

FULKE GREVILLE AND THE ART OF POETRY:
A STUDY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate Faculty of the Department of English
University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Paul G. Reeve, III
January, 1977

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The style of Fulke Greville's poetry may be approached through a consideration of Greville's ideas about the nature and purpose of poetry as contrasted with the ideas prevalent in his time and place. If practice follows theory, what is distinctive in Greville's poetic should account for what is distinctive in his poetry.

Greville preferred a poetry of direct statement, a poetry drawn from experience and shaped to precepts which could again find application in practical use. Many of his contemporaries argued that the poet should create a second nature in pursuit of the Ciceronian purpose--to delight, to teach, and to move. But Greville, influenced by the thought of John Calvin, believed that men could be moved to goodness only by the grace of God. Poetry could only instruct them in the prudent conduct of the existing world.

In his early lyrics Greville reveals a tendency toward general philosophical statement. In these poems, he learned to use the six-line stanza in the combination of particular observation and general precept which found its best use in the treatises, direct, aphoristic, philosophical poems.

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF STYLE

In October, 1915, the young Aldous Huxley wrote from Oxford to his father, "I am doing a paper for Raleigh's society on Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke--an interesting creature, and really, sometimes, a great poet--tho' his intense intense intellectuality and his careless style render him always very obscure."¹ This assessment of Greville's style is by no means unique to Huxley. More familiar, perhaps, is William Hazlitt's attribution to Charles Lamb of the following remark:

As to Fulke Greville, he is like nothing but one of his own "Prologues spoken by the ghost of an old king of Ormus," a truly formidable and inviting personage: his style is apocalyptical, cabalistical, a knot worthy of such an appartition to untie; and for the unraveling a passage or two, I would stand the brunt of an encounter with so portentous a commentator!²

Nor is this view of Greville's style peculiar to

¹ Aldous Huxley, The Letters of Aldous Huxley, ed. Grover Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 82.

² William Hazlitt, "Of Persons one Would Wish to Have Seen," The Hazlitt Sampler, ed. Herschel M. Sikes (New York: Fawcett, 1961), p. 84.

moderns and romantics, for in 1687, William Winstanley commented upon Greville's "close, mysterious, and sententious way of writing."³

In short, the difficulty, the obscurity, the knottiness of Greville's style has often been noted. But style is a difficult term. It is a term which is almost indispensable to the student of literature, and yet one which cannot be safely used, except in the most casual remarks, without first attempting to define it. Of the comments quoted above, only Winstanley's does not use the term style. All of the comments, however, suggest that what is difficult about Greville's work is not its substance, not what he says, but the way in which he says it, his "way of writing." The study of style, then, is concerned with the manner, rather than the substance, of expression. But even this observation does not resolve the matter fully.

In some contexts, style simply means an indefinable superior quality and among the most opprobrious remarks that one can make is to say that something, or someone, has no style. To have no style,

³ William Winstanley, quoted by Ronald A. Rebholz, The Life of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 1.

in this sense, is worse than to have a difficult style, but the term has only the most uncertain and impressionistic meaning. It is merely a term of general approbation. Style, in this sense, is the je ne sais quoi which is the sine qua non of great literature.

The term style sometimes refers to modes of language which appertain to different social contexts and relations. Linguist Martin Joos, in The Five Clocks, identifies five broad categories of language usage which he calls styles. These he names "intimate," "casual," "consultative," "formal," and "frozen."⁴ Only the last of these is of concern here. "Frozen" style is Joos's whimsical term for the mode of language usage that is called literature. Literature is "frozen" because its text is fixed and because it can be reread--"thawed out"--repeatedly with benefit to the reader. "Literature," says Joos, "is that text which the community insists on having repeated from time to time intact."⁵ To deserve rereading, literature is more densely packed with thought than

⁴ Martin Joos, The Five Clocks (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967), p. 11.

⁵ Joos, pp. 51-52.

other styles, and rather than simply informing the reader or hearer, it encourages him to make discoveries on his own beyond the surface of the text.

