A TOULMIN ANALYSIS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN'S USE OF LOGICAL PROOF AS A MEANS OF AUDIENCE ADAPTATION

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Speech
University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

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by
Hal Rhea Upchurch
January 1969

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ABSTRACT

Many apparent inconsistencies and contradictions surround history's record of the life of John Caldwell Calhoun. During his political career, he made a complete reversal in his philosophy of the powers of the Federal Government. This radical switch from nationalist to sectionalist forced his opposition to those issues which he had earlier advocated. Yet in spite of this radical shift, he consistently maintained the reputation of a great logician.

This study investigates how Calhoun was able to be inconsistent, politically, and logical, rhetorically. The Toulmin construct for reasoning, which is used in this study, enables the critic to chart changes in Calhoun's logical appeals.

The issue of internal improvements crystallizes the dichotomy of Calhoun, the inconsistent, and Calhoun, the logician. Hence, this study investigates his three major speeches on this subject. Support for the thesis entails three major areas of analysis--an examination of Calhoun's political philosophies and his position on internal improvements, an analysis of the three audiences under consideration, and an analysis of his speeches on this issue.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"For more than a quarter of a century the Great Nullifier [John Caldwell Calhoun] was ranked as one of the nation's finest speakers."[1] The one attribute most commonly ascribed to the South Carolinian centered around his use of logical proof. As a speaker, he emphasized intellectual prowess. The merging of this intellect with an abundance of logical proof characterized his speaking. "Confident that all men were rational, he assumed he could win them by the cold force of logic alone."[2]

Throughout his entire career as a public servant, John Calhoun maintained his image as a logical speaker in spite of difficulties caused by a radical change in his political philosophy. He was an ardent nationalist when first elected to the United States House of Representatives in 1810. However, his last speech to Congress in 1850 portrayed an extreme sectionalist engulfed in the cause of the South. By the 1830's this shift of philosophy forced Calhoun's opposition to many issues which he had earlier advocated. Thus, he faced the necessity of asking the same general audience--Congress--to accept opposite conclusions on the same issues.

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[1] Herbert L. Curry, "John C. Calhoun," A History and Criticism of American Public Address, ed. William N. Brigance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943) II, 661.

[2] Gerald M. Capers, "A Reconsideration of John C. Calhoun's Transition from Nationalism to Nullification," The Journal of Southern History, XIV (February, 1948), 37.

In spite of the many inconsistencies caused by the change of political philosophy, Calhoun still enjoyed the reputation of a logical speaker. The existence of this situation formulates the rationale for this study. Herbert L. Curry charged that Calhoun "seems to have been more interested in displaying intellectual processes than in moving men to accept his point of view."[3] This study investigates the converse of Curry's conclusion by examining the following thesis: John Calhoun varied his logical appeals as a means of audience adaptation. Substantiation of this thesis would explain the seeming contradiction surrounding the dichotomy of Calhoun the inconsistent, and Calhoun the logician.

Scope of the Study

Calhoun's three speeches on the issue of Federal involvement in internal improvements comprise the area for investigation.

> Internal improvements meant simply transportation: roads, canals and deepened river channels by means of which the raw materials of the West and South could reach the growing factories of the East, and

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[3] A History and Criticism . . ., II, 661.

> over which in return might flow a steady stream of manufactured goods.[4]

Calhoun's position on internal improvements was a direct manifestation of his national and sectional viewpoints. As his political philosophy changed, his position on this issue switched from one of support to one of opposition. The nationalistic Calhoun introduced a bill for internal improvements in 1817, but his speeches of 1840 and 1845 pictured him as opposed to Federal assistance. Although the issue remained identical, Calhoun's philosophy--and consequently, his position--altered radically.

For the purpose of this study, the terms "nationalist" and "sectionalist" differentiate Calhoun's beliefs regarding the powers of the Federal Government. When nationalistically inclined, he advocated broad governmental powers. As a sectionalist he sought to restrict the Government's powers and protect the rights of the South. Hence, the terms do not apply to every specific circumstance, but merely serve as indicators of the role of the Federal Government in the political philosophy of John Calhoun.

Method of Analysis

A twofold method of analysis is necessary to support the thesis of this study. The first approach involves the analysis of the audiences of the three speeches under consideration: the House of 1817, the

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[4] Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1944) I, 131.

Senate of 1840, and the Memphis Convention of 1845. The second line of analysis entails an examination of the arguments and logical appeals in each of the three speeches. This examination utilizes the Toulmin method of classifying arguments. The study evaluates whether Calhoun's changes in logical proof corresponded to the values of his various audiences.

Chapter II, "The Man," examines Calhoun's background, his political philosophy, speaking career, and position on internal improvements. Chapter III, "The Audiences," explains the construct of audience analysis used in this study and investigates the three audiences in terms of general influences, their positions on internal improvements, and their perceptions of John Calhoun. Chapter IV, "The Speeches," illustrates the Toulmin system and classifies the arguments of the three speeches. Chapter V, "Conclusion," evaluates whether the changes of logical proof investigated in Chapter IV coincide with the values of the audiences as presented in Chapter III.

Justification of the Study

Calhoun's influence as an important southern spokesman justifies an examination of his speaking career. This study adds to present knowledge of his rhetoric in several ways. First, rhetorical critics have devoted little attention to a systematic analysis of Calhoun's logical proof. This work supplements the presently limited amount of research in this area of Calhoun's most dominant appeal.

Also important is the determination of how (if at all) he used his most potent weapon--logical proof--in adapting his communications to fit the desires and beliefs of his individual audiences.

A second general area of justification is the utilization of the Toulmin method of analysis. While not necessarily unique to this study, the use and application of Toulmin might provide greater understanding of the system and hence give insight into its value as a means of rhetorical criticism.

This study also attempts to contribute a unique perspective of Calhoun and his time through the concern of how history changed a man; not how a man changed history. Critics of public address often analyze a particular speech to determine its impact on history. This study reverses that procedure by examining the influence of history on Calhoun's rhetoric.

Review of Related Research

Rhetorically-oriented research on John Calhoun is not abundant. Of the six major speech journals, only one article presents a direct examination of his speaking.[5] However, many articles dealing with southern oratory as well as historical research include incidental references to his rhetoric.

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[5] Robert T. Oliver, "Studies in the Political and Social Views of the Slave-Struggle Orators: I. Calhoun," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXII (October, 1936), 413-429.

The rhetoric of Calhoun is the principal subject of five theses and dissertations. In addition to general analyses,[6] these studies also investigate Calhoun's arguments on foreign affairs[7] and evaluate his debating techniques in pro-slavery speeches.[8] Another source of relevant research includes the more general studies such as Ronald Denison's "A Rhetorical Analysis of Speeches by Segregationists in the Deep South."[9] Finally, historically-oriented studies provide useful information on the life of Calhoun.[10]

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[6] Karl W. Cavanaugh, "A Rhetorical Analysis of John C. Calhoun's Speech on the Force Bill" (unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Dept. of Speech, University of Illinois, 1958); Herbert L. Curry, "John C. Calhoun: Speaker" (unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1941); Carl H. Ritzman, "A Critical Study of Four Representative Speeches on States Rights by John C. Calhoun" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1935).

[7] Malvin L. Hanson, "An Evaluation of the Arguments of Calhoun on Foreign Affairs" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1940).

[8] Herbert L. Curry, "An Evaluation of the Debating Techniques of John C. Calhoun in Representing Pro-Slavery Speeches, 1847-1850" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1936).

[9] Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Dept. of Speech, Purdue University, 1961.

[10] Roxana Shaper, "Southern Anti-Slavery Sentiment and Behavior" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of History, State University of Iowa, 1933); Carolyn Z. Winters, "Defection of the Calhounites, 1832-1840" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of History, State University of Iowa, 1923).

CHAPTER II

THE MAN

Oliver Dyer observed that "there were at least two Calhoun's perhaps there were several."[1] This appraisal of the South Carolinian's political beliefs applied to his speaking career as well. From a rhetorical standpoint, at least four Calhouns emerged between 1811 and 1850. During his tenure in the United States House of Representatives from 1811 to 1817, Calhoun was a nationalistic advocate of extensive Federal action. After 1830 a second image pictured him as "The Great Nullifier." As such, the sectionalistic southerner condemned the broad powers of the Central Government and argued for state sovereignty. The third Calhoun spanned both the nationalist and sectionalist periods in his active attempt to gain the presidency. First nominated in Pennsylvania in 1822, Calhoun sought this office until his death in 1850. Finally, his speaking caused many contemporaries to regard him as "the greatest logician in America."[2] Each of these four images contributed not only to how his audiences perceived him, but also to the style and content of his speeches. Therefore, this chapter analyzes Calhoun from these four viewpoints.

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[1] Great Senators of the United States Forty Years Ago (New York: R. Bonner's Sons, 1889), p. 186.

[2] Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun, American Portrait (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 48.

Nationalism and Sectionalism

Calhoun the nationalist

Calhoun first took his seat as Representative of South Carolina on November 4, 1811. From that time until he became Secretary of War in 1817, he "approached every subject that came before the House from a standpoint of broad nationalism."[3] In this period, nationalism was "the idea of one for one, one for all and all for the United States. . . ."[4] Calhoun weighed all issues according to how they would benefit the United States as a whole, not South Carolina or the South in general. He believed

> to legislate for our country requires not only the most enlarged views, but a species of self-devotion not exacted in any other. In a country so extensive, and so various in its interests, what is necessary for the common good may apparently be opposed to the interests of particular sections. It must be submitted to as a condition of our greatness.[5]

The young nationalist quickly informed the House of these beliefs. In his maiden speech to that body, Calhoun stated:

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[3] Gaillard Hunt, John C. Calhoun (Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs & Co., 1908), p. 24.

[4] Malvin L. Hansen, "An Evaluation of the Arguments of John C. Calhoun on Foreign Affairs," (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1935), p. 81.

[5] "Speech on the Internal Improvement Bill," The Works of John C. Calhoun, ed. Richard K. Cralle (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854), II, 191. Hereafter referred to as Works.

> There is, Sir, one principle necessary to make us a great people, . . . and that is, to protect every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business. He will then feel that he is backed by the government; . . . and will rejoice in its increased strength and prosperity.[6]

The first demonstration of Calhoun's nationalism was his support for and advocacy of the War of 1812. As a member of the "War Hawks," he urged the nation to vindicate America's honor; to openly and definantly resist oppression and insult. Supplementing this ostensible purpose was a desire for national expansion and economic growth. At this time there was considerable sentiment "to add Canada to the United States in fulfillment of Manifest Destiny. . . . The lower South was eagerly desirous of seizing Florida. . . ."[7] Calhoun visualized an economic-political alliance between the South and the West as a result of the War. Such an alliance would dominate the Union, and the South would dominate the alliance.

Therefore, Calhoun's support of the War reflected his feelings of "one for one," and of "one for all and all for the United States." He felt the War to be a means of protecting the nation's honor and achieving Manifest Destiny. Also, in the spirit of "one for one," the nationalistic southerner hoped that United States' involvement would economically and politically strengthen the South. These motives made Calhoun the House's strongest champion of the War.[8]

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[6] "Speech on the Resolution of the Committee on Foreign Relations," Works., II, 6.

[7] Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (2d ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), pp. 187-188.

After the Treaty of Ghent in December, 1814, "blueprints for a broadening Union dominated his thinking."[9] Calhoun's efforts at legislation revolved around four nationalistic goals. He desired the development of an adequate policy of defense, construction of an efficient system of internal transportation, protection of the American manufacturing industry, and the strengthening of the United States' financial system. His concern for a strong and self-sufficient nation evolved partially from his fear of future wars with Great Britain.

> I am sure that future wars with England are not only possible, but I will say more, they are highly probable--nay, that they will certainly take place. Future wars, I fear (with the Honorable Speaker)-- future wars, long and bloody, will exist between this country and Great Britain.[10]

This fear, coupled with a sincere desire for establishing a strong and independent United States, accounted for Calhoun's role as "the chief champion of some of the most national measures voted by that [the fourteenth] Congress."[11] To develop a reliable defense, he advocated a continual maintenance of over-all military readiness, a substantial strengthening of the Navy, and establishment of more Federal military schools such as West Point. His arguments in favor of these schools hinted of compulsory military training.[12] To achieve a system of efficient transportation, Calhoun believed the Federal Government should sponsor the building of roads and canals. His concern for protection of the manufacturing industry and stability of the financial system resulted in his support of a protective tariff and a strong national bank. Perhaps the best summary of Calhoun's career as a Representative was the succinct observation of August O. Spain: "certainly, he was something of a nationalist."[13]

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[8] Hunt, p. 28. [9] Coit, p. 109.

[10] "Speech on the Repeal of the Direct Tax," Works., II, 142.

[11] John W. Burgess, The Middle Period: 1817-1858 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), p. 2.

The presidential election of 1816 marked both the beginning of the "Era of Good Feelings," and the end of Calhoun's career as a Representative. Republican James Monroe gained the presidency with virtually little opposition, for "the Federalists were so discredited by their conduct during the War of 1812 that they did not even bother to nominate a candidate."[14] On March 3, 1817, Calhoun left the House and assumed duties as Monroe's Secretary of War.

Even though Calhoun did little speaking during his eight years as Secretary of War, he continued to strive for nationalistic goals. America's lack of military readiness in the War of 1812 haunted Calhoun and forced him to strive for constant improvements in national defense. "He reorganized the department to a high degree of efficiency, eliminated corruption, fought earnestly for an adequate system of fortifications and a strong army."[15] Calhoun also supported the development of internal transportation under the guise of military necessity. These actions, as well as the Secretary's liberal Indian policy and involvements in foreign affairs, demonstrated a consistent adherence to the philosophy of nationalism. As Secretary of War from 1817 to 1825, "Calhoun's vote was usually on the side of bold action."[16]

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[12] Coit, p. 110.

[13] The Political Theory of John C. Calhoun (New York: Bookman Associates, 1951), p. 15.

[14] Ray A. Billington, American History Before 1877 (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1966), I, 137.

Calhoun served as Vice-President from 1825 to 1832 under the administrations of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson. The transition from nationalism to sectionalism occurred during these seven years. His reversal in political beliefs represented not just a change in one man, but was rather an indication of a widespread and growing trend toward sectionalism.

Background of the emergence of sectionalism

During this period of history, the term "section" referred to "a geographic area devoted to economic enterprises peculiarly suited to the unique environment."[17] The three basic sections by 1824 were the Northeast, the

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[15] Eaton, p. 303. [16] Hunt, p. 47.

[17] Billington, I, 141.

West, and the South. The respective economies of each section destined the South to an eventual role of a minority.

Preoccupation with industry and development of manufacturing prompted the Northeast's legislative demands. Their economic interests called for high protective tariffs to stifle foreign competition and internal improvements to facilitate the expansion of home markets. These measures advocated by the Northeast also proved advantageous to the agricultural economy of the sparsely-settled western region. The western farmers desired a protective tariff to develop the home market and good roads for shipping their crops to the East in exchange for manufactured goods.

However, both these measures harmed the export-import nature of the southern cotton economy. Lack of diversification necessitated foreign markets for southern crops. Protective tariffs curtailed the ability of the South to import foreign goods and thus interfered with cotton exports. Likewise, the South also opposed Federal expenditures on internal improvements. These projects did not benefit southern economic interests, and their cost merely opened the door for high tariffs to provide governmental revenue. Therefore, southern interests conflicted with the needs of the Northeast and West.

