

THE JANUS-FACED PHILOSOPHY OF FULKE GREVILLE

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of English

University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Margaret Anne L. Mathieson

May 1971

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to Dr. Jesse D. Hartley, Dr. Wendell T. Howard, and especially to Dr. Patrick G. Hogan, my thesis director, for their suggestions and help in the preparation of this thesis, as well as for the many hours they spent assisting and advising me.

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Fulke Greville was a pious Christian and, at the same time, a Machiavellian statesman. His philosophy, like that of many Renaissance intellectuals, was made up of a multitude of incongruous ideas drawn from many diverse sources. From this complexity of ideas, two co-existing attitudes usually emerged, and, thus, Greville often appeared to face in two directions like the god Janus.

In nearly every situation, one attitude or viewpoint sought the ideal, whereas the other recognized the actual. As a Christian, Greville yearned for an inner and personal relationship with God, which he considered the only true religion, but from a practical point of view he recognized and approved of the advantages to be gained from an established or state religion. Moreover, he envisioned monarchy as a benevolent arrangement between king and people, that had God's approval, but, at the same time, he realized that it was usually a corrupt system made up of men who were themselves corrupt. Similarly, he thought of the ideal king as one who was benevolent, merciful, and loving, but from a practical point of view he realized that a capable ruler, who had to maintain order, could not afford to have these qualities. These coexisting attitudes toward the desirable qualities of a king included two divergent views of blood succession and the theory of divine right. In addition, Greville's dual responses emerged when he considered the subject of war. From his idealistic or religious

point of view he deplored war as injurious to man and hateful to God, but as a practical statesman he recognized and approved of the advantages gained by war.

Greville apparently did not consider these dual attitudes unusual enough to mention specifically, for to him they reflected the dual nature of all men. Thus, his idealistic and worldly attitudes were analogous to the divine part of man, who was created in the image of God, and the error in man, who is corrupt because of the Fall.

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INTRODUCTION

When Fulke Greville wrote, "I know the world and believe in God,"¹ he revealed in very few words the double nature of his philosophical views. As an able politician, he was required to be practical, employing the pragmatism of Machiavelli while, at the same time, as a deeply religious Christian humanist, he could not help deploring in his literary works the political ideas that he advocated as a statesman. All Greville's writing reflects the practical and Christian aspects of his nature, which are constantly in conflict with one another, just as the error in man that is a result of his being a fallen creature is in conflict with the divine in man that is the image of God.

This precarious balance between ideologies is responsible for the philosophic introspection that lies behind Greville's poetry, for he was an exceptionally intelligent and speculative poet who reflected upon and weighed all the religious and political ideas that were current in his time. Of the four characteristics of Lord Brooke's poetry listed by the Rev. Alexander Grosart, "the mass of his thought, the wisdom and nobleness of his opinions, the vitality of his counsels, and the realness of his poetic gift,"² three involve his inner tension between the actual

¹Quoted in Fulke Greville, Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, edited by Geoffrey Bullough, I (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), 1.

²Quoted in Fulke Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of the Right Honourable Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, edited by Alexander B. Grosart, II (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), xviii.

and the ideal or between political expediency and religious conviction. His thought, his opinions, and his counsels are all concerned with politics or religion.

This thesis is an examination of Greville's dichotomy of ideas in all his works: Alaham, Mustapha, A Treatise of Monarchy, A Treatie of Warres, An Inquisition Upon Fame and Honour, A Treatie of Humane Learning, Caelica, The Life of Sir Philip Sidney, and A Treatise of Religion. His Senecan dramas, Alaham and Mustapha, are political in nature, and although the scene in both cases is laid in the Near-east, the ideas presented are a reflection of Greville's concern with contemporary Elizabethan politics and show the contradiction between the spiritual and intellectual sides of his nature. In A Treatise of Monarchy, originally intended as choruses for the plays, Greville delves deeper into the science of government and reveals his dual attitudes to an even greater degree. The other treatises deal with various subjects, but they also reveal his inability to reconcile the ideal with the actual. Even in Caelica, a sonnet sequence intended to express the poet's love for his mistress, Greville deals with impersonal themes that are pertinent to his inner conflict. In addition, his Life of Sir Philip Sidney, while praising Sidney's political ideas and Elizabeth's competence as a queen, actually reveals Greville's own ideas.

The final chapter is devoted to an analysis of any factor which might tend to unify Greville's ideologies, to make them less incongruous, or to explain his preoccupation with the conflict between them.

For example, it might seem that his plain style, which is a departure from the popular literary fashion of his time, could have encouraged or inspired his philosophic reflection, for it is particularly suited to speculative poetry. However, an investigation shows that his conviction that man was a two-sided creature, half divine and half depraved, explains his acceptance of dual attitudes and responses in himself.

The primary texts used for Alaham, Mustapha, Caelica, An Inquisition on Fame and Honour, A Treatie of Humane Learning, and A Treatie of Warres are from Geoffrey Bullough's edition of The Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke. Quotations will be cited parenthetically in the text as Alaham, Mustapha, Caelica, Fame and Honour, Humane Learning, and Warres. Quotations from A Treatise of Monarchy and A Treatise of Religion are from G. A. Wilke's edition of The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion and will be cited in the text as Monarchy and Religion. The text for The Life of Sir Philip Sidney is Nowell Smith's edition, and quotations will be cited as Life. Throughout the paper Greville's spelling and orthography will be scrupulously maintained except where normalized by modern editors. In addition, the frequent use of italicized words and passages by Greville's editors has been carefully retained by the conventional process of underlining.

CHAPTER I

THE RENAISSANCE MIND: A COMPOSITE OF IDEAS

Fulke Greville's ideas, like those of many versatile thinkers of the English Renaissance, were a product primarily of the medieval period and humanism. He was familiar with the otherworldliness of the medieval past, the ideas of ancient writers brought forward by the revival of classical culture, and the skepticism of some of his contemporaries. Some men were able to reconcile these various and sometimes conflicting ideas and to combine them to form one systematic philosophy,¹ but Fulke Greville could not, and the effect of these different influences left him, like the ancient Roman god Janus, with two distinct views which were often in conflict with one another.

Although Janus' traditional two faces "represented the confusion of his original state," Chaos, his designation as "god of 'beginnings'," the "promoter of all initiative," and the "head of all human enterprises," led to his consideration as the "god of all means of communication." As the "god of all doorways," both public gates and private

¹Fulke Greville, Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke, edited by Geoffrey Bullough, I (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), 1. Bullough says that this sort of "cleavage between the ideal and the actual formed part of the stock-in-trade of most Elizabethan poets and moralists; but it was usually alleviated, as in the case of Spenser, by a somewhat facile Platonism, or, as in many forerunners of William Browne, by an escape into the Utopia of pastoral convention." All quotations from Greville's writings--Caelica, A Treatie of Humane Learning, An Inquisition Upon Fame and Honour, A Treatie of Warres, Alaham, and Mustapha--are from this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text.

doors, he at once observed what went on within and without and could control admissions and exclusions. By extension, not only could he control beings, but the coming and going of ideas.²

Fulke Greville was a Janus figure in a number of ways, but primarily because the many conflicting ideas that he encountered often caused him to be, if not in confusion or chaos, at least in the position of having two attitudes or of giving two responses to a given situation. Moreover, as a statesman and a trusted adviser he presided over beginnings and was in charge of communication. He was also necessarily enterprising and vigilant, observing or ascertaining to the best of his ability not only what went on within and outside his country, but also what individuals seemed to be thinking inwardly as well as how they reacted outwardly. Furthermore, as a statesman and adviser, he controlled the comings and goings of individuals, and, as an intelligent and speculative thinker and writer, he was able to exclude or advocate ideas. Reflecting over ideas and pondering over any undertaking before embarking upon it constituted a characteristic habit, one which often caused him to adopt two views or two attitudes toward a situation. One view ultimately saw the ideal, whereas the other primarily saw the actual. However, the complex views of this speculative, and often contradictory, personality become a little more understandable when one has some knowledge of his personal and political life, of the writers and friends who influenced him, of the comments critics have made about him

²New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology, translated by Richard Aldington and Delano Ames (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1959; rpt. London: Prometheus Press, 1970).

and his literary works, and of his characteristic attitudes as revealed by his works.

Greville's varied ways of viewing life are partly explained by the fact that he lived from 1554 to 1628 and was therefore a product of the English Renaissance. Thus, in order to understand the man and the complexity of thought in his work, it is really necessary to have some knowledge of his background, his schooling, his associations, and his positions as a civil servant as well as to know something of the major events in his life. He was born at Beauchamp Court to an old and distinguished Warwickshire family, the son of Fulke Greville II, the son of a distinguished soldier under Henry VIII, and Anne Neville, daughter of the Earl of Westmoreland.³ In 1564 he entered Shrewsbury School on the same day as did his distant cousin, Philip Sidney, who was the same age,⁴ and between whom a warm and lasting friendship developed.⁵ To the end of his life Greville cherished and honored the

³A. H. Bullen, Elizabethans (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1924), p. 196.

⁴Fulke Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of the Right Honourable Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, edited by Alexander B. Grosart, I (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), xxiii-xxiv. Greville's descent is from the noble House of Beauchamp of Powick, or Powyke, and the Willoughbys De Broke or Brook. Robert, Lord Brook, or Brooke, married Elizabeth, daughter and co-heir of Richard Beauchamp, Lord Beauchamp of Alcester and Powyke. Their daughter, Elizabeth, married Sir Fulke Greville, or Greville, of Alcester, the grandfather of Fulke Greville, the poet. Their children were Fulke and Robert. Fulke married Ann Neville, daughter of the Earl of Westmoreland, and Fulke was their only son. Sir Philip Sidney was also a descendant of the Beauchamps through the Dudleys, Greys, and Talbots, Viscounts Lisle; thus, the two friends were related through Elizabeth, grandmother of Fulke.

⁵Dictionary of National Biography, edited by Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, VIII (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), 602.

memory of his friend who was mortally wounded at Zutphen; in fact, he occupied himself in his old age by writing The Life of Sir Philip Sidney, which shows the affection and respect that Greville felt toward the friend of his early years.⁶ From Shrewsbury School Greville went to Jesus College, Cambridge, and Sidney went to Christ Church, Oxford; they, however, maintained a close relationship during their university days. Through his friend, Greville made the acquaintance of Philip's father, Sir Henry Sidney, who was Lord President of the Council in the Marches of Wales⁷ and who gave Greville a small political office as early as 1576. Greville resigned this post the following year and went to court with Sidney where he shortly became one of Queen Elizabeth's favorite advisers.⁸ He remained one of her closest advisers to the end of her life as Sir Robert Naunton relates in Fragmenta Regalia.

Sir Fulke Grevill, since Lord Brook, had no mean place in her favour, neither did he hold it for a short term; for, if I be not deceived, he had the longest lease and the smoothest time, without rub, of any of her favourites. He came to the Court in his youth and prime: for that is the time or never. He was a brave gentlemen, and honourably descended from Willoughby, Lord Brook and admiral to Henry VIIth. Neither illiterate: for he was, as he would often profess, a friend to Sir Philip Sidney: and there are of his now extant, some fragments of his poems, and of those times, which do interest him in the Muses: and which show the Queen's election had euer a noble conduct, and it /the poetry/, motions more of vertue and judgment than of fancy. I find that he neither sought for or obtained any great place or

⁶Bullen, Elizabethans, p. 196.

⁷Malcom W. Wallace, The Life of Sir Philip Sidney (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1915), p. 21.

⁸Dictionary of National Biography, VIII, 602.

preferment in Court, during all the time of his attendance; neither did he need it; for he came thither backed with a plentiful fortune; which, as himself was wont to say, was the better held together, by a single life, wherein he lived and died, a constant courtier of the ladies.⁹

In fact, the queen's affection for him prevented his following the life of adventure he seemingly wished. He relates in The Life of Sir Philip Sidney how she sent a messenger to forbid him to leave England when all his preparations had been made to take part in the fighting in the Low Countries.¹⁰ However, he was occasionally allowed to go abroad, and in 1579 he accompanied Sidney's friend Languet to Germany and on the return trip met William the Silent, one of the most outstanding contemporary Protestant leaders whom Sidney greatly admired.¹¹ From 1597 Greville devoted himself to civil employment. On April 20, 1583, he was made secretary for the principality of Wales, and on July 24, 1603, he was given that office for life. The office apparently did not necessitate his residing in Wales, for he sat in parliament representing Warwickshire from 1592 to 1593, in 1597, in 1601, and in 1620, taking an active part in the debates.¹² In March, 1597, he became Treasurer of the Wars and in September, 1598, Treasurer of the Navy. Always

⁹Quoted in Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, I, lxxi.

¹⁰Fulke Greville, Sir Fulke Greville's Life of Sir Philip Sidney, with an introduction by Nowell Smith (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1907), pp. 146-147. All references to The Life of Sir Philip Sidney are from this edition and will henceforth be cited parenthetically in the text.

¹¹Bullen, Elizabethans, p. 197.

¹²Dictionary of National Biography, VIII, 603.

loyal to his sovereign, he even participated in the arrest of his kinsman, the Earl of Essex, on February 8, 1600. When James I ascended the throne, Greville was made Knight of the Bath at the coronation,¹³ but still worked as Treasurer of the Navy, higher offices being denied him because of the hostility of Robert Cecil, Lord Salisbury. When Cecil died in 1612, however, Greville became Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer.¹⁴ On January 18, 1614, he was made Privy-Councillor and Gentleman of the Bedchamber.¹⁵ As Privy-Councillor he signed the warrant ordering the torture of Edmund Peacham, a clergyman who had written a sermon derogatory to the crown. In 1618 he became Commissioner of the Treasury and later resigned as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1620. He was made Baron Brooke and became a member of the House of Lords on November 15, 1621, after which action he was less active in politics. He was, however, appointed to the Council of War on April 21, 1621, and to the Committee to Advise on Foreign Affairs on April 9, 1625. He subsequently served as Counsellor of State for three years under Charles I.¹⁶

His services for his sovereigns did not go unrewarded, and his influence with Queen Elizabeth can be "proved by the list of his worldly

¹³Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, I, xxii.

¹⁴Dictionary of National Biography, VIII, 603.

¹⁵Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, I, lxxiv.

¹⁶Fulke Greville, The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion, edited by G. A. Wilkes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 33. All quotations from A Treatise of Monarchy and A Treatise of Religion are from this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text.

acquisitions in the last fifteen years of her reign."¹⁷ James I was also a liberal patron, and Fulke Greville was able to add substantially to the property he had inherited from his father in 1606. Elizabeth had given him Wednock Park in 1597, and in 1605 James gave him the ruined Castle of Warwick, which he repaired and beautified until it was the "boast of the county, and of England."¹⁸ He also obtained the manor park of Knowle.¹⁹ In February of 1627 he made a will leaving all these possessions to his cousin, Robert Greville. One of the witnesses to the will, an old servant, Ralph Haywood, irked by not being provided for, stabbed Greville as he lay in bed, after which Haywood killed himself. Greville, in his seventy-fourth year, soon died from the wound. He was buried in St. Mary's Church at Warwick. The epitaph engraved on the monument was one that he had composed himself and read: "Fulke Greville, servant to Queen Elizabeth, Councillor to King James, and friend to Sir Philip Sidney, Trophaeum Peccati."²⁰ As Greville's life spanned the years of the English Renaissance, and as he was an active civil servant, participating in many political events that took place during these years, his beliefs were understandably developed from the events that occurred and from the people whom he met.

Although Greville's epitaph mentions three of the most important influences on his life and thinking, there were undoubtedly many more.

¹⁷Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 7.

¹⁸Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, I, xxlii.

¹⁹Dictionary of National Biography, VIII, 603.

²⁰Ibid., p. 604.

In fact, Greville's thinking, due to his habit of speculating and of sifting ideas, was the result of ideas drawn from everyone he met and everything he read. Probably the earliest and most lasting influence was Sidney and his friends. Greville, for instance, paralleled Sidney's thinking in regard to the Turkish menace, although Greville was much less optimistic than Sidney. Sidney, in turn, owed many of his ideas to Hubert Languet whose correspondence with him dealt with the problem of Italy and the Turks.²¹ All three "admired the unity and discipline which made the Turks so dangerous an enemy," but Greville was not optimistic enough to agree that the Turks would be corrupted by Italy as Sidney believed. However, Greville did incorporate Sidney's and Languet's views into the Chorus Secundus of Mustapha.²² Another friend of Sidney who unquestionably influenced Greville was Philip du Plessis Mornay whose De Veritate Christianae Religionis Sidney had begun to translate. Then too Greville was definitely affected by the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, attributed to both Languet and Mornay; although Greville never approved of rebellion under any circumstances, the speeches of Achmat and Heli in Mustapha could not have been written without an understanding of the attitude advanced by Sidney's friends in this work.²³ Through Sidney, Greville knew Edward Dyer, and all three were in close contact while Sidney was writing the Arcadia.²⁴ Probably through Sidney,

²¹Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 3.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., p. 4.

²⁴Ibid., p. 5.

Greville met the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno when Bruno visited London in 1584.²⁵ Although Greville was not greatly influenced by his theories, the two were alike in their ironic attitude toward love.²⁶ Moreover, The Chorus Tertius of Mustapha involves a debate between Time and Eternity, and, while it does not agree with Bruno's infinite pantheistic universe, it recognizes the same aspect of change that Bruno uses to introduce the Spaccio.²⁷ The Pembroke Circle, headed by Mary Sidney, was another possible influence inasmuch as Greville, like others who tried to put Sidney's views into practice, followed the Senecan form in drama, not only admiring Senecan rhetoric, but becoming somewhat of a Senecan moralist.²⁸ Another great influence upon his thinking was Calvinism, which he and Sidney both believed in.²⁹ In addition to Sidney Greville was deeply influenced by Elizabeth I and James I. In order to serve them he unquestionably became interested

²⁵Franklin B. Newman, "Sir Fulke Greville and Giordano Bruno: A Possible Echo," PQ, XXIX (October, 1950), 368-369. The dialogues of Bruno's Cena de la Ceneri supposedly took place in Greville's apartments during an Ash Wednesday Supper, and thus they were so titled.

²⁶Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 5-6.

²⁷Newman, "Fulke Greville and Giordano Bruno," p. 370.

²⁸Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 8-9.

²⁹Greville's reliance on and divergence from the teaching of Calvin are discussed in Chapter II, Religion: Worldly and Spiritual. John Buxton, Sir Philip Sidney and the English Renaissance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1906), p. 54 and p. 100, points out that Sidney's Calvinism was based upon his dislike of Popery and his admiration for Calvin's hard, clear logic, whereas for Greville Calvinism was the guiding discipline of his life.

in Machiavelli's The Prince, which advanced ideas that enabled him to serve them capably. As a politician and civil servant, Greville relied heavily upon Machiavelli's ideas. Although Sidney, Calvin, the sovereigns Greville served, and Machiavelli exerted the greatest influence on him, his thinking was the result of ideas in and influences from many sources. For instance, his Treatise of Humane Learning is partly an echo of and partly an argument against Francis Bacon's Advancement of Learning.³⁰ Moreover, his political ideas are drawn from a variety of sources: George Buchanan's De Jure Regni and Jean Bodin's La République as well as Languet's or Mornay's Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos and Machiavelli's The Prince. Thus, Greville, after reflecting over things he read and every idea he received from those he met, seemingly accepted parts of some ideas while rejecting others.

Greville's intellect, his reflective habit, and his propensity for writing difficult and obscure passages have been apparent to literary figures and literary historians through the years; however, their comments are of a fugitive nature. The following extensive quotations, brought together here for the first time, reveal agreement that Greville's work was intellectual, speculative, and extremely difficult to understand. Samuel Pepys, however, seemed singularly impressed by Greville's evaluation of England's relationship with the Dutch and by the fact that his comments had amounted to a prophecy.

³⁰Morris W. Croll, The Works of Fulke Greville (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1903), p. 23.