This is a stylistic distinction between literature and other modes of language use. It is a helpful distinction, but the label style may be appended to a set of characteristic features discerned in a genre, a period, a movement, an author, or any other imaginable subdivision of the genus literature. One may speak, for example, of poetic style as something distinguishable from other literary styles.⁶

Most often, perhaps, style refers to a set of linguistic or rhetorical traits characteristic of an individual author. "Le style est l'homme meme," said

⁶ Many attempts have been made to identify the stylistic features which are characteristic of poetry. None have presumed to be definitive, but some have been enlightening. Samuel R. Levin in Linguistic Structures in Poetry (The Hague: Mouton, 1962) analyzes the systematic exploitation of convergences between syntactic form and semantic content in the combination of elements in a poetic discourse. Traditional rhetoric would call this "parallelism"; Levin calls it "coupling." In fairness, "coupling" is a larger term than "parallelism" and Levin's monograph is a pioneer effort at applying recent linguistic theory to literary study. Also interesting is James Peter Thorne, "Stylistics and Generative Grammars," in Linguistics and Literary Style, ed. Donald C. Freeman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 182-196. Thorne argues that if the

Buffon, but this appealing aphorism does not resolve the problem. The man himself is no doubt reflected in the linguistic structures and rhetorical strategies that he characteristically chooses, but he is also revealed in the subject matter and genres that he chooses. Moreover, the linguistic structures, rhetorical strategies, subject matter, and genres in which an author writes are to some extent determined by his historical epoch as well as by his own predilections. It is easy to speak offhand about style, but it is quite another matter to find a separately identifiable quality of a work or an author which can be consistently labelled style and carefully analyzed.

Part of the problem is that the term style seems to imply a dichotomy between what is said and the way in which it is said. But in fact the way in which something is said is often part of the message. Transformational-Generative grammar seems to provide a model for the kind of alternatives that

linguistic structures occurring in a poem cannot be accounted for in the grammar of standard English, the poem should be regarded as "a sample of a different language, or a different dialect," and, he suggests, "Reading a poem . . . is often like learning a language."

the concept of style implies. Optional transformations (e. g. the passive voice) change the structure of a sentence while retaining its meaning intact. Thus, "Dickens wrote Bleak House" and "Bleak House was written by Dickens" are different ways of saying substantially, if not exactly, the same thing.⁷ But one instance of the passive transformation does not by itself define an author's style. Many instances might suggest the author's preference for the passive formulation, and that preference should be duly noted as an element of style. At the same time, if the use of the passive so far exceeds the normal probabilities of language use as to be readily identifiable as a stylistic trait, it is likely to be felt by a reader as a nuance of meaning as well.

On the other hand, if one looks for style not in the characteristic linguistic choices that an author makes, but in his choice of imagery, to distinguish style

⁷ The example is taken from Richard Ohmann, who argues this same point in "Generative Grammars and the Concept of Literary Style," Linguistics and Literary Style, ed. Donald C. Freeman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 258-278.

from substance is even more difficult. Morris Croll observes that in Fulke Greville's poetry, "the images used for illustration are of a note-worthy kind. The greater number are drawn from real life and almost all of them from its homely conditions."⁸ But this is as much a comment on the substance of Greville's poetry as on its style. The images that a poet uses are not merely something added to the substance of his thought, nor did the Renaissance think them so. Style is the garment of thought, as Rosamond Tuve points out, "in the sense that the flesh is the soul's garment, its bodying-forth or manifestation."⁹

According to linguist Bernard Bloch, "The style of a discourse is the message carried by the frequency-distributions and transitional probabilities of its linguistic features, especially as they differ from those of the same features in the language as a whole."¹⁰ This definition avoids a strict and uncompromising distinction

⁸ Morris W. Croll, The Works of Fulke Greville (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1903), p. 22.

⁹ Rosamond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (1947; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 61.

¹⁰ Bernard Bloch, quoted by Nils Erik Enkvist, "On the Place of Style in Some Linguistic Theories," Literary Style: A Symposium, ed. Seymour Chatman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 51.

between style and meaning. Style is a part of meaning, but a separately definable part. Even so, the message carried by the statistical variation of linguistic features cannot be considered apart from the total meaning of a discourse. Consider the following linguistic construction: "Comes now [name] of [address] who deposes and says: [affadavit]." Phrases conjoining latinate and English synonyms ("deposes and says") are characteristic of legal prose; "will and testament" is another familiar example. Also, inverted word order is more common in legal documents than in the language as a whole. If the discourse in which a construction such as this appears is simply a legal document, a sworn affadavit, these features are code labels identifying the frame of reference in which the document is to be interpreted. If, however, such a construction occurred in another context, in a love letter, for example, its significance would be different. Thus, "the message carried by the frequency-distributions and transitional probabilities" of linguistic features in a discourse, Bloch's definition of style, cannot be considered apart from its context, the message carried by the semantic component of language--a more restricted context than "the language as a whole."