Regardless of whether protective tariffs legitimately harmed southern interests or whether they simply provided a convenient scapegoat for the economic ills lingering from the Panic of 1819, southern opposition to the tariff increased rapidly. The concept of protectionism began in nationalistic fervor with the Tariff of 1816 and continued with still higher duties in the Tariff of 1824. In reaction to this act, both the Senate and the House of South Carolina denounced protective tariffs and Federally-sponsored internal improvements as unconstitutional. This action marked "the first official condemnation by any State legislature"[18] and provided a forewarning of coming conflicts.

The southern position of states' rights and the theory of nullification developed after the 1828 Tariff of Abominations. This Bill represented a political maneuver by the supporters of Andrew Jackson. Believing that Congress would defeat the excessively high duties prescribed in the Bill, Jackson's followers planned to gain political support in the Northeast and West for having introduced a high-tariff bill, and in the South for having defeated it. However, the Northeast demonstrated unexpected strength and foiled this ingenious scheme by passing the "abominable" legislation. This new law confirmed the fear instilled in the southern mind as a result of the Missouri Controversy of 1820--the South had become both a political and economic minority. As a means of protection, southerners sought refuge in the constitutional rights of the states. The champion of this cause was the nationalist turned sectionalist, John--"The Great Nullifier"--Calhoun.

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[18] Frederick Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928), p. 14.

Calhoun the sectionalist

At the time of his election to the vice-presidency in 1825, Calhoun was the epitome of a nationalistic statesman. However, the Calhoun who resigned that office in 1832 had reversed all of his earlier nationalistic beliefs. The totality of that reversal not only prompted frequent cries of treason, but also caused President Jackson to threaten the rebellious Calhoun with a hanging from the nearest tree.

Calhoun realized that the geographic and economic differences of the various sections destined the South to a minority position. Since in 1816, no interest which was alien to South Carolina threatened to dominate the Union, he supported measures such as the protective tariff because of their benefits to the other sections of the country.[19] However, by 1827 Calhoun believed a system of free trade necessary to the economic maintenance of the South. "He was convinced that it [the tariff] had brought depression to the section in which he lived and antagonism between the sections; therefore he now opposed it."[20]

In reaction to the Tariff of Abominations, Calhoun wrote the South Carolina Exposition.[21] This document challenged the constitutionality of the Tariff and the North's merciless exploitation of the South. The remedy to such oppression was the right of a sovereign state to nullify an unconstitutional Federal law. The result of this doctrine was the reservation of a state's unprecedented right to veto Federal legislation.

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[19] Christopher Hollis, The American Heresy (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1930), p. 87.

[20] Hunt, p. 62.

[21] Works., VI, 1-59.

South Carolina enacted this doctrine by nullifying the Tariff of 1832 and prohibiting collection of import duties within the State. This action created such a crisis that the people of the State "began to prepare for defending the homeland from the invasion of Federal forces."[22] At this time, Calhoun, having completed his retreat from nationalism, resigned the vice-presidency. "He had arrived at the State Rights position slowly and painfully, over a long period of time, but he was now there to stay. . . ."[23]

Immediately after "The Great Nullifier's" resignation, the constituents of South Carolina elected him Senator. Whereas Calhoun, the nationalist, had viewed every issue before the House from a standpoint of broad nationalism, the sectionalistic Senator "sought to restrict the government's powers so that the majority could not inflict mortal injury on a minority South."[24] Thus, as a sectionalist, Calhoun opposed those measures which he had earlier advocated--the tariff, a national bank, and Federally-sponsored internal improvements. His efforts revolved around one central idea; he "would save the Union if he could, but first of all he would save the South. . . ."[25] "The Great Nullifier" sought this objective for eighteen years through constitutional manipulations and fervid enunciations of states' rights. Calhoun's admission to complete and final defeat came just twenty-seven days before his death.[26] After all other attempts had failed, he finally "was reduced to a plea of mercy for the South."[27]

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[22] Eaton, p. 308.

[23] Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1951), III, 22.

[24] Matthew A. Fitzsimons, "Calhoun's Bid for the Presidency, 1841-1844," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVIII (June, 1951), 42.

Internal Improvements

Knowledge of both the development of internal improvements and of Calhoun's beliefs regarding these projects is necessary to an understanding of the Carolinian's speaking on that subject. To provide the needed historical perspective, this section first summarizes the growth of transportation through the early 1800's. The second portion traces Calhoun's changing beliefs on this subject.

Development of internal improvements

Roads.--Although the early colonists traveled by water whenever possible, the primary mode of transportation was either by foot or horse. The absence of good roads and trails not only hindered travel, but also made progress excessively difficult. Therefore, the improvement of roads represented an early step in the development of America's transportation system.

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[25] Wiltse, III, 22.

[26] "Speech on the Slavery Question," Works., VI, 542-574.

[27] Andrew N. Lytle, "John C. Calhoun," The Southern Review, III (Winter, 1938), 528.

Both the Federal Government and individual enterprise sponsored the early road-building activities. The efforts of the private sector in developing a transportation network resulted in corporations and joint-stock associations. "By 1800 over 300 corporations had been created, chiefly for providing social overhead capital. . . ."[28]

In 1794 the nation's first gravel turnpike connected the cities of Philadelphia and Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Sponsored by a private corporation, this sixty-six mile road cost $465,000.[29] "A mania for building turnpikes followed the opening of the Philadelphia and Lancaster turnpike."[30] During the next few years, Pennsylvania granted eighty-six road charters, New York had one hundred thirty-seven transportation companies, and the other New England states chartered over two hundred similar corporations.

The principal Federal endeavor of this period was the Cumberland Road. In 1806 Congress authorized this project to connect the East with the Mississippi Valley for the ostensible purpose of aiding the delivery of mail. By 1852 the road stretched a total of six hundred miles and "the Federal government had appropriated altogether $7,000,000 for its building and for repairs."[31] Calhoun's introduction of the Bonus Bill of 1817 marked the second major attempt for Federal assistance in internal improvements.

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[28] Arthur Bining and Thomas C. Cochran, The Rise of American Economic Life (4th ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 179.

[29] Harold U. Faulkner, American Economic History (rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1924), pp. 327-332.

[30] Bining and Cochran, p. 182.

Inland Waterways.--Completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 symbolized American interest in the great canal era. Although the Erie was the largest, most important, and most profitable of the early canals, several others

> had been built much earlier: one seven miles in length connecting Richmond and Westham was authorized in 1785; the Dismal Swamp Canal in Virginia and North Carolina was begun in 1787 and completed in 1794; the twenty-two mile Santee Canal between the Santee River and Charleston in South Carolina was completed in 1802; a canal of 108 miles with 129 locks, completed between 1815 and 1826, made navigation of the Schuylkill River possible, and canals were constructed in New England in 1808 and 1812.[32]

Although the canal movement was active in 1817, the Federal Government had not assisted in its development. Financing of the inland waterways depended upon the initiative of the states and various private corporations.

Railroads.--The rail industry grew from infancy to near maturity during the latter part of Calhoun's career. Growth of the railroads resulted from the efforts of private enterprise, communities, towns, and cities; but not from Federal aid. "Many corporations looked to the Federal government for aid, but the constitutional argument, supported especially by the southerners in Congress, prevented direct assistance until the Civil War."[33]

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[31] Ibid., p. 185.

[32] Herbert L. Curry, "John C. Calhoun: Speaker" (unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1941), p. 236.

Summary.--The concept of internal improvements in transportation was a relatively new, yet rapidly expanding activity during the years Calhoun served as Representative. In spite of much progress in road and waterway development, the needs of the nation demanded still more improvement. The Federal Government established the precedent of Federally-sponsored activities with the authorization of the Cumberland Road in 1806. However, this one instance marked the only deviation from the policy of private or local support. On many occasions during Calhoun's career as a public official, the Federal Government attempted to aid America's developing transportation network. The next section explains Calhoun's nationalistic and later sectionalistic reactions to these attempts at Federal involvement.

Calhoun and internal improvements

As a nationalist.--John Calhoun perceived an energetic system of internal improvements as one of the four fundamental measures necessary to the development of a strong and united America. He therefore advocated Federal support and maintenance of the roads, canals, harbors, and other projects beneficial to the economic development of the Union.

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[33] Bining and Cochran, p. 203.

Calhoun proposed central rather than local support for two reasons. First, he believed that agricultural as well as manufacturing and mining interests would benefit from extensive national aid. A well-developed transportation system would provide a means by which the Northeast's finished products would conveniently reach the markets of the South and West in exchange for the raw materials and agricultural goods needed in New England. Since the benefits of good transportation applied equally to all economic sections, all should share in the burden of construction. Calhoun's second argument focused on the practicality of local administration. Although private and local agencies had contributed greatly, the present policy of expecting them to continually support, maintain, improve, and administer these projects was not only unrealistic, but also precluded a uniform development. Internal improvements required "the resources and general superintendence of this government to effect and complete them."[34]

Consistent to this nationalistic philosophy, Calhoun introduced legislation for Federally-built internal improvements in 1817. This Bonus Bill allotted "the $1,500,000 bonus paid the government for its charter by the Second

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[34] "Speech on the Internal Improvement Bill," Works., II, 188.

National Bank to the construction of internal improvements. . . ."[35] The southern nationalist claimed the constitutionality of the Bill to be inherent within the enumerated powers; specifically, within the word "necessary." He reasoned that "the constitution gives to Congress the power to establish post-offices and post-roads,"[36] and the construction of internal improvements qualified as post-roads. The Bill narrowly passed both in the House and the Senate, but President Madison promptly vetoed it as unconstitutional. An attempt to pass the Bill over this veto was unsuccessful.

As Secretary of War, Calhoun continued to advocate Federally-sponsored roads and canals. "He called for highways and canals to link the nation together. He sent expeditions to explore the Mississippi and Missouri Basins."[37] The Secretary argued that "a judicious system of roads and canals . . . is itself among the most efficient means for 'the more complete defence of the United States.'"[38] This system required Federal finance and support since "the Government has a deep stake in them [roads and canals], and as the system of defence will not be perfect without their completion. . . ."[39] To avoid all question of constitutionality, Calhoun suggested an amendment to authorize internal improvements.

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[35] Billington, I, 136.

[36] "Speech on the Internal Improvement Bill," Works., II, 193.

[37] Coit, p. 132.

[38] "Report on Roads and Canals," Works., V, 41.

[39] Ibid., p. 47.

As a sectionalist.--Although he was a consistent advocate of the desirability of internal improvements, his beliefs regarding the manner in which they should be supported changed during his sectionalist years. He had now "learned to test governmental questions by a different touchstone."[40] Whereas in 1817 Calhoun argued the practicality of Federal superintendence, in 1840 he remarked, "the experience of a quarter of a century has proved that this government was utterly unfit to carry on works of this kind."[41]

Calhoun clearly stated his position on internal improvements in his "Report on the Memphis Memorial," in 1846.[42] He believed that unless unusual conditions existed, support for such improvements was the responsibility of either state governments or private capital.[43] The sectionalist specifically outlined those instances which allowed the Central Government to give both direct and indirect assistance. Justification for direct Federal administration existed only in cases involving three or more states or where the proposed project passed through public lands.[44] "But though it may not be in the power of the General Government to give any considerable direct aid in execution of the system, yet it may give indirectly very essential aid."[45] One example of this indirect aid was the granting of portions of public land to those state or private concerns interested in developing transportation facilities. A second type of Federal assistance entailed reducing import duties on the materials needed for construction.[46]

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[40] Hunt, p. 290.

[41] "Speech on the Cumberland Road Bill," Works., III, 491.

[42] Works., V, 246-311.

[43] "Address to the Memphis Convention," Works., VI, 280.

Summary.--Calhoun recognized the need for good transportation and consistently advocated such development throughout his career. However, his position regarding the means of supporting these projects shifted with his changing political beliefs. As a nationalist, the Representative from South Carolina argued that Federal administration was constitutional, practical, and advantageous. By 1840, however, like the price of cotton, Calhoun's opinion of Federal control had dropped rapidly. He not only denounced the impracticality of Federal supervision, but also questioned the constitutionality of such actions.

Calhoun and the Presidency

The complex and often confusing image of Calhoun which developed because of the incompatibility of his nationalist and sectionalist politics received further complication from his intense desire for the presidency. "For a period covering thirty years, from the time he was a young man until his death at the age of sixty-eight, Calhoun was an aspirant to the presidency. . . . This overwhelming ambition was ever in his mind. . . ."[47] The combination of this desire and of his sectionalist beliefs placed Calhoun in an awkward position. While his intellect and personal feelings demanded a constant defense of southern interests, his political survival depended upon the maintenance of good relations and cooperation with all sections. "The task was great--even for Calhoun's intellect--the task of being a nationalist in the North, a states' right man in the South--and at peace with his own soul."[48]

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[44] "Report on the Memphis Memorial," Works., V, 275, 289.

[45] "Address to the Memphis Convention," Works., VI 281.

[46] Ibid., pp. 281-282.

The incongruity of these images--nationalist, sectionalist and presidential desire--caused frequent and savage condemnations of "The Great Nullifier."

> Because of the differences between his views prior to 1816 and after 1830 on many public questions, he has been pictured as a scheming, unscrupulous politician who rode every political wind in an effort to achieve the presidency; and that in this effort he consciously led the nation toward Civil War.[49]

Although most historians have subsequently discounted such charges, the inhesion of this attitude in Calhoun's ethos severely damaged his image as a speaker.

He did not actively seek the presidency until the election of 1824, but evidence of his future intentions existed as early as 1817. After Calhoun introduced the

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[47] Hunt, p. 49. [48] Coit, p. 144. [49] Curry, p. 40.

Bonus Bill, Thomas Hart Benton "accused him of having favored internal improvements . . . so as to curry favor and improve his chances for the presidency."[50] Gerald M. Capers argued that Calhoun's desire to become President probably "was his chief reason for accepting the secretaryship of war under Monroe."[51]

Calhoun made his first open presidential bid in 1821. "His nationalistic record as a War Hawk and as a supporter of the Bank of the United States, federally-sponsored internal improvements, and a tariff provided material for appeals to all sections of the country."[52] These policies made the South Carolina statesman extremely popular in Pennsylvania, and that State initially nominated him in 1822--two years before the election. By 1824,

> almost every top-rank statesman who had not already held that office was running . . . and the mere list of candidates sounds like a roll-call of American history: John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, William H. Crawford, William Lowndes, Andrew Jackson, John C. Calhoun.[53]

Originally, Calhoun believed his chances for election were excellent. However, Pennsylvania's surprise support of Jackson awakened the hopeful candidate to his coming disappointment. He wisely chose to bide his time, and become the running-mate of "Old Hickory." This decision of political necessity resulted in Calhoun's serving as Vice-President for seven years, and thus temporarily delayed his attempts to gain the presidency.

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[50] Hunt, p. 216.

[51] John C. Calhoun, Opportunist: A Reappraisal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p. 76.

[52] Fitzsimons, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVIII, 40.

[53] Coit, p. 139.

Virtually everyone except Martin Van Buren, the "Little Magician," knew that Jackson would select Calhoun as his running-mate in 1832, and that the South Carolinian would then become President in 1836. Unhampered by this seemingly common consensus, the "Little Magician" rapidly gained the favor of "Old Hickory."