January 1st. Dined with my Lord Crewe, with whom was Mr. Browne, Clerke of the House of Lords, and Mr. John Crewe. Here was mighty good discourse, as there is always: and among other things my Lord Crewe did turn to a place in the "Life of Sir Philip Sidney," wrote by Sir Fulke Greville, which do fortell the present condition of this nation, in relation to the Dutch, to the very degree of a prophecy; and is so remarkable that I am resolved to buy one of them, it being quite throughout, a good discourse. . . .³¹

January 2nd. To Westminster Hall, and there staid a little: and then home, and by the way did find with difficulty the Life of Sir Philip Sidney. And the bookseller told me that he had sold four, within this week or two, which is more than ever he sold in all his life of them; and he could not imagine what should be the reason of it: but I suppose it is from the same reason of people's observing of this part therein, touching his prophesying our present condition here in England in relation to the Dutch, which is very remarkable.³²

On the other hand, Richard Flecknoe, one of the first to comment on Greville's obscurity, was impressed with Greville's intellect and the difficulty encountered in understanding him, for he wrote the following lines in 1671 after the appearance of The Remains in 1670.

Food, for strong minds! whilst of your lighter stuff
The weaker find in other Books enough,
Whose Master-strokes, great wits do look upon
With reverence and admiration,
While Novices, and those of meaner wit
Are not grown up to th'admiring of them yet. . . .³³

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who patterned his "Farewell to Love" on Caelica LXXXIV, was also aware of the difficulties involved in an understanding of Greville's writing; he wrote three lines from Cowper's

³¹Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, deciphered by Rev. J. Smith, III (New York: Bigelow, Brown, and Co., Inc., 1924), 336-337.

³²Ibid., pp. 340-341.

³³Quoted in Greville, The Remains, pp. 18-19.

"Yardley Oak" in Lamb's copy of Certaine Learned and Elegant Workes which were intended to be a "Motto for the Whole Volume."

A quarry of stout spurs and knotted fangs
That, crook'd into a thousand whimsies, clasp
The stubborn soil.³⁴

He says of Caelica XLIV: "A sweet poem supposing it to end with the third stanza. . . ." Of Caelica LV he says:

A poem this not to be written but by men of some genius.
Sould to Heaven that men of any genius would never write such poems.³⁵

Robert Southey was likewise aware of the difficulty involved in understanding Greville's verses, stating that Greville was "certainly the most difficult of our Poets" and adding "but no writer, whether in prose or verse, in this or any other country, appears to have reflected more deeply on momentous subjects."³⁶ Charles Lamb agrees and compares understanding the meaning of Greville's lines to learning a new language. He points out the purely intellectual nature of the verses.

These two tragedies [Alaham and Mustapha] of Lord Brooke might with more propriety have been termed political treatises than plays. Their author has strangely contrived to make passion, character and interest, of the highest order subservient to the expression of state dogmas and mysteries. He is nine parts Machiavel and Tacitus, for one part Sophocles or Seneca. In this writer's estimate of the faculties of his own mind, the understanding must have held a most tyrannical pre-eminence. Whether we look into his plays, or his most passionate love-poems,

³⁴Ibid., p. 19.

³⁵Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism, edited by Thomas Middleton Raysor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 243.

³⁶Quoted in Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, II, xviii.

we shall find all frozen and made rigid with intellect. The finest movements of the human heart, the utmost grandeur of which the soul is capable, are essentially comprised in the actions and speeches of Caelica and Camena. Shakespeare, who seems to have had a peculiar delight in contemplating womanly perfection, whom for his many sweet images of female excellence all women are in an especial manner bound to love, has not raised the ideal of the female character higher than Lord Brooke in these two women has done. But it requires a study equivalent to the learning of a new language to understand their meaning when they speak. It is indeed hard to hit:

Much like thy riddle, Samson, in one day
Or seven though one should musing sit.

It is as if a being of pure intellect should take upon him to express the emotions of our sensitive natures. There would be all knowledge, but sympathetic expression would be wanting.³⁷

Swinburne also recognized the difficulty and obscurity of Greville's poetry, linking Greville and Chapman as the two poets "most genuinely obscure in style upon whose work I have ever adventured."³⁸ Moreover, Adolphus Ward, in speaking of Greville's two tragedies, echoes Lamb's sentiments, quoting part of Lamb's comment that everything is "frozen and made rigid with intellect" in his own appraisal.

Charles Lamb, who never penned a more felicitously expressed criticism than his envoi to the extracts given by him from these tragedies, observes that they "might with more propriety have been termed political treatises than plays," and that their author shows himself in them "nine parts Machiavel and Tacitus, for one part Sophocles or Seneca." Yet even as the tragedies stand, they fail to do full justice to the original design of the writer, who informs us that he had at first intended the "treatises," now printed separately and extending to much the same length as the tragedies themselves, to serve as choruses to the several acts of the latter, in addition no doubt to the choruses proper, for the most part tolerably lengthy in themselves,

³⁷Charles Lamb, Specimens of English Dramatic Poets, edited by William Macdonald, I (London: J. M. Dent and Co., 1903), 36-37.

³⁸Quoted in The Remains, p. 19.

already appended to them. On the difficult style and the profundity of meaning which characterise the treatises there is no need for descanting here; but even in the tragedies as they stand, in the dialogue as well as in the purely didactic--they cannot be called lyric--excurses, the language is extremely obscure. This is the result, not of ambiguity or vagueness of diction, but of a closeness as well as abstruseness of thought to which to all intents and purposes no reader will prove equal unless he approaches these so-called dramas as a student addresses himself to a set of long series of problems. It is a peculiarity of style--a peculiarity extending to almost everything that he has left behind him in verse--which must continue to leave Lord Brooke's tragedies unread except by a resolute few. Seneca and Euripides, whom he generally though not slavishly follows as his dramatic models, are not responsible for what is the reverse of a rhetorical, and only as it were incidentally a sententious, style. It should be added that there are to be found in these strange compositions not only characters as strongly conceived as they are subtly worked out, but situations full of awe and pathos; but everything, to recur to Lamb's inimitable phraseology, is "frozen and made rigid with intellect."³⁹

In addition, George Saintsbury agrees that Greville is obscure and comments on his ethical and political treatises that "poems or tracts on human learning, on wars, and other things" seem "singularly inappropriate to verse." Of the sonnet sequence Caelica he says:

Even Caelica is very unlikely to find readers as a whole, owing to the strangely repellent character of Brooke's thought, which is intricate and obscure, and of his style, which is at any rate sometimes as harsh and eccentric as the theories of poetry which made him compose verse-treatises on politics. Nevertheless there is much nobility of thought and expression in him, and not unfrequent flashes of real poetry, while his very faults are characteristic.⁴⁰

Furthermore, Felix E. Schelling concurs with the appraisals of other critics, finding Greville's verse difficult to understand, subtle, and

³⁹Adolphus William Ward, A History of English Dramatic Literature, II (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1899), 614-615.

⁴⁰George Saintsbury, A History of Elizabethan Literature (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), p. 99.

intellectual. To Schelling, Greville's literary reputation is based upon his "lyrics of intellectualized emotion," his "singularly difficult Senecan dramas," and his political treatises, and he says of Greville:

. . . A more completely metaphysical mind than Greville's it would be difficult to discover. He was a Stoic in an age of Platonism, a theorist in statecraft among politicians. He is full of Machiavellian subtlety and insight, but stands aloof from argument, controversy, and all practical applications. Consciousness of the gauds and ornaments of rhetoric as such he knows not at all; and yet the very essence of poetry and of beauty of expression is his at times, not only in his verse but in his prose as well. Fluency is the quality that is furthest from the thought as from the style of Greville. What he says, he says with gravity, with a certain hesitant difficulty; and he abounds in indirections of speech and sentences in which we wander with him as in a maze. But there is certainly (If we will but seek it) a significance, depth, and beauty in the thought of Greville that make it worth the labor of attainment and that come to exercise on him who learns to know him a peculiar fascination. The comparison which has been made of Greville to Polonius, with his pedantic parade of shallow, hackneyed truisms, and his incessant babbling to no purpose, seems peculiarly unhappy. . . . --King James is Polonius; not Greville, whose lofty preoccupation with abstract truth and search therefor, together with a certain awkwardness of style, despite his power to express a beautiful thought in apt and fitting raiment, seem qualities more in common with our American Emerson.⁴¹

G. A. Wilkes and Alexander Grosart, both of whom have edited Greville's works, aptly sum up the comments of the other critics. Wilkes refers to Greville as "a reflective poet" with a "tendency to probe, speculate, and discuss,"⁴² and Grosart asserts that his work, if one hopes to understand it completely, "demands the love and reverence of Patience."⁴³

⁴¹Felix E. Schelling, English Literature During the Lifetime of Shakespeare, Rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), pp. 304-305.

⁴²Greville, The Remains, p. 6.

⁴³Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, II, vii.

Thus the critics seem to be unanimous in their appraisal of Greville and his poetry: his verses are difficult to understand, they show his introspective and philosophic intellect, and they are the results of a subtle interweaving of ideas, which are often in conflict with one another, arising from many sources.

Greville's interweaving of ideas, often displayed by two sharply divided attitudes, has been apparent to those who have studied his literary works, for frequent mention is made of his dualism by editors and critics. However, no careful study or statistical analysis has been made of all his works to determine the nature of his diverging attitudes or dual responses to a certain subject or situation. The following chapters provide such a detailed study and demonstrate that Greville did indeed have a dual attitude or view, giving different responses to ideas, depending upon whether he viewed them from the standpoint of the ideal or from the standpoint of the actual. His first view of life can be characterized by the words "Christian," "religious," "Calvinistic," or "idealistic;" the other view can be called "worldly," "pragmatic," "practical," or "political." The Christian, or religious, aspects of the first attitude appear in frequent references to his beliefs, as in the stanza

For on this sp'rituall Crosse condemned lying,
To paines infernall by eternall doome,
I see my Sauour for the same sinnes dying,
And from that hell I fear'd, to free me, come;
Depriu'd of humane graces, not diuine,
Thus hath his death rais'd up this soule of mine.
(Caelica, XCIX, 19-24)

Moreover, he says "Wee pray to Christ" (Caelica, XCVII, 16) and expresses his Christianity in

If from this depth of sinne, this hellish graue,
And fatall absence from my Sauours glory,
I could implore his mercy, who can saue,
And for my sinnes, not paines of sinne, be sorry:
Lord, from this horror of iniquity,
And hellish graue, thou wouldst deliuer me.
(Caelica, XCVIII, 13-18)

Furthermore, he was a Calvinist,⁴⁴ following most of the doctrines in Jean Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, although Greville's Calvinism was his own kind because he could not agree with the idea of predestination or advocate a theocratic state.⁴⁵ In addition, this same attitude toward life was idealistic for he always yearned for the ideal, or perfect, situation even though he was aware that man, in his depraved condition caused by the Fall, was unlikely to behave in an ideal way. His other attitude toward life was more concerned with practicality. From this viewpoint Greville was the Elizabethan statesman or politician who frequently advocated pragmatic advice from Machiavelli's The Prince.⁴⁶ He often recommended whatever was apt to keep order within the state with little regard for the ideal. He can also be called worldly, for he was definitely of this world in the same sense that medieval man was otherworldly or lived primarily for

⁴⁴Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 2.

⁴⁵Greville's divergence from some of Calvin's doctrines are discussed in Chapter II, Religion: Worldly and Spiritual.

⁴⁶Greville's reliance on Machiavelli is discussed in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

the world to come.⁴⁷ Thus, he was at times a pious Calvinist who yearned for the ideal, but at other times he was a worldly, pragmatic "English Machiavelli"⁴⁸ whose chief concern was keeping order within the state.

Greville's background, the events in his life, his associations, and his political positions all provided threads that made up the fabric of his thought, which literary figures through the years have found intellectual, introspective, and obscure. All the ideas, both new and old, together with his tremendous intellect and habit of speculating caused him to develop two views that may be said to reflect his age and its many currents of thought. Thus, an understanding of Greville's age and the part he played in it is necessary to an understanding of his works and the recurring two major views expressed in them. This dualism or inability to reconcile the ideal and the actual, is then the result of the cross currents of Renaissance thought, which was a conglomerate, consisting of old and new ideas and in which a harmonious unity did not exist. As C. S. Lewis suggests, the characteristic Renaissance mind was a "hodge-podge" or "rag-bag" of ideas, and to see two somewhat incongruous views combined in one man's philosophy was not unusual during this period.⁴⁹ Thus, Greville's seemingly divergent

⁴⁷J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 38. For medieval man "the true future is the Last Judgment, and that is near at hand."

⁴⁸Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 16.

⁴⁹C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 63.

attitudes actually made him typical of the Renaissance or the typical Renaissance man.

CHAPTER II

RELIGION: WORLDLY AND SPIRITUAL

Fulke Greville was "staunchly Protestant,"¹ a pious Calvinist who loved God and whose religion was always the "guiding light" of his mind,² and, because the "severe discipline of Calvin" was a constant influence on his "exceptionally acute and fearless" intellect,³ a discussion of his religious ideas is a necessary preliminary to an understanding of his judgments. However, at the same time that he was a devout Christian who loved God and followed many of the theological tenets of Calvin, he was also an able statesman who knew the world and was fascinated enough by its political intrigues to devote his life to the science of statecraft. As a statesman, he was influenced by Machiavelli's ideas on the practical use of religion in politics, and, like Machiavelli, he believed that religion was one of the "two main pillars of the State."⁴ Greville's attitudes toward religion thus developed from a blending of ideas drawn from Calvin and Machiavelli, which were often incongruous, and which caused him to make a distinction

¹Fulke Greville, Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke, edited by Geoffrey Bullough, I (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), 1.

²Ibid., p. 9.

³John Buxton, Sir Philip Sidney and the English Renaissance (2nd ed.; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 100.

⁴Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 15.

between heavenly or God-made religion and worldly or man-made religion. In his attitude toward them he wavered between heaven and earth, reflecting the incompatibility of the pragmatism and piety that dominated his whole existence. Both God-made and man-made religion attracted him; but, because of his conflicting attitudes, he was unable to abandon one in order to follow the other; his Calvinistic convictions and love of God forced him to heed God-made religion, whereas his reason or practical side compelled him to recognize man-made religion.

Although Greville was influenced by Calvin and Machiavelli, he was too intelligent and speculative to accept their ideas without reservations. His brand of Calvinism was unique,⁵ and even though a great deal of what he wrote was in agreement with Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, he diverged from Calvin's teaching on several points: the importance of Scripture, the nature of God, predestination, and theocratic government.⁶ Moreover, his Calvinism was not Puritanism, "which challenged the authority of the monarch."⁷

⁵Ibid., p. 56. Bullough agrees.

⁶Greville's divergence from Calvin's ideas on the first three of these points will be discussed later in this chapter, and his opposition to theocracy will be covered in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

⁷Fulke Greville, Selected Poems of Fulke Greville, edited by Thom Gunn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 9. The term "Puritan" as applied during Elizabeth's reign is often loosely defined as one who wished to purify the Church of England. M. M. Knappen, Tudor Puritanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. viii is more specific, defining the term as an English Protestant who "actively favored a reformation beyond that which the crown was willing to countenance and who yet stopped short of Anabaptism."

Greville, similarly, advocated a great many of Machiavelli's pragmatic policies, and in A Treatise of Monarchy Greville often seems to be quoting advice from The Prince; however, stanzas 164 through 175 advocate policies Machiavelli would not have approved.⁸ As Greville believed in a divinely ordered universe, a concept that would have been repugnant to Machiavelli,⁹ Greville had to reach his conclusions about human nature, not only through history and observation as Machiavelli did, but through theology as well.¹⁰

Strongly influenced as he was by the ideas of Calvin and Machiavelli, two completely different kinds of religion appealed to Greville, but, for him, the very nature of man and God explained the two types of religion that attracted man and man's inability to forsake one for the other. Man was originally a perfect creature created by God in His own image, but, as a consequence of the Fall, he is now a degenerate creature whose corruption taints all his activities and produces havoc on earth.

Angels fell first from God, Man was the next that fell:
Both being made by him for Heav'n, have for themselves made Hell.
(Mystapha, Chr. IV, 1-2)

When man, like Satan and his fallen angels, resigned his original

⁸Fulke Greville, The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion, edited by G. A. Wilkes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 12. Specific examples of agreement and disagreement with Machiavelli will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

⁹E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (New York: Vintage Books, n.d.), p. 8.

¹⁰Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 14.

position of perfection to seek knowledge which " . . . is the same forbidden tree, / Which man lusts after to be made his Maker" (Humane Learning, 3, 1-2), he found error as well. His fall even rendered his reason and knowledge corrupt, for " . . . where the Iudge is false, what truth abides?" (Humane Learning, 51, 4) Sharing in his corruption are man's four major avenues for receiving knowledge: sense, imagination, memory, and understanding.¹¹ Man's sense, although it tries "To free him from deceit, deceives him most" (Humane Learning, 6, 2), and imagination is "A glasse, wherein the object of our Sense / Ought to reflect true height, or declination, / . . . But this power also hath her variation" (Humane Learning, 10, 2-5). Memory "Can yeeld no Images for mans instruction" (Humane Learning, 14, 4), and understanding, although it contains "Some ruinous notions, which our Nature shoves, / Of generall truths, yet haue they such a staine / From our corruption, as all light they lose" (Humane Learning, 15, 3-5). Hence, all man's knowledge is subjective and consequently corrupt, because " . . . Reason stooping to attend the Sense / Darkens the spirits cleare intelligence" (Humane Learning, 17, 5-6). Furthermore, man's wit and passions are faulty and useless to him. Greville calls wit "a distemper of the braine" (Humane Learning, 20, 3) and asks if "one true forme" was ever " . . . found out by wit of Man" (Humane Learning, 24, 6). Thus, the Fall has rendered man and his methods for obtaining

¹¹John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. by John Allen, I (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1936). This assertion seems to be a restatement of Calvin's ideas in Book II, Chapters II and III.

knowledge subject to error, and this corruption has spread to all his arts and sciences, making them totally unreliable and a mirror of his sin and folly.

These Arts, moulds, workes can but expresse the sinne,
Whence by mans follie, his fall did beginne.

(Humane Learning, 47, 5-6)

The results of the Fall and man's consequent faulty knowledge are far-reaching. In the first place, man is subject to sin and moral error. Even though he recognizes virtue in his conscience, his "stranglie mixt" (Religion, 12, 3) nature causes him to act sinfully, praising good while he does evil:

But there remaines such naturall corruption
 In all our powers, even from our parents seed,
 As to the good gives native interruption;
 Sense staines affection; that, will; and will, deed:
 So as what's good in us, and others too
 We praise; but what is evill, that we doe.

(Religion, 13)

Secondly, man's degenerate nature causes him to err in his judgment, placing false reliance upon three idolatries: fame, fortune, and friends. Fame is the " . . . child of Peoples lust" (Fame and Honovr, 53, 4), "Borne of Opinion, not of Vertues race" (Fame and Honovr, 54, 3), and "The child of humour, not allyed to right" (Caelica, CV, 11). It does not contain the roots of goodness, and even though "in Mans youth, perchance, Fame multiplies / Courage" (Fame and Honovr, 4, 1-2), fame depends entirely upon man, who cannot know when it is truly deserved.

Besides, the essence of this glorious name,
 Is not in him that hath, but him that giues it:

If people onely then distribute Fame,
 In them that vnderstand it not, yet liues it:
 And what can their applause within vs raise,
 Who are not conscious of that worth they praise?
 (Fame and Honovr, 47)

Likewise, fortune and friends are both "False visions . . . which in our sense appears, / To sanctifie desire's Idolatries" (Caelica, CV, 3-4). Fortune is merely

. . . a wat'ry glasse
 Whose chrystall forehead wants a steely backe,
 Where raine and stormes beare all away that was,
 (Caelica, CV, 5-7)

and friends are the "false strength of feeble minds" (Caelica, CV, 13) that will "send voyces down the wind" (Caelica, CV, 15) and will disappear in times of adversity.

