proposed but staggered along without much advancement for years. Rockefeller's visiting professor in Political Science, Philip Taylor, publically chastised the university and Latin American governments on Colombian radio for their lack of commitment to real change. Speaking of aid to Latin America in general, Professor Taylor said, "It would be a good idea to suspend all American aid to that area and to afford it an opportunity to either sink or come out afloat."³¹² Of his experience trying to establish political science at Los Andes, Taylor said it failed "simply owing to the fact that they are not interested."³¹³

Other departments, however, would fare better in terms of accomplishments and university attention. In 1957 Rockefeller began supporting the Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Economico (C.E.D.E.), an institute set up at Los Andes to conduct economic research. The faculty of economics at Los Andes would receive a good deal of attention and support not only from Rockefeller and Ford, but from the U.S. government as well through USAID contracts. The work in economics done at Los Andes would come to have national relevancy when Carols Lleras Restrepo (of the Liberal Party) would use C.E.D.E. data and recommendations in his presidential bid. The center would also train labor leaders in Colombia and would help draft position papers for the major labor confederation UTC (Unión de

³¹² Translation of interview with Philip B. Taylor on Radio Caracol in Colombia, January 16, 1967. RAC, RF, RG 311, Series S, Box 80, folder 756.

³¹³ Ibid.

Trabajadores Colombianos). The center's ties to the Liberal Party (president of Colombia from 1958-1962 Alberto Lleras Camargo was rector of Los Andes before becoming president) gave it influence during the years of Liberal governance.

Despite the constant problems with finances early on and the frustrations experienced in some of the foundation programs, Universidad del los Andes stands as probably the biggest success story in Colombia.³¹⁴ The Basic Studies program became the best in Colombia, as did the Engineering School and the Faculty of Economics. The support and funding Los Andes received from the foundations was a significant, if not crucial, factor in the university becoming one of the best universities in Colombia.³¹⁵ The extent to which Los Andes succeeded in being a catalyst for changing other Colombian universities though is debatable. When Alberto Lleras Camargo won the presidency he appointed founder of Los Andes Marion Laserno as rector of the National University. Laserno hoped to implement reforms at the National University, but he was ousted by rebellious students in 1960, dashing hopes he could move the National University toward the Los Andes model. However, Los Andes did set a precedent for the establishment of secular, private institutions of higher education in Colombia, and in the decades that followed the trend toward privatization would be the most significant phenomenon in higher education.³¹⁶

In Chile the foundations also sought out private alternatives to the Universidad de Chile which, like Colombia's Universidad Nacional and Universidad de Valle, was impacted tremendously by national politics. While much aid went to Universidad de Chile in Santiago due to its size and political importance, the foundations also focused on two other private universities in Chile, Universidad de

³¹⁴ This is especially true of the engineering school and the field of economics.

³¹⁵ While foreign aid to Los Andes was significant during the 50s and 60s, by the 1970s domestic contributions were its main source of financing, another reason why the foundations thought it was a successful venture. See Levy, *To Export Progress*.

³¹⁶ This will be discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter, but by privatization I am referring to the growing number of private institutions (both non-profit and for-profit) relative to state institutions. Academics have also considered the growing reliance of public universities on corporate funding a form of privatization.

Concepción and Pontifical Universidad Católica de Chile. While private universities in Chile did not operate totally autonomously (they received state funding), they were generally less impacted by radical politics than was the premier National University. In part, this was due to the student body which tended to be made of students from wealthy families. In their assessments, the foundations found encouraging signs that these schools could quickly become models for reform and would "influence educational developments in other Chilean universities" and "serve as a pilot establishment for Latin America as a whole."³¹⁷ These two universities were already considered two of the best institutions of higher education in Chile after the National University, and this factor played a role in the decision to offer aid. In the case of Católica, the relationship between the administration and North American reformers had already been established in the early fifties when Rockefeller began supporting the medical school and the field of agronomy. This prior relationship and experience made it more likely the foundations would consider the university for further development. From a strategic point of view, the foundations often felt the more reputable and established the university was the better off the chances for success were. In addition, both of these institutions were much smaller than the National University and had rectors who had already begun implementing reforms, perhaps anticipating foundation assistance.

The most successful partnership the foundations had in Chile with a private or public-alternative school was their partnership with Pontifical Universidad Católica. Established by the Catholic Church in 1888 as a counter to what was perceived as growing secularization of the elite, the state gave Católica full academic autonomy and the governance and administration was overseen by the Church, even while receiving a substantial amount of funding from the state.³¹⁸ The relationship between Católica and North American reformers began in the early 1950s with support for the medical school and the

³¹⁷ Request for Grant Action, OD-677G, April 14, 1960

³¹⁸ Andrés Bernasconi, "University Entrepreneurship in a Developing Country: The Case of the P. Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985-2000," *Higher Education*, 50:2 (Sept. 2005), pp. 247-274.

school of agronomy, two fields Rockefeller had championed in Latin America since the 1920s. In 1957 Rockefeller made a small grant to assist the U.S. government sponsored economics project at Católica that aimed to introduce market economics into Latin American universities (see chapter four for more on this). Beginning in 1960, however, Rockefeller began expanding its support for Católica. A year later Ford would partner with the U.S. government and Rockefeller to support the economics project. By 1966, the two foundations had expanded beyond these three fields to support development of the sociology, civil engineering, agricultural economics, and urban development and planning.

When Rockefeller and Ford began to expand their support for the development of the university during the 1960s they did so due to the impression that Católica's departments of economics and sociology were "among the strongest in their disciplines in Latin America, in terms of both quality of staff and of orientation toward real problems of development."³¹⁹ They also envisioned Católica as a regional model that would "share its resources with other universities of Latin America, particularly in Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Western Argentina."³²⁰ The success of Ford and Rockefeller's support for the graduate economics program and program in agricultural economics appeared to live up to that vision as Católica's economics department would begin training other Latin Americans, particularly in Colombia. However, the this success was tempered by concerns, especially at Ford, that the Católica group was too conservative and neglecting issues of equity and poverty.³²¹ The partnership between the U.S. government, Ford and the University of Chicago to introduce neo-liberal economics into Chile's institutions of higher education had produced in Católica a group of economists and agricultural economist that, in Ford's assessment, "shared a uniformly conservative viewpoint." The

³¹⁹ Request for Grant Action, Pontifical Catholics University of Chile, January 7th, 1965, p.1, FFA, Grant files 65-96, reel 2723.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ This comes up several times in Ford's evaluations of the project in economics and agricultural economics. For an example see Inter-Office Memorandum from Gerald W. Dean to Peter D. Bell, April 30, 1973, "Catholic University of Chile, Agricultural Economics, Grant Evaluation and Progress Report, FFA, Grant files 70-329, reel 4932.

specific ideological components of this project are discussed in the next chapter, but a large part of the "success" of reforms at Católica had to do with the economics department. Despite concerns about the conservative nature of the faculty, Ford concentrated its efforts on developing economics and agricultural economics at Católica, prodding them when they could to take on issues of inequality and poverty. For example, Ford brought in University of California economist Alain de Janvry as a visiting professor in hopes that Janvry's "more structuralist concerns will help to direct more departmental research work toward problems of the rural poor, income redistribution, and other current policy concerns in Chilean agriculture."³²² After the military coup in 1973 Janvry became uncomfortable with the department's increasingly close relationship with the military government (many of the faculty took posts in the government) and Janvry felt he no longer could offer much in the way of mentoring and teaching.³²³ The military coup also helped the economists at Católica, who generally supported the coup, to realize the ideal in terms of what the foundations had envisioned for university development: Latin Americans trained in and by the United States assumed government posts and used their skills to direct government policy.

Though perhaps not as successful if measured by the above standard, foundation efforts at the third best university in Chile, the private Universidad de Concepción, yielded what scholar Daniel Levy calls "prismatic change," or a result arising out of "a clash and mix of preexisting with imported structures and practice."³²⁴ In other words, the results were not what was envisioned, yet not entirely negative either. Founded in 1919 as a private autonomous university in the southern region of Chile, Concepción had a rector who was praised by North American reformers as being committed to change using the model laid out by North American reformer Rudolph Atcon. In assessing the university for

³²² Ibid. p. 9.

³²³ Inter-Office Memorandum from Alain de Janvry to Peter D. bell, March, 18, 1974, "Graduate Program in Agricultural Economics at the Catholic University of Chile, FFA, Grant files 70-329, reel 4932.

³²⁴ Levy argues that prismatic change could be seen as a negative when measured by absolute goals but could also be seen as positive when measured against what was. Daniel Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 235.

assistance Ford received glowing appraisals of Rector David Stichken from the U.S. Ambassador, who attached "great importance to aid to the university."³²⁵ The United States government had been involved with the development of the region around Concepción since the mid-1950s when Albion Patterson, the head of ICA's agricultural mission in Chile, initiated a major agricultural modernization program to increase agricultural productivity through research and training of farmers to use new technologies (extension). Patterson, who became involved in Latin American development working for Nelson Rockefeller in the Office of Inter-American Affairs, became an important link between the U.S. government and the foundations as he exemplified the type of North American reformer who promoted technocratic modernization through North American technical assistance.³²⁶ The agricultural project at Concepción he helped spearhead led to a much larger agreement of cooperation between Chile, the foundations and the University of California (known as the Chile-California *Convenio*).³²⁷ This type of agreement of cooperation reflected the way university reform and other initiatives, like agricultural modernization, were dependent on one another. North American reformers relied on universities collaborating with governmental research institutions to disseminate information and new technologies. North American reformers who had worked with Concepción during the 1950s, including Vice Chancellor of the University of California and President of the University of Oregon, could offer testimony to Ford that Concepción and its rector were committed to reform.³²⁸ With an eye to creating models for others to follow, Ford began funding the reorganization of sciences and mathematics in 1960 hoping to make "a significant contribution to higher education in Chile, which could, in turn, exert some influence in

³²⁵ Request for Grant Action, OD-677G, April 14, 1960, University Reform- reorganization of the sciences and mathematics programs, p. 3, FFA, Grant files, 60213, reel 2616.

³²⁶ Thomas F. O'Brien, *Making of the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), p. 188-89.

³²⁷ For a discussion of the University of California and its initial contacts with Chilean Minister of Agriculture Marion Astorga about the agricultural program in Concepción see Richard Adams and Charles Cumberland, *United States University Cooperation in Latin America: A Study Based on Selected Programs in Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Mexico*, (East Lansing: Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, Michigan States University, 1960), p. 210-216.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

Latin America generally.³²⁹ This was following in 1964 by assistance to develop agricultural extension and education and support for a general project through the University of Minnesota to "assist the Universidad de Concepción in providing advanced study and training for members of its faculty" and for cooperative research between the two universities.³³⁰ This large project involved financial support from not just Ford, but Rockefeller, UNESCO, the Kellogg Foundation and the Inter-American Development Bank, among others. It involved over two million dollars, ten regular University of Minnesota staff members and eight Chilean staff members.³³¹ In addition, in 1967 Washington State University signed an educational exchange contract with Concepción that allowed the two universities to exchange students.³³²

Successes and failures followed the flood of North American and international (UNESCO) money into Concepción. The easier tasks, like the centralization and expansion of the library system, were deemed "remarkable" achievements.³³³ The more difficult and ambiguous task of "modernization" was harder to gauge. Ford's final evaluation in 1968 found the professors at Concepción "were not as impressive as the group at Católica" and "did not bring back as much to their teaching situations as did the Católica group."³³⁴ In addition, the university could not entirely escape the national discussions and debates being had about university reform coming from student groups. In the case of Concepción, the students appeared to echo voices from the 1918 Cordoba Movement criticizing the low quality of faculty and administrative incompetence.³³⁵ Ford's assessment found that the leadership of the Rector that followed Stitchkens, Ignacio González Ginouvés, "failed in a crucial area" in that he did not delegate

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 4

³³⁰ Department of Educational Affairs, Pan American Union, *Inter-American University Cooperation: A Survey of Programs of Cooperation Between Institutions of Higher Education in the United States and Latin America*, (Washington D.C.: Pan American Union, 1968), p. 63.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid., p.131.

³³³ See the evaluation of a grant to centralize and expand the library, Inter-Office Memo from George Sutija to John Netherton, Subject: University of Concepcion's Library, May 15th, 1970, p. 1, Grant files 60-213, reel 2616.

³³⁴ Inter-Office Memorandum from Reuben Frodin to John P. Netherton, "Evaluation of University of Concepcion," October 9, 1968, p. 2-3, FFA, Grant Files, 60213, reel 2616.

³³⁵ Ibid.

authority.³³⁶ In the end, the efforts to develop Concepción took a respectable university (in relative measures) and made it better. Assistance did not, however, create the type of catalysts for systemic change envisioned by foundations. Systemic change would come from a different source, one that would radically alter the university system in Chile. When the military ousted President Allende in 1973 they would institute sweeping changes to higher education. The wave of military governments coming to power during the precise decades when foundations were focused on university reform presented a serious challenge to North American reformers.

University Reform Under Military Rule: Ford, Rockefeller and Authoritarian States

In Colombia, government repression operated underneath a veneer of democracy while the national government continued to espouse commitment to reform. Foundation assistance continued without much pontificating about the impact of government repression on the reform process. However, in Brazil, Chile and Argentina democracies would be replaced by military rule, presenting Ford and Rockefeller with a dilemma where their projects were concerned. In their response to military takeovers, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations behaved pragmatically and did not automatically withdraw support based on moral opposition to military rule. Modernization theory in general had taken an authoritarian turn as North American reformers began to realize democracy was sometimes a barrier to their goals. As advisor to the U.S. government and several foundations, modernization theorists Walt Rostow applauded actions taken by several Latin American governments to crack down on radical student activity noting in a memo to the White House, "The process of modernization of Latin American education will be speeded up if student interference with university administration is curtailed."³³⁷ So,

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

³³⁷ Walt W. Rostow, Memorandum for the President, "Significant Trends in Latin America: Curbing University Autonomy," December 21, 1966, L.B.J. Library, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America, Box 2 (2 of 2), folder: LA Volume 4-a (1 of 2) 9/66-12/66.

faced with military governments in control the foundations protected their investments in particular fields by helping scholars relocate if repression became too severe (discussed in more detail in the following chapter) and adapted their approach to the particular situation in each country.

The military take-over in Brazil in 1964 caused some re-assessment, but in the end had little impact on either Ford or Rockefeller's decision to continue support. Though acknowledging the realities of self-censorship in foundation supported scholars doing research, Ford felt they did not want to "overreact" and pull their support.³³⁸ Scholars such as famed sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso and anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro were either exiled or forced to flee the country in the initial phase of repression. Ironically, Ribeiro had just launched a significant university reform project in Brazil. In 1962, the radical left-wing scholar founded University of Brasilia which adopted a North American university structure, including a basic studies program with the help of the Ford Foundation.³³⁹ Ribeiro was arrested and forced into exile in Uruguay. Cardoso later returned to Brazil and resumed his position at University of Sao Paulo only to be forced to retire under a new wave of repression in 1968. The Ford Foundation assisted him in setting up an independent research and consulting organization called Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP) where "retired" scholars could continue their work independent of the government.³⁴⁰ Though it was not always possible, Ford sought ways to carry on research projects by funding independent centers where scholars who were barred from government work could do research. The Rockefeller Foundation too continued its support for projects in a wide

³³⁸ Inter-office memo from James A. Gardner to William Carmicheal, December 19, 1969, p. 2, FFA, grant files 66-, 115, p. 4.

³³⁹ Jerome Levinson and Juan Onis, *The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 293-96.

³⁴⁰ Joseph A. Kahl, *Three Latin American Sociologists: Gino Germani, Pablo Gonzales, Fernando Henrique Cardoso*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 139.

range of fields in Brazil. In 1966, two years after the military took over, Rockefeller was funding projects in medicine, physics, agriculture, agronomy and university reform.³⁴¹

Though Argentina was never a priority for either foundation due to its advanced development relative to other countries in the region, grants to institutions in the country continued at a consistent level throughout the 1960s despite an authoritarian or military government for much of the decade. The 1966 military takeover by General Juan Carlos Onganía, which sought to create a permanent military regime as opposed to a temporary military junta, did result in hundreds of academics at major universities (in particular the University of Buenos Aires) leaving the country. Many of those academics were assisted by U.S. universities and the Ford Foundation, who helped them find places to go including the U.S. and other Latin American countries. The Ford Foundation provided support to various organizations (Latin American Council of the Social Sciences, Committee to Aid Latin American Scholars) to find new opportunities for scholars adversely affected by the coups in Argentina and Chile, and also gave money to Latin American Faculty of the Social Sciences (FLASCO) to "sustain research projects which might otherwise have been abandoned" in Chile.³⁴²

In Chile, Ford had a different response to the military coup in 1973 that replaced Chile's democracy with a military junta under General Augusto Pinochet. Immediately after the coup in 1973 Ford reacted pragmatically and evaluated individual grants on a case by case basis to determine if continued funding was appropriate. However, after six months Ford made the decision to stop most, though not all, of its activities in Chile because they felt that grants "would inevitably become entangled in the arbitrary and repressive measures of the regime and that their broad objectives would be

³⁴¹ Rockefeller annual reports, on-line at <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/annual-reports>, accessed 1/10/12.

³⁴² Memo, William Carmichael to Peter Bell, "Review of the Foundation's Program in Chile," April 1st, 1974, FFA, 008957.

thwarted."³⁴³ Ford's assessment understated the reality. The university system, especially the National University, became a prime target of government repression because of its ideological traditions of left-wing politics and because it represented the type of statism the military junta was bent on crushing. The eight regional colleges that Ford has assisted were given total autonomy from the National University. In 1980 reform law was passed aimed at destroying the power of the National University while at the same time promoting stratification of the university system with new technical training centers and the encouragement of private institutions to compete with public ones. As a result, the number of institutions under the higher education category mushroomed from the original 18 (all funded by the state) to over 310 institutions both public and private.³⁴⁴ In addition, universities that had relied on the state for their revenue were now forced to initiate tuition schemes and raise revenue from non-state organizations. Government support was drastically cut, and in the case of the regional colleges almost totally eliminated (they receive only 8% of their funding from the government today).³⁴⁵ It is probably safe to say the scope of the military government's intervention in universities surpassed what Ford could have imagine in 1974 and set the stage for the current student protests engulfing Chile today.

The different attitude and actions exhibited by Ford in Brazil and Chile is reflective of both the timing of the military takeovers and the image Ford had in various countries. When the military coup occurred in Brazil (1964) the idealism and optimism of reformers had not yet diminished. Brazil was

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁴⁴ José Joaquín Brunner, "Chile's higher education: Between market and state," in *Contemporary Higher Education: International Issues for the Twenty-First Century*, Philip G. Altbach, ed., (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997). On this topic also see Andrés Bernasconi and Fernando Rojas, *Informe Sobre La Educación Superior En Chile: 1980-2003*, (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 2004), Daniel Levy, *Higher Education and the State in Latin America: Private Challenges to Public Dominance*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), Kathleen B. Fischer, *Political Ideology and Educational Reform in Chile, 1964-1976*, (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1979), and Karen L. Remmer, "Political Demobilization in Chile, 1973-1978," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (April, 1980), pp. 275-301.

³⁴⁵ figure comes from Verne S. Atwater and Evelyn Walsh, *[A Memoir of] the Ford Foundation, the Early Years: An Insider View of the Impact of Wealth and Good Intentions*, (New York: Vantage Press, 2012), p. 146.

strategically important to broad plans for Latin America and a major recipient of foundation and U.S. government aid. In addition, Ford felt they did not have a defined "political image" in Brazil making it less likely the military would interfere with projects.³⁴⁶ The coup in Chile (1973) came at a time of dwindling commitments to university reform and Latin American development in general. Although Ford still had important projects going on in Chile, the enthusiasm for the possibility of real change had been seriously dampened by the 1970s. In addition, because Ford did not pull out of Chile in the aftermath of Allende's victory, in some circles they had the image of being left-wing, or least tolerant of Marxism.³⁴⁷ This would have made it difficult to avoid scrutiny under the military junta. While Ford did undergo government scrutiny during the Allende years (Allende even threatened foundations with expulsion during his presidential campaign), the government was rarely a barrier to projects. During the decade of the 1960s, the years of most intense funding for projects in university reform, neither Ford nor Rockefeller made decisions about projects based on the presence or absence of democracy. Strategic considerations and pragmatism guided their decisions in this regard.

Higher Education in the Age of Neoliberals and Globalization: The Departure of the Foundations and the Arrival of Academic Capitalism

By the 1970s the top-down approach to social change and the pivotal role of higher education in particular was looking inadequate to Ford and Rockefeller. Foundation reports on university reform projects often gave mixed results (what scholar Daniel Levy describes as prismatic results) highlighting important successes and down playing important failures, but the dramatic decline in funding and attention to university development beginning in the early 1970s reveals the extent of the disillusionment with modernization theory and the top-down approach to social change. Officers at Ford openly recognized this in their proposed budget for 1974-75 for Colombia and Venezuela, noting,

³⁴⁶ Memo from Francis X Sutton to The Self Study Committee, Interviews with overseas staff in Latin America, May 15th 1972, p. 4, FFA, 010942.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

"we have approached our program development work too exclusively and narrowly through contacts with technocrats and top-level administrators in highly centralized agencies."³⁴⁸ Recommendations for future programs in education involved non-formal education and family life education in addition to a focus on disadvantaged groups.³⁴⁹ By century's end Ford would will be involved in aiding higher education, but as Daniel Levy points out, not for institution building but "focusing instead on access and equity for deprived groups."³⁵⁰

At the Rockefeller Foundation, similar changes were underway. In the foundation's 1974 annual report the following statement describes the new focus:

The change in 1974 of the program's designation from University Development to Education for Development reflects the desirability to mesh more closely the resources of the university with the planning and executive functions of other public agencies and institutions. Of particular interest today are the university's potential in planning and training for elementary and secondary education, and for rural development.³⁵¹

Both the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation would continue to promote research and advance graduate training through select grants, but their grandiose vision for managed social change spearheaded by the universities evaporated amidst a general realization of the inadequacies of the modernization paradigm that had shaped their agenda.

In evaluating the impact of Ford and Rockefeller's foray into institution building through the university system one must consider the extent to which the system changed, specifically the extent to which it looked more like the U.S. model, and the consequences of those changes on the various societies. Two superficial "successes" in regard to this were expansion (measured by enrollment) and diversification (measure by the number of new institutions that supplemented the national universities).

³⁴⁸ The Ford Foundation Office for Colombia and Venezuela, Proposed FY 1974-75 Budget, January 15, 1973. p.3.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 239.

³⁵¹ 1974 Rockefeller Foundation annual report, online at <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/annual-reports>.

Enrollment rates for Latin American higher education grew dramatically during the 60s and 70s, so too did the number of different institutions, from private universities to technical schools to regional colleges. Universities receiving special attention from Ford and Rockefeller improved in a number of measures including the ratio of full-time to part-time faculty, the extent of integration and departmentalization and the production of research. But the uneven improvements in these areas still left Latin American universities lagging way behind their U.S. counterparts. For example, Latin America as a region still had only two universities in a recent ranking of five hundred "world class" universities, and science publications are extremely low comparatively.³⁵² Due to state cuts in higher education spending, Universities have been forced to diversify their funding sources including charging tuition. This puts them more in line with the U.S. model but has also led to dramatic increases in student debt and, more recently, student protests demanding tuition-free public education be reinstated. Daniel Levy suggest that "donor" money (inclusive of U.S. government aid and foundation aid) improved targeted universities relative to the unassisted universities but did not produce a trickle-down effect, rather it merely stratified the system creating and even sharper hierarchy amid the proliferation of new institutions of dubious quality.³⁵³ In this sense the "successes" of expansion and diversification worked against the larger goal of improving the quality of higher education

While the Latin American university system does look more like the U.S. system than it did before university reform was attempted, the changes clearly did not produce the type of growth and stability the foundations envisioned. One of the reasons for this was the wide-spread adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by Latin American governments during the decades that followed. This produced one of the most destabilizing trends in higher education, that of privatization. The privatization of higher education that was at the center of protests in Chile and Colombia in 2011 was

³⁵² See Jorge Balán, "Reforming Higher Education in Latin America: Policy and Practice," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 41, no. 2, June 2006.

³⁵³ Levy, *To Export Progress*.

the result of a host of direct and indirect efforts to bring market forces to bear on the education system, some of the efforts had their roots in foundation projects to diversify the system and expand enrollments. As foundations pushed for what Levy calls "differentiation and autonomy" for institutions, the groundwork was laid for the expansion of private universities and tuition in public universities. Foundations also took interest in universities that sought corporate backing through donations, seeing this as "entrepreneurial spirit." In exchange for paying the salaries of full-time faculty, companies would receive some type of privilege at the university. This trend was similar to what happened in U.S. universities during the twentieth century when endowed chairs became a popular way for wealthy individuals to gain influence in the university. But more importantly, the universities began assessing their research and programs in terms of market relevancy.³⁵⁴ Additionally, Ford's support of organizations like ICETEX (commonly referred to as Educredit) expanded a student loan system which made paying for the array of new private institutions that sprouted up much easier.

The proliferation of new private universities and technical schools throughout Latin America, but in particular in Colombia and Chile, has brought the neo-liberal core value of "choice" to Latin American higher education. If there is one element of U.S. culture that has been incorporated into the higher education system more than any other it is the embracement of competition and consumer choice as the ideal foundation for a university system. However, this incorporation has often been forced on the people by authoritarian governments or budgetary constraints within the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and the most recent popular protests against the current system suggests a significant backlash to this cultural change. Perhaps in the efforts to bring growth and stability to Latin America the

³⁵⁴ This change was first examined by scholars looking at the U.S. system. The pioneering work by Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie, *Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies and the Entrepreneurial University* (1997) led to a whole new genre of works looking at this phenomenon. See also, Jan Currie and Janice Newson, *Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives*, (London: Sage, 1998), Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff, eds., *Universities and the Global Knowledge Economy: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations*, (Washington: Pinter Press, 1997). In reference to Chile see Abdres Bernasconi, "University Entrepreneurship in a Developing Country: The Case of the P. Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985-200," *Higher Education*, Vol. 50, no. 2 (September 2005), pp. 247-274.

foundations would have been better off paying attention to the words coming out of the student movement in Colombia during the 1960s: "It is commonly said that the university is a reflection of the society in which it exists. Then in order to change the university what alternative do we have to first changing society."³⁵⁵ Of course, that was an inversion of the way Ford and Rockefeller saw it happening.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the efforts by North American reformers to modernize the university system as part of the first step toward larger societal change. The activities of the foundations in this area highlight some common tenets of larger global reform efforts and reveal certain common assumptions about how North American reformers saw modernization proceeding. Top-down reform became the hallmark of global reform efforts, and this is perhaps nowhere more evident than in attempts to create more centralized universities. North American reformers did not see students as having a role in this process, rather administrative decisions and governance, like in American universities, was managed by the administration. The re-making of the university system was not the end goal, and the activities described in this chapter were supposed to lay the foundation for additional projects aimed at specific disciplines within the university and for joint government-university projects to modernize agriculture and contain population growth.

Beyond the goals of centralization and creating a basic studies program, much of the university reform agenda involved building up certain departments (agronomy, medical sciences and the social sciences) to address the needs of the agricultural sector and the efforts to reduce population growth. In addition, university reform was geared toward creating technocrats in the social sciences who could serve their government. These projects were all a part of the larger endeavor to create political

³⁵⁵ Emphasis in original. Jorge Posada, president FUN, quoted in Magnusson, "Reform at the National University of Colombia," p. 154.

stability through economic growth and promote American cultural values abroad by integrating Latin American societies into a global economy managed by the United States. Universities were to be the conduit through which modernization was promoted, and this is why they were essential for other projects in agriculture and population control. While scientific advancements in crop yield and variety and in artificial birth control would assist efforts to develop agriculture and reduce population growth, making the social sciences more empirical would provide the basis for social engineering. The next chapter examines three specific disciplines within the university (economics, political science and sociology) to reveal how the ideological parameters of the modernization paradigm were disseminated to newly trained Latin American technocrats through building the social sciences. These disciplines were central to social engineering in that they helped to advance government policy based on scientific research and supposedly neutral market forces.

Chapter Four

Scientific Nation Building: Engineering Reform through the Social Sciences

In the past fifty to seventy-five years has developed what might be called a new approach to the understanding of man. It is not new in the sense that it has identified new problems, but rather in its applications of the principles of scientific method to the study of human behavior.³⁵⁶

When the Rockefeller Foundation approved a grant to support the School of Sociology at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile in 1964 they did so with the explicit goal of influencing the direction of social change in Chile. In 1964 Eduardo Frei, the reformist candidate for the Christian Democrat Party, appeared likely to win the presidency and usher in major social and economic reforms.³⁵⁷ Justifying the support of sociology in Chilean universities the Rockefeller Foundation reported "The lack of Chileans with adequate sociological training becomes acute as the time approaches when a new government committed to social change will be installed in Chile. It is virtually certain that the government elected next September will embark on a vigorous program of social change, either within the present constitution or outside it."³⁵⁸ Further noting that "the universities are the major source for filling the lack that exists," foundation officials realized the opportunity to shape policy making and prevent radical solutions to Chilean problems from gaining traction.³⁵⁹ Development of the social sciences in Latin America, in particular economics, political science, and sociology, became an important strategy in the modernization paradigm of the foundations as Latin American countries

³⁵⁶ *Behavioral Sciences Division Report*, (New York: Ford Foundation, 1951), p.5. quoted in Peter J. Seybold, "The Ford Foundation and the Triumph of Behaviorism in American Political Science," in Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*.

³⁵⁷ The election of 1964 brought the Christian Democrat candidate Eduardo Frei to power. Frei was hailed by more liberal North American reformers as the last chance for a "reformist" model of change before a more radical approach took hold. See Leonard Gross, *The Last, Best, Hope: Eduardo Frei and Chilean Democracy*, (New York: Random House, 1967).

³⁵⁸ Request for Grant Action No. OD-1522, August 3, 1964, RAC, RF, RG 12, series 309, box 8, folder 49, p. 2.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

look more and more toward specialized experts to explain and manage social change.³⁶⁰ In addition, the social sciences were important for supporting reforms being made in other areas, particularly agricultural modernization.

The United States government had already been exploring the possible uses for the social sciences during World War II, especially in the area of psychological warfare. As third world development became a major policy issue after the war the focus would expand to include explaining and managing social change. Latin America was seen to be in a dangerous transition period that could leave many countries susceptible to communism. A 1961 government intelligence estimate explained the instability in this way:

The 19th century pattern of relationships and attitudes which still prevails through most of the area [Latin America] is being progressively undermined by a host of economic, social, and political changes, whose pace has accelerated in the period since World War II. Economic growth over the last decade or two has been rapid, but uneven. It has exaggerated the disparities between the traditionally important agricultural and extractive sectors of the economy, which function much as they did in the past, and the modern industrial developments associated with the cities. The influx into the urban communities of unskilled peasants in search of employment has produced a mass of city slums occupied by the unemployed and the underemployed.³⁶¹

The U.S. government's urgency in finding a way to direct this transition is reflected in a report done by MIT at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The report, entitled "Economic, Social and Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries," argued that "In a real sense our subject is revolution, for the entire fabric of these societies with which we are concerned is being torn apart, the

³⁶⁰ for an excellent general discussion of how the social sciences were used in political development studies and were seen as a tool to manage political change see Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

³⁶¹ CIA National Intelligence Estimate Number 80/90-61, July 18, 1961, Latin American reactions to developments in and with respect to Cuba, p. 3, LBJ Library, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Box 2 (1 of 2), Folder: NSF National Intelligence Estimate

old and time-honored being replaced by totally new economic, political, and social forms."³⁶² The social sciences, the report argues, could assist in explaining and guiding policy with regard to this change. Behavioral science research, as one member of the U.S. Congress stated, was "one of the vital tools in the arsenal of the free societies."³⁶³

By the mid-1960s the U.S. government was ready to launch the largest endeavor yet utilizing the social sciences in the service of national security. In 1964 the U.S. military launched Project Camelot, a multi-million dollar research project to study social conflict in countries deemed important to U.S. national security. Its primary objective was to "determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world."³⁶⁴ Its target was Latin America. Though Project Camelot never got passed the initial planning stage due to word of the project and its funding source (the U.S. military) being leaked to the Chilean press and subsequent widespread protest against the project in Chile, clearly the U.S. government had realized the potential for the social sciences. The protests against Project Camelot lead to its cancellation, but other projects continue to operate.³⁶⁵

The similar lines of thinking between those in the U.S. government and foundation officers regarding the importance of the social sciences to developing nations was not mere coincidence. The social sciences created Modernization Theory, and this paradigm was widely accepted by both

³⁶² Quoted in Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 59-60.

³⁶³ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report 4 with Part IX of the hearings on "Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive," Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, 1966, p. 5R, Quoted in Gendzier, *Managing Political Change*, p. 57.

³⁶⁴ solicitation for scholarly participation in Camelot released by the Office of the Director of the Special Operations Research Office of the American University in Washington D.C., December 4, 1964, quoted in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship Between Social Science and Practical Politics*, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 5.

³⁶⁵ Chile was never one of the countries Camelot was targeting, but the news about the project broke there first due to the people involved. There was a similar project in Colombia called "Simpatíco" that continued. See Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*."

government reformers and the foundations as a lens through which to see development. In addition, the network of scholars that advised the government and the foundations was made up of many of the same people. The development of the social sciences in Latin America would, like other projects, be a joint venture between the U.S. government and Ford and Rockefeller.

The university reform projects discussed in the previous chapter were meant to create an institutional foundation for "action research" to flourish. This research was to be aimed at explaining, analyzing and ultimately controlling the potentially destabilizing changes that modernization brought. While Rostow's *Stages of Growth* manifesto provided a neat linear blueprint for nations to follow on the road from traditional to modern societies, there was also a consensus among development specialists that modernization created disequilibrium which could lead to political instability, as noted in the MIT report above.³⁶⁶ In addition, the belief in increased productivity and economic growth as the panacea for Latin American instability was often tempered by the growing awareness that growth did not necessarily translate into modernization and that growth itself could be destabilizing. The development of the social sciences in Latin American would ensure that the problems of modernization could be properly identified and, importantly, be dealt with in an acceptable way that maintained stability and accelerated Latin America's integration into the global economy.

Progressive Era Origins of the Applied Social Sciences

Like many of the projects the foundations championed in Latin America, attempts to develop the social sciences drew upon experiences in the United States where philanthropic foundations had been successful in professionalizing the disciplines and convincing skeptics that social science research could indeed be scientific and useful in government planning. Though behavioral sciences often took a back seat to the hard sciences in government funding, their influence in government, and in policy

³⁶⁶ also see Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

making in particular, grew exponentially after the 1930s.³⁶⁷ A concerted effort by philanthropic foundations to elevate disciplines such as economics and political science to the level of respect enjoyed by the natural sciences took place in the United States beginning in the 1920s. Key to this effort was proving their utility to guide and direct the forces of change in modernizing countries.

The government's interest in the uses of social science research to address society's problems had been growing since the First World War.³⁶⁸ After the post-war economic downturn in 1920 the government began a partnership with private philanthropy to produce research that would help explain economic changes in a way that would be helpful for policy making. As Secretary of Commerce in 1921 Herbert Hoover helped create the President's Conference on Unemployment, a partnership between business, government, labor and private philanthropy that sought to understand and manage economic changes. Then, as president of the United States, Hoover established the President's Research Committee on Social Trends to oversee a scientific study of social problems in America. The resulting report, *Recent Social Trends in the United States (1933)*, was a massive endeavor that brought together numerous government agencies, Rockefeller financing and social scientists from the new social science organization the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). Private philanthropy had created the SSRC, and after *Recent Social Trends* its instrumentality in government service was established.³⁶⁹

The disciplines that made up the social sciences in the SSRC (most prominently economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and history) found their champion in Beardsley

³⁶⁷ For an examination of the relationship between the social sciences and government see Gene Martin Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ on this see Donald Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science Research Council*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

Ruml, the director of the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial Fund (LSRM).³⁷⁰ Established in 1918 by John D. Rockefeller Sr., the LSRM initially focused its support on traditional missionary activities. The focus shifted in 1922, when the board appointed Ruml to be its new director. A psychologist by training (specializing in the study of intelligence measurement), Ruml was an ardent believer in the application of research to solve society's most pressing problems. He also believed the best results would come with collaboration between the social sciences rather than maintaining strict disciplinary boundaries in research.³⁷¹

During this same period Charles Merriam, the president of the American Political Science Association, was spearheading an effort to create an organization that would bring together social scientists in the fields of political science, economics, history and sociology in an effort to professionalize the fields and gain respect in the scientific community.³⁷² Ruml and Merriam would soon form a partnership that elevated a newly created organization, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), to one of the most powerful umbrella organizations in the social sciences. With the LSMF as its benefactor the SSRC would have the financial support needed to embark on its mission to make the study of human behavior a respectable and scientific endeavor. For his part, Ruml found the SSRC to be the perfect coordinating board for building up the social sciences in universities around the United States.

The onset of the Great Depression marked a period of growth and expansion of applied social scientific research. The SSRC, under Rockefeller's guidance and funding, shifted social science research away from "pure research" and toward applied research.³⁷³ The process of knowledge production became oriented toward predetermined ends rather than a pure and scientific quest for knowledge and truth. Seeking funding and legitimacy, academics and researchers who once viewed government work as

³⁷⁰ Donald Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science Research Council*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Ibid

"prostituted science" began to embrace cooperation with the government.³⁷⁴ This shift was in direct response to labor unrest and racial tensions of the 1920s, but even more so to the crisis of capitalism brought on by a failure of the free market to produce growth and stability in the 1930s.

The discipline of economics was the first to reap the benefits of expanding collaboration during the Depression years. Government responses to the Great Depression required new levels of statistical information about the economy to be used in planning and managing the economy. The SSRC, the Rockefeller Foundation and government agencies worked together closely to direct research agendas to the most pressing problems of the economy. In 1933, in the depth of the Depression, the Rockefeller Foundation made emergency grants to help the Federal Emergency Relief Administration gather and analyze data needed for relief projects.³⁷⁵ It also funded advisory panels dealing with applications to the Public Works and Civil Works Administration. Men like Beardsley Ruml, who by this time had left the foundation and entered the business world, created an economic advisory council to advise the government. Eventually the council won over the Roosevelt administration where deficit spending was concerned and ushered in a new economic paradigm called Keynesian economics that remains the basis for managing the economy today.³⁷⁶ In addition to grants given to the SSRC, the Rockefeller Foundation supported the National Bureau of Economic Research and The Brookings Institution as well as giving grants to a variety of organizations to train public administrators for federal service.³⁷⁷

Between 1930 and 1950 the Rockefeller Foundation alone spent over \$100 million dollars on developing the social sciences, much of it going to individual fellowships and American universities

³⁷⁴ Christopher Simpson, ed., *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, (New York: The New Press, 1998).

³⁷⁵ 1933 Rockefeller Foundation Annual report, p. 287-290. accessed online at <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/annual-reports/1930-1939>

³⁷⁶ for an examination of Ruml's role in persuading the Roosevelt administration of the merits of Keynesianism see, Robert M. Collins, "Positive Business Responses to the New Deal: The Roots of the Committee for Economic Development, 1933-1942", *The Business History Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3, (Autumn, 1978), pp. 369-391.

³⁷⁷ Second Interim Report, Section I, A Brief History, RAC, RF, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 30, folder 162, p. 22.

helping to create the modern research university in the United States.³⁷⁸ Domestic development and stability was the main focus of the social sciences, especially what would become known as the applied social sciences, during the period before World War II.³⁷⁹ However, the Rockefeller Foundation, in keeping with its concern for expanding U.S. global leadership, also began funding centers for international studies during this time. The most prominent of these would be the Yale Institute of International Studies. Created in 1935 by a Rockefeller grant, the Yale Institute would be devoted to producing research that could be used by government officials in formulating foreign policy.³⁸⁰ Though economics would continue to be a key field targeted for development, World War II and the onset of the Cold War would create a new market for social scientists of all stripes.³⁸¹

The increased attention paid to the developing world brought on by the Cold War resulted in new fields within the social sciences, specifically area studies and development studies. Beginning in the 1950s, the U.S. government and the major foundations (Rockefeller and Carnegie) would build numerous academic centers housed within universities devoted to these two areas. The Yale Institute would continue to be at the forefront of this field, but it would be joined in 1951 by MIT's Center for International Studies and a host of university based centers around the country. Latin America became an important region to study after World War II due to its existence as a post-colonial region that remained underdeveloped. Studying the region would be important for understanding the trajectory for

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 20-22.

³⁷⁹ Ethan Schrum, "Administering American modernity: The instrumental university in the postwar United States," PhD Dissertation (University of Pennsylvania), 2009. Schrum looks at the development of the research university in the United States prior to and after World War II, arguing the postwar university was an instrument for the social engineering of American modernity. Key to the concept of the "instrumental university" was the buildup of applied social sciences.

³⁸⁰ for a brief history of the Yale Institute see Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*, pp. 68-73.

³⁸¹ for an excellent history of the links between foreign policy and the funding of academics in universities during the post-war years see Christopher Simpson, *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, (New York: New Press, 1998).

all the newly independent countries in other parts of the world.³⁸² Particularly important to Latin American studies were the centers for Latin American studies at UCLA, University of Texas, Tulane, Florida and Columbia.³⁸³ While government research money was important to the development of the field of Latin American studies, the Ford Foundation would be the most important non-government sponsor.