> The source of Van Buren's influence over Jackson remains somewhat a mystery. . . . Yet Van Buren was an opportunist who studied the character of "Old Hickory" and treated him with unfailing tact. . . . Observing that the planter-President liked to exercise by horseback-riding, Van Buren acquired a horse and often his plump little figure would be seen bobbing up and down on his horse as he rode beside the stern old man.[54]

A combination of Van Buren's perceptive analysis of Jackson with several other events resulted in a split between the President and Vice-President which, for all practical purposes, destroyed Calhoun's chances of ever becoming President.

The first sign of the impending break was a social crisis that developed when Jackson's close friend and Secretary of War, John Eaton, married a former barmaid. Despite the wishes of the President, most of Washington's official society, led by Mrs. John Calhoun, refused to accept the lady and her questionable reputation. "The occasion gave Van Buren a golden opportunity to win the heart of the determined Old Hero, for being a widower and unencumbered by female protocol, he became especially attentive to the snubbed lady."[55]

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[54] Eaton, pp. 268-269.

The most damaging blow to Calhoun was Jackson's discovery that his Vice-President had been the one member of Monroe's cabinet who wished to punish him for his Florida raid of 1818. As Secretary of War, Calhoun had ordered General Jackson to protect American citizens from Indian uprisings in Florida. "Old Hickory" was tragically effective in this assignment.

> The Indians he disposed of in short order; then started in on the British and Spaniards. Within fifty-nine days the job was completed. St. Marks had fallen; Fort Barrancas had fallen; Pensacola had fallen; the Spanish governor was in Jackson's hands; an Englishman named Ambrister . . . had been shot; a Scottish trader . . . had been hanged.[56]

This incident had greatly embarrassed the Monroe administration and Calhoun had recommended a censure of the over-enthusiastic general. Jackson's accidental discovery of Calhoun's feelings, though over ten years belated, opened an irreparable split between the two men.

About this time, the nation learned of Calhoun's secret authorship of the South Carolina Exposition, and he resigned his position as Vice-President in order to defend his home state in the crisis developing as a result of the nullification of the Tariff of 1832. The combination of these events as well as later quarrels between the two men explained why "to the end of a long and tempestuous life, Andrew Jackson regretted that he had not hanged John C. Calhoun."[57]

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[55] *Ibid.*, p. 269. [56] Coit, p. 123.

Although the split with Jackson ruined Calhoun's practical chances of ever becoming President, his hopes, nonetheless, remained. In 1842, he resigned his position in the Senate to prepare for the 1844 campaign. "It now remains for the people of the United States to determine how long [I] shall continue in retirement."[58] The efforts of Calhoun and his followers during this campaign excelled those of every election since 1822.[59] Notable among these efforts was his authorship of a campaign autobiography under the pseudonym of H. M. T. Hunter.[60] However, the election of James Polk signaled still another defeat and disappointment for the aspiring Calhoun.

Thus, John Calhoun never achieved the one position which he wanted above all others. His recompense for seeking the office consisted only of creating suspicion and making enemies of such men as Thomas Hart Benton and Andrew Jackson.

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[57] Wiltse, I, 1.

[58] "Letter to James Hammond," The Papers of John C. Calhoun, ed. Robert L. Meriwether (Charleston: University of South Carolina Press, 1959), II, 522.

[59] Coit, p. 350.

[60] Life of John Caldwell Calhoun (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1843).

Calhoun as a Logical Speaker

The images of Calhoun as nationalist, sectionalist, and desiring presidential candidate caused considerable difficulty in understanding his motives and intentions. From a rhetorical viewpoint, Calhoun's use of logical proof, and his resulting reputation as a "master logician,"[61] further compound the difficulty of understanding the complexities inherent in his career. This section analyzes how Calhoun was able to logically support the opposite conclusions of his nationalist and sectionalist years.

Calhoun's attributes as a logician

Blessed with "an orderly, analytical mind, [and] a clear mental vision,"[62] Calhoun possessed "an uncanny power to analyze complicated circumstances and show . . . the underlying and controlling factors hidden in the tangle."[63] Although he demonstrated unusual powers of analysis, Calhoun lacked the ability to sway the emotions of his hearers. Therefore, "he turned, as it was only natural that he should, to close logic and to what had the appearance of cold reason. . . ."[64] Coit described the development of the southerner's speaking style as follows:

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[61] Carl H. Ritzman, "A Critical Study of Four Representative Speeches on States Rights by John C. Calhoun" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1935), p. 169.

[62] Hunt, p. 34.

[63] Arthur Styron, The Cast-Iron Man: John C. Calhoun and American Democracy (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1935), p. 50.

[64] Capers, p. 35.

> Calhoun was aware of his weaknesses. Wisely he determined not to aim for the graces which he sensed were alien to him, but to build upon his natural powers. Not style but content would be his aim; not display but simplicity of speech and gesture. . . . The results were effective. Before he left Congress, a journalist would describe him as "the most elegant speaker who sits in the House."[65]

Thus, Calhoun's oratory appealed to the minds of men rather than to their hearts. This emphasis on content and reasoning reflected "the assumption that all you need to do to lead men is to convince them."[66] He failed to consistently lead or convince his contemporaries, but rather impressed them mainly as a "thinking machine."[67] This logician who "was prepared to make every measure of government stand or fall as a syllogism,"[68] probably suffered his greatest weakness because of his confidence "that no one could resist his facts and reasoning."[69]

Characteristics of Calhoun's reasoning

Premises.--An episode which occurred at a dinner party which Calhoun attended provided an example of the key to his reasoning power. On that occasion, he explained his theory of the trade winds to an English sea-captain. The captain remarked that his many travels across the equator did not sustain Calhoun's beliefs. "Yet the company, convinced by Calhoun's argument, were surprised that the captain's experience did not agree with it."[70] In referring to this incident, Coit crystallized an important and rather common characteristic of Calhoun's reasoning.

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[65] P. 109.

[66] Gamaliel Bradford, As God Made Them (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), p. 93.

[67] Ibid., p. 89.

[68] Hunt, pp. 246-247.

[69] Bancroft, p. 157.

> Had Calhoun's political enemies been present, they might have seen in his little triumph one of his greatest weaknesses: the failure to examine his premises with the care and effort he put into his logical deductions, thus arriving at the "most startling conclusions."[71]

In other words, Calhoun proceeded backwards in his reasoning process. Rather than formulating his conclusions from premises inherent to his political beliefs, "he worked from his conclusions, often intuitively reached, back to constitutional and economic premises."[72] Instead of attempting a logical determination of the expediency or inexpediency of a proposed policy, the southern statesman instinctively formulated his conclusions and then retrogressed to the most convenient premise. Therefore, his arguments from an original premise did not necessarily represent the real reasons for his conclusions. On the contrary, they were often merely "the children of the desired results."[73]

Reasoning from premises.--Although "The Great Nullifier's" bases for argument tended to represent bogus

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[70] *Ibid.*, p. 158. [71] P. 395. [72] Capers, p. 58.

[73] Hansen, p. 21.

"dunes of shifting sand,"[74] his reasoning "from his stated premises . . . [was] inexorable."[75] The following description by Curry indicated the comprehensiveness of Calhoun's logical development.

> Calhoun's greatest strength as a speaker lay in his constructive logical methods of argument. His favorite inductive logical devices were those of argument from causal relation and authority, although analogy and specific instances were not omitted. Categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms were employed, usually in enthymemic form. These enthymemes, as well as some of the causal relations series, were frequently developed into long and complicated chains of argument which were constructed with few, if any flaws in the series. . . . His rhetorical kit contained virtually every tool of destruction known--including a complete repertoire of the various fallacies of both inductive and deductive logic and the various special devices of refutation--such as reductio ad absurdum, exposing inconsistencies, counter argument, the dilemma, the method of residues, and turning the tables.[76]

Calhoun simply overpowered his adversaries by bludgeoning them with his iron-clad logical development. "Discomforted opponents . . . found it difficult to match his logical arguments and too great a task to dig up his premises and attempt to confute them."[77] Although the task of "digging up" the premises and subjecting them to close scrutiny was great, it remained a virtual necessity. "Those who unwarily accepted Calhoun's premises usually found themselves caught in a locked vice of logic."[78]

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[74] Ibid., p. 22. [75] Ritzman, p. 107.

[76] pp. 115-116. [77] Spain, p. 30.

[78] Gerald M. Capers, "A Reconsideration of John C. Calhoun's Transition from Nationalism to Nullification" The Journal of Southern History, XIV (February, 1948), 36.

Summary

"Calhoun was a good speaker who achieved fame as a result of the points of view he presented and the logic with which those views were enforced."[79] However, these very factors which contributed to his greatness as a speaker also created a complex and confusing image of Calhoun, the man. His nationalism, sectionalism and desire to become President greatly compounded a clear understanding of his points of view. His changing beliefs on the subject of internal improvements illustrated the perplexing manner in which nationalism, sectionalism, and seeking the Presidency influenced his actions.

Calhoun "had taken his stand on a principle, and followed up the consequences of it with masterly logic and fatalistic sternness of purpose."[80] The two major characteristics of his logical proof consisted of the manner in which he developed his premises and his resulting iron-clad reasoning. "Whether Calhoun was a statesman or a maddening pedant, ready to disrupt a Continent in order that he might have an exercise in logic-chopping, depends upon whether we grant or not the original premise. . . ."[81] When his audiences accepted the premises, the southern logician "was invincible in pure argumentation"[82] and

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[79] Curry, p. 166.

[80] Herman E. Van Holst, John C. Calhoun (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917), p. 75.

[81] Hollis, p. 97. [82] Ritzman, p. 169.

"swatted rhetorical flies with a hammer."[83]

John Calhoun was a man of many images. As a result, both his contemporaries and subsequent historians questioned and criticized the intentions and motives of "The Great Nullifier." However, in his defense of the South, he seemed oblivious to such indictments. His enunciation and advocacy of issues such as nullification and states' rights evolved simply because "his intellect was forced to come to grips with them by the specific interests and conditions surrounding him."[84]

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[83] Curry, p. 116.

[84] Harold S. Schultz, "A Century of Calhoun Biographies," South Atlantic Quarterly, L (April, 1951), 250.

CHAPTER III

THE AUDIENCES

Method of Analysis

"One of the first duties of the public address critic, if he is to . . . analyze rhetoric, or judge and assess the speaker's prowess, is to evaluate the nature of a specific audience at a critical juncture in history."[1] The determination of whether Calhoun adapted his logical proofs to fit the circumstances unique to each particular audience requires a critical analysis of each audience under consideration.

For the purpose of this study, audience analysis refers to "the application of all that is known about human behavior in general to a specific audience in order to anticipate or evaluate their response to a particular persuasive communication."[2] Although discussions of audience analysis usually focus on the speaker and his understanding of an audience, most of the present recommendations apply to the critic of public address as well. Those factors which help a speaker anticipate a specific audience's response to a particular speech also enable the critic to better evaluate the traits of a given audience. In other words, that which allows the speaker to adapt permits the critic to evaluate.

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[1] Anthony Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions: The Art of Public Address Criticism (New York: Random House, Inc., 1966), p. 29.

[2] Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 241.

Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird list eleven characteristics which are necessary for understanding an audience.

> (1) age level; (2) sex; (3) intellectual and informational status with regard to the subject; (4) the political, social, religious, and other affiliations; (5) the economic status; (6) known or anticipated attitude toward the subject; (7) known or anticipated prejudices and predispositions; (8) occupational status; (9) known interest in the subject; (10) considerations of self-interest in the subject; and (11) temper and tone of the occasion.[3]

While most speech theorists agree with these "basics" enumerated by Thonssen and Baird, the concept of audience analysis varies with the emphasis or individuality of each writer. For example, Wayne Minnick approaches analysis from six general considerations[4] while J. Jeffery Auer discusses only two.[5] Both men, however, encompass the same factors listed by Thonssen and Baird.

Formulation of the type of audience analysis conducted in this study involves not only the principles of men such as Thonssen, Baird, Minnick, and Auer, but also the warning of Theodore Clevenger.

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[3] Speech Criticism (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 361-362.

[4] pp. 247-251.

[5] Brigance's Speech Communication (3d ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), p. 89.

> Audience analysis principles . . . must be understood as a means of getting into the analysis, as tools for thinking about the audience situation, as suggestive principles only. If we try to develop algorithms for audience analysis--rules that are capable of carrying us rigorously through a complete analysis to communication decisions--or if we try to treat whatever principles are developed as if they could be made to work in this way, then valid and effective analysis will always be beyond our reach. It is only when we understand audience analytic techniques as beginning points for analysis that we can use them effectively.
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> What this means is that the communicator must, at some point in his analysis of the audience, formulate his own analytic principles to cover the specific situation in which he finds himself. General principles may get him started and set the direction of his analysis, but when he gets into the details of the problem, he will usually find himself on his own without specific recommendations to follow and with only general principles to guide him.[6]

This writer believes that Clevenger's remarks on the "communicator" apply equally to the critic.

In essence, the specific audience analysis of this study can utilize general suggestions or rules, but does not remain tied to such principles. The analysis seeks to discover that material which explains the make-up of Calhoun's audiences. The specific guidelines for analysis come from the audiences themselves rather than from a pre-established set of principles. Thus, the study seeks to identify and incorporate the historical and biographical data relevant to an understanding of the audiences under consideration.

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[6] Audience Analysis (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966), p. 50.

The analysis seeks to answer three questions: (1) What was the influence of the times upon the audience? (2) What was the audience's position on the issue of internal improvements? (3) What was the audience's perception of John Calhoun?

The House of 1817

General Influences

The Second Generation of American Statesmen

Perhaps one motivation for American involvement in the War of 1812 evolved from the nation's need of a controversy. The issues and conflicts arising from thirty-odd years since gaining independence from England subjected the people of the United States to many demands. They had successfully adapted to the requirements of the new constitution, had formulated economic policies applicable to a nation rather than to separate colonies, and had begun the process of governing America. By the year 1811, the nation reached a stage of inertia and was politically stagnant. The constituents reacted to this inactivity with the election of the Second Generation of American Statesmen. "Fully half the members of the House of Representatives for the Session of 1811-12 were newcomers to Washington."[7]

This congressional turnover marked the end of America's colonial period and the beginning of a spirit of nationalism. The new breed of statesmen, as represented by John Calhoun, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster, were not as closely tied to such influences as the Founding Fathers, the "Spirit of 76," George Washington's "no entangling alliances," and Jeffersonian democracy. Rather, these new legislators desired to build and broaden the Union. Hence, their beliefs on economic, political, and military expediency reflected new and different guidelines. Although parallels such as Calhoun's and Alexander Hamilton's financial policies existed, the new statesmen basically represented another age--an age with different goals and new allegiances.

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[7] Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun, American Portrait (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 67.

The influx of second generation spokesmen greatly influenced both the composition and the beliefs of the House of 1817. Popularity of the young Republicans and their centralized programs had wrecked the once-dominant Federalist Party. "The label of Federalist was enough to damn the political prospects of any man."[8] Since political survival precluded an open minority party during this period, the Republicans occupied a vast majority of the seats of the House. The House agreed on most questions of policy and aired any existing differences in opinion through the guise of sectional interests rather than from the construct of a political philosophy.

The House of 1817 reflected the centralism characteristic both of the Second Generation of American

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[8] Ibid., p. 101.