Man's error in judgment is not limited to worldly pursuits but applies to man's knowledge of God as well. His degeneration has made it difficult for him to know God:

Then by affectinge powre we cannot knowe him,
 By knowinge all thinges else we knowe him lesse;
 Nature containes him not, Art cannot showe him,
 Opinions, idolles, and not God expresse:
 Without, in power, we see him everie where;
 Within, we rest not, till we finde him there.
 (Religion, 7)

Man's failure to understand God, therefore, causes him "To seeke God, and Religion from without" (Religion, 14, 5) and to fashion " . . . God unto man, not man to God" (Religion, 23, 4). Torn by his own sense of guilt, he is tempted to believe in a God who is "Much more inclinde to punishe, then releeeve" (Religion, 21, 6), and, not realizing that a "Good life would finde a good Religion out" (Religion, 15, 6), he

infects the world with " . . . manie worships, Gods, and sects"
(Religion, 16, 5).

To Greville, the effects of man's depravity were awesome and encompassing and accounted not only for the divisions and error within man's religion, but also for the corruption within all his institutions. References to Greville's sense of human incapacity are numerous throughout his works,¹² but perhaps he states man's dilemma most aptly in these lines from Mustapha:

"Oh wearisome Condition of Humanity:
"Borne vnder one Law, to another bound:
"Vainely begot, and yet forbidden vanity,
"Created sicke, commanded to be sound.
(Mvstapha, Chr. Sac., 1-4)

Although Greville's pessimism over the fallen state of humanity is often evident in lines such as "Fly unto God: For in humanity / Hope there is none" (Alaham, IV, ii, 57-58), he does realize that man has a divided nature, an original goodness from "His Image that first made us in perfection" (Religion, 4, 1) as well as a " . . . deepe-dy'de infection" (Religion, 41, 4) caused by the Fall. The divine part of man, that is a remnant of his original perfection, has an awareness of God, and, sensing His existence, seeks to find Him for " . . . that course is naturall / For owned soules, to finde their owner out" (Religion, 8, 1-2). Therefore:

¹²Morris W. Croll, The Works of Fulke Greville (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1903), p. 42, points out that Greville's "belief in the depravity of man is not a theological convention, but a conviction which he carries into every field of thought with a consistency of which few Calvinists can boast." Furthermore, Wilkes, Remains, p. 7 says that a comparison of earlier and later versions of Mustapha show his preoccupation with the depraved condition of humanity increasing as he grew older.

Religion thus we naturallie professe,
 Knowledge of God is likewise universall,
 Which diverse Nations diverslie expresse:
 For truth, power, goodnesse men doe worship all.
 (Religion, 10, 1-4)

Moreover, these godly qualities are as deeply rooted and as potent as the evil ones because they were originally instilled in man's nature by God Himself.

However, because of his dual nature, even though man loves God, prays to Him, and tries to obey His rules, his religion is a shallow thing:

Thou bidst vs pray, and wee doe pray to thee,

 One thought to God wee glue, the rest to sinne,
Quickely unbent is all desire of good,
 True words passe out, but haue no being within,
 Wee pray to Christ, yet helpe to shed his blood;
 For while wee say Relieve, and feelee it not,

 We with the Iewes euen Christ still crucifie.
 (Caelica, XCVII, 9-21)

Indeed, man cannot even fulfill the law of God put forth in Scripture without His help:

The word is cleare, and needs no explanation,
 Onlie the councell is a mysterie;
 Why God commanded more then man could doe.
 (Religion, 76, 5-7)

Although he may recognize truth and goodness, he needs God's grace to help him for "Without God there was no man ever good" (Religion, 35, 2). Man will never find perfection in this world, but he can look upon his life as a "pilgrimage" during which he must keep faith in and try to obey God.¹³ Even though he falters, he can hope for regeneration, but

¹³Greville, Remains, p. 262.

his salvation can be accomplished only by the gift of God's grace.

Greville's concept of true religion is based on this idea of redemption by divine grace, and he states his recurring theme at the beginning of A Treatise of Religion.

What is the chaine which drawes us backe againe,
And lifts men up unto his first Creation?
Nothinge in him his owne hart can restraine,
His reason lives a captive to temptation,
Example is corrupt, precepts are mixt:
All fleshlie knowledge frayle, and never fixt.

It is a light, a guifte, a grace inspired,
A sparcke of power, a goodnesse of the good,
Desire in him, that never it desired,
An unittie where desolation stood;
In us, not of us; a spirit not of earth,
Fashioninge the mortall to immortall birth.
(Religion, 2 - 3)

Clearly Greville envisioned an omnipotent and benign God who works to accomplish the miracle of regeneration:

This worcke is Gods, even his that worckes all wonder,
His arme not shortned, and his goodnesse one;
Whose presence breakes sinnes middle wall in sunder,
And doth in fleshe deface the evilles throne:
He is all, gives all, hath all where he is,
And in his absence never soule found blisse.

Nowe by his spirit he doth blast our weedes,
Immediate grace, true miracle Divine:

But to the harts of sinne, shaddowes of death,
The savinge light of truth he doth inspire;

He drawes the Cammell through the needles eye,
And makes the chosen fleshe die, ere they die.

(Religion, 59 - 61)

Greville addresses God as "Eternall Truth, almighty, infinite" (Caelica, XCVII, 1) and refers to Him as " . . . this sauing God of mine"

(Caelica, XCIX, 6). He speaks of His "sweet mercy" (Caelica, XCVII, 5)

and apparently regards Him as a much more benevolent and forgiving deity than the jealous, punitive, and often wrathful Yahweh, or Elohim, of the Old Testament¹⁴ or the awesome and inflexible God of justice envisioned by Calvin.¹⁵ Although Greville's concept of God was drawn from both Old and New Testaments and was basically similar to Calvin's, it differed from Calvin's, and certainly from that of some of the later Calvinists and Puritans, in the stress placed on the mercy and saving qualities of God. For Greville, God's mercy was extended to all who chose to obey Him rather than to a preordained few. However, the matter of choice was of vital importance, for God appeared differently to those

¹⁴Julius A. Bewer, The Literature of the Old Testament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), p. 71 says that the Yahwist, or J source, described " . . . the one great God, the Creator, the only God for Israel" who controlled the forces of nature and history as " . . . a moral God who demands righteousness, rewards faith and kindness, innocence and unselfishness, but punishes wickedness and oppression." The Elohist, or E source, stressed the jealous and punitive aspects of God in Joshua's speech, quoted by Bewer, p. 81.

. . . for He is a holy God; He is a jealous God; He will not forgive your transgression nor your sins. If ye forsake Yahweh, and serve foreign gods, then He will turn and do you evil, and consume you. . . .

(Joshua 24:19-20)

¹⁵Calvin's concept of God in John Calvin, Institutes, Book I, Chapter X, " . . . which the Lord gives us of himself in the Scripture," is marked by "clemency, goodness, mercy, justice, judgment, and truth." However, in Calvin's discussion of predestination in Institutes, Book III, Chapter XXI where he asserts that God has foreordained "eternal life" for some and "eternal damnation" for others, the justice and judgment of God seem to overshadow His mercy. In defense of this doctrine Calvin states in Institutes, Book III, Chapter XXIII that " . . . the will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what he wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because he wills it."

of the invisible church¹⁶ who heard His voice and chose to obey Him than to those who listened to the voice of false religion: "He shoves his glorie clearlie to the best, / Appeares in clowdes and horror to the rest" (Religion, 48, 5-6).

Man's divided nature caused Greville to hear both the voice of God and the voice of the visible church which, to Greville, means all institutionalized religion. The visible, or outward, church is man-made and, consequently, false like all man-made institutions, and, therefore, it assumes many shapes and creates many sects. Men are responsible for "these diverse worships . . ." (Religion, 1, 3) for "As manie mindes, as manie Gods they make" (Religion, 19, 5). When they base their religion on "blinde affections," it becomes "grosse superstition" (Religion, 17, 2-3), and when it is fashioned from "wittie passions," it becomes a religion of craft and "politique pretense" (Religion, 17, 5), which Greville calls "meere hypocracie" (Religion, 24, 1). The church of superstition begins with ignorance and fear, and, playing upon man's sense of guilt, makes an idol of his sin and underrates God to the point where He becomes only an instrument of punishment. Instead of inspiring man to hope for grace, it teaches

¹⁶Throughout his works Greville uses the terms "false," "worlds," "outward," "visible," and "seen" to describe man-made or institutionalized religion and "true," "Gods," and "invisible" to describe God-made, personal, or inner religion. Calvin also uses the terms "visible" and "invisible" and "false" and "true" to describe religion, but they mean something a little different to him than they did to Greville. For Calvin, the false and visible church were not identical; for Greville, they were. Calvin's interpretation of these terms can be found in Institutes, Book IV, Chapters I-II.

him to pray " . . . to shunne the rod" (Religion, 23, 2). On the other hand, the "worlds Religion, borne of wit and lust" (Religion, 24, 2) is a religion of craft and hypocrisy that makes wit her priest and instructs the power hungry:

. . . howe to build,
 Idolls of power to alter Natures rates
 And by false feares and hopes, make people yeild
 Their harts for temples unto Tyrants lawes.
 (Religion, 26, 2-5)

This religion based on craft can " . . . take / As manie shapes, as manie strange attires, / As there be in the world degrees of change" (Religion, 25, 3-6). Although these various sects " . . . beare a holienesse in shoue" (Religion, 28, 1), they bring forth blood and inquisition and inspire people to rebel against their king or to fight among themselves. " . . . These false heades of holie mother see" (Religion, 29, 5) are jealous of any power but their own and must dominate both church and government. "Both must be theirs, or both be overthrowne" (Religion, 29, 3) in order that "Scepters to Miters there inferior be" (Religion, 29, 6).

Although Greville criticizes all forms of institutionalized religion, he obviously had two particular examples in mind which he felt were mixtures of both superstition and hypocrisy: the false religion of Mohammed and the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁷ To Greville, both of these outward churches were idolatries, setting worldly glory

¹⁷Although Greville mentions the Jews, he, unlike Calvin, did not include the Jews in his denunciation of false religions, possibly because they posed no political threat.

above true religion in an attempt to gain power. He criticizes the pride of those who, thirsting for honor, " . . . in Peters chaire Gods power assume" (Fame and Honovr, 36, 2) and accuses the Pope of using craft and superstition to dominate governments.

And doth not our great Capitolian Lord
 Use the same compasse in each course hee steers?
 Arre not those acts which all estates discord,
 As kinges assassinate, mutiny of peeres,
 Stirr'd up by him under pretence divine
 To force those scepters, hee cannot encline?
 (Monarchy, 60)

Mohammed, likewise, used religion for political purposes, making it an instrument of conquest.

Instance prowd Mahomet when hee propos'd
 The Empire of this world to his ambition;
 Under Gods name were not his acts dispos'd
 To change mans faith, and freedome of condition?
 The sacred dove whispering into his eare,
 That what his will impos'd, the world must beare.
 (Monarchy, 58)

At the same time that the pious Greville criticizes anyone who takes " . . . not God as hee is, but makes him new, / Like to his endes, large, narrow, false, or true" (Monarchy, 56, 5-6), the pragmatic Greville recognized the practicality of man-made, or institutionalized, religion. In fact, he realized that it was a very potent political tool; "The Church it is one lincke of gouernment, / Of noblest Kings the noblest instrument" (Alaham, I, i, 237-238) and " . . . that frame, which all frames els exceeds, / Religion, by whose name the Scepter gaines" (Monarchy, 202, 2-3). It is one of the most powerful arms of government because it "Secretly seizeth all powers of the minde" (Monarchy, 205, 2) and unites the people "If not in truth, at least in

outward rite" (Monarchy, 206, 6). Therefore, a king who uses religion to exact obedience from the people " . . . should need noe other lawes to frend, / Conscience being the base of their authoritie" (Monarchy, 238, 3-4). In The Life of Sir Philip Sidney Greville praises Queen Elizabeth's policy as an example of the prudent use of established religion. She united the people in one church but wisely took care to keep the clergy from growing too powerful and thus lessening her authority.

For her Clergy, with their Ecclefiasticall or Civill jurisdictions, she fashioned the Arches, and Westminster Hall to take such care one to bound another, that they in limiting themselves enlarged her Royalties, as the chief and equall foundation of both their greatneffes.

(Life, p. 187)

Elizabeth, however, used the power of organized religion only in moderation, but, as Greville points out, it can be used to even greater advantage by tyrants to become the " . . . cheif strength of tirranny" (Monarchy, 207, 2). He explains that " . . . where swords and Canons doe unite, / The peoples bondage there proves infinite" (Monarchy, 210, 5-6). It is through this unity of faith linked to the crown that the Mohammedans have been able to spread their power to the detriment of divided Christianity:

Where since, though we still spoyle that Christian Sect,
Which, by diuision fatall to their kinde,
Friends, duties, enemies, and right neglect,
To keepe vp some Selfe-humor in the winde;
Yet all we thus winne, not by force, but sleight,
Poys'd with our Martiall Conquests, will lacke weight.
(Mvstapha, Chr. II, 67-73)

The worldly Greville admires this unity at least from a temporal point

of view,¹⁸ and he shows the crises that can occur when it is compromised in his two tragedies, Alaham and Mustapha. By using the passions of great men in Oriental kingdoms to create a gulf between the king and the people and to destroy the accord between the king and the clergy, Greville created situations analogous to those in Christian kingdoms.¹⁹ He often compares the Christian and Mohammedan religions, suggesting that such a comparison is not always to the advantage of the Christians,²⁰ because the Mohammedans carry practicality in religion for political ends even farther, making "no Idols" yet fashioning "God, as if from Powers Throne he tooke his being" (Mvstapha, Chr. II, 97-98). Although they leave their new subjects a certain freedom of conscience, the Mohammedans tax their infidelity for the benefit of the throne and make laws that " . . . take life from Soueraignitie" (Mvstapha, Chr. II, 137). Greville clearly shows his admiration for the practical use the Mohammedans make of religion and sums up the difference between their crown-church relationship and that of the Christians:

Our Sultans rule their charge by Prophets Sawes,
And leave the Mufti Iudge of all their Lawes:
The Christians take, and change Faith with their Kings,
Which vnder Miters oft the Scepter brings.
We make the Church our Sultans instrument:
They with their Kings will make their Church content.
(Mvstapha, Chr. II, 151-156)

¹⁸Jean Jacquot, "Religion et Raison d'État dans L'Oeuvre de Fulke Greville," Études Anglaises, V (August, 1952), 213.

¹⁹Ibid., 214.

²⁰Ibid.

Although Greville, the statesman, recognizes and heeds worldly religion and admires its results from a political point of view, he also yearns for God-made religion or the invisible church. To him, this true church is not an institution or habit but rather a " . . . raysinge of Gods Image . . . , a hallowed state of minde" (Religion, 45, 2-3), and a state of grace " . . . not taken on, but in" (Religion, 18, 2). He points out the error of art and pomp in religion and questions if there can really be a true religion on earth other than God's presence " . . . neare about us, even within, / Worckinge the goodnesse, censuringe the sinne" (Religion, 34, 5-6). Thus, for Greville, the true or invisible church is based upon a very personal relationship between God and the individual. Its " . . . proper armes be teares and prayer" (Monarchy, 208, 1), and its prime purpose is the regeneration of man.

In order to accomplish the miracle of man's regeneration, the invisible church requires certain things from man; two of the most important are faith and obedience. Faith " . . . implies a state of minde" (Religion, 55, 1) and "A given hand that feeleth heavenlie thinges" (Religion, 55, 4), and he who " . . . gives faith, gives true obedience" (Religion, 72, 2) for, Greville asks, "Can we beleive in him, whom we obay not?" (Religion, 70, 6). Obedience includes attention to Scripture, observing " . . . faithes nature in these hallowed shrines, / Both of the old, and perfect testament" (Religion, 70, 1-2). Although Greville does not consider the written word the most important element

in religion,²¹ he does look upon it as " . . . light to cleare the minde" (Religion, 80, 1) and " . . . that eternall glasse, / Where all mens soules behold the face they bringe" (Religion, 58, 1-2).

In addition to having faith and to giving obedience, man must do several other things if he wishes to be part of the unseen church and hopes for salvation. In the first place, Greville asserts, he should not try to mix heavenly and earthly matters:

Mixe not in functions God, and earth together;
The wisdom of the world, and his, are two;
One latitude can well agree to neither;
In each, men have their beinges, as they doe:
The world doth build without, our God within;
He traffiques goodnesse, and she traffiques sinne.
(Religion, 98)

The foregoing advice is a counsel Greville sufficiently believed in to follow in his own life, and his feeling on this matter suggests one possible reason for his viewing religion in different ways. Secondly, man must eliminate sin from his life in order to see truth, for "Who knowes Gods power but where he sinne removes?" (Religion, 75, 5) Moreover, he should not rely upon reason, "Since reason dies before this faith can live" (Religion, 75, 4). Most of all, man must acknowledge that Christ, Who " . . . comes to none of Gods in vayne" (Religion, 74, 5), is necessary to redeem him from Adam's sin. To those

²¹Here Greville diverges sharply from Calvin, who regarded Scripture a central part of his theology. Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, trans. by Harold Knight (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 50-51, explains that Calvin felt Scripture was necessary to attain any knowledge of God and that it should be followed "alone as the rule of our faith and religion without mixing therewith anything derived from human understanding." Furthermore, any departure from Scripture caused God to fade from man's mind.

who are willing to practice this kind of true religion, Greville says, God " . . . sends his graces downe" (Religion, 104, 5) and leads them to " . . . our Savior, who no more / Doth aske, then he enables us to doe" (Religion, 105, 1-2).

Greville often refers to the members of this invisible or God-made church as the elect, implying that he believed in the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination; however, he also implies that becoming one of God's flock involves a choice and considerable effort on the part of man himself. He tells those who want to belong to the invisible church

. . . pray, and obtaine; beleeve, and have;
Omnipotence and goodnesse readie be
To rayse us with our Saviour from the grave.
(Religion, 43, 1-3)

He cautions that until they " . . . feele this heavenlie change . . . / Of pride, to meeknesse; Atheisme, to Zeale; / Lust, unto continence; anger, to charitie" (Religion, 44, 1-3), they cannot consider themselves God's elect. Thus, to Greville, the elect are not the elect of orthodox Calvinism²² but those who are firm in their faith, continue

²²Jacquot disagrees, stating flatly that Greville believed in predestination and using the following lines to justify his position:

As God by goodnesse saves those soules he chooseth,
So hell condemnes those wicked soules it useth.

(Religion, 84, 5-6)

However, the word 'chooseth' can mean that God chooses those who obey Him just as well as those who have been predestined for salvation, and Greville clearly believed that effort on man's part was necessary:

The mover onlie makes our nature free:

Faith, and obedience, he that asketh gives;
And without these Gods spirit never lives.

(Religion, 102, 4-6)

G. A. Wilkes, Remains, p. 264, agrees, stating that Greville did not take the Calvinist view of predestination but that "the elect are rather those who chose to accept God's calling. . . ."

to do good works, and are part of God's invisible church.²³ Greville's stand here is interesting because, as a Calvinist hating Rome from a political standpoint, he rejects Calvinistic doctrine²⁴ in favor of the belief that salvation stems from faith and good works. Intropective by nature, he apparently found it impossible to accept any religious ideology without question but was inclined to incorporate into his personal religion ideas that appealed to him from each.

Similarly, Greville found it impossible to accept either worldly religion or true religion completely. He listened to the voice of God and recognized the importance of a very personal religion where " . . . all rests in the hart" (Religion, 95, 6); at the same time, his practical side advocated using the political advantages offered by an established church. He loved God and considered himself part of the invisible church, but, as Jacquot suggests, since Greville lived on this earth, he felt that he could not abandon it to confusion. "Un ordre politique doit exister," and "l'ordre ne saurait se maintenir dans la société sans le secours de la religion."²⁵ Wavering, thus, between

²³Wilkes, Remains, p. 17.

²⁴John Calvin, Institutes, II, Book III, Chapter XXI. Calvin says that " . . . by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once and for all determined, both whom he would admit to salvation, and whom he would condemn to destruction. We affirm that this counsel, as far as it concerns the elect, is founded on his gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human merit. . . ." In Book III, Chapter XXII Calvin denies that good works have any effect on election or salvation.