Area and development studies required a multi-disciplinary approach and thus drew on a variety of social sciences. North American academics in many fields benefited not only from the funding of a huge array of projects that cut across multiple disciplines but also from the growing prestige and authority of the social sciences within government circles. When the time came for addressing the needs of the social sciences in Latin America, the U.S. government and the foundations could seek advice from a pool of Latin American specialists whom they had created. The process of bridging the social sciences with policy making in the United States was only a few decades old when North American academics were called upon to make the social sciences in the developing world relevant to policy making and useful to foreign governments.

**From Academia to Policy Making:
Bridging the Social Sciences and the Technocratic State in Latin America**

Antecedents to the post-war research social scientist existed in almost every Latin American country in the form of *pensadores*, or thinkers drawn from the educated and professional classes who

³⁸² This idea was present in the project to modernize Mexico's agricultural sector (the Mexican Agricultural Project). Mexico served as an accessible model for reform of a "traditional system" during World War II, and it was hoped the model could be used in other "traditional societies." See chapter five for a discussion of this or E.C. Stakman, Richard Bradfield, Paul C. Mangelsdorf, *Campaigns Against Hunger*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), or Deborah Fitzgerald, "Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953," in Marcos Cueto, Ed., *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

³⁸³ Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*.

wrote descriptive and philosophical essays on social and political issues.³⁸⁴ The "national question," or discourse on the formation and direction of the nation, was an overriding theme in many of these early writings.³⁸⁵ Men like José Victorino Lastarria, whose 1844 study on the social influences of Spanish colonialism in Chilean society created interest in Chilean history among the elite, exemplified the first generation of these *pensadores*.³⁸⁶ Twentieth century writings began to reflect the social criticism seen in much of the post-war commentary by social scientists. The contributions of these writers, though outside the university setting, provided descriptions and diagnoses of social and political problems that often used empirical observations.³⁸⁷ They laid the foundation for the post-war boom in scientific and applied social science. The field of economics, once left to lawyers and politicians, would become one of the most important foundations for the technocratic state, and the fields of sociology and political science would leave their philosophical foundations and become accepted as a scientific basis for government policy. These fields would undergo a revolution in methodology that sought to make them less philosophical and more empirical and action oriented, and in this way made them invaluable to Latin American governments wanting to direct industrialization.

The growing influence of the social sciences in policy making circles in Latin America during the post-war years can be traced to the creation of the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America (Comisión Económica para América Latina-CEPAL) in 1948.³⁸⁸ The Commission was founded to

³⁸⁴ For a discussion of these antecedents see Jorge Balán, "Social Sciences in the Periphery: Perspectives on the Latin American Case," in Laurence D. Stifel, Ralph K. Davidson, James S. Coleman, *Social Science and Public Policy in the Developing World*, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982).

³⁸⁵ Hernán Godoy identifies the various strains of literature present in early writings on social and political development in "La sociología del intelectual en América Latina," in *Anuario de Sociología de los Pueblos Ibéricos 2* (1967), pp. 11-57. For a discussion of early thinkers in the field of sociology and their writings see José Vicente Tavares-dos-Santos and Maria Baumgarten, "Latin American sociology's contribution to Sociological Imagination: analysis, criticism, and social commitment," *Sociologías* vol. 1, no. se Porto Alegre, 2006.

³⁸⁶ Edmundo F. Fuezalida, "The Reception of 'Scientific Sociology' in Chile," *Latin America Research Review*, 18:2 (1983), pp. 95-112.

³⁸⁷ Balán, "Social Sciences in the Periphery", p. 220.

³⁸⁸ This is the argument of Jorge Balán who argues CEPAL was an antecedent to the post war growth of the social sciences. See Jorge Balán, "Social Sciences in the Periphery: Perspectives on the Latin American Case," in *Social*

identify economic trends and address problems using a Latin American perspective. The work of the commission, headed by Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, served to legitimize the role of the social sciences in national planning. Because CEPAL took a holistic approach to development, political science, sociology, and anthropology would benefit along with the rise of economics.³⁸⁹ CEPAL saw economic growth as much a product of structural forces as it was of government monetary policy and therefore welcomed a multidisciplinary approach.

In 1957 the UN initiated another important organization that would facilitate the building of the social sciences in Latin America: Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). Formed with financial support from UNESCO and the Inter-American Development Bank, FLACSO was to be a regional post-graduate training institution for Latin American students of sociology and political science. In 1958 FLACSO started a two year training program in sociology, and in 1966 they established a School of Political Science. Graduates from these programs provided social scientist trained in new modern methodology based on quantitative data analysis and sample survey methodology.³⁹⁰

While regional organizations like CEPAL and FLACSO were important to giving the social sciences prestige and influence, it was the universities that would become the focus of foundation efforts. Both Rockefeller and Ford sought out the best of the social scientists in specific fields in Latin America and began a process of institution building through these men and their universities or research

Sciences and Public Policy in the Developing World (Lexington: LexingtonBooks, 1982). During and immediately after the war the United Nations, embracing the modernization paradigm, would begin relief and reform efforts around the globe. Though the United States preferred bi-lateral aid over aid that went through the United Nations, initiatives coming out of the United Nations had a multinational character that gave them legitimacy in the developing world. Thus the UN became a means to promote development along Western and capitalist lines. For a discussion of the extent to which the UN furthers U.S. hegemony see Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, eds. *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), and for a history of its creation see Stephen E. Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003). For a discussion of early UN projects and initiatives and U.S. global reform efforts see Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, pp. 86-97.

³⁸⁹ Balán, "Social Sciences in the Periphery," pp. 214-215.

³⁹⁰ Both Rockefeller and Ford supported FLACSO at various times. Ford Grant Request Action, Background and Justification, 68-796, located in Rockefeller files, RAC, RF, Record Group 1.2, series 309, box 8, folder 49.

institutions. The following examination of Rockefeller and Ford's involvement in building the social sciences looks at the development of three key disciplines in Latin America: economics, sociology, and political science. I present an analysis of why the foundations felt these disciplines were important and how they sought to refashion the fields in the service of the modernization paradigm. As was true in the United States during the initial phase of professionalization of the social sciences, the most support went to the field of economics specifically because it seemed to be the most useful in state planning. It was also more easily quantified therefore giving it the illusion of objectivity. Perhaps most importantly, the field of economics would support projects in agricultural modernization through the introduction of free market principles that promoted economic growth and productivity as the solution to Latin America's agricultural stagnation. Foundation justifications for the support of sociology and political science stemmed from their usefulness in managing the social and political problems of growth that would necessarily arise during the modernization process. The ideological assumptions behind the modernization paradigm drove the focus in each of these fields as social science research in the service of public policy became the goal. Modernization theorists such as Walt Rostow, Max Millikan, Edward Shils, Lucian Pye and Gabriel Almond had close connections to the foundations, serving as advisers and receiving grants for their studies. This in turn impacted the type of research encouraged and supported by the foundations in Latin American universities and research institutions.

Despite their best efforts to control the process by which social scientists influenced government policy, often events within specific countries would derail these efforts at least temporarily. Nonetheless, Rockefeller and Ford were successful at introducing new theoretical paradigms in economics and political science that sought to counter Latin American theories. Critics of U.S. involvement called this imperialism, but the foundations called this process fostering "pluralism."³⁹¹ The change was complex and involved supporting many left-of-center scholars as well as the more well-

³⁹¹ For a discussion of how pluralism was a goal in university reform see Daniel Levy, *To Export Progress*.

known right leaning economists trained under foundation grants. The foundations were not overtly imperialistic; this is not how hegemonic systems maintain control. Instead, they hoped to create a consensus about economic and social problems within the social sciences that was compatible with global capitalism. They also wanted U.S. trained scholars on both the left and the right in order to "hedge their bets" on who held power in government, thus increasing the likelihood that grants would lead to influence in government policy. Like their attempts to break the monopoly of the national universities and offer choice and diversity in the university system, efforts to build the social sciences were built around challenging Latin American orthodoxy in all fields. Pluralism would be a catch phrase used to obscure the ways in which the foundations were institutionalizing western approaches to the social sciences that would facilitate the integration of Latin America into a capitalist global economy and culture.

The Mask of Pluralism: Building an Economics to Serve Global Capitalism³⁹²

Economic growth is at the heart of the capitalist system, and managing both economic growth and economic contractions became the centerpiece of the technocratic state in North America during the first part of the twentieth century. A need for data and statistics to manage and control growth gave rise to the discipline of economics in the United States ahead of the other social sciences. When the foundations turned their attention to Latin America and the task of accelerating and managing economic growth the need for trained economists was a priority. The initial impetus for developing the field would be a collaborative effort between the U.S. government (Point IV and USAID after 1961), North American universities and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Ford Foundation, coming after the others initiated assistance, would nonetheless take up the task of training Latin American economists with perhaps greater attention than any of its partners. The result of this three way collaboration was a

³⁹² the term "mask of pluralism" is taken from Joan Roelofs critical look at foundations in the U.S., *Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism*.

remarkable success in increasing the number of economists in Latin America but also in institutionalizing a type of economics ideal for promoting global capitalism and challenging prevailing Latin American statist theories.

Prior to World War II the teaching of economics in Latin America took place in faculties such as law, accounting or commerce and was often taught in a holistic way, utilizing political economy as a framework. There was very little quantitative or micro-level analysis. In 1950 a new paradigm for understanding Latin American development and accelerating industrialization emerged in academic and political circles within Latin America. In 1948 the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or CEPAL for the Spanish acronym) was founded under the auspices of the United Nations to identify economic trends and address problems using a Latin American perspective. Under its director, Raúl Prebisch, CEPAL promoted Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), a model for industrialization in late developing countries to help them become more self-sufficient and less depended on damaging fluctuations in commodity prices.³⁹³ Far from radical, ISI as a means of achieving full industrialization was the basis for development in the United States and many Western European countries.³⁹⁴ While ISI did advocate protective tariffs and state planning to develop domestic industries, it did not uniformly reject foreign capital. To the contrary, foreign financing through direct investment and loans was needed to build new industries.

To North Americans the more controversial element of CEPAL's intellectual contribution was the explanation for why Latin America remained behind the game relative to the core industrialized nations. The academics at CEPAL rejected any universal model of development based on "stages," and argued that the conditions in which latecomers (i.e. developing countries) faced during their attempts to

³⁹³ for a short history of ISI in Latin America see Werner Baer, "Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 7 No. 1 (Spring, 1972), pp. 95-122.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

industrialize were quite different than the conditions faced by countries in the first wave of industrialization³⁹⁵. Furthermore, Prebisch argued, the exchange of raw materials from periphery countries (i.e. developing countries) for finished industrial products from developed countries resulted in an unequal exchange and prevent optimal development in periphery countries. Prebisch and others challenged Western economic theory that promoted development through comparative advantage, which for Latin America meant a focus on primary commodity exports. According to scholar Eduardo Venezian, "Although ECLA [CEPAL] did not become directly involved in university education and research, it had broad influence through its in-service training of vast cadres of practicing economists throughout the region."³⁹⁶ In the mid-1950s the United States government and the Rockefeller Foundation would embark on a mission to break CEPAL's monopoly on economics teaching. Though slow to take root, the fruits of this effort would arrive in Chile decades later.

Challenging CEPAL in Chile

In September 1973 Chilean democracy ended when General Augusto Pinochet led a successful military coup against the democratically elected president Salvador Allende, whose left leaning Unidad Popular party had made substantial concessions to the lower classes and represented the democratic road to socialism. General Pinochet quickly consolidated power through the use of widespread and violent repression of any opposition. Following the military takeover Pinochet instituted a radical transformation of the Chilean economy. The regime turned to a group of U.S.-trained economists at the Universidad Católica, known for their opposition to the Allende government, to fill positions in the

³⁹⁵ See *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principle Problems* (United Nations, 1950) or Prebisch's "Commercial Policies in the Underdeveloped Countries," *AER*, 49:251-273, 1959.

³⁹⁶ Eduardo Venezian, "The Economic Sciences in Latin America," in Laurence D. Stifel, Ralph K. Davidson, and James S. Coleman, eds., *Social Sciences and Public Policy in the Developing World*, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982).

government and manage the economy.³⁹⁷ Adhering to the ideological underpinnings of their training, the team of economists recommended a series of “shock treatments” for the economy, which was suffering from rising inflation. The neo-liberal economic policies implemented by the Chilean government called for dismantling state owned enterprises, eliminating price controls, drastically cutting state spending on social programs and opening the market to foreign capital and businesses. Neo-liberalism, an orthodox belief in free market economics, had arrived in Chile via a collaborative effort by the U.S. government, the University of Chicago, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation.³⁹⁸

The effort to develop the field of economics in Latin America was inextricably tied to a desire by North Americans to counter CEPAL's theories and solutions. In the 1950s the United States began technical assistance to Latin American universities under the Point IV program, later renamed the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). In 1955, University of Chicago economists Arnold Harberger, a zealous proponent of the anti-CEPAL, neo-liberal economic model entered into a contract with ICA to train Chilean students at the Universidad Católica. The School of Economics at University of Chicago was the center of a small but committed group of economists who led an anti-Keynesian faction within the field of economics. They, and others around the country who would join them, sought to challenge Keynesianism and unseat it from its prominent position as the government's guiding economic philosophy. This task was undertaken with missionary zeal. According to scholar Juan Valdés' account of economists at University of Chicago, "The attitudes about economics as a science and the role of the

³⁹⁷ According to Foundation records, after the coup “the group [of Católica economists] assumed a new role. Individual members of the group were immediately drafted into government service. Two were given important policy positions in the Ministry of Agriculture’s planning section and in the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), while others were brought in as consultants and advisors.” Memo from Peter Hakim to William Carmichael, p. 2,
³⁹⁸ Juan Gabriel Valdés, *Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.) Valdés provides a fascinating account of the ideological transfer of ideas that took place between University of Chicago and Católica. Though his work focused on the U.S. government, University of Chicago, and Católica, Valdés describes “the enormous influence of the Ford Foundation in the development of the discipline of economics in Chile.” P. 186. For a more critical interpretation see Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, & Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power*, chapter 7, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2012). My account draws on these interpretation, supplementing them with additional documents.

economist as educator and propagandist are an intrinsic part of the characterization of the Chicago School."³⁹⁹ The Chilean Project, as the program to introduce neo-liberal economics to Latin America was called, aimed to "foster pluralism in the economic theories that were being taught in Chile at the time," and more implicitly to "combat what was perceived as 'socialist ideology' in Chilean economics."⁴⁰⁰ In conversations about the project with the Rockefeller Foundation, who was providing some of the financial support, Harberger's collaborator at Chicago T.W. Schultz remarked "a major drawback to development in Latin America has been the indiscriminate intervention of governments in trying to force development."⁴⁰¹ He further noted that "statism" was one of the "major problems of Latin American economics."⁴⁰²

The development of economics in Chile would have an explicit ideological component that over the course of a decade and a half would become obscured and eventually hailed by the foundations as promoting pluralism in the field. Spearheaded by men like ICA's director in Chile Albion Patterson, the project to train economists in Latin America exemplifies the collaborative working relationship between reformers in the United States government and foundation reformers. Patterson would initiate numerous projects in university reform and agriculture that the foundations would help fund, and many times the foundations would supply the means to continue programs that the government had started. According to Inderjeet Parmar's account of the development of economics in Chile, the foundations "preferred to view economics as a set of analytical and methodological techniques rather than as an overtly ideological and political force for radical change."⁴⁰³ The ICA contract lasted from 1956 to 1964 and resulted in numerous Chilean economists who had been trained in neo-liberal economics, some of whom returned to Católica as faculty members. In 1964 the Ford Foundation provided Harberger with

³⁹⁹ Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists*, p. 78.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴⁰¹ Conversation between MY and Schultz on 11-29-1956 documented by MY in interviews, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309.S, Box 32, Folder 268.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*

⁴⁰³ Parmar, p. 219.

the means to continue his work in Chile with grants to both the University of Chicago to fund Harbinger's *Program of Latin American Economic Research and Training* and grants to Católica to develop their undergraduate and graduate program in economics. Though the Foundation considered the grants to Chicago and to Católica as separate projects, Harbinger considered them both part of his personal and professional mission to spread the neo-liberal model to the underdeveloped countries of Latin America.⁴⁰⁴ The introduction of neo-liberal economics into a field dominated by the structuralist approach fit with Ford's goal of encouraging pluralism in the social sciences and was considered a significant achievement. They could claim neutrality in their endeavors due to the fact they also supported some structuralist economists at University of Chile, thus upholding their image as a-political.

The conservative nature of the economists at Católica did not escape the notice of the Ford Foundation. Expressing concern over the ideological orthodoxy at Católica, foundation officer Peter Hakim noted the "lack of political pluralism narrows internal debate on critical issues, and limits the potential influence of staff studies on agricultural policy, or even on public debate, at least in the short run."⁴⁰⁵ In separate correspondence, Hakim further noted, "we have always been uneasy about their lack of interest in problems of a structural nature and their inattention to questions of distribution, social welfare, and the like."⁴⁰⁶ Some Foundation officers found the ideological position of the Católica group "even more disturbing" when they assumed positions of power in the government.⁴⁰⁷

These concerns, however, did not seem to affect the overall evaluation of the grants to Católica. Senior program officer Lowell Hardin noted that "graduate training at the international standards was achieved" and "we would, were we doing it all over again starting from where we were and where they

⁴⁰⁴ Valdés, Pinochet's Economists, p. 49.

⁴⁰⁵ Interoffice memo from Peter Hakim to Peter Bell, August 8, 1972, p. 14., FFA, grant file 70-629.

⁴⁰⁶ Memo from Peter Hakim to William Carmichael, Annual Reporting, Catholic University of Chile, April 23, 1974, p.2, grant file 70-629.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p.2.

were then, very probably do it again, for the same good reasons."⁴⁰⁸ Another foundation officer offered his assessment: "This is one of our most successful grants. Chicago has recruited, trained, and returned an impressive number of economists to Chile, who have already made significant contributions."⁴⁰⁹

The grant making relationship that both Rockefeller and Ford had with Católica extended well beyond the field of economics, but it was in the field of economics that they would enjoy the most success. The grants to Católica would prove instrumental in increasing the number of Chilean economists from 121 in 1960 to over 700 by 1970.⁴¹⁰ The end result of Ford's grants to Chicago and Católica proved decisive for economic policy in Chile. Because of the military takeover in 1973 Católica economists would be in a unique position to impose their ideological model on the Chilean economy. Up until the coup, the government of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) and the Allende government (1970-1973) relied on economists trained in the structuralist approach, and the Católica group had little influence on government policy.⁴¹¹ In the years after the coup, however, the "Chicago Boys" (the name given the team trained under Harberger) would gain the confidence of the military government and have the type of influence on policy that would make the foundations proud of their role in the project. Furthermore, the Pinochet regime would begin a purge of "suspect" scholars which included not only Marxists but also those whose academic work or activism seemed to threaten the new regime. According to scholar Daniel Levy, "most of the initial purges were fundamentally political but were linked with mammoth financial cuts...derived in part from the regime's zeal in diminishing public

⁴⁰⁸ Final evaluation: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, from James Trowbridge to William Carmichael, April 8, 1985, p.3, FFA, grant file 70-629

⁴⁰⁹ Quoted in Valdés Pinochet's Economists, p.193. John Strasma, quoted in memo from James Trowbridge to William Carmichael, p. 3, October 24, 1984, FFA, grant file 65-190.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid. p. 186

⁴¹¹ Foundation officer Gerald Dean noted about the Católica group, "the staff members share a nearly uniformly conservative viewpoint in strong opposition to the current government. These views are well known within Chilean academics and government circles, with the result that the Department, although respected for its professional and technical competence, tends to be identified as 'reactionary' and therefore is unlikely to contribute constructively toward programs of the current government." Memo to Peter Bell, April 30, 1973, p.10 FFA, grant file 70-629.

expenditures."⁴¹² The social sciences were hit particularly hard when it came to the cutbacks and political purges that continued through the late 1970s.

The repression of scholars under the military government in Chile elicited a major rescue effort from American academics in the United States and from the foundations. Working together, they sought to find positions for the hundreds of scholars who were fired or suspect by the military. The Latin American Studies Association formed the Emergency Committee to Aid Latin American Scholars (ECALAS) and worked closely with the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) to coordinate a database for academic positions and graduate fellowships that Latin American scholars might be eligible for. The Ford Foundation acted to help prevent the worst of the repression from impacting their investment in building the social sciences. In Chile they began trying to relocate Foundation supported scholars and professionals who were affected by the purge. Through direct grants to CLASCO and the ECALAS the Ford Foundation was able to place 61 Chilean scholars, most of whom had been fired, in graduate study programs abroad, though they noted there were still over 600 more scholars needing assistance.⁴¹³ In addition, Ford gave the Facultad de Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) additional support to maintain funding for groups of scholars still able to work and carry out research in Chile. The Ford Foundation did its best to ensure the years of support given to building up the social sciences would not be completely undone by the military's repression. Though the "Chicago Boys" were safe and well situated to impact public policy, many other scholars were not. Ford's focus in Chile would shift to supporting "groups or individuals working within the relatively safe havens of international and regional organizations" and increasing travel and study abroad fellowships

⁴¹² Daniel C. Levy, "Chilean Universities Under the Junta: Regime and Policy," *Latin American Research Review*, 21:3 (1986), pp. 95-128.

⁴¹³ Inter-Office Memo, Peter D. Bell to William D. Carmicheal, "Review of the Foundations' Program in Chile and Staff Deployment for the Southern Cone," April 1, 1974, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 008957.

which would continue to be "important vehicles for assisting young Chileans to obtain more ample training abroad."⁴¹⁴

Probably the foundations' most influential project in terms of its national outcome, the development of economics at Católica again underscores the position foundations took with regard to democracy and modernization. Their conception of modernization ostensibly encouraged pluralism in the social sciences as the best path to training objective technocrats. In reality, the foundation's determination to remain above politics and maintain what they say was objectivity in host countries led them to relegate democracy to a secondary concern in the modernization process. Building a group of modernizing elites would provide the necessary knowledge when, and if, democracy took hold. More to the point, these modernizing technocrats did not necessarily need democracy in order to make reforms. In the case of the Católica group, the military regime provided the political environment that enabled the economists to implement economic policies that were highly unpopular with the popular classes but opened the economy to global investment.⁴¹⁵

By the 1960s there was a growing sense within American policy circles that the military could serve as a stable modernization agent. Intelligence reports from the CIA indicate they saw the military as a reformist option if democracy failed to produce American friendly governments:

"In most of Latin America the military, often identified in the past with the maintenance of the economic and social status quo, has now recognized the need for reforms within the constitutional framework. With a long tradition of anticommunism and of friendship with the US, the military remains one of the

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴¹⁵ The stabilization measures enacted by the government hit the lower and middle classes particularly hard as price controls were eliminated and social spending disappeared

strongest bulwarks against the spread of Castroism and communism and is becoming a supporter of reformist governments."⁴¹⁶

Outside of the CIA, others were thinking along similar lines. Many prominent modernization theorists saw the military as the one institution able to maintain stability during the modernization process. According to theorists Lucian Pye and Edward Shils, the military often championed middle-class reforms and promote national pride.⁴¹⁷ In his widely read report on his trip to Latin American commissioned by President Nixon, Governor Nelson Rockefeller also saw potential in the military to advance reforms while maintaining stability stating, "Increasingly, their concern and dedication is to the eradication of poverty and the improvement of the lot of the oppressed, both in rural and urban areas."⁴¹⁸ Many North American reformers began to make peace with the wave of authoritarian governments coming to power, but challenges to CEPAL ideology also took root in more democratic countries.

Exporting the Chilean Project to Colombia

Though the Chilean case provides the most dramatic impact of the foundations' efforts to build indigenous resistance to CEPAL and the structuralist school, similar efforts were playing out in Colombia and would also lead to a permanent institutionalization of anti-CEPAL economics. The chosen sites in Colombia would be the both the Universidad del Valle (Rockefeller's chosen university for comprehensive assistance) and the private Universidad de los Andes, the university hailed by Nelson Rockefeller as the model of the future for Latin American universities. Plans to develop economics at the Los Andes began shortly after plans to assist Católica were implemented in 1956, and the Chilean

⁴¹⁶ CIA National Intelligence Estimate Number 80/90-61, July 18, 1961, Latin American Reactions to Developments in and with respect to Cuba, p. 1, LBJ Library, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Box 2 (1 of 2), Folder: NSF National Intelligence Estimate.

⁴¹⁷ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).

⁴¹⁸ Nelson Rockefeller, *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas: The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

project served as a model. In a letter to a colleague, Rockefeller's officer in Bogota Montague Yudelman remarked, "If the Catholic University in Santiago seems to be a promising experiment, perhaps it might be a good idea to draw on their experience, and if necessary, to send one or two of the economists from the Andes down to Chile to see what is going on there."⁴¹⁹ In 1956 the Rector of Los Andes was in talks with both the International Cooperation Agency (ICA) and Rockefeller about creating an economic research institution within the university. Los Andes already had a School of Economics, but the research center would be, according to the School's director Jorge Mendez, "concerned with the theory of economic development and the deep-seated problems of development in the under-developed regions of northern Latin America."⁴²⁰

With ICA, Rockefeller and the University of Illinois backing the idea of a research institution at Los Andes the search for someone to head the institute was on.⁴²¹ Mendez cautioned Rockefeller on the selection of a director: "neither a Colombian nor anyone who has worked in Colombia for some time...would be politically acceptable" as "the nature of Colombian politics is such that past associations (albeit blameless) would be introduced as 'evidence' of bias whenever controversial subjects were examined."⁴²² This would of course suit ICA and Rockefeller just fine, as a North American director would ensure more control over the project. After reaching out to modernization theorist Max Millikan at MIT to help find a suitable North American director, Rockefeller made its first grant to help establish the Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Economico (CEDE) in 1959.⁴²³ Like the School of Economics at Católica, CEDE would quickly become a strong counter to

⁴¹⁹ Excerpt from letter from M. Yudelman to NSB, September 14, 1956, RF, RAC, RG 1.2, Series 311, box 78, folder 739.

⁴²⁰ Meeting between Montague Yudelman and Jorge Mendez, Interviews: MY, RAC, RF, R.G. 1.2, Series 311, box 78, folder 739

⁴²¹ Ford would begin supporting the graduate economics program in 1968.

⁴²² Meeting between Montague Yudelman and Jorge Mendez, Interviews: MY, November 28, 1956, RAC, RF, R.G. 1.2, Series 311, box 78, folder 739

⁴²³ The first director of CEDE was John M. Hunter, the chair of economics at Michigan state.

CEPAL ideology. By 1961 the economists at CEDE had a name for numbers and figures they thought were not trustworthy- "muy cepalina."⁴²⁴

Though Colombian economists at Los Andes tended to take an anti-CEPAL stance, this did not ensure a problem free environment. A USAID contract that brought in economists from the University of Minnesota created mutual distrust between the North American staff and the Colombian staff in the School of Economics due to the paternalistic way the Minnesota economists treated the Colombians. The tensions escalated to the point where communications and collaboration between the two groups ceased.⁴²⁵ Evaluations during the 1960s of the pace of development of economics at Los Andes were mixed, often expressing disappointment with progress.⁴²⁶ Still, Los Andes was largely recognized as one of the success stories by North American reformers.⁴²⁷ The work done at Los Andes and CEDE would come to have national relevancy under years of Liberal governance (despite its elite student body the university was largely considered aligned with the Liberal Party in Colombia). Foundation fellowships to faculty at Los Andes to pursue graduate degrees paid off as well in terms of building a pool of technocrats to lead national reform. Eduardo Wiesner Durán, former Rockefeller fellow and dean of the economics department in the mid-sixties, would go on to be Minister of Finance in the Colombian government. Universidad de los Andes would eventually be known for having the best economics program in the country and the region.

The institutionalization of anti-CEPAL economics did not go over as well at the other Colombian university targeted for economics development. As discussed in the previous chapter, Universidad del

⁴²⁴ Discussion between Director of CEDE Wallace N. Atherton and Rockefeller officer Charles Hardin, January 27, 1961, Interviews, CMH, RAC, RF, RG 12.2 Diaries, Charles Hardin, box 46, p.2.

⁴²⁵ JMD Diary notes August 18-30, 1966, Economics program at U. de los Andes-Eduardo Wiesner, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 79, folder 746.

⁴²⁶ for an example see excerpt from RKD Diary, John Buttrick-los Andes program, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 79, folder 746. Buttrick was overseeing the graduate program in economics and was "thoroughly discouraged over the state of economics at los Andes." Also see Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 97-98.

⁴²⁷ See Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 97-98.

Valle, a public university in Cali, had been targeted by USAID, Ford, and in particular Rockefeller for university wide development. In 1961 Rockefeller began its support for building the economics department with a grant to the library. But it was in 1963 that Rockefeller began the process of developing the faculty and curriculum, and to do this they turned to the brightest of the "Chicago Boys" at Católica, Sergio de Castro. Rockefeller paid for de Castro to take leave from Católica for a year and train the faculty at de Valle. De Castro, who was close to his former teacher Arnold Harberger, called on Harberger to help make recommendations for del Valle. He also warned Rockefeller officer Charles Hardin that "the development of economics here [del Valle] would be a long-time proposition," and that "eventually business would support the University when they begin to see results that are useful to them and respectable."⁴²⁸ The next year they brought in another Católica faculty member, Luis Arturo Fuenzalida, when de Castro took over as head of the School of Economics at Católica. In addition Rockefeller brought in numerous North American economists as visiting professors and sent del Valle students to the U.S. to train.

The Universidad del Valle, however, was not as immune to political pressures and student protests as the private Los Andes, and student anger over the North American presence caused significant disruptions.⁴²⁹ The students in economics in particular had organized a student strike in 1962 that sought to unseat the dean of the economics department. The search for a new dean, which Rockefeller was involved with, proved a troublesome issue as students used their power of *cogobierno*, specifically the power to reject candidates for positions in the economics department, to reject men who had been trained in the United States due to their perceived ideological bias.⁴³⁰ Despite the tremendous amount of attention and money that flowed to del Valle, its existence as a public university

⁴²⁸ Meeting between Sergio de Castro and Charles Hardin, October 16, 1963, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, Box 49, p.2.

⁴²⁹ see chapter three for a discussion of general student protest against North Americans at del Valle

⁴³⁰ this issue continued as late as 1970 until the government shut down the university temporarily due to student protests, MPT (Interviews) meeting with Carlos Mejia Roa, Wednesday, December 2, 1970, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 81, folder 760.

and a site of increasing student mobilization prevented the type of smooth implantation of anti-CEPAL economics that had taken root at Católica and Los Andes. Foundation reforms appeared to work best in environments where popular opinion could be marginalized or ignored (like in private universities) or repressed (like in dictatorships). In many cases of university reform democracy was a hindrance.

Efforts to institutionalize the anti-CEPAL school of economics would reach other countries as well, most notably Brazil where foundation support for economics at the Getulio Vargas Foundation would create Brazil's own pool of "Chicago Boys" ready to take government posts and provide the military with economic advice after the coup in 1964.⁴³¹ There is little doubt that Rockefeller and Ford's success in diversifying the field of economics and creating a generation of anti-CEPAL economists was seen by them as one of their most significant achievements. This project also created the type of direct impact on policy in Chile, Brazil, and even Colombia, that was at the heart of efforts to build up the social sciences. This was evident in the impact the projects in economics had on agricultural reform, especially in Chile. Neo-liberal tenets of free trade, comparative advantage and economic growth being the gauge for modernization were applied to Chilean agriculture in the aftermath of the military take-over in 1973. The agricultural sector, like the university system, was totally reconfigured around neo-liberal ideology, tying the sector to the global agricultural system. The dominant protectionist and statist ideology of CEPAL would be forever weakened. This would become clear in the 1980s when Latin American countries began struggling with national debt as the global economy sank into recession and the solutions for handling what became known as the debt crisis were defined by prevailing neo-liberal economic thought.

Latin American countries had borrowed heavily during the development decades, and neo-liberal policies such as those instituted in Chile had further opened up national economies to U.S

⁴³¹ One example is Octávio Gouveia de Bolhoes who was head of the Getulio Vargas Foundation and had been trained at Chicago. He became finance minister after the coup and in 1989 helped with the austerity program initiated in Brazil.

financial capital. This debt, however, was not overly burdensome until the "perfect storm" hit in 1981. A combination of falling commodity prices which drastically lowered export earnings throughout Latin America, rising interest rates on existing loans stemming from U.S. domestic policy which sought to restrict the money supply to dampen inflation, and a severe cutback in international lending to developing nations meant Latin American countries began having difficulties servicing their debt.⁴³² The growing external debt was in part a result of Latin America's increasing integration into the global economy, and the debt crisis was a manifestation of the negative side of this integration. In some cases the growing indebtedness was accelerated by neo-liberal policies that liberalized the financial capital markets.⁴³³ For example, the external debt in Chile almost doubled from 1979 to 1982.⁴³⁴ The response to the crisis, in other words how Latin American governments dealt with debt servicing and consequences for the domestic economy, was informed by the growing neo-liberal consensus in governments and the power the IMF and the World Bank came to have over individual government policy. In Chile, a country that had already implemented major liberalization policies, the government's response was export promotion, reductions in tariffs and deep cuts in government expenditures.⁴³⁵ In Brazil, the initial response was also restrictive monetary policies and severe government cutback.⁴³⁶ In country after country, the governments turned to free-markets policies advocated by the economists trained in neo-liberal economics.

Much of the borrowing that took place before the 1980s was through international banks who lent money without conditions linked to specific governmental policies regarding the economy . When

⁴³² Miguel S. Wionczek, ed., in collaboration with Luciano Tomassini, *Politics and Economics of External Debt Crisis: The Latin American Experience*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

⁴³³ Ricardo French-Davis, "The External Debt, Financial Liberalization, and Crisis in Chile," in Wionczek, *Politics and Economics of External Debt*.

⁴³⁴ Erik Haindl, "Chile's Resolution of the External Debt Problem," in Robert Grosse, ed., *Government Responses to the Latin American Debt Crisis*, (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1995).

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Carlos von Doellinger, "Brazil's Rollercoaster Response to the Debt Crisis," in Grosse, *Government Response to the Latin American Debt Crisis*.

international banks quit lending in the aftermath of the global economic downturn and interest rates rose dramatically, Latin American governments had few choices but to turn to the IMF and requirements to institute neo-liberal reforms such as privatization of government own industries, further opening markets to foreign investment, deregulation of industry and steep cutbacks in government social spending. Chile and Mexico implemented their neo-liberal policies willingly and with more breadth than required by the IMF, but others, especially Brazil, tried a more heterogeneous approach.⁴³⁷ One option promoted by some leftist economists, that of debt repudiation, was rarely considered a viable option by government economists, who generally held to the belief that globalization required free market policies.⁴³⁸ Even as countries democratized in the 1990s and realized the social consequences of austerity programs and the inadequacies of the neo-liberal model, the CEPAL model would continue to decline in influence. The neo-liberal model promoting export-led growth and privatization of state owned industries remained an unquestioned tenant of government economic policy into the new century.⁴³⁹

However successful, the foundations felt their projects in economics neglected some important aspects of the modernization process and that "criticism of economics as narrowly technocratic is due in part to its lack of political and social dimensions."⁴⁴⁰ Thus, projects in economics were followed by efforts to build the fields of sociology and political science. To replace the more holistic but less

⁴³⁷ Robert N. Gwynne, "Structural Reform in South America and Mexico: economic and regional perspectives," in Robert Gwynne and Cristóbal Kay, eds., *Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity*, (New York: Oxford Press, 2004).

⁴³⁸ One exception to this would be Brazil in 1984, when the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) won the election and PMDB economists openly advocated debt repudiation, which did not happen. See Carlos von Doellinger, "Brazil's Rollercoaster Response to the Debt Crisis," in Grosse, *Government Response to the Latin American Debt Crisis*. Ironically, debt repudiation would be the very thing that revived the Argentine economy in 2001.

⁴³⁹ The rise of left of center politicians in Latin America since 2000, the most symbolic being Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, suggests a new era of resistance to the neo-liberal model is upon us. Still, the protectionist model of CEPAL and the assumptions behind it still appear to be discredited in countries other than Venezuela and Bolivia.

⁴⁴⁰ Report on Social Sciences, September 1967, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 8, folder 49, p.2.

"scientific" paradigm of political economy, foundations championed efforts to narrowly define various social sciences and compartmentalize Latin American problems.

A Science for Social Development: Building a Subversive Discipline

Sociology as a discipline had its roots in what Argentine sociologist Gino Germani called "pre-sociological thought" during the early national period.⁴⁴¹ This period of intellectual writings that spanned from the revolutions to the late 19th century was heavily influenced by the writings of French sociologist August Comte.⁴⁴² The theory of Positivism elucidated by Comte "held that the world was rationally ordered with laws of social development and interaction that might be discovered by rational thought and study."⁴⁴³ This type of social philosophy adhered to a belief that the application of scientific solutions to national problems is best carried out by an elite group of technocrats. The same nationalistic impetus that gave rise to reorganizing universities and creating new ones in the service of the nation also established sociology in the universities.⁴⁴⁴

By the first decade of the twentieth century sociology had been institutionalized in virtually all countries in Latin America, with several chairs in sociology. However, most chairs were assigned to the faculties of law or philosophy and remained marginalized within those areas. Despite its Positivist origins promoting scientific study, there was virtually no focus on research or specialization, but lecturers from this early stage of institutionalization did publish a considerable amount of sociological literature that contributed to the advancement of sociological theory.⁴⁴⁵ The search for theories of social change grounded in the Positivistic tradition of observable data and analysis opened the way for

⁴⁴¹ Gino Germani, "Development and Present State of Sociology in Latin America," RAC, RF, Record Group 1.2, Series 301, Box 10, folder 81.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ Miguel Jorrín and John D. Martz, *Latin American Political Thought and Ideology*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), p. 122.

⁴⁴⁴ see chapter 3 for the discussion of universities in the early national period.

⁴⁴⁵ Germani, "Development and Present State of Sociology", p.13

Latin American academics and intellectuals to move from a philosophical interpretation of society towards interpretations backed by empirical data. By the 1950s sociology was in a new stage in Latin America, one greatly influenced by the move in North America to professionalize the field by incorporating quantitative methodologies and sample surveys to arrive at scientifically derived data.

Building Sociology in Latin America

Rockefeller and Ford looked to economists to provide empirical data about society that could be used to initiate modernizing reforms or challenge prevailing theories, but the destabilizing forces of change brought on by urbanization and agricultural modernization required a deeper understanding of society and the social laws that governed it. According to the Ford Foundation, the privileging of economics in the social sciences led to a situation in which "economic planning has gained important attention while problems of social development are left largely untended" and "analysis and action of social problems are left mainly to people of goodwill who have little professional preparation for grappling with the explosive forces of a society still sharply divided between the privileged and the mass of people."⁴⁴⁶ The foundations felt sociological research could assist with identifying and containing the potentially dangerous side effects of modernization.

The field of sociology in Latin America had been significantly advanced by a few academics before Ford and Rockefeller became its patrons in Latin America. The foundations would naturally find themselves drawn toward the most established and well respected practitioners of the discipline, but this would also mean they had less power to influence the direction of the field as part of their buildup of the social sciences. Rockefeller and Ford began funding academics in the field of sociology at various key universities in Latin America. A look at this process in Argentina, Colombia, and Chile reveals how the discipline of sociology became more empirical and research based, but the nature of sociology in

⁴⁴⁶ Ford Foundation Request for Grant Action, August 3, 1964. School of Sociology, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, RAC, RF, RG 1.2 Series 309, Box 8, Folder 49.

Latin America and its focus on development, however scientific it became, often created suspicion in government circles.

Right about the time when the foundations began taking an interest in building the social sciences in Latin America, an Argentine academic name Gino Germani was making a name for himself as one of Latin America's most respected sociologist. Germani had fled Italian fascism in 1934, and after a brief stay in Rome, arrived in Argentina to take a position in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires in 1938. Germani promoted the Positivist tradition in sociology where a rational scientific approach to social issues would prevail over ideology.⁴⁴⁷ His work represented a reaction to the philosophical interpretation of society that dominated the field at the time. The take-off point for his career came in 1955 with the publication of his book, *Estructura Social de la Argentina* and his ascendency to Chair in Sociology at the University of Buenos Aires. The fall of Peron in 1955 opened up new paths for academics and intellectuals in Argentina, and Germani quickly took advantage of this opening.⁴⁴⁸ His work on social change and its focus on discontinuities that arose during the process and the stabilizing forces of the middle-class meshed well with the modernization paradigm that saw reformism as the key to social change. Though Argentina was never a priority country for the foundations given its level of development, they could hardly ignore one of the best sociologists in the region who was already advancing the cause of scientific research to solve social problems. Rockefeller began supporting Germani's work in 1958, a year after Germani founded the School of Sociology at the University of Buenos Aires. Under Germani's leadership the school would become an influential leader in empirically based sociology. When the Ford Foundation entered Latin America in 1960 the School of

⁴⁴⁷ see Joseph Kahl, *Three Latin American Sociologists: Gino Germani, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Fernando Henrique Cardoso*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988) and a biography by Germani's daughter Ana Alejandra Germani, *Antifascism and Sociology: Gino Germani: 1911-1979*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 2008).

⁴⁴⁸ J. King, "El Di Tella and Argentine Cultural Development in the 1960s," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Oc. 1981), pp. 105-112.

Sociology at the University of Buenos Aires would be the recipient of one of the initial seven grants in all fields to Latin American universities, receiving over \$200,000 to build up the department.