Statesmen and of the Republican Party. Legislation on issues such as a national bank, a protective tariff, and internal improvements exemplified the nationalistic leanings of the House. Although the majority agreed on the advantages of such legislation, differing opinions regarding the particular means of administration resulted in many bitter debates and close votes. Since the popularity of the Republican Party dictated one to be a Republican from political necessity, these differences ostensibly evolved from sectional interests, not from political philosophy.

War of 1812

The influences of the Second Generation of American Statesmen and of the War of 1812 were inherent to each other. Pressure from nationalists such as Clay and Calhoun prompted American military involvement. At the same time, the results and progression of the War added further to the nationalism of these statesmen. America's near defeat at the hands of Great Britain contributed greatly to the growing mania for strengthening the Union. The lack of adequate defense measures and absence of cooperation between different sections of the country took the United States to the brink of military calamity. The British destruction of the Capitol Building and the narrow escape of President James Madison exemplified the nearness of this tragedy. This memory occupied the minds of the

Representatives in 1817 and prompted their attempts to find legislation which would strengthen and unify America.[9]

Thus, the War provided the controversy necessary to begin the nation's movement from colonialism to nationalism. Regardless of the legitimacy of American reasons for involvement or the military inadequacies demonstrated during the conflict, the War fulfilled a vital function in the development of the United States. "We emerged from the war thinking we were a great nation, and armed with this delusion we were able to exist more comfortably until the thought became fact."[10]

Congressional Pay-Raise Bill of 1816

In 1816 Congress innocently and unsuspectingly passed a bill which raised congressional pay from the standard six dollars per day to an annual salary of around fifteen hundred dollars. This six dollar figure was a carry-over from the colonial era and did not meet the living expenses of the Congressmen. The costs of living forced them either to cut drastically their expenses while in Washington or to supplement this salary with private revenue. Understandably, support for the pay-raise was nearly unanimous.

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[9] Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 1944), II, 116. Frederick Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928), pp. 1-2.

[10] Coit, p. 100.

However, the people did not favor this idea as strongly as had the Congressmen.

> The people were horrified. Was the American taxpayer to reach into his breeches pockets just to keep a pack of lazy Congressmen chattering up there in Washington? If the job didn't satisfy the present office-holders, there were plenty it would satisfy. A tidal wave of outraged public opinion engulfed the Fourteenth Congress, perhaps the most remarkable assemblage to sit in the national councils until 1850. Few even dared to run for re-election; most of those who did were speedily and permanently retired.[11]

The few Representatives lucky enough to retain their seats owed their fortune to their reputation and vigorous campaigning. Daniel Webster solved the problem by shifting his residence from New Hampshire to Massachusetts. Henry Clay pleaded with the enraged Kentuckians, reminding them that if a good rifle failed once, they would try it a second time before throwing it away. Calhoun, even with his great popularity in South Carolina, barely regained his seat in the House.[12]

Not only did this scandal result in many new legislators in 1817, but it also created a feeling of timid apprehension among all members of the House. Realizing the scorn of their constituents over a simple congressional pay-raise, the Representatives were understandably reluctant to appropriate Federal money needlessly.

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[11] Wiltze, II, 117. [12] Ibid.

Summary

The influences of the Second Generation of American Statesmen and the War of 1812 upon the House of 1817 resulted in a nationalistic design to strengthen the Union. This goal became almost as stereotyped as the colonial belief of "no taxation without representation" and the modern desire to "contain communism." Perhaps the greatest boon to this spirit of broadening the Union was the memory of American shortcomings in the War of 1812 coupled with a fear of future conflicts with England.

The House operated virtually under a one-party system, as the Republicans had slowly engulfed and eventually destroyed the Federalists. While the Representatives usually agreed regarding the policies most expedient to the national welfare, constant debate evolved from the consideration of the appropriate means of attaining a particular end. These disagreements reflected sectional and economic rather than political interests. Although Congress was basically nationalistically oriented, the scandal resulting from the pay-raise Bill forced them to maintain a position of guarded apprehension. An example of the specific application of these general characteristics was the beliefs of the House regarding Federally-sponsored internal improvements.

Position on Internal Improvements

Although there was almost universal agreement in the House regarding the value of internal improvements, the

Representatives of 1817 differed in their beliefs of how such projects should be financed. As a result of these differences, Calhoun's Bonus Bill met "with more opposition than the Bank Bill or the Tariff Bill had experienced."[13] Several factors made Calhoun's proposal for setting aside revenues gained from the national bank unacceptable to the Representatives.

The principal area of disagreement concerned the constitutionality of the Bill. The only precedent for Federal-sponsorship of internal improvements was the Cumberland Road Bill of 1806. In that instance, the Government constructed one road for the specific purpose of aiding delivery of the mails. The Bonus Bill, however, neither specified particular projects nor provided individual rationales. Hence many members of the House believed the Constitution contained no warrant for the power to pass this Bill. Rather, "Federal aid should consist of subscriptions to the stock of private corporations chartered by the States to carry out the many parts of the general plan."[14]

Another factor contributing to the reluctance of the Representatives to pass the Bonus Bill was the recent agitation of the congressional pay-raise. This controversy

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[13] John W. Burgess, The Middle Period 1817-1858 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), p. 16.

[14] John B. McMaster, A History of the People of the United States (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1914), IV, 411.

"had made the members timid about the appropriation of money, and disinclined to obligate the Treasury to anything beyond absolutely necessary expenses."[15] Thus, while most Representatives favored internal improvements, they believed these endeavors should initiate from private enterprise rather than the Federal Government.

Although constitutionality was the primary objection to the proposal, the actual support or rejection followed sectional lines. The Representatives from New England opposed the Bill from the fear of a resulting West-South alliance.[16] Not to be outdone by their northern counterparts, many southern Representatives rejected the Bill in order to prevent an alliance between the West and New England.[17] All sections favored the idea of improving the nation's transportation system. However, both the North and the South needed the cooperation of the West in order to dominate the Union,[18] and both feared that this proposal would align the West with the other section.

Thus, the House of 1817 took a unique stand on the issue of internal improvements. While the group almost universally supported the idea, many opposed the expediency and constitutionality of Federal sponsorship. The existence of this situation caused Calhoun to remark in the introduction of his speech on the Bonus Bill: "It seems to be the fate of some measures to be praised, but not adopted. Such, I fear, will be the fate of this on which we are now deliberating."[19]

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[15] Burgess, p. 16.

[16] McMaster, IV, 414.

[17] Arthur Styron, The Cast-Iron Man: John C. Calhoun and American Democracy (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1935), p. 50.

[18] Bancroft, p. 59.

The Bonus Bill passed in the House by the narrow margin of eighty-six to eighty-four. This total of one hundred and seventy votes represented an unusually full House. Only eight voting members were absent. "It is fair to suppose that the large attendance was due to the deep interest every section of the country took in the question of internal improvements."[20]

Calhoun's *Ethos* with the House of 1817

The initial source of Calhoun's desirable *ethos* with the House of 1817 was his activities pertaining to the War of 1812. Edmund Randolph, a Virginia statesman, headed the opposition of American involvement and constantly condemned the youth, inexperience, and presumptuousness of the War Hawks. Not only was Calhoun the one Hawk willing to debate the sarcastic Randolph, but he also successfully persuaded the House to a declaration of war. Calhoun's success in this endeavor immediately propelled him to a position of leadership and influence in the Republican Party.

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[19] *The Works of John C. Calhoun*, ed. Richard Cralle (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854), II, 186. Hereafter referred to as *Works*.

[20] McMaster, IV, 414.

Of all the War Hawks who had entered Congress in 1811, the South Carolinian ranked second only to Henry Clay.[21]

Also contributing to Calhoun's ethos was his image as the champion of nationalism in an age characterized by "an exaggerated view of patriotism and New World strength."[22] His support of such measures as the protective tariff and the national bank during the Session of 1816 gained support from all sections of the country. These actions portrayed him as one willing to overlook the interests of a particular section in order to promote the general welfare. Even though the Representatives from New England opposed Federal support of internal improvement, they respected John Calhoun.

Calhoun also impressed the House of 1817 with his speaking ability. He developed his abilities as an orator with such thoroughness that by 1817, "he excelled all his companions. His powers of logic, too, were commanding attention."[23] These characteristics enhanced his image as early as 1817.[24] One particular example of Calhoun's ethos as a speaker was his speech in 1817 on the protective tariff. His effort "was so satisfying to the most ardent of high-tariff supporters that his address was framed and tacked upon the walls of taverns and barrooms beside Washington's Farewell Address."[25]

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[21] Coit, p. 67.

[22] Malvin L. Hansen, "An Evaluation of the Arguments of John C. Calhoun on Foreign Affairs" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1940), p. 21.

[23] Coit, p. 41.

[24] Herbert L. Curry, "John Caldwell Calhoun: Speaker" (unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1941), p. 166.

The Senate of 1840

General Influences

Whereas the House of 1817 represented a political unity marred only by slight sectional considerations, the factions of the Senate of 1840 "were at opposite poles on all questions except resistance to executive usurpation."[26] The South had earlier feared an alliance between the Northeast and the West which would subject southern interests to a role of political minority. By 1840, that fear had become reality.

No formal alliance as such existed between the Northeast and the West. The two sections favored the same general policies, but for different reasons. The commercial demands of the one section and the agricultural and migration needs of the other found advantages in the same type of programs. Coincidentally rather than purposefully, the Northeast and West combined to defeat those measures desired by the South.

Confronted with the position of minority, southern Senators assumed a defense characterized by constant agitation. The efforts of these men revolved around the justification and protection of their "peculiar institution." They analyzed issues not from the viewpoint of national expediency, but rather from sectional survival. Recent failures of the South such as the Missouri Compromise, the rise of abolition movements, and the annexation of free states made the southern Senators even more determined to protect the interests of their section. In general terms, "protectionism and anti-slavery were stronger in the North, anti-protectionism and states-rights had rapidly increased in the South. . . ."[27]

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[25] Coit, p. 114.

[26] Catherine Z. Winters, "The Defection of the Calhounites 1832-1840" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of History, State University of Iowa, 1923), Ch. 3, p. 18.

The Senate of 1840 did not function in the manner customary for a representative body. Rather than reflecting upon the expediency of an issue, the Senators often reacted automatically and allowed sectional formulas to determine their acceptance or rejection of proposed acts. Thus, "so far as constructive legislation was concerned, the session was barren of result."[28]

The political ramification of this extreme sectionalism took the form of the Whig and Democratic Parties. The Democrats portrayed southern interests and

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[27] Bancroft, p. 59.

[28] Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 151.

"emphasized the limited powers of the national government."[29] The Whigs, who constituted the majority, had no specific platform. In general, they were more liberal than the Democrats, especially in fiscal policies. However, the fundamental distinction between the two parties concerned the issue of slavery.

One additional barrier compounded the sectional difficulties of the Senate of 1840. Not only were the two parties divided on sectional lines, but the Whig Party itself split into two groups--the northern and the southern Whigs. By 1840 the northern Whigs, who encompassed the rapidly growing abolitionist movements, "formed a significant cloud upon the political horizon."[30] Although the southern Whigs realized that something must eventually be done about slavery, they openly resented and fought the efforts of the northern faction of their Party. As a result of this split, "the Whigs were united only in condemning."[31]

The issue of slavery, the sectional differences, and the party split all contributed to an uneasy and tempestuous Senate. Senator Thomas Allen observed, "I feel sometimes . . . as though we were on a volcano."[32]

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[29] Ibid., p. 145.

[30] William B. Hesseltine, The South in American History (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943), p. 242.

[31] Frederick Jackson Turner, The United States 1830-1850 (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 479.

[32] Cited in Van Deusen, p. 153.

Both parties attempted to overcome this hostile atmosphere. "For a time these Congressmen were prohibited from speaking against slavery by the rule of silence that both parties adopted in the effort to avoid rift within the ranks."[33] On one occasion, Thomas Morris of Ohio challenged this unwritten rule, and the state legislature refused his re-election.[34] However, in spite of the efforts of both parties, the Senate remained hostile and apprehensive.

In essence, the Senate of 1840 officially consisted of two political parties. Yet in actual practice, three groups continually fought to protect and advance the interests of three different sections. Although the Whigs comprised the majority party, the clash between the northern and southern elements precluded any meaningful strength on their behalf. As a result, the "lame duck . . . 26th Congress"[35] remained ineffective. The Senate "did little or nothing beyond the barest routine of voting the public supplies."[36]

Position on Internal Improvements

In 1817, the House of Representatives operated from a philosophy of broadening and strengthening the Union.

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[33] Charles S. Sydnor, A History of the South, Vol. V: The Development of Southern Sectionalism 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), p. 236.

[34] Ibid., pp. 237-238.

[35] Van Deusen, p. 151.

[36] James Schouler, History of the United States of America, Vol. IV: 1831-1847 (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1889), p. 348.

Inherent to this philosophy was a well-developed internal transportation system. However, in 1840, the Senate simply wanted to preserve peace and harmony within the various sections of the nation. The turmoil and uneasiness evolving from the slavery dispute relegated the issue of internal improvements to a role of little prominence. Because of this preoccupation with slavery, both congressional and national interest in Federal development of roads and canals had decreased significantly.

Another negative influence was the steady stream of presidential vetoes of internal improvement bills. After President Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill of 1817, President Monroe continued the precedent by declaring an act of 1822 unconstitutional. Eight years later, Andrew Jackson applied the presidential axe to the Maysville Road Bill.[37] These vetoes resulted from Congress' inability to differentiate between national and local roads. The bill before the Senate in 1840 proposed a continuation of the Cumberland Road. Since this Road was the one project universally agreed upon as national in scope, the rationale of previous vetoes clearly did not apply. However, the constant rebuffs had caused many to doubt the constitutionality of Federal assistance in this area.

The hesitancy and disagreements did not center around the need for better transportation facilities.

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[37] Arthur C. Bining, and Thomas C. Cochran, The Rise of American Economic Life (4th ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), pp. 186-188.

The Cumberland project clearly needed repair.

> The present state of the road is decidedly bad. The temporary bridges that we constructed to facilitate the operations have nearly all decayed, and are falling in almost daily. The unfinished and unprotected grade is washing away or cut in gulleys by every shower, where the ground is undulating; and, from want of proper care, worn in deep holes where the country is level.[38]

The proponents of the bill argued that the cost of the necessary repairs and extensions was too great a burden for the individual states. The amount needed for completion and repair in Ohio alone totaled $638,166.26.[39]

Although the need was obvious, the Senate of 1840 exhibited considerable opposition in allowing the Federal Government to fulfill that need. As early as 1835, John Q. Adams had predicted the coming fate of Federally-built projects.

> The long cherished system, that of internal improvements under national patronage, has utterly failed: systematically renounced and denounced by this administration, . . . it has been undisguisedly abandoned by Clay, ingloriously deserted by Calhoun, and silently given up by Webster.[40]

In the Campaign of 1840, the Democrats included a provision in their platform which "pronounced against internal improvements at national expense."[41] Because of the split within their party, the Whigs did not present an official campaign platform. However, their actions in the Senate demonstrated that, as with most issues, the Whigs, split concerning the subject of internal improvements.[42] The northern support and southern opposition reflected another example of the dominance of sectionalism.

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[38] U. S., Congress, Senate, Report from the Chief Engineer, Report No. 1, 26th Cong., 2d Sess., 1840, I, 139.

[39] Ibid., p. 138.

[40] Cited in Schouler, IV, 183.

[41] Van Deusen, p. 145.