²⁵Jacquot, "Religion et Raison d'État," p. 212. "A political order must exist," and "order would not know how to maintain itself in society without the help of religion."

earthly laws and the laws of heaven and unable to live completely by either, he faced in two directions like the god Janus, attracted by both a deep and personal relationship with God and by an established religion for political expediency. The resultant two attitudes produced a complexity or confusion of ideas that is analogous to the chaos associated with Janus' original state.

CHAPTER III

TWO EVALUATIONS OF MONARCHY

For Fulke Greville, any study of the sciences began with the science of government, which he considered far more important than any other;¹ in fact, he felt that all other arts and sciences were subordinate and existed only as "seruing Arts" (Humane Learning, 72, 2) to the central science of politics. His plays, Mustapha and Alaham, are " . . . no Plaies for the Stage" (Life, p. 224) but actually studies in statecraft, and A Treatise of Monarchy, a series of treatises originally intended to be a chorus for every act, or as Greville phrased it, " . . . for every Act a Chorus" (Life, p. 150), is in reality a political manual or "an essay on government by an Elizabethan statesman"² in which Greville examined and compared different political structures and their functions. His study of various forms of government revealed two conflicting attitudes; to the "English Machiavelli"³ who saw the actual, monarchy was the most perfect, workable, and lasting form of government, but, to the Christian humanist who yearned

¹Fulke Greville, Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke, edited by Geoffrey Bullough, I (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), 57.

²Fulke Greville, The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion, edited by G. A. Wilkes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 8.

³Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 16.

for the ideal, monarchy was corrupt, was subject to excess, and was even an affliction to be endured as a punishment sent by God.

Greville's political thought, including his opinions on monarchy, became a fusion of political ideas drawn from a number of sources and reflects his characteristic "habit of sifting contemporary attitudes and theories before adopting a position."⁴ It is difficult, however, to ascertain the extent to which each political writer influenced him, for, as Maclean suggests, "Greville is notoriously chary of reference to figures who have been shown to be important in his thought and work."⁵ On the other hand, there is reason to assume that Greville was familiar with the works of certain writers and that they contributed, to one extent or another, to the body of his political thought. In the first place, the continuous influence of Calvin and Machiavelli is apparent, and, in addition, "a strong current of Stoicism" runs through his work, with "Stoic ethic" nearly becoming a religious doctrine to reinforce Christian belief, and universal and natural law being used to advocate individual liberties.⁶ A fourth source of political ideas which may have influenced Greville was the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, written under the pseudonym of Junius Brutus but usually attributed to the Huguenot leader, Hubert Languet.⁷ In the Vindiciae, Brutus advocates

⁴Hugh N. Maclean, "Fulke Greville: Kingship and Sovereignty," Huntington Library Quarterly, XVI (May, 1953), 238.

⁵Ibid., p. 258.

⁶Ibid., p. 238.

⁷Greville was undoubtedly familiar with this work because of his close friendship with Sidney, who knew Languet and translated some of his work. Some, however, attribute this work to DuPlessis-Mornay, who was also known to Sidney.

a theocracy, although not necessarily a Calvinistic one, as the only acceptable form of government and assumes an original compact between God and people expanded to include a contract between king and people.⁸ Resistance to tyrants, especially because of religious conviction, is justified according to Brutus,⁹ but he insists that the decision to resist the authority of the monarch should be made by a small aristocratic group.¹⁰ Jean Bodin's La République is a fifth work that was unquestionably known to Greville¹¹ and can consequently be considered a possible source of his political ideas. Bodin's concept of sovereignty insists on supreme power over subjects unmodified by laws, on perpetual and absolute power, and on power to make or break laws without the consent of the people. Thus, Bodin conceives of the monarch as above

⁸Junius Brutus, A Defence of Liberty Against Tyrants: A Translation of the "Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos," with an Introduction by Harold J. Laski (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1924), p. 38. Laski says "The establishment of Kingship, in fact, clearly involves a double contract. There is a contract between God, on the one hand, and the King upon the other; there is a contract also between the King and the people."

⁹Ibid., p. 66. Brutus compares a rebel for religious reasons to Jesus Christ: "Now is there any man that sees not this, if a man disobey a prince commanding that which is wicked and unlawful, he shall presently be esteemed a rebel, a traitor, and guilty of high treason. Our saviour Christ, the apostles and all the Christians of the primitive church were charged with these calumnies."

¹⁰Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," pp. 256-257. Greville accepted the idea of original compact, but he would not have agreed with the Vindiciae in the matter of theocracy nor would he have advocated rebellion or decisions made by an aristocracy.

¹¹Ibid., p. 251. Members of Sidney's circle were familiar with La République; therefore, it is logical to assume that Greville, a close friend of Sidney's, was also.

the law, and, although he does not make the source of sovereignty clear, he does indicate that monarchy is established by God. Moreover, the monarch is God's representative here on earth, and no subject should rise against him for any reason.¹² In addition, George Buchanan's De Jure Regni was certainly familiar to Greville, and, according to Maclean, had a greater influence on him than the Vindiciae or La République. The De Jure Regni, like the Vindiciae, advances ideas on monarchy that are at variance with Bodin's. Buchanan insists that power rests in the people, that a contract exists between king and subjects, and that rebellion is justified in certain cases, the decision resting in the will of the people.¹³ Lastly, although great differences existed between the religious thought of Richard Hooker and that of Greville,¹⁴ there are enough parallels in political thought to suggest that the Ecclesiastical Polity not only was known to Greville but had exerted some influence. Maclean points out that "in the field of political theory, both attempt to reconcile theory with the actual political situation . . . , both are receptive to the notion of contract," but "neither will countenance the right of active resistance."¹⁵ The

¹²Ibid., pp. 252-253.

¹³Ibid., pp. 255-256.

¹⁴Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, I (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1954), xi. Christopher Morris states in the introduction that Hooker believed that church and state were two complementary parts of the same society and that citizenship also implied church membership. Greville would not have agreed; his opinions are discussed in Chapter II, Religion: Worldly and Spiritual.

¹⁵Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," p. 258.

foregoing political writers all unquestionably contributed ideas which were sorted and accepted, accepted with reservations, or rejected entirely by the speculative Greville, but all were tempered by the most powerful influence of all, Greville's personal experience as a politician and statesman.¹⁶

Speaking as a practical statesman, Greville considered monarchy the best form of government available and one which had God's approval. Three of the subtitles in A Treatise of Monarchy begin with "The Excellence of Monarchie" and provide a strong indication of his attitude.¹⁷ Moreover, he asks "Can mankinde under anie Soveraigne / Hope to finde rest, but in the Monarchs raigne?" (Monarchy, 650, 5-6) and points out that monarchy was the original form of state, because even the mythical gods had a monarchical system that " . . . acknowledg'd Joves Supremacie" (Monarchy, 651, 4). Thus, men ought to realize that monarchy is not only the oldest, but also the best type of government and " . . . that the best times pris'd, / That old Monarchall forme" (Monarchy, 653, 2-3). Furthermore, all other forms of government are merely "Confused moulds, by error since devis'd" (Monarchy, 653, 4) that "Make manie shapes, but never anie true" (Monarchy, 656, 6). Not only is monarchy the oldest and best system, but, Greville believes,

¹⁶Ibid., p. 238.

¹⁷Greville, Remains, p. 11. Wilkes says that "it was a commonplace of Elizabethan political theory to examine the merits of three forms of government" and to prefer monarchy to the other two, aristocracy and democracy. Greville conforms to the tradition.

it derives its authority from God.¹⁸ He asserts that monarchies,
 " . . . these Crownes, these theatres of Clay / Derive their earthlie
 pow'r from power Divine" (Religion, 66, 3-4), and are maintained by
 God. "The constant health of Crownes doth not remaine / In pow'r of
 man, but in the powres divine" (Monarchy, 114, 2-3). He refers to "the
 facred foundations of Monarchy" (Life, p. 153), and, in praising
 Elizabeth, mentions that " . . . fhe was as well fervant to God, as
 by him King over Peoples" (Life, p. 171), thus providing ample evidence
 of his conviction that the monarchical form had been ordained by God.¹⁹

Although he was convinced, as a statesman, of monarchy's
 excellence and divine approval, Greville, the Calvinist²⁰ and the
 idealist, was aware that monarchy had become corrupt like all man's
 institutions.

All Gouvernments, like Man himselfe within,
 Being restlesse compositions of the sinne.
 (Fame and Honovr, 14, 5-6)

Speaking of the world's governments, he explains that they are all

¹⁸Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," p. 264. Greville agrees with Bodin that monarchy is established by God.

¹⁹Greville believed that monarchy was a form of government which had the approval of and drew its authority from God; however, he believed in the divine right of kings only up to a point. His deviations from the current theory of divine right will be discussed in Chapter IV, Kingship: Ideal and Actual.

²⁰Although scholars consistently refer to Greville as a Calvinist, one must bear in mind that he did not agree with Calvin on every point. Greville was a monarchist and a trusted adviser to three sovereigns. Calvin did not believe in monarchy but rather in a theocratic civil government. This difference of opinion is discussed later in the chapter.

controlled by man who is degenerate and, consequently, apt to cause the decline of any system regardless of how efficient it is.

Yet is her ruler man, through self conceipt
Violence of pride, fate of corruption,
Apt to give all her best workes interruption.
(Monarchy, 46, 4-6)

Thus, the monarchal system, like "all States, all Gouvernments, all Thrones," is as corrupt as man because it has " . . . no basis, but his Policy" (Fame and Honovr, 13, 3-4). However, even though monarchy has become a faulty institution because of man's fallen state, there has been a time, a golden age, "When nature raign'd, in stead of lawes or artes" (Monarchy, 1, 2), when "Both kinge, and people seem'd conjoyn'd in one" (Monarchy, 2, 2), and when good government was obtained " . . . by good dealing, to obtaine good hearts" (Monarchy, 2, 6).²¹ During this ideal period, kings took care of their people, had "Fewe and good rules" (Monarchy, 4, 3), and gained such praise and thanks for their good government that they were worshiped as gods after they died. After this golden age passed, however, men raised their kings from among themselves, and the whole system of monarchy became corrupt, infection spreading from man's fallen nature to the throne. Hence, both king and subject share in the common corruption of mankind, and both " . . . are a meane creation / Betwixt the heaven above, and hell belowe, / Noe more deserving hate, then adoration" (Monarchy, 31, 2-4).

²¹Greville seems to believe in government by natural contract here, although he claims in Monarchy, 610-640, that democracy is an inefficient system that leads to anarchy. His views on democracy will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Even though the institution of monarchy had become as corrupt as man according to Greville who yearned for the ideal and saw faults in the system, the practical Greville, viewing the world as it actually was, concluded that monarchy was the best system of government to maintain order within a state and thus to promote the public good. If, as Greville thought, the purpose of government was the public good, maintaining order was to him, as it was to most Elizabethans, the most important function of the state, for any disruption of order in man's world was a frightening warning of universal chaos.²² Furthermore, political order in the world was considered the first step toward man's regeneration.²³ Thus, to Greville, a government's ability to maintain order was the most important consideration in assessing a government's worth. For instance, the Turkish government was a competent system capable of maintaining unity and order by its strict policies and use of established religion, and for this reason, although Greville hated and feared it, he was willing to give it at least grudging admiration.²⁴ By comparing the ability of a monarchical system

²²E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (New York: Vintage Books, n. d.), p. 16. Tillyard explains that Elizabethans visualized an ideal cosmic order directly related to earthly order and were terrified that it might be upset. Any disorder on earth was viewed as a sign that suggested or implied a breakdown of the whole system followed by chaos, and, to an Elizabethan, chaos meant "the cosmic anarchy before creation."

²³Ibid., p. 20. Tillyard says that salvation "through God's grace and Christ's atonement" was often paired with the idea of salvation through "contemplation of divine order of the created universe."

²⁴Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 3. The Turkish government's use of established religion was discussed in Chapter II, Religion: Worldly and Spiritual.

to keep order to the "frayle confused policies" (Monarchy, 640, 3) of other systems, he concluded that monarchy was the best safeguard against disorder and was, in politics, analogous to reason in the human body.

And as we doe in humane bodies see,
Where reason raignes in cheife, not the affection,
Order is greate, not wanton libertie,
Man to himself, and others a direction;
Where if too much abstracted or let fall,
The tares of passion there runne over all:

So when men fall away from Monarchie,
Whether it be to States of few, or more,
Change leades them nearer unto Anarchie
By divers minutes, then they were before;
Since unitie divided into manie
Begetts confusion, never frende to anie.
(Monarchy, 657-658)

Moreover, the alternatives to monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, are products of man's faulty thinking²⁵ or " . . . new-fangledness in peoples mindes" (Monarchy, 583, 1). Aristocracy is " . . . manie-headed powre" (Monarchy, 592, 2) and "That infinite of multiplicitie" (Monarchy, 606, 2) that man's finite nature cannot admire. Under this form of government where authority is shared, "Mans justice" is " . . . seldome cleare and never wise" (Monarchy, 595, 5), civil war between factions is encouraged, and the whole structure is unstable and incapable of maintaining order. Democracy is just as faulty and is, likewise, inadequate as a form of government or a means of preventing disorder. It "Lets fall mens mindes, and makes their manners base" (Monarchy, 612, 2) and is a system "Where that blinde multitude cheife

²⁵Greville, Remains, p. 11.

Master is" (Monarchy, 610, 1). Moreover, under a democratic government

" . . . States doe choose / Their Magistrates, or officers by lott, /

And chance instead of worth or knowledge use" (Monarchy, 645, 1-3) and

. . . religion, God, and humane lawes

No other use, or honor can expect,

Then to serve idle liberties applause,

As painted toyes, which multitudes affect:

Who judginge all thinges, while they nothing knowe,

Lawlesse, and Godlesse are, and would live so.

(Monarchy, 613)

Greville thus rejected other systems in favor of monarchy which he felt was the most adequate form of government to prevent disorder and consequent chaos or anarchy.

Although Greville, the pragmatic statesman, concluded that monarchy was the best and most efficient form of government, his idealism caused him to view monarchy as less than ideal and subject to tyranny and decline as a result of the sovereign's excess or weakness. Greville cautions that when a throne, "Flattering it self that all is made for one" (Monarchy, 66, 2), makes of itself an idol and man its "sacrifice" (Monarchy, 68, 1), tyranny, that " . . . giant creature in excesse of might" (Monarchy, 56, 2), is the result. Monarchy then becomes a " . . . pow'r that thinkes it stands and works alone, / With an unsatiate pride and wanton ease, / Surfetts it self with other mens disease" (Monarchy, 66, 4-6). Subjects become " . . . oppressed soules content to woe: / Feare suffring much, for feare to suffer more" (Monarchy, 64, 4-5) or mere " . . . blankes where pow'r doth write her lust" (Monarchy, 55, 2). Such tyranny usually stems from some "Excesse, (the maladie of Might)" (Mvstapha, Chr. I, 159) prompted by the ambition,

desire for fame, or weakness of the monarch, causing him to " . . . over-act with restless scepter-witt" (Monarchy, 147, 2). Lust for power and "private vice" which "Is not kept servant to the publique state" (Monarchy, 157, 1-2) are the commonest causes of a monarch's excess and "overacting might" (Monarchy, 72, 1), but virtue also can be carried to extremes.²⁶

Thus, pleasing vices sometimes raise a Crowne,
As austere vertues often pull it downe.
(Monarchy, 152, 5-6)

However, the following vices are the usual excesses which disgrace the monarchy and turn it into tyranny:

. . . extortions, crueltie, opprèssion,
Covetousness, endlesse anger, or displeasure,
Neglect, or scorne of person, or profession,
Pryde, baseness, rudenes, wayne expence of treasure.
(Monarchy, 161, 1-4)

In addition, excessive violence such as that practiced by Nero and Caligula (Monarchy, 74, 2-4) and ambition that knows no bounds and becomes "Soueraigne lust" (Fame and Honovr, 67, 6) are "engines" of "tiranny" (Monarchy, 70, 2) which eventually

. . . stirr offence in each estate,
And from the deepe impressions of despight
Enflame those restles instruments of fate,
Which as noe frendes to dutie or devotion,
Easily stirr upp incursion, and commotion.
(Monarchy, 72)

²⁶This idea restates Niccolo Machiavelli's advice in The Prince, trans. by Luigi Ricci (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 85. "It will be found that some things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear vices result in one's greater security and wellbeing."

Thus, in the same way that excess leads to tyranny and oppression, tyranny and oppression of subjects "Like blasing starres, that burne their owne foundation" (Monarchy, 103, 4) inevitably lead to the disease and decline of the monarchical system. However, a monarchy can become diseased beyond cure from a monarch's weakness as well as from his overbearing strength. A monarch who is weak and indecisive and who makes power a cloak for slothfulness, making " . . . the Crowne a spetious hive for drones" (Monarchy, 93, 2) and during whose reign "Ease is made greatnes, trust a liberty" (Monarchy, 92, 3) will find "scorne, and ruyne both" (Monarchy, 93, 3), for "States fall, where power flies with feeble winges" (Monarchy, 97, 3).

In Greville's discussion of tyrannies and weak monarchies in A Treatise of Monarchy and in his exploration of "the high waies of ambitious Governours" (Life, p. 221) in his plays, he dealt with the relationship between subject and king, offering advice to each, much of which parallels counsels found in Machiavelli's The Prince. Machiavelli, of course, was primarily concerned with the preservation of a monarch's power, and his pragmatic counsels were offered to that end, whereas Greville, pragmatic but also idealistic, approached the preservation of monarchy from the standpoint of both king and subject with the purpose of preserving order in the state as part of the divine order of the universe. Both, however, believed that religion and law were the two most important elements that upheld the state,²⁷ that

²⁷Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 15.

desire for power was inherent in man and the cause of corruption within a state, and that evil and good succeeded one another, one being the cause of the other.²⁸ In addition, many of Greville's counsels are similar to Machiavelli's; Greville advises a monarch that his

. . . best help indeed is happy choice
Of underministers in every kinde,
By whome discretely thrones may judge the voyce
Of Images projected to their minde:
And soe by weake, but wakefull jealousie,
The true or false scope of propounders see.
(Monarchy, 125)

The foregoing lines seem to echo Machiavelli's assertion that

The choice of a prince's ministers is a matter of no little importance; they are either good or not according to the prudence of the prince. The first impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains is from seeing the men that he has about him. . . . When you see the minister think more of himself than of you, and in all his actions seek his own profit, such a man will never be a good minister, and you can never rely on him; for whoever has in hand the state of another must never think of himself but of the prince, and not mind anything but what relates to him.²⁹

Greville also warns the monarch against indulging in vices that might endanger the monarchy.

Which to improve, stronge princes must despise
All arts that blemish birth, place, courage, worth;
For Tyrants unto men then sacrifice
Their thrones, when inward errors they show forth;
Which curiouslie the wise have ever us'd
To keepe conceal'd, well ballanc'd, or excus'd.
(Monarchy, 160)

²⁸Ibid., p. 14.

²⁹Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 114-115. Greville, an adviser to three sovereigns, patterned himself according to Machiavelli's idea of a good minister. Bullen, Elizabethans, p. 206, points out that he was always careful to uphold the king's prerogatives.

His advice parallels Machiavelli's comment that a monarch

. . . should be prudent enough to avoid the scandal of those vices which would lose him the state, and guard himself if possible against those which will not lose it him, but if not able to, he can indulge them with less scruple.³⁰

On the other hand, Greville is not willing to carry pragmatism to the extreme that Machiavelli does in the matter of keeping faith; Greville cautions

But above all, such actions as may bringe
His faith in doubt, a stronge prince must eschew,
Because it doth concerne a boundless kinge
To keepe his wordes, and contracts, steddy, true,
His graunts entire, graces not undermyn'd,
As if both trueth, and power, had but one mynde.
(Monarchy, 164)

Machiavelli, however, says that "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist."³¹ Greville diverges from Machiavelli again in his edict, "Powre, make your leagues, guifts, contracts therefore just, / Since wronge prescribes not Crownes, by tyme or deed" (Monarchy, 173, 1-2). Thus, even though Greville and Machiavelli offered their practical advice for the purpose of maintaining a monarchy, Machiavelli was willing to resort to cruelty and deceit to accomplish it, but Greville, the Christian who yearned for the ideal, although realizing certain policies were necessary to hold the state together, was not willing to abandon ethical dealing and Christian standards entirely. In addition, their reasons for

³⁰Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 85.