Gino Germani's efforts in institutionalizing scientific sociology in Argentina would be cut short by the military coup in 1966. Since the era of *pensadores* social development had been the focus of sociological thought, and it continued to be a primary concern for the new scientific sociology in Latin America. This made the field inherently more political than it was in North America. Germani was as anti-communist and anti-fascists as they come, in fact his work was situated firmly within the reformist tradition that informed modernization theory.⁴⁴⁹ However, Sociology was viewed by many Latin American elites, especially the military, as one of the more radical social sciences due to its focus on social processes and structures, especially social classes and social change. Facing military repression and a hostile environment in Argentina, Germani took a position at Harvard in 1966 and went on to publish numerous books on the modernization of countries coming late to industrialization.⁴⁵⁰ The foundations' support for economics would continue during the years of military rule, but support for research on social change would be diminished, and what money was available would be transferred to private institutions like Torcuato Di Tella Institute that were somewhat less susceptible to government repression.⁴⁵¹

The situation in Colombia proved to be more stable politically, but the development of sociology would also be impacted by the political nature of the field. Here too the foundations would begin their

⁴⁴⁹ Joseph Kahl, *Three Latin American Sociologists: Gino Germani, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Fernando Henrique Cardoso*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988)

⁴⁵⁰ some of his more influential works include *Autoritarismo, Fascismo, y Populismo Nacional, Sociología de la Modernización, and Política y Sociedad en Una Época de Transición de la Sociedad tradicional a la Sociedad de Masas*,

⁴⁵¹ The Torcuato Di Tella Institute was founded by industrialist and patron of the arts Torcuato di Tella in 1958, and received financial help from Ford and Rockefeller from its inception. Known more as a cultural institution, El Di Tella nonetheless received numerous grants from Ford to support social science research into the 1970s. Though less immediately impacted by government repression than universities, the Institute nonetheless was targeted by the military for its support of the artistic community. See J. King, "El Di Tella and Argentine Cultural Development in the 1960s," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Oc. 1981), pp. 105-112.

support for sociology by collaboration with those who had developed the field already. In the case of Colombia that individual was Orlando Fals Borda, a sociologist at the National University. After attending graduate school in the United States Fals Borda returned to Bogotá to promote the social sciences in Colombia's traditional university system. In 1959 he and another Colombian sociologist, Father Camilo Torres Restrepo, founded the Faculty of Sociology at the National University in Bogota. Discussions with the Rockefeller Foundation for support began in 1958, and by 1962 both Rockefeller and Ford were assisting with fellowships for training.⁴⁵² Ford's assistance was more comprehensive, as was typically the case in the social sciences. In 1962 Fals Borda published his seminal work on the Colombian peasantry and began to formulate his methodology of participatory action research. On one level, both the foundations and Fals Borda agreed that research should ultimately lead to political action. However, Fals Border embraced a more radical, bottom-up type of political action, one more in line with Liberation Theory than Modernization Theory.⁴⁵³

The decade long relationship that developed between Fals Borda and Rockefeller and Ford reflects the uneasy partnership the foundations had with left-wing academics. During the 1960s the discipline of sociology at the National University often came under attack by the Oligarchs for being a haven for communists.⁴⁵⁴ Initially, Fals Borda could use men of the cloth such as his collaborator Camilo Torres to defend against these accusations. However, as the rift widened between the conservative wing of the Catholic Church and the liberal wing, who embraced Liberation Theology, those priests who defended peasant and student mobilization were seen as subversives themselves. Fals Border's co-

⁴⁵² For initial discussion see RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 1.0002, 311.S, Box 71, folders 691.

⁴⁵³ Liberation Theology was a new religious paradigm coming out of the Catholic Church in Latin America in the 1960s that promoted a left-wing interpretation of the Bible and implored priests and religious practitioners to take the side of the poor. The theology advocated the Church break its traditional alliance with the elite and the wealthy and work toward a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources. Its grassroots organizing and bottom-up reform paradigm was in some ways the exact opposite of what the foundations were attempting to do. For more on Liberation Theology see Phillip Berryman, *Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions*, (Maryknoll:Orbis, 1984).

⁴⁵⁴ See discussion between Fals Borda and Rockefeller officer Charles Hardin, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, Box 46, January 28, 1961.

founder, Camilo Torres was defrocked, left his academic position due to persecution, and joined the guerilla movement, dying in 1966 in a battle with the Colombian military. Problems also arose over the direction of the department, as Fals Borda wanted to create a regional center for graduate work and Ford disagreed.⁴⁵⁵ Rockefeller's support for the department ended in 1964, but Ford continued its support through 1971 even though they had diminished their support in general for the National University due to student protests and political uncertainty. According to Ford's assessments, its decade long support for the department yielded little in the way of larger accomplishments.⁴⁵⁶

There can be little doubt, due to the numerous influential books Fals Borda himself published, that the support he received from the foundations contributed to the development of the discipline in Colombia. It was not however, the type of development the foundations expected. Because of the politicization of the discipline of sociology and the left-wing nature of Fals Borda's work, the government did not avail itself of his expertise in the manner envisioned by foundations. In fact, he often had an antagonistic relationship with the government, and in 1979 he and his wife were arrested and held for several weeks, suspected of collaboration with the guerillas.

The most success the foundations had with sociology came in Chile, at the Universidad Católica, the same institution where their program in economics resulted in the most lasting impact of all the grants in the social sciences. The foundations were quite happy with the pace of development in economics, but realized the other social sciences had lagged far behind. Given the impending 1964 elections, and the focus of the assumed winner Eduardo Frei on social reforms, the foundations felt it was critical to build a pool of sociologists to direct the reforms.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁵ Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 88.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁷ Ford Foundation Request for Grant Action, August 3, 1964. School of Sociology, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, RAC, RF, RG 1.2 Series 309, Box 8, Folder 49.

In approving a large grant to develop sociology at Católica Ford noted, "the Catholic University has made the most progress among Chilean universities toward meeting needs for sociological studies and training through methods that are academically sound and relate directly to problems of Chilean development."⁴⁵⁸ This statement, however, obscures the process of how scientific sociology developed in Chile up to that point, and how ideology played a role in Católica's prominence as a school of sociology.

The rise of scientific sociology in Chile beginning in 1951 is detailed by scholar Edmundo F. Fuenzalida in his article "The Reception of 'Scientific Sociology' in Chile."⁴⁵⁹ Fuenzalida argues that the development of an empirically based sociology moved from a process directed "by a local charismatic leader, without influence from non-Chileans" to a process "heavily influenced by one foreign agency, the Ford Foundation."⁴⁶⁰ Important in this transition was the shift away from the National University of Chile to Católica due to disagreements over the direction of the "new sociology." In 1949 Chilean Eduardo Hamuy, interested in learning new methodological approaches to sociology, went to the United States and studied at Columbia. He returned to Chile in 1951 intent on using the new research techniques he had learned to counter the "speculative tradition" that existed within the field. Realizing the need for external funding to proceed with his plan to establish an institute of sociology, Hamuy collaborated with a group of professors at the National University of Chile to secure funding from UNESCO (educational division of the United Nations). By 1960 Hamuy and his collaborators had established the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociológicas and had brought the new sociology to Chile with the intentions of creating a regional center for sociological study. There existed, however, a competing institutions for sociology that was created by FLASCO called Escuela Latinoamericana de

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Edmundo F. Fuenzalida, "The Reception of 'Scientific Sociology' in Chile," *Latin America Research Review*, 18:2 (1983), pp. 95-112.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 99 and p. 106.

Sociología (ELAS), and it was under the leadership of a non-Chilean, Peter Heintz. For a while the two institutions collaborated, but a rift appeared in 1964 when the two vied for allocations from a sizable grant from the Ford Foundation to develop sociology and Heintz was replaced by Brazilian sociologist Gláucio Ary Dillion Soares, who envisioned a more U.S. model of graduate education for ELAS.⁴⁶¹

The institute Hamuey started was further marginalized when one of its founders, Hernán Godoy Urúa left to join a new school of sociology at the Universidad Católica under the leadership of a Belgian Jesuit, Roger Vekemans. Ford and Rockefeller's decision to support sociology at Católica made much sense given they were more concerned with creating sociologists for the government than with Hamuey's vision of creating an empirically based sociology that drew from U.S. methodology but did not have predetermined outcomes in terms of its direction.⁴⁶² In contrast, Vekemans' vision was a school where students were "trained to think about Chile with a long-term political view to the emergence of a political movement that would implement structural reforms in a democratic way."⁴⁶³ Besides his leadership in the School of Sociology at Católica, Vekemans worked closely with the Christian Democrats in Chile and the U.S. government to ensure "reformism" would triumph over socialism as a cure for Chilean problems. He was a natural choice for the foundations, who saw him as a "liberal activist in Latin America" and were impressed with his interest in social reformism.⁴⁶⁴ One of the consequences of Ford's support for Católica was that the University of Chile's School of Sociology was marginalized with regard to government services from the period 1965-1970. As former director of the School of Sociology at Católica remarked, "those that went to work for the government were mainly the sociologists from the Catholic University, whose training was more akin to the ideology of the

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

⁴⁶² Ford's support was much more comprehensive than Rockefeller's, who generally limited its support to fellowships.

⁴⁶³ Interview with Gabriel Gyarmati, Professor of Sociology at Católica, quoted in Fuenzalida, "The Reception of Scientific Sociology," p. 104.

⁴⁶⁴ Ford Foundation Request for Grant Action, August 3, 1964. School of Sociology, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, RAC, RF, RG 1.2 Series 309, Box 8, Folder 49, p. 2.

government."⁴⁶⁵ Ford and Rockefeller's support for Católica during the decade of 1960s yielded significant results in terms of providing sociologists for government service, but it did little to prevent a leftward shift in national politics, and by the 1970s the victory of Unidad Popular in the presidential election dealt a final blow to the reformist agenda the foundations had championed.

In venturing into developing the discipline of sociology the foundations had two interrelated goals. The first was to institutionalize the empirically based sociology that had been introduced by various Latin American sociologists in the 1950s but was struggling to counter the philosophical tradition of the discipline. In this they largely succeeded, as by the 1970s scientific sociology was firmly rooted in all the major schools. The second and related goal of utilizing the research coming out of the new sociology to influence government planning was less successful, owing in part to the way sociology was viewed by the government. In Argentina and Colombia, sociology was viewed with skepticism by the governments. In Chile, at least until the military coup of 1973, sociologists represented a growing number of technocrats employed in government service. However, the success in Chile was fleeting, and after 1973 sociology, even in the reformist mold, was viewed as subversive and the government's targeting of social scientists hit the discipline hard. The foundations' support for sociology involved both "reformist" scholars such as Germani and more leftwing scholars such as Fals Borda, reflecting the general left of center disposition of sociologists in Latin America. Though tension arose between Ford and its grantees in sociology in Colombia, the foundation felt they could not pull their support due to not wanting to appear bias.⁴⁶⁶ This support for left of center scholars would come to have a significant impact on the overall goals for developing sociology as the conservative and military governments that came to power throughout Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s purged the field of many grant recipients. Yet, if measured in terms of professionalizing the field so that it gained respect as truly

⁴⁶⁵ Interview with Gabriel Gyarmati, Professor of Sociology at Católica, quoted in Fuenzalida, p. 105.

⁴⁶⁶ Levy, *To Export Progress*, p. 88

scientific then the foundations had achieved something. Foundation officers justified this effort by seeing their support as laying the seeds for the field to flower under the right conditions.

Made in the U.S.A.: A Political Science for Social Equilibrium

Like economics, the development of political science offers an illustration of how the foundations introduced particular schools of thought within the social sciences that they believed would foster the type of modernization they envisioned. These schools of thought were hailed as more empirical and scientific than those of the Latin American tradition, which were seen as philosophical. In political science that school of thought was Behavioralism. The "behavioral revolution" in political science took hold in the United States in the late 1940s and totally redirected the field. Political science had traditionally focused on political theory and the political structures of society (i.e. branches of government, etc.). Against this grain, the behavioralist approach to political science emphasized empirical and objective research on human behavior and reliance on quantitative and observable data to describe and analyze political behavior. According to scholar Joan Roelofs, Behavioralism "was the attempt to transform all fields of political science into the scientific study of behavior, which included expressed attitudes, voting, abstaining lobbying, coalition building, and other observable activities."⁴⁶⁷ Political theory and ideology, according to Behavioralism, were unscientific and therefore not credible enough to be used for policy formation.⁴⁶⁸ The rise of Behavioralism in the United States was a direct result of the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation, whose financial backing for the movement included funding of research projects, grants to universities that promoted the behavioral approach and even the creation of a new journal for the field, *Behavioral Science*.⁴⁶⁹ By the time the foundations began their

⁴⁶⁷ Joan Roelofs, *Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), p. 35.

⁴⁶⁸ Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ideas and a Political Science for Policy," *ANNALS, AAPSS*, 600, July 2005.

⁴⁶⁹ Peter J. Seybold, "The Ford Foundation and the Triumph of Behavioralism in American Political Science," in Robert F. Arnove ed., *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*, Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980.

work in Latin America the behavioral approach dominated foundation thinking in the field of political science, and as it turns out was useful in its application to modernization in Latin America.⁴⁷⁰

As applied to developing countries, the behavioralist approach emphasized several important aspects that would be useful in the modernization process as promoted by North American reformers. First, the approach took political theory, and therefore ideology, out of the research agenda increasing the likelihood research results would be seen as legitimate science. As scholar David Easton points out about the movement in the United States, " The emphasis upon the basic character of research, upon pure science and the need to deal with fundamentals rather than with policy issues, served political scientists well at a moment when liberal positions on policy issues might expose and reveal them, or invite unfavorable attention to them."⁴⁷¹ Like foundation efforts in the field of economics to extract economics from political economy and focus on data, the behavioralist movement focused on the behavior of individual citizens in society and tended to ignore larger questions of power and political economy. Second, the turn away from studying structures meant less criticism of military or authoritarian governments. Third, its focus on political stability and equilibrium fit well within the modernization paradigm, which saw mass mobilization as a negative force. Many of the most prominent modernization theorists that the foundations backed like Gabriel Almond and Lucian Pye were political scientists who embraced the behavioral approach and tended to have an elitist perspective on democracy. These same men served as consultants to Ford on projects in Latin America.

Upon deciding to support the development of political science in Latin America the foundations found the field (as they defined it) was not as developed as economics or sociology. An initial report done for Ford in 1959 on possible activities in Latin America, the so-called Yale Report, noted "Political

⁴⁷⁰ The "Behavioralist Revolution" in political science became linked with prominent modernization theorists at Yale and other elite American universities

⁴⁷¹ quoted in Roelofs, *Foundations and Public Policy*, p. 37.

Science scarcely exists as a discipline separate from the study of law...the teaching of the social sciences by amateurs produces a vicious circle, such that amateurs become professors without becoming professionals."⁴⁷² In 1959 the Foundation sent an exploratory committee to Brazil to assess possible needs. The committee's report noted that "the very rapid pace of economic and social change in Brazil provide unusual opportunities for constructive influence by the Foundation."⁴⁷³ The "wide-spread feeling of American neglect" and the "acutely anti-Yankee" nationalism noted by the committee only added to the belief that the Foundation, being a private, neutral organization, could be of particular assistance in the politically charged atmosphere.⁴⁷⁴ The committee recommended that Foundation activities focus on developing university and research programs in the social sciences, economic research related to development problems and programs in agricultural development.⁴⁷⁵

The 1966 Ford grant to Federal University of Minas Gerais in southeastern Brazil represented the first grant to develop political science studies in Latin America. A foundation proposal for assistance in political science noted, "it has become increasingly clear that political problems are close to the heart of the general development difficulties of the emerging countries. No factor is more significant in determining the future course of these nations than the viability of their political leadership, mores, and institutions."⁴⁷⁶

In the mid-sixties perhaps no other country in Latin America exemplified this statement more than Brazil. The decades of the 1930s and 1940s saw Brazil struggle with how best to industrialize and modernize its economy. Brazilian politicians sought to gain support from the land owning class, the

⁴⁷² A Report to the Ford Foundation concerning Program Possibilities in Latin America, June 1958, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 000066, p. 18.

⁴⁷³ Ford Foundation Mission to Brazil, July-August, 1959, by Alfred Wolf, Lincoln Gordon, and Reynold Carlson, FFA, Staff and Consultant's Reports, 000008.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.6-7. Committee members noted that some "opportunities are especially appropriate for private foundation support because of the delicacy of inter-governmental relations, which may well become more delicate in the current phase of intensive Brazilian nationalism." p. 7.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁶ Proposed Ford Foundation Support of Political Science Program at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, December 4, 1965, p.1, FFA grant file 66-115.

military, and the popular classes by vacillating between nationalistic rhetoric and accommodation to foreign capital. By the late 1950s, President Juscelino Kubitschek's "50 years progress in 5" program for economic development had reached its limits (but not its goals), and political unrest was on the rise.⁴⁷⁷ By the early 1960s Brazilian president João Goulart had consolidated support from the popular classes by pushing for economic and social reforms that went against the interests of the established elite and deeply concerned the United States government. In 1964, the Brazilian military with covert support from Washington deposed the reformist Goulart and installed an anti-communist military junta that inaugurated an era of political repression.⁴⁷⁸

Although the foundations ostensibly tried to remain outside the diplomatic tensions between Brazil under President Goulart and the United States government, the influence of the U.S. government's perception of events in Brazil penetrated foundation activities through men like Lincoln Gordon, one of Ford's Brazilian consultants. Gordon was one of the authors of the original survey of Brazil along with Reynold Carlson. Both men served the U.S. government as ambassadors, Gordon as ambassador to Brazil from 1961 to 1966 and Carlson as ambassador to Colombia from 1966 to 1969.⁴⁷⁹

The military takeover in Brazil did not appear to significantly alter either Rockefeller or Ford's activities in Brazil. Political instability and recalcitrant elites significantly hampered Brazil's attempts to modernize in the sixties, and the foundation's assumptions about development necessitated a stable, though not necessarily democratic, government. The modernization paradigm had a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward democracy. The fostering of democracy, though best in an ideal situation, took a back seat to economic development, and modernization theory increasingly leaned toward a

⁴⁷⁷ Ronald M. Schneider, "*Order and Progress*" *A Political History of Brazil*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 186-194.

⁴⁷⁸ For an interpretation of the coup and U.S. involvement see Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969*, (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990).

⁴⁷⁹ Gordon was an outspoken critic of the Goulart government, accusing them of communist sympathies, and he supported the military coup in 1964. See Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution*.

more authoritarian model which saw democracy as a potential hurdle to implementing policies.⁴⁸⁰ Modernization theorists Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba explained the elitist theory of democracy in this way: “In all societies, of course, the making of specific decisions is concentrated in the hands of a very few people.... Neither ordinary citizens nor ‘public opinion’ can make policy.”⁴⁸¹ These sentiments were echoed in 1969 by Nelson Rockefeller in his report to the President (the so-called Rockefeller Report on the Americas) when he spoke of the military being a “force for constructive social change.”⁴⁸²

Reflecting Ford and Rockefeller’s fundamental belief in the importance of objective and scientific research, as well as the desire to steer clear of attempts at “fostering democracy” in a country run by the military, the stated goal of the development of the field of political science in Brazil was “nothing more than to reveal and to explain Brazilian political reality.”⁴⁸³ This would be done by addressing what the foundations saw as a lack of independent departments of political science and a lack of objective and empirical research on the political structures and institutions in Brazilian society. Ford selected the Federal University of Minas Gerais in Brazil for a grant to build a department of political science (at the time scholars of political science worked in other related departments). The plan for building a strong department of political science at the University of Minas Gerais called for the “re-tooling abroad of selected professors,” fellowships to send graduate students to study at select U.S. universities, the use of visiting professors from the U.S. to teach and develop curriculum, and the development of an empirical research program.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸⁰ Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, pp.47-56.

⁴⁸¹ Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.136.

⁴⁸² Nelson Rockefeller, *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas: The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 32.

⁴⁸³ Inter-office memo, from Peter Bell to Stacey Widdicombe, December 7, 1965, Development of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais: Background, FFA, grant file 66-15

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

The professors and students at Minas Gerais would be introduced to the modernization paradigm and the behavioral approach through the selection of U.S. institutions and academics that would train the Brazilians. According to the grant proposal, the project called for Brazilian students to attend “21-month Masters’ program in political science at various universities abroad, probably all of them in the United States, since that is where the behavioral approach to political science is most advanced.”⁴⁸⁵ In addition, Gabriel Almond, a political scientist and modernization theorist who worked on comparative politics, would use his position as coordinator for the political science project at Minas Gerais to introduce his ideas on civic culture to the faculty and students there.⁴⁸⁶

Efforts to build a team of research oriented political scientists met with some difficulties. Besides the typical problems encountered in many of the other university reform projects like low staff salaries, delays in staff appointments, and a lower than expected completion rate for Ph.D. students, the foundation had to grapple with how government repression impacted the project. Meetings held in 1969 between Ford Foundation officers and social science staff members from universities throughout Brazil tried to assess the extent of government repression, forced “retirements,” and censorship of course material. At Minas Gerais a foundation program advisor and visiting professor resigned his post in protest, stating it was his “duty to terminate my activities in this University and to inform my colleagues in the United States and elsewhere of the conditions existing in Brazil which make difficult, if not impossible, any contribution from visiting professors to the social sciences in the country.”⁴⁸⁷ Ford program officers, however, felt the situation was not that dire, arguing that to withdraw support would be an “insensitive and rather crude response, an over-response at the expense of the Department.”⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p.21.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 24. The well-known study on civic culture was Almond’s seminal work, linking him with modernization theory in the political science field.

⁴⁸⁷ The professor who resigned was Dr. Frank Bonilla, quoted in Inter-office memo from James A. Gardner to William Carmichael, December 19, 1969, p., 2, FFA, grant file 66-115.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

Though acknowledging the realities of self-censorship in course material and research choices, the foundation felt the project should continue.⁴⁸⁹

From 1966 to 1985 Ford made grants of over \$1.5 million to Minas Gerais for development of their political science department. An internal foundation evaluation of the grant noted, “In its institution-building program of Political Science at UFMG, the Foundation could be criticized for the backstopping arrangement, the heavy use of visiting professors, the uniform Ph.D. training, the attempt to develop political science in isolation, over-funding in the early years, and other short-comings.”⁴⁹⁰ On the positive side the Ford felt it had created a self-sustaining department of political science. Another outcome of the foundation project would be that by 1976 “all the core professors” had been trained at U.S. universities, “and a good number of these at one university [Stanford].”⁴⁹¹ According to a foundation officer, one Brazilian professor in the department “expressed dissatisfaction with the department’s image in Brazil: that it was ‘made in the U.S.A.’.”⁴⁹²

Conclusion: Managing Social Change through the Social Sciences

The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations played a crucial role in developing the social sciences in the United States in the early 20th century and saw the fruits of their labor in the creation of a technocratic state able to maintain economic and political stability. They entered Latin American countries alongside U.S. government agencies and universities with the intention of reforming the university system and training a generation of new social scientists who would apply their research to development problems and lead their countries through the stages of modernization while avoiding the

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁹⁰ Memo from Peter S. Cleaves to Drs. Eduardo Venezian and Richard Krasno, March 18, 1976, Grant Modification and Grant closing: Federal University of Minas Gerais Department of Political Science, p. 7, FFA, grant file 66-115.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

worst side effects. At the heart of these efforts in the social sciences was an effort to institutionalize Western schools of thought that would create a consensus on the modernization process and tie Latin America closer to the United States both economically and culturally. The ideas promoted in the social sciences supported other areas targeted for reform, including agricultural modernization and population control, by grounding these reforms in free market principles and an elitist form of democracy.

In the case of economics, the neoliberal model, with its focus on comparative advantage, encouraged Latin American economies to expand their exporting sectors while diminishing trade barriers that protected the domestic economies from foreign competition. This ideology was also instrumental to reforms in agricultural modernization. Integrating Latin American agriculture into the global system would require free market solutions that were marginalized within government circles until the U.S. government and the foundations began their support of the discipline of economics. Creating a complementary economy rather than a competitive economy would bring economic growth and ensure industrialization in the south did not outpace industrialization in the north.⁴⁹³ The spread of neoliberal ideology also impacted the ways in which Latin American governments responded to the debt crisis of the 1980s. The austerity programs demanded by the IMF and World Bank in exchange for assistance managing debt appeared much more palatable to Latin American economists trained under foundation sponsored programs. In fact, many of these economists were even stronger advocates of applying free market principles to Latin American economies than the economists at the IMF. In addition, the program in economics champion by the U.S. government, North American universities, and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations permanently altered the way economics was taught in many universities. Though the orthodox neo-liberal model was somewhat discredited by the turn of the

⁴⁹³ an excellent example of this process played out in Chile with the expansion of the fruit export business that was a direct result of foundation funding for a cooperative program between the government of Chile and the University of California- Davis. See Kathleen Holder, "The UC Davis-Chile connection: A relationship funded on fruit production branches out," April, 21, 2005, *UC-Davis News and Information*, on-line publication at http://www-dateline.ucdavis.edu/dl_detail.lasso?id=8247, accessed 12/1/12.

century due to its lack of social justice, some of the basic assumptions behind it are still mainstays of government policy in Chile and other countries today.

Efforts to develop sociology met with more difficulty due to the way it was perceived by more conservative Latin American governments. Still, the foundations succeeded in challenging the philosophical nature of the field and creating a more uniform and empirically based methodology. Finally, in political science assistance from the foundations developed the field as an independent discipline and brought the "behavioral revolution" to Latin American political studies. Seen as more objective and empirical than political theory, Behavioralism took questions of power and political economy out of research agendas and made it a safe and useful field of study for governments.

The mission to remake the university system in Latin America began with its structure and moved to individual disciplines within the university that were seen as crucial to the modernization process. In this chapter I looked at how the foundations sought to shape the fields of economics, sociology, and political science in a way that would create a consensus about growth and stability. The top-down reform efforts in higher education described in chapter three were matched by an equally elitist program to challenge Latin American orthodoxy in the social sciences. These changes in turn would assist in two other areas that were targeted for reform, agricultural modernization and reducing the population growth rate. Certain core components of the neoliberal model, especially the focus on economic growth as an engine of development, would inform projects in the agrarian sector. In the next chapter I turn to the field of agriculture, where efforts to expand the Green Revolution of the 1940s and 50s incorporated many of the tenets promoted in the economic and political schools of thought transplanted by the foundations.

Chapter Five
Opening Pandora's Box:
Foundations and Agricultural Reform in Latin America

"The quiet, passive peasant is already aware of the modern world-far more than we realize-and he is impatient to gain his share. The Green Revolution offers him the dramatic possibility of achieving his goal through peaceful means. It has burst with such suddenness that it has caught many unawares. Now is the time to place it in its long-range perspective and to engage in contingency planning so that we may respond flexibly and quickly as the Revolution proceeds. Perhaps in this way we can ensure that what we are providing becomes a cornucopia, and not a Pandora's Box."⁴⁹⁴

Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., 1969

In 1953 Colombia was experiencing an economic boom, yet when Rockefeller consultant Herrell DeGraff made a visit to assess the state of agriculture his concern about food prices tempered the good news of economic growth. In his report to the foundation he noted, "I found myself wondering how long a situation could continue in which a half-kilo loaf of bread cost a quarter of a day's wages for an industrial worker before revolution might grow out of popular disgust and despair."⁴⁹⁵ Reflecting the sense of urgency North American reformers had with regard to modernizing Latin America, DeGraff saw a "Mexican-type land revolution" inevitable unless "greater food production can be achieved before the public rises up in wrath over the high food prices and short supply."⁴⁹⁶ DeGraff, an agricultural economist who had worked with Rockefeller in Mexico, believed that increasing agricultural production in developing nations would solve world hunger and prevent political instability. From the Rockefeller Foundation's perspective increased production would do more than solve problems of hunger. It was widely believed within the Foundation that modernizing the agricultural sectors of Latin America would spur economic growth and accelerate industrialization. The modernization paradigm held that few

⁴⁹⁴ Clifton R. Wharton Jr., "The Green Revolution : Cornucopia or Pandora's Box?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47:3 (April 1969), p. 476. Wharton was an American economist who served the U.S. government in various capacities , a trustee for the Rockefeller Foundation for 17 years and president of Michigan State University.

⁴⁹⁵ Herrell DeGraff, Report in Colombia, October 15, 1953, to Dr. J.G. Harrar, RAC, RF, R.G 1.2, Series 311-S, Box 86, Folder 819, p. 2.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 3.

countries had experienced true industrialization without a corresponding "revolution" in agriculture.⁴⁹⁷ Given the size and importance of the agricultural sectors in many Latin American countries, modernization could hardly happen without technological advancement in this sector. In a report about what U.S. policy should be regarding assistance, prominent American agricultural economist and foundation advisor Albert Mosher argued "American policies should facilitate the expansion of agricultural production in underdeveloped countries, not instead of, but along with, and frequently as a necessary step toward, greater industrialization."⁴⁹⁸ As a result of this connection between agriculture and industrialization, modernization of agriculture was a core component of the post-war reform agenda for both the foundations and the U.S. government. However, the model used for modernization, derived from the experiences of the United States, unleashed new forces on traditional agrarian structures. While this process succeeded in furthering the integration of Latin American agriculture into the global economy, it did so without solving basic structural problems in the agrarian sector and larger problems with the transition to a fully industrialized economy, and thus the process reinforced uneven capitalist development.⁴⁹⁹

This chapter looks at efforts by Rockefeller and Ford to increase crop productivity and variety and bring modern technologies and institutions to Latin American agriculture. As with university reform and the development of the social sciences, the plans to overhaul the agricultural sector were based on strategic institution building and embedding in these institutions assumptions about the power of science to alleviate the political tensions inherent in capitalism. Also like foundation projects in university reform, agricultural modernization was a global endeavor, looking to establish success in Latin

⁴⁹⁷ for a discussion of the relationship between industrialization and the agriculture sectors in developing nations see John W. Mellor, *Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).

⁴⁹⁸ Arthur Mosher, "The Role of Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries and United States Policy," prepared for the Special Studies Project Rockefeller Brothers Fund, inc., May 1958, p. 8, RAC, RBF, V, 4C, Box 21, folder 241.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴⁹⁹ For a discussion of uneven capitalist development as a product of global capitalism see Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*, third edition., (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008), for a treatment of uneven development in Latin America see Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

America and then spread the model throughout the underdeveloped world. In the broadest sense North American reformers hoped to create a true "agricultural system" that streamlined all aspects of food production including crop yields, credit, transportation, and marketing into an efficient and modern system. This national system was then to be integrated into the larger global agricultural system the foundations hoped to create through a group of research centers under the umbrella of an international agricultural advisory board. The genesis of this ambitious plan sprouted from a project in Mexico focused on increasing crop yields and varieties later dubbed the "Green Revolution." The first phase of the Green Revolution began in Mexico with the basic idea of increasing food production with hybrid seeds, new farming techniques and the application of modern fertilizers.⁵⁰⁰ In the second phase of the Green Revolution, the foundations in collaboration with the United States government and international organizations like the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) sought to export the Mexican project to other Latin American countries and eventually to Asia and Africa.

The problems experienced in the second phase of the Green Revolution in Latin America reveal the limitations of a model of agricultural modernization that focuses almost exclusively on increased productivity and neglected structural problems like land tenure. If the Green Revolution solved the technological questions of how to produce more, it said nothing about the social and politically explosive question of who gets the benefits of this growth. Ultimately, this question stood at the heart of the agrarian problem in Latin America and in other underdeveloped regions. While foundation officials recognized the problems created by an inequitable land tenure system, they generally chose to attack the problem on the periphery of the issue and peg the fate of the agricultural sector to the adoption of technologies and institutions present in modern agricultural system such as the one in the

⁵⁰⁰ For a discussion of the Green Revolution in Mexico see E.C. Stakman, Paul Manglesdorf, and Richard Bradfield, *Campaigns Against Hunger*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, *Modernizing Mexican Agriculture: Socioeconomic Implications of Technological Change, 1940-1970*, (Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development, 1976), and Deborah Fitzgerald, "Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953," in Marcos Cueto, Ed., *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

United States. United States technical assistance to Latin America dating back to the early 20th century was founded on the belief that social inequalities could be ameliorated with technology and scientific advancements brought by North Americans. As ICA Director in Chile Albion Patterson put it, "If the problem we are tackling in Chile is the immediate need for increased food production, we can't put any large part of our budget into giving the down-and-outer advise on nutrition, child care, etc."⁵⁰¹ North American reformers believed improving efficiency was the best way to help the lower classes. This belief, rooted in North America's own experience during the Progressive Era when advancements in technology and the sciences led to an expanding middle class, colored almost every area the foundations worked, but perhaps none more profoundly than agriculture. Technology and science would increase productivity, and this productivity was to be harnessed in support of a modern agricultural system oriented towards global markets. Only then, it was thought, would underdeveloped nations see a permanent reduction in social inequalities. While the problem of insufficient production of food to meet domestic needs was a consistent topic in foundation assessments, so too was the need to increase production of export crops to meet foreign exchange demands.⁵⁰² In the end, it would be the export industries that derived the greatest benefits from the Green Revolution.⁵⁰³

The story of agricultural modernization begins with the spectacular success of the Green Revolution in Mexico in the 1940s and continues with efforts to export this model to Colombia and Chile

⁵⁰¹ Albion Patterson quoted in O'Brien, *Making of the Americas*, p. 189.

⁵⁰² In a report for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund development specialist Arthur T. Mosher noted, "Despite the real dangers of heavy reliance on a few commodities, often an important first step toward diversification and strengthening of nonagricultural industries, is paradoxically to stimulate production of specialized export crops. This is especially true when a crop like coffee, or bananas, or jute is a major source of foreign exchange.." quoted in Arthur Mosher, "The Role of Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries and United States Policy," prepared for the Special Studies Project Rockefeller Brothers Fund, inc., May 1958, p. 8, RAC, RBF, V, 4C, Box 21, folder 241.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵⁰³ On how transnationalism and export industries have eroded the Green Revolution see Meera Nanda, "Transnationalization of Third World State and Undoing of Green Revolution," *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 28, 1995 and Warwick E. Murray, "Competitive Global Fruit Export Markets: Marketing Intermediaries and Impacts on Small-Scale Growers in Chile," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 16:1, (1997), pp. 43-55.

and ultimately create an international agricultural structure guided by the modernization paradigm. It also involves a gradual understanding on the part of reformers of the limitations of a purely scientific solution to agricultural problems. The extent to which foundation representatives and U.S. government officials dealt with this realization was determined by the ideological parameters that guided their work and by events within the host country. This chapter primarily deals with the second phase of the Green Revolution, when reformers began exporting the success they had in Mexico to Colombia and Chile. This second phase is important for understanding the limitations of the model the foundations were using, and it reveals how different domestic situations impacted foundation goals. For all its successes, the Green Revolution created new problems as Latin American agricultural sectors became increasingly tied to the global markets.

Agrarian Structures in Latin America and the Modernization Paradigm

Like the United States, most Latin American countries in the twentieth century experienced a decline of the relative importance of agriculture to the overall economy and a significant decline of the percentage of the population working in that sector.⁵⁰⁴ Agriculture in both North American and South America by the end of the century had become more centralized and systematic. But while the United States managed to compensate for dwindling rural employment opportunities with a phenomenal expansion in the industrial sector, countries in Latin America struggled to successfully transition their rural workforce into industrial jobs. The transition from an agrarian society to a modern industrial one in Latin America has not replicated the process in the core industrialized Western nations. First, the 19th century yeoman farming sector in the United States was markedly different from the peasant farming sector in Latin America. The structure of the agricultural sector in Latin American, with subsistence

⁵⁰⁴ Norman Long and Bryan Roberts, "The Agrarian Structures of Latin America," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *Latin America Economy and Society Since 1930*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). In the United States, the percentage of individuals working in rural labor fell from 40% in 1900 to 2% by 1975, "The Rise of Industrial Agriculture," The John Hopkins University and Shawn McKenzie, 2007, http://ocw.jhsph.edu/courses/nutritionalhealthfoodproductionandenvironment/PDFs/FoodEnv-sec2b_McKenzieOCW.pdf, accessed on 4/15/2013.

farming and debt peonage, did not respond to the modernization process in the same way the free holding farming sector did in the United States. In addition, while employment in agriculture in Latin America as an overall percentage of employment dropped from 1925 to 1960, this decline was not happening alongside a major expansion of manufacturing jobs, which held steady during this period at about 14 percent.⁵⁰⁵ The growth in non-farm jobs was in the service sector, and this sector did not generally offer the type of steady employment with good pay that the industrial jobs offered. Thus, the rapid urbanization occurring through Latin America was more a result of job losses in the rural sectors rather than growing industrial sector employment. In Western industrialized countries like the United States, the service sector grew only after the manufacturing sector had absorbed a large percentage of the displaced rural and artisan groups.⁵⁰⁶ In part, the reliance on an export-led economy hampered the process of industrialization by directing capital and investments to export industries rather than to industrial development, one of the problems the adoption of the Import Substituting Industrialization model (ISI) was supposed to address.⁵⁰⁷ Where there was capital investment in high tech sectors, in railroads for example, it tended to benefit foreign owned export businesses while failing to spur more widespread industrial growth.⁵⁰⁸

This transition was essential to the modernization paradigm, which envisioned the peasant farmer turning in his hoe for an urban, industrial job and becoming a consumer of the plethora of goods and services offered in an expanding industrial economy. Latin America, however, proved unwilling to conform to this vision of modernization. Not only was the U.S. experience useless for understanding the

⁵⁰⁵ from Fernando Henrique Cardoso and José Reyna, "Industrial, Occupational Structure and Social Stratification in Latin America," in Cole Blasier, ed., *Constructive Change in Latin America*, (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1968) cited in Joseph A. Kahl, *Three Latin American Sociologists*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988).

⁵⁰⁶ Kahl, *Three Latin American Sociologists*.

⁵⁰⁷ For a discussion of the development of export economies and later ISI policies see Simon Collier, ed., *The Economic History of Latin America since Independence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁵⁰⁸ For example see John Coatsworth's argument about the development of the railroads in Mexico in the late 19th century in Coatsworth, *Growth Against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Porfirian Mexico*, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981).

development of capitalism in Latin America, but the solutions offered by the U.S. foundations were bound by an unwavering belief in the power of economic growth and increased productivity to cure the ills of any economy.

When foundation officials and their U.S. government counterparts took up the mission of agricultural modernization in Latin America they were immediately confronted with a sector of the economy that, more than any other, bore the scars of colonialism.⁵⁰⁹ The land tenure system that developed under colonial rule created an agrarian structure where a privileged few held the vast majority of quality agricultural land. While the degree of the inequitable distribution varied by country, by 1960 the *latifundios*, or large landed estates in Latin America, represented only five percent of the land owners but held eighty percent of the land.⁵¹⁰ This skewed distribution existed despite the diversity of agrarian structures present in Latin America. Scholars Norman Long and Bryan Roberts identify four types of agrarian structures found throughout Latin America in the twentieth century: large scale commercial farming found mainly in the Southern Cone, enclave production such as the banana plantations of Central America, small scale farming that served local or regional markets and large sectors of low-productivity farming such peasant subsistence farming and *haciendas*.⁵¹¹ Of the four, only the large scale commercial farming and the enclave production were export oriented, with the other two being either oriented toward production for local and regional markets or subsistence farming not oriented toward the market. The agricultural sectors producing for export markets often had a significant and negative impact on general development in the country they operated in due to the amount of control that foreign economic interests in collaboration with local elites exercised over the

⁵⁰⁹ For a discussion of how colonialism shaped the development of Latin America see Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).

⁵¹⁰ Solon Lovett Barraclough, *Agrarian Structure in Latin America: A resume of the CIDA land tenure studies of: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru*, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973).

⁵¹¹ Norman Long and Bryan Roberts, "The Agrarian Structures of Latin America," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *Latin America Economy and Society Since 1930*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

production cycle and land distribution.⁵¹² Classic examples of this include the production of sugar in Cuba and the banana enclaves of Central America. Adding to these diverse arrangements were regional and country specific variations in both the number of people employed in the rural sector and the significance of agriculture to the overall economy.⁵¹³ In some countries the traditional peasant was either non-existent or existed in such small numbers that they had little impact on agrarian policy. In other countries peasant communities stood at the center of national debates over development.

The general trend in rural areas, however, was toward stratification of the rural populations. The particular ways in which capitalism developed in Latin American countries left a large segment of rural producers who were not totally integrated into the capitalist economy. Scholars such as Nils Jacobsen, Florencia Mallon and William Roseberry have examined the advancement of capitalism in rural areas and have shown how the peasant populations of Latin America underwent an incomplete process of proletarianization, creating rural producers who run the gambit from wage laborers to subsistence farmers.⁵¹⁴ Thus, when the Rockefeller Foundation began their work in agricultural modernization in Latin America the development model they embraced needed to be incorporated into an agrarian structure that reflected what scholar Nils Jacobsen called "traditional modernization."⁵¹⁵ To the foundations, the solution was simpler and far less revolutionary. North American reformers saw the problems with agriculture and the lack of investment in the non-export sector as a problem science and

⁵¹² Ibid., p. 335.

⁵¹³ For example in 1930 Colombia had 73% of its labor force working in agriculture, while Chile only has 37% and Argentina had only 24%, Long and Roberts, "The Agrarian Structures of Latin America," p. 317.

⁵¹⁴ See Nils Jacobsen, *Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano, 1780-1930*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), Florencia Mallon, *The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) and William Roseberry, *Coffee and Capitalism in the Venezuelan Andes*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983).