Several developments in the twenty-three years following the Bonus Bill provided for a complete transformation in congressional opinion on the subject of internal improvements. Rather than attempting an expansion of strengthening of the Union, the Senate of 1840 sought merely to maintain the status quo. The emergence of sectionalism and the past failures of legislative attempts caused doubt as to the constitutionality of Federal participation. In summary, many felt the subject of internal improvements to be outside the realm of Congress, and nearly everyone regarded the issue as one of secondary importance.

Calhoun's *Ethos* with the Senate of 1840

Events prior to 1840

The birth of John Calhoun's sectionalism occurred in 1832, eight years before the commencement of the twenty-sixth Congress. The events of those eight years played an important role in the Senate of 1840's perception of the South Carolinian. Just before his switch from a nationalist to a states'-righter, Vice-President Calhoun "found himself in the disturbing dilemma of having worked half his life to create what turned out to be a Frankenstein's monster."[43] To combat this "monster" of nationalism, the Vice-President resigned his office and immediately gained election to the Senate. Calhoun reported the public reaction to this surprise move in his autobiography.

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[42] Schouler, IV, 337.

> Never was there, since the commencement of the government, a moment of more intense interest and anxiety throughout the whole Union, and never before was any public man placed in a situation more difficult and responsible. The expectation was general that he would be arrested as soon as he arrived in Washington; and on his way thither, wherever he stopped crowds collected to see him. Nor was the excitement less when he arrived at the seat of government. . . . When he appeared in the Senate to take his seat over which he had so long and recently presided, the gallery and chamber were thronged with spectators.[44]

Thus, Calhoun was a marked man from the moment he first took his seat in 1832.

As a politician

Calhoun's image as a southern sectionalist did not temper with time. By 1840, he was "a traitor in the eyes of one part of the nation and its greatest patriot to the others."[45] As was to be expected, this perception followed the sectional divisions of the Senate.

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[43] Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist: A Reappraisal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p. 109.

[44] John C. Calhoun, Life of John Caldwell Calhoun (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1843), p. 44.

[45] Carl H. Ritzman, "A Critical Study of Four Representative Speeches on States Rights by John C. Calhoun" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1935), p. 64.

Northern Senators feared and disagreed with the ideas and philosophies of Calhoun. However, he was able to nullify this antagonism somewhat by maintaining a moderate position. Even though he relentlessly defended southern interests, he never advocated the radical ideas of many of his contemporaries. Unlike such men as Rhett, Yancey, and Hammond, Calhoun sought protection from the Constitution--not from secession--and "never mustered any enthusiasm for a Southern Confederacy."[46] Historians have disagreed on motivation which dictated Calhoun's position of moderation. Frederick Turner believed Calhoun's desire for the presidency compelled him to seek a national following.[47] On the other hand, Clement Eaton ascribed Calhoun's actions to his sincere love of both the South and the Union.[48] Regardless of his reasons, this policy of moderation served to alleviate the antagonism of his opponents. The northern Senators disagreed with Calhoun, but respected him as one basically sincere in his beliefs.

Whereas northern opinion was against Calhoun, southern sentiments favored his efforts and philosophies. He joined the Democratic Party in 1837 and immediately gained a position of prominence. His prestige influenced the Democratic campaign platform of 1840 and placed him as the unofficial leader of the party. In an attempt to counteract his popularity, "the southern Whigs were vigorously asserting that they, not he, were the true protectors of slavery and the South."[49] However, most southern Senators remained loyal in their respect and appreciation of Calhoun.

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[46] Harold S. Schultz, "A Century of Calhoun Biographies," South Atlantic Quarterly, L (April, 1951), 253.

[47] p. 190.

[48] A History of the Old South (2d ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 309.

As a person

John Calhoun had never demonstrated social graces. Following his resignation of the vice-presidency, he became even more tense and withdrawn. He made little effort to cultivate close friends or social acquaintances.[50] In 1840, Alabama Senator Dixon Lewis called him "too intellectual, too industrious, too intent in the struggle of politics to suit me except as an occasional companion. There is no relaxation with him."[51]

Although Calhoun seemed aloof or cold, and had few real friends, his personal reputation with the Senate was exceptionally good. Although many were suspicious as a result of his changing political philosophy, they generally regarded him as an honest and sincere individual. None of his actions as a public servant had ever suffered the tarnish of dishonesty or scandal. Daniel Webster stated that "he had the basis, the indispensable basis of all high characters and that was unspotted integrity, and unimpeached honor and character."[52]

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[49] Hesseltine, p. 246.

[50] Sydnor, V, p. 334.

[51] Cited in Turner, p. 189.

As a speaker

Long before 1840, Calhoun had firmly established his reputation as an effective speaker. In the Senate, both his supporters and enemies admired and respected his speaking ability. Adlai Stevenson reported that Senator Lyman Trumball

> told me he distinctly recalled John C. Calhoun, his commanding presence and splendid argument, as he addressed the large assemblage. As a clear-brained logician--whose statement alone was almost unanswerable argument--he thought Mr. Calhoun unsurpassed by any statesman our country had known.[53]

The opinion of Senator Oliver Dyer, a northern abolitionist, provided further evidence of Calhoun's reputation as a speaker. "I spontaneously wished that Calhoun was an abolitionist. . . . If he were only on our side, he might even eclipse Wendell Phillips as an anti-slavery orator."[54]

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[52] Cited in Franklin L. Riley, Political History of the South, Vol. IV of The South in the Building of the Nation (12 vols.; Richmond: The Southern Historical Publication Society, 1904), p. 331

[53] Something of Men I Have Known (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1909), p. 382.

[54] Great Senators of the United States Forty Years Ago (New York: R. Bonner's Sons, 1889), p. 150.

The Memphis Convention of 1845

General Influences

Reasons for the Convention

The original idea for a convention on the subject of internal improvements came from the West. Several factors accounted for the motivation and desire to hold such a meeting. Constant and rapid westward migration had brought new people, created new industry, and stimulated the demand for new markets. Texas had just recently gained statehood, and the territories of Oregon, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, and California would soon be admitted to the Union. As a result, "the West was becoming self-conscious and was ready to make demands upon the nation for full recognition of its special interests."[55] The most pressing western interest centered around the necessity of efficient transportation connections with the rest of the nation.

"While the convention was Western in origin and obviously intended to unite the West, it was in some degree captured by the South."[56] A group of Memphis merchants learned of the West's interest in such a convention and began correspondence with certain southern and western leaders. The result of these efforts was the Memphis Convention of 1845. Southerners had two basic reasons for favoring such a convention: first, improved transportation would aid the prosperity of the South; second, such a meeting might contribute to the development of a South-West alliance.

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[55] Turner, p. 225.

[56] Riley, p. 182.

Aid southern prosperity.--Agriculture and a one-crop economy characterized the southern way of life. This rural-type existence lacked the prosperity and abundance of the industrialized Northeast. During the 1840's, "there was neither sufficient industry nor commerce to support a dynamic urban civilization; with the exception of centers such as New Orleans, Charleston, and Baltimore, no Southern community deserved to be called a city."[57] Even the more advanced southern cities lacked many of the advantages of modern civilization. For example, "New Orleans had only open gutters for sewerage as late as 1857."[58] The southerners believed that a strong transportation network would bring new industry and prosperity to their region. Thus, to the southern mind, "the growth of commerce and the increase of population called for increased facilities of transportation."[59]

Hope for a South-West alliance.--The southern objective for the Memphis Convention was to combine the South with the West "in an economic--and, indirectly, a political--alliance."[60] John Calhoun's reasoning on this issue exemplified the southern rationale for such an alliance. Throughout his career, Calhoun dreaded any political merger between New England and the West. Thinking always of the South, he was constantly "willing to sacrifice immediate material interests for a rejuvenated South-West party.[61] Thus, Calhoun's primary hope for the Memphis Convention was the formulation of such an alliance.[62] One additional example of the southern desire for western alliance was a letter James Gadsden wrote to Calhoun shortly before the opening of the Convention. Gadsden wanted to make the West "feel as allies of the Great Commercial and Agricultural interest--instead of the Tax gathering and Monopolizing interests of the North."[63] In essence, the political strength resulting from such an alliance represented the South's last chance for a majority vote in Congress. Senator E. A. Hannegan of Indiana explained the possibilities in such a league.

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[57] John Hope Franklin, The Militant South (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 22.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Julian A. C. Chandler, The History of the Southern States, Vol. II of The South in the Building of the Nation (12 vols.; Richmond: The Southern Historical Publication Society, 1909), p. 495.

> The West will be united and will demand funds for the improvements of their harbours, rivers and the Cumberland Road, the graduation of the

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[60] Turner, p. 225.

[61] Styron, p. 50.

[62] Eaton, p. 310.

[63] Robert L. Meriwether (ed.), The Papers of John C. Calhoun (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959), III, 1062.

> price of public land, and if the South will give these to the West, the West will go with the South on the tariff.[64]

Physical structure of the Convention

In total, nearly six-hundred delegates attended the meeting on behalf of Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Kentucky, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and the Iowa territory.[65] John Calhoun accepted the invitation to preside over the meeting, in spite of fears that "his appearance at Memphis [would] be regarded as electioneering for [the presidential campaign of] 1848."[66]

Position on Internal Improvements

Both sections recognized and believed in the necessity of good transportation facilities. The West, however, was especially adamant in demanding a large system of internal improvements, and did not share the constitutional qualms of the southern delegates. The twenty resolutions finally adopted by the Convention illustrated the degree of western interest in this subject. The proposals included items such as improving navigation of the Mississippi, the deepening of rivers and harbors, the establishment of a national foundry and armory, the reclamation of waste lands, and the completion of a western marine hospital. Soon after the Memphis Convention, western delegates attended another meeting on internal improvements at Chicago.[67] In short, the westerners not only desired improved transportation facilities; they also expected definite action in that direction.

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[64] Cited in Turner, p. 225.

[65] Riley, p. 181; Turner, p. 226.

[66] Wiltze, III, 237.

While the West seemed preoccupied only with the subject of internal improvements, the southern delegates faced a more perplexing situation. They too, desired the increased prosperity and western alliance possible only with the initiation of internal improvements. However, the means to these goals were in direct opposition to their constitutional beliefs. The dichotomy of their present interests and their beliefs regarding Federal participation in internal improvements placed the southern delegates in a serious dilemma. Their solution to this problem was what later proved to be an ineffective compromise. Since southern leaders were anxious to meet western demands, they would gratify that section with a system of internal improvements "so far as the Constitutional scruples of their states permitted."[68]

Thus, the Memphis Convention reflected the historical opinion on the subject of internal improvements. Virtually all members agreed upon the advantages of good transportation facilities. Yet the delegates were divided in their determination of how these projects should be developed. Throughout Calhoun's entire career, no one ever provided a universally acceptable definition of the role of the Federal Government in the construction of internal improvements.

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[67] Riley, pp. 181, 183.

[68] Turner, p. 225.

Calhoun's *Ethos* with the Memphis Convention

Calhoun had the advantage of a good *ethos* with this group of southern and western leaders for basically the same reasons discussed in the section on the Senate of 1840. The Convention's appreciation of Calhoun's abilities as a statesman and its respect for him as an individual contributed to his *ethos*. The fact that he was invited to preside over the Convention indicated the delegates' allegiance.

Only one factor seemed to disrupt Calhoun's bond with his audience. Speculation existed to the effect that the perennial presidential candidate was seeking the 1848 Democratic nomination. Calhoun had feared his appearance at Memphis might be interpreted as a maneuver to win a political following. Once the Convention began, this fear became reality. The delegates questioned whether he had attended because of "his expectations in the forthcoming presidential election, or whether he believed his ideas if fulfilled would redound to the advantage of the South."[69]

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[69] Styron, p. 270.

Although most remained uncertain, "his action was generally regarded as a bid for the presidency."[70]

Thus, the Convention respected Calhoun and listened favorably to his ideas. However, his creditability suffered to some degree as a result of presidential speculations. The delegates, uncertain of Calhoun's motivations, were suspicious of his intentions.

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[70] Capers, p. 231.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPEECHES

Method of Analysis: The Toulmin Construct for Reasoning

A belief in the importance of raising "general, philosophical questions about the practical assessment of arguments"[1] prompted Stephen Toulmin, an English philosopher, to break from the traditional Aristotelian system of logic.

> The science of logic has throughout its history tended to develop in a direction leading it away from . . . practical questions about the manner in which we have occasion to handle and criticize arguments in different fields, and towards a condition of complete autonomy. . . .[2]

Regardless of the validity of these charges or the advantages of his system as compared to Aristotelian logic, the Toulmin method of classification provides an understanding of the anatomy of argumentation. A combination of this understanding with a practical application to public address justifies the utilization of the Toulmin system in this study.

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[1] _The Uses of Argument_ (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 2.

[2] _Ibid._

A Method of Classifying Arguments

An argument, or "total unit of proof,"[3] consists of six elements. The first three--data (D), warrant (W), and claim (C)--are indispensable. Absence of any of these parts precludes the existence of controversy, and consequently, the necessity of advocacy. The remaining three elements--qualifier (Q), backing for warrant (B),[4] and reservation (R)--become essential only as the argument increases in complexity.

The claim is simply "the conclusion whose merits we are seeking to establish."[5] Since some extent of disagreement is inherent within the concept of argumentation, the claim must be of a controversial or potentially controversial nature. Claims may occur in different forms: "they may make a general assertion; . . . assert a value judgement; . . . [or] a fact. . . ."[6] However, regardless of form, the claim must be a controversial statement "to be supported by the evidence and data available."[7]

Data represent the "facts we appeal to as foundation for the claim."[8] By answering the question "what have you got to go on?," this element justifies the formation of a claim. Without data, or evidence, one has no rationale for movement to a claim. Therefore, an important characteristic of data is that it must be either explicit or strongly implied within an argument. This requirement of explicit presence remains whether data consist of "statistical materials, case histories, a series of factual statements, statements from authorities having some expertise in the subject, or any other statement which will back up the original Claim."[9]

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[3] Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), p. 157.

[4] Hereafter referred to only as "backing."

[5] Toulmin, p. 97. [6] Windes and Hastings, p. 159.

[7] Erwin P. Bettinghaus, "Structure and Argument," Perspectives on Argumentation, eds. Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. Nilsen (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966), p. 149.

[8] Toulmin, p. 97.

Toulmin classifies the third indispensable element of an argument as the warrant. By definition, warrants are "general, hypothetical statements, which can act as bridges, and authorize the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us."[10] In essence, the warrant represents the rationale for one's move, or "mental leap," from data to claim. Whereas data answer "what have you got to go on?," warrants justify "how did you get there?" In addition to its general and hypothetical quality, a warrant usually takes the form of an implication or assumption rather than an actual expression. Although a warrant need not be explicitly present, its existence is inherent to any argument.

The combination of data, warrant, and conclusion serves both to define and to express an argument. Based on a synthesis of Toulmin's discussion, Wayne Brockriede and

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[9] Bettinghaus, p. 149. [10] Toulmin, p. 98.

Douglas Ehninger define an argument as "movement from accepted *data*, through a *warrant*, to a *claim*."[11] Toulmin's schematic expression of these units is as follows.



Summarily, data and warrant provide the evidence and justification necessary to establish the claim. These elements may range from explicit to implicit, may be valid or fallacious; but some combination of *all* three is necessary for the existence of an argument. The additional three elements of the Toulmin classification--qualifier, reservation, and backing--serve to support or clarify an argument.