³¹Ibid., p. 92.

wanting to see monarchy upheld were different. Machiavelli wrote from the standpoint of a prince who wanted to acquire political power or to increase his sphere of influence³² and expressed little if any sympathy for the people. Greville, on the other hand, was concerned for both king and people, who would all share in the anarchy and subsequent chaos, which Elizabethans believed would ensue, should the monarchy fall and disturb world order. He sympathized with the plight of the people and examined the problem of their right to rebel against tyranny in Mustapha.³³ However, in the end he has Achmat support the tyrant against the rebels,³⁴ for to do otherwise would be to bring the destruction of the monarchy and disruption of world order.

Order was Greville's primary reason for rejecting aristocracy and democracy in favor of the monarchical system, but he really had two

³²Ibid., p. 8. However, Machiavelli's personal motives for writing The Prince are open to debate. In the introduction, Christian Gauss states that it was his "intention to dedicate it to one of the Medici in the hope that they might invite him back to public service" (p. 11), but also suggests (p. 16) that in the last chapter, Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians, an eloquent passage shows him to be an ardent patriot, hoping for the unification of Italy. Speaking of his country, Machiavelli says "Behold how she prays God to send some one to redeem her from this barbarous cruelty and insolence. Behold her ready and willing to follow any standard if only there can be someone to raise it. There is nothing now she can hope for but that your illustrious house may place itself at the head of this redemption . . . " (p. 125).

³³Greville has sympathy for the people and realizes they have reason to rebel, but, unlike Brutus or Buchanan, feels rebellion is not justified for any reason. He parallels Hooker in his attitude toward rebellion and Bodin in his attitude that a king can make or break laws without popular consent.

³⁴Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 13-14.

different attitudes toward these forms of government, or at least toward certain aspects of them, depending upon the circumstances.³⁵ The pragmatic Greville rejects aristocracy, a government "Where manie heads have power of creation" (Monarchy, 594, 3), for a number of reasons. In the first place, "These manie heads ofte Civyll warr invite: / So against forraine force they worse unite" (Monarchy, 592, 5-6), and, secondly, these magistrates are "impotent" in "extremities" (Monarchy, 609, 4) and unfit to guide the state through troublesome times. The Christian Greville, however, must consider the people, and, in his advice to subjects ruled by a weak king, he advocates delegating authority to others, as long as they are wisely chosen, using fame as a guide. He affirms that a weak king's " . . . best help indeed is happy choice / Of underministers in every kinde" (Monarchy, 125, 1-2) who can "Instruct weake power to kepe her state upright" (Monarchy, 130, 2), especially if the king realizes that " . . . fame this quintessence of humane spiritt, / Bringes unto light the divers states of men, / And seldome to unworthines gives meritt" (Monarchy, 129, 1-3). Thus, if he utilizes " . . . fames many eyes, heads, winges and heart" (Monarchy, 130, 1), he can " . . . rule by these," which "is one way of might, / Wherein the Crowne can feelee noe great distress, / And for the people, they must sure finde lesse" (Monarchy, 130, 3-6). Moreover, as long as the king is impartial, the factions that may result are not a danger because "Twoe bodies headles seldome danger breed" (Monarchy, 137, 6). Actually,

³⁵Greville, Remains, p. 11. Wilkes disagrees, stating that no arguments in favor of either system are advanced anywhere.

" . . . true Counsellors assist good kings, / And help their Greatnesse on with little things" (Mvstapha, Chr. I, 115-116), and, therefore, nobility chosen in a way "Where they that cleerest shine, most honor beare" (Monarchy, 325, 6) can reinforce the monarchy, if

. . . this brave magnificence be us'd,
Not reallie to dispossess the Crowne
Either of powre or wealth, but so infus'd
As it may rather rayse then pull it downe.
(Monarchy, 334, 1-4)

Thus, Greville recognized the worth of an aristocracy, although he felt it should be led by a king. In a similar way, he had two attitudes toward democracy. The practical Greville asserts that it leads to anarchy "Since unitie divided into manie / Begetts confusion, never frende to anie" (Monarchy, 658, 5-6), yet the idealistic Greville was in sympathy with republicanism³⁶ and individual rights. To Greville,³⁷ the Calvinist, all souls were equal in God's sight, and this belief implied justice and equality between individuals or groups within the state.³⁸ He says "Order no Basis findes; Honor must fall: / Where man is nothing, Place cannot doe all" (Mvstapha, I, ii, 200-201) and

³⁶A. H. Bullen, Elizabethans (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1924), p. 206. Greville does not deal with the shades of difference between a democracy and a republic; he does, however, show sympathy for the rights of the people and seems to be in favor of a monarchy that is limited by law and Parliament. His views on law will be discussed in Chapter IV, Kingship: Ideal and Actual.

³⁷Fulke Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of the Right Honourable Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, edited by Alexander B. Grosart, IV (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), xxiii. Grosart points out that his name, "Fulke" or "Foulk," means "beloved of the people and commons."

³⁸Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 13.

embodies in Mustapha the protests of the people and speculation on their right to revolt against tyranny.³⁹ Moreover, the Chorus Quartus of Alaham is a view of government from the people's point of view. In addition, Greville advocated individual liberties, a concept based upon universal and natural law,⁴⁰ and insisted on a simple relationship between ruler and people⁴¹ which is similar to the theory of Original Contract found in the Vindiciae and the De Jure Regni.⁴² Lines in the first stanzas of A Treatise of Monarchy suggest such a contract between ruler and people even though the ruler in this case is a king: "And mortall Goddes with men made up the glory / Of one republique, by united hearts" (Monarchy, 1, 2-3) when "Both Kinge, and people seem'd conjoyn'd

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," p. 238. Maclean traces this idea to the influence of Stoicism possibly through Seneca.

⁴¹Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 59. Greville examines this relationship in Humane Learning, stanzas 98-101, calling for a direct relationship between power and the people without reliance on the past for traditions and precedents. Bullough points out, however, that Greville's thinking here is quite different than in Mustapha and may have been written with "James I's pretensions in mind" to convert the English monarchical system into royal absolutism and to impose a tyrannical personal rule, dissolving Parliament whenever it pleased him.

⁴²Later the idea found in the Vindiciae was expanded by Locke who found the origin of the civil state in a contract between rulers and ruled, a theory that is often cited as a basis for the democratic form of government. Greville seems to agree that there should be such a relationship but would not have gone as far as Locke in advocating rebellion when the contract was broken. Obviously, Greville could not have read Locke, who wrote later in the 17th century, but he may have been influenced by the contractual agreement in the De Jure Regni or the twofold original contract of the Vindiciae.

in one: / Both nurst alike with mutuall feeding waynes" (Monarchy, 2, 2-3). Thus, Greville was at least in agreement with certain ideas associated with democracy and, as a Christian, yearned for an ideal and just relationship in government, although as a politician, he rejected both aristocracy and democracy as freedom which would ultimately invite anarchy, for "If libertie they finde, then Anarchie they make" (Mvstapha, I, ii, 216).

Although Greville, was, on the one hand a Calvinist who accepted, with a few reservations, the main doctrines of Calvin's beliefs,⁴³ the practical Greville rejected Calvin's concept of a theocratic state⁴⁴ along with aristocracy and democracy. He cautions subjects: "Milde people therefore honour you your kinge, / Reverence your preists, but never under one" (Monarchy, 209, 1-2). Likewise, he warns kings "How suddenly in man kinges powre is drown'd; / The Myter rais'd, the Scepter prejudic'd, / If you leave all rights superstition bound" (Monarchy, 211, 2-4). The practical Greville diverged from Calvin's teaching in the matter of a theocratic state, because he, like Machiavelli, believed that established religion existed to aid in the maintenance of civil government, whereas Calvin believed civil government existed to maintain the church.⁴⁵ It is important to remember, however, that to the religious

⁴³Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," p. 238.

⁴⁴Greville, Remains, p. 12.

⁴⁵John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. by John Allen, II, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Religion, 1936), Book IV, Chapter XX, ii. " . . . This civil government is designed, so long as we live in this world, to cherish and support the external worship of God, to preserve the pure doctrine of religion, to defend the constitution of the church. . . . "

Greville, the church that Calvin was interested in sustaining was really false religion⁴⁶ and not the true personal relationship with God that was not dependent upon any earthly institution.

Although the practical Greville rejected aristocracy, democracy, and theocracy in favor of monarchy because it was stable enough to preserve order and endure as a government, his idealism caused him to view monarchy as subject to excess and decline and even thought of the cycles of rise and decline as God's way of bringing about needed change or punishment. In his comparison of the different forms of government in A Treatise of Monarchy, the practical Greville stressed the fact that monarchy was a more permanent and enduring system. He comments on other forms of government: "No longe liv'd state hath been of either kinde" (Monarchy, 641, 6) and points to the enduring qualities of monarchy: "Forgett not how the Monarchie preservd / Rome, for a thousand and seaven hundred yeeres" (Monarchy, 628, 2-3). On the other hand, "Democratie / Did in few ages rise, and fall againe" (Monarchy, 629, 1-3). However, the Christian Greville, who saw the institution of monarchy as subject to corruption and excess, realized that monarchies rose and fell like other governments and that these changes were part of God's plan. He says "Worth must decay, and height of power declyne, / Vices shall still, but not the same vyce raigne" (Monarchy, 83, 1-2) and points out "That in it self time onlie doth not change" (Monarchy, 86, 2)

⁴⁶Greville's ideas on established religion are discussed in Chapter II, Religion: Worldly and Spiritual. He probably disapproved of theocracy because, like institutionalized religion, it was tainted by man's corrupt nature.

and that " . . . to see vice succeed worth is not strange, / Weakenes and strength, as well as youth and age, / Having in each estate a various stage" (Monarchy, 86, 4-6).⁴⁷ He asserts that "States have degrees, as humane bodies haue, / Springs, Summer, Autumne, Winter and the graue" (Warres, 42, 4-6) and that "Thus rose all states, thus grew they, thus they fall, / From good to ill, and so from ill, to worse" (Monarchy, 105, 1-2). Like Machiavelli, he saw monarchy as subject to variation, weak rulers succeeding strong, and bad succeeding good,⁴⁸ with "Scepters shadow-like" growing "short or long, / As worthy, or vnworthy Princes reigne" (Caelica, CI, 25-26). Furthermore, this waxing and waning of states was God's way to " . . . fixe, change, ruyne, or build upp againe / According to the period, wayne, or state / Of good or evils seldome changing fate" (Monarchy, 114, 4-6). Hence, tyranny, although evil, can be considered God's instrument to destroy an evil state, for "Cures and diseases oft together dwell" (Monarchy, 115, 6); it will, by its own excess, eventually destroy itself by overreaching and will thus fulfill God's plan. However, until such evils are cured by change, man must endure them⁴⁹ as a punishment sent by God for his own transgressions.

⁴⁷John L. Mahoney, "Donne and Greville: Two Christian Attitudes Toward the Renaissance Idea of Mutability and Decay," CLA Journal, V (March, 1962), 209 points out that Greville "felt a deep tension when confronted with the notion of a world surrounded by mutability" and, unlike Donne, could not "turn from this scene of whirling change and corruption" but was constantly torn between the love of God and an intense desire to remain in the world.

⁴⁸Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 14.

⁴⁹Greville agrees with Calvin here. Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, trans. by Harold Knight (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 241-242, points out that Calvin thought man should obey even

But if pow're will exceed, then lett mankinde
 Receive oppression, as fruites of their error;
 Let them againe live in their duties shrinde,
 As their safe haven from the windes of terror,
 Till hee that rais'd powre, to mow mans synnes downe,
 Please, for pow'rs owne synnes, to pluck of her Crowne.
 (Monarchy, 191)

Thus, the Christian Greville saw monarchy as subject to disease and decay like any other form of government, whereas the pragmatic Greville saw it as the most enduring system available; opposition to rebellion against tyranny was the one point of agreement.⁵⁰

If all Greville's convictions warned against rebellion, rebellion was the only topic on which they agreed, for his pragmatism recognized

bad government until God intervened, because tyranny was more bearable than no order at all. The only exception to this practice occurred when a government practiced idolatry or forbade subjects to serve God.

⁵⁰Sixteenth Century English Prose, edited by Karl J. Holzknecht (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1954), pp. 123-127. It is not at all surprising to find the concept that rebellion against a monarch was a sin completely ingrained in the minds of most Englishmen, including Greville, when one realizes that the church continually taught this idea from the pulpit. The following are excerpts from Certain Sermons, or Homelies, Appoynted by the Kynge's Maiestie to bee Declared and Redde by all Persones, Vicars, or Curates in their Churches: An Exhortacion Concernyng Good Ordre and Obedience to Rulers and Majestrates. Almighty God hath created heaven and earth with a certain order and

. . . hath assigned kynge, princes, and other gouernors vnder them, all in good and necessary ordre. . . . Here let vs mark wel and remembre that the high power and auctoritie of kynge, with their making lawes, iudgements, and officers, are the ordinaunces, not of man, but of God. . . .

. . . Even the wicked rulers haue their power and auctoritie from God. And therefore it is not lawfull for their subiects by force to resist them. . . . But we must in suche case patiently suffre all wronges and iniuries, referrying the iudgement of our cause onely to God. . . . The violence and iniury that is committed against auctoritie is committed against GOD. . . .

monarchy as it actually existed and knew that a benevolent though weak government was a worse danger to order within the state than tyranny, whereas his Christianity preferred an ideal form of government and contradictorily viewed monarchy as another one of man's corrupt institutions. Greville saw monarchy, or even tyranny, as the best form of government because it was strong, enduring, and able to maintain order; at the same time, he saw it as corrupt, subject to decay, and comparable to any other affliction man had to bear.

CHAPTER IV

KINGSHIP: IDEAL AND ACTUAL

Whether monarchy was perfect or corrupt, absolute or modified by an aristocracy or by democratic principles, Greville believed in it as an institution and preferred it to any other form of government, but his sincere belief in monarchy as the best political system available was quite separate and distinct from his concept of the ideal monarch and the qualities he felt should be embodied in the perfect sovereign. In other words, he felt that monarchy was without doubt the best system of government, but that it could be a perfect system of government under a good king or that it could be merely the lesser of several evils¹ under a wicked one or a tyrant. To the Christian and the pragmatic Greville, however, the qualities of an ideal king or a bad king--sometimes a tyrant--were not the same. He had conflicting ideas about the nature of a king's position and the characteristics of a good or a bad sovereign, his own interpretation of the qualities that distinguished a strong ruler from a tyrant, as well as divergent attitudes toward the proper relationship between king and people, blood succession, the role of law in bounding a king's power, and the doctrine of the divine right of kings.

¹Greville felt that monarchy, even under a bad king, was superior to an aristocracy or a democracy. His opinions on these forms of government are discussed in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

Greville's concept of kingship stemmed primarily from a combination of influences: his religious convictions that caused him to yearn for the ideal relationship between ruler and subject such as the one envisioned by Junius Brutus in Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos (1648), Jean Bodin's La République (1577) that insisted upon a monarch's perpetual and absolute power unbounded by laws, the concept advanced by Buchanan in the De Jure Regni (1680) that a sovereign's power rested in the will of the people, and Greville's personal experience as a statesman and a member of Parliament.² The foregoing represent the major influences upon Greville's political philosophy, but, as a widely read, speculative intellectual, he undoubtedly absorbed political ideas from a multitude of sources.

Greville's plays, Mustapha and Alaham, although basically studies of two kinds of kings and the problems that arise as a result of their leadership, also give an insight into the nature of kingship itself and show the position of sovereign from both an idealistic and a practical point of view. To the religious Greville, the position of king is an enviable one; it is a place of honor and unquestioned authority. "The State of Kings is large" (Alaham, III, ii, 46), "where he that Monarch is" can "(like the Sunne) haue no light shine, but his" (Mvstapha, I, i, 37-38). Moreover, " . . . none dare shew Kings they goe amisse" (Mvstapha, II, i, 69), for a king's "annoynted Power" (Mvstapha, IV, iv, 151) makes him God's representative on earth, and

²These various political influences are explained in greater detail in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

Solyman³ sums up a king's position when he says, "Only God is aboue me" (Mvstapha, IV, i, 2).⁴ However, although the throne is ideally a high and coveted place, from the practical point of view Greville deemed it a dangerous one. Knowing that his position is envied by others--and "Enuy is but the smoke of low estate, / Ascending still against the fortunate" (Alaham, III, iii, 80-81)--a king can never feel secure, and, thus, kings "that all men feare, are fearefull too" (Mvstapha, II, iii, 64). In fact, constant watchfulness and suspicion are necessary to insure a king's position, and although "power is proud till it looke downe to feare," it⁵ is "only safe, by euer looking there" (Alaham, I, ii, 20-21). Kings have reason to fear loss of position, but they also have to fear for their lives because, although they are respected and possibly defended while alive as the symbol of authority, their reputations are not worth avenging once they are dead.

People doe power, not persons apprehend:
 Strength shoves like truth: Mankinde loves policie:
 Defended Kings, but not reuenged be.
 (Alaham, III, iii, 72-74)

Moreover, in order to keep their power, kings must be distrustful and secretive because "Many with trust, with doubt few are vndone" (Mvstapha,

³Fulke Greville, Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke, edited by Geoffrey Bullough, II (London, Oliver and Boyd, 1938). "Solyman" and "Soliman" seem to be used interchangeably in the play Mustapha.

⁴Here Greville echoes Bodin's concept of a king as God's image on earth.

⁵Greville often uses the word "power" to refer to the king or his position of authority.

I, i, 18), and they must constantly remember that "Dead men onely of the Wise are trusted" (Mvstapha, II, ii, 90). Their best defense is to appear enigmatic for "Kings are not safe whom any vnderstand" (Mvstapha, II, i, 41). Therefore, "The way of Princes is to hide their mindes" (Alaham, V, i, 22) because, as Hala remarks, "Who hides his minde is to himselfe a friend" (Alaham, II, i, 68). In addition to being distrustful and difficult to understand, a king is forced to be constantly alert and willing to take active steps to defend his position and to recognize that "To Thrones a passiue nature fatall is" (Alaham, IV, i, 40).⁶ The necessity for constant watchfulness and fear has a corrupting influence on the character of kings and causes them to become less than admirable. "Kings that haue cause to feare, take leaue to hate" (Mvstapha, II, iii, 224), and eventually they become "too base for friends, or enemies" (Alaham, V, iii, 13). Thus, even though the position of king is ideally a place of honor and authority as God's lieutenant on earth, it is actually, to the practical Greville, an insecure position where "it is danger to be good" (Mvstapha, IV, iv, 105), a position which, by its very nature, can transform a good king into a bad one or a tyrant.⁷

⁶Here Greville seems to restate Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by Luigi Ricci (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 93. " . . . Those that have been best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived."

⁷Greville seems to be paralleling the idea Shakespeare advances in Macbeth and which is aptly stated later by Lord Acton in his Essays on Freedom and Power (1907) that "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Greville was preoccupied with tyrants in his plays and in A Treatise of Monarchy, but his interpretation of the term "tyrant" cannot be defined by its Greek or twentieth century meaning. The ancient Greeks used the word tyrannos as the equivalent of "king,"⁸ and today the word "tyrant" has taken on the meaning of "absolute sovereign" but with strong connotations of cruelty, oppression, and illegal seizure of power.⁹ G. A. Wilkes, however, says that in Elizabethan times the term could mean either "despot" or "strong ruler" and suggests that Greville used it in both ways.¹⁰ This explanation seems to be an oversimplification and hardly adequate to explain Greville's intended meaning. For example, "tyrant" cannot have meant merely a strong ruler to Greville, for he never referred to Elizabeth as a tyrant, although she was obviously a strong monarch. On the contrary, he refers to her as a "provident Princeffe" (Life, p. 175), as "this Sovereaign Lady" (Life, p. 178), as "this bleffed, and bleffing Lady" (Life, p. 175), as "this excellent Princeffe" (Life, p. 178), as

⁸Fulke Greville, The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion, edited by G. A. Wilkes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 239.