To summarize, the term style is sometimes used to refer to an ineffable superior quality of great literature. This meaning is of no interest for the purposes of this study. The term may also refer to modes of language usage peculiar to various social contexts from intimate communication to literary creation. What Martin Joos calls "frozen" style--literature--is the level of usage with which this study is concerned. Within literature, style may refer to the characteristic traits of a genre, a period, a work, or an author. These traits may be grammatical or rhetorical, but in either case they can hardly be considered apart from the meaning of the work or works in which they appear.

To discover what is distinctive in the style of an individual author, it is not sufficient simply to go through his works and point out various linguistic and rhetorical features, for unless this is done against the background of other works of the same genre, period, and place, it is impossible to know whether the traits selected are truly distinctive. It is not feasible, however, within the scope of this study, to examine all or even a representative sample of late Elizabethan and Jacobean poetry as a prelude to

approaching the style of Fulke Greville. One alternative is to approach style at its theoretical roots. If an author's notions about the nature and practice of literature or the audience and purpose for which he writes differ from the prevailing ideas of his time and place, this divergence may account at least in some degree for the distinctiveness of his works.

Unfortunately, Greville did not set out his views on poetry in a systematic and easily accessible form as Sidney did in his Defence of Poesie. But nevertheless he was moved on several occasions, notably in The Life of Sir Philip Sidney and A Treatise of Humane Learning, to comment on the subject. From these comments can be gathered a partial understanding of Greville's theory of literature. Two prior efforts in this regard are of interest, "Greville's 'Poetic'" by Hugh N. Maclean and "Fulke Greville and the Poetic of the Plain Style" by Norman K. Farmer, Jr.¹¹

Maclean attempts to establish Greville's theory of poetry by pointing out where it diverges from Sir Philip Sidney's more fully articulated theory. To do

¹¹ Hugh N. Maclean, "Greville's 'Poetic,'" Studies in Philology, 61 (April 1964), 170-191; Norman K. Farmer, Jr., "Fulke Greville and the Poetic of the Plain Style," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 11 (1969), 657-670.

this he draws upon Greville's own comments about poetry and contrasts them with Sidney's in his Defence of Poesie. Maclean believes that "Greville's is a highly individual poetic, and (specifically) that it contrasts quite sharply with the theory of poetry enunciated by Sidney in the Defence."¹² Farmer, on the other hand, contends that the differences between Sidney's theory of poetry and Greville's are only apparent and appear because of the divergent purposes for which the two men wrote on the subject. Sidney wrote to defend poetry from its puritan detractors; Greville, when he touched on the subject, wrote not to persuade or defend, but simply to present a philosophical view.¹³ Farmer sees Greville's poetic as quite close to Sidney's in the Defence and sets out in his article to demonstrate Greville's affinity for the plain style.¹⁴ Like Maclean, Farmer draws upon

¹² Maclean, p. 170.

¹³ Farmer, p. 659.

¹⁴ Farmer apparently shares the view expressed by Robert Montgomery in Symmetry and Sense: The Poetry of Sir Philip Sidney (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 64. Montgomery holds that Sidney, in the Defence, tended to reject the poetic implicit in the Arcaïia poems in favor of a less ornate style. This view is not universally held. See Neil Rudenstine, "Sidney and Energia" in Elizabethan Poetry: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Paul J. Alpers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 210-234.

the explicit comments about poetry in Greville's writings to support his thesis.

Maclean and Farmer begin with what would seem to be mutually exclusive objectives, and yet, basing their arguments on essentially the same body of evidence, both conclude confidently, declaring their demonstrations successful. In each case, a premise concerning the nature of Greville's style was decided beforehand and the only problem that either Maclean or Farmer set for himself was, it seems, to find material that would tend to support a preconceived notion. Another, and perhaps sounder, approach would be to examine Greville's writings to discover his explicit comments on poetry, poetic, and rhetoric, and then seek to find what similarities or differences his views may have with other views of the period. Greville's ideas should be measured not only against Sidney's poetic, but also against such other typical studies of poetic and rhetoric in the period as George Puttenham's Arte of English Poesie, Thomas Wilson's Ciceronian Arte of Rhetorique, the work of the newly emergent Ramistic school of rhetoric, and the ideas of such masters of "plain style" in prose as Sir Francis Bacon. This process will provide a fairly clear understanding of Greville's poetic and of his position with respect to the views of his

contemporaries without necessarily attempting to tag his style as "plain," "metaphysical," "obscure," or "baroque"--to mention only a few of the possible tags which, without explication, are likely to produce more confusion than enlightenment.