⁵¹⁵ Jacobsen, *Mirages of Transition*. According to Jacobsen traditional modernization resulted when elites "selectively grafted notions of a constitutional political culture, liberal legal norms, and bourgeois cultural values and patterns of consumption onto old hierarchical norms of social conduct, in which the honor of the family and a harsh patriarchal order of domination and subordination maintained their uncurtailed validity and legitimacy," p. 147.

a more strategic capital investment plan could solve instead of a complex socio-economic order which would require structural changes to fix.

The first half of the twentieth century saw increasing stagnation of the agricultural sectors in terms of productivity and, coupled with moderate to high population growth rates during the same period, created a situation in which some countries found themselves having to import basic foodstuffs. During the 1940s and 1950s agriculture was given low priority in national planning as countries focused on accelerating industrialization.⁵¹⁶ By the 1950s most countries had adopted a state led industrialization model known as Import Substitution Industrialization and, with the exception of a few countries like Mexico that adopted land reform policies, attention on agricultural problems was minimal compared to the focus on industrial development. By the 1960s many governments in Latin America began turning their attention to the agricultural sector and the issue of land reform. In large part this shifting attention was due to the growing demand for food brought on by increasing populations in the urban areas and the growing class conflict caused by the unequal distribution of land and the growing poverty among rural populations. It was during this period that the Rockefeller Foundation and the U.S. government sought to export the Mexican project to other Latin American countries. The increased interest in the area of agriculture, while not new for either partner, was directly tied to overall foreign policy in the region and joint efforts to stabilize Latin America and prevent leftwing revolutions from spreading.

The interest of North American reformers in modernizing agriculture in underdeveloped countries sprouted from a multitude of factors during an age when globalization was tying the economic and political fates of countries closer to one another. One impetus for the Green Revolution was the Malthusian link being made between population growth and food supply.⁵¹⁷ Back in late 18th century

⁵¹⁶ Norman Long and Bryan Roberts, "The Agrarian Structures of Latin America," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *Latin America Economy and Society Since 1930*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 335.

⁵¹⁷ I examine this link more closely in chapter six when I look at foundation programs to curb population growth.

Thomas Malthus posited unchecked population growth would eventually outstrip agricultural productivity and bring about social upheaval. Variations of his theory resurfaced throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the fear that global population would surpass the global food supply was ever present in foundation discussions about developing nations and the problems they faced.⁵¹⁸ The link between rural stagnation or underproduction and increasing urbanization was another factor pushing agriculture to the top of the priority list within foundation and government circles. The Policy Planning Council of the U.S. State Department noted that the "wider economic development" of underdeveloped countries "is being held back by insufficient growth in rural areas," and a stagnant countryside "...promotes a flow to the cities and may ultimately contribute to serious political vulnerabilities."⁵¹⁹

Underlying all these factors was the belief that agricultural modernization was the key to transforming traditional, rural peasants into modern consuming citizens. The idea that subsistence agriculture was primitive and perpetuated poverty was very much part of the Rockefeller Foundation's efforts to alleviate poverty among rural populations in the Southern United States and in China early in the century. In a modern world farming was a commercial endeavor, and farming not oriented toward the market was deemed inefficient and backwards. In an industrial agricultural system the farm becomes a factory with "inputs" like fertilizers and pesticides that produce "outputs" in the form of food.⁵²⁰ A 1958 report prepared for the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller's Brothers Fund on the role of agriculture in underdeveloped countries and U.S. foreign policy put it this way:

Thus the emphasis in agriculture [in Latin America] is on production for use: millions of small farms are 'households' rather than 'firms.' Yet if

⁵¹⁸ Oscar Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth: An Insider's Perspective on the Population Movement*, (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), pp. 9-17.

⁵¹⁹ "Agricultural Development and US Policy," Department of State, Policy Planning Council, October 20, 1964, p. 2 and 7. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 286, Box 4, folder: Agriculture.

⁵²⁰ "The Rise of Industrial Agriculture," The John Hopkins University and Shawn McKenzie, 2007, http://ocw.jhsph.edu/courses/nutritionalhealthfoodproductionandenvironment/PDFs/FoodEnv-sec2b_McKenzieOCW.pdf

they are to become more productive, they must become increasingly commercial so that seeds, fertilizers, implements, etc., can be purchased; if they are to get maximum output from the resources used, they must take on more of the characteristics of firms, with production decisions dominated by market prices rather than by family preferences in the consumption of home-grown products.⁵²¹

The linear path from "household producer" to "commercial producer" that North American reformers envisioned was based on the experience of Western industrialized countries where subsistence agriculture gave way to commercial agriculture and subsistence farming became an undesirable mode of production. Traditional agriculture had little value in a modern society and, more importantly, prevented individuals from becoming productive members of the market economy. The transition to modernity was a cultural transition as well, and "traditional rural attitudes" were as much a problem as the lack of needed technology. According to the Special Studies Report, "The prevailing pattern is for each new generation to raise traditional crops, in traditional ways, with traditional tools and implements. These inherited attitudes are so intimately interwoven with the social and economic strands of each culture that changes in agriculture are the only possible to the degree that new motivations and new values become acceptable."⁵²² The inadequacies North American reformers saw in Latin American societies that were once attributable to racial inferiority were now expressed in cultural terms. The use of cultural deficiencies to explain the lack of development in non-white countries appeared at mid-century when racial arguments for the backwardness of certain countries became less acceptable.

The type of agricultural modernization promoted by the foundations involved some key assumptions about growth and stability. These assumptions came out of America's own experience with economic growth in the early to mid-twentieth century and shaped both the definition of problems and

⁵²¹ Arthur Mosher, "The Role of Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries and United States Policy," prepared for the Special Studies Project Rockefeller Brothers Fund, inc., May 1958, p. 8, RAC, RBF, V, 4C, Box 21, folder 241.

⁵²² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

the solutions to those problems in the underdeveloped world. Foundations saw the agricultural problem as largely a problem of productivity- in other words not enough was being produced. The answer was to find scientific breakthroughs that would produce more with less work. However, to many in Latin America the agricultural problem was a political one- a question of the unequal distribution of land. Foundations viewed this approach to the agricultural problem as the "structural" approach, and, while recognizing the problems highly inequitable land distribution caused, felt it was not an avenue they wanted to pursue.⁵²³ Modernization theorists who influenced foundations' policies such as Walt Rostow argued for a process that modernized a country without overturning the political and social status quo.⁵²⁴ Instead, foundation officials sought to by-pass the politically explosive issue of land reform by refashioning the question into one that could be answered with science, in other words into a question of productivity. The productivity solution was embraced and promoted by prominent economists in North America involved in overseas reform. For example, T.W. Schultz, an agricultural economist working with both the U.S. government and the foundations in building the field of economics in Latin America, argued that the task of modernizing agriculture in traditional peasant economies was a matter of introducing "inputs" (education being prime but also new technology) rather than locating the solution in structural explanations.⁵²⁵ Scholar Charles Maier calls this the "politics of productivity," a process in which American global reformers "sought to transform political issues into problems of output, to adjourn class conflict for a consensus on growth."⁵²⁶

⁵²³ The foundations relied on the approval of host governments for almost all of their projects, therefore, a certain amount of caution in the area of land reform was necessary. However, even when governments moved forward with real land reform (as in the case of Chile) the foundations were unwilling to venture too far into that area, preferring to appear a-political with support for R&D. For a discussion of the "structural approach" versus the "technical approach" see Reynold Carlson, "The Ford Foundation Program and Brazilian Agriculture," 09/02/1964, FFA, Consultants Reports, 002609.

⁵²⁴ Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*.

⁵²⁵ Theodore W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

⁵²⁶ Charles Maier, "The politics of productivity: foundations of American international economic policy after World War II," *International Organization*, Vol. 31, No. 4, (Autumn, 1977), p. 607.

The substitution of increased productivity for radical redistributive policies had worked quite well for the United States and had produced both economic and political stability. This model, the reliance on increasing output rather than redistribution as a means of solving problems of scarcity, became central to agricultural modernization in Latin America. Adding to the appeal of this model was its scientific foundation, relying on technology to solve the problems politics could not. The agrarian structures did not necessarily have to change to implement this type of solution, because as scholar Edmund Kazuso noted in his work on the International Rice Research Institution, "science contributed to a rapidly evolving process, which neutralized as a given social context in which problems arose."⁵²⁷ Thus, growth, in the form of increased crop yields, became the mantra for agricultural modernization despite the deep structural problems. The comparisons North American reformers made between peasant farmers in Latin America and the small yeomen farmers that existed in the United States before agricultural modernization with regard to the "stages" of development were superficial at best and incomparable at worst. Ignoring the differences, however, allowed them to believe growth could accelerate modernization without the need to resort to radical change. Expressing the belief in this model, a 1958 Rockefeller's Brothers Fund report on foreign economic policy summed up the most basic connect between growth and stability this way: "A growing economy can absorb adjustments of a social, political and economic nature which would prove unmanageable in a stagnant economy."⁵²⁸

While the productivity model shaped how problems were defined, North American reformers often had to suspend their condemnations of statism in order to implement this model. The complexity of the agricultural problems in Latin America identified by North American reformers required a solution that was outside the rhetoric of laissez-faire capitalism. The approach they settled on was similar to the approach the U.S. government took in solving its own agricultural problems during the years of the

⁵²⁷ Edmund Kazuso Oasa, "The International Rice Research Institute and the Green Revolution: A Case Study on the Politics of Agricultural Research," PhD Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1981, 8122485, p. 443.

⁵²⁸ Report of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, *Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Doubleday, 1958), p. 69.

Great Depression, when the plight of American farmers and agriculture in general consumed policy makers. As historian Nick Cullather points out, the Great Depression years produced a new set of assumptions about agriculture where "Rationalized planning of supply and consumption would replace the arbitrary dictates of prices and demand."⁵²⁹ In Latin America both the U.S. government and the foundations argued centralized planning of agriculture was essential to solving the problems of Latin America, at least initially. The contradictions inherent in using statist solutions to cure Latin America of its statism did not seem to cause much hand wringing with U.S. reformers. Accelerating the pace of modernization would require some unusual bed partners. Statism had proven useful in the United States in the 1930s to rein in the excesses of capitalism, and now it would be used to create modern societies in Latin America.

The Rockefeller Foundation is usually given institutional credit for creating the Green Revolution, but as the model expanded out of Mexico other foundations, notably Ford and Kellogg, as well as U.S. government agencies and international organizations would join the effort and embrace the productivity model as the solution to the agricultural problems in Latin America. The intimate partnership between the U.S. government and U.S. foundations in the area of agricultural reform in Latin America was forged in the 1940s when the U.S. government greatly expanded its commitment to technical assistance to the region.⁵³⁰ Initially, the driving force behind this assistance was to help develop resources that North America needed for its economy.⁵³¹

In the early 1940s the U.S. government began a multitude of projects under the auspices of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), an agency set up at the behest of Nelson

⁵²⁹ Cullather, Nick, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 48.

⁵³⁰ For a discussion of the beginning of U.S. technical in agriculture to Latin America see Arthur Mosher, *Technical Co-operation in Latin-American Agriculture*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

⁵³¹ For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture began a program in the early 1940s to develop rubber in Latin America. Also in the 1940s the Department of Agriculture developed a "Complementary Crop Program" to assist Latin America countries in growing crops not grown in the United States, Mosher, *Technical Co-Operation*.

Rockefeller, who convinced President Roosevelt that the growing Nazi threat in Latin America needed to be countered with pro-American propaganda. In 1942 the OIAA created the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) to administer technical co-operation projects with Latin American countries. The IIAA's primary concerns were in the area of public health and agriculture-two areas the Rockefeller Foundation knew well. Much like at the Rockefeller Foundation health and sanitation programs took precedent in the early years of assistance, but that emphasis gave way to a more balanced focus on health and agriculture by the 1950s, with agriculture exceeding health and sanitation in IIAA funding by 1952.⁵³² When President Truman established the Technical Co-operation Agency (TCA) in 1950, more popularly known as Point IV, existing technical assistance programs, including the IIAA, were put under the TCA umbrella. By 1950 there were also international organizations involved in technical assistance in agriculture, including the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Organization of American States (OAS). While these two organizations remained important partners in agricultural modernization in Latin America during the post-war years, the foundations and the U.S. government played central roles where funding and direction were concerned.⁵³³ The working relationship between Rockefeller and Ford and these various organizations, especially U.S. technical assistance under TCA (known as USAID after 1961), grew extensively in the 1950s. Certain individuals who worked for the U.S. government, like ICA Director Albion Patterson and academic turned U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, created important links between the U.S. government and the foundations. The foundation relied heavily upon men like Patterson and Gordon and often used them as advisors. By the 1960s this relationship could be described as an unofficial partnership where consultants and experts often moved frequently from organization to organization. Though the

⁵³² Mosher, p. 16. There was also a third agency strictly devoted to agriculture called the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations (OFAR) under the control of the Department of Agriculture. This group was merged with IIAA in 1950 when the Technical Co-operation Administration was established.

⁵³³ The FAO general confined its assistance to supplying advisors to countries requesting assistance and granting fellowships for study in certain areas. The U.S. government stepped up its aid in 1961 when the Alliance for Progress was launched.

foundations rarely duplicated services offered by USAID, they did seek to complement existing projects. Since they had less financial resources at their disposal, the foundations avoided costly projects and preferred to plant strategic seeds.

The following pages trace foundation involvement in agricultural modernization from its genesis in Mexico to its expansion to Colombia and then Chile. Besides being strategically important in their own right, having technical assistance programs in these three countries would mean "that the entire Latin American axis would be covered...Thus diversities in geography, climate, altitude, and crops would be covered, and future expansion would seem most logically to be fill-in efforts arising spontaneously from need and opportunity."⁵³⁴ Colombia and Chile were key to building an international agricultural structure with regional research centers connected to the global agricultural system. Examining this expansion into Colombia and Chile provides much insight into the new problems that arose in this second phase of the Green Revolution. In addition, it illuminates how the foundations adjusted their efforts in response to local environments and how domestic political situations often altered foundation plans. The agricultural project in Mexico would lay the foundations of what would become a global initiative to modernize agricultural systems in developing nations and tie them into an international system based on commercial farming.

The Mexican Agricultural Project: Building the Foundation of an International Agricultural System

The role of the Rockefeller Foundation in initiating a "revolution" in Mexican agriculture in the 1940s is the standard starting point for a discussion of the Green Revolution that swept the developing world in the 1960s. It was the specific scientific breakthroughs that came out of the Foundation's joint program with the Mexican government that became the basis for the expansion of the Green Revolution

⁵³⁴ J.G. Harrar, October 1954, "Observations on Chile," Interviews: J.G. Harrar, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 3, p. 222.

elsewhere in Latin America and Asia. From the Foundation's point of view, the Mexican project was merely a logical extension of what they had accomplished in the Southern United States and what they had started but never finished in China in the 1930s. Their involvement in assisting the Southern U.S. set certain expectation for science as a solution to rural poverty and marginalization. What the Foundation learned from its experience with these early projects shaped how they defined the problem elsewhere.

The first project in agricultural modernization the Rockefeller Foundation became involved with was in the Southern part of the United States. Agricultural development in the United States has a long history of government assistance, from the establishment of land grant colleges through the Morrill Land-Grant Act in 1862 to the present day subsidies of certain sectors of agricultural producers.⁵³⁵ The Morrill Act gave federal land to states for the purpose of supporting Agricultural Colleges (called land-grant colleges) that focused on teaching practical agriculture and science. The Morrill Act was followed by several other pieces of legislation that eventually created an agricultural system where research and extension work, or training farmers to use new technology, rationalized and systematized agricultural production in the United States.⁵³⁶ The Rockefeller Foundation played a significant role in this process.⁵³⁷

In 1906 the Foundation decided to take part in an effort by the United States Department of Agriculture to rid Southern farm lands of the destructive boll weevil. Under the direction of Seaman Knapp, the U.S. government funded demonstration farms to teach farmers how to protect their crops and agricultural extension agents to visit farms and ensure compliance with recommended methods.

⁵³⁵ For a comprehensive discussion of the federal government's role in creating land grant colleges and promoting rural extension projects see Roy V. Scott, *The Reluctant Farmer: The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).

⁵³⁶ The culmination of these efforts was the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 that provided federal funds for extension work, Scott, *The Reluctant Farmer*

⁵³⁷ For their role see Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*.

⁵³⁸ Out of this grew Rockefeller's involvement in rural extension work to teach modern farming technologies. Already involved in rural southern education the Rockefeller Foundation's General Education Board decided to fund, through a contract with the Department of Agricultural, Knapp's rural extension program to non-boll weevil areas in the South. This experience would convince Foundation officials of the importance of agricultural modernization in alleviating rural poverty and increasing productivity.

Rockefeller's first attempts at agricultural reform outside the United States came in China in 1934. Having already established programs in university reform and health and sanitation, the Rockefeller Foundation initiated projects in "rural reconstruction" which focused on modernizing the agricultural sector of China.⁵³⁹ World War II ended this endeavor, but Mexico offered what the Foundation saw as a similarly traditional agricultural sector that could serve as a more accessible model for reform. This opportunity, coupled with the fact that Rockefeller had already experienced success in Mexico with their public health project aimed at eradicating Yellow Fever, made Mexico particularly well suited to initiate the Foundation's first agricultural modernization project in Latin America. For their part, the United States government encouraged if not convinced the Foundation of the value of this type of endeavor. In 1941 Vice President Henry Wallace, who had been Secretary of Agriculture in the 1930s, discussed the merits of assisting Mexico with its agricultural problems with Rockefeller president Raymond Fosdick. It was from these discussion that the commitment was made to pursue a project.⁵⁴⁰ A survey team of three U.S scientists in the fields of agronomy, plant pathology, and plant genetics who had extensive experience with land grant college in the United States conducted a survey

⁵³⁸ Scott, *The Reluctant Farmer*

⁵³⁹ <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/annual-reports/1930-1939>

⁵⁴⁰ E.C Stakman, Richard Bradfield, Paul C. Mangelsdorf, *Campaigns Against Hunger*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. The authors of this book were also the three agronomist who led the initial survey team to make recommendations for a project in Mexico. The account here is taken mostly from their account of events. However, for a more critical and objective look at the overall program see Deborah Fitzgerald, "Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953," in Marcos Cueto, Ed., *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

of Mexican agriculture. The most pressing problems noted by the survey team was underproductive land and low yields. The three American scientists noted attention should be paid to "the improvement of soil management and tillage practices; the introduction, selecting, or breeding of better-adapted, higher yielding and higher-quality crop varieties; more rational and effective control of plant disease and insect pests."⁵⁴¹ The Mexican Agricultural Project (MAP), as it would be known, was officially initiated in February of 1943 when the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government signed a memorandum of agreement to begin the collaborative project. The Oficina de Estudios Especiales (Office of Special Studies) was established as a semi-autonomous agency within the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and J. George Harrar, an American plant pathologist, was chosen to head the program. As scholar Deborah Fitzgerald recounts in her examination of MAP, "the [North American] advisors and staff quite naturally drew on their own experience when ordering their new experiences and priorities in Mexico, in effect building a Mexican land-grant network as a reflection of their own."⁵⁴² In the United States the land-grant system was the conduit through which modernization of agriculture occurred, and the necessity of research and extension work was never questioned as Rockefeller and Ford expanded the work done in Mexico to other parts of Latin America and to Asia.

The overall success of the MAP program with regard to increasing crop yields through improved techniques and hybrid seeds obscured some important elements of the process that would come to have significant consequences for exporting the organizational model used in Mexico to Colombia and Chile. As Deborah Fitzgerald has shown, while corn and wheat production increased in areas that adopted the new technologies and seeds, the benefits of the increased productivity went largely to commercial farmers who were already in a financial position to take advantage of what was being

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² Deborah Fitzgerald, "Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953," in Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*, p. 78.

offered.⁵⁴³ This left out a large segment of subsistence farmers who could not readily take advantage of the new technologies or pay for the seeds and fertilizers.⁵⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the project was deemed a success, and by the late 1940s Rockefeller felt that the model was sufficiently vetted and ready to expand to other parts of Latin America.⁵⁴⁵

The Problem of the Small Farmer: Agricultural Modernization in Colombia

In many ways Colombia exemplified the structural defects of what scholars Stanley and Barbara Stein call the colonial heritage of Latin America: an export mono-crop economy and a highly inequitable land tenure system.⁵⁴⁶ Coffee exports in Colombia fueled the economy in the twentieth century, reaching 84 percent of total exports in 1954.⁵⁴⁷ An elite one percent of landowners owned 49 percent of the land used for farming, and 64 percent of the poorest farmers (peasants) owned only 5 percent of the land used for farming⁵⁴⁸. Although Colombia experienced a general decline in the percentage of people living in rural areas during the first half of the twentieth century (from 71 percent in 1938 to 62 percent in 1950), the agricultural sector remained a force to be reckoned with at mid-century.⁵⁴⁹ One third of Colombia's Gross Domestic Product came from agriculture, and the rural population, while shrinking in relation to the overall population, was growing in absolute numbers. Add to this an exceedingly high population growth, in many years surpassing growth in the agricultural sector, and you have

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Bruce H. Jennings takes on this topic in his critical examination of MAP, *Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).

⁵⁴⁵ There is no doubt that parts of the program were tremendously successful when looking at the goal of increased yields, and other scholars like Joseph Cotter argue there were many other benefits to MAP for the Mexican state including enhancing the image of the state and the scientific community in Mexico, providing farmers with new methods, and appeasing critics of land reform. See Joseph Cotter, "The Rockefeller Foundation's Mexican Agricultural Project: A Cross-Cultural Encounter, 1943-1949, in Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*.

⁵⁴⁶ Stein and Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective*.

⁵⁴⁷ Delbert A. Fitchett, "A Short Survey of Colombian Agricultural Development in Recent Years," RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, box 5, folder 24, p. 6. For a history of the coffee industry in Colombia see Charles Bergquist, *Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910*, (Duke University Press, 1986).

⁵⁴⁸ Solon Barraclough and Arthur Domike, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries," *Land Economics*, Vo. 42:4 (Nov. 1996), p395.

⁵⁴⁹ figures taken from Delbert A. Fitchett, "A Short Survey of Colombian Agricultural Development in Recent Years," RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, box 5, folder 24.

skyrocketing food prices that quadrupled between 1950 and 1965, impacting rural and urban areas alike.⁵⁵⁰

In 1948 the Rockefeller Foundation, seeking to expand the work done in Mexico, eyed Colombia as the best place to begin this expansion. The Foundation was already involved in training Colombian agricultural scientists through its fellowship program. Since 1944 select students from two agricultural schools that were part of the National University system in Colombia, Palmira and Medellín, were sent to train in the MAP program under Rockefeller scholarships. The Mexican project had sparked an interest in a number of countries in the type of agricultural modernization championed by Rockefeller, and foundation officers felt "that one more experiment in agricultural operation might, together with Mexico, offer such convincing proof of the value and effectiveness of this type of activity that the RF might decide seriously to study opportunities elsewhere."⁵⁵¹ The choice of Colombia had much to do with Rockefeller's previous work in the country in health and sanitation projects and conversations with the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Willard Beaulac, who urged the Rockefeller to "proceed at once" as "he knew no other South American country which would cooperate in such a program more eagerly or more reliably."⁵⁵² This willingness on the part of the Colombian government proved true as negotiations began for a joint program. Rockefeller officer Warren Weaver found "a most gratifying warm, cooperative, and intelligent reception for our proposal from everyone-the President, the Minister of Agriculture, the technical personnel in the Ministry, the officials and faculties of the agricultural colleges, the men in the experiment stations, the Rector of the National University, etc., etc. These men include all political factions, and the question of politics simply never entered."⁵⁵³

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

⁵⁵¹ Inter-Office Correspondence, Colombian Agricultural Project, from Warren Weaver to Chester IB, October, 11, 1949, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 5, folder 27, p.2.

⁵⁵² Ibid., p.1.

⁵⁵³ Inter-Office Correspondence, from Warren Weaver to Chester IB, Monday, September 19, 1949, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 5, folder 27.

This last statement was significant because Colombia in the midst of "La Violencia," the civil war between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party that swept the country in the late 1940s and 1950s and was largely played out in violence confrontations in the countryside.⁵⁵⁴ Despite the country being consumed with political turmoil and fighting between Liberals and Conservatives, the Rockefeller Foundation did not shy away.⁵⁵⁵ Largely this was because neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives presented a radical challenge to the U.S. presence in the country. Unlike the 1970 elections in Chile, the outcome of the battle between Liberals and Conservatives would not significantly alter the relationship the government had with the United States. Though the foundations tended to see the "reformist" Liberal Party as a better option, a Conservative victory posed no threat to the presence of U.S. aid agencies. The compromise between Liberals and Conservatives that ended *La Violencia* was a compromise between elites to preserve much of their privilege and prevent a massive mobilization of the lower classes. Neither party was willing to challenge the basic domestic system, and more importantly neither was willing to challenge U.S. investment or business interests to any significant degree. The Rockefeller Foundation felt that "the long and varied experiences of the IHD [Rockefeller's International Health Division] that non-political programs of obvious benefit to the people successfully weather political storms."⁵⁵⁶

The initial cooperative agreement between Rockefeller and the government of Colombia, implemented in May of 1950, was focused on improving the yield and quality of corn and wheat in

⁵⁵⁴ for an examination of La Violencia see Charles Berquist, Ricardo Pecaranda and Gonzalo Sanchez, eds., *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992), Dario Betancourt and Martha Garcia, *Matones y Cuadrilleros: Origen y evolución de la violencia en el occidente Colombiano, 1946-1965*, (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1990), or Mary Rolden, *Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1964-1965*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), Stephen Dudley, *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerilla Politics in Colombia*, (New York: Rutledge, 2004), Gonzalo Sánchez Gómez, *Bandits, Peasants, and Politics: The Case of 'La Violencia' in Colombia*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001).

⁵⁵⁵ on this see Rebecca Tally, "No Question of Politics Ever Arose: Science, Violence, and Agriculture in Colombia, 1949-1969," *Anamesa: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Spring, 2004.

⁵⁵⁶ Inter-Office Correspondence, Colombian Agricultural Project, from Warren Weaver to Chester IB, October, 11, 1949, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 5, folder 27, p.1.

Colombia with a specific eye toward increasing exports.⁵⁵⁷ Two American scientists who had been on the staff of the Mexican project, Lewis Roberts and Joseph Rupert, were brought to Colombia to lead the project. The central administrative offices for the Colombian Agricultural Project (CAP) were located within the Ministry of Agriculture housed in Bogotá, but the agricultural schools of Medellín and Palmira were a main focus of Rockefeller grants. These two schools received money for fellowships, equipment, and new buildings during the early stages of the project. The government run experimental stations, where scientist conducted research on new seed varieties, also received money from Rockefeller. In fact, in the foundation's eyes, nothing exemplifies better the collaborative nature of the project than the building of one of the largest experimental stations in the Western Hemisphere, the Tibayatá experimental station near Bogotá.⁵⁵⁸ Completed in 1953, Tibayatá was owned and operated by the government but staffed by Rockefeller advisors and specialist who oversaw research and trained local scientists.

The Colombian Agricultural Project appeared to be a huge success just two years into the project. Foundation justifications for expanding assistance in 1952 noted the "unusually rapid" progress in developing new varieties of corn and wheat.⁵⁵⁹ Of course it was recognized the rapid progress was due largely to scientists being able to draw from the successes of the MAP program, but the role of the Colombian government in this progress was constantly mentioned. Foundation officials lauded how the Colombian government's financial support "consistently exceeded the initial promises" and how cooperative Colombians were in general.⁵⁶⁰ By 1953 research was expanded to include other crops such as potatoes and beans, and efforts at distribution and extension were playing a larger part in the project. Finding new seed varieties that would withstand different climates and resist diseases involved

⁵⁵⁷ The initial grant from Rockefeller was for \$260,000 to be disbursed over a five year period.

⁵⁵⁸ see 1953 Rockefeller Foundation annual reports, p. 205. On-line at <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/annual-reports>, accessed 2/5/2013.

⁵⁵⁹ Grant Action 51206, Colombian Agricultural Program, p. 1, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 1, folder 1.

⁵⁶⁰ Action 51206, Colombian Agricultural Program, p. 2, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 1, folder 1.

the type of researched based solution that Rockefeller was most comfortable with. However for these breakthroughs to translate to higher crop yields efforts to distribute the seeds to as many farmers as possible were essential. Once new seed varieties were identified, the government owned credit bank, Caja Agraria, took the lead role in demonstrating new seed superiority to farmers and selling the seeds on a widespread scale.

Research at the experimental stations had produced significant results by the early 1960s, but those results were not trickling down to farmers as quickly as was hoped. This decade would see added emphasis by foundations and the national government on two areas that addressed the continuing stagnation of agriculture: land reform and agricultural extension work. The 1960s saw a dramatic increase in attention paid to agricultural development by the foundations followed by a similar build up of aid coming from the United States government as part of the Alliance for Progress. This build up was not just an effort to increase funding for experimental stations research on crops, but rather it involved a comprehensive plan to address the problems in higher education and governance that contributed to agricultural stagnation. Colombia was a major recipient of Alliance funds for both agricultural modernization and higher education owing in part to its reputation of being a willing partner, especially with regard to agricultural reform.⁵⁶¹

Even before the Alliance for Progress was launched, some Colombian politicians recognized the need for land reform to help reduce the violence in the countryside arising out of battles over land. When the National Front Coalition was formed in 1958 the Liberal politician designated to be the first president of Colombia under the Coalition, Alberto Lleras Camargo, backed a moderate land reform package meant to redress the inequitable distribution of land through expropriation of underproductive

⁵⁶¹ The Charter for Alliance for Progress signed by all participating nation had the general goal of increasing agricultural productivity and to improve storage facilities, transportation, and marketing. The Charter also called for encouraging agrarian reform in places that had inefficient land tenure structures. This "encouraging" took many forms, but ultimately was not as important as other goals, such as economic growth and increased productivity.

private land if necessary. The explosive population growth, especially in rural areas, added urgency to the issue. Linking agrarian reform with the population issue, outgoing Liberal Party president Alberto Lleras Camargo stated, "Here is the reason why agrarian reform is one of the vital needs in our development. For there is no sort of economic expansion, however swift or successful, that can assimilate both the rural masses who cease to live by agriculture and the new surplus hands, whether in the town or in the country, who come year by year to glut the labor market."⁵⁶² Much like North American reformers, Latin American elites often saw reforms as a means of avoiding revolutionary action by the masses, hoping the reforms would bring about modernization without social upheaval.

The need for land reform grew all the more urgent as violence in the countryside began to increase due to the government's efforts to destroy the communist rural enclaves that were challenging the legitimacy of the National Front . In these enclaves communists had set up "independent republics" after being denied participation in the new National Front government and had mobilized self-defense forces. Communist survivors of the military attack on the enclaves eventually regrouped and formed the basis of various guerrilla movements operating in the countryside. The United States government began assisting the Colombian government in its counter-insurgency efforts in 1961 to destroy these groups, training men and providing money and equipment. In 1966 the Communist Party officially formed the guerilla movement known as Fueras Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) which grew in size and strength as the 1960s progressed. FARC's base of support came from the rural population, and the government recognized if they didn't deal with the problems in the countryside radical solutions might become more appealing. The United States was also pressuring Latin American governments to address the issue with moderate land reform that would quell the rural insurgencies and lay the foundations for commercial export farming. The land reform law, enacted in 1962, created an agency to oversee this reform called Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (INCORA).

⁵⁶² Alberto Lleras Camargo, "The Alliance for Progress: Aims, Distortions, Obstacles," *Foreign Affairs*, 42:1 (Oct. 1963), p 32.

Colombia appeared to the United States reformers, both public and private, to be the perfect partner with regard to development aid, willing to tackle the most controversial issue of the period. The United States government targeted Colombia for substantial aid under the Alliance for Progress, and the foundations targeted it as well. However, the Agrarian Reform Act was plagued with problems from the start, the most significant of which was a lack of motivation in either of the two parties to dismantle the existing agrarian structure.⁵⁶³ The government did grant over 78,000 new titles to small farmers, but most of this was poor farming land and far from transportation and marketing centers. Significantly, only one percent of the land given to small farmers was expropriated from private land holders. The vast majority was new land opened up by the government. In 1971 the Colombian government suspended all redistribution of land under the law. The end result of what was touted as a major land reform initiative was negligible in terms of its effects on the agrarian structure. In 1973, Ford president David Bell noted during his trip to Colombia, "The appearance and reality of reform is well illustrated by agrarian reform....There has been no significant alteration of an agrarian structure that was transplanted from feudal Spain in the 16th century."⁵⁶⁴ In 1961 though, the reform law, and the creation in 1962 of the Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario (ICA), appeared to be a significant gesture on the part of the Colombian government to address the agricultural problems plaguing the country. By 1963 all national centers of agricultural research were placed under the auspices of ICA, a move seen by the foundations as essential for coordinating research and extension.

While Ford and Rockefeller stayed out of the political issue of land reform, they were interested in tackling the problem of extension of research, or how to disseminate the work being done at the experimental stations to Colombian farmers. This interest was shared by many Colombian politicians and

⁵⁶³ for a detailed examination of the problems with the Agrarian Law see Roger Findley, "Problems faced by Colombia's Agrarian Reform Institute in Acquiring and Distributing Land," in Robert E. Scott, ed., *Latin American Modernization Problems*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973).

⁵⁶⁴ David E. Bell and William D. Carmichael, *Visit to Colombia, July 11-15, 1973*, p. 15, FFA, Papers of David Bell, 015406.

technocrats working in the issue of land reform. The Director of the government entity established to oversee land reform (INCORA), Enrique Peñalosa, remembers this was the thinking among Colombians working on land reform during the mid to late 1960s:

You couldn't just subdivide the land to solve the problem. Land was a factor, but more important was capital and technical assistance. Because you had 80% of the country at that moment were "minifundias," small productive land in the hands of peasants, but still they were very , very poor. What you need was, in addition to the land, of course and essential element, you needed technical assistance and capital.⁵⁶⁵

Much like foundations, Colombian technocrats saw rural development as a matter of extension to train farmers in new technology and making credit available to those who want to modernize. When Ford joined Rockefeller's efforts at agricultural modernization in the early 60s a Ford review of agriculture found "there was already a reasonable consensus within Colombia, supported by Rockefeller and Kellogg Foundation advice, that substantial improvements in agricultural education and extension were required and that these needed to be coordinated with existing successful research work."⁵⁶⁶ The discovery of new seeds was just the first step in the process of increasing productivity, and it was the easiest to solve as it was a question of science. The middle stage, that of getting the new seeds and technology into the hands of the famer was perhaps the most difficult, and it is here that the Green Revolution began to breakdown.

Partly, this breakdown was due to the path taken by the foundations which privileged creating efficiency ad growth over issues of equity or social justice. The foundations were not interested in forcing social justice onto the agrarian structures because they felt that economic growth would necessarily bring improved standards of living for most, if not all, in society. The unquestioned belief in improving efficiency meant attention to this was a priority. The process of disseminating seeds and new

⁵⁶⁵ Interview with Enrique Peñalosa, Bogota, Colombia, March 31, 1995, cited in Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerda and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, Friends of the Alliance for Progress, 2008, p 204.

⁵⁶⁶Robert Wickham, Review of Agricultural Progress in Colombia, no date (assumed year is 1963), FFA, Staff and Consultant Reports, 002622, p. 7.

techniques that produced higher yields was necessarily impacted by the agrarian structure and the patterns of land tenure in the country. The foundations had learned this lesson from their activity in Mexico. The new seeds and farming technologies being introduced came at a cost that was prohibitive to many small farmers, many of whom farmed at a subsistence level. In addition, the adoption of new seed varieties and the accompanying increased cost of storage and marketing required capital. Small farmers in Colombia had much less capital and less access to credit than large land owners. Introducing modernization in this form to a country whose land tenure system was so inequitable often produced counterproductive results, concentrating land even further and pushing small farmers off the land and accelerating urban migration.⁵⁶⁷ Numerous studies on Mexican and Colombian agricultural have shown that the Green Revolution's benefits went mostly to large landholders who have access to capital and credit.⁵⁶⁸ Large land holders in Colombia had numerous advantages when it came to taking advantage of the Green Revolution as they could take advantage of economies of scale.

Then of course, there were macro-economic problems to consider. Increasing production is usually accompanied by falling prices. However, large land holders also held an advantage in terms of this consequence as well. Rockefeller Foundation officer Gerald Trant warned of the problems that could emerge in Colombia and elsewhere as a result of increased productivity. Writing to Rockefeller's Director of Agricultural Sciences Trant warned:

Given the Latin American production situation, the increases in production, and hence price declines, could come about very rapidly. In the absence of price support, those who do not grow the improved

⁵⁶⁷ A. Eugene Havens and William Flinn, "Green Revolution Technology and Community Development: The Limits of Action Programs," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 23:3 (April 1975), pp. 469-481. Havens and Flinn look at the coffee growing region in the department of Antioquia in Colombia and examine the consequences of the Green Revolution in this area with regard to family income and land distribution.

⁵⁶⁸ On Mexico see Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, *Modernizing Mexican Agriculture: Socioeconomic Implications of Technological Change, 1940-1970*, (Geneva: UNRISD, 1976) or Deborah Fitzgerald, "Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953," in Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*. On Colombia see A. Eugene Havens and William Flinn, "Green Revolution Technology and Community Development: The Limits of Action Programs," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 23:3 (April 1975), pp. 469-481 or Michael Taussig, "Peasant Economies and the Development of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cauca Valley, Colombia," *Latin American Perspectives*, 5:3 (Summer, 1978), pp. 62-91.

varieties, including the upland rice producers, may well be in a worse position financially, than they were before. I believe that C.I.A.T has the responsibility to point out this type of problem to the representatives of those nations which may wish to collaborate in a rice improvement program.⁵⁶⁹

With regard to corn farmers in Colombia, Trent agreed with Wortman that small farmers might have an initial advantage in that they "may be willing to accept a lower wage when corn prices decline, simply because they have no alternative way of marketing their labor," but argued "this may have high social costs in terms of lower levels of family income."⁵⁷⁰

Efforts to train Colombian farmers and increase acceptance of new technologies and seeds, known as extension work, accelerated in the mid-1960s, especially as the U.S. government committed to step up its aid to Colombian agriculture and to higher education under USAID contracts. So too did attention to the so-called "second generation problems" of the Green Revolution such as storage, transportation, and marketing. In the early 1960s, activities under the Alliance for Progress in the area of Colombian agriculture were fairly limited to such things as agricultural credit and technical assistance to small farmers in the coffee growing region.⁵⁷¹ By 1968, USAID under the Alliance banner had greatly expanded its assistance to Colombia to include loans to build public and private storage facilities, support for a variety of INCORA projects, and extension projects supervised by ICA. These activities that addressed the "second generation" problems were supported by USAID and foundation personnel who would train a generation of agronomists and agricultural economists at the main agricultural schools in Colombia. Between 1964 and 1968 an alliance of foreign aid agencies, including USAID, Rockefeller, Ford, Kellogg, the Inter-American Bank and the FAO/UN Special Fund, gave over ten million dollars to ICA and Colombian institutions engaged in agricultural modernization. While second generation

⁵⁶⁹ letter from Gerald Trant to Sterling Wortman, June 3, 1970, RAC, RF, RG 6.9 Cali Field Office II. folder 4, box 48, p. 1.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., p.2.

⁵⁷¹ Thomas C. Mann, "Report to the President on Alliance for Progress Activities," December, 1963-May, 1964, LBJ Presidential Library, Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security Files, Agency File, Box 4, folder-Alliance for Progress, Vol. I, 1 of 2.

problems of storage, marketing and transportation were discussed frequently, and attempts were made to direct resources to these areas, the eight-hundred pound gorilla in the room, namely the plight of many small farmers, was largely ignored. As scholar Rebecca Tally notes about Rockefeller's agricultural program in Colombia:

"from the very start of the program, RF [Rockefeller Foundation] officers were certain of two things. The first was that the inequitable system of land tenure in the countryside, especially the concentration of highly arable lands in the hands of absentee landlords who used it mainly for cattle ranching, was a serious problem which created conflict and impeded Colombia's ability to effectively feeds its population....But this had no bearing on the RF's second certainty, which was that land tenure was a problem they would make no efforts to rectify."⁵⁷²

In addition, Tally suggests that Rockefeller found a willing and able partner in large landholders who were capable of taking advantage of new technologies as opposed to the small farmer who for financial or cultural reasons resisted change.⁵⁷³ By 1969, despite continued concerns about the second generation problems, when Rockefeller's director of agricultural sciences Sterling Wortman met with the CIAT executive committee he remarked in his diary he felt " more comfortable now about Colombia than at any time in the past three years," because, according to his assessment, "Colombia has become development and production minded."⁵⁷⁴ Wortman went on to explain why he felt this way, noting, "The activities of the five major agricultural-related government corporations have been interlocked with the director of each serving on Boards of all the others."⁵⁷⁵ In addition, he explained how Colombia was now exporting more than 15,000 tons of rice and corn to Peru. The time had come for Rockefeller to phase out its Colombian Agricultural Program (CAP). Wortman noted that the Rockefeller Foundation

⁵⁷² Rebecca Tally, "No Question of Politics Ever Arose: Science, Violence, and Agriculture in Colombia, 1949-1969," *Anamesa: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Spring, 2004, p.3.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵⁷⁴ SW Diary, Feb. 18-22, 1969, Colombia, trip to CIAT Executive Committee meeting, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 5, folder 26. The Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) was created in 1967 to be a regional research center focused on tropical crops serving Colombia and beyond.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, The five government agencies included ICA, INCORA, IDEMA (Instituto de Mercadeo Agrícola), INDERENA (Instituto Nacional de Recursos Nacionales) and CAJA Agraria (national credit agency).