⁹The Oxford English Dictionary, XI (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1933), 563. However, Vittorio Alfieri, Of Tyranny, translated and edited by Julius A. Molinaro and Beatrice Corrigan (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1961), p. 11 defines a tyrant in terms of the illegal use of power, asserting that any ruler, whether he is elective or hereditary, who is charged with the execution of the laws and instead has the force to destroy, break, make, interpret, hinder, evade, or suspend them can be properly called a tyrant.

¹⁰Greville, Remains, p. 239.

"worthie" and "greate" (Monarchy, 406, 1), and as "this unmatched Queen and woman" (Life, p. 215).¹¹ On the other hand, strong rulers such as Nero, Caligula (Monarchy, 74), the Sultan, Cambyses, and the Pope (Monarchy, 58-60) are specifically referred to as tyrants, and an allusion is made to the "mixt Tyranny of Rome and Caftile" (Life, p. 166). Thus, the word "strong" is apparently not the key word that determines the difference between king and tyrant. Moreover, not all those that Greville considers tyrants are strong. Alaham, for instance, is concerned with the evils of government under a weak tyrant,¹² and A Treatise of Monarchy has one section entitled "Of Weake Minded Tyrants." Hence, it would seem that, to Greville, a tyrant could be either weak or strong, and that neither of these terms can be used to define clearly his interpretation of a tyrannical ruler. However, a clue to his intended meaning is provided by his frequent use of the word "excess" in connection with tyrants and tyranny. He speaks, for example, of the "Turcks excesse of tyrannie" (Monarchy, 475, 5), the "steepe excess of Tyrannie" (Monarchy, 566, 2), "excess of might" (Monarchy, 70, 6), "excesse of tyrants violence" (Monarchy, 74, 1), "excesse of vanity" (Monarchy, 136, 3), and "covetous, cruell, or

¹¹Greville's praise of Elizabeth was genuine and not flattery. When these lines were written she was already dead, and Greville had no intention of publishing his works during his lifetime. "Now if any man fhall demand why I did not leave unto the world a complete hiftory of her Life, then this fhort memoriall in fuch fcatter'd, and undifgefted minutes, let him receive this anfwer from a dead man, becaufe I am confident no flefh breathing (by feeling what is done) fhall have occafion of asking that queftion, whileft I am living" (Life, p. 215).

¹²Greville, Poems and Dramas, II, 4.

wanton exceffes of encroaching Tyranny" (Life, pp. 194-195). In addition to his constant use of "excess" to describe tyranny, Greville includes the idea that this excess is the kind that infringes on people's rights and enslaves them. Thus, to Greville, tyranny seems to mean an excess of power or authority which leads to an excess of pride, passion, or vice, becoming an "Excesse (the Maladie of Might)" that drowns "all the stiles of right" (Mvstapha, Chr. I, 159-160) and undermines "mans native libertie" (Mvstapha, Chr. I, 170). Greville apparently felt that unbounded power had a corrupting effect, because he says that tyrants incline "By nature either way unto excesse" (Monarchy, 115, 2), and will inevitably overact in one way or another. A strong ruler has a tendency to become too proud, "overswolne with windie vice" (Monarchy, 148, 1), desirous of fame more than the good of his people, or greedy for more and more power, whereas a weak ruler may become lazy or extravagant, or may allow himself to be swayed by flattery or governed by passions; in either case, it is the people who suffer. Thus, to Greville, a tyrant was a ruler, weak or strong, who had absolute power over his subjects and who used that power for selfish ends, thereby sacrificing his people to feed some private excess. All of those that Greville called tyrants fit such a definition: the weak Sultan in Alaham, Solyman in Mustapha, Nero, Caligula, Cambyses, the Turkish Sultan, the Pope, Caesar, and Philip of Spain. Elizabeth, on the other hand, did not, for Greville felt that she was not guilty of excess but that she used her power wisely, keeping the good of her subjects in mind. In fact, Greville praised Elizabeth's moderation.

. . . this Lady, in the like ftraines, by an humble, and conftant temper, had already with true obedience triumphed over the curious examinations of afcending flattery, or defcending Tyranny, even in the tenderneffe of Princes fucceffions.

(Life, p. 163)

A few pages later he says:

Yet tears fhe not the Lyons jawes in funder at once, but moderately begins with her own Changlings; gives the Bifhops a proper motion, but bounded: the Nobility time to reforme themfelves, with inward, and outward Councell; revives her Brothers Lawes for eftablifhing of the Churches doctrine, and difcipline, but moderates their feverity of proceeding. . . .

(Life, pp. 165-166)

Not only was she moderate in her dealings with the church, but she was not overbearing in her demands from Parliament.

So as fhe came ever in ftate, when fhe demanded aid from her Houfe of Commons. Neither did fhe fetch, or force prefidents from her Predeceffors in thofe demands: but made her felf a prefident to all Poffterities, that the love of people to a loving Princeffe is not ever curioufly ballanced, by the felf-pittyng abilities of mankind: but their fpirits, hearts, and ftates being drawne up above their owne fraile felfneffe, the audit is taken after; and perchance fumm'd up with a little fmart to themfelves, wherein they glory.

Neither did fhe, by any curious fearch after Evidence to enlarge her Prerogatives Royall, teach her fubjects in Parliament, by the like felf-affections, to make as curious inquifition among their Records, to colour any encroaching upon the facred Circles of Monarchy: but left the rife or fall of thefe two ballances afleep, with thofe afpiring fpirits, who (by advantage of ftate, or time taken) had been authors of many biaced motions. . . .

(Life, pp. 173-174)

Moreover, she had the wisdom to see that any act of excess on the part of the monarch had a disrupting effect upon the people.

For this Lady, though not prophetically, yet like a provident Princeffe, in the feries of things, and times, forefaw through the long lafting wifdome of Government, a quinteffence, howfoever abftracted out of Morall Philofophy, and humane Lawes, yet many degrees in ufe of mankind above them. She, I fay, forefaw, that every exceffe of paffion exprefst from the Monarch in Acts, or

Councils of Estate, would infallibly stir up in the people like the cobwebs of a popular spinning, and therefore from these piercing grounds, she concluded, that a steady hand in the government of Sovereignty, would ever prove more prosperous, then any nimble or witty practice, crafty shifting, or Imperious forcing humors possibly could do.

(Life, pp. 175-176)

Thus, to Greville, Elizabeth was an example of a powerful ruler, but one who was wise enough to avoid the excesses that would have made her a tyrant.

Although Greville sincerely believed Elizabeth was a good sovereign and consistently praised her good leadership from both his religious and practical sides, at all other times his judgments were not in agreement concerning the qualities that characterized a good ruler. To the religious Greville, a good or ideal king was one who attained his position through a mutual agreement with his subjects and maintained it "even by those artes / By which it grewe, as justice, labour, love" (Monarchy, 3, 1-2). In an ideal arrangement with "Transcendency of either side unknowne" (Monarchy, 2, 4), the king was characterized by a "Reserved sweetnes . . . Even unto slaves" (Monarchy, 3, 3-4) "And by a meeke descending to the least" by which he "Enviless sway'd, and govern'd all the rest" (Monarchy, 3, 5-6). Moreover, a good king is never cruel or oppressive for "Mercie must hand in hand with Power goe" (Mvstapha, II, iii, 171). Thus, to the idealistic Greville, a good king was just, industrious, reserved rather than prideful, benevolent, protective, merciful, and loving, and he, in return, was loved by his people. On the other hand, to the pragmatic Greville, who saw the role of king as it actually seemed to be,

the qualities of a good king were quite different. From his political point of view, the most important characteristics of a good king were his strength and consequent ability to keep order within the state,¹³ and Greville knew, as a statesman, that qualities such as justice, benevolence, and mercy hampered a king in the execution of this primary function. He voices this opinion in Solyman's exclamation, "Mercie, and Loue! you Phrases popular, / Which vndermine, and limit Princes Thrones" (*Mvstapha*, II, ii, 1-2) and says, moreover, that "Iustice in Kings cannot be definite" (*Alaham*, V, i, 11). In addition, kings should not be judged by the standards that apply to other men because "Power hath great scope; she walkes not in the wayes/ of Priuate truth: Vertues of common men / Are not the same which shine in Kings aboue, / And doe make feare bring forth the workes of loue" (*Mvstapha*, I, ii, 508).¹⁴ Thus, a good king, who must show strength and evoke fear to keep order, cannot afford to have qualities or virtues that would cause him to be sincerely loved as a person; he can hope only for admiration, respect, and an outward but not necessarily sincere show of affection.

For Power may be fear'd; Empire ador'd;
 Rewards may make knees bow; and self-loue humble:
But loue is onely that which Princes couet;
And for they haue it least, they most doe loue it.
 (*Mvstapha*, I, i, 73-76)

¹³The importance of order within civil government as part of world order, to Greville or any Elizabethan, is discussed in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

¹⁴Here again Greville echoes sentiments found in Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 90. ". . . one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting."

No matter how much a good king might want the love of his people, he cannot display the justice, mercy, benevolence, and love that would bring him this affection, for in so doing, he would become less able to maintain order and hence cease to be a good king.

Not only did Greville have conflicting ideas with regard to the qualities necessary for a good king, but he also developed two attitudes toward bad kings or tyrants. To the religious Greville, bad kings were tyrants, "confident imperious spiritts" (Monarchy, 147, 1) who think "the world inferior to their meritts" (Monarchy, 147, 3) and who refuse to allow their power to be bounded by laws. They set "noe lymitts" to their "powre or will, / Nor true distinction betwene good and ill" (Monarchy, 4, 5-6) and " . . . worke in all with every pow'r but worth" (Monarchy, 56, 3), using religion, cruelty, or superstition to help enslave their subjects and " . . . cancel all inferior rights" (Monarchy, 63, 2). To the practical Greville, however, the worst kind of king was not a strong and powerful tyrant, but a weak and inept ruler who was "made to serve, not raigne" (Monarchy, 88, 1). Thus, from Greville's political point of view, a bad king was one who was not a strong leader and whose policies were " . . . cleare zones dimly overcast with feare" (Monarchy, 91, 4) or "false mists" (Monarchy, 91, 5) to which mankind was forced to give allegiance. Some bad kings, he asserts, are too lazy to rule, "Pow'r loosing it self, by distaste of paine" (Monarchy, 93, 5), whereas others are so moved by flattery that they are completely under the influence of favorites, "Base idle fastosmes, creatures of grace, / Impossible to temper, hard to please" (Monarchy, 96, 2-3).

Such timorous, lazy, or inactive kings "Grove fondlie scornfull, idlie imperious / Despising forme, and turning lawe to will" (Monarchy, 100, 1-2) and, like the old Sultan in Alaham, eventually invite usurpation and consequent disruption of order within the state. Because keeping order was, to the practical Greville, a king's most important function, a weak king unable to maintain a stable government was a bad king; on the other hand, the idealistic Greville admired a king who had a balanced and benevolent relationship with his people, and he condemned a bad king who was so powerful and self-centered that he refused to allow his personal will to be curbed or modified by law, religion, or love for his people.

Greville was very concerned with the relationship between king and people and the question of whether oppressed subjects had the right to rebel, but he expressed two different attitudes toward the proper relationship between ruler and ruled and the right of rebellion. His idealistic or religious face insisted on a balanced relationship between king and subjects and continually warned kings that subjects would rebel if they were oppressed.¹⁵ For example, the Chorus Quartus of Alaham, "Of People," offers advice to kings on the proper relationship that should be maintained with subjects. In the first place, a king must love his people if he wants their love and loyalty in return.

¹⁵Here Greville follows the idea of original contract set forth by Junius Brutus in Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, asserting that subjects have the right to break their agreement.

Grant that we be the stuffe for Princes art,
 By, and on it, to build their Thrones aboue vs:
 Yet if Kings be the head, we be the heart;
 And know we loue no soule, that doth not loue vs.
 (Alaham, Chr. IV, 13-16)

Moreover, Greville warns kings, if they hope to keep their subjects' love and respect, to govern them, but not oppressively, for even one instance of excess will not be easily forgotten.

Kings gouern People, ouer-racke them not:
 Fleece vs; but doe not clippe vs to the quicke.
 Thinke not with good, and ill, to write, and blot:
 The good doth vanish, where the ill doth sticke.
 Hope not with trifles to grow popular;
 Wounds that are heal'd for euer leaue a scarre.
 (Alaham, Chr. IV, 25-30)

Furthermore, " . . . what power obtaines by wrong, is euer dearly bought" (Alaham, Chr. I, 74), and kings will find "That fortune still must be with ill maintained, / Which at the first with any ill is gained" (Mvstapha, II, iii, 50-51). The idealist Greville has the people advise kings, "Your safest racke to winde vs vp is Loue" because "To maske your vice in pompes is vainly done: / Motes lie not hidden in beames of a Sunne" (Alaham, Chr. IV, 34-36) and warn them that any oppressive treatment, even though it be apparently calmly endured, may be looked upon as a calm before the inevitable storm of rebellion.

Like as strong windes doe worke vpon the Sea,
 Stirring and tossing waues to warre each other:
 So Princes doe with Peoples humors play,
 As if Confusion were the Scepters mother.
 But Crownes! take heed: when humble things mount high,
The windes oft calme before those billowes lie.
 (Alaham, Chr. IV, 1-6)

In addition, Greville counsels kings that the people are really the foundation of a sovereign's power, and, hence, they can depose a king

by withdrawing their support.¹⁶

Since People, who did rayse you to the Crowne,
Are ladders standing still to let you downe.
 (Mvstapha, V, ii, 6-7)

On the other hand, the political Greville, who feared disruption of order more than anything else, insisted upon a course that would preserve

¹⁶In 1399 Parliament had done exactly what Greville was warning that they could do. They deposed Richard II and made his cousin, Henry Bolingsbroke, Henry IV of England. Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England, I (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), 266-267. In connection with the sentence of deposition passed upon Richard II, a group of men representing all the estates of the realm sat in tribunal and considered Richard's crimes and his confession. They pronounced him unfit to rule and stated the following:

And with this same caution we do depose him by this our definitive sentence in writing, expressly forbidding all and singular the lords, abps. bps. and prelates, dukes, marquises, earls, barons, knights, vassals, and vasalors, and other subjects, and liege people of the said kingdoms and dominion, and other places to the said kingdoms and dominion belonging, that henceforth none of them shall any way obey or regard the said Richard, as king or lord of the said kingdom or dominion. . . . --And then presently, as soon as it appeared by the premises, and the occasion of them, that the crown of England, with its appurtenances was vacant; the aforesaid Henry duke of Lancaster, rising from his place, and standing so erected as he might conveniently be seen by the people, and humbly fortifying himself with the sign of the cross on his forehead, and on his breast, having also first called upon the name of Christ, did claim the said kingdom, so vacant as aforesaid, with its crown and all its members and appurtenances; in this form of words in his mother tongue:

"In the name of Fader, Son, and Holy Ghost, I Henry of Lancaster, challenge this revme of Ynglonde, and the croun with all the members, and the appurtenances, als I that am descendit, be the right line of the blode, comyng fro the gude lord Henry therde, and thorghe that right that God of his grace hath sent mee, with helpe of my kyn, and of my frendes to recover it; the which rewme was in poynt to be ondone for defaut of governance, and undoyng of the gude laws."

"After which claim and challenge, as well the lords spiritual as temporal, and all the states there present, being severally and jointly interrogated, what they thought of that claim; the said states with the whole people, without any difficulty or delay, did unanimously consent, that the said duke should reign over them."

the king's power and prevent rebellion even at the cost of tyranny, oppression, and cruelty. He advises the people not to complain about oppressive treatment from kings because it is no more than they deserve.

Man then repyne not at these boundless kinges,
 Since yow endure the fate of your forefathers,
 To whome God did foretell, on humane winges
 He inequality once rais'd, still gathers;
 Their choice offended him, please you it must,
 Whose dreggs still in you, on you make it just.
 (Monarchy, 25)

From his political standpoint, Greville envisions no original contract or agreement between king and people as the idealistic Greville does, but rather a relationship between king and subject like the one advocated in Machiavelli's The Prince. The people should be ruled with a firm hand, "For Subjects growing full is Princes wane" (Alaham, Prol., 54). Moreover, in order to maintain his power, a king must rid himself of anyone who is a potential threat to him. In Alaham, the usurper adopts this practical policy.¹⁷

My Guard is strong; their first imployment is
 The murther of those men my father trusts;
 Not all; for that were cruelty, not wit:
 Some simple being, some indifferent sp'rits:
 Their ends, and honours being but delights.
 Others ambitious, rash, and violent,
 No inward strength of nature: or of grace;
 Of present power the noblest instruments.
 Transforme, and vse: wit vertue doth exceed.
 (Alaham, III, i, 27-35)

¹⁷This policy echoes ideas in Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 36-37. Machiavelli cautions a new king to make sure " . . . that the blood of their old rulers be extinct. . . . For it must be noted, that men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance."

Thus, at times Greville advocated an ideal relationship where the king attained his power through the people's love and respect and avoided rebellion by governing humanely; at other times he advised the use of wit to attain these ends, avoiding rebellion by permanently removing all those capable of rebelling.

Greville's idealism and pragmatism also produced two conflicting attitudes toward blood succession.¹⁸ Greville, the idealist, saw heredity¹⁹ as a less-than-ideal way to choose a king.²⁰ He asserts that "Misfortunes have in blood successions too" (Alaham, IV, i, 104) for "Kings children are no Kings; authority / Goes not by blood; she sets another rate; / Vse, is her kinne; Grace, her affinity" (Alaham, I, ii, 99-101). Moreover, choosing kings by birth leaves "True worth to chance, brave industry to blood" (Monarchy, 35, 2). In addition to being

¹⁸ Hugh N. Maclean, "Fulke Greville: Kingship and Sovereignty," Huntington Library Quarterly, XVI (May, 1953), 266, suggests that inasmuch as English kings had been claiming the throne through heredity, Greville, as a discreet statesman, could hardly express ideas that were contrary to hereditary right. However, Greville does express two different viewpoints in his writings, opinions which cannot be due to this believing in one thing and saying another to avoid displeasing the monarch, for he did not publish his works during his lifetime and, hence, would not have worried about the effect his statements might have had on his position at court.

¹⁹ Ruth Mohl, Studies in Spenser, Milton, and the Theory of Monarchy (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1949-1962), 52, states that the "theory of an indefeasible hereditary right to the throne" had not always been a tradition in England and was not fixed "until the defeat of the House of Lancaster in the Wars of the Roses established the succession by primogeniture rather than by act of Parliament."

²⁰ Greville did not admire James I, who was the rightful heir to the throne by succession, but thought Elizabeth, whose right was somewhat doubtful, the perfect sovereign.

an inefficient way to choose a worthy king, blood succession tends to create suspicion and jealousy between the king and his children and between the heir and those who would succeed him. Kings must fear their children for "A fatall winding sheet Succession is" (Mvstapha, IV, iii, 94), and this fear breeds violence and more fear.

Suspitions common to Successions be;
Honor, and Feare together euer goe.
 Who must kill all they feare, feare all they see.
 (Mvstapha, II, ii, 152-154)

Likewise, the heir must fear those who would follow him and regard his position as "This second slippery place of Honors steepe, / Which we with enuy get, and danger keepe" (Mvstapha, II, i, 27-28). On the other hand, the practical Greville, who was intent on maintaining order within the state, had a completely different attitude, advocating the orderly and traditional method of succession. He criticizes the Romans for " . . . their tumultuouse election / Of Caesars, which did manie times make way / To Civile broyles, disorder, and defection" (Monarchy, 63⁴, 1-3), and points out that Elizabeth's greatness²¹ was the result of

. . . a long and happy defcent within the pedegrees of active Princes, together with the moderating education of Kings children in thofe times; or laftly in a quintefference of abilities, gathered out of thofe bleffed, and bleffing mixtures of Nature, Education, and Practice, which never faile to lift up man above men.
 (Life, p. 192)

Thus, at the same time that the religious Greville, who was always searching for the ideal, saw blood succession as a poor way to choose a

²¹Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," p. 265, suggests, however, that Greville thought Elizabeth's greatness was due more to her innate ability than to heredity.

king, the political Greville believed that it was the only practical and orderly way.