Finally, it will be necessary to examine Greville's poetry to determine how, or if, it represents the ideas about literature suggested by his comments. The objects of this study will be the "sonnet" sequence Caelica and the long verse treatise, Of Religion. In the opinion of Greville's recent biographer, Ronald A. Rebholz, the poems of Caelica were written and revised over the entire course of Greville's career as a poet, and Of Religion was almost certainly his last major work.¹⁵ Both should, therefore, reflect the poetic of Greville's mature period, the period to which the bulk of his explicit comments about poetry belong. The earlier poems in Caelica, however, may be informed by a different view and may suggest the line of development by which Greville arrived at his final position.

A recent critic has observed that much Greville criticism "is vitiated by an insistence upon describing Greville's

¹⁵ Ronald A. Rebholz, The Life of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 327-340.

dense, figurative idiom as 'plain' and a reassessment of his style is . . . very much in order."¹⁶ By determining the outlines of Greville's poetic, its relationship to other views of poetry and rhetoric prevalent in his period, and the way in which it is manifested in his work, this study will attempt to provide the reassessment that is needed.

¹⁶ Paula Bennet, "Recent Studies in Greville," English Literary Renaissance, 2 (1972), 376-382.

II. THE TRUE ART OF ELOQUENCE

Nowhere in his work did Fulke Greville put forth in systematic form his ideas on the nature of poetry and rhetoric. The chief sources of such views are his Life of Sir Philip Sidney and A Treatie of Humane Learning. In both works Greville touches upon poetry only in the wider context of his experience and philosophy. Nevertheless, his remarks provide some insight into his understanding of the nature and function of poetry.

Greville's Life of Sir Philip Sidney is not a biography in the usual sense. It is a repository of political opinion, anecdote, philosophy, literary criticism, and much else besides. What it reveals about Sidney is hardly more complete than what it reveals about its author. The work, in fact, was written not as a biography, but as an epistle dedicatory for the eventual publication of Greville's poetry. It does not, however, remain just that, for, as Nowell Smith observes,

The Dedication spreads out, in the unchan-nelled abundance of our earlier prose and the retired soliloquizing of Greville's older age,

into a 'Treatise', in which the primary object is clean forgotten in the rush of the writer's memory of those two subjects of so much greater importance, his friend, Sir Philip, and his mistress, Queen Elizabeth.¹

What Greville had to say about his works, the works which he was undertaking to dedicate, is almost lost in the "unchannelled abundance" of The Life of Sir Philip Sidney. Here as in much of his other writing, Greville's mind seems to turn most readily to politics, to public affairs and religion. But even so, he does still manage to touch, however briefly, on some of his most basic notions about literary art and artists and particularly about Sidney's work and his own. Of his own literary endeavors, Greville writes as follows:

For my own part, I found my creeping Genius more fixed upon the Images of Life, than the Images of Wit, and therefore chose not to write to them on whose foot the black Oxe had not already trod, as the Proverbe is, but to those only, that are weatherbeaten in the Sea of this World, such as having lost the sight of their Gardens, and groves, study to saile on a right course among Rocks, and quick-sands.²

This passage is an observation upon two elements inherent in any speech act, in any use of language,

¹ Nowell Smith, "Introduction" to The Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), pp. v-vi.

² Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, The Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 224. Further references to this work will be to this edition and will be given parenthetically in the text.

the character of the speaker and the nature of the audience addressed. Greville's observation speaks only of his own experience and does not occur in the context of a theory of style. But what he says of his disposition more to the "Images of Life, than the Images of Wit" is founded in his more general opinions about human nature as reflected in his Treatie of Humane Learning. Humane Learning expresses Greville's profound distrust of all human faculties, a distrust rooted in the Calvinistic theology which he embraced in his mature years.³ In the treatise Greville shows the fallibility of sense, fancy, imagination, memory, and consequently of understanding (stanzas 1-20). He then suggests that "all these naturall Defects perchance / May be supplied by Sciences and Arts" ⁴ But in the remainder of the poem he

³ Ronald A. Rebholz suggests, plausibly, that Greville's theological views passed from a kind of Christian stoicism in his younger years to essentially the position of English covenant theology and finally to full acceptance of the predestinarian view of John Calvin. The Life of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 25, 219, 309.