"can now look back on a program (CAP) which has been highly successful and terminated in an orderly and most friendly way."⁵⁷⁶

Peasant resistant to the "highly successful" modernization of agriculture told a different story. The concentration of land continued to worsen, from 3% of landholders owning 50% of the land in the 1960s to 3% of landholders owning 71% of the land in the 1980s.⁵⁷⁷ Absolute rural poverty also accelerated dramatically after 1964, only abating somewhat in the mid-1980s.⁵⁷⁸ While the formation of the National Front ended the worst of *La Violencia*, at least in terms of political fighting between the Liberals and the Conservatives, the deteriorating conditions in the countryside sprouted a new manifestation of the same tensions grounded in land ownership and peasant pauperization. The early 1960s saw armed peasant resistance to the National Front, and by 1964 this resistance formed into what would become the longest lasting guerilla army in Latin America, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). Eventually, the FARC would grow to have tremendous influence in the countryside, and as peasant farmers found themselves unable to compete with larger operations, especially in coffee production, they turned to coca production.⁵⁷⁹ This new "Violencia," however, was as unimportant as the first one to the foundations' vision of agricultural modernization. They saw themselves above the politics of it all.

While CAP was phased out in 1969 (phase out began as early as 1966), the Rockefeller Foundation would continue to influence the trajectory of agricultural modernization in Colombia through its control of research centers like CIAT and its support for research in the universities. The Ford Foundation too would continue its assistance through its support of CIAT and its emphasis on

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ James Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP*, (London: Pluto Press, 2010), p. 82.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 83

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid, Brittain explains the origins of the FARC as routed in capitalists exploitation of rural farmers and the turn toward coca production as a necessary outcome to policies enacted by the government that drove peasants off their land using a combination of economic policies and military force.

training university and research personnel. Officials at the Ford Foundation, typically more sensitive to the impact of their programs on the lower classes than their counterparts at Rockefeller, had become unusually frank about the failure of their project to benefit most Colombian farmers by the early 1970s. In the budget proposal for Colombia in the 1974-75 year Ford acknowledged that they "failed to achieve anticipated results in developing a program closely guided by objectives of social equity."⁵⁸⁰ But of course, the modernization paradigm they embraced did not directly attack problems of social equity, but rather implied that modernization would bring about a more equitable society through economic growth. Nonetheless, they were "convinced of the need for a sharpened focus on some of the problems of some of the "disadvantaged," and proposed to concentrate more on the "problems of the marginal and small-farm sector."⁵⁸¹

In a statement that seemed to be a direct attack on the productivity paradigm, the 1974-75 budget proposal recognized, "the increasing GNP's that have been the dividends of an "economic growth" approach to development problems have had little or no impact on the distribution of wealth or opportunity."⁵⁸² Yet just a few year previous to the this statement , development specialists around the globe were meeting to sing the praises of this model of agricultural reform. The unyielding belief in the tenets of the productivity model was clear when international aid agencies such as Ford, Rockefeller, the United Nations, the World Bank, and others met in 1969 for a conference on agricultural development. According to the conference summary, "the importance of vastly superior technologies of production was a thread running through the entire meeting."⁵⁸³ The agencies were in agreement that "vastly superior technologies are a pervasive force in disrupting traditional agriculture and paving the way to its modernization and to great increases in agricultural production" and "so long as technologies

⁵⁸⁰ Proposed FY 1974-75 Budget, The Ford Foundation Office for Colombia and Venezuela, January, 15, 1973, p. 1, FFA, Consultants Reports, 015406.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵⁸³ Conference on Agricultural Development- Villa Serbelloni, April 23-25, 1969, Summary prepared by W.M. Myers of the Rockefeller Foundation, p.1, FFA, Papers of David Bell, box 30, folder 741.

are deficient or inadequate, other efforts to stimulate agricultural development and productivity increases will have disappointingly little impact."⁵⁸⁴

What should we make of the continued belief in the productivity model despite its apparent failure as a development model? The modernization paradigm was predicated on the way agriculture had modernized in the United States. That is to say, as the modernization of agriculture created less need for rural labor, industrialization created jobs in factories to absorb excessive rural labor. Also, birth rates in the U.S, unlike in Colombia, declined throughout this transition. Though these differences were well known to foundation officials, the belief that science and technology could provide an easier avenue to development was so entrenched in the mission of both foundations that this belief continued to be the foundation for projects. In the end, there was a general acknowledgement that perhaps the problems the small farmers faced were not solvable. They were an inherent by-product of the move to commercial agriculture. Ford officer Lowell Hardin wrote to Fords' president that "the belief on the part of some that given enough technology the income problems of the small farmers, the marginal people, can be solved" is misguided. He continues, "I'm afraid that those who hold this view will be continually frustrated. Non-farm employment opportunities must be expanded--beyond the foreseeable capacity of the agri-industries if people are to have work."⁵⁸⁵ Further south in the hemisphere, the foundations sought to complete hemispheric agricultural modernization with assistance to Chile. While *La Violencia* and the emergence of FARC appeared to have little influence on how the foundations viewed their projects, the politically charged atmosphere in Chile shaped almost every aspect of the pace and direction of agricultural modernization.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ Interoffice Memo from Lowell Hardin to David Bell, September 16, 1970, Socio-political Implications of the Green Revolution, FFA, papers of David Bell, 26-681.

The Problem of Politics: Agricultural Modernization in Chile

In contrast to Colombia, Chile was a much more industrial country in which the agricultural sector accounted for less than ten percent of the GNP and only about twenty-five percent of the population.⁵⁸⁶ Yet Chile's inefficient agrarian structure, dominated by the *latifundia*, began to significantly impact the economy by the 1950s. The agricultural sector, hobbled by the dominance of inefficient and unproductive large estates, was failing to keep up with the growing demand for food in Chile's industrializing economy. Chile had to import much of its basic food stuff creating a major drain on foreign exchange and contributing to inflation. Even the right of center government in the late 1950s felt compelled to bring about change before the "agrarian question" brought about true revolution. In this climate, the Rockefeller Foundation followed by USAID and Ford were constantly reacting to the shifts in political climate rather than operating, as they had in Colombia, under the assumption that elections would not significantly impact programs.

Chile's agricultural problems were important to the U.S. government and the foundations for two reasons. First, in terms of the broad goals of agricultural modernization, assistance to Chilean agriculture was viewed by the foundations as the final link in a triangle that would address the agricultural needs of the entire Latin American region.⁵⁸⁷ Chile's agricultural problems also became important to foundations and U.S. government officials due to the impact of economic instability on politics in the country, particularly the growing strength of the left, both communist and non-communist.⁵⁸⁸ Rockefeller's director of agriculture, J. George Harrar, assessed the political situation in 1954 and felt that Communist influence, though not large at the time, would decline if the government

⁵⁸⁶ figures taken from Kyle Steenland, "Rural Strategy under Allende," *Latin American Perspectives*, 1:2 (Summer, 1974), p. 129.

⁵⁸⁷ J.G. Harrar, Observations on Chile, October, 1954, RAC, RF, R.G. 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 3, p. 222

⁵⁸⁸ Rockefeller officials were taking note of the anti-American sentiments and protests in Chile following the Guatemala coup of 1954. passing around a copy of the American Legion Magazine which ran an article suggesting Chile is the next Guatemala in terms of a communist take-over. Letter with copy of article to Harrar from Norman Borloug, January 7, 1955, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 4.

can stabilize the economy. He further noted the role Rockefeller could play: "if cooperative efforts such as an RF operating program in agriculture do become established and result in improved agricultural production, this in itself would be one factor which might strengthen national economy and political stability."⁵⁸⁹ So, despite Harrar's view that there will be numerous problems and obstacles encountered, the Rockefeller Foundation decided the chances for success were good enough to make a substantial investment. Chile, like Colombia, would become a major recipient of U.S. government aid under the Alliance for Progress due to a similar assessment that they were close to "take-off" in terms of their development.

When assessing the problems of agricultural underproduction in Chile, especially wheat, Harrar recognized the land tenure system as a major issue noting in his observations, "Finally, and of great importance, the persistence of the system of 'latifundia' in agriculture has been a great deterrent to national production."⁵⁹⁰ Foundation criticism of the landed elite in Chile and elsewhere was never in short supply, making the point in one assessment that "these large land owners do not have a sufficient sense of their personal obligation toward the betterment of the economic conditions of their country."⁵⁹¹ Nonetheless, as with Colombia, Rockefeller would attempt to work around this given using science to solve the identified technical problems such as poor land management, inadequate use of fertilizers, mediocre varieties of crop plants, inadequate control of pests and diseases, and a lack of adequate transportation and marketing.⁵⁹²

Like with most other projects, the foundation kept in close contact, through letters and meetings, with officials from the U.S. government and other aid agencies so that duplication of services

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., p.1.

⁵⁹⁰ Observations on Chile, J. George Harrar, October, 1954, JGH Interviews, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 3.

⁵⁹¹ General impressions of Chile, R.F. Chandler, Interviews, October, 1954, RFC Interviews, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 3.

⁵⁹² Observations on Chile, J. George Harrar, October, 1954, JGH Interviews, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 3, p. 2.

could be avoided.⁵⁹³ The United States government's International Cooperation Administration (ICA) was already assisting Chile with some aspects of modernizing its agriculture, and Rockefeller wanted to make sure their activities complemented and reinforced one another. The model of agricultural modernization that Rockefeller and Ford promoted was already in place in areas that ICA was active.⁵⁹⁴ In particular, the head of the U.S. agricultural mission to Chile, Albion Patterson, had already begun introducing the type of reform the foundations were interested in promoting. Patterson, who was discussed in chapter four for his role in training Latin American economist, sought to bring the type of agricultural extension practiced in the United States to Chile in an attempt to accelerate production.⁵⁹⁵ Similar in their thinking, Patterson and Rockefeller and Ford officials saw increasing productivity and efficiency with a top-down approach as key to solving the agricultural problems of Chile and other countries.⁵⁹⁶ The relationship the foundations had with U.S. government agencies like ICA and later AID involved a shared world-view about how modernization would proceed and a shared pool of intellectuals, academic and technocrats to initiate reform. For example, Rockefeller grant summaries note that "the Foundation agricultural programs have all served as training centers for various individuals from ICA and other international agencies, who have spent temporary periods in direct association with Foundation project leaders in the field." Similarly, a considerable number of educators and investigators from the United States and other countries have benefitted from temporary periods spent in Mexico and/or Colombia and Chile. In 1955, the Rockefeller Foundation formally established an Operating Program in Chilean Agriculture with the specific intention of focusing on wheat improvement. A large part of the assistance involved helping the Chilean

⁵⁹³ see for example the letter dated March 5, 1954 from J.G. Harrar to Dr. Albion Patterson, Director of Technical Cooperation in which Harrar discusses the mutual interests of the two groups (ICA and Rockefeller) and offers to "reinforce" the activities of ICA and other agencies operating in Chile, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 3.

⁵⁹⁴ See ICA's sponsorship of agricultural modernization in Southern Chile that culminated in the *Plan Chillan* and agreements with the University of California in Adams and Cumberland, *United States University Cooperation in Latin America*, p. 210-216.

⁵⁹⁵ O'Brien, *Making of the Americas*, p. 188-89.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 188-89.

government establish and staff new research demonstration stations located in Santiago and Temuco.

The other focus was on building up the agricultural sciences in the universities.

Unlike in Colombia, where foundations found the government to be a willing and eager partner, the government in Chile proved to be more of a challenge. The political system was becoming decisively more polarized as left of center parties were drawing strength from the weak economy and rising inflation and had begun to mobilize peasants in the 1950s. Rockefeller closely watched political events in Chile because, unlike in Colombia, it was perceived that the outcome of elections would impact activities in the country. Leading up to the 1958 elections, Rockefeller's director of agriculture in Chile, Joseph Rupert, felt that "If the Left should win, the future of our programs might be in jeopardy; if the Right should win, we would have to work largely under the orientation of the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, which clearly would be less undesirable."⁵⁹⁷ By the end of 1958 Rupert expressed relief at the election of the right of center Jorge Alessandri, declaring "I think we can look forward to six more years of a pro-American government friendly to the technical assistance agencies."⁵⁹⁸ The Alessandri administration was indeed friendly to technical assistance, seeing it as the only type of land reform that was needed. Minister of Agriculture during the Alessandri years, Ruy Barbosa, recalls the thinking within the government at the time about agricultural reform:

Alessandri and I as well as my ministerial predecessor, Orlando Sandoval thought of agrarian reform in purely technical and experimental terms. But at that moment came the Punta del Este meeting [setting up the Alliance for Progress], with the dogma that in Chile an Agrarian Reform was needed to resolve a socio-political problem. It is my impression that Alessandri saw himself under pressure to benefit from the Alliance for Progress by acceding to this imposition, but that he did not attribute to it the importance which it would acquire later.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹⁷ Letter from Joseph Rupert to J.G. Harrar, July 14, 1958, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 6.

⁵⁹⁸ Letter from Joseph Rupert to J.G. Harrar, September 9, 1958. RAC. RF. RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 6.

⁵⁹⁹ Interview with Ruy Barbosa, March 18, 1995, cited in Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerda and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, Friends of the Alliance for Progress, 2008, p46.

Political events in Chile made the foundations rethink their opposition to the issue of dealing with land reform, but only within certain parameters. The economic problems Chile was experiencing during the 1950s were the result of not only long-standing foreign domination of important industries but a complex mixture of rapid industrialization and urbanization combined with rural stagnation. As in many other Latin American countries, land reform became an imperative even the political center and right recognized. In addition, the growing strength of the Socialist and Communist in the 1952 and 1958 elections meant the political right had to address the issue or risk losing the next election to the center or left. In 1962, despite opposition from his own party's base (the oligarchy) Alessandri managed to pass a land reform package that included small scale expropriation of underproductive land on large estates. Under the new law the CORA (Agriculture Reform Corporation) was created and INDAP (Institute for Agrarian Development) was put in charge of implementation. Alessandri's land reform, however, was seen by most as a non-starter and a token effort without the political will to enforce it. Thus, the inefficiencies of the *latifundio* system continued to take its toll on the economy and on the popularity of the Alessandri government. Rather than appease the electorate, Alessandri's lack of political will to enforce provisions in the new law made land reform a key issue that drove many into the opposition camp.

As late as 1960, the position of the Rockefeller Foundation where land reform was concerned was exemplified by a letter from Director of Agricultural Sciences, A. H. Moseman to William Myers. In the letter Moseman notes, "The principle interest in Chile at the moment appears to be in land reform. This, of course, is not a field in which we would wish to participate actively..."⁶⁰⁰ However, just one year later Rockefeller's program director Charles Hardin was having some serious conversations with various individuals from the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) about impending land reform. Assistant Director General for the FAO, Hernan Santa-Cruz told Hardin in 1961 regarding land

⁶⁰⁰ Letter from A.H. Moseman to W. I. Myers, March 7, 1960, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 2, folder 8.

reform " the question is no longer whether it will take place, but how; whether by revolution or evolution, the later with the intelligent use of rural credit, agricultural extension development of markets, and so forth."⁶⁰¹ Solon Barraclough, an economist with the FAO and advisor to the foundations on agricultural matters, also met with Hardin quite regularly and impressed upon him that "a radical change in Chilean agriculture is in the making." Barraclough suggested that the UN-FAO and other aid groups should train individuals "who will be able more sensibly and intelligently to take hold of action programs that emerge."⁶⁰²

The idea of training individuals who would take the lead in policies that emerged, seemed to be more up Rockefeller's alley, so when the FAO mentioned wanting to establish an independent research institution for training those individuals who will direct land reform and those who would help implement it in the field, the Rockefeller Foundation took interest. Support for educating future technocrats was at the heart of global reform, and this is where foundations felt they could make the biggest impact. Several years passed, however, before the Chilean government approved and established the Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias (INIA) in 1964-a drawn out process that caused Rockefeller officials in New York and Chile much frustration. The INIA was not totally independent, nonetheless, the opportunity to influence the direction of government implemented land reform through support of research was one of the few acceptable forays into land reform that Rockefeller was willing to make, specifically because of its "technical" aspects that appeared a-political. For example, as one possible solution to what Hardin noted as the "rise in tension in Latin America and the probable impending radical changes, " Barraclough and Hardin discussed John D. Black's approach to land reform which was implemented with some success in

⁶⁰¹ Discussion between Charles Hardin and Hernan Santa-Cruz in New York, February 24, 1961, CHM Interviews, February 24, 1961, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 35, folder 287.

⁶⁰² CMH's interviews with Solon Barraclough, January 10, 1961, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, box 46, 1960-1961, Charles Hardin Diaries.

Tennessee and could prove successful in Chile.⁶⁰³ Barraclough had worked with John Black on a model for increasing farm productivity on a 20,000-acre cotton plantation in West Tennessee in which black tenants farmers realized greater productivity and income when the plantation was divided into a number of smaller farms. They were successful in increasing both productivity and income using his farm management method. Though Black's model was radical for its time and place when implemented in Tennessee, it fit within the ideological parameters of a capitalist development model. The Black model retained the fundamental belief in private property and individualism by utilizing private lots to bring about increased productivity. Barraclough informed Hardin that the Ministry of Agriculture in Santiago was "committed to trying this farm management approach," and Hardin thought this approach might yield significant results in Chile. However, in talks with FAO about cooperation on this type of extension project, Hardin stressed the Foundation's reluctance to become involved so directly in highly controversial policy questions."⁶⁰⁴

The Rockefeller Foundation preferred to stick with what it knew best, funding research centers and technical aspects of the Green Revolution. For extension projects they let other aid organizations take the lead, and by the mid-1960s a host of new organizations were interested. Specifically, in 1963 the Ford Foundation sent a three man team from University of Minnesota to evaluate the principle experiment stations of the new Research Institute. The Minnesota team pointed to agricultural extension and education as the most needed area. In 1964 Ford would begin its support of agricultural extension and education through grants to the University of Minnesota for consultants and fellows to train Chilean agricultural extension leaders. Additionally, the University of California sent a team to evaluate a large cooperative program with the government of Chile. In 1965 a *Convenio*, or cooperative

⁶⁰³ Charles Hardin interview with Solon Barraclough, January 10, 1961, RAC, RF, RG 12.1, Box 46, 1960-1961. John D. Black was an agricultural economist and New Dealer. He was one of the authors of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.

⁶⁰⁴ Charles Hardin interview with Hernan Santa-Cruz of FAO, February, 24, 1961, New York City, RAC. RF. RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 35, folder 287, p. 2.

agreement, between the University of California-Davis and the Government of Chile was established to provide for UC-Davis personnel to work in Chile and Chilean graduate students to train at UC-Davis. The Ford Foundation also provided funding for much of this *Convenio*.

This increase in attention was directly associated with support for the party that U.S. reformers saw as the best hope for avoiding a Cuban style revolution, the Christian Democrats.⁶⁰⁵ The change that Barraclough predicted began in 1964, when the center-left Christian Democrats under Eduardo Frei won the election with an outright majority, providing a popular mandate for land reform to proceed. Frei's election marked a dramatic increase in aid to Chilean agriculture by North American reformers. In addition to a significant amount of new development aid, the Frei government committed to actually implement land reform, though not of the most radical type that many on the far left wished for. The foundations expressed approval of Frei's win mixed with some relief given the possibility of a Socialist victory. At Rockefeller, one officer remarked, "We were all very pleased of course by the outcome of the election...Now that the political area is cleared, we should move forward as quickly as possible to crystallize our plans for future activities in Chile."⁶⁰⁶

Land reform too was moving quickly. In 1967 the government passed the Agrarian Reform Law with the purpose of breaking up the largest and most unproductive estates through expropriation, redistributing the land to 100,000 peasant families.⁶⁰⁷ A new law in 1967 also made it easier for peasants to unionize, and under the Christian Democrats peasant began organizing (often assisted by radical urban groups). The Agrarian Law provided for a period of *asentamiento*, or a period of legal transition in which CORA administrators and peasant committees would manage the land until new title of ownership were granted. Land reform under the Christian Democrats was predominately top down reform in which the

⁶⁰⁵ for this view see Gross, *The Last, Best Hope: Eduardo Frei and Chilean Democracy*

⁶⁰⁶ letter to Joseph Rupert from SD, September 14, 1964, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 2, folder 9.

⁶⁰⁷ For a discussion of land reform under the Frei administration see Robert Kaufman, *The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950-1970*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, or as a comparison with Allende's reform see Peter Winn and Cristobal Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural Revolution in Allende's Chile," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 6:1 (May, 1974), pp. 135-159,

pace and direction of change was supposed to be managed by the government. In addition, the Christen Democrats often yielded to political opposition by allowing the landowners the right to select the best land to keep and by allowing the removal of all farm machinery and equipment from the farms, therefore de-capitalizing the expropriated land.⁶⁰⁸ By 1969 less than one third of Chile's *latifundios* had been broken up, and the *asentamiento* system was criticized by both right and left.⁶⁰⁹ State credits and technical aid had assisted the better off farmers but did little to impact the rest. According to historians Peter Winn and Cristobal Kay, "the Christian Democrat agrarian reform improved the situation of the agro-capitalists and wealthier peasants, but did little for the poorer strata...who remained unorganized, unassisted and unemployed."⁶¹⁰ This seemed to be a recurring problem with the type of agricultural modernization pushed by North American reformers. Like in Colombia, the poorest farmers and the landless farmers saw their status unchanged or worsened by state led modernization.

In many ways there were two parallel efforts to reform agriculture in Chile, one emanating from the land reform law (managed by CORA) and the other emanating from technical assistance. There were many manifestations of the technical assistance sector including experimental stations and the Chile-California *Convenio*, the foundation supported cooperative agreement which focused on research and extension work. While these sectors occasionally crossed, as in the case of INIA, they often worked on independent tracks. For example, according to the head of CORA from 1964-19970, Rafael Moreno, the Chile-California *Convenio* "was marginal in the Reform Sector. They worked rather in the farms that were not expropriated."⁶¹¹ In their examination of agricultural reform in Chile during the Frei administration, scholars Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerdaun and Theodore Mesmer recognized this disconnect:

⁶⁰⁸ Winn and Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural Revolution in Allende's Chile," p. 138.

⁶⁰⁹ Left-wing critics of the asenamientos charged that it was too paternalistic and state led and had the effect of re-creating the latifundio system. See Winn and Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural Revolution."

⁶¹⁰ Ibid. p. 138.

⁶¹¹ Interview with Rafael Moreno, March 17, 1995, cited in Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerdaun and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, Friends of the Alliance for Progress, 2008, p. 110.

What is perhaps most remarkable in the treatment of agriculture by Chile's Christian Democratic Government is that these two stands-land reform and modernization of research and service capabilities-moved on parallel, but largely independent, tracks, with the first getting increasingly intermingled with political goals and processes in its implementation by CORA, while the second proceeded through technical exchanges, foreign training, university reorganization and other technocratic elements. *The officials involved were largely different, and were not strongly coordinated from above.*⁶¹²

This disconnect also reflected the different visions for change advocated by the various sectors of Chilean society. Some saw the structural problems as insurmountable and therefore pushed land reform as the necessary solution. Others, hopeful that a technical solution could ameliorate the problems of land tenure, pushed for the type of solution advocated by foundations and U.S. AID.

During the second half of the 1960s politics in Chile was changing more rapidly than the foundations anticipated, and the tensions between these two different visions were escalating. Despite the initial optimism over what the Christian Democrats could achieve, Rockefeller very quickly became disillusioned with their reform projects in Chile. The growing voice of the left in Chilean politics meant that foreign agencies found themselves on the defensive, not just from discontented students or opponents of the government as in Colombia, but from government officials themselves. Tensions mounted after 1965 when word of a U.S. government backed social science project aimed at devising a model to predict and influence social change in developing countries got out and Chilean papers began running the story. Although Chile was not one of the countries Project Camelot was focused on, the idea that the U.S. government (and the military at that) had initiated such a plan provoke widespread condemnation, even among those considered to be U.S. allies. Since the foundations were heavily involved in the social sciences by this time, they became suspect as well. The criticism of foreign agencies in Chile was growing, and Rockefeller noted a "general undercurrent of resentment against foreign

⁶¹² Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerdau and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, Friends of the Alliance for Progress, 2008, p. 30.

experts who have been advising Chile so generally since the war."⁶¹³ This atmosphere troubled Rockefeller much more than Ford, and by 1968 they were making plans to withdraw from their agreement with the government for cooperation in agriculture.⁶¹⁴ Ford was dismayed at Rockefeller's exit, not because the radicalization of politics did not worry them too, but rather because they were losing a valuable partner at a time when they still felt they could impact the direction of change. Despite the difficulties and the diminishing influence of the foundation on government policy, Ford remained engaged in Chilean agriculture until the 1973 coup. The radicalization of politics leading up the 1970s elections and the victory of Allende's *Unidad Popular* were a major obstacle to the type of evolutionary policies the foundations sought. Rockefeller had feared this since 1966, and their exit before the elections reflected their more conservative (i.e. risk averse) nature compared to the newcomer, Ford.⁶¹⁵ Ford was willing to work with the more moderate wing of the Allende government, funding scholars who were considered more radical and earning Ford the reputation of being radical among more conservative Chileans.

When Allende's *Unidad Popular* party won the 1970 elections the country embarked on a much more radical solution to agricultural problems. Allende's victory was tempered by the fact that he still had to work with the legislature, which was dominated by the opposition. Given this opposition, the Allende government decided to proceed with its more radical agrarian reform agenda utilizing the existing reform law of 1967 rather than try to pass a new law. The government nationalized the marketing, credit, and supply of agricultural inputs in order to more equally distribute the gains of new technology. Allende's agrarian reform also entailed empowering the peasants, not in the paternal way

⁶¹³ KW interview, September 21-25, 1968, Santiago, Chile, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 8, folder 48.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ One of the major frustrations Rockefeller had in Chile was trying to get the Congress to give the foundations a special tax status as a non-profit that would exempt them from paying taxes. The legislation was tied up in Congress for years and Rockefeller was critical of Ford for continuing to pay taxes to the Chilean government for assisting them. See KWT Interviews, Trip to Chile, November 17-19, 1969, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 8, folder 49.

that Frei's government had envisioned, but in a way that made the peasants a powerful political force.⁶¹⁶

While the government stretched the 1967 law to its limits by authorizing new government actions, the rural sector began taking action on its own in an effort to speed the process of redistribution, sometimes with only tacit approval from the Allende government.⁶¹⁷ Many peasant communities began the seizure of farms, or *tomas*, before the official expropriation was initiated. These actions were aimed at accelerating the reform and pressuring the landholders into agreeing to the government's offer.

Thus, the Allende government, restricted in its legal actions by the opposition led Congress, was also being confronted by a faction of its coalition that was moving extra judicially to enact reform. The impact on the agricultural sector was not surprisingly very chaotic. While the Frei administration's land reform policy privileged efficient production over equality (the moderate road to reform championed by the foundations), the focus of Allende's land reform policy was redistribution and ending the *latifundia* system.⁶¹⁸ However by 1971, the government realized it needed to combat falling productivity even before the land reform was complete due to the macroeconomic impact of increasing food imports. Allende's short tenure as president makes it difficult to fully assess the impact of land reform instituted during his administration. One thing is for certain, the *latifundia* system had ended, but the cost was a strong reactionary coup that toppled Chilean democracy for two decades.

It was perhaps this coup that ushered in the type of agricultural modernization ultimately envisioned by the U.S. government and the foundations: one based on the integration of Chilean agricultural into the global capitalist system based on comparative advantage and the rise of agribusiness. There is a good argument to be made that this change was largely underway during the

⁶¹⁶ Winn and Kay, "Agrarian Reform."

⁶¹⁷ for a discussion of this process see Kyle Steenland, *Agrarian Reform Under Allende: Peasant Revolt in the South*, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977, and for a discussion of how urban groups were doing the same see Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986,

⁶¹⁸ Winn and Kay, "Agrarian Reform."

Frei administration.⁶¹⁹ At the same time foundation projects were trying to increase food production for domestic consumption, other projects, most notably the Ford funded Chile-California Convenio, had already begun examining what products Chile could grow for export under the principles of comparative advantage. And of course, it was the land reform of the 1960s that laid the foundation for this integration. However, the military government under Augusto Pinochet sought an immediate application of the neo-liberal model on many aspects of the Chilean economy after taking power in 1973.⁶²⁰ Where agriculture was concerned, the Pinochet regime moved to end the land reform process, arguing the rationale for reform-getting rid of large unproductive estates- had been accomplished and no more expropriation was needed. In addition, arguing many of the expropriations were illegal, the military government returned approximately forty percent of the land that had been expropriated between 1965 and 1973 to its previous owner or to an agency that sold it on the private market. This made large landholder once again dominant in the agricultural sector.

While the government drastically cut state aid to agriculture, in order to encourage productivity increases the government lowered tariffs on imported "inputs" and cut labor costs through repression of peasant organizing. Government assistance for credit to farmers and technical assistance (extension) was cut deeply, especially after 1976, and funding for agricultural research took an equally hard hit as part of the general austerity program. Just as the foundations found themselves reacting to the pace and direction of Chilean politics in the late 1960s, they could also do nothing to influence the pace and

⁶¹⁹ For the crucial role of the Frei administration in creating the foundation for the fruit export industry boom see Lovell S. Jarvis, "Changing Private and Public Roles in Technological Development: Lessons from the Chilean Fruit Sector," in Jock Anderson, ed., *Agricultural Technology: Current Policy Issues for the International Community*, (Wallingford: CAB International, 1994). Warwick Murray also discusses the Frei administration's contribution to developing the fruit industry, probably the best example of the integration of Chilean agriculture into the global system based on comparative advantage that occurred in the Pinochet years. See "Competitive Global Fruit Export Markets: Marketing Intermediaries and Impacts on Small-Scale Growers in Chile," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 16:1, (1997), pp. 43-55.

⁶²⁰ For an examination of how the government applied the neo-liberal model to agriculture and its outcome see Lovell S. Jarvis, *Chilean Agriculture under Military Rule: From Reform to Reaction, 1972-1980*, Berkeley: University of California, 1985 or David E. Hojman, ed., *Neo-Liberal Agriculture in Rural Chile*, (New York: St. Martha's Press, 1990).

direction of change under the new military regime. Though Ford had provided much of the training for the economic team that Pinochet turned to after the coup (and the U.S. government backed the coup), Ford expressed real concerns about the level of repression under the military and eventually decided to wind down their support, including support for the very successful Chile-California Convenio.⁶²¹

Despite the significant (though not total) pull out from Chile of both Ford and Rockefeller during the Pinochet years, the seeds of the Green Revolution had been planted and the incorporation of Chilean agriculture into a global agricultural structure proceeded, as it had in Colombia, even after programs were ended. Here too we see the impact of the comprehensive approach and how projects in university reform and the social sciences reinforced efforts to modernize agriculture. Efforts to “diversify” economics training in Chile would inform efforts to transform Chilean agriculture into pockets of technology intensive production for export markets. In Chile, this integration took its fullest form in the fruit industry. One of the widely touted success stories of technical assistance to Chile, the fruit industry saw spectacular growth during the mid-seventies and continues to be a major export product. This success is usually credited to the Chile-California Convenio. Under the Frei administration, scientists working under foundation fellowships, dubbed the "Davis Boys" began developing the fruit industry as an export product to wealthier nations.⁶²² These scientists, mostly professors at Chilean universities, helped farmers identify Californian fruit types that might grow well in Chile. This type of export oriented integration, based on comparative advantage, was exactly what Chicago economist and advisor to both foundations and the U.S. government T.W. Schultz promoted. Schultz thought "the potential gains from the promotion of agricultural exports such as processed fruit from Latin America to the industrialized

⁶²¹ Peter D. Bell, Review of the Foundation's Programs in Chile and Staff Deployment for the Southern Cone, April 1, 1974, FFA, Staff and Consultant Reports 008957.

⁶²² In 1962 the National Development Corporation (CORFO) began working on a national fruit plan. For the role of the government in the early stages see Lovell S. Jarvis, "Changing Private and Public Roles in Technological Development: Lessons from the Chilean Fruit Sector," The name "Davis Boys" is a reference to the University of Catholic's "Chicago Boys," a group of economists trained in the neo-liberal model at University of Chicago. The "Davis Boys" were trained at University of California-Davis, Kathleen Holder, "The UC Davis-Chile connection: A relationship founded in fruit production branches out," *UC Davis Magazine*, April, 21, 2005.

countries" offered a practical solution to some of Latin America's agricultural problems.⁶²³ According to proponents of an export-led agricultural policy, "The fundamental objective of this system" would be "increasing specialization that could be translated into rapid increase in production and a reduction of prices to the benefit of Latin American consumers, as well as better possibilities for exportation of such products, and as a more immediate result, into increased substitution of imports from extra regional countries."⁶²⁴

The success of the Chilean fruit industry seemed to validate the promotion of export led growth, yet a closer examination reveals how it also opened up the fruit industry to domination by foreign capital and exacerbated, rather than solved, the problem of the small farmer due to the increasing concentration of the industry in the hands of agribusiness.⁶²⁵ The fruit export industry experienced phenomenal growth from 1974 to the early 1990s, however, a gradual leveling of the growth as markets saturated and competition increased left the small farmer, encouraged to convert their holdings to fruit production in the 1980s, in a precarious position. Increased debt forced some to sell their land, but many others simply found themselves indebted to multinational and national export marketing companies that then dictated the terms of their farming.⁶²⁶ With the leveling of the fruit sector in the 1990s the government launched a program to help farmers "reconvert", or transition to the most efficient crop

⁶²³ Memorandum of Conversation, Summit Meeting, May 21, 1966, p. 3, LBJ Library, National Security Files, CF, LA, Box 3, folder OAS Summit Meeting, April 1967, Chronology 4/1/99-3/15/67, tabs 1-15.

⁶²⁴ "Ideas on Social and Economist Matters for the Meeting of Chiefs of States," taken from a meeting of advisors to the Committee on Preparations for the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Washington D.C., December 1966, p. 21, LBJ Library, Papers of LBJ, NSF, NS Council Historians, OASS Meeting, April 1967, Box 12, folder OAS Summit Meeting 1967.

⁶²⁵ For an examination of the Fruit Sector and its impact see Cristóbal Kay, "Globalization, Peasant Agriculture and Reconversion," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 16:1, Lovell S. Jarvis, "Changing Private and Public Roles in Technological Development: Lessons from the Chilean Fruit Sector," in Jock Anderson, ed., *Agricultural Technology: Current Policy Issues for the International Community*, (Wallingford: CAB International, 1994) and Warwick E. Murray, "Competitive Global Fruit Export Markets: Marketing Intermediaries and Impacts on Small-Scale Growers in Chile," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 16:1, (1997), pp. 43-55.

⁶²⁶ Most small growers were offered credit during the boom years creating lots of debt, but later credit became much harder to get for small farmers. This process appears to represent a new type of debt-peonage.

given the global market. However, a few scholars have noted that the government's policy discriminated against *minifundia* in a number of ways, creating, ironically a "*minifundia* problem."⁶²⁷

In Chile, as in Colombia, the tensions between creating a modern agricultural system that privileged large agribusiness and simultaneously trying to improve the lot of peasant farmers, who still represent a significant percentage of the rural sector, appear to be the Pandora's Box few North American reformers considered.⁶²⁸ Yet, before this problem was fully in focus, the foundations were constructing the foundations of an international agricultural system that would do for the rest of the developing world what the Green Revolution had done for Latin America.

Creating an International System of Agriculture

From the beginning the foundations had envisioned agricultural modernization projects as bigger than any one country. Officials at Rockefeller envisioned "that the operations in Mexico and later Colombia and Chile should ultimately result in benefits which were in no wise (sic) limited by political boundaries."⁶²⁹ Their Operating Program budget proposal for 1959 acknowledged that the projects they had in Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and India "are in fact the elements of a single international program designed to improve basic food crops and at the same time strengthen education, research, and extension in the areas concerned."⁶³⁰ Ford officers, too, saw the projects they undertook as being catalysts for global change, remarking they needed "progressively greater concentration on Latin

⁶²⁷ Cristóbal Kay, "Globalization, Peasant Agriculture and Reconversion," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 16:1, p. 21.

⁶²⁸ Although I would argue the Green Revolution was at its core a transnationalization of agriculture, for a discussion of how the transnationalization agriculture in the developing world has eroded the gains of the Green Revolution see Meera Nanda, "Transnationalization of Third World State and Undoing of Green Revolution," *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 28, 1995.

⁶²⁹ "Overview: Operating Program in Agriculture," RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 311, Box 1, folder 1, p.581017.

⁶³⁰ "Operating Program in Agriculture," RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 309, Box 1, folder 1, p. 581009.

American institutions than can achieve world standards" and needed to "help these institutions to reach out elsewhere in Latin America and elsewhere in the world."⁶³¹

No sooner had projects begun in individual countries in Latin America when the foundations began plans to make it global. The Mexican Agricultural Project was the beginning of what would become a series of agricultural research centers under a centralized international advisory board called the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR). The first of these regional research centers, the Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT), formed out of the MAP program in 1963 and was devoted to research on maize and wheat. This same model was followed in Colombia, when out of their efforts to modernize the agricultural sector the Colombian government, and three U.S. foundations (Rockefeller, Ford, and Kellogg) created the Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) in 1967. According to a Ford Foundation report, these two institutes, CIMMYT and CIAT, would form foundation "hubs" for agricultural activities in Latin America and would "influence investments by other agencies, especially the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International Development, the United Nations Special Fund, and the World Bank."⁶³² Ford's agricultural division felt the existence of these centers was crucial to the success of increasing global food production, writing to Ford's president in support of creating CIAT, "We are strongly persuaded that, if such centers were not to exist in Latin America, the productivity of individual nations' efforts and of our own and other agencies' inputs would continue to be too small to meet needs and demands for food."⁶³³

Though the eventual goal for these centers was financial independence from the foundations, both the Ford Foundation and especially the Rockefeller Foundation felt that foundation

⁶³¹ Harry Wilhelm, Agenda for Discussion with Mr. David Bell, September 15, 1966, FFA, Papers of Harry Wilhelm, box 8, folder 104.

⁶³² memo to McGeorge Bundy from Harry Wilhelm, "Agricultural Research and Training Centers in Latin America, October 4, 1966, p. 2, FFA, McGeorge Bundy Papers, 26-684.

⁶³³ Ibid.

control over these centers was important to their initial success, and they of course could demand this given their financial backing. Both foundations would have a representative on the board of trustees for each center and "control would be exercised through annual budget negotiations among the two foundations and the director of each center."⁶³⁴ CIAT was up and running in 1967 and would serve as a national and regional research center. When international aid agencies convened for a conference on Agricultural development in 1969, these international research institutions were the center point of the plan to create a global agricultural structure, providing "a major shortcut in developing improved technologies and training of people which will fill the gap while national institutions and programs are being established and strengthened."⁶³⁵ These research centers were also important for disseminating the ideological paradigm that defined agricultural problems as problems of production that could be best addressed through science, not politics.⁶³⁶

By 1970 Ford and Rockefeller had established four regional research centers around the world (CIMMYT, CIAT, and two others located in Nigeria and the Philippines) designed to be "four complementary centers of a world-wide interlocking network of research, training, and agricultural development."⁶³⁷ Both foundations wanted to create more but lacked the financial resources to do so. To avoid the expense of creating more centers, the foundations created an advisory board that would oversee the creation of similar research centers with money from a wide range of donors.⁶³⁸ In 1971 at the behest of the foundations the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) along with other multinational development organizations formed CGIAR and a 13 person Advisory Committee (TAC).

⁶³⁴ Ibid., p. 3

⁶³⁵ Summary, Conference on Agricultural Development- Villa Serbelloni, April, 23-25, 1969, p. 2, FFA, Papers of David Bell, 30-741.

⁶³⁶ On this subject see Bruce H. Jennings, *Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) and Edmund Kazuso Oasa, "The International Rice Research Institute and the Green Revolution: A Case Study on the Politics of Agricultural Research, PhD Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1981, 8122485.

⁶³⁷ Information Memorandum on The International Agricultural Research Institutes, FFA, David Bell Papers, 26-688, p. 11.

⁶³⁸ for a brief history of CGIAR see Donald L. Plucknett and Nigel J.H. Smith, "Agricultural Research and Third World Food Production," *Science*, Vol. 217, 16 (July 1982).

Thus, the international structure to promote the productivity model was in place. Furthermore, the research driven foundation of this international system and the productivity model's reliance on technology ensured a new form of dependency for developing nations, one that was created and managed by international aid agencies.⁶³⁹

Conclusion

Exporting MAP's success to Colombia then was not just about modernizing Colombian agriculture as part of overall reform efforts, though this was an important goal. Just as important, Colombia was to be a regional leader that promoted the productivity model of agricultural modernization and provided assistance to other countries. Similarly, the plan to spread the Green Revolution to Chile had as its goal more than the stabilization of the economy and political situation in Chile. Chile was to complete the system of regional research centers that were going to guide the Green Revolution in Latin America. However, just as the structure of an international agricultural system was forming, the second phase of the Green Revolution began to reveal the limitations of the productivity model as a panacea for development problems. The relatively easy transition from small farms to large agribusiness that occurred in the United States did not materialize in Latin America. The inability of the Green Revolution to solve the agrarian problem and the marginalization of small farmers in the global agricultural system continued to be a key development problem into the new century.