Since controversy functions within the domain of probability, the advocate cannot assign certainty to his arguments. The purpose of the qualifier is to modulate the degree of probability existing within the claim. Toulmin defines the qualifier as "some explicit reference to the degree of force which our data confer on our claim in virtue of our warrant."[12] Qualifiers consist of terms such as "probably," "presumably," "likely," "often," and "possibly."

By recognizing possible refutation of the claim, the reservation serves as an argument's safeguard against conditions of exception. This element allows the advocate to reason that unless specific exceptions exist, his warrant justifies the claim drawn from the data.

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[11] "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLVI (February, 1960), 44.

[12] p. 101.

"Standing behind our warrants . . . there will normally be other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor currency--these other things we may refer to as the backing. . . ."[13] In essence, backing consists of evidence and/or reasoning which explains why the warrant is true. The distinction between backing and data rests not in the manner or form of presentation, but in the roles which they play in the argument. Data must be produced if an argument is to develop. The backing, however, "need not be made explicit--at any rate to begin with: the warrants may be conceded without challenge, and their backing left understood."[14] Backing differs from a warrant in that, like data, the support for a warrant may take the form of categorical statements of fact while the warrant remains a general, hypothetical statement.

The following diagram represents the six elements of Toulmin's classification.



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[13] Ibid., p. 103. [14] Ibid., p. 106.

The progression of Toulmin[15] follows these lines of thought; (1) D. exists, (2) Therefore, I am justified in assuming Q. C. since W. W. is true because of B. (3) So, unless the existence of R., then Q. C. Although this verbal rendition explains the progression of Toulmin, the resulting ambiguity and awkwardness demonstrate the advantages of a schematic means of classification. Figure 1 illustrates the mechanics of Toulmin.


D.
State, local and private organizations do not provide adequate opportunity for higher education.
Q.
Probably,
C.
The Federal Government should guarantee that opportunity.
W.
A well-educated society is desirable.
R.
Unless a Federal guarantee is unconstitutional.
B.
Education provides culture, stability, prosperity, etc.

Fig. 1.

Application of Toulmin to Public Address

Brockriede and Ehninger substitute the original philosophical emphasis on Toulmin with a stress on its rhetorical application.[16] Although other speech scholars now use this approach,[17] the original adaptation of Toulmin to public address remains the creation of Brockriede and Ehninger. Their incorporation of rhetorical principles and theory within the original framework of Toulmin provides a tool for the critic of public address as well as for the philosopher or student of formal logic.

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[15] Hereafter, "Toulmin" refers to the construct for reasoning, not to the man.

Brockriede and Ehninger justify the importance of Stephen Toulmin's analysis and terminology to the rhetorician in two areas.

> First, they [analysis and terminology] provide an appropriate structural model by means of which rhetorical arguments may be laid out for analysis and criticism; and second, they suggest a system for classifying artistic proofs which employs argument as a central and unifying construct.[18]

These factors--a system for classifying artistic proofs and a model for criticism--are especially important to the purpose of this study.

The first step necessary in applying artistic proofs--logical, emotional, and ethical appeals--to Toulmin is a rhetorical expansion of the claim. Essentially, Brockriede and Ehninger incorporate the Classical concept of stases with the claim.

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[16] The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI (February, 1960), 44-53; Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963).

[17] In addition to the sources cited in this section, see Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate (San Francisco: Wadsworth, 1961); Halbert E. Gulley, Discussion, Conference, and Group Process (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); James C. McCroskey, "Toulmin and the Basic Course," The Speech Teacher, XIV (March, 1965), 91-100; Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1964); and John F. Wilson and Carroll C. Arnold, Public Speaking as a Liberal Art (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1964).

[18] The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI, 44.

> 1. Claims that answer questions of definition--whether something is, or was, or will be--are definitive. . . .
> 2. Claims that answer questions of fact--whether something is, or was, or will be so--are designative. . . .
> 3. Claims that answer questions of value--of what value something is, or was, or will be--are evaluative. . . .
> 4. Claims that answer questions of policy--what proposal should be accepted--are actuative. . . .[19]

Brockriede and Enhinger then categorize the three elements of artistic proof in terms of a

> proof pattern [which] may be employed to establish or deny any statement.
> 1. Proofs in which the warrant asserts a relationship among phenomena of the external world--these may be called substantive proofs.
> 2. Proofs in which the warrant asserts an assumption concerning the credibility of the source from which the evidence is arrived--these may be called authoritative proofs.
> 3. Proofs in which the warrant asserts an assumption concerning the emotions, values, or motives which direct the behavior of those persons to whom the proof is addressed--these may be called motivational proofs.[20]

The merit of these adaptations is obvious. Through Toulmin, critics of public address can determine an advocate's pattern of reasoning and the validity of that reasoning. In addition, knowledge of the proof patterns also enables the critic to discover the mode of artistic proof utilized by the speaker. This knowledge permits an evaluation of the relationship between appeal and audience.

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[19] Decision by Debate, p. 102.

[20] Ibid., pp. 125-126.

Therefore, analysis of the warrant reveals a great deal concerning the framework of an argument. Such analysis can determine how the speaker justifies his "mental leap" from data to claim and the validity of that justification. Analysis of the warrant also determines whether an argument follows a logical, emotional, or ethical proof pattern. Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate how each of these proof patterns can serve as warrants for the same data and claim.


D.
The Federal Government has required a caution label on all cigarette packages.
Q.
Probably,
C.
Cigarettes are harmful.
W.
The Government acts because of a concern for our best interests and security.
R.
The Government had another motive such as establishing a precedent.
B.
Clauses of the Preamble, etc.

Fig. 2.--Motivational

In this instance, the warrant assumes the acceptance of certain values or emotions. Therefore, the argument follows a motivational proof pattern.


D.
The Federal Government has required a caution label on all cigarette packages.
Q.
Probably,
C.
Cigarettes are harmful.
W.
The Government acts only on the advise of qualified authorities.
R.
Other qualified authorities who did not testify disagree with Doctors X, Y and Z.
B.
Doctors X, Y, and Z all testified. . . .

Fig. 3.--Authoritative

By appealing to the credibility of sources, this argument follows an authoritative proof pattern.


D.
The Federal Government has required a caution label on all cigarette packages.
Q.
Probably,
C.
Cigarettes are harmful.
W.
Things bearing caution labels are harmful.
R.
The Government has no evidence to support this warning.
B.
Poison, etc.

Fig. 4.--Substantive

In this instance, the warrant asserts relationships within the external world. Therefore, the argument follows a substantive proof pattern.

Toulmin as a Method of Criticism

Although Brockriede and Ehninger justify the study of Toulmin in terms of its value to criticism, their treatment of the subject is basically speaker-oriented. Two additional expansions will clarify Toulmin's merit as a standard for critical study. First, the critic may study the speech as a whole as well as a particular argument. Secondly, by isolating the artistic appeals used in each instance, Toulmin serves as a means for determining both the attempts and the techniques of a speaker's audience adaptation.

When considering an entire speech as an argument, or unit of proof, the thesis becomes the claim, and each of the contentions supporting that purpose is datum. Figure 5 demonstrates a Toulmin classification of a speech arguing that one should quit smoking for three reasons.

A Toulmin classification of an entire speech would enable the critic to evaluate both the relevance of each argument in fulfilling the specific purpose and the dominant means of appeal. He can then trace the progression of each datum to the ultimate claim or specific purpose of the speech. In general, Toulmin allows for evaluation of an argument, a speech, an appeal, and of logical validity. The critic can determine whether the advocate utilizes the proper stasis as a result of Brockriede and Ehninger's enlargement of the claim.


D.
Smoking causes lung cancer. (Contention #1)
Q.
Probably,
W.
Lung cancer is harmful.
R.
You already have lung cancer.
B.
. . . .
D.
Smoke is obnoxious to non-smokers. (Contention #2)
Q.
Probably,
W.
You should respect the feelings of others.
R.
You are never around other people.
C.
You should quit smoking.
B.
. . . .
D.
The Government requires a warning label on all cigarette packages. (Contention #3)
Q.
Probably,
W.
Things with warning labels are harmful.
R.
Your pack has no such warning.
B.
. . . .

Fig. 5.

A combination of audience analysis and of the Toulmin method of reasoning formulates the construct for criticism in this study. The audience analysis indicates traits and characteristics; Toulmin indicates types of--and changes in--

appeals. A critical evaluation of these variables will determine whether John Calhoun's changes in logical appeals corresponded with the traits and characteristics of each audience.

Speech of 1817

Calhoun delivered this speech in the House of Representatives on February 4, 1817.[21] He advocated passage of the Bonus Bill, which would set aside the National Bank dividends and bonuses as a permanent fund for the construction of roads and canals. The following outline demonstrates the arguments Calhoun used to support the Bill.

I. Introduction.
  A. Times favorable for deliberation.
  B. Thesis: "Thus situated, to what can we direct our resources and attention more important than internal improvements?"[22]

II. Reasons for the Bill.
  A. Add wealth to the nation.
  B. Federal action is justifiable.
  C. Add to the nation's strength and political prosperity.
    1. Strengthen our defense.
    2. Strengthen our power of raising revenue.
    3. Promote unity--deter disunity.

III. Refutation of existing objections.
  A. Constitutional objections.
    1. Congress has no power to cut a road or canal through a state without consent of that state.
    2. Congress may act only upon enumerated powers.
  B. Mode of the Bill.

IV. Conclusion.

---

[21] "Speech on the Internal Improvements Bill," *Works.*, II, 186-196. The terminology and ideas contained in this speech appear in the following section in the Toulmin construct. Those items within quotation marks represent the author's word choice rather than Calhoun's.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

Reasons for the Bill

Add wealth to the nation

In his arguments on increased wealth, Calhoun spoke not of a particular bill, but rather of the over-all concept of internal improvements. He first developed the idea that a good transportation system would diffuse wealth to all parts of the nation. Secondly, he argued that a good system of roads and canals was the best means of increasing the nation's wealth. His later development of the justification for the Federal Government represented the specific correlation of his arguments on wealth with the Bonus Bill.

D.
The manner in which facility and cheapness of intercourse contributes to the wealth of a nation has often been discussed by political economists, and I presume the House is perfectly acquainted with the subject.

C.
Facility and cheapness of intercourse tend to diffuse universal opulence.

W.
"What the political economists speak of in general terms is also true in our specific instance."

B.

1. Every branch of national industry is greatly stimulated and rendered more productive.
2. It gives the interior advantages.
3. It makes the country buying approximate to that of the country towns.

D.

An article, to command a price, must be the subject of demand; and the better the means of commercial intercourse, the larger the sphere of demand.

C.

Nothing is more favorable to the growth of wealth than good roads and canals.

W.

"This position is historically true."

B.

1. Historically in every country.
2. Especially in England.

Federal action is justifiable

D.

In a country so new and extensive as ours, there is a reason for the Federal Government, the state governments, and individuals to exert their efforts.

C.

The resources and general superintendence of the Federal Government are necessary.

W.

Internal improvements may not be left wholly to the enterprise of the states and of individuals.

R.

Pecuniary advantages only might leave some doubt as to why the Federal Government.

B.

1. Contemplated improvements are on too great a scale for the resources of states or individuals.
2. State jealousies would prevent certain improvements.

In developing his justification for Federal sponsorship, Calhoun included a transitional argument by using the reservation of the previous argument as data for the transition. This enabled him to move from the consideration of wealth and the Federal Government to an appeal for the necessity of internal improvements. The following Toulmin schematic represents the relationship of the transitional argument to his rationale for the Federal Government.


D.
C.
W.
R.
B.
Pecuniary advantages only might leave some doubt as to why the Federal Government.
C.
We find urgent reason for the Federal Government.
W.
There are higher and more powerful considerations.
B.
I will develop the intimate connection between the subject of internal improvements and the strength and political prosperity of the country.

As indicated by the above diagram, Calhoun's summary of coming arguments (B) served several functions. This device helped to overcome a possible reservation of his previous argument and, at the same time, provided him with a chance to restate his original claim. Perhaps most importantly the promise of what was to come enabled the nationalist to move from a consideration of individual wealth to the higher and more powerful issues of national strength and political prosperity.

Add to the nation's strength and political prosperity

Strengthen our defense

In his arguments on defense, Calhoun used two warrants. In the first, he reminded the Representatives that they were duty-bound to strengthen the country. Secondly he demonstrated that good roads and canals represented the best means of fulfilling that duty.



D.
We are weak in only one respect. We have too much surface and too few people. The common strength is brought to bear with great difficulty on the point that may be menaced by an enemy.

C.
Internal improvements would strengthen our country.

W.
It is our duty to counteract weakness and provide strength.

W.
Good roads and canals are the proper remedy.

B.
1. We suffered for want of them during the recent war.
2. Their allowance promotes tardiness and inefficiency.
3. Without them, our transportation is a great expense.

Strengthen our power of
raising revenue

Calhoun developed the argument that the nation's ability to raise revenues would be strengthened by a good system of roads and canals. In this instance, his reasoning followed the pattern of a sorites. By definition, a "sorites" is the enthymematic expression of a "chain of categorical syllogisms, connected by the conclusion of the first, which is the premise of the second."[23] A Toulmin classification of this argument involves four separate steps before reaching the eventual claim. In each instance, the claim of the preceding argument constitutes the data for the one which follows.


D.
Taxes are necessary--especially in time of war.

C.
Taxes must be paid in money.

W.
Taxing surplus produce is impossible.


D.
Taxes must be paid in money; and, by the Constitution, must be paid uniformly.

C.
The resulting expenditure must be principally confined to the scene of military operations.

W.
In times of war, taxes are used for military operations.

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[23] Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (2d ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 219.



D.
The expenditure must be principally confined to the scene of military operations.

C.
The part from which the constant drain takes place must ultimately be impoverished.

W.
This drains the circulatory medium from one region and accumulates it in another.

R.
Unless the circulatory medium can return through the operation of trade.

D.
Commercial intercourse is the true remedy for this weakness; and the means by which this is to be effected, are roads, canals, and the coasting trade.

C.
Our power of raising revenue, in war particularly, depends mainly on internal improvements.

W.
On these (data) does the moneyed capacity of this country, in war, depend.

B.
Without them, not only will we be unable to raise the necessary supplies, but the currency of the country must necessarily fall into the greatest disorder; such as we lately experienced.

Calhoun's reasoning that internal improvements would strengthen the nation's power of raising revenue involved four separate arguments. He first asserted the claim and then developed it.

Promote unity--
deter disunity



D.
We are under the most imperious obligation to counteract every tendency to disunion.

C.
Internal improvements promote unity and thereby strengthen our political prosperity.

W.
The ability to overcome distance helps unity.

B.
1. The more enlarged the sphere of commercial circulation, the more extended that of social intercourse; the more strongly we are bound together, the more inseparable are our destinies.
2. Whatever impedes the intercourse of the extremes with the centre of the republic weakens the Union.

As in the case of the justification of the Federal Government, Calhoun used a transitional argument to move from his constructive arguments to refutation of known objections to the Bill. In the Toulmin construct, Calhoun's advantages appear as data and represent a summary of all that he had covered; the anticipated objections take the form of a reservation.



D.
Internal improvements would generate wealth, and strengthen the nation militarily, economically, and politically.

C.
We should commence the system.

W.
"These strengths are advantageous."

R.
Unless certain constitutional objections among some members of the House are more serious disadvantages.

Refutation of Existing Objections

Constitutional Objections

Congress has no power to cut a road or canal through a state without the consent of that state



D.
When a bill is introduced to apply the money to a particular object in any state, then, and not till then, will the question be fairly before us.