Although Greville advanced two different opinions on blood succession as a method for choosing the sovereign, he consistently agreed on the necessity for law within a monarchy, even though he realized that laws could be used in different ways and for different reasons. The religious Greville considered law a necessity and advocated "the establishment and retention of checks upon the power of the ruler."²² He felt that originally laws were sent from Heaven to help men keep their God-given freedom.

Hence when these antient frending Godds foresaw,
Schisme and devision would creepe into nations,
By this subjecting subtilty of law,
Which yet did yeild their makers reputation;
They, out of grace, sent down their progenie,
To keepe men, as they were created, free.
(Monarchy, 239)

However, these laws, like everything else man touches, tended to become corrupt, "Falling from lawes of heav'n-like harmony, / To mans lawes, which but corrupt reason be" (Monarchy, 242, 5-6). Yet king and subject must have some kind of help in maintaining order and preventing injustice.

Yet in mans darknes since Church rites alone
Cannot guard all the parts of government,
Least by disorder states be overthrowne,
Powre must use lawes, as her best instrument;
Lawes bring Mappes, and Councillors that doe
Shewe forth diseases, and redresse them'too.
(Monarchy, 246)

²²Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," p. 250. Maclean suggests that Greville drew this idea from Junius Brutus' Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos.

Thus, the idealistic Greville felt that laws, even if they are imperfect ones, can protect man from wrongs and injustices perpetrated by tyrants, and for this reason he saw the need for them. However, at the same time, the practical Greville realized that laws could also be established to revoke men's rights, laws that could be used to mask a tyrant's vice or oppression.

And though perchance at first sight lawes appeare
Like prisons, unto tyrants Soveraigne might;
Yet are they secretts, which powre should hold deere,
Since envillesse they make her infinite:

And sett soe faire a glosse upon her will,
As under this vayle powre cannot doe ill.²³

(Monarchy, 247)

This sort of situation exists when kings " . . . order and reduce / Those abstract rules of Truth, to rules of Vse" (Humane Learning, 91, 5-6) and especially when these laws are not understood by everyone and published in the common tongue.

For it is meete that lawes which ought to be
Rules unto all men, should rest knowne to few?
Since then how can pow'rs soveraigntie

Of universall justice beare a shew,
Reforme the judge, correct the advocate,
Who knowinge law alone commaunds the state?

(Monarchy, 262)

In such a situation,

Hard therfore is it for men to decree,
Whether it better were to have no law,
Or lawes kept onlie as a mysterie,
In their brest, that revenewes from it draw;
Whether to barr all mandates be not one,
With spreading them in dialects unknowne.

(Monarchy, 265)

²³As in many instances, Greville uses the word "powre" in place of king or sovereign.

Thus, Greville, as a member of the House of Commons representing his native Warwickshire and as a member who took an active part in the debates,²⁴ believed in laws but saw only too clearly that they could be used to protect the people or to enslave them. He ends "Of Lawes" in A Treatise of Monarchy by reminding his reader that laws, depending on whether they are meant " . . . to governe, or beguile" (Monarchy, 321, 4)

Equallie serve the tyrante, and the Kinge;
This, to good uses for the publique cause,
That, all mens freedome under will to bringe;
One spider like, the other like the bee,
Drawinge to helpe, or hurte humanitie:
(Monarchy, 320, 2-6)

Thus, Greville, intelligent and speculative as he was, realized that law was necessary but realized also how it could be twisted to become an agent that could protect or injure, depending upon how one used it.

Inasmuch as Greville had two attitudes toward nearly everything, it is not surprising that he advanced a two-sided attitude toward the theory of the divine right of kings.²⁵ This widely accepted doctrine²⁶

²⁴Fulke Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of the Right Honourable Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, edited by Alexander B. Grosart, I (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), lxix.

²⁵Mohl, Studies, p. 52, states that the Stuarts used succession by primogeniture as the "first tenet in their theory of divine right," implying that belief in divine right depends primarily on belief in hereditary right.

²⁶John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. 5, suggests that this theory is more the result of facts than thinking. He points out that such an enthusiastic faith "must have been the expression of deep-seated instincts and the result of a long chain of historical causes." Thus, it was formulated to meet certain needs and had a "definite function to fullfil in the development of society."

advanced four propositions, the first of which was that monarchy was a divinely ordained institution.²⁷ Secondly, the doctrine asserted that hereditary right was indefeasible, succession being determined by right of primogeniture. Moreover, this birthright could not be changed by usurpation; as long as a rightful heir lived, he must be considered king even if a usurping dynasty had reigned for generations. Thirdly, the theory assumed that kings were accountable only to God, and that their power could not be bounded by any legal limitation. Hence, law was a "mere concession," and "all constitutional forms and assemblies" existed only at the king's pleasure.²⁸ Lastly, the doctrine asserted that resistance to a king was a sin, insuring damnation. Thus, when a king's command was contrary to God's law, God was to be obeyed, but the penalty for this infraction was to be patiently endured by the subject.²⁹

²⁷Figgis, The Divine Right, p. 11, points out that this theory belonged to a time when religion, politics, and theology were inextricably mixed in people's minds, and, in order for anything to gain acceptance, some religious basis for it had to be found. "All men demanded some form of divine authority for any theory of government."

²⁸Ibid., p. 6. This part of the theory of divine right echoes Bodin's La République, which asserts that a king's power is perpetual and absolute and that he can make or break laws at will.

²⁹Ibid. Figgis quotes an address of the University of Cambridge to King Charles II in 1681 which sets forth this doctrine:

We will still believe and maintain that our Kings derive not their title from the people but from God; that to Him only they are accountable; that it belongs not to subjects, either to create or censure, but to honour and obey their sovereign, who comes to be so by a fundamental hereditary right of succession, which no religion, no law, no fault or forfeiture can alter or diminish.

Greville's contrasting attitudes toward this doctrine stemmed from the fact that he believed that monarchy was a "divinely ordained institution,"³⁰ but, at the same time, that the source of sovereignty was found in the people.³¹ The religious Greville believed in an original contract between king and people³² and also realized that blood succession was hardly the ideal way to choose a sovereign.³³ He also believed that laws were necessary, and that since a king derived his power from the people, they could depose him by withdrawing their support.³⁴ Thus, holding these beliefs, the Christian Greville could not subscribe to any of the four points in the doctrine of divine right. On the other hand, the

³⁰Maclean, "Kingship and Sovereignty," p. 264.

³¹Ibid., p. 262. Greville's two-sided concept of sovereignty was discussed in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy. It is also reflected in a speech made by him in Parliament on March 3, 1592 / 1593. Maclean quotes the following excerpt from Parliamentary History of England: 1066-1803, Vol. I, 1066-1625 (London: 1806), p. 822.

" . . . It is said, our countries are poor, and we must respect them that sent us hither. Why, so we must also remember who called us hither. This cause is hard, for there is necessity against necessity, danger against danger, and inward discontent against outward forces. The poor are grieved by being overcharged; this must be helped by increasing our own burthen; for otherwise the weak feet will complain of too heavy a body; that is to be feared. If the feet knew their strength as well as we know their oppression, they would not bear as they do. But to answer them, it sufficeth that the time requireth it; and in a prince power will command."

³²Greville's belief in original contract was discussed in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

³³James I would certainly be a frequent reminder that hereditary right did not always provide good rulers.

³⁴This point was covered earlier in the chapter in the discussion of a king's relationship with his subject.

political Greville, who wanted, above all, a stable government, found the theory of divine right a practical instrument. From this point of view, he agreed with, or at least for reasons of expediency appeared to agree with, all four of the propositions advanced in the theory of divine right. As a statesman, he put his belief in this doctrine into practice, serving three different sovereigns faithfully whether he felt they were good monarchs or not. Indubitably he served Elizabeth as her most trusted adviser, not only because she was the rightful sovereign, but also because, to him, she was the epitome of what the ideal monarch should be, and was the object of his sincere admiration. James, however, he served faithfully even as Chancellor of the Exchequer, as Privy Counsellor, and as one of the gentlemen of the bedchamber,³⁵ although he did not consider him a capable king.³⁶ He continued to serve James' son, Charles I, as "Counsellor of State" but was apparently not very active, preferring "retirement and literary leisure" to political involvements, possibly due to his age rather than to his personal feelings toward the reigning monarch.³⁷ Thus, Greville the statesman, subscribed to the theory of divine right, although the religious Greville could not agree with any of the propositions it advanced.

³⁵Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, I, lxxiv.

³⁶Greville's admiration of Elizabeth and implied criticism of James I is quite apparent in The Life of Sir Philip Sidney.

³⁷Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete, I, lxxxiii.

Greville's divergent attitudes toward every stated aspect of his concept of kingship is a reflection of the contrasting ideologies which dominated his entire existence, and thus, the characteristics of a good king for the religious Greville were the characteristics of an inept one for Greville the statesman. Moreover, the religious Greville realized that succession by hereditary right and the absolutism advanced by the theory of divine right of kings often brought about less-than-ideal situations within a state, but his political judgment, although realizing that succession could produce two kinds of kings, advocated blood succession and was willing to subscribe to the propositions put forth in the theory of divine right³⁸ rather than disturb the status quo and disrupt world order. Hence, he was, even for a bad king, first and foremost always the king's man.

³⁸Figgis, The Divine Right, p. 90. This theory was needed to justify the position taken against the Pope. If kings are kings by divine appointment, the Pope has not, and never had, the right to depose them.

CHAPTER V
TWO VIEWS OF WAR

During the turmoil of the late sixteenth century when armed conflict was a constant threat if not an actuality, war and its nature, causes, problems, and justifications became a fascinating subject for speculation among Elizabethan writers. Fulke Greville was no exception, and, as a trusted adviser to Queen Elizabeth as well as to James I and Charles I later, he was often involved in decisions which concerned war; thus, he became interested in the subject and its implications. His interest in war had also been heightened when, as a young man with the desire to win fame and glory on the battlefield or in some other adventure overseas, his desires had been thwarted by the queen herself. What he was forbidden to experience personally became for him mysterious and fascinating. In sympathy with the Protestants, "he volunteered for service in the Netherlands in 1578, and was actually about to embark" when he was restrained by Queen Elizabeth.¹ He relates how he endeavored to offer his services:

And out of that freedom, having many times offered my fortune to the courfe of Forraigne employments, as the propereft forges to fafhion a Subject for the reall fervices of his Soveraigne; I found the returnes of thofe mif-placed endeavours to prove, both a vaine charge to my felfe, and an offenfive undertaking to that excellent Governeffe over all her Subjects duties and affections.

(Life, p. 146)

¹Fulke Greville, Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke, edited by Geoffrey Bullough, I (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), 4.

He describes "foure out of many" (Life, p. 146) occasions when he attempted to follow a life of adventure by becoming involved in the war in the Low Countries only to find himself out of favor with his queen, who apparently considered him too valuable as a counselor to risk his life in a dangerous area.

First, when those two mighty Armies of Don Iohns, and the Duke Cafimires, were to meet in the Low Countries . . . , when Mr. Secretary Walsingham was sent Embassador, to treat with those two Princes in a bufineffe so much concerning Christian blood, and Christian Empires . . . , when my Lord of Leicester was sent Generall of her Majesties Forces into the Low Countries . . . , and when Lastly, the universall fame of a battle to be fought between the prime forces of Henry the third, and the religious of Henry the fourth, then King of Navarre; lifting me yet once more above this humble earth of duty, made me resolve to see the difference between Kings present, and absent in their Martiall expeditions.

(Life, pp. 146-148)

When on each occasion he found himself ordered to remain in England or found himself in disgrace at court,² he at last prudently abandoned his desire to experience war in the field and resigned himself to the life of a statesman.

By which many warnings, I finding the fpecious fires of youth far more fcorching, then glorious, called my fecond thoughts to counfell, and in that Map cleerly difcerning Action, and Honor,

²A. H. Bullen, Elizabethans (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1924), p. 196. Bullen relates how "On one occasion he had actually obtained the royal permission to cross to the Low Countries and take part in the fighting; but at the last moment--when all his preparations had been made and his horses were being shipped at Dover--the Queen changed her mind and sent down in hot haste a special messenger, Sir Edward Dyer, to forbid him to leave England. On another occasion, without asking the Queen's leave, young Greville stole abroad in the train of Secretary Walsingham; but Elizabeth signified her displeasure by refusing--on his return--to admit him to her presence for many months."

to fly with more wings then one: and that it was fufficient for the plant to grow where his Sovereignes hand had planted it; I found reafon to contract my thoughts from thofe larger, but wandring Horizons, the world abroad, and bound my proſpect within the fafe limits of duty, in fuch home ſervices, as were acceptable to my Sovereigne.

(Life, p. 149)

Although he was prevented from participating in the war himself, his interest in and fascination with the subject remained and is apparent in his writing. He examined war from each one of the four standpoints usually taken by Elizabethan writers, and from this inspection of peace and war, two evaluations emerged, the Christian and the pragmatic; his outlook created in him two different attitudes toward peace and war, divergent attitudes toward the justifications and causes of war, and a conviction that some wars were man-made whereas others were God-made and therefore holy.

Elizabethan writers, considering every facet of war, usually emphasized four viewpoints, although these frames of reference were generally dealt with separately by individual authors.³ The first area of consideration dealt with war in connection with the individual and was a study of its uses and effects in that context. This concept

³Hugh N. Maclean, "Fulke Greville on War," The Huntington Library Quarterly, XXI (Feb., 1958), 99. Maclean refers specifically in this article to the military writers Barret, Sutcliffe, Barnes, Geoffrey Gates, and Edward Davies; to the technologists, Smyth and Barwick; to William Blandy's The Castle, or picture of policy; to T. Styward's The Pathwaie to Martiall Discipline; to George Whetstone's The Honourable Reputation of a Souldier; to Francis Markham's Five Decades of Epistles of Warre; to Francis Bacon's The True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates; and to Sir Philip Sidney and Sir Walter Raleigh, remarking that Raleigh was the only one who examined war as closely as Greville and from every aspect.

stemmed from the classic idea of personal honor and glory: the noble stature sought by epic heroes. From the second viewpoint wars were considered as they related to the state or to society in general and examined in terms of their being just or unjust. This viewpoint provided a study of war from a nationalistic point of view where law and balance of power played important roles. The third method examined war with respect to the religious significance of the war in reference to both the individual and society. Duty to God and duty to the state were considered in this inspection of just or holy wars. As man played a major part in these types of wars, they may be referred to as man-made. The fourth viewpoint considered war in respect to divine power, and more emphasis was assigned to the reasons certain things happened than to the events themselves. War in this frame of reference was God's scourge or His instrument to produce needed change, and wars in general, just or unjust, were ultimately in His hands.⁴ In order to distinguish the fourth way of viewing war from the third one, or the so-called holy war, it can be said that a holy war such as that waged by Mohammed was a man-made war under the pretense of being holy, whereas a holy war sent by God and not for man's purposes could be considered His scourge or instrument and therefore a holy, God-made war. Thus, there was a division, however slight, between man-made, pious wars and God-made, holy wars to protestant Elizabethans.

Most Elizabethan writers limited their comments to a study of war from one or two of the foregoing viewpoints, but Greville, as a

⁴Ibid., pp. 99-104.

Christian as well as a statesman, examined war from all four points of view in The Life of Sir Philip Sidney, in A Treatise of Monarchy, in Caelica CVIII, in A Treatise of Warres, and, to some extent, in Mustapha and Alaham.⁵ In The Life of Sir Philip Sidney Greville considered war from the first two standpoints, as it affected the individual in his praise of Sidney's courage, loyalty, and nobility, and as it affected society in his approval of Elizabeth's policy of using war as an instrument of order⁶ and of maintaining a balance of power. Greville also referred to the third area of discussion in a number of places, often in reference to war against Rome to uphold true religion. For example, he approved Sidney's recommendation that the holy war against Catholicism be carried

. . . into the bowels of Spain, and by the affittance of the Netherlands, burn his Philip's fhipping in all havens as they paffed along; and in that paffage furprize fome well-chofen place for wealth, & ftrength: eafie to be taken, and poffible to be kept by us. . . .

(Life, p. 90)

Greville considered the war against Philip of Spain a holy war, but it was a man-made war to uphold man-made or established religion.⁷ He also examined the fourth aspect of war, that of being God's instrument, in

⁵Ibid., 96-98. Maclean says that Greville examined war from only the first three of these points of view, failing to distinguish clearly between the third and fourth or ignoring the fourth entirely. However, Greville does refer to wars as a scourge in Warres, 6.

⁶Ibid. The importance of world order to most Elizabethans is discussed in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

⁷A discussion of Greville's ideas on man-made and God-made religion is found in Chapter II, Religion: Worldly and Spiritual.

which case it could be considered God-made. He refers to wars as "Scourges of God" (Warres, 6, 5) and asserts that God's hand can even be in the works of the devil.

Yet let us not forget that Hell, and hee,
Vnder the power of Heauen, both incline;
And if Physitians in their art did see,
In each disease there was some sparke diuine:
Much more let vs the hand of God confesse,
In all these sufferings of our guiltinesse.
(Warres, 31)

Although Greville did not discuss the God-made, holy war to the extent that he discussed the three ways of considering man-made war, he did mention it and implied its existence when he discussed tyrants, perhaps ones who started unjust wars, as punishments sent by God. Thus, in Caelica CVIII and in A Treatie of Warres Greville enlarged the area of discussion, started in A Treatise of Monarchy and in The Life of Sir Philip Sidney, to give a comprehensive study of war from every point of view and to deal with war " . . . in terms of man's role within a divine scheme."⁸ It is in this examination of war from all four standpoints that his own judgments become apparent.

In dealing with the subject of war on all levels, Greville also discussed peace, its uses, and its dangers; peace could be good or bad depending upon whether he was viewing it as a Christian or as the practical statesman. To the religious Greville who longs for the ideal, "Peace is the haruest of Mans rich creation" (Warres, 1, 1) and " . . . the most perfect state governmente" (Monarchy, 467, 2) where

⁸Ibid., pp. 96-97.

"No power, but Need, is idle in her raigne" (Warres, 3, 6). In A Treatise of Monarchy he recounts the possible uses of peacetime. In the first place, it is a time for "Greate undertakings farr beyond the flighte / Or pitch, of any lower fethered winges" (Monarchy, 468, 2-3). Bridges can be built, monuments and towns rebuilt, harbors repaired, and swamps drained. Such peacetime projects bring fame and reputation to a ruler as long as they are useful to the public, unlike works of vanity such as the "useless Pyramids" (Monarchy, 472, 6). Secondly, peace provides time to build schools "Where knowledge, and obedience multiplie / The fame, and sinewes of greate monarchies" (Monarchy, 473, 3-4) and to spread knowledge and intelligence as a protection to "The cominge ages, from that barbarisme / Which first breeds ignorance, and after schisme" (Monarchy, 474, 5-6). A third product of peacetime, "the art of writing," is an outgrowth of the first two, because

Lyke natures twynns that must together dwell;
Doing and writinge being to each other,
As bodies be of their owne shadowes mother.
(Monarchy, 488, 3-6)

Thus, Greville considered peacetime an ideal state when works, learning, and writing could flourish and enrich mankind. Moreover, peace at home enabled a nation to establish colonies and to spread its civilization and accomplishments as ancient Rome had done:

That all states did not onlie stand in awe
Of Rome as mistress, but the whole worlde was
Lincked with her in traffick, league, and law,
And did so much adore the Romans fame,
As they forsooke their owne, to beare her name.
(Monarchy, 506, 2-6)

However, at the same time that the religious Greville praised peace as an ideal time of accomplishment that improves man, "And in refining him, all else refines" (Warres, 4, 4), he expressed his pragmatic evaluations. As he began to speculate on the subject of peace and to take a more practical attitude, he still concluded that peace was an ideal time, but that, as such, God really could not let one nation enjoy its fruits indefinitely. Furthermore, "A state lyke unto coates with manie seames, / Subjecte to all the rents of tyme and chance" (Monarchy, 493, 1-2) will have its decline or schisms and find it expedient to indulge in hostilities for one reason or another. As he turns farther away from a religious or an idealistic attitude, showing his pragmatism, he demonstrates that the periodic rise and fall of states or peoples is not only to be expected but, in fact, to be desired as a means of ridding the world of decadent forms of government. War is the instrument which can bring about needed change:

The world must take new forms of wrong and right,
For Warr did never love things definite.
(Warres, 9, 5-6)

Furthermore, in peacetime men have a tendency to grow idle and lazy, and thus, the state declines. Greville asks:

What is the cause, why States, that war and win
Haue honour, and breed men of better fame,
Than States in peace, since war and conquest sin
In blood, wrong liberty, all trades of shame?
(Caelica CVIII, 1-4)

He concludes:

The reason is; Peace is a quiet Nurse
Of Idlenesse, and Idlenesse the field
Where wit and Power change all seedes to the worse.
(Caelica CVIII, 7-9)

In addition, " . . . the sinnes of Peace on Subiects feed, / And thence wound power . . . " (Caelica CVIII, 13-14), whereas " . . . conquest works by strength, and stirs up Fame" (Caelica CVIII, 19). Thus, in Caelica CVIII Greville's opinions are disclosed, and as he speculated, he emerged, concomitantly, a Christian who loved God and hated the sins of war, and a pragmatic politician who was acutely aware of the disadvantages of peace.