North American reformers saw the development of agriculture, and in particular the development of large scale, technology intensive agricultural production as essential to the modernization process. A modern agrarian sector was supposed to spur industrial growth, much like it did in the United States. The U.S. government and foundation officials worked very closely with one another in this area, as exemplified in the Chile-California *Convenio* and numerous other projects that

⁶³⁹ for a discussion of the new forms of dependency created by technological change and the negative impact it has had on Latin America's global competitiveness see Manuel Castells and Roberto Laserna, "The New Dependency: Technological Change and Socioeconomic Restructuring in Latin America, *Sociological Forum*, 4:4 (Dec. 1989), pp. 535-560.

involved a host of USAID personnel, foundation fellows and North American university personnel. Other reforms, such as university reform and the building of the disciplines of economics, sociology and political science laid some of the groundwork for projects in agriculture by increasing the research capacity of universities and reinforcing the role of market forces in determining agricultural output. Training a generation of agronomists who saw the problems of Latin American agriculture in scientific terms instead of political terms meant solutions to the problems would be sought with new technology and not radical land reform. Latin American scientists would also be linked to larger global agricultural institutions through their work with the regional centers in Mexico and Colombia, thus creating a network of foundation trained scientists who promoted the productivity model as a solution to the agricultural problems of the globe.

Where agricultural modernization was successful it transformed traditional modes of production into technology intensive sectors geared to export markets tied to the global economy. The uneven success of these efforts, however, left many rural regions still struggling with issues related to rural production. North American reformers, cognizant of the connection between political instability in rural areas and the growing rural populations who had been left out of the modernization process, began attacking population growth as a way of making sure the gains in other areas were not diminished by unchecked population growth. The foundations began turning more attention to the problem of population increases as an alternative approach to attacking the poverty and low productivity of the rural sectors. The next chapter will explore the link between the failures of North American reformers to adequately address the agricultural problems of Latin American and the increasing focus on the problems of population growth.

Chapter Six

Modernizing the Family: Latin America and the Global Population Control Movement

In 1968 Pope John Paul, the leader of the Catholic Church, dealt a severe blow to global organizations trying to rein in world population growth with the release of his encyclical *Humanae Vitae*, which condemned the use of artificial birth control methods. This was particularly damaging to groups in Latin America trying to reduce the explosive population growth due to the region's large Catholic population and the influence the Church had in many countries. Despite this edict, by 1974 local parish priests in the Colombian municipality of La Celia were allowing family planning advocates to broadcast messages on the parish radio station like "plan your family for the good of your home, get your contraceptives from the cafeteros."⁶⁴⁰ A few parish priests were even offering their homes as distribution points for condoms and birth control pills.⁶⁴¹ The distribution of contraceptives in rural Colombia emerged as part of the war on global population growth that sprang up quickly in the mid-nineteen sixties and was intricately related to the problems both Ford and Rockefeller were facing in their overseas development programs. Programs in university reform and agriculture would take precedence in the fifties and early sixties, but the rapidly increasing population in developing countries impacted almost every issue the foundations worked on. Population growth increased pressures on food production, social services, and the university system, and both Ford and Rockefeller began to tie failures in economic development to explosive rates of population growth. Consequently, the Foundations led the way in funding research and non-profit organizations focused on curbing global population growth and collaborated with a host of U.S. and multilateral agencies in hopes of bringing about zero population growth in underdeveloped countries.

⁶⁴⁰ "Cafeteros" refers to the local coffee growers association, Memo from Bruce Carlson to William Carmicheal, "Interim narrative and financial report, Colombian Association of Family Welfare (PROFAMILIA)," May 30, 1975, p. 6, Ford Foundation Archives, Grant Files, 72-382, reel 2688.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

Efforts to curb world population came out of longstanding fears about the impact of overpopulation on resource distribution and economic and political stability. The effects of any economic growth that could be achieved in developing nations was sure to be diminished, if not totally negated, by explosive population growth. Growing populations also strained the already deficient education and housing systems in these countries and created the conditions that bred radical revolutions. Thus, foundation and U.S. government projects aimed at curbing fertility and reducing population growth in the developing world became essential to the overall project of global reform. North American reformers saw reducing population growth as a path to development that avoided the more politically difficult issues involving redistribution of resources. In rural areas, where high fertility rates seemed to be most pronounced, introducing family planning could help avoid the mounting battles over land and calls for radical land reform. Much like their projects in university reform and agriculture, which relied on top down, scientific approaches to development, the introduction of artificial birth control to developing nations offered a non-revolutionary path to development. Due to the expected religious and political resistance in various countries, the partnership between the U.S. government and foundations in this area was based on a strategic plan to let the foundations take the lead in initiating programs in developing nations. Domestic elites in developing countries who shared similar views of modernization would prove crucial for negotiating the difficult political and religious terrain encountered by North American reformers. Ultimately, efforts to reduce population growth would be the most successful element of global reform, though this success would not necessarily translate to the larger goal of modernization.

Genesis of a Population Program

Warnings about the catastrophic effects of unchecked population growth on societies were not new to the twentieth century. In 1798 the British economist Thomas Malthus wrote *An Essay on the*

Principles of Population as it affects the Future of Society in which he argued that population growth would soon outpace food production and bring untold misery to society. Theories based on his work, more broadly known as the Malthusian Theory, continued into the 19th century and would mix with theories of natural selection and racial inferiority to form the basis of the Eugenics Movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁶⁴² The Eugenics movement, which used false science to advance the cause of white supremacy, gained traction in the United States and was advanced by supporters like Margaret Sanger, founder of Planned Parenthood. Advocates of the movement argued that it was possible to improve the quality of the population, which to most advocates meant racially purify, through breeding of those deemed mentally and physically superior and sterilization of those deemed inferior. Though many of the leaders of the Eugenics movement in the United States secured positions of influence in the post-war movement for population control, most organizations shed the earlier, overt racial arguments and used a neo-Malthusian argument centered on the impact of population growth on the economic well-being of society.

The Eugenics movement concerned itself more with the "quality" of a population than with the actual size of the population, but in the post-war years that concern would shift to the actual numbers of people inhabiting the earth, or more precisely, inhabiting the third world. Attempts by nation states to control the quality and quantity of their own population are as old as the nation state itself, but efforts at multi-continental global population control was something entirely new.⁶⁴³ This new global

⁶⁴² For a history of the Eugenics Movement see Edwin Black, *War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race*, (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows Press, 2003).

⁶⁴³ Some scholarly debate exists on the extent to which nation-states took the lead in controlling populations or whether private actors did so. For example, Mathew James Connelly challenges James C. Scott on this and argues that civil society often promoted controlling the quality and movement of populations more aggressively than the state. See Matthew James Connelly, "Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Past and Present*, 193, November, 2006, pp. 193-233. He specifically refers to *Scott's Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Connelly places the first global movement for population control during the late 19th century with the anti-immigrant movement in California and attempts to control immigration from Asia. I would argue attempts to control one's own population through "movement" policies are distinct from the global

movement was made possible in part to the field of demographics and its growing complexity that included projective and predictive techniques.⁶⁴⁴ The advancement of demography, or the study of human populations and their attributes, was crucial to the post-war shift from Eugenics to global population control. Interest in the demographics of foreign populations had been a particular interest of the British during the first half of the twentieth century due to their vast geographic empire that included disparate populations.⁶⁴⁵ Increasingly, managing colonial populations required knowing about the make-up of them. Demographics grew as a study field in the British Empire precisely because it was useful in colonial policy making.⁶⁴⁶ As the United States emerged from World War II as a global leader intent on controlling development in the third world, demography became a necessary social science in foreign policy formulation in the United States as well.

During the 1940s concern about population growth in less developed countries was largely contained within a small nucleus of demographers and activists in the Eugenics community.⁶⁴⁷ Included with their pessimistic projections of population growth in developing countries was a solution: modernization. Prominent demographer Frank Notestein wrote in 1945, "it is only when rising levels of living, improved health, increasing education, and rising hope for the future give new value to the

population movement of the post-war years that focused on controlling the population in other nations, though the two have similarities in terms of their connection to political economy.

⁶⁴⁴ Influenced by Malthus, early demography focused on the size of the population and its relationship to political economy, but demography in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century's shifted away from this as Europe and the United States saw declining fertility rates. The focus then was on understanding this transition. For a discussion of demography as it related to policy see Dennis Hodgson, "Demography as Social Science and Policy Science," *Population and Development Review*, 9:1, (March, 1983).

⁶⁴⁵ For a discussion of the field of demographics as it related to British and French colonial policy see Karl Ittmann, Dennis D. Cordell, and Gregory Maddox, Eds, *The Demographics of Empire: The Colonial Order and the Creation of Knowledge*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010)

⁶⁴⁶ See Karl Ittmann, "Demography as Policy Science in the British Empire, 1918-1969," in *The Journal of Policy History*, 15:4, 2003, pp. 417-448.

⁶⁴⁷ Probably the most influential scientist in these early years was Frank Notestein. As head of the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, Notestein had both the technical skills and the political contacts to use demographic data to persuade government agencies to begin population research.

individual life that old customs break and fertility comes under control."⁶⁴⁸ For this to happen Notestein recommended a "complete and integrated program of modernization."⁶⁴⁹ By the 1950s the issue of population growth was emerging as a serious foreign policy concern within the U.S. government, largely due to being pushed by private organizations who were receiving assistance from Ford and Rockefeller. The publication of two influential books in 1948, Fairfield Osborn's *Our Plundered Earth* and William Vogt's *Road to Survival* highlighted the environmental impact of global population growth and influenced a growing number of people in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. The issue made its way into discussions of foreign policy in 1958 when President Dwight Eisenhower established a committee to review foreign assistance. Eisenhower made a former military officer and businessman, General William H. Draper Jr., head of the committee charged with evaluating the military assistance program and making recommendations. Draper, a staunch advocate of population control, pushed the committee to include in the final report recommendations that the United States involve itself in global population control through assisting countries with establishing "maternal and child welfare" programs aimed at coping with overpopulation.⁶⁵⁰ Eisenhower ultimately repudiated the report's recommendations on this matter (more for political reasons than out of lack of sympathy for its aims), and the United States put the issue on the backburner.

While many individuals in the U.S. government saw a need to curb population growth, including President Kennedy, in the early 1960s policy makers were not convinced it was an area the U.S. government could get involved least they leave themselves open to charges of racism and imperialism aimed at controlling the population of non-white regions of the world. In addition to resistance from nationalists groups, advocating birth control would heighten tensions with the Catholic Church who still

⁶⁴⁸ Frank W. Notestein, "Population- the long view," in Theodore Schultz, Ed., *Food for the World*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945).

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ Draper would go on to be very influential in U.S. population policy in foreign countries and would push to get USAID to begin funding population research in 1963 and birth control in 1967. See Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *The World Population Crisis and the United States Response*, (New York: Praeger, 1973).

held significant cultural influence in regions like Latin America. Instead of venturing into this themselves, the United States initially encouraged the Ford and Rockefeller to make it a priority.⁶⁵¹ Due to the sensitive nature of contraceptive use, Eisenhower and Kennedy specifically avoided getting the U.S. government involved in the movement in any direct way, encouraging the foundations instead to open the doors. The Rockefeller and Ford foundations rose to the challenge and would create a "population control establishment" to direct activities until such time the U.S. government could support the movement.⁶⁵² Recognizing the unique role private organizations play in advancing global reform a Ford Foundation evaluation notes, "The non-governmental, non-political *posture* of the foundation exempts it in a significant degree from prevalent 'anti-Yankee suspicion' and enables it to work in areas that may be closed off to other agencies."⁶⁵³ The "population establishment" would include not just the two foundations, but a number of private organizations that received a large part of their funding from Ford and Rockefeller including the Population Council (PC) and The International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). Both the PC and the IPPF were created in 1952 and would be the most visible face of the global population movement in developing countries, acting as intermediaries for foundation and U.S. government money, and sometimes obscuring the extent of foundation and government activity in the field.

The global population control movement of the sixties and early seventies contained within it numerous influences and strains of thought, often contradictory, which resulted in a variety of

⁶⁵¹ Piotrow, *The World Population Crisis and the United States Response*.

⁶⁵² Matthew James Connelly states "population control was not, therefore, the quintessential state-building project, but a transnational social movement." In stating this, Connelly wants scholars to see the movement as involving complex interactions between those in the U.S. and likeminded individuals in other countries who "tended to share both a sense of belonging to a 'world population'-albeit the small, conscious part of it- and a determination to remake their own societies." One of my aims in this chapter is to show how Latin Americans collaborated in this movement and through both cooperation and opposition appropriated the movement for their own agenda. Connelly, *Seeing Beyond the State*, pp.232.

⁶⁵³ emphasis added to highlight how Ford's posture (how they tried to present themselves) was a-political, but their actual nature was not. Overseas Development Program: Evaluation 1951-1961, December 1961, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 008897.

approaches to limiting population growth in the developing world. Racial and class-based justifications coming out of the Eugenics movement certainly remained within the post-war movement, specifically with Frank Osborn as vice president of the Population Council and William Draper's influential advisory role within the U.S. government. Both men had strong ties to the Eugenics movement.⁶⁵⁴ There were also the Neo-Malthusian adherents, represented most within Ford and Rockefeller and in popularized "dooms-day" books like Paul Erlich's *The Population Bomb*, that focused more on the link between overpopulation and political economy and economic development. Finally, the emerging feminist movement began to frame the population issue as a woman's rights issue and, especially in the 1970s, wanted the population issue broadened to include maternal health, children's health, and reproductive rights.⁶⁵⁵ Feminists argued that the population control movement was too narrowly defined by the issue of access to birth control, and simply providing contraceptives to poor women was not an adequate solution. This position was best articulated by demographer Judith Blake in an article that appeared in the journal *Science* in 1969⁶⁵⁶. Though Blake was speaking about federal population policies in the United States, her critique of the "population establishment" would become a familiar one on the international scene as the second feminist wave emerged in the 1970s.

Remarking on the uneasy coalition of groups pursuing population control, scholar Victoria Lynn Black notes, "Heterogeneous and at odds with each other, population experts agreed on little except that women deserved access to contraceptives."⁶⁵⁷ These three strains of thought sometimes overlapped, other times conflicted, and ironically produced programs that both empowered women to

⁶⁵⁴ For Osborn's role and the role of the Draper family see Black, *War Against the Weak*.

⁶⁵⁵ See Sonia Corrêa, in collaboration with Rebecca Reichmann, *Population and Reproductive Rights: Feminist Perspectives from the South*, (London: Zed Books, 1994). Many countries in Latin America began addressing the issue not because of the need to expand rights for women, but because the abortion rate had reached epidemic proportions, which implies a more traditional religious justification for action aimed at population growth.

⁶⁵⁶ See Judith Blake, "Population Policy for Americans: Is the Government Being Misled?", *Science*, New Series, 1:3879 (May 2, 1969), pp. 522-529.

⁶⁵⁷ Victoria Lynn Black, "Taking Care of Baby: Chilean State Making, International Relations, and the Gendered Body Politic, 1912-1970," PhD Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2002, p.288.

take control over their fertility and also involved the state exercising control over women's sexuality and fertility. The coercive nature of many of the programs developed under the auspices of the global population movement and conducted with foundation money led to many abuses including sterilizations without consent.⁶⁵⁸ To physicians and others in the global population movement, the need to quickly tame population growth in developing countries far outweighed the possible dangers of methods used.⁶⁵⁹ Proponents of population control cited the justification that the dangers of overpopulation and excessive childbirth outweighed the risks of the procedure.⁶⁶⁰ Coercive tactics were sometimes present even in the programs that stressed individual choice, reflecting the complexities of the nexus in which the global population control movement, domestic proponents of family planning, and women's rights issues coexisted.⁶⁶¹

The Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in population related activities began when Eugenics was still considered a legitimate science and the foundation supported the research of numerous academics and scientists involved in the Eugenics movement. In the early 1950s, however, the trustees at Rockefeller shied away from initiating a full blown population control program arguing it was too controversial. Due to the reluctance of the trustees, John. D. Rockefeller personally took the initiative and founded the Population Council, an organization that would become a major player in the movement. The Rockefeller Foundation would begin making sizable grants to the Population Council

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Judith Nagelberg, "Promoting Population Policy: The Activities of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Population Council, 1959-1966," PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1985.

⁶⁶⁰ See Black, "Taking Care of Baby."

⁶⁶¹ For example, in a joint program between PROFAMILIA and the Colombian government to provide milk to new mothers the benefits went only to those agreeing to use contraceptives. See interview with PROFAMILIA worker Amapri Sanchez recounting her work in the 1970s, Tina Rosenberg, "Winning the Trojan War; what Ultra-Catholic third worlders can teach America about contraception," *Washington Monthly*, July/August, 1991.

before establishing their own population program in 1963 justified by "the evidence that current rates of population increase constitutes one of the more serious hazards to the welfare of mankind."⁶⁶²

The impetus to establish a program in population came out of the realization that population growth threatened the success of other areas they were working in. The connection between population growth and development would be a constant theme in justifying projects in population control. Linking population growth to agriculture a Rockefeller report noted, "The marked increase in food production achieved over the past twenty years has been outstripped and exceeded by population growth in many regions of the world."⁶⁶³ Rockefeller preferred, however to work behind the scenes funding research in demography, reproductive biology, and the development of better contraceptive devices. Rockefeller's less visible presence in population programs in Latin America reflected their focus on research and their decision not to have a field operating program. The foundation generally believed it was "unwise to exaggerate[the] foreign presence in this area."⁶⁶⁴ With nationalists sentiments on the rise, foreign involvement in population control could be (and was) construed by opponents as a racist project to check the growth of the non-white population of the world. Likewise, the low profile of U.S. government agencies with regard to population programs during the early to mid-sixties reflected a realization they would face major resistance from Latin American nationalists and critics of U.S. policy in the region. This was especially true after the U.S. military project known as Camelot (Simpatico in Colombia) was revealed and there was increased scrutiny of U.S. government and foundation activity.

The Ford Foundation jumped into the population control movement sooner and more aggressively than Rockefeller or the U.S. government. They began assistance to the Indian government in 1952 just after they emerged as a global player in development aid. Soon they too made the

⁶⁶² "The Population Problem," Excerpts from 12/1963 Report to Trustees, p. 11, RAC, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 57, folder 312.

⁶⁶³ "2nd Interim Report," 1973, Section I, A Brief History, RAC, RF, 3.2, Series 900, Box 30, folder 162.

⁶⁶⁴ Report: Population Program, p. 2, RAC,RF, Record Group 3.2, series 900, box 57, folder 311A.

connection between population growth and modernization. A 1962 Ford Foundation report noted, "The one constant retarding factor in all schemes for the economic and social development of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, is the explosive rate of population increase."⁶⁶⁵ Thus when Ford began population work in Latin America in 1962 the concerns Malthus warned about in 1798 were still alive and drove foundation thinking on population issues. Ford Foundation officer Lyle Sanders' comments at a planning session for population projects in 1965 echoed the 1798 prediction of a demographic catastrophe:

"The alarming growth of world population continues, and there is nothing in sight that gives much promise of slowing it down..Rapid population growth is new in human history and cannot be long continued. No one knows when it will stop or what the human condition , the quality of life, will be when it stops. But we can be certain that it will stop, either by conscious deliberate human effort or through the inexorable and probably unpleasant operation of natural physical and biological laws."⁶⁶⁶

While the United State government did eventually begin a major expansion of its population control program, in the early sixties they were treading carefully in an area that was full of nationalistic and religious opposition in developing countries. A CIA survey of Latin America in 1964 blames population growth for the economic ills of Latin America noting, "At the root of all these issues is an annual population increase averaging about 3% for the area, a rate which limits per capita growth. Powerful religious and political considerations combined with the poverty and backwardness of large segments of the population prevent facing up to this issues."⁶⁶⁷ Clearly they recognized population growth as a major problem, but, unwilling to be the face of the movement, the U.S. government looked to their partners in global reform, the foundations and multilateral organizations. They not only urged

⁶⁶⁵ "Program Submission Concerning Future Program Activities," The Ford Foundation Special Committee, Spring 1962, Ford Foundation Archives, Consultants Reports 008897, p 9.

⁶⁶⁶ Lyle Sanders, "La Ceja Seminar, 10/13/65, LS Comments at Closing Session, " Colombian Log notes, 1965, Ford Foundation Archives.

⁶⁶⁷ Memo from Ray S. Cline, Office of the Deputy Director of the CIA to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, "Survey of Latin America," April 17, 1964, p. 5, LBJ Library, Papers of LBJ, NSCF, Country File: Latin America, Box 1, folder: National Security File, Country File.

Ford and Rockefeller to begin addressing the issue, but they also prodded multilateral organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) to adopt recommendations for countries regarding population growth. A successful meeting of these groups was held in September of 1967 in which the organizations jointly called for "a new era of frank recognition by Latin American institutions and nations of the adverse effects of their high rates of population growth on their economic development and social progress and of the need for action to reduce growth rates."⁶⁶⁸ U.S. State Department official Philander Claxton noted this was "the great opportunity we have been looking for to get action started in this fundamental subject by the key institutions: OAS and CIAP."⁶⁶⁹ After 1967, when U.S. AID got the go ahead from Congress to begin spending on population contraception in developing nations (from 1963-67 they could only allocate money for research), collaboration between the foundations and the U.S. government deepened. The foundations invited State Department and U.S. government officials to their annual Bellagio Population Conference and shared ideas about future plans and areas of collaboration.⁶⁷⁰ By the late 1960s, there was a general consensus that population growth was "the number one problem facing mankind today," and that "none of the other basic problems confronting us can be resolved unless population stabilization is attained."⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶⁸ memo from Special Assistant to the Secretary Philander P. Claxton, Jr. to Secretary of the Department of State, September 19, 1967, "Recommendations of OAS-PAHO Meeting on Population in Relation to Development in Latin America, p. 1, LBJ Library, Papers of LBJ, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 10(1411), folder: McPherson International Education.

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶⁷⁰ See for example letter from John Hannah to John D. Rockefeller 3rd, May 5, 1970, NARA, Record Group 286, Office of Administration, Office of Executive Secretary, Subject Files, Box 24, folder: HLS Feb-June 1970.

⁶⁷¹ See "Personal Observations Regarding Population Conference," NARA, Record Group 286, Office of Administration, Office of Executive Secretary, Subject Files, Box 24, folder: HLS Feb-June 1970. Though these are the words of John D. Rockefeller, the shift on priorities to population programs was evident in both Ford and Rockefeller (see annual reports for general idea of the magnitude of this shift) and within USAID. In particular President Nixon's review of foreign aid, known as the Peterson Report, gives particular emphasis to population problems.

"The Malthusian Dilemma of all Colonialism"⁶⁷²

The demographic transition, a phenomenon in which a society moves from high birth rates and death rates to low birth rates and death rates, took place in the developed countries of Europe and the United States during the 19th century.⁶⁷³ This process, which usually began with lower death rates due to improvements in health and nutrition, was widely thought to occur along a relatively linear trajectory and reflect the degree of modernization of a society. Not coincidentally, the universal, linear model of modernization theory fit well with the demographic transition model as high fertility rates were viewed as reflective of a traditional society and lower fertility rates were assumed to be part of a modern nation. Family planning, a euphemism for contraceptive use, became synonymous with the modern nuclear family that could afford all the conveniences industrialization brought.⁶⁷⁴ Large, unplanned families, on the other hand, were relics of the traditional society tied to subsistence agriculture. The modernization project in Latin America that the U.S. government and the foundations pursued would not have been complete without "reforming" the fundamental unit of society- the family.

Due to the particulars of capitalist development discussed in the first chapter the demographic transition in Latin America was only just beginning in the twentieth century. Mortality rates began to decrease in the first half of the century due to improved nutrition and modern medicine (and public

⁶⁷² The phrase is used by demographer Warren Thompson to describe why colonial populations experience declining mortality rates that are not followed by declining fertility rates. See Warren Thompson, *Population and Peace in the Pacific*, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1946).

⁶⁷³ The original theory was posited by American demographer Warren Thompson in 1929. His theory argued societies went through four stages. The first was population stabilization due to high death rates and high fertility, the second was population growth due to falling mortality rates and sustain high fertility, the third was falling fertility due to industrialization and urbanization, the final stage was population stabilization due to low birth and death rates.

⁶⁷⁴ The idea of family planning is complicated by the issue of women's rights and feminism. On one hand, family planning as a right of women to control their fertility is supported by most feminists. However, family planning in the context of the global population control movement had little to do with empowering women. The promotion of the modern nuclear family abroad was more about exporting a cultural ideal that served national and international purposes. For a wonderful discussion of family planning films created by IPPF and USAID used in Latin America see Jadwiga E Pieper, "From Contested Duties to Disputed Rights: The Social Policies of Fertility Regulation in Chile, 1964-1989," PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2000, or her book *The Politics of Motherhood: Maternity and Women's Rights in Twentieth Century Chile*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).

health campaigns initiated by certain governments with the assistance of the Rockefeller and Kellogg foundations), but fertility rates remained high.⁶⁷⁵ This phenomenon did not deviate from the model of demographic transition, as the "transition stage" was just that- population increase due to lower death rates and sustained high fertility. Thus, by the 1950s Latin America as a region had the world's highest population growth rate at 2.8 percent a year. From here, the theory predicted, growth rates would fall as the effects of urbanization, industrialization, higher levels of education, and rising standards of living caused lower fertility rates. In fact, fertility rates did begin to decline, in an uneven fashion, beginning in the early 1960s. We may never know if this transition would have occurred "naturally" (i.e. without outside assistance) or not because it was at this very point that the global war on population growth emerged.

Development experts (backed by prominent demographers) warned that there was not time to wait for the demographic transition to happen naturally due to the strain on resources that already existed and would get worse in the coming decades.⁶⁷⁶ In addition, the factors that caused fertility decline in Europe and the United States did not appear to be developing in the same way. As early as 1946 demographers were arguing that the demographic transition appeared stunted in former colonial nations. Empires had brought a "one-sided" modernization process that reduced mortality rates in colonial countries through public health and the rationalization of agriculture, but because they did not promote industrialization fertility rates had not declined.⁶⁷⁷ Demographer Warren Thompson referred to this as "The Malthusian dilemma of colonialism."⁶⁷⁸ In Latin America, which shared with the post-war decolonized nations a colonial heritage of underdevelopment, rapid urbanization had outpaced the

⁶⁷⁵ José Miguel Guzmán, Susheela Singh, Germán Rodríguez, Edith A. Pantelides, Eds., *The Fertility Transition in Latin America*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁶⁷⁶ See for example the edited volume by David Chaplin in which a number of prominent North American population experts make the case for action, *Population Policies and Growth in Latin America*, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1971).

⁶⁷⁷ Hodgson, "Demography as Social Science and Policy Science," p. 9.

⁶⁷⁸ Thompson, *Population and Peace in the Pacific*.

capacity of industry to absorb displaced rural workers. Increases in agricultural productivity had displaced small farmers without a concurrent growth in industrial jobs. While fertility rates were generally lower in Latin American cities and income levels higher, the major cities were experiencing such high rates of growth due to migration that slowly declining fertility rates had little effect on standards of living.⁶⁷⁹ Besides, half the population was still engaged in agriculture and fertility rates in rural areas remained extremely high. Finally, as we shall see, Latin American governments generally did not see population growth in the same light. All of these factors combined to produce a lack of faith among North American development agencies in letting population growth take its "natural" course. The urgency evident in calls for university reform and agriculture was even greater when it came to population growth.

The explosive rate of population growth rate in Latin America at mid-century was linked to problems of development by Ford almost immediately after intense efforts to speed development began in the early 1960s, but the climate for promoting population control was not optimal. First, most Latin American governments were reluctant to consider any national policy directed at population reduction and many intellectuals and politicians did not accept the argument that population growth and economic growth were inversely related. Some countries, including Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, supported pro-natalist policies arguing that a strong nation and a robust economy needs a large population to sustain itself.⁶⁸⁰ Behind much of this resistance lay a nationalistic and anti-imperialistic rhetoric that critiqued foreign intervention in national affairs. Still, many elites in Latin America recognized the problem with population growth and agreed that action was needed. It would be these elites that the foundations would seek to partner with and overcome nationalist resistance.

⁶⁷⁹ J. Mayone Stycos, *Human Fertility in Latin America: Sociological Perspectives*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968.) For a general discussion of urbanization in Latin America see Jorge Hardoy, ed., *Urbanization in Latin America: Approaches and Issues*, (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975).

⁶⁸⁰ Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth*.

Second, contraceptive use was a sensitive topic, especially given the dominance of Catholicism in Latin America, and talk of family planning sparked varying degrees of opposition from conservative groups and especially the Church hierarchy. The relationship between Church and State in each country helped determine the outcome, but so too did the changes within the Church. The Catholic Church during these decades was experiencing a growing divide between the traditional conservative wing and a new, progressive wing that was more receptive to the idea of birth control. In the 1960s a radical theological movement within the Church, known as Liberation Theology, had gained traction across the region. Liberation Theology represented a stark departure from the Catholic Church's traditional stance on social and economic matters in Latin America. The movement's belief that the Church and its followers had a duty to redress economic inequality through a "preferential option for the poor" made the acceptance of birth control programs in poor rural areas or crowded urban ghettos much easier for local, parish priests and some higher officials. This new progressive wing of the Church meant there were openings for mutual understanding with regard to family planning in some regions. Still, the official word came from the Church hierarchy, which due to the Vatican's opposition to family planning tended to take a public stance against measures to provide family planning services. When this happened the position of the government played the deciding factor. In the case of Chile, the government convinced the Church hierarchy to support family planning to reduce abortions. In the case of Colombia, the government negotiated with the Church to avoid a standoff. In the case of Brazil, nationalist sentiments ran high and, despite having one of the most progressive Church hierarchies, resistance to family planning remained high. The foundations, keenly aware of this resistance, looked for allies in each country that shared their goal of reducing growth rates and could push the population issue from within.

An examination of foundation population activities in Chile, Colombia, and Brazil can illuminate how the foundations' broad agenda played out in various countries and how nationalism and

Catholicism impacted projects in various countries. To some extent the foundations had to deal with nationalist opposition in every country but it was particularly strong in Brazil, Mexico, and Chile (in the later 1960s). Opposition from the Catholic Church also played a significant role, but as we will see the impact of this varied from country to country, and ultimately the Church ceded much ground throughout Latin America. The foundations approach also changed over time and according to the country. The technocratic approach worked well when governments collaborated, but a reliance on private and grassroots organizations was essential in other countries.

The Technocratic Approach: Collaboration and Coercion in Chile's Family Planning Programs

If there was one country that appeared on the verge of "take-off" in the area of curbing population growth in 1960 it was Chile. At this early date in the population control movement most Latin American countries were still years away from public discussions about birth control and family planning, and some were decades away from any state involvement in family planning. Chile, however, already had a major regional research institution devoted to the study of demographics and stood just a few years away from state sponsored family planning activities. Chile would begin experiencing declines in fertility long before most other Latin American countries, and the foundations would point to Chile as the model country for efforts in population control. The amount of foreign money flowing into Chile during the 1960s for population related programs surpassed all other countries in Latin America, but the crucial factor in declining fertility rates was the Chilean government's early collaboration with population control advocates that enabled programs to be part of the national health system and reach the most women. Unlike other countries, Rockefeller and Ford found they had a cooperative national government for most of the decade, and this allowed a more technocratic approach. Universities and research centers played a crucial role in transitioning from research on demographics to implementation of family planning services. Thus, university reform efforts and

fellowships to train Latin American in demography and the medical sciences supported the overall population control agenda. Ironically, or maybe tellingly, while the population establishment experienced its biggest success story in Chile, by the end of the decade they found themselves expelled from the country in the tidal wave of anti-American sentiments that ushered in a socialist president.

Chile in 1960 was well on its way to the type of "modernity" foundations envisioned for the rest of Latin America. Perhaps this is why Chile's capital Santiago was referred to as the "Geneva of Latin America" and was home base for numerous international agencies working on development issues.⁶⁸¹ The country had deeply rooted political institutions and established parties that allowed democracy, however imperfect, to flourish without interruption since 1932. The level of urbanization, industrialization, unionization, and state planning far surpassed that of other countries in the region except perhaps Argentina. In addition, Chile's educational system was one of the better systems in Latin America, and Santiago was home to some of the best universities in the region. The road to modernity, however, was far from complete as Chilean agriculture suffered from low productivity and retained significant elements of the traditional oligarchic system. The effects of industrialization combined with a stagnant agricultural sector created rising inflation and economic problems. Chileans promoting population control linked the problem of insufficient agricultural productivity and economic development to population growth in a Malthusian narrative. Prominent Chilean physician and population control advocate Benjamin Viel frequently related the three issues. Writing for *the Journal of Sex Research* in 1967 Viel notes:

Although some industrial development has taken place in Chile, food production has not kept pace with the population increase, and the rate of growth of the gross national product was only 3.7 percent during the last five years. In 1936, the average Chilean consumed 20.5 kgs. of meat per year; in 1965 only 12 kgs. In 1951, milk consumed amounted to 111 liters per capita, 1965, 92

⁶⁸¹ Ford Foundation report, International Urbanization Survey, Urbanization in Chile, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 002013.

liters. The reduction in the availability of food provokes social and political instability, which works against economic development.⁶⁸²

The economic problems and the polarization of politics that Chile was experiencing in the decade of the 1960s made this type of argument all the more attractive to Chilean elites and government officials, but it wasn't until after the 1964 elections that the government was willing to officially embrace family planning programs.

In 1964, trying to prevent further radicalization of the political system, the Christian Democrats campaigned on a reform agenda with Eduardo Frei as their candidate. Frei was exactly the type of leader the U.S. needed to push the modernization agenda, which included proposals for moderate agricultural reform, increased spending on education, and cooperation instead of confrontation with U.S. companies doing business in Chile.⁶⁸³ The United States lauded the election of Frei and saw him as the best chance to prevent further advancement of the Socialist Party under Salvador Allende.⁶⁸⁴ As scholar William Sater noted in his work on Chilean-U.S. relations, "Washington considered a Christian Democrat-ruled Chile as an experiment, demonstrating that the United States could help a nation implement social and economic change within the framework of liberal democracy and capitalism."⁶⁸⁵ The Frei government, under pressure to adopt more progressive policies from its citizens, used a template for modernization that adopted much of what U.S. reformers prescribed. Thus, Chileans who agreed that family planning should be part of the government's health services had allies in the government willing to put the issue on the national agenda. In 1966, the National Health Service (SNS-Servicio Nacional de Salud) issued official guidelines on family planning that "emphasized the free selection of effective contraceptive methods for the principle goals of reducing maternal mortality from

⁶⁸² Benjamin Viel V., "Family Planning in Chile," *The Journal of Sex Research*, 3:4, Nov. 1967, p. 284.

⁶⁸³ O'Brien, *Making the Americas*, p. 222.

⁶⁸⁴ See the treatment of the Frei government by Leonard Gross, *The Last, Best Hope: Eduardo Frei and Chilean Democracy*, (New York: Random House, 1967)

⁶⁸⁵ William F. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), p.

provoke abortions, lowering infant mortality, and promoting family welfare favoring responsible procreation."⁶⁸⁶ This policy statement affirming a national commitment to family planning only made official the road the government had been taking since 1962 when it began collaboration with the medical community.

Long before the government's official support of family planning, foreign advocates of population control had set up shop in Santiago with tacit government approval. In 1957 the United Nations, in conjunction with the Chilean government, established El Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE) in Santiago. The Population Council had been pushing the United Nations to take up the population issue for some time and by 1957 the UN agreed to establish two regional centers to train scholars in the field of demography (the second one was located in Bombay).⁶⁸⁷ Contraceptives and family planning was still a taboo topic throughout the world, but the much more benign study of demographics was one way to open the door to policies aimed at curbing population growth. Commenting on the usefulness of the Santiago demographic center, Ford Foundation officer Frosty Hill remarked to his colleagues, "I should think there is little doubt that the only way to start on 'the population problem' in Latin America is through the demographic door."⁶⁸⁸ This strategy started with research on basic demographic facts then moved to disseminating the research through university channels and using demographic information in teaching. It was hoped these demographic "facts" would then move the medical community, the social scientists, and the government to apply the research to problems of overpopulation. It was implicit in this strategy that the research would suggest there was a problem with population growth, thus a need to take action to reduce it. The Ford Foundation began making direct grants to CELADE in 1962. Though the Rockefeller did not make direct

⁶⁸⁶ Vivian Epstein-Orlowski, "Family Planning Programs and the Dynamics of Agenda Building in Costa Rica and Chile," in Terry McCoy, ed., *The Dynamics of Population Policy in Latin America*, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974, p. 234.

⁶⁸⁷ Charles Hardin, meeting with Dudley Kirk (Population Council), January 12, 1961, RAC, RF, 12.1, Diaries, Charles Hardin, Box 46.

⁶⁸⁸ Inter-office memo from F.F. Hill to Alfred Wolf and Oscar Harkavy, Demographic Center in Santiago, June 29, 1961, FFA, Grant Files, 062-0145, reel 0702.

grants to the center until later, indirect money came from Rockefeller's support of the Population Council whose financial assistance was crucial to the development of the center.

Support for CELADE exemplifies the type of institution building the foundations favored in their approach to development during the decade of the 1960s. The Santiago Center's main task was to conduct research and train Latin American demographers who would then use the data to prod their respective governments into action. Latin American governments sent students to the center for training, usually through fellowship grants from the Population Council or the foundations. These fellows would then go back to their respective countries and serve as advocates for a government population policy. This type of "trickle-down" from a respected regional organization had emerged as the hallmark of programs in agriculture and university reform, and now the foundations would pursue this approach in the population field.

The center's director, Carmen Miró, was Latin America's technocrat extraordinaire in the area of population. Consistently praised by the population establishment as "one of those rare administrators who also has managed to maintain a high level of professional competence in her field, so that she can lead her troops instead of ordering them forward," Miró, a former PC fellow, would head the most respected and influential demographic research center in Latin America.⁶⁸⁹ CELADE gained respect not just for its efforts in training and research, but also because it was one of the few "indigenous" institutions that the foundations felt required no back-stopping, or technical support, from North American researchers due to the complete competency of its staff.⁶⁹⁰ The success of CELADE, however, was only half of the battle. The trickle-down approach to development through the creation of technocrats and research institutions could be a slow process considering the many opposition groups

⁶⁸⁹ Memo from D.J. Bogue to UN Population Branch, Ford Foundation, Population Council, and Milbank Memorial Fund, "Informal Observations and Recommendations with references to the program of CELADE," Nov. 24, 1964, p.2, FFA, Grant Files, 062-0145, reel 0702. Miró did not contain her interests to demographics but actively encouraged other groups to expand fund for birth control. See Black, "Taking Care of Baby," p. 317.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

that existed, and the urgency within the population establishment to get governments on board with action plans led Ford and Rockefeller to venture into supporting direct action programs. In Chile, early government sponsorship meant the Foundations could support more aggressive methods and tactics since their role was shrouded behind the wall of state programs.⁶⁹¹

The "action oriented" organization in Latin America was the International Planned Parenthood Federation, or more specifically their domestic affiliates operating in various countries. In 1961 IPPF contacted the Chilean government and set up a visit with prominent medical, public health, and government officials. After these meetings the government agreed to set up an advisory committee to study the issue of maternal mortality and induced abortions. In 1962 members of the committee decided to form a private organization, the Asociación Chilena de Protección de la Familia (APROFA). The Association was at first an unofficial partnership between the medical community and the national government as its founding members included "all the professors of preventative medicine and of obstetrics and gynecologist at the University of Chile and officials in the maternal and child health program of the Servicio Nacional de Salud (SNS)."⁶⁹² Money to fund the work of APROFA came from IPPF, and in 1964 the association became an official IPPF affiliate. Unlike IPPF affiliates in other Latin American countries, the APROFA did not open its own clinics. Because the state was willing to collaborate (even if unofficially), APROFA contracted with SNS hospitals and clinics to provide personnel and contraceptives for family planning services.

⁶⁹¹ Victoria Lynn Black, "Taking Care of Baby," Black quotes a Rockefeller report which states "An important factor has been the sponsorship of the program by the Division of Health Services....*Very few people know that any part of the program is being financed from outside sources.* So far as Chileans are concerned, top-flight medial people have put their own prestige on the line." p. 310-310,

⁶⁹² Inter-Office memo from Ozzie Simmons to Mr. John S. Nagel, "IPPF-Related Activities in Chile, August 11, 1969, FFA, Grant Files, 69-173. APROFA broke formal links to the SNS in 196e when they began distributions of contraceptives so that the government did not have to make family planning an explicit policy. The use of SNS hospitals and clinics for family planning under APREFA, however, continued. See Vivian Epstein-Orlowski, "Family Planning Programs and the Dynamics of Agenda Building in Costa Rica and Chile," in McCoy, *The Dynamics of Population Policy in Latin America*.