C.
The objection, it is plain, does not apply to the Bill.

W.
No particular road or canal is proposed to cut through any state.

B.
The Bill simply appropriates money to the general purpose of improving the means of intercommunication.



D.
The objection is scarcely worth the discussion since the good sense of the states may be relied on.

C.
They will, in all cases, readily yield their assent.

W.
"Approving internal improvements makes good sense. The states have demonstrated good sense in the past."

Congress may act only
upon enumerated powers

D.
The Constitution gives to Congress the power to establish post-offices and post-roads.

C.
The Bill constitutes a part of the enumerated powers.

W.
Roads and canals qualify as post-roads.

Calhoun probably realized that those with constitutional objections would not accept his argument that roads and canals qualified as post-roads. He next argued that even if internal improvements did not fall within the enumerated powers. there was no reason for Congress to refuse the necessary appropriations.

D.
Our laws are full of instances of money appropriated without any reference to the enumerated powers.
--We granted nearly $50,000 to the inhabitants of Caraccas and a very large sum to St. Domingo.
--On what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified?
--To pass over many other instances, the identical power, which is now the subject of discussion, has, in several instances, been exercised.

C.
There is no reason to be restricted to the enumerated powers; and the habitual and uniform practice of the Government coincides with my opinion.

W.
The actions of the Government surely furnish better evidence of the true interpretation of the Constitution than the most refined and subtle arguments.

Mode of the Bill

Calhoun felt that one principal objection centered around the mode or method of implementing the Bill. The proposal presented to Congress asked only that a designated amount of funds be set aside for the purpose of internal improvements. The framers of the Bill had not included a description of specific projects or improvements. Calhoun isolated the objection he wished to refute in relation to the mode of the Bill. "A system, it is contended, ought to be presented before the money is appropriated. I think differently."[24]



D.
To set apart the fund
appears to me to be,
naturally, the first
act.

C.
A bill filled with
details would have
but a faint prospect
of passing.

W.
"This is the only practical way."

B.
The enemies to any possible
system in detail, and those
who are opposed in principle,
would unite and defeat it.

Following this argument, Calhoun states "though I am unwilling to incorporate details in the bill, yet, I am not averse to presenting my view on that point."[25] In expository form, he then explained the general projects envisioned by the framers of the Bill, Thus, he first attempted to show why the mode was the only practical approach, and then described the specific goals of impending legislation.

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[24] Works., II, 195. [25] Ibid.

Speech of 1840

Calhoun delivered this speech April 1, 1840, in the United States Senate.[26] The Bill under discussion called for the continuation of the Cumberland Road which was first authorized in 1806. The funds originally appropriated for the Road had been exhausted, and this proposal represented an attempt to gain additional money to expand the Road. In opposing the Bill, Calhoun covered the following:

I. Introduction.
   A. He was satisfied that the General Government was unfit to carry on internal improvements.
   B. Thesis: He believed "the fund was entirely exhausted, and that the States interested in the road had no just claim to further appropriation or aid from the Government."[27]

II. Refutation of arguments favoring the Bill.
   A. The Government is duty-bound to continue the Road.
   B. Justice demands the appropriation.

III. Constructive arguments against the Bill.
   A. The Government is unfit to carry on the system.
      1. Cost is too high.
      2. Projects will soon be outdated.
      3. The system breeds political discontent.
   B. Federal sponsorship weakens the nation's defense.

IV. Conclusion.

---

[26] "Speech on the Cumberland Road Bill," Works., II, 488-495. The terminology and ideas contained in this speech appear in the following section in the Toulmin construct.

[27] Ibid., p. 488.

Refutation of Arguments Favoring the Bill

The Government is duty-bound to continue the Road

This argument in support of the Bill evolved from the premise that since the Government committed itself to the Cumberland Road in 1806, a sense of duty demanded the additional appropriations. Calhoun believed the only commitment of the Government was to fulfill the terms of the original agreement.

D.
The Law of 1806 bound the Government to expend a designated fund on the Road.

C.
The Government is bound no further.

W.
That fund has been exhausted.

D.
The fund was exhausted by a few interested states against the strenuous opposition of a large portion of the members from other parts of the Union.

C.
The interested states are estopped by their own acts.

W.
The fund is not liable for such expenditures.

Justice demands the appropriation

The Senators who favored acceptance of the Bill from the standpoint of justice argued that internal improvements made the public lands more valuable. Since the Government therefore received more money from the sale of these lands, and since the purchasers of public lands paid for the Road through the increase in price, justice demanded additional governmental expenditures. An example used to support this argument concerned the contrast of Connecticut's difficulty in selling reserve lands as opposed to the ease of the Federal Government's disposition of land. Calhoun developed two arguments in refutation of this issue.



D.
Public lands do not provide an income. They have not yet returned to the General Government the sum expended for them.

C.
Internal improvements are financed through commerce, not public lands.

W.
The nation's only real source of income is from commerce.



D.
Connecticut sold both good and bad land, without expense, for cash in hand. The Government sells piece by piece of our best land at a heavy expense.

C.
Far from selling on better, we have sold on worse terms than Connecticut.

W.
Realizing the deductions for expenses, trouble, and management. . . .

Constructive Arguments Against the Bill

The Government is unfit to carry on the system

Cost is too high

D.
According to the Treasury Department, the Government has spent the sum of twenty-five millions for internal improvements.

C.
The aggregate income of the Government from these works is just $173,620.

W.
Government expenditures should realize a return.

D.
The $173,620 came from one project, and that project is soon to be surrendered.

C.
The costs of internal improvements are excessive.

W.
Even the one project providing income was wasteful.

B.
It cost $18,000 per mile; a sum at least three times as great as a good road of the kind may be made for, and much greater than what a substantial road ought to cost.

Projects will soon be outdated

D.
Georgia is constructing at this time a one-hundred twenty mile road, at the rate of $15,000 per mile.

C.
This very road will in ten years be superseded by a railroad, and will prove worthless, like all other projects of the kind.

W.
Due to changing times and advancements of the rail industry. . . .

The system breeds political discontent

D.
Through 1833, the Government expended ten millions of dollars on internal improvements. Of this sum, Georgia received just seventeen thousand, South Carolina nothing, Kentucky nothing, Virginia nothing, and Tennessee twenty-seven thousand dollars.

C.
Disbursements are partial and unequal.

W.
All states have need for internal improvements.

D.
Disbursements are partial and unequal.

C.
An unequal system must lead to discontent, and be productive, politically, of many mischievous consequences.

W.
The present Bill under discussion is an example of what happens when a system is unequal.

B.
1. A large portion of this body is discontented with so large an annual draft.
2. A great majority of both parties are opposed.

Federal sponsorship weakens the nation's defense



D.
Present conditions make future wars conceivable.

C.
We must put a stop to internal improvements.

W.
We must look to the ocean to insure an adequate defense.

B.
1. The external, not the internal, is the exposed side; the side of danger.
2. We must economize our resources and apply them to the specific point of danger.

Speech of 1845

Calhoun delivered this speech when he took the chair as President of the Southwestern Convention in Memphis, Tennessee, November 13, 1845.[28] The Convention consisted of representatives from various western and southern states gathered for the purpose of finding ways to develop the economic resources of their regions. Calhoun's address consisted of two major parts. The first portion was an expository discussion of the various methods available for developing the resources of the Southwest. The aging Senator explained the possible routes for navigation and railroads and how these facilities would provide "free and ready transit for persons and merchandise between the various portions of these vast regions, and between it and other portions of the Union and the rest of the world."[29]

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[28] "Address on Taking the Chair of the Southwestern Convention," *Works*., III, 273-284. The terminology and ideas contained in this speech appear in the following section in the Toulmin construct. Those items within quotation marks represent the author's word choice rather than Calhoun's.

The second part of his speech dealt with the issue of Federal involvement in internal improvements. In presenting his viewpoints, Calhoun covered the following:

I. Introduction.
  A. Necessary to preserve the Constitution.
  B. Thesis: How far "may we invoke the aid of the General Government for that purpose [aid in internal improvements]?"[30]

II. Areas of Government responsibility.
  A. The Federal Government and the Mississippi River.
    1. The Government may initiate projects.
    2. The States must expand the projects.
      a) Constitutionality.
      b) Expediency.
  B. The Federal Government and the railroads.
    I. No authority for direct aid.
    2. Indirect aid permissible.
  C. The Federal Government and reclamation of flooded lands.
    1. The Government may contribute for lands within its proprietorship.
    2. Ideally, the Government should terminate its proprietorship.

III. Conclusion.

---

[29] Ibid., p. 274.

[30] Ibid., p. 279.

Necessary to Preserve the Constitution

D.
It is well known that my opinion is in favor of a rigid construction of the Constitution, while there are others in favor of a more enlarged view.

C.
Let us then agree to touch no subject on which any portion of the body entertains constitutional scruples.

W.
"Harmony is desirable for this Convention."

B.
1. Only by forbearance can we avoid conflict and preserve harmony; and I for one am prepared to set an example of such forbearance.
2. The circular of the committee calling the Convention stated that no subject upon which adversity of opinion existed on constitutional grounds should be discussed.

The Federal Government and the Mississippi River

The Government may initiate projects

D.
The River is far beyond the power of individuals or separate states as there are eighteen states--more than half the nation--which lie within the valley of the Mississippi or border its navigable tributaries.

Q.
Realizing my opposition to any extensions beyond certain limits.

C.
I am prepared to place the River under the superintendence of the General Government.

W.
The Government has authority to improve national waterways.

B.
The invention of Fulton has, for all practical purposes, converted the Mississippi, with all its great tributaries, into an inland sea.

The states must expand the projects

Calhoun qualified his acceptance of Federal assistance in developing the Mississippi River to include no extensions beyond what he had specifically stated. He then justified this position from both the standpoint of constitutionality and of expedience.

Constitutionality



D.
It is the genius of our Government to leave to individuals what can be done by individuals, and to individual states what can be done by them, and to restrict the power of the General Government to that which can only be effected through its agency and the powers specifically granted.

C.
I have constitutional objections to any extension of Federal supervision.

W.
The states are capable of any necessary extensions.

Expediency



D.
In a country of such vast extent as ours, local expenditures of public money are liable to great abuses.

C.
It would be improper, as a mere matter of expediency to invoke the aid of the General Government.

W.
"What has been true in the past would also be true in this instance."

The Federal Government and Railroads

No authority for direct aid



D.
I must premise, that, according to my opinion, the General Government has no right to appropriate money except to carry into execution its delegated powers.

C.
It is not within the power of the General Government to give any considerable direct aid in execution of the system.

W.
I do not regard the system of railroads or internal improvements as comprehended under the delegated powers.

In both the data and warrant of this argument, Calhoun specifically mentioned that these statements represented his own opinion. His reliance upon personal opinion only in this area probably stemmed from the Convention's decision not to discuss those issues on which constitutional differences existed. Having established his beliefs that the Government should not provide direct assistance, he next considered other alternatives for action.

Indirect aid is permissible



D.
It is not within the power of the General Government to give any considerable direct aid in execution of the system.

C.
The Government may indirectly give very essential aid.

W.
Means of assistance other than direct aid are possible.

B.
1. The Government, regarded in the light of a proprietor, may grant lands in aid of such improvements.
2. As a member of Congress, I never hesitated to vote in favor of acts granting alternate sections of land to railroads.

At this point of the speech, Calhoun turned his attention to the subject of the protective tariff. He ultimately showed how repeal of certain duties represented an indirect aid to the railroads. However, during the development of these arguments, Calhoun seemingly forgot the issue of Federal aid to internal improvements and concentrated on the protective policy. His reasoning on this issue again followed the pattern of a sorites.



D.
It is well known that the principal expense in constructing railroads is caused by the price of iron; but perhaps it is not as well known that a large portion of the price consists in the duty laid on the importation of iron.

C.
A repeal of the duty on iron would be equal to a subscription of that sum per mile.

W.
By cutting the cost of iron, the Government could furnish an indirect aid.

B.
The duty on heavy T iron alone is more than two thousand dollars a mile.



D.
A repeal on the duty of iron would help the railroads.

C.
I do not intend to touch upon the vexed question of the tariff.

W.
Harmony of the Convention is important, and a diversity of opinion exists in respect to the tariff policy.

R.
Unless the interests of the southern and western regions are more important.

Calhoun apparently assumed the Convention delegates were more interested in the development of their economies than in the resolve to ignore constitutional differences. He immediately developed the reservation of the previous argument as an indictment of the protective policy. Notice should be taken of Calhoun's word choice. He stated he did not intend to speak on the "tariff," which left him free to discuss the policy or philosophy of "protectionism."

D.
The South and West already produce more articles than can be consumed within our own limits, including other portions of the Union.

C.
We must increase our world markets.

W.
We desire to market our surplus goods.

D.
Our capacity for commanding markets depends upon a free exchange of goods with the rest of the world.

C.
The existing tariff hurts our development.

W.
Every barrier interposed in the shape of tax or duties must necessarily limits its market for our products.

D.
The existing tariff hurts our development.

C.
It is hoped that all will concur that no duty shall be imposed which is not necessary.

W.
The desire for further development is the principle reason for this meeting.

The Federal Government and Reclamation of Flooded Lands

The Government may contribute for lands within its proprietorship



D.
Lands subject to annual inundation comprehend a large and most valuable portion of the whole regions. A large portion is held by the Federal Government.

C.
The Federal Government ought to contribute to leveeing the land, in proportion to its interest, or terminate its proprietorship.

W.
"The owners of land should care for that land."

W.
Individual ownership is preferable to Federal ownership.

Calhoun did not explicitly state the second warrant regarding the advantages of individual rather than Federal ownership. However, his claim involved only the possibility of Federal termination of proprietorship and ignored the idea of the General Government purchasing the remainder of land in question. Thus, the statement of his claim provided insight to his assumed warrant. After Calhoun had implied the advantages of individual control, he turned to the practicalities of such ownership.

Ideally, the Government should terminate its proprietorship

D.
Either the Federal Government ought to contribute to leveeing the land, or it should terminate its proprietorship.

C.
It would be the most advisable every way for the Government to take measures to terminate its proprietorship in land as early as it can be practically effected.

W.
There would be great difficulty in fixing the proportion which the Federal Government and individuals ought to contribute.

Calhoun's first two arguments on reclamation of flooded lands actually skirted the issue of the responsibility of the Federal Government. Rather, the Senator seemed more concerned with the proper ownership of the land in question. Having demonstrated that individual ownership was more advantageous and practical, he then returned to the original issue of who was responsible for reclamation. The claims of the first two arguments provided the sectionalist with data for his ultimate conclusion.



D.
Individual and state ownership is more advantageous and practical.

C.
Leave the construction of the levees to the respective states and individual owners.

W.
Once Government ownership is terminated. . . .

B.
I introduced a bill to this effect some years ago.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Evaluation of Calhoun's Audience Adaptation

Speech of 1817

The audience

In general, the House of 1817 represented an unusually nationalistic group. Both the War of 1812 and the Second Generation of American Statesmen had generated a profound influence upon the philosophies of this group of legislators. Since the vast majority of Representatives were members of the Republican Party, they tended to view issues along the same political guidelines. Evidence of the nationalistic leanings of the House was the approval of bills on the tariff, a national bank, and internal improvements.