Greville's divergent opinions were even more apparent in his discussion of man-made war; it is evident that, as a Christian, he believed it inherently evil, but that, as a statesman, he realized that it was often a means to maintain the state. He refers to war as a blending of " . . . Pride, Rage, Auerice, / Ambition, Lust, and euery tragicke vice" (Warres, 20, 5-6) even though it is " . . . cloth'd, coloure'd, and disguis'd, / With stiles of Vertue, Honour, Zeale, and Merits" (Warres, 20, 2-3). He asserts that it is " . . . Horrour from aboue, below Confusion, / Where the vnhappy onely are" (Warres, 6, 2-3), "A Discipline whereof the rule is Passion; / And mens vices, beasts chiefe vertues are" (Warres, 7, 4-5), the "very spirit of the Deuill" (Warres, 27, 1), and " . . . the mould and Maiesty of hell" (Alaham, Chr. II, 36). He also discusses the implications of an institution where " . . . people beare the faults, and wounds of Might" (Warres, 22, 4) and questions how humanity can survive in "the ruine of Mankinde" where the good and bad alike " . . . fatall ruine finde" (Warres, 11, 2-4). Moreover, not only humanity suffers, but learning and the arts are often destroyed by war when "Wisdome of times grows infancy againe, /

Beasts rule in man, and men doe beastly raigne" (Warres, 10, 5-6). A well-known example of such wanton destruction caused by war was provided by the burning of the library at Alexandria. Greville asks if such evils bring fame as they did to Sylla, the Roman general who subdued Rome by violence and cruelty? In such cases should not the fame of war rightly be referred to as "swolne iniquity" rather than "eminent vertue" (Fame and Honovr, 56, 3-4)? As a Christian, Greville found war sinful and injurious to mankind and his works, and summed up this attitude in the following lines:

Let vs then thus conclude, that onely they
 Whose end in this World, is the World to come
 Whose hearts desire is, that their desires may
 Measure themselves, by Truths eternall doome,
 Can in the War find nothing that they prise.
 (Warres, 59, 1-5)

Thus, Greville says that Christians, or those whose hope is in the next world, could certainly find nothing admirable in a war. However, the practical man who knew the world and was a capable statesman and politician showed himself when Greville discussed other aspects of war, such as its causes, justifications, and uses. His attitude was completely pragmatic, and any reason for war that would maintain the state was considered justified. Since man's primary task on earth was to preserve order, any undertaking to accomplish that end, even fighting a war to restore peace, was applauded.⁹ Naturally any defensive operation could be justified as an attempt to restore order, and, in addition, war might justly be used to "Reforme that common stayned discipline / Which is the base of unprosperitie" (Monarchy,

⁹Ibid., pp. 105 and 108.

574, 2-4) and unite people within a country. Furthermore, a king might be justified in waging a war for a number of personal reasons. In the first place, according to the worldly Greville, he was justified in defending his title; secondly, he could use war as a protection "When weake Crownes threatned are to be opprest" (Monarchy, 524, 2); and thirdly, he could use war to enforce his claims or "Crowne-right againe which natively descends, / Clayminge estates in other Crownes Possession" (Monarchy, 525, 1-2). Thus, a king could be excused for taking territory that he felt was rightfully his by force. Moreover, sovereigns were justified in spreading their power and reputation abroad by conquest. "Since warr and Crownes consist by reputation" (Monarchy, 567, 3), kings should not be stayed from such a course,

But rather follow Mars in forraigne parts,
 Who ever friends the undertaking spiritt,
 With honor, hope of spoile, and all those arts,
 Which still as treasures are reser'd for meritt.
 (Monarchy, 568, 1-4)

Queen Elizabeth receives her share of praise as an example in this regard for developing a strong navy to spread her power abroad:

Nay, in the Indians East, and west againe,
 What greate thinges men may with Sea forces doe,
 Not onlie in surprisinge of the mayne
 But in possessinge land, and Citties too,
 By undertakings of a mayden Queene,
 May, as in modell to the world be seene.
 (Monarchy, 578)

Indeed, her policy of maintaining a strong navy is applauded because she had thus " . . . made all wars by fea far more cheap, proper, and commodious to her, than any expedition upon land could poffibly be" (Life, p. 93), and Greville advises that a continuation of this policy

would bring " . . . honour to her felf, advantage to her traffique, and reputation to her people" (Life, p. 93). In fact, he asserted that a sovereign not only is justified in waging war for the foregoing practical reasons, but was obliged to do so to maintain his reputation, for it was doubtful if any nation could hold her position in any way but by might. He asks, "Must he not yeeld, that cannot make defense" (Warres, 56, 4)? Furthermore, he cautions that states that are reluctant to fight seem weak and attract would-be conquerors. "Lastlie, it much more danger will be founde, / Where Princes shall be thought adverse to warr" (Monarchy, 527, 1-2). Kings, therefore, sometimes cannot afford to be peaceful:

Then let not Kinges by their neglect invyte
Aspiringe states, Or Princes to doe wrong;
Securitie exposeth wealth and righte
As prays to their ambitions that be stronge;
Nor is the spoilers hand so soone made free,
By anythings as inhabilitie.

(Monarchy, 530)

Moreover, any nation foolish enough to rely on treaties as a protection or substitute for military might invites destruction.¹⁰ Disarming is "A signe that active force might venture farr" (Monarchy, 538, 3), and making treaties " . . . shoves againe, when frends or foes drawe swords, / They ever loose, that rest or trust to words" (Monarchy, 538, 5-6). Thus, in examining the causes, justifications, and uses of man-made war, and in discussing the man-made holy war, Greville expressed his religious

¹⁰Greville parallels Machiavelli's advice on treaties here, contradicting his advice given in Monarchy, (164-173) which is discussed in Chapter III, Two Evaluations of Monarchy.

judgments as well as his pragmatic ones. The religious Greville is reluctant to approve even pious wars and warns that " . . . even these Warres though built on Piety" (Warres, 53, 1) must be undertaken by lawful might, and, furthermore, they must be conducted in a charitable manner, offering peace and using wisdom to guide the cure, for "Art prunes the earth, confusion leaves it waste" (Warres, 54, 4). The charitable, Christian Greville gave way, however, to the practical politician when war against Rome was considered. He apparently felt that Rome was too evil and insidious to deserve any type of charitable treatment, for he devoted a number of stanzas in A Treatise of Monarchy to cautions against her many guises, asserting that the rift with the papacy should never be allowed to mend. Therefore, he applies his pragmatic advice against trusting in treaties with regard to "that creeping Monarchie of Rome" (Life, p. 82) which seeks to " . . . bringe her harvest home with others payne" (Monarchy, 558, 4). He exhorts kings not to let " . . . this gathering mass / Of superstition . . . / Lurke, and by false faith, bringe her ends to pass" (Monarchy, 522, 1-3), but rather to " . . . watch this governess, / That by her wisdome, they may fashion theires; / When to be merciful, where merciles" (Monarchy, 553, 1-3). "Therefore when she letts inquisitions raigne, / Pow'rs law as freelie should their process use" (Monarchy, 554, 1-2), and

. . . when she, and her sword bearers stryve
 In peace, warr, practise, league, or combination,
 By fall of other Princes states to thrive,
 Wee must of force breake that association.
 (Monarchy, 557, 1-4)

To Greville the papacy and its policies or "this flesh borne Church supremacie" (Monarchy, 551, 1), would never be content "with less then all" (Monarchy, 551, 4) but would constantly strive to be the authority over good and bad nations alike. Hence, Queen Elizabeth embarked upon a pious or holy war when she vowed:

. . . that fhe would neither hope, nor feeke for reft in mortall traffique of this world, till fhe had repaired the precipitate ruines of our Saviours Militant Church, through all her Dominions; and as fhe hoped, in the reft of the World, by her example.
(Life, p. 165)

Greville asserts, " . . . this She-David of ours ventured to undertake the great Goliath among the Philiftins abroad, I mean Spain and the Pope" (Life, p. 165), and in so doing contrived to wage a holy and just war in the cause of true religion. Thus, the Christian Greville was hesitant to approve man-made war for any reason, whereas the practical Greville favored a holy war against Catholicism.

In dealing with God-made holy wars, however, the practical and pious Greville fused, possibly because he assumed he would be on God's side, and any war undertaken to further God's purpose in preserving a certain "Equilibrium" (Warres, 34, 3) would have his approval from both the religious and pragmatic points of view, for man, engaging in such a war, is merely playing his role in the divine scheme of things. Wars decreed by God include those which He sends " . . . to have his honor knowne" (Warres, 34, 3), or those which accomplish some necessary change or punish some offending country. Change and punishment are to be expected:

Mortality is Changes proper stage:

States have degrees, as human bodies have,
Springs, Summer, Autumne, Winter and the grave.

God then sends War, commotion, tumult, strife,
 Like windes, and stormes, to purge the ayre and earth.
 (Warres, 42, 4 to 43, 2)

Moreover, this type of " . . . Warre proceeding from the Omnipotence, /
 No doubt is holy, wise, and without error" (Warres, 50, 4-5). Thus,
 to Greville, even war could have a divine purpose, and man simply
 became God's instrument in carrying out His justice.

Hence, Greville had varied reactions to war. To the religious
 Greville war was evil, and peace was good, yet to the practical
 Greville war was often justified for political expediency, and peace
 often allowed men to become soft and states to decline. Neither the
 idealistic nor the pragmatic Greville could disapprove the godly war,
 however, since it was God-made to accomplish His purpose. He felt that
 all man could do was to accept it and to fight for what he believed
 was justice. Consequently, Christian man faces a dilemma: he must
 abhor war on the one hand, but he must fight wholeheartedly once he is
 involved in a war, for to do otherwise might be contrary to God's
 plan. He can, of course, take the practical attitude of the political
 Greville and use war to his advantage, or he can accept the thinking
 of the Christian Greville and, like others "Whose end in this World,
 is the World to come" (Warres, 59, 2) abstain from all wars, even godly
 ones. The first choice is "sub-Christian" and a way men claim they
 try to avoid, and the second is "supra-Christian" and impossible of

attainment in a corrupted world.¹¹ Greville asserts that the Turks chose the first way and that "Their Church was meere collusion, and deceit, / Their Court a campe, their discipline a Warre" (Warres, 64, 3-4), "Their Doctrine Peace, yet their Ambition War" (Warres, 65, 5). Thus, "God and the World they worship still together" (Warres, 66, 1). On the other hand, when Greville looks at the Christians, he finds them unable to make a definite choice: "Thus, waue we Christians still betwixt two aires; / Nor leaue the world for God, nor God for it" (Warres, 68, 1-2). He leaves them much in the position that he usually finds himself, loving God and deploring what he sees in the world, but being too much of the world to turn his back on it.

¹¹Maclean, "Fulke Greville on War," p. 106.

CHAPTER VI

THE DUAL NATURE OF MAN

This study of Greville's philosophy as it is revealed in his works shows a definite clash of ideas. Greville the Christian who longed for an ideal world viewed life in quite a different way from Greville the Machiavellian statesman who had to deal with his contemporary world. He could not reconcile the ideal with the actual, and the result of his dilemma in nearly every situation was a two-sided attitude that is perhaps the most dominating factor in his work.

This duality is apparent throughout his work, and in various places he advances two different judgments of religion, of the ideal form of government, of the desired qualities of a ruler, and of the nature of war and peace. In regard to religion, the Christian Greville criticizes established religion and advocates an inner, very private relationship with God, but the Machiavellian Greville recommends the use of established religion as one of the best means to maintain order within a state. In addition, the religious Greville feels that the ideal form of government is one that is formed by a social contract based upon mutual love and respect between ruler and ruled, whereas the political Greville admires strength in a monarchy above all else and feels that the people have no right to rebel or to break the contract even if the ruler is an oppressive or a cruel one. Similarly, the religious Greville admires the qualities of mercy, justice, and

love for the people in a sovereign, but the practical Greville realizes that a strong ruler cannot afford to have these characteristics. Moreover, the Christian Greville abhors the horrors of war and praises peace as a time of accomplishment, but the pragmatic Greville realizes the advantages to be gained by war and looks upon peacetime as a time when men become soft and lazy. Thus, in his reflections about religion, politics, and war Greville reveals his inner conflict between the ideal and the actual.

However, in spite of his obvious and increasing duality, Greville, in his writing, never refers to it in specific terms, leading one to believe that it was due to a lack of intelligence or courage on his part, that his vacillating attitude might have been only a result of his so-called plain style, that he felt his dual outlook was not unusual enough to mention, or that he was unaware of his own dual nature. A close inspection reveals that the third explanation is the correct one; Greville was so obsessed with the fact that man himself had a dual nature, that dual attitudes or responses in himself or any man did not seem unique or sufficiently surprising to deserve notice.

In the first place, Greville's coexisting ideologies cannot have been due to a lack of intelligence, for it is obvious from his writing and from the positions of importance and trust which he held that he was an exceptionally intelligent individual. All the critics seem to agree on this point and to concur with Robert Southey, who said that "no writer . . . appears to have reflected more deeply on

momentous subjects,"¹ and Charles Lamb, who mentioned that all Greville's lines are "frozen and made rigid with intellect."² Thus, stupidity or a lack of intelligence cannot account for the duality that is present in Greville's thought.

If a lack of intelligence was not the cause of this duality, one might attribute his views to a lack of courage. This explanation might seem logical if Greville had said one thing and had done another, or had advocated an idealistic solution but in the end had been willing to accept a practical one. However, his works deal with ideas and advice rather than actions. Moreover, he does not give the impression that he was giving in to expediency because of cowardice, but rather that he was expressing his despair because the ideal way of life that his religious attitude advocated would not work in a corrupt world. In fact, rather than displaying a lack of courage, Greville was courageously admitting to himself and subsequently to the world that the ideal way seemed impossible on this earth.

Since Greville's major variances did not result from a lack of intelligence or courage, one might speculate that his plain style lent itself to weighing both sides of a question, and thus, that his style dictated his vacillating attitude. Although he wrote in a plain style

¹Quoted in Fulke Greville, The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of the Right Honourable Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, edited by Alexander B. Grosart, II (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1966), xviii.

²Charles Lamb, Specimens of English Dramatic Poets, edited by William Macdonald, I (London: J. M. Dent and Co., 1903), 37.

that was devoid of ornament³ in an age when ornamental figures of speech were fashionable, his style of writing did not dictate the subject matter. On the contrary, he began writing love poetry in imitation of Sidney,⁴ and many of the images found in the early sonnets of Caelica⁵ are the same as those found in Sidney's Astrophel and Stella,⁶ but Sidney's stylistic influence continued only as long as Greville wrote about love.⁷ As he matured and became more and more obsessed with the diseases of the world and their original cause, the imperfection and divided nature of man, his style gradually changed.⁸ He became

³Morris W. Croll, The Works of Fulke Greville (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1903), p. 23. Croll says of his style: " . . . His vocabulary is distinguished by its simplicity and definiteness. He calls things by their commonest names and renounces the ornaments of language. The emotional power of bare unadorned words in expressing intense convictions and deep feeling is one of the secrets of his impressiveness, and, like the plainness of his images, his use of such diction is a sign of his effort for incisiveness and expressiveness, rather than for decorative beauty."

⁴Fulke Greville, Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, edited by Geoffrey Bullough, I (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), 5. Bullough suggests that some of Caelica was written in rivalry with his friend.

⁵Fulke Greville, The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion, edited by G. A. Wilkes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 491. Wilkes says that no one can dispute that Greville's work began with Caelica.

⁶Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 236.

⁷Ibid., p. 39.

⁸Croll, The Works of Fulke Greville, pp. 21-22. Croll says: "Gradually, however, a change appears. . . . His obscurity has become greater rather than less; for it is now increased by the darkness of close and mysterious thought. Both the allegorical devices and the displeasing satire of the first group are noticeably absent, and instead of Platonism there is the ordinary contrast between truth and right on the one side and the world on the other."

increasingly concerned with creating a style that would best express the thought as he explains in the following lines:

Whereas those words in euery tongue are best,
Which doe most properly expresse the thought;
For as of pictures, which should manifest
The life, we say not that is fineliest wrought,
Which fairest simply showes, but faire and like:
So words must sparkes be of those fires they strike.
(Humane Learning, 109)

Thus, an examination of the form of his early sonnets and later treatises and of his own comments upon his style shows that his style changed in order to adapt to the deepening subject matter rather than vice versa. Therefore, his reflections on weighty subjects called for his plain style; the plain style did not cause his speculative and vacillating attitude.

If Greville's style changed in order to handle an increasing weightiness of subject matter, his increasing awareness of, and pre-occupation with, the dual nature of man adequately explains his being both a Christian and a pragmatist. To Greville, man was a two-sided creature, half divine because he had been created in God's image, but depraved since the Fall of Man in the Garden of Eden. He speaks of him as "A crazed soule unfix'd; / Made good, yet fall'n, not to extremes, but to a meane betwixt" (Alaham, Chr. I, 21-22) and says "That if our natures were not strangelie mixt" (Religion, 12, 3) it would be easier for men to recognize and admire what is good in the world. In another place he says "Then judge pore man! Gods Image once 'tis true, / Though nowe the Devills, by thine owne defection" (Religion, 41, 1-2), and in still another he describes man as made of both good and evil:

Then since 'tis true, we onlie here possesse
 These treasures but in vessels made of slime;
 Religion we by consequence confesse
 Here to be mixt of base thoughts and sublime;
 Of native evill, supernaturall good;
 Truth borne of God, and error of our blood.
 (Religion, 51)

Moreover, in the Chorus Sacerdotum of Mustapha he sums up the duality of man's nature and the futility of man's attempting to be anything but divided.

"Oh wearisome Condition of Humanity!
"Borne vnder one Law, to another bound:
"Vainely begot, and yet forbidden vanity,
"Created sicke, commanded to be sound."
 (Mvstapha, Chr. Sac., 1-4)

Greville was convinced that man definitely had a divided nature that precluded his looking completely toward an ideal life or being willing to settle for a completely evil one. He recognized the good and evil in himself, although he never acknowledged his duality in specific terms, and was not able to reconcile these two conflicting elements, or even to live with them, except by means of constant reflection within the framework of his literary works.

Thus, the very nature of man explained Greville's ideologies and made them seem a logical consequence of man's fallen condition. He tries to explain, since he cannot reconcile, the two diverse qualittites in all men with the following statement; "The world is made for use; God is for Love" (Religion, 114, 3) and to explain it in himself with the comment: "I know the world and believe in God."⁹ He

⁹Quoted in Greville, Poems and Dramas, I, 1.

lived in the world and was too much a part of it to forsake it, but,
at the same time, he yearned for Christ and felt a hatred for the world
and the life he led.¹⁰

¹⁰Ibid., p. 56.

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