Though the Chilean government moved earlier than others to incorporate family planning into the national health services, the official motivation was not "population control" but rather addressing the alarming number of abortions that occurred each year and the high maternal mortality rates related to this.⁶⁹³ This distinction was important in terms of building support for official government programs, especially in gaining support from the Catholic Church. The Bishops of the Chilean episcopate, whose dominant characteristic is described by one scholar as "realism," generally supported contraceptive programs aimed at reducing abortion before the publication of *Humanae Vitae*. All over Latin America the new theology of liberation and the "preferential option for the poor" was causing many in the Catholic Church to reconsider its historic alignment with the reactionary and conservative sectors of society and fight on the side of the people for social justice.⁶⁹⁴ The so called "progressive Church," or those in the Church who promoted versions of Liberation Theology, was particularly strong in Chile during the 1960s. After the Pope's condemnation, however, the episcopate felt obliged to defend the Pope's statement and took an official stance against artificial contraception in 1969.⁶⁹⁵ Even so, Catholic theologians in Chile were split and a number of them questioned the encyclical's infallibility. The lack of consensus within the Church made it easier to use the abortion and maternal health issue as the official justification for a national program. In addition, by the time the Church hierarchy had hardened their position to artificial birth control in support of the Pope's encyclical the state had already institutionalized family planning within the National Health Service. The distinction in motives for state

⁶⁹³ In addition the moral issue of maternal mortality due to induced abortions (estimated at half of all maternal deaths), health complications from induced abortions were costing the Nation Health Service over one million dollars a year by 1960. See Benjamin Viel, "Family Planning in Chile," *The Journal of Sex Research*, 3:4, pp. 284-291.

⁶⁹⁴ See Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation*, 15th Anniversary Edition, (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2004) or Phillip Berryman, *Liberation Theology: The Essential Facts about the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).

⁶⁹⁵ Thomas Sanders, "The Relationship between Population Planning and Belief Systems: The Catholic Church in Latin America," in McCoy, *The Dynamics of Population Policy in Latin America*, p.24.

involvement also reveals how on the population issue the goals of Chilean elites and the goals of Ford and Rockefeller often converged but with important differences in terms of motivation.⁶⁹⁶

During the years when APROFA was successfully lobbying at the national level to establish official support for family planning, the Population Council, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation were active in supporting medical research geared toward finding better contraceptives. In 1959, Population fellow and native Chilean Jaime Zipper would create an inexpensive intrauterine device (IUD), nicknamed the "Zipper Ring," simply enough to be inserted by paramedical staff.⁶⁹⁷ The fact that paramedical staff could perform insertions made the Zipper Ring an attractive contraceptive to family planning advocates. Zipper's experimental program in IUD insertion would be just the beginning of a much larger program financed by foreign money. With its support for public health and medical school development in Chile the Rockefeller Foundation had been tangentially involved in women's health issues in Chile in the 1950s, but the potential of IUDs as an inexpensive and reliable contraceptive led the Foundation to support one of the largest family planning programs in Chile—the post-partum IUD program.

The post-partum program in Chile reveals the international character of family planning programs in Chile and exposes the coercive nature of technocratic approaches to population control and family planning. The post-partum program involved providing family planning services to women who had come into public hospitals for birth or due to complications from an induced abortion. From a psychological standpoint, research had shown women to be more open to the idea of contraception immediately after birth or receiving care from an induced abortion. A Rockefeller grant to the

⁶⁹⁶ For an excellent look at how domestic and international issues shaped the approach to fertility control in Chile see Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney, *The Politics of Motherhood: Maternity and Women's Rights in Twentieth-Century Chile*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009.).

⁶⁹⁷ Jaime Zipper worked at the Barros Luco Hospital in Santiago and conducted research at the University of Chile. His initial experimentation with the new IUD included over three thousand women in Santiago. See Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney, *The Politics of Motherhood*.

Population Council to support the PC's post-partum program notes, "Scholars in the field of population have reached the conclusion that the time of pregnancy and the immediate post-partum period offer unusually favorable opportunities for reaching women in a systematic way, at a time when contact with persons on whom the mother relies for advice and help is at a maximum, and when the subject of family planning is most relevant."⁶⁹⁸ In 1963, the Rockefeller Foundation began supporting the Center for Population Studies at Harvard University's School of Public Health. Shortly after, the Center began assisting Benjamin Veil with an IUD insertion program in Santiago.⁶⁹⁹ According to Veil, post-partum women were given information about contraceptives and scheduled for IUD insertion at clinics near their home within ten to forty days after birth while women who have had an abortion "have the IUD inserted immediately after curettage while still under anesthesia, unless medically contra-indicated."⁷⁰⁰ The program, which showed a 31 percent decrease in abortions and a 40 percent decrease in fertility rates in the targeted areas, was touted as a great success at reducing abortions and fertility, so much so that in 1965 the Population Council launched an international post-partum program involving twenty-six hospitals in nineteen cities around the world funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.⁷⁰¹ In Chile, foreign financing of the program was crucial. Veil noted how the number of insertions plummeted when Harvard pulled out in 1965 and the National Health Service took over funding the program.⁷⁰² The Rockefeller Foundation began direct assistance to Veil in 1966, and insertions rose again and expanded to rural areas.

The success of the program, however, obscured some of the more questionable tactics that emerged as the post-partum program expanded, especially surrounding the issues of safety, consent,

⁶⁹⁸ Grant general description RF 66020, The Population Council, Post-Partum Program, April 1, 1966, RAC, RF, RG 1.2, Series 200-U.S., Box 78, folder 669.

⁶⁹⁹ Veil, Family Planning in Chile.

⁷⁰⁰ Veil, Family Planning in Chile, p. 291.

⁷⁰¹ see Veil's evaluation of the program in Veil, Family Planning in Chile and see the edited volume compiled in 1970 on the International Post-Partum Program, Gerald Zatuchini, Ed., *Post-Partum Planning: A Report on the International Program*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).

⁷⁰² See chart on number of IUD insertions at various stages of the program,, Veil, Family Planning in Chile.

and incentives. First, many physicians in the U.S. considered post-partum insertions to be dangerous, and greater acceptance rates during this period did not justify the additional risk. Consent was also an issue, as even when consent was given the tactics used to get that consent was questionable. In her examination of the post-partum program in Chile, Victoria Lynn Black recounts how the Population Council paid for additional expenses associated with extending the hospital stay of women who could not have an IUD inserted immediately after delivery or an abortion due to complications so that the procedure could be done before they leave the hospital.⁷⁰³ Finally, in order to increase the number of IUD insertions, The Rockefeller Foundation, APROFA, and SNS paid financial incentives to healthcare workers in clinics based on the number of new IUDs insertions they performed, creating ethical questions about how much women were being pressured into accepting IUDs. The initial IUD program started by Veil provided IUDs for over 49,000 women in and around Santiago.⁷⁰⁴ By 1970 Veil's program, funded in large part by Rockefeller Foundation, accounted for forty-four percent of all IUD insertions in Chile.⁷⁰⁵

The coercive nature of some of the family planning activities in Chile underscores the complexity of the issue as it played out in a country where women defied religious prohibitions against abortion and sought to take control of their own fertility, with or without state approval. Clearly, many women wanted to limit their fertility and welcomed the family planning initiative. North American researcher Norman Gall interviewed Chilean women in the early 1970s in an effort to tell their stories. One woman, identified only as a thirty-one year old woman who had four children and seven abortions before getting an IUD at a free clinic explains her views:

A woman full of children doesn't have time even to look up. The most beautiful thing in the world is for a woman to have the number of children that

⁷⁰³ Black, "Taking Care of Baby."

⁷⁰⁴ Veil, "Family Planning in Chile."

⁷⁰⁵ Epstein-Orlowski, "Family Planning Programs and the Dynamics of Agenda-Building in Costa Roca and Chile," p. 239.

she wants. According to us Catholics we should have the number of children that God sends us, but there are times when one cannot anymore although God keeps sending them. My husband is a hard worker who doesn't rest day or night. He sells bread from house to house and works eight to 16 hours each day, and the doctors tell him that he'll end up very sick if he doesn't get some rest. So what do I get from having seven or eight kids if I can't give them eggs, cheese, or milk for breakfast?⁷⁰⁶

Despite this apparent congruency between what women wanted and what the state was doing, scholars who have examined gender inequality in Chile and the state's role in controlling women's fertility for the purposes of "nation building" (whether pro-natalist or anti-natalist) highlight how the expansion of family planning and the rhetoric of choice did little to challenge the patriarchal culture that limited women's choices.⁷⁰⁷ Rather than an expansion of women's rights, the technocratic nature of family planning in Chile allowed the state to control women's fertility for the "good of the country." The distinction between "family planning" and "population control" that Chileans who supported family planning but were critical of foreign population experts made did not involve a critique of traditional gender roles. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations had little problem with this as they were not concerned with women's rights but rather limited population growth. Though the rise of the women's movement in the 1970s would force them to re-examine this approach, during the decade of the 1960s and into the 1970s addressing gender inequalities was not part of the discussion.

As happened in many countries, Ford and Rockefeller provided the financial backing for indigenous organizations and local physicians to build support and start up family planning programs. The U.S. government played only a minor role in initial efforts as direct assistance from the U.S. government for population related activities in Latin America before 1967 was hampered by restrictions placed on USAID by the U.S. Congress. Though USAID did begin funding some population activities in the mid-sixties (one of the first grants they made was to CELADE in 1964), it was by no means

⁷⁰⁶ Gall has posted his interviews along with his publications on his personal web site http://www.normangall.com/chile_art1.htm, accessed 5/15/2012.

⁷⁰⁷ See for example Pieper, *The Politics of Motherhood*, Corréa, *Population and Reproductive Rights*, Black, "Taking Care of Baby."

comparable to their efforts in other areas through the Alliance for Progress . That all changed in 1967 when Congress passed the Foreign Aid Assistance Act and opened the flood gate, allowing USAID to tackle global population growth with nearly unrestricted activities.⁷⁰⁸ From this point on, AID would become the largest foreign donor for population control activities in most Latin American countries. In 1968, USAID would enter into contracts with the SNS, the Chilean Ministry of Public Education, and the Department of Public Health at the University of Chile.⁷⁰⁹ Though the money USAID provided for population activities dwarfed what Ford and Rockefeller spent, the foundations had deployed their funds in the early years in a strategic way thus allowing USAID to build and expand on the work they had done .

By 1969 the population establishment held up Chile as the prime example of what could be accomplished when national governments could be persuaded to tackle the issue of population growth. The fertility rate in Chile dropped by one-fourth in under a decade (1963-1970). However, the Chilean experience offered some warning signs as well. The amount of foreign money flowing into Chile for population activities was creating a backlash, especially as many Chileans saw economic development taking a back seat to population control efforts. Generally, the Chilean government gave low priority to population issues compared with the more pressing problems of inflation, economic development, and land reform. Even the Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Radamiro Tomic (a Christian Democrat), warned there needed to be more balance between population policies and economic policies.⁷¹⁰ While leading Chilean technocrats like Benjamin Veil and Director of the National Health Service Hernán Romero continued to stress the relationship between population growth and economic development, arguing the increasing population will outpace the country's ability to provide not only

⁷⁰⁸ for an excellent look at the evolution of population policy within the U.S. government see Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*.

⁷⁰⁹ Epstein-Orlowski, "Family Planning," p. 239.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 242

state services but basic food items as well, those on the left denounced the focus on fertility as a foreign imposition that detracted from real structural change.⁷¹¹ As the country's politics moved leftward, efforts by the state to lessen the influence of foreigners in the field of population control resulted in new directives by the SNS to expand its authority over family planning while at the same time limiting some existing programs.

The climax of anti-foreign sentiments as they affected population programs in Chile came in 1970, with the election of Salvador Allende. As a presidential candidate, Allende, a physician with experience in public health, denounced "population control" dictated by foreign donors but upheld family planning as an important state function. As president, he sought to remove the international presence in family planning and reclaim the initiative for Chileans, and in particular the working and lower classes. To this end, Allende ordered all foreign population organizations to leave Chile in 1970, though he eventually accepted UN money to help fund population activities. Allende also began a process of democratizing the two-tiered healthcare system which in 1970 included SNS for the poor and working class and SERMENA, a health insurance plan started in 1968, for the middle and upper classes.⁷¹² This restructuring involved moving away from the SNS hospital based healthcare system to a community health clinic system. By this time family planning had become institutionalized within the government, and though Allende's break with foreign donors forced a cutback in funding, family planning remained an accepted field for the state to be involved in. The Rockefeller Foundation had already begun to phase out its involvement in Chile in other areas by 1968 due to skepticism about the radical path Chile was taking. However, population was the one field they continued to fund after Allende's victory. Despite Allende's pledge to get rid of foreign population experts, the Rockefeller Foundation was allowed to continue its support (though at much lower levels) for both Dr. Veil's

⁷¹¹ Black, "Taking Care of Baby."

⁷¹² Vicente Navarro, "What Does Chile Mean: An Analysis of Events in the Health Sector before, during, and after Allende's administration," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society*, 52:2 (Spring 1974).

research and CELADE. They also supported, with a small grant, public health work at the University of Chile. The Ford Foundation would also continue supporting research in reproductive biology at the University of Chile well into the 1970s.

A final blow to the momentum of the family planning initiative in Chile came after the 1973 military coup that ended democracy in the country. As he did with the university system, General Augusto Pinochet placed military generals in charge of the Ministry of Health and proceeded to dismantle the public health system. The regime sought to significantly reduce access to contraceptives and enforce harsh punishment on women who had abortions.⁷¹³ By 1978 the military regime under Pinochet began promoting pro-natalist policies and sought to return talk of contraceptives to the private sphere. Although APROFA was allowed to continue to operate, its director was replaced and its activities circumscribed by the government. In 1979 the government endorsed a policy that led to a significant reduction in access to contraceptives stating, "Access to birth control measures will be controlled in order to avoid excess ease that could result in imposition or coercion."⁷¹⁴ In rhetoric the government reaffirmed the right to plan ones family, a testament to how family planning became institutionalized, but in practice the cutbacks to social services and the ambivalence toward ensuring access to contraceptives ended the expansion of family planning programs. Not surprisingly, the number of abortions rose in the decades that followed and remained high even after democracy returned.

The technocratic approach worked best in countries where state cooperation was strongest, in Chile and Costa Rica, but in other countries resistance to state involvement in family planning forced

⁷¹³ In 1967 abortion was made legal for instances where the mother's life or health was imperiled, though abortion for other cases remained illegal. Under the military regime abortion was made illegal in all circumstances.

⁷¹⁴ Política de Población, quoted in Casas, Lidia B. "Women and Reproduction: From Control to Autonomy? The Case of Chile." *American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law*. 12, no. 3 (2004), p. 433.

Ford and Rockefeller to rely more on private organizations to push the agenda.⁷¹⁵ In addition, opposition from the Catholic Church and nationalists, which began to significantly impact projects in Chile only after the state incorporated family planning into its health services, posed more significant problems elsewhere in Latin America. A look at events in Colombia and Brazil will illuminate how Ford and Rockefeller dealt with these issues and how they adapted their programs to specific countries.

From Technocratic to Grassroots : Changing the Culture of Reproduction in Colombia

At first glance, the circumstances in Colombia did not look promising for projects in population control and family planning. Colombia had one of the region's most conservative episcopates and the Catholic Church still retained significant political power. While many priests at the local level had embraced Liberation Theology and didn't necessarily resist family planning (and sometimes assisted directly in efforts to distribute birth control), the conservative nature of the hierarchy meant it would be harder to sell the idea. In addition to resistance from the political right, left-wing opposition denounced any foreign activities in the area of family planning as an imperialist plot that served the economic interest foreign capital. Though the Colombian government eagerly collaborated with foundations and the U.S. government in areas such as education reform and agriculture, they were reluctant to get state involved in family planning during the early 1960s. Many governing elites in Colombia saw the population issue as a significant threat to development and as a barrier to reaching the goals set forth by the Alliance for Progress. Upon leaving office in 1962, outgoing Liberal Party President Alberto Lleras Camargo expressed in a very blunt way the relationship between population growth and economic growth in an article published by *Foreign Affairs* writing, "The basic and almost elemental problem of Latin America is the vertiginous increase in population which threatens to drown any rhythm of

⁷¹⁵ For the case of Costa Rica see Vivian Epstein-Orlowski, "Family Planning Programs and the Dynamics of Agenda Building in Costa Rica and Chile."

economic growth and overflow any capacity to improve living conditions."⁷¹⁶ He also lambasted the Church at an international conference on birth control held at Universidad del Valle in 1965.⁷¹⁷ Yet the incoming Conservative president Guillermo Valencia did not pursue the issue, largely owing to the influence of the Church within the Conservative Party. It would not be until the Liberals took power again in 1965 that things began to change. Meanwhile, within the medical community in Colombia there existed a small group of medical doctors who shared the foundations' concerns about population growth, and it was these allies that the foundations would turn to in the initial years.

Colombia's population growth rate of 3.4 percent, one of the highest in the region, was seen by foundation officials as a serious impediment to economic and political stability in Colombia and efforts to promote population control would intensify as the decade advanced. Both Ford and Rockefeller had similar goals in terms of what they hoped to accomplish. The population programs at the foundations worked toward "the limitation of population growth rates, and eventually their stabilization (zero population growth), resulting from low mortality balanced by low fertility attained by voluntary means through individual decisions."⁷¹⁸ An examination of foundation population projects in Colombia reveals how foundation projects meshed with local organizations and interest groups, and despite considerable opposition in one of the most Catholic countries in Latin America, resulted in substantially reduced fertility rates and a new cultural acceptance of family planning.

In 1965 the Ford Foundation sponsored the "First Seminar on Demography" in Colombia in which it was suggested that "leadership in population control can come from physicians, since they have strong professional autonomy and public respect, and thus can rally support from clergy, public officials,

⁷¹⁶ Alberto Lleras Camargo, "The Alliance for Progress: Aims, Distortions, Obstacles," *Foreign Affairs*, 42:1 (Oct. 1963), p 32.

⁷¹⁷ "Lleras Criticizes Church over births," *New York Times*, August 13, 1965.

⁷¹⁸ Report, "Population Program," 6/15/1972, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Rockefeller Foundation (RF), RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 57, Folder 311A

and lay scholars."⁷¹⁹ Several Colombian private organizations formed in the mid-sixties and would begin promoting research and action programs aimed at curbing population growth. First, in 1965 the Colombian Association of Medical Schools (ASCOFAME) would establish a division of population studies to investigate and act on reducing population growth. Rockefeller's support for the medical sciences paid handsome dividends in that its fellows were among the first to bring the issue to Colombian universities. This is just one of the many examples of how university reform assisted and reinforced other areas targeted for reform. Also in 1965, Colombian physician Fernando Tamayo started PROFAMILIA, an organization that soon became the leader in family planning services in Colombia. Finally, a group of individuals from university circles established a private organization known as Asociacion Colombiana para el Estudio Cientifico de la Poblacion (ACECP) to act "as an information and educational center to bring to the attention of governmental, industrial, and intellectual leaders and other interested groups the implications of population growth for Colombia, and to prepare and distribute informational materials as widely as possible throughout the country."⁷²⁰ None of these organizations were without connections to the international population control movement and both Ford and Rockefeller. PROFAMILIA was set up as a local affiliate of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), ASCOFAME had strong ties to the Rockefeller Foundation due to their support of the medical field, and ACECP came out of the Universidad del los Andes, a university that was receiving substantial support from Ford, Rockefeller, and U.S. AID. However, all three organizations represented concerns circulating in the Colombian medical community about fertility and population growth and all three commanded a certain amount of credibility due to their links to the medical community.

Of the three organizations Ford's support of PROFAMILIA best reveals how foundation's utilized domestic groups and established grass-root networks to further their goal in limiting population growth.

⁷¹⁹ Brief report in "The First Seminar in Demography in Colombia," Kingsley Davis, 03/65, FFA, 000319.

⁷²⁰ Grant in Aid Approval to Universidad De Los Andes, June 30th, 1965, RAC, RF, RG 311, box 30, folder 286.

The partnership between Ford and PROFAMILIA was also a break from the usual top-down approach to assistance which generally favored research and elite institution building instead of outreach programs to the urban and rural poor. During the 1960s, influenced by development theories like Modernization Theory, Ford's programs were directed toward select elite institutions. As Ford's International Division explained:

We believe the Foundation's resources will be used most efficiently if they are applied to leadership and other elite groups. This hypothesis leads us, for example, to support teaching, research, and application of economics and political science and to decline insistent appeals that the Foundation subsidize community-development projects and youth groups.⁷²¹

By the early 1970s this approach had not yet yielded the results intended, and Ford and to a lesser degree Rockefeller, began to reconsider their approach to development. By 1973 Ford's assessment of their programs concluded "we have approached our program development work much too exclusively and narrowly through contacts with technocrats and top-level administrators in highly centralized agencies..Foundation personnel are not very close to real problems faced by poor and disadvantaged people." Consequently, a shift in programs to " (1) problems of the marginal and small-farm sector; (2) non-formal education; and (3) family life education, broadly defined, and family planning services for those least well served by present programs" took place.⁷²² The IPPF affiliate in Colombia, PROFAMILIA, seemed a perfect fit with this new direction and the increased emphasis on population control and family planning.

From its beginning in 1965 PROFAMILIA was focused on and geared toward providing access to contraceptives to poor women. Its founder, Dr. Fernando Tamayo, served both Colombia's elite in his

⁷²¹ Information Paper, The Ford Foundation's Activities in Latin American and the Caribbean, September 1967, p.2, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 002409.

⁷²² The Ford Foundation Office for Colombia and Venezuela, Proposed Budget FY1974-75, January, 15, 1973, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 015406.

private gynecological practice and poor women in his work at public hospitals. In 1965 Dr. Tamayo and a few others began providing exams and inexpensive contraceptives to poor women in Bogotá, and by 1966 they had secured funding from IPPF and were seeing over 800 women a month.⁷²³ The clinics multiplied with financial assistance from IPPF and later U.S. AID, and by 1969 there were twenty-four clinics in seventeen cities.⁷²⁴ The rapid expansion and success was based on the idea that access to contraception did not require an expensive medical exam and could be sold over the counter at reduced prices. This revolutionary idea did not sit well at first, even with IPPF officers. Dr. Tamayo recounts the reaction from his financial backers noting, "They almost lynched me at an IPPF meeting in 1972...How could I give out pills without a complete exam? I kept repeating that it's much riskier to have children than to take the pill, that half a million women die each year in the world due to complications from pregnancy."⁷²⁵

Objections from within the movement were the least of PROFAMILIA's concerns, as they faced significant opposition from the Catholic Church hierarchy due to their aggressive tactics which included radio advertisements. The Church hierarchy, in defense of Pope John Paul's condemnation of birth control in *Humanae Vitae*, attacked domestic organizations involved in family planning and linked them, wherever possible, to foreign intervention thus stoking nationalist sentiments. In a vague reference to both PROFAMILIA's rural program and U.S. organizations in Colombia the Bishops lambasted family planning in the Bogota newspaper *El Siglo* by noting, "They come to our rural zones and practice vasectomy, thus not only diminishing but destroying the reproductive power of our peasants, who are

⁷²³ Tina Rosenberg, "Winning the Trojan War; what Ultra-Catholic third worlders can teach America about contraception," *Washington Monthly*, July/August, 1991.

⁷²⁴ The increase in new patients was equally dramatic, in 1968 there were 18,000 new patients and in 1969 PROFAMILIA served 42,000 new patients. See Alan B. Simmons, "Information Campaigns and the Growth of Family Planning in Colombia," in J. Mayonne Stycos, *Clinics, Contraception, and Communication: Evaluation Studies of Family Planning Programs in Four Latin American Countries*, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973).

⁷²⁵ interview with Dr. Tamayo in 1991 from Rosenberg, "Winning the Trojan War"

subject to irreversible surgery."⁷²⁶ In 1973 a "media war" between the Archbishop of Medellín and PROFAMILIA founder Fernando Tamayo played out over the radio when Tamayo responded to the Archbishop's critical "Pastoral Instruction on Family Planning" by arguing "sometimes the sheep must lead the shepherd."⁷²⁷ Though the Church hierarchy remained a staunch critic of artificial birth control methods, opposition among priests and lower level church officials was much less rigid, and many priests supported and advocated the use of birth control in their parishes. Liberation Theology did not have the same influence over the Colombian episcopate that it had over the Bishops in Chile or Brazil, but many priests working in poor areas embraced the new theology in their work. Thus, the official Catholic opposition to artificial birth control often had a diluted effect on the target population.⁷²⁸

The expansion and success of PROFAMILIA coincided with a new stance from the government after 1965. President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1965-69), a strong supporter of technocratic modernization, saw the need for family planning but was also hampered politically from taking a strong stand by the conservative episcopate. Instead of taking the Church on in a public stand-off, he quietly negotiated a deal with the Church that let the government move toward adopting moderate maternal health programs by 1970. According to Rodrigo Botero, the President's advisor from 1966-1970:

The President came to an understanding with the hierarchy, saying in effect, "Look, I'm not going to make you lose face, I'm not going to humiliate you, and I'm not going to talk very much about this. The services are going to be made available quietly, we're not going to go out of the way to antagonize you. We understand that you're going to have to oppose it. Now, don't oppose it too much." So that a subtle understanding was

⁷²⁶ "Defensa de la Propiedad Privada Hacen Obispos: Denuncian Intervención Extranjera en Problema Demográfico," *El Siglo*, Bogotá, December 3, 1973, page 1.

⁷²⁷ Bogota Interoffice memo from Bruce Carlson, to James Himes, "A" Status Recommendation/PROFAMILIA, December 3, 1973, FFA, Grants files 72-382, reel 2688.

⁷²⁸ for more on this see Thomas Sanders, "The Relationship between Population Planning and Belief Systems: The Catholic Church in Latin America," in Terry McCoy, ed., *The Dynamics of Population Policy in Latin America*, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1974) and Mayone J. Stycos, *Ideology, Faith, and Family Planning in Latin America: Studies in Public and Private Opinion on Fertility Control*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).

reached: the church hierarchy would make their point, saying that they disagreed, but they wouldn't let this disagreement get out of hand.⁷²⁹

This agreement allowed the government to give tacit support to PROFAMILIA's activities and eventually begin to initiate its own programs.

PROFAMILIA's success caught the eye of the Ford Foundation in 1971. By this point in time the population issue had become a major focus of the foundation, and they were looking for ways to tie it to their other new focus on rural poverty. The idea to expand PROFAMILIA's services to rural areas came from conversations between Ford Foundation Officer Bill Sweeney and PROFAMILIA staff member Lily de Bucheli during Bucheli's visit to University of Chicago for a summer workshop on family planning communication.⁷³⁰ Out of these conversations came a proposal from PROFAMILIA to Ford for a rural experimental family planning education and services project in the coffee region of the state of Risaralda with Bucheli serving as director of the program and Dr. Edgar Angel Arango and economist Alberto Restrepo serving as resident project coordinators. Both Angel and Restrepo worked for the National Federation of Coffee Growers (FNC), an important business association that would be key to the success of the rural project due to its extensive networks and already established community service programs. The local Coffee Growers Committee, or Cafeteros, would not only put up half the money for the rural project, but would also allow PROFAMILIA to use their established community networks to advertise and build the program. Since the 1940s the FNC had promoted the use of rural extension agents to educate farmers on new methods and technologies to increase agricultural productivity. They also ran a number of social and educational programs in rural communities and their extension

⁷²⁹ Rodrigo Botero, Interview in Cambridge, Massachusetts on April 18, 1995, cited in Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerda and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, Friends of the Alliance for Progress, 2008, p 147.

⁷³⁰ Memo from Robert C. Bloomberg to Dr. James R. Himes, " 'A' Status Recommendation for grant of 52,000 to The Colombian Association of Family Welfare (PROFAMILIA) for pilot community based education in family planning," March 18, 1972, FFA, grant files, 72-382, reel 2688.

personnel were recognized by the communities they served.⁷³¹ The FNS's interest in population growth in rural areas came out of the desire to maintain economic and political stability in the countryside, and with rural poverty on the rise the Cafeteros found it in their best interest to promote family planning.

PROFAMILIA's pilot program began in the department of Risaralda, a moderately developed coffee region close to Bogotá. The program was started here due to the willingness of the Coffee Growers Committee to help fund the program and allow PROFAMILIA to use its network of local representatives who could help introduce the program. The pilot program in Risaralda involved a comprehensive education program to educate people about family planning and, importantly, a way of providing access to inexpensive contraception without a doctor's visit. The key people in the project were the fieldworkers and the distributors, both chosen from among the local population. The fieldworkers, all of whom were women in the community, would attend a two-week training program in which they would be taught how to disseminate family planning information to the community. Their job would include various tasks aimed at educating both men and women about the importance of planning your family and convincing couples to use contraception. The local representatives of the Cafeteros would first introduce the fieldworkers to the communities as a person they could trust and listen to. According to evaluations of the program, "This institutional cooperation is extremely valuable, and helps enormously in getting the extension worker and her message accepted more quickly, since she has the backing of the reputation of the Committee which has a great deal of prestige among rural people."⁷³²

The field workers were then given the responsibility of organizing meetings in their *vereda*, or small rural community, in which both family planning as well as other health and social issues could be

⁷³¹ For a history of the FNC and their extension and social programs see Bennet E. Koffman, "The National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia," PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1969.

⁷³² Preliminary Report: Evaluation Report: The Rural Profamilia Program, p. 23, December 1973, FFA, Grant Files, 72-382, reel 2688.

addressed. During the meetings fieldworkers would pass out educational pamphlets, show a film, or have members of the community act out socio-dramas in which "subjects like 'machismo' and alcoholism always involve a family characterized as large and unplanned," thereby linking a host of social problems with having too many children.⁷³³ A second function of the fieldworkers would be to make home visits to couples in hopes of recruiting them as contraceptive users. In addition to home visits, they would set up housewives clubs modeled after the men's friendship groups organized by the Cafeteros but with a focus on family planning.

The second key player in the rural program was the distributor who sold contraceptives (both the pill and condoms) to the community. When fieldworkers sign-up a new contraceptive user they referred the new recruit to the community distributor. The distributors were also selected from those within the community, usually a school teacher, the main store owner, the police chief, or another person of prestige. The distributors were responsible for selling and tracking the contraceptives they were given by PROFAMILIA in exchange for a small financial incentive for each contraceptive cycle sold.

One report on PROFAMILIA's rural project describes the distributor role as such:

In one sense the distributor is really a paramedical worker trained and supervised in one very simple task, namely pill, tablet and condom distribution. The philosophy is not very far removed from that of a Chinese barefoot doctor-- someone from within a particular community is chosen and trained to carry out a specific task in the health delivery system and contrives to live and work in the community, but has access to a well defined ladder of increasingly expert advice. It is a democratic approach to health and family planning and, interestingly, in some areas of Colombia the distributor is actually elected by the local community.⁷³⁴

⁷³³ Evaluation Report: The Rural PROFAMILIA Program, Jerald Bailey and Juan Correa, December, 1973. FFA, grant files 72-382, reel 2688.

⁷³⁴ Memo from John Nagel to Richard Dye, Evaluation of Grant to Colombian Association for Family Welfare (72-03820), October 28, 1977, FFA, Grant Files, 72-382, reel 2688.

There was no doctor's visit needed to obtain the contraceptives, but fieldworkers were responsible for asking about and tracking side-effects as well as making referrals to a doctor if needed.

Initial reception to contraceptive use was certainly influenced by traditional religious values. However, religious convictions were not the only grounds upon which people resisted the idea of birth control, as women were also concerned about side effects and the opinion of their husbands. According to reports, there were many women who were receptive to the idea of the pill, but their spouses "believed that if their wives take the pill they will be unfaithful to them and will turn into shameless women."⁷³⁵ The fieldworker was crucial to countering this argument against birth control with private conversations aimed at educating and informing all parties. For example, the extension worker might counter objections based on religious grounds by pointing out that "the real "sin" is bringing more children into the world to die of hunger."⁷³⁶

By the mid-seventies PROFAMILIA's rural pilot program had been expanded to other departments in Colombia, and by 1977 they had 543 distribution posts in rural areas along with 33 conventional clinics and 1,277 non-clinic distribution posts in urban areas.⁷³⁷ According to PROFAMILIA's founder, this expansion happened in an arbitrary way, usually the result of conversations he had with interested individuals in his travels around the country.⁷³⁸ PROFAMILIA would eventually provide services along the entire coast and as far east as Meta and Boyacá and as far south as Caquetá. However, services and access were much better in the central regions around Bogotá, Cali and Medellín than in the more remote areas, leaving the most impoverished areas underserved and masking the

⁷³⁵ Preliminary Report: Evaluation Report: The Rural Profamilia Program, p. 23, December 1973, FFA, Grant Files, 72-382, reel 2688.

⁷³⁶ Preliminary Report: Evaluation Report: The Rural Profamilia Program, p. 23, Dec. 1973, FFA, Grant Files, 72-382, reel 2688.

⁷³⁷ Nagel to Dye, Evaluation of Grant, 1977.

⁷³⁸ Grant Miller, "Contraception as Development: New Evidence from Family Planning in Colombia," *NBER Working Paper Series*, w.p. # 11704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, October 2005.

differences between regions in the overall decline of the birth rate.⁷³⁹ Nonetheless, the Ford Foundation and evaluators at the Population Council continued to praise PROFAMILIA in reports throughout the seventies as a "significant development" and a model for family planning services that could possibly be replicated in other Latin American countries.⁷⁴⁰ The role of PROFAMILIA as a pressure group and the work of other domestic population control organizations were successful in pushing the Colombian government towards adopting a population policy that was anti-natalist by 1970.⁷⁴¹ Though they moved cautiously into the field, the Colombian Ministry of Health would assist with family planning through its maternal and child health program.⁷⁴² Even the Catholic Church would concede the need to address the issue in their own way, and in 1970 the Colombian episcopate opened an Office on Population and the Family. Further down the road, the population growth in Colombia would drop significantly, as it did all over Latin America, and by the end of the century would resemble that of many western industrialized nations.⁷⁴³ By the 1990s the phrase "Estoy planificada" (I am planned) and PROFAMILIA's ubiquitous green flag noting "Profamilia, Para una vida sexual plena" spoke to the attitudinal and cultural change. The model of private organizations taking the lead with foreign financial backing was replicated in a number of other countries where the national government took a neutral or pro-natalist position. In Brazil and Mexico, Ford and Rockefeller faced less resistance from the Church but had to contend with nationalistic rhetoric that challenged the global population control movement's argument that unchecked population growth was detrimental to the country.

⁷³⁹ I would like to thank Dr. Natalia Milanesio for her comments on an earlier draft pointing out that Risaralda was a comparatively wealthy region and perhaps an easier region to introduce a program of this type than the less developed coastal areas or Southern region. Though I found no evidence that Ford had much to do with the selection of region to start the pilot program in, as it was an outgrowth of the clinics Dr. Tamayo had started in urban areas near Bogotá, the success of the pilot program in Risaralda had much to do with the support (financial and otherwise) of the Coffee Growers Association, which was a product of the wealth of the area.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., also see Jerald Bailey and Juan Correa, "Evaluation of the Profamilia Rural Family Planning Program," *Studies in Family Planning*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (June, 1975), pp. 148-155.

⁷⁴¹ Bailey and Correa, "Evaluation of Profamilia."

⁷⁴² For a discussion of the evolution of government policy see Germán Bravo, "National Planning and Population Policy in Colombia," in McCoy, *The Dynamics of Population Policy*.

⁷⁴³ Fertility rates in Colombia dropped from 6.8 in 1950 to 3.1 in 1990. See José Miguel Guzmán, ed., *The Fertility Transition in Latin America*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 5.

To Govern is to Populate: Nationalism and the Population Control Debate in Brazil

In backing family planning organizations like Profamilia, the foundations hoped to change popular attitudes about family planning and increase acceptance of programs aimed at curbing population growth. However, the eventual goal was for individual countries to adopt anti-natalist policies and institutionalize family planning services into national institutions and programs. The type of rapid declines in fertility that the foundations sought in order to avert a demographic disaster necessitated large scale government involvement in population control. One of the major hurdles Ford and Rockefeller faced in persuading Latin American governments to adopt anti-natalist policies was convincing them that population growth was even a problem. Nationalistic rhetoric coming from both the political right and the political left challenged the neo-Malthusian argument by pointing to economic growth alongside population growth or by suggesting that it was the distribution of land and wealth that caused development problems, not the growing number of people. In Brazil, the foundations found themselves having to confront an entrenched nationalism despite a pro-U.S. military regime the U.S. government helped bring to power.⁷⁴⁴

Brazil's unique position in Latin America as the largest country in both geographic size and population gave it a history of economic penetration and exploitation by foreign capital and a fierce sense of independence that often resulted in significant challenges to foreign influence. From the authoritarian corporate state under Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) to the left wing nationalism of João Goulart (1961-1964) to the right-wing nationalism of the military government that took over in 1964, Brazil often attempted to chart an independent course within the confines of its economic dependency on foreign capital. The decades of the 1930s and 1940s saw Brazil struggle with how best to industrialize and modernize its economy. Brazilian politicians sought to gain support from the land

⁷⁴⁴ For U.S. involvement in the military coup of 1964 see Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969*, Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990).

owning class, the military, and the popular classes by vacillating between nationalistic rhetoric and accommodation to foreign capital. While the military government was generally friendly to U.S. interests, on the population control issue they took a nationalistic stance.

Population growth in Brazil during the early twentieth century mirrored many other Latin American countries with growth due to a decrease in mortality alongside sustain high fertility rates. At mid-century fertility rates among well-off Brazilians began to decline, but fertility rates for the majority of Brazilians remained high, especially in rural areas and the underdeveloped Northeast.⁷⁴⁵ The difficulty Ford and others had in pushing population control in Brazil stemmed from Brazilian elites' rejection of the neo-Malthusian arguments linking unchecked population growth with economic malaise. Brazil's "economic miracle" between 1968-1974 seemed to disprove the doomsday proclamations of the global population movement. During those years rapid economic growth occurred despite very high fertility rates and population growth rates. Because of these circumstances, very few political pressure groups were willing to ally with foreigners and push a family planning agenda. The following statement on population growth is reflective of the nationalist and pro-natalist sentiments that existed among Brazilian politicians; "It is not a fundamental problem. It is an American problem they want to impose on us. The Brazilian problem is the occupation and development of areas like the Amazon, whose population is less than that of the Sahara desert."⁷⁴⁶ Even among elites willing to concede high fertility rates and population growth were a problem, they gave priority to other issues

⁷⁴⁵ George Martine, "Brazil's Fertility Decline, 1965-95: A Fresh Look at Key Factors," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 47-75.

⁷⁴⁶ MDB politician quoted in Peter McDonough and Amaury DeSouza, *The Politics of Population in Brazil: Elite Ambivalence and Public Demand*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 41. This study of elite attitudes towards population control contains numerous interviews with Brazilian elites.

they saw as more pressing like educational reform, income distribution, agricultural issues, and the military in politics.⁷⁴⁷

The Catholic Church in Brazil, though not as outspoken against family planning as the Colombian hierarchy and more willing to take a neutral stance, was certainly no strong advocate for family planning. Even the progressive members of the episcopate in Brazil, who supported the general idea of family planning, resisted programs tied to foreign money.⁷⁴⁸ The archbishop of Recife, Hélder Câmara, articulated the position of the progressive Church in Brazil in a statement to the press noting, "There is a certain temptation in the developed countries to regard development as a matter of birth control, and when this control is directed from abroad, it causes repugnance in me."⁷⁴⁹ President Lyndon Johnson's statement about the value of birth control in relation to development heightened suspicion of foreign aid for population control throughout Latin America. At a gathering celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Johnson remarked, "Let us act on the fact that less than five dollars invested in population control is worth more than a hundred dollars invested in economic growth."⁷⁵⁰ This reasoning reinforced the idea in the minds of many Latin Americans that the U.S. did not have the best interests of developing countries in mind.

The military government of Brazil (1964-1985) certainly had the ability to institute a national anti-natalist policy or at least push the nation in this direction, but during the 1960s and early 1970s no such catalyst existed to push the regime into changing what was essentially a laissez faire approach to

⁷⁴⁷ See Peter McDonough and Amaury DeSouza, *The Politics of Population in Brazil: Elite Ambivalence and Public Demand*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

⁷⁴⁸ Thomas Sanders, "The Relationship between Population Planning and Belief Systems: The Catholic Church in Latin America," in Terry McCoy, ed. *The Dynamics of Population Policy in Latin America*.

⁷⁴⁹ Quoted in Thomas Sanders, "The Relationship between Population Planning and Belief Systems: The Catholic Church in Latin America," in Terry McCoy, ed. *The Dynamics of Population Policy in Latin America*, p. 23, taken from *Diário de Notícias*, September 20, 1966. Archbishop Camara was a proponent of Liberation Theology and staunch critic of imperialism.

⁷⁵⁰ quoted in Piotrow, *The World Population Crisis*, p. 90

population growth.⁷⁵¹ The United States government had issued a directive to AID to avoid using AID funds for family planning in Brazil due to an incident in 1966 that evoked harsh criticism from the Brazilian press.⁷⁵² The Peace Corp in Brazil had independently initiated a family planning program and the Brazilian press denounced the activity as a U.S. plan to sterilize black Brazilian out of racial motivations and to reduce Brazil's population. Importantly, the U.S. government backed off bringing up discussions on a population program with the Brazilian government when it learned that the Ford Foundation was going to fund the programs it had in mind.⁷⁵³ The impact of nationalism on the global population movement, and on programs in Brazil in particular, was laid bare at the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest. The meeting in Bucharest, attended by delegates from 136 nations, was supposed to result in a World Population Plan of Action that aggressively sought to reduce world population growth. However, the U.S. "population establishment" was taken aback by the response from third world delegates. According to Ford Foundation officer Oscar Harkavy's recollections of the meeting, "A majority of Third world delegates to Bucharest believed that changes in the economic balance between the rich and poor countries were much more important to their own welfare than curbing population growth."⁷⁵⁴ On the matter of population control the Brazilian delegation stated "Birth control is a matter for decision by the family, which, in this context, is not subject to government interference," and "The Brazilian Government will not accept outside interference, either official or private, in its demographic policy."⁷⁵⁵ The statement, however, offered a

⁷⁵¹ See Peter McDonough and Amaury DeSouza, *The Politics of Population in Brazil: Elite Ambivalence and Public Demand*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). McDonough and DeSouza argue that Elite and popular opinions on family planning diverged considerably, with popular opinion being more supportive of family planning than elites.