In spite of this feeling of unity, three restraining factors signaled possible defeat for the pending Bonus Bill. The Congressional Pay-Raise Act of 1816 had caused such a widespread public furor that the Representatives hesitated to appropriate any funds beyond what was absolutely necessary. Secondly, although the House was nationalistic, many members feared the Bonus Bill would harm the economic and political interests of their respective sections. Both the South and Northeast believed this legislation might align the West with the other region. Finally, in an attempt to ease their constitutional consciences, many preferred that the Federal Government allow private enterprise to take the initiative.

The speech

John Calhoun's speech on the Bonus Bill coincided with the values and characteristics of the House of 1817. The South Carolinian approached this nationalistic audience with the major arguments that internal improvements would strengthen the nation economically, militarily, and politically. He urged the individual members to accept their duty of strengthening a country so recently ravaged by war. Calhoun referred to the other useful measures already authorized and expressed his desire that this Congress would also enjoy the reputation of passing this legislation.

Calhoun not only appealed to the nationalistic viewpoints of the House, but also attacked the three restraining factors. Realizing the indisposition of the House toward new appropriations, he began his speech with a description of the universal wealth connected with such a system. Calhoun emphasized that "every portion of the community--the farmer, mechanic, and merchant--will feel its good effects. . . ."[1] Coincidentally, the House's hesitancy to spend money had developed because of the outrages of the nation's farmers, mechanics, and merchants.

Calhoun used two arguments to offset regional interests and the fear of harmful alliances. First, he stated that a good system of roads and canals would promote national--not regional--unity. By connecting the extremes with the center of the Union, he reasoned that the nation would become both economically and politically inseparable. Secondly, he used the existence of these regional fears as a justification for the necessity of Federal assistance. As long as individual states or sections distrusted one another, no one area dared take the initiative of developing roads and canals.

The final obstacle to the Bonus Bill centered around constitutionality and the method of financing. Calhoun demonstrated that the constitutional argument did not apply to the specifics of the Bill. Further, even if the objection was relevant, past Government actions denied the validity of such fears. He then explained how the proposed method of financing represented the only realistic and practical approach.

Summarily, Calhoun succeeded in adapting his speech on the Bonus Bill to the House of 1817. He appealed to the values of his audience and acknowledged most, if not all, of the existing barriers.

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[1] "Speech on the Internal Improvements Bill," Works., II, 196.

Speech of 1840

The audience

The Senate of 1840 became entangled in hostility, apprehension, frustration, indecision, and ineffectiveness. The incompatibility of the Democrats and Whigs just barely exceeded the conflicts between the northern and southern elements of the Whig Party. Further, this addiction to conflict went beyond party lines and extended to sectional lines as well. An informal alliance between the Northeast and West had designated the South to the role of a political minority. Faced with failures such as the Missouri Compromise, the rise of the abolitionists, and the admission of new free states, the southern Senators assumed a position of constant agitation. In essence, the Senate reflected the epitome of sectionalism and was virtually void of any constructive legislation.

The subject of internal improvements ranked little above routine because of the severity of the slavery conflict. Although the issue was relatively unimportant, both political parties opposed the idea of Federal assistance. The opposition of most Senators stemmed from sectional formulas. Additionally, the steady stream of presidential vetoes of such projects discouraged even the most ardent supporters.

As with virtually everything else, the status of Calhoun's ethos with the Senate followed sectional lines. Because of his earlier shift of political philosophy, the Northeast regarded him as something of a traitor. Calhoun's position of moderation helped ease the Northeast's antagonism to some extent. However, the moderation which soothed the Northeast only served to arouse the suspicions of the southern Whigs. They believed he maintained a moderate position because of his desire for the presidency. While many Senators distrusted and disagreed with Calhoun, nearly all recognized him as an honest and sincere man.

The speech

Calhoun's arguments and appeals to the Senate conformed to his image as a "moderate." From this standpoint, he attempted to overcome or rise above the existing sectionalism by omitting many arguments and specifics which he might have used effectively to fortify his position. The Senator ignored any mention of constitutionality and neglected to mention how passage of the Bill might aid one section at the expense of another. While this approach conceivably reflected what he believed to be the best means of defeating the proposed legislation, these overtures also raised the usual suspicions regarding his political motives. Enforcing these doubts was Calhoun's belief "that the man who was the candidate of one section alone could never be President."[2]

While Calhoun attempted to avoid hostility, he also managed to use the current sectionalism to his own advantage. He spoke of how a few interested states had wasted much of the original appropriation for the Cumberland Road, and of how they had done so against the wishes of the majority. He warned that Federal continuation of the Road would breed political discontent and produce many mischievous consequences. He criticized past projects for the inequities of disbursement. Arguments such as these enabled Calhoun to utilize the jealousies and factions of the Senate.

In summary, while Calhoun attempted to rise above the sectionalistic nature of the Senate, the acceptance of many of his arguments required its existence. This perhaps represented the best approach of convincing an audience which generally agreed on nothing. However, this means of persuasion also served to create suspicion and doubt among some members of the Senate. Hence, Calhoun adapted to his audience in some respects; yet in other, he failed.

Speech of 1845

The audience

The Memphis Convention consisted of delegates from the West and South, gathered for the purpose of discussing the subject of internal improvements. Because of the rapid westward migration, the West felt a new sense of political power and seemed determined to expand its markets and improve its transportation facilities. The South also needed the commerce and prosperity which would come from new improvements. Yet even more importantly, southern leaders desired to form an indirect political and economic alliance with the West, and believed that concessions on the issue of internal improvements could make such a league reality. The idea for such a meeting originated with the West, the South quickly began the planning and organization.

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[2] Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1951), III, 417.

A desire for the development of new markets and increased transportation facilities was common to all members of the audience. The only important difference of opinion existing among the delegates regarded a constitutional interpretation of the degree in which the Federal Government should intervene. The West demanded improvements and suffered no constitutional qualms. The South, however, had to resolve the dilemma of a desire for alliance and prosperity versus constitutional scruples. The eventual compromise exhibited a willingness to overlook much in order to achieve the alliance.

The audience's perception of John Calhoun was good as indicated by his invitation to preside at the Convention. One serious detriment to his ethos was speculation that his appearance in Memphis reflected his desire to win a political following for the presidency. Leaders of both sections believed he saw the Convention as an excellent chance to court the West.

The speech

The address to the Memphis Convention abounded in the spirit of compromise. In an attempt to settle the constitutional differences, Calhoun granted concessions to each section. However, he tempered or restrained each concession to make it acceptable to the other region.

Calhoun established the groundwork for his conciliatory position with his remarks on the constitutional differences existing within the audience. He reminded the delegates of their resolve to speak on no subject involving diversity of opinion over the Constitution. He then promised to abide by that decision. This approach conveyed the impression that the advances desired by both sections were possible without infringing upon the constitutional beliefs of the South. Thus, under the aura of harmony and compromise, Calhoun presented his beliefs on the role of the Federal Government in the development of internal improvements.

In his remarks on the Mississippi River, Calhoun appealed to the West with the concession of Federal authority. He justified this position as constitutional by placing the Mississippi River on the level of an inland sea. As a result, Calhoun's allowance of Federal assistance pleased the western desire for development, while the justification for that assistance satisfied the constitutional demands of the South.

Calhoun's primary concession in the area of the Mississippi River was to the West, but when discussing the Federal Government and the railroads, he coincided with the South. To offset western dissatisfaction with his belief that the Government had no power to aid the railroads directly, Calhoun again relied on compromise. He explained the many types of indirect governmental assistance and how such aid would help the development of the rail industry. He alluded to his congressional voting record on such acts as granting alternate sections of land to railroads. He emphasized that the repeal of certain duties would lower the cost of building tracks. This argument not only demonstrated an indirect aid, but also aligned the southerners with him against the hated tariff legislation.

Calhoun's last item of consideration involved Federal participation in the reclamation of flooded lands. Again, he enunciated a position designed to satisfy the desires of both sections. He believed the Federal Government could contribute for reclamation of public lands. However, the ideal situation called for changing public lands to private ownership. This approach appealed to western interests by making land available to the independent farmers and ranchers, and coincided with southern hopes of diminishing the control and activities of the Federal Government.

Thus, under the guise of compromise, Calhoun successfully adapted to both elements of the Memphis Convention. However, this success probably proved a shortcoming in disguise. Calhoun had feared his appearance would be regarded as a bid for the presidency, and his speech effectively evoked that very response from many members of the audience.

Summary

The foregoing justifies the conclusion that Calhoun consistently adapted to his audience when he spoke on the subject of internal improvements. He succeeded in many instances and failed in others; yet in all the speeches, he incorporated the process of audience adaptation.

Evaluation of Calhoun's Logical Appeals

Analysis of Claims, Warrants, and Data

Claims

Generally, the claims of Calhoun's arguments followed a relatively standard pattern. The majority were designative in that they answered questions of fact. In both the speech of 1817 and of 1840, virtually the only deviation from this type of claim was Calhoun's ultimate appeal for the acceptance (or rejection) of the bill.

The fact that Calhoun spoke both for and against the subject of internal improvements and used the same type of claim on each occasion suggests that he did not adjust his claims as a means of audience adaptation. However, a significant change in the claims of the speech of 1845 negates that suggestion.

In the address to the Memphis Convention, Calhoun used several evaluative claims. The reasons for this switch from questions of fact to value-oriented conclusions might be due to any of several causes. Conceivably, the claims of this speech differed from the others because of the absence of a congressional audience. Yet the composition of the Memphis audience tends to deny such a possibility. These men were the leaders of their respective sections, and as delegates, would react in much the same manner as would their elected representatives to Congress. Another answer might be that the content of these particular arguments required an evaluative claim. However, acceptance of this position ignores the fact that Calhoun also argued against Federal assistance in the Speech of 1840 and relied solely upon claims of designation.

The evidence presented in this study supports the conclusion that Calhoun's shift from designative to evaluative claims represented a means of audience adaptation. The speech of 1845 was above all, a speech of compromise. The evaluative claims consistently coincided with each area of compromise offered by Calhoun. In each instance where his conciliatory efforts aggravated or violated the desires of one section, he immediately appealed to that group with an evaluative claim. For example, the decision to avoid mentioning any subject on which constitutional diversity existed represented the interests of the South. Since the West had no qualms regarding the constitutionality of Federal projects, Calhoun reasoned that the approach was valuable in that it would preserve harmony and avoid conflict. His concession of the authority of the Federal Government to develop the Mississippi River was in accordance with western goals. To conciliate the South, Calhoun showed why he thought any further extension beyond what he had specifically stated was unconstitutional. His value judgment thereby appealed to southern beliefs.

The consistency of the relationship between areas of compromise and evaluative claims partially substantiates the thesis of this study. Although the number of fluctuations in types of claims was not great, the existing deviations conformed both with the pattern of the speech and the characteristics of the audience.

Warrants

No significant differences occurred in the warrants of the speeches under consideration. As a general rule, the warrants followed a substantive proof pattern, in that they asserted relationships between phenomena of the external world. Although motivational and authoritative warrants occasionally appeared, Calhoun's arguments relied predominantly upon substantive proof patterns. Hence, his process of audience adaptation did not include noticeable changes in his warrants.

The role of the warrant within the Toulmin construct discourages deliberate manipulation or change. This element serves as the connecting link between data and claim. Hence, substantive warrants can support opposite conclusions, if the original evidence is different.

This study fails to demonstrate that Calhoun adjusted his warrants when adapting to an audience. However, it does support the existing belief that he relied primarily upon logical appeals. Although some motivational (emotional) and authoritative (ethical) warrants are present in his speeches on internal improvements, this study isolates the substantive, or logical appeal, as the predominant mode of artistic proof. This isolation both supports and enhances his reputation as a logician.

Data

Calhoun's use of data constituted the area of greatest change in his logical appeals. "The most important requirement of evidence is that the person listening to the argument accept the evidence--he must believe it."[3] Calhoun's technique of audience adaptation consisted of first presenting data acceptable to the values of his audience, and then reasoning from that evidence to his desired conclusions.

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[3] Erwin P. Bettinghaus, "Structure and Argument," Perspectives on Argumentation, eds. Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. Nilsen (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966), p. 149.

Often, the data necessary to satisfy the audience corresponded with the position he advocated. Under these circumstances, Calhoun merely presented the data and then drew his conclusions. For example, his data in the Speech of 1817 that internal improvements would strengthen the country economically, militarily, and politically fit the values of his audience and enabled him to conclude immediately that the Bill deserved adoption.

However, in some instances, the characteristics of the audience forced Calhoun to reason from indirect data. In his address to the Memphis Convention, he argued that the tariff was detrimental to southern and western interests. The data necessary to support this argument might have offended many of the western delegates. Therefore, he began with data concerning railroad construction costs. The neutrality of this data insured its acceptance to all members and furnished Calhoun a springboard to his desired conclusion. By means of a sorites involving four separate arguments, he eventually concluded the tariff was detrimental. In the same speech, he wished to conclude that the states should assume the responsibility of reclaiming flooded lands. The data for this argument, which required the denial of Federal authority, conflicted with western beliefs. Hence, Calhoun began with evidence pertaining to the advantages of individual ownership of land. He then reasoned from this non-related and seemingly irrelevant data to his desired conclusion.

The major arguments Calhoun used in the speech of 1817 to support internal improvements--economic, military, and political strengths--reappear in the speeches of 1840 and 1845 as reasons to reject the system. An examination of these issues reveals additional instances of his manipulation of data.

In 1817, Calhoun presented data pertaining to the long range wealth accruing from internal improvements. His evidence in 1840 considered only the immediate costs of such projects. The warrants of both arguments followed substantive proof patterns and both claims were designative. Yet the change of data enabled him to adapt his desired conclusions to his audiences.

The nationalistic Calhoun argued that an efficient transportation system would strengthen the nation militarily. His data that the Union had too much surface and too few people allowed him to reason that roads and canals would concentrate America's common strength. However, the sectionalistic Calhoun changed the data and logically arrived at an opposite conclusion. Since the ocean was the exposed side, the Government should stop emphasizing internal improvements and apply our resources to the specific point of danger.

Calhoun's argument that internal improvements would strengthen the country politically developed from the data that the nationalistic House had an obligation to counteract every tendency of disunion. He later reported to the sectionalistic Senate that Government appropriations for internal improvements were partial and unequal. Thus, the South Carolinian again used data acceptable to his audience as he formulated his desired conclusions.

Summary

Two general conclusions emerge from an examination of John Calhoun's speeches on internal improvements. First, the South Carolinian consistently adapted to the unique characteristics of each of his audiences. Secondly, this process of adaptation incorporated certain traceable changes in his use of logical proof. These two conditions substantiate the thesis of this study.

Calhoun adapted his logical appeals to his audiences in two ways. His attempts to lead the Memphis Convention to a compromise solution resulted in the departure from his normal use of designative claims. The concept of compromise necessitated his requesting a concession from one section or the other. In each of these instances, he appealed to that section with an evaluative claim.

The predominant method of adaptation involved Calhoun's use of data. He drew his desired conclusions from evidence which was acceptable to his audiences. While this technique occasionally forced him to reason in an indirect manner, it also permitted him to reach opposite conclusions on the same issue.

John Calhoun varied his logical appeals as a means of audience adaptation. This rhetorical device enabled him both to change his position on many issues and to maintain his reputation as a master logician throughout his long and perplexing career.

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