⁷⁵² See Information Memorandum for the Administrator, from Jack Heller to EXSEC, Subject: Mr. Bundy's Report to you Concerning Restrictions on AID Funding of Population Programs in Brazil, November 3, 1970, NARA, RG 286, Office of the Administrator, Office of Executive Secretary, Country and Regional Files 61-70, Box 11, Folder: Brazil Oct 70-Jan 71.

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.* p., 2.

⁷⁵⁴ Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth: An Insider's Perspective on the Population Movement*. p. 64.

⁷⁵⁵ Brazilian official position quoted in Grant Précis, request No. ID-2657, The Civil Society for Family Welfare in Brazil, p. 3-4, FFA, Grant Files, grant 67-462, reel 3465.

glimmer of hope for population control advocates as it also included an opening for family planning noting, "Being able to resort to birth control measures should not be a privilege reserved for families that are well off, and therefore it is the responsibility of the State to provide the information and the means that may be required by families of limited income,"⁷⁵⁶ This was one of the first signs that the Brazilian government was considering moving away from its hands off approach. Still, no concrete plans to provide family planning services were actually initiated and the national development plan, which included a chapter on population, focused on Brazil's historic under populated terrain and the hoped that industrialization and economic growth would naturally bring down fertility rates as it had in western industrial countries.⁷⁵⁷

By the time of the Bucharest conference though the door to family planning had already been opened by those in the medical field with assistance from the IPPF, Ford, and Rockefeller. As in Colombia, assistance to private organizations and to universities doing research on population related issues would allow the foundations to essentially circumvent the national government's resistance. Rockefeller had been marginally involved in the population field in Brazil since 1955 with grants to support research in genetics. Fords exploratory mission to Brazil in 1959 mentioned Brazil's population growth only in passing as it prioritized the development of the fields of economics and agriculture as well as assistance to the Northeast, a region that was particularly underdeveloped.⁷⁵⁸ However, as the global population control movement began asserting itself in Latin America Ford began to increase their involvement in Brazilian population issues.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁶ *ibid.*

⁷⁵⁷ Thomas W. Merrick, "Population, Development, and Planning in Brazil," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (June 1976).

⁷⁵⁸ Ford Foundation Mission to Brazil, July-August, 1959, Alfred Wolf, Lincoln Green, and Reynold Carlson, FFA, Consultants Reports, 000008.

⁷⁵⁹ The Rockefeller Foundation was not as aggressive in Latin America in this area as Ford, preferring to stick to supporting research in demographics and reproductive biology. In Brazil, Rockefeller's main focus on the population field was the support of genetics.

The increased attention to population issues that came in 1963 with the establishment of Rockefeller's program in population did not yield much additional direct support for programs in Brazil. In the late 60s and early 70s, Brazil's population issues did not appear to be a priority for U.S. AID either, despite a massive expansion into the field in general that took place after 1968.⁷⁶⁰ The Ford Foundation, on the other hand, had made population issues a priority in their funding allocations, and by the mid sixties were looking for allies in the medical community in Brazil.

In 1967 the Ford Foundation initiated a familiar three pronged strategy to push the population control agenda in Brazil: research in demography, research in reproductive biology and action programs in family planning. As with other countries, Ford made grants to fund research in demography at various universities in an effort to " 'institutionalize' groups of Brazilian scholars who can analyze their nation's population situation, in all its aspects, and help to prescribe whatever remedies are needed."⁷⁶¹ Grants made to several universities in the field of reproductive biology assisted with the search for new and better contraception.⁷⁶² Finally, as in Colombia, Ford sought out organizations who were willing to aggressively pursue the family planning agenda through services and education. In Brazil, Ford felt the only significant national organization offering services and educational seminars was the IPPF affiliate in Brazil, The Civil Society for Family Welfare in Brazil (BEMFAM).⁷⁶³

Founded by a group of professors in the medical field, BEMFAM was an action oriented organization very similar to ProFamilia in Colombia. In fact, its origins were remarkably similar to its counterparts in Chile and Colombia. In 1965 Dr. Walter Rodrigues and Dr. Octavio Rodrigues-Lima presented a paper at a meeting of the Congress of Gynecology on the prevalence of abortion in Brazil.

⁷⁶⁰ Thomas Naylor, Brazil: The Population Situation 1971, p.5, FFA, Consultant Reports, 76305.

⁷⁶¹ Brazil Briefing Material for Dr. Vivian W. Henderson, Population, p. 2, FFA, Consultants Reports, 015400.

⁷⁶² grants in this field began in 1966 and went to various universities including Federal University of Bahia, University of Brasilia, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, and Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. See Ford Foundation Annual Reports on-line.

⁷⁶³ Grant Précis, request No. ID-2657, The Civil Society for Family Welfare in Brazil, p. 3-4, FFA, Grant Files, grant 67-462, reel 3465.

The large number of abortions in the country sparked a conversation among many of the doctors present and led to the formation of BEMFAM.⁷⁶⁴ The U.S. AID population officer in Brazil, Herbert Wagner, was also in on the conversations and managed to secure AID funding, funneled through IPPF, for the nascent organization. Initially, BEMFAM worked through the university medical schools because they believed this would lend prestige and respectability to their work.⁷⁶⁵ By 1966, BEMFAM had ten regional offices or affiliates (located in universities) in various state capitals.⁷⁶⁶

The Ford Foundation began its support of BEFAM in 1967 with a grant to expand the organizations research and training capacities. In the early years (1966-1970) the main thrust of BEMFAM was political, to push the medical community, the national government, and the general public to recognize the problems caused by population growth and to take action aimed at limiting family size. To this end BEMFAM held seminars for the medical community, politicians, and journalists. They also engaged in lobbying efforts to persuade the national government to get rid of restrictive laws on contraception and held training classes targeted at the medical schools. By the 1970s BEMFAM was using various media outlets- magazines, newspapers, radio, television, and cinema "spots"- to broadcast their message to the public. Radio and television spots were aimed at the middle and lower classes, but short presentations preceding a full length movie called "cinema spots" were aimed at the urban upper and middle classes. The "spots" would feature interviews to "contrast the views of those who use family planning themselves but oppose family planning programs (a depressingly common view) with the views of those who have no access to family planning but would like to " in order to expose the hypocrisy of this segment of Brazilian society.⁷⁶⁷ Other spots would portray family planning as "a basic human right

⁷⁶⁴ Brazil log notes, 1966, Tuesday, Dec. 13, 1966, Rio de Janeiro, FFA, Staff and Consultants Reports, 71198.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁶ IPPF was financing about ninety percent of BEFAM's service and educational programs in the beginning. Request No. 2657, Précis, The Civil Society for Family Welfare in Brazil, no date, Grant Files, 67-462, reel 3465.

⁷⁶⁷ memo from Robert McLaughlin to Dr. Eduardo Venezian, "Recommendation of "A-Status" for BEMFAM," August 17, 1976, p. 38, FFA, Grant files, 67-462, reel 3465.

which responds to a spontaneous, felt need."⁷⁶⁸ BEMFAM officers felt the upper and middle classes play "a vital role in determining national attitudes about family planning" and "These attitudes, in turn, usually constitute the starting point for policy debates within the federal government—at least where matters of 'national security' are not involved."⁷⁶⁹

Another tactic BEMFAM used to push their agenda was to bypass the national government and approach the state governments with proposals for family planning. BEMFAM enlisted support from state governors and local mayors through a series of seminars held on the issue of population growth and family planning. These seminars were instrumental in creating partnerships between BEMFAM and state governments that set up family planning clinics. In 1971 governors of the states of Espírito Santo and Rio Grande do Norte signed agreements with BEMFAM to set up traditional family planning clinics like the ones in urban areas.⁷⁷⁰ Quickly, however, BEMFAM realized that traditional clinics did not work as well in rural areas, particularly in culturally different regions like the Northeast where women did not respond to having to travel to a clinic and be examined by a physician. The Northeast region of Brazil was a particularly impoverished region with exceptionally high birth rates and infant mortality rates. Responding to the lack of receptivity to traditional clinics, in 1973 BEMFAM introduced community based distribution (CBD) programs.⁷⁷¹ Officials from BEMFAM worked closely with Columbia University's Center for Population and Family Health, IPPF, and the Ford Foundation in creating the CBD program. It was then implemented in selected municipalities in the state of Rio do Norte and was overseen by the states secretary of health and BEMFAM staff members. The basic idea was very similar to ProFamilia's rural programs in that they used trained community members to distribute oral contraceptives with no doctor's visit or prescription. Unlike the Colombian programs the "community educators" and

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 37

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 37

⁷⁷⁰ Thomas Naylor, Brazil: The Population Situation 1971, RAC

⁷⁷¹ The description of the program that follows is from "A Proposal for a Follow-up Survey of Clients and Distributors in the Community Based Distribution (CBD) Program Operated by BEMFAM in the State of Rio Grande Do Norte, Brazil," April 13, 1976, FFA, Grants Files, 67-462, reel 3-465.

distributors were all volunteers and did not receive financial compensation for their role. Enlisting the support of the local mayors was crucial to the success of the programs, as they often recruited community leaders to participate as educators or distributors. The response from mayors was "overwhelmingly favorable" as it brought much needed resources to their communities.⁷⁷² In addition to the distributors and educators, BEMFAM kept four traditional clinics operating to serve as medical back-up.

Not everyone responded "favorably" to the CBD programs, however. The Bishop of Rio Grande do Norte launched a media assault on BEMFAM and the Governor, threatening to get the federal government to enforce a federal regulation requiring a prescription for all contraceptives. To avoid federal entanglement, the Governor and BEMFAM decided to hire medical supervisors to write prescriptions for all new clients (though still without an exam).⁷⁷³ The local priests, however, were less of a problem. Much like in Colombia, priests were split over the issue of family planning, and in Rio Grande do Norte BEMFAM found priests' "silence in the face of opposition from the Official Church" was an important element of success in particular communities.⁷⁷⁴

Despite BEMFAM's success at local levels in breaking down resistance and implementing programs, the national government continued to take a pro-natalist stance until 1974, even if allowing family planning advocates to work at state and local levels. Given the restrictive laws on the books governing the distribution of contraceptives and the repression exercised by the Brazilian military in other areas, if the government had wanted to stifle the family planning movement it could have. After 1974 nationalist rhetoric at the federal level began to break down in the climate of increased acceptance of family planning and, perhaps more importantly, a slowing of the economy and a widening

⁷⁷² "A Proposal for a Follow-up Survey of Clients and Distributors in the Community Based Distribution (CBD) Program Operated by BEMFAM in the State of Rio Grande Do Norte, Brazil," April 13, 1976, FFA, Grants Files, 67-462, reel 3-465.

⁷⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 18-19

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10

of economic inequality.⁷⁷⁵ It wasn't until 1986, though, that the national government initiated any significant program in reproductive health. This was quite a bit after the trend of lower fertility rates began. Beginning in the seventies fertility rates fell dramatically in Brazil, from around 7.0 in 1970 to 3.7 in 1990.⁷⁷⁶ Though several factors account for this decline, the influence of the "population establishment," and in particular the Ford Foundation, the Population Council, and IPPF, cannot be discounted. Scholars studying the factors that contributed to Brazil's fertility decline note that while abortion and sterilization account for the most significant means through which the fertility decline occurred, organizations like BEMFAM and other foundation supported endeavors in the medical field "had an important indirect influence on spreading awareness of the advantages of fertility limitation and on creating a favorable milieu for the practice of birth control."⁷⁷⁷

Conclusion

Population control became a major area of focus for the foundations when the impact of population growth was tied to projects in agriculture, university reform, and general economic development. The effects of population growth on food supplies was a particular concern for foundation officials who saw gains in agricultural productivity eroded by population growth. The foundations saw their university development projects aimed at improving the quality of higher education undercut by the rising demands for higher education and palliative measures taken by countries to expand access which resulted in reinforcing low quality, part-time faculty. Most importantly, by the end of the 1960s both foundation officers and the U.S. government were dealing with the realization that, after almost a decade of attempts to accelerate modernization and economic

⁷⁷⁵ Martine , "Brazil's Fertility Decline, 1965-1995."

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 49.

⁷⁷⁷ Martine, p. 71.

growth, Latin America's problems seemed larger than ever. The Malthusian argument linking population growth to development seemed a reasonable explanation to foundation officers, and at the very least, efforts to curb population growth would stave off the worst case scenario- overpopulation in developing countries eventually impacting growth and material living standards in the United States.

Though taken up somewhat later than university reform and agricultural modernization, efforts by North American reformers to reduce population growth became a crucial component of Latin American and global reform. Unchecked population growth came to impede progress in all other areas, and thus very little could be achieved until this issue was addressed. We can also see the hallmarks of global reform, scientific solutions instead of political ones and a top-down approach to implementing reforms, evident in these efforts. The partnership between the U.S. government and the foundations in this area highlights the instrumentality of private reformers to the mission to reform the globe. There were certain issues, like population control, best handled by private organizations that could at least claim an apolitical stance. While this did not totally shield the foundations from criticism, it gave them more room to operate in this field than the U.S. government had. Projects in family planning and population control also tied Latin American technocrats and scientists to a global network of reformers promoting a Western conception of the modern family.

Just as issues of rural poverty had redirected the agricultural programs at Ford and issues of primary education had begun to take precedence over university development at both foundations, population control programs also adapted to the realization that the grand project in modernization had failed. The foundations' assumptions about the connection between population growth and economic growth did not stand up over time, as lowering the fertility rate globally did not necessarily correlate with economic growth or political stability in Latin American countries. It was a paradox of success and

failure that troubled many at the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the same paradox that continues to plague attempts at global reform by U.S. organizations today.

Conclusion

Who can now ask where his country will be in a few decades without asking where the world will be?⁷⁷⁸
Report of the Commission on International Development, 1969

Despite humanitarian claims, America's concern about development in other countries has always been tied to larger economic and strategic concerns. Consequently, the intensity of efforts and the regions the United States focused these efforts on shifted with the changing geopolitical situation. What remained constant from the late 19th century to today, however, is the idea that America had a duty to mold the world in its image, to share with developing countries its political and economic values, as if all of humanity was on an evolutionary path to become quintessentially American in their embrace of individualism, free enterprise and democratic governance. North American reformers sought to bring stability to developing countries through promoting economic growth and a form of democracy based on elite control that limited popular participation in the political process, much like what had developed in the United States. By the 1950s this sense of duty had morphed into a comprehensive and multi-faceted agenda to help modernize underdeveloped countries. The development agenda of the post-World War II years brought together unprecedented North American resources, both public and private, to reform the globe and spread American economic and cultural values. While the government of the United States and private North American reformers began piecemeal projects to develop certain U.S. overseas enclaves as early as the late 19th century, by the 1950s the goal became to understand and attack the many interrelated parts of economic development.

The projects in global reform initiated in the post war period were meant to have a broad impact and cross-connections, interacting with one another to accelerate modernization. Latin America was the most natural testing ground for these efforts, which spanned the globe, due to its relatively developed status compared to Asia and Africa and due its historical ties with the United States. In the

⁷⁷⁸ *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 9.

aftermath of World War II, when countries around the world were rising up against colonial rule, Latin America was particularly important. Countries in this region had been independent for over a century and yet still struggled with development. United States reformers felt that if Latin America could be stabilized through modernization projects it would represent a model of capitalist development for other regions of the world. Thus, nowhere were efforts at global reform more comprehensively applied than in Latin America.

Large philanthropic foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation, born out of an age in which social engineering promised to create more efficient, prosperous and just societies, began developing their partnership with the government from the very beginning. Early foundations did more than just assist the U.S. government in reforming America's social and economic systems during the Progressive Era. They often initiated projects in the United States that brought efficiency and increased productivity to America's workforce and its economy. It was during these early years that the modus operandi foundations would use in overseas development was fleshed out. Elite led reform, with a focus on efficiency and growth, became the core of the development model. With shared ideas about spreading American values and institutions through top-down reform, foundations and the U.S. government turned their missionary zeal toward underdeveloped regions of the world. These efforts were intimately tied to U.S. foreign policy objectives and followed the geographic map of foreign policy concerns within the U.S. government. The men who created, led and advised the major private foundations were the "power elite" to use C. Wright Mill's now famous concept, men connected to or belonging to the political, corporate and military elite in the country.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁹ See C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956). Perhaps nothing exemplifies this more than the make-up of the study committee that made recommendations for Ford's global expansion. It includes men like Rowan Gaither, chairman of the Rand Corporation and consultant to the National Defense Research Committee and Charles Lauritsen, director of the Kellogg Radiation Laboratory and adviser to the Office of Naval Research.

Though the mission to modernize Latin America was a shared endeavor, the major foundations had a unique role to play. As private institutions they went abroad representing themselves as organizations concerned merely with the well-being of humanity and intent on bringing prosperity to underdeveloped regions. As such, they could engage with certain issues that would have been difficult for the U.S. government to address. The case of population control is a prime example. Due to the sensitive nature of birth control and the charges of population control being an imperialist scheme to dominate non-white countries, the U.S. government let the foundations handle initiating reforms. The foundations, though they too had to tread lightly, had an easier time introducing the issue through their support of research on demography and through channeling funding through local groups interested in the same reforms.

A second crucial function foundations served in the reform mission involved bringing science and technology to bear on social problems. Because of their reputation among Latin American elites as an organization that promoted scientific and not political solutions to development, the foundations were able to build relationships with Latin American elites who held similar views of the modernization process. The productivity approach to agricultural reform touted the ability of science and new technology to address economic, and ultimately social, problems. As with the approach to university reform and population control, this top-down approach was meant to side-step thorny political issues embedded in the structural problems of Latin America. In their efforts to bring a scientific approach to the social sciences, the foundations supported the diffusion of economic and political theories that served the global capitalist system. In economics this meant the introduction and support of neo-liberal theories and ideology which replaced questions of wealth and resource distribution with single-minded concerns about economic growth and inflation and supposedly neutral market forces. Similarly, in political science, systemic questions about political economy were replaced with questions about

individual voting behavior and political equilibrium, something easily measurable without questioning the power structure.

Finally, as private institutions the foundation had much more flexibility than the U.S. government to engage in projects and change course when needed. We can see how this played out in both Colombia and Chile when efforts to reform the university system and agriculture met with a host of challenges from the popular classes. When projects to mold the national universities in both countries met with significant resistance from the student body and from some faculty, the foundations quickly turned to supporting private universities like Los Andes in Colombia. In Chile, U.S. government assistance to universities and to agricultural modernization was cut short when Salvador Allende won the presidential election in 1970. While the more conservative Rockefeller Foundation joined the U.S. government in pulling out of the country, the younger and more adventurous Ford Foundation continued its programs until shortly after the military coup in 1973. The significance of this flexibility can be seen in perceptions of both the U.S. government and the foundations in Latin America today. Elite opinions of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations tended to be more positive than views of the U.S. government, even though, as we have seen, they were essentially engaging in the same type of reforms with the same underlying mission.⁷⁸⁰ The foundations did not have the same ability to coerce countries into submission with the threat of force or intervention, and thus Latin American nationalists often, though not always, focused their hostility on Washington while leaving the foundations alone.

The Successes and Failures of Reform Efforts: Evaluating the Lasting Impact of Foundation Activity

Though an era of disillusionment with national building in foreign countries had set in by the 1970s, North American reformers could indeed look upon their efforts during the 1950s and 1960s and

⁷⁸⁰ For an example of these views see Irwin Baskind, Enrique Lerdau and Theodore Mesmer, *The Alliance for Progress in Chile and Colombia: Some Latin American Perspectives*, (Friends of the Alliance for Progress, 2008).

see signs of success. Though not nearly as widespread as they would have liked, university reforms had made the U.S. model of a university, with its focus on research, full-time faculty and centralized control, at least an ideal to strive for. In addition, the population growth rate had been significantly reduced in many regions by the late 1970s, and the structures for integrating Latin American agriculture into the global agricultural system based on technology intensive production had been established if not yet fully realized. Beyond these compartmental goals, however, the consequences of foundation activities in Latin America were much more significant than accomplishments in any one area. North American reformers saw all of the projects they supported as part of the same mission to modernize and stabilize Latin American countries and part of a larger American project with global ambitions. Though this may not have happened in the way they envisioned, there were some lasting results.

First, the top-down approach of institution building that was central to all of the projects, no matter the area, was successful in creating a general consensus about the role of technocrats in the government, thus institutionalizing the idea that science, not politics, should guide policy. The various projects for university reform tied Latin American universities to a wider global community of knowledge which held that scientific answers could be found to almost any social and economic problem. The connections and links to institutions within the United States that were developed under these projects helped build a consensus on problem solving and a belief in the technocratic ideal. Latin Americans like Sergio de Castro, trained in neo-liberal economics through the foundations and U.S. government's economics project, became widely respected and sought after by other universities outside Chile to bring the scientific study of economics to their departments. Rather than being viewed as an ideologue whose neo-liberal views might prejudice conclusions, de Castro was hailed as a scientist whose conclusions were based on sound and a-political research. The multitude of university reform projects undertaken eventually tied Latin American universities into a system of global higher education that defined problems and solutions within certain parameters and promoted the belief that science

would take the politics out of policy making. The consensus that developed out of the many and varied university reform projects is important to understanding the policies implemented by Latin American governments in the decades that followed the most intense university reform years. Proponents of neoliberal policies had been marginalized or were non-existent in most Latin American countries up until the 1960s, but the efforts to promote "pluralism" in the field of economics yielded young new technocrats willing and able to implement neo-liberal policies. The enduring confidence in technocratic solutions has manifested itself in the tremendous popularity of technocrats with the electorate since the democratization of the region.⁷⁸¹

Second, foundation activities and national governments worked together to accelerate Latin America's integration into the global economy even while resistance to this integration remained a significant force. The paradoxes of American global reform in the twentieth century are perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Chile, the often touted "jaguar of Latin America," whose economic success through free market principles and return to democracy are supposed to be a model of how integration into the world economy can accelerate growth and reduce poverty. Yet Chile's economic success appears to some as just a veneer, beneath which still lay significant structural problems. The phenomenal growth of the agricultural export sector during the 1980s and 1990s, specifically the sectors reorganized around technology intensive production, can be directly linked to the combination of foundation supported economists trained in neo-liberal model and the Chilean government's land reform of the 1960s. Yet, the problem of the small farmer and the poverty of rural populations remains to be solved as they have yet to be integrated into a robust industrial economy. The university system, too, remains a structural problem despite decades of effort by North American reformers. Reform of

⁷⁸¹ Patricio Silva, "The new political order: towards technocratic democracies?" in Robert N. Gwynne and Cristóbal Kay, *Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity, second edition*, (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 2004). Silva argues that one of the reasons for the dominance of technocrats is the diminished power or absence of groups who had traditionally opposed technocrats such as left-wing political groups, labor unions, and student groups, p. 164.

the university system along market principles in both Colombia and Chile created skyrocketing tuitions and a proliferation of private for-profit technical schools of dubious quality. In 2011 Chile became the epicenter of continent-wide student protest movement denouncing the market as a force for development and demanding that the state take a stronger role in developing the nation.⁷⁸²

The result of foundation activities described above, of course, were significantly shaped by Latin American elites. In addition, country specific histories ultimately determined if reforms would be lasting and institutionalized or superficial and limited. The role of domestic elites in influencing the trajectory of university reform, agricultural modernization and population control varied from country to country, but projects where Latin American elite ideas closely matched those of North American reformers were most successful. Projects in population control illustrated this interplay. The global population control movement highlights an important aspect of the partnership between the foundations and Latin American elites. If national governments were not willing to initiate a population control agenda, the foundations by-passed them through a global network of private organizations operating in individual countries and often lead by domestic elites. These domestic elites, most from the medical community, usually did not have to be convinced of the merits of population control, and many of them welcomed collaboration on projects they had already begun. Some, like Carmen Míro, would become widely respected not just within Latin American, but among North American reformers too. These domestic elites were crucial to the successful implementation of programs to reduce population growth due to their ability to navigate the complex political opposition that emerged from the Catholic Church and from nationalists who saw attempts to reduce population as a foreign threat.

Conversely, where Latin American elites rejected aspects of the reform mission the foundations found themselves frustrated. In these circumstances, nationalist sentiments held by Latin American

⁷⁸² I am referring here to the 2011-12 student protests that swept Chile and pushed the conservative led government into negotiations with the movement yielding small concessions for the students.

elites led to resistance of overly burdensome demands. Chilean elites and Brazilian elites often rejected U.S. domination over the modernization process even while accepting some of the technical and advisory assistance from North American reformers. We see this in the Brazilian government's response to attempts by North American reformers to introduce birth control and family planning. We also see this in the events that played out in Chile during the late 1960s through the Pinochet years. University reform at the Universidad de Chile in the manner proposed by the foundations was upended first by leftist students and faculty, who wanted the university to be used to further social justice and land reform, then by the military government when they sought to strip the national university of its influence and power and reorganize the university system along market principles. Even though domestic elites in Latin America embraced the type of top-down technocratic change that North American reformers promoted, domestic politics often took precedent and impacted reforms.

**From Colombia to Cairo:
What the Great Mission to Modernize Latin America Tells Us About Global Reform**

Though the disillusionment following the failures of the development decade to bring about stability and sustained economic growth brought a period of retrenchment and reevaluation, it never fully destroyed the belief among North American reformers that global reform was possible. Since 9/11 the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have launched major new initiatives in the Middle East and Northern Africa. These initiatives, focused on public health, gender equality, free expression, reform of education, food security and transparent government, appear to be very similar to those promoted in Latin America. In particular the Rockefeller Foundation's new initiative in Africa, A Green Revolution for Africa, seeks to expand what it had accomplished in Latin America to the new area of concern.⁷⁸³

⁷⁸³ Gary Toenniessen of the Rockefeller Foundation explains these efforts, "What we have seen is a shift toward agricultural development as an engine of economic growth so that agriculture can provide the resources for other sectors as well – for education, for health, for overall advancement...And that requires private sector involvement to a much greater degree. If all

Certainly the breadth of the initiatives suggest they are all part of a larger effort to bring Western conceptions of democracy, science and human rights to the Middle East. This time, however, the cultural and religious differences are much bigger, and thus newer initiatives like gender equality and free expression play larger roles in the overall project. The foundations are joined in the Middle East by their long-time partners, U.S. universities. Perhaps nowhere is this reconstituted project of global reform more obvious than in the area that received the most attention during the development decade, universities. Political writer and cheerleader for the benefits of globalization under American leadership, Thomas Freidman, recently pondered the significance of technology for global reform:

Imagine how this might change U.S. foreign aid. For relatively little money, the U.S. could rent space in an Egyptian village, install two dozen computers and high-speed satellite Internet access, hire a local teacher as a facilitator, and invite in any Egyptian who wanted to take online courses with the best professors in the world, subtitled in Arabic.⁷⁸⁴

The fact that Freidman is speaking of the Arabic world is no coincidence. Many of the new American university campuses are in places like Dubai, Kalumpor, Qatar, and Indonesia. This shouldn't be surprising, but all the same one wonders about the prospects for success in a region even more culturally and religiously different from the United States than Latin America.

If the results of a century of global reform in Latin America are any indication of the problems this new initiative will encounter, the outcomes will certainly not be what the new generation of North American reformers in the U.S. government and in the major foundations expect. The history of reform efforts in Latin America discussed in the previous chapters suggests a few lessons. First, the development agenda pursued by North American reformers that sought to de-politicize development

you are trying to do is provide food relief, then that goes through governments and UN agencies. But if you really want economic growth then you need a private sector that is working across the agricultural value chain." cited on The Rockefeller Foundation website at <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/financing-agricultural-growth-africa>, accessed 8/25/2013

⁷⁸⁴ Thomas Friedman, "Revolution Hits the Universities," *New York Times*, Op-Ed, Jan. 26th, 2013.

and take questions of political economy and resource distribution out of the equation, and instead use technology and scientific advancements to modernize a country, has certain limits when applied to societies with large disparities in wealth. Second, the success of the top-down reform approach depends heavily on the political environment in which it operates. Reforms promoted by North Americans are often modified by countries to suit their own needs, and in some cases these modifications dramatically change outcomes. Thus, promoting democracy *and* modernization with a top-down approach is a difficult task. Third, and perhaps most important, successful and lasting reforms demand a strong commitment from the state. The state matters when it comes to national development. A look at these insights in relation to foundation efforts in Latin America should make this clear.

The Limits of Technology and Scientific Advancements as the Panacea for Development

The United States has long held that economic growth measured in GDP is the most important indicator of prosperity. It is not surprising then that when North American reformers ventured into Latin America economic growth became essential to modernization. Modernization theorists reinforced this view with an almost a single-minded focus on economic growth as a tool to raise the living standards of millions living in poverty thereby preventing radical solutions to endemic poverty and social injustice. North American reformers from the government and the foundations accepted this premise as well. Their projects in agricultural modernization and in population control exemplify this approach and expose the limits of relying too heavily on technological solutions when applied to a social structure suffering from an inequitable distribution of wealth.

The productivity model in agriculture held that the problem of a stagnant agricultural sector was a problem of productivity, in other words not enough was produced and what was being produced relied on traditional and inefficient farming methods. Thus, the answer to the problem was to increase production and efficiency through new technologies. The productivity model offered an alternative to

radical social policies of redistribution that would improve living standards with economic growth instead of revolution. As the process unfolded in Mexico, Colombia and Chile it became apparent that the transition to a capital and technology intensive system did not solve many of the problems in the country side. Persistent problems with rural poverty and land distribution continued despite clear gains in food production, crop quality, and export earnings in certain agricultural products. So while capital intensive farming geared to the export market has created a boom in export earnings for many countries and accelerated the integration of agriculture into a global markets, the structural inequality in Latin American agriculture and land distribution remains the Achilles' heel of agricultural modernization. In the case of both Chile and Colombia, agricultural output and productively did increase and the agricultural sectors became more tied to global markets, but many of the problems of resource and land distribution are still there. The fundamental assertion of the development paradigm promoted by North American Reformers, that economic growth (measured in GDP) is the most important catalyst for development, is flawed.⁷⁸⁵ Growth is not always beneficial to society if it is distributed unevenly or exacts a steep cost in terms of resource depletion.⁷⁸⁶

The population control movement, though one of the more successful projects undertaken by North American reformers, had its limits as well. At their core, the grants aimed at reducing population growth were economic projects meant to increase the impact of economic growth by reducing the population and therefore diminish the appeal of more radical solutions to the distribution of wealth. Like in agriculture, where increasing productivity did not solve underlying problems of rural poverty, a significant reduction in population growth rates did not have the impact on poverty rates and standards of living that were anticipated. In keeping with results in the more industrialized countries, birth rates in

⁷⁸⁵ The most noteworthy critic of the notion of GDP as a good measure of development comes from Noble Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz and co-authors Amartya Sen and Jean Paul Fitoussi in *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't Add Up*, (New York: The New Press, 2010).

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

Latin America declined more significantly in urban areas and in women who attained a certain level of education. Birth rates in rural populations and among women without access to education declined less dramatically.⁷⁸⁷ Without a strong push to improve educational opportunities for men and women living in poverty, further advancements in women's rights and creating modern consuming families will be difficult. Like agricultural reforms, the existing structure in which reforms were implemented mattered to the outcomes.

Democracy as an Obstacle to Top Down Reform

The experience of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in Latin America, like America's foreign policy in the region, belies the often repeated rhetoric that America's great mission to the world was and is to bring democracy to other countries. The modernization mission championed by North American reformers worked best in undemocratic environments, and the foundations understood this even as they sometimes felt uneasy about this truism. Returning to the statement about development in the opening chapter, we see that the process of development in Latin America has indeed been creative, destructive and necessarily contested. Popular classes in Latin America, from students to peasant farmers, contested both what was being created and what was being destroyed, and in the process shaped the outcomes.

The case of university reform is most illustrative of this. Efforts to remake the university system in Latin America and mold them in the image of U.S. universities were only partially successful owing to student and faculty resistance. Latin American students did want reforms, but the changes they envisioned clashed with elite notions (both North American elites and Latin American elites) of modernization. Specifically, North American reformers wanted a more centralized and elite managed university that stripped students of any voice in school administration and governance, similar to what

⁷⁸⁷ Grant Miller, "Contraception as Development: New Evidence from Family Planning in Colombia," *NBER Working Paper Series*, w.p. # 11704, (National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, October 2005).

existed in the United States. Students and faculty fought these changes and in some cases shut down universities in protest. In addition, while both North American reformers and Latin American students wanted to increase access to higher education, many students organizations held that access to higher education was a fundamental right that should be available to all at a minimum cost to the student. This type of democratization of education was not necessarily the goal of North American reformers, who saw their support of higher education as part of the larger goal to create modern technocrats. The most far-reaching reforms in higher education happened at private schools like Los Andes in Colombia, where administrators had the ability to limit student governance, and under military governments like Chile had after 1973. The Chilean military was able to impose its will and totally remake the university system as it saw fit by repressing the popular will. While some North American reformers felt somewhat troubled by the excesses of the military government in Chile, it's interesting to note that they praised the Colombian government for repressing student and peasant led protests in similarly violent ways. The type of democracy North American reformers wanted to promote in developing countries involved a stable power sharing arrangement between elites, the exact type of government Colombia had under the National Front.

By the late 1960s there was a growing chorus of North American reformers trying to paint military governments as efficient modernizers who cared about building a more just society. Of course, this "efficiency" relied on disappearing thousands of Latin Americans who disagreed with them. All this suggests that the model of top-down reform used by the foundations and the United States government was rarely compatible with popular democracy. There was a generally accepted assumption among North American reformers, grounded in the modernization paradigm, that sustained economic growth would produce political stability and in time the educated citizenry necessary for democratic intuitions to develop. Thus, democracy, while much touted as the ultimate goal, took a back seat to promoting growth and stability.

Global Reform and the State: An Uneasy Alliance

The modernization mission also ran into competing ideas between Latin American reformers and North American reformers about the role of the state in development. Despite the necessary reliance on Latin American states to make projects successful, North American reformers were careful to denounce the type of statism they saw as troublesome. Statism, they argued, was different from the model used in the United States since the New Deal which was based on state-private sector collaboration. A 1964 CIA report on Latin America gets to the heart of why statism as it existed in Latin America was seen as a problem:

Government action or contemplated action against the private sector in combination with the paternalistic trend toward statism in Latin America has not only harmed private investment and frightened away potential new investment but has probably reduced the attractiveness of the area to American foreign capital vis-à-vis Western Europe, Japan, Canada, and other parts of the world. Latin American politicians continue to demonstrate, at least publically, little understanding of the role of private capital and the factors which promote government-business confidence. Expropriations or adverse government actions toward the private sector in recent months have frequently been accompanied by vacuous mouthings to the effect that 'private foreign capital is welcome provided it respects the laws of the land and promotes national objectives.'⁷⁸⁸

The foundations, too, denounced the statism of Latin America, even while promoting the idea of state led development. In their eyes, the two were separate phenomena. One involved state ownership of the means of production and shutting out private investment and the other involved the state making investments in certain fields that then could be best developed by the private sector. The following Ford Foundation assessment of Latin America demonstrates their thinking:

Where agricultural modernization had proceeded, private firms working through the market have preformed major roles in providing production inputs and in combining financing with technical knowledge; they also have handled essential assembly, processing, storage, and distribution functions. An

⁷⁸⁸ "Survey of Latin America," memorandum from Ray Cline, Deputy Director of CIA to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, April 17, 1964, LBJ Library, Papers of LBJ, NSCF, country file, Box 1, folder: National Security File, Country file, p 6-7.

environment conducive to accelerated growth and participation by private firms in these activities is needed throughout much of Latin America.⁷⁸⁹

Thus, North American reformers felt state led development involved public investment for private gain versus statism's claim to public investment for public gain. Latin American reformers often operated under a different paradigm with regard to state involvement in the economy. Both reformers from North and South agreed the state needed take a role in directing change, but they differed with regard to the degree the state should interfere with market forces.

The debate over the role of the state in national development was temporarily paused when neo-liberal ideology swept the globe after Ronald Reagan's victory in the Presidential election of 1980. With the Soviet Union collapsing and free market principle being championed by the World Bank and the IMF, it seemed as though state led development was quickly becoming a relic of the past. Development aid from the West dried up and the very idea of nation building became troublesome. Faced with the collapse of support from their partners in the coalition that had promoted liberal developmentalism abroad, namely the U.S. government and private businesses, the foundations shifted their priorities and began embracing a new trend in development ideology that meshed with the new free market paradigm. Suddenly, answers to development problems lay not in grandiose plans to build institutions involving massive state commitments, but in small private philanthropic groups bringing capitalism down to the poor and creating millions of small entrepreneurs through the expansion of microcredit, or small loans to individuals usually involved in the informal economy.⁷⁹⁰ At the same time North American reformers were busy building up the microfinance industry as a solution to poverty, events

⁷⁸⁹ "Information Paper: The Ford Foundation's Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean: Sectoral Programs, Agriculture," International Division, September, 1967, p. 4, FFA, Conference and Discussion Papers, 002409.

⁷⁹⁰ Milford Bateman, "The Age of Microfinance: Destroying Latin America from the Bottom Up," Austrian Research Foundation for International Development, Working Paper 39, (March 2013). During the development decade microcredit, or small loans to support a commercial endeavor, had been employed in Latin America as part of state led and financed schemes to get small farmers to adopt new technologies and modernize their farms. The new microcredit trend took this idea, which actually had mixed results in terms of helping small farmers, and expanded it to target microenterprises, or small businesses that often operated in the informal economy. The microcredit solution to poverty has lost momentum in recent years due to evidence that it has not effectively addressed large scale poverty and sometimes actually exploits the poor.

around the globe at the turn of the century were bringing the state back into debates about national development and global reform.⁷⁹¹

First, the rising economic power of China and their state led development plan would provide an alternative to market ideology. China's development model not only exposed the long held fallacy that linked modern societies to democracy, it also demonstrated to other developing nations that statist approaches to development could work. While China has taken the lead and is the most extreme example of the new ideology of state led development, others are watching and following suit. Russia, Brazil and India (the original BRIC countries together with China) have to various degrees adopted China's anti-neoliberal model and embarked on a path of state led modernization. The second event that has brought North American reformers back to some of the ideas of liberal developmentalism is 9/11 and the war in the Middle East. Identifying radical Islamic fundamentalists as the new threat to global stability, the United States, with its usual partners, ventured into the Middle East in an effort to stabilize the region and ensure access to oil.⁷⁹² In countries that are occupied by the U.S. military, the American military is remaking the economy by attacking statism (selling off state owned industries) and building infrastructure. In other countries they are joined by the foundations in projects that look remarkably similar to earlier projects in Latin America (higher education reform, public health, agricultural reform, etc.). According to scholar David Ekbladh, "As development regained a clear geopolitical role, old relationships and formulations that marked its era of strategic relevance began to reappear."⁷⁹³

Alongside China's ascent Latin American countries were orchestrating their own rejection of the ideology of market led globalization. Latin America countries have begun to shift policies away from

⁷⁹¹ Both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation began supporting various non-profit microcredit organizations all over the world. The United States government was also funneling large sums of money into these programs.

⁷⁹² See Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, pp. 256-273.

⁷⁹³ Ibid. p. 270.

market driven development and have created once again a strong role for the state where economic and social development are concerned. This shift varies from country to country, as leaders in Venezuela and Bolivia envision a much larger role for the state than leaders in Chile or Brazil, but the type of statism that has a long history in Latin America is on the rise again. The state led development embraced by Latin American countries more recently is thus not something totally new, but in many ways a continuation, albeit on somewhat different terms, of the projects begun in the twentieth century.

Large philanthropic foundations, quintessentially American in their origins, set out to modernize the globe almost a century ago. Latin American became the testing ground for many of the projects the foundations and the U.S. government would initiate in other countries, thus the story of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation has become inextricably intertwined with the story of Latin American development. Foundation projects did help institutionalize technocratic governance and integrate Latin American agriculture, science, and higher education into the global economy. Yet this integration is a point of major contention all throughout Latin America today due to the persistent disparities in wealth and income that technocratic governance and globalization have failed to eradicate. After decades of retrenchment from state led development, Latin American countries are now embracing many of the tenets of liberal developmentalism that North American reformers had championed, suggesting the state matters in national development.⁷⁹⁴ Sustainable development involves a long term commitment, and as long as North American reformers continue to link their goals to the foreign policy goals of the United States their commitments will likely be superficial and fail to address the most important development concerns. Given the historic record and the ideological parameters Ford and Rockefeller operate under altering their approach will be a challenging task.

⁷⁹⁴ While most countries are adopting a Progressive Era stance toward state involvement in the economy, some like Venezuela and Bolivia are following a more radical approach and adopting policies of state socialism.

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- The Population Council
- Rockefeller Brothers' Fund
- Nelson Rockefeller Personal Files

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- NACLA*
- New York Times*
- Santiago Times*
- Semana.com* (Chile)
- The Guardian*
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- UC-Davis News and Information*
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⁷⁹⁵ When research was conducted for this study the Ford Foundation housed their archival material at the Ford Foundation's headquarters in New York, NY. The material had since been moved to the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow.

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