⁴ Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, A Treatie of Humane Learning in The Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, ed. Geoffrey Bullough (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), I, p. 159. Further references to this work will be to this edition and citations will be given parenthetically in the text by stanza number. Unless otherwise indicated, the italicizations which

proceeds to demonstrate how vain this hope is for fallen man:

Then, if our Arts want power to make vs better,
 What fool will thinke they can vs wiser make;
Life is the Wisdome, Art is but the letter,
Or shell, which oft men for the kernell take;
In Moodes, and Figures moulding vp deceit,
 To make each Science rather hard, than great.
 (Humane Learning, 35)

All the "instrumentall following Arts" (Humane Learning, 102), including grammar, logic, rhetoric, poetry, and music, are vain for fallen man (Humane Learning, 103-115). Man is fallible both in his natural faculties and in the arts which he has devised, and the latter, since they are man-crafted, are less trustworthy than the former. Because of his corrupt nature, man must proceed cautiously in his study and employment of sciences and arts. Theory must be tempered by practical knowledge:

Their Theoricke then must not waine their vse,
 But, by a practise in materiall things,
 Rather awake that dreaming vaine abuse
 Of Lines, without breadth; without feathers, wings:
 So that their boundlesnesse may bounded be,
 In Workes, and Arts or our Humanity.
 (Humane Learning, 118)

Greville's conception of the nature of the poet, as of the nature of man in general, focuses on his de-

appear in quotations from the poetry are those found in Bullough's edition.

praved condition, a condition which is irredeemable except through the grace of God. This fact of his nature urges the poet's restraint in his recourse to the "Images of Wit," the arts of man's devising. But Sidney, as often seems to be the case in Greville's thought, occupies a special place among poets. Of Sidney's work, Greville says,

And though my Noble Friend had that dexterity, even with the dashes of his pen to make the Arcadian Antiques beautifie the Margents of his works; yet the honour which (I beare him record) he never affected, I leave unto him . . . ; yet I do wish that work may be the last in this kind, presuming no man that followes can ever reach, much less go beyond that excellent intended patterne of his.

(Life of Sidney, pp.
223-224)

Those for whom Greville intended his compositions were "those only that are weather-beaten in the Sea of this World, such as having lost sight of their Gardens, and groves, study to saile on a right course among Rocks, and quick-sands." He wrote for the lost, the sinful, for those who have known sorrow and hardship, and not "to them on whose foot the black Oxe had not already trod,"⁵ not for the elect who

⁵ For a thorough account of this proverb in Renaissance literature and some speculation on its origin, see Archer Taylor, "The Proverb 'The Black Ox has not Trod on his Foot' in Renaissance Literature," Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hardin Craig, ed. Baldwin Maxwell, et al. (Stanford University Press, n. d.), pp. 74-86.

. . . in the world, not of it, since they be;
 Like passengers, their ends must be to take
 Onely those blessings of Mortality,
 Which he that made all, fashion'd for their sake:
 Not fixing loue, hope, sorrow, care, or feare,
 On mortall blossoms, which must dye to beare.
 (Humane Learning, 129)

The problem of such a poet writing for such an audience is clear. It is the problem that haunted Puritan divines after the first flush of success had faded from Calvin's reforms. Perry Miller summarizes the history of this dilemma as follows:

If man must wait upon God for grace, and grace is irrespective of works, simple folk might very well ask, why worry about works at all? . . . Calvin simply brushed aside all objections and roundly declared: "Man, being taught that he has nothing good left in his possession, and being surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, should, nevertheless, be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is destitute." Perkins taught that the will of man before it receives grace is impotent and in the reception is purely passive . . . ; he distinctly said that God's predestination is regardless of any quality or merit in the individual, and that man can achieve any sort of obedience only after being elected. Ames restated this doctrine; yet at whatever cost to consistency, he had to assert that though without faith man can do nothing acceptable to God, he still has to perform certain duties because the duties "are in themselves good." The divines were acutely conscious that this was demanding what their own theory had made impossible⁶

⁶ Perry Miller, "The Marrow of Puritan Divinity," in Errand into the Wilderness (1956; rpt. New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 54.

The more traditional notion of poetry as an instrument of moral instruction is not possible in this predicament. For Sidney, the end of poetry was "to delight and teach, and delight to move men to take that goodness in hand, which without delight they would fly as from a stranger, and teach to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved."⁷ But if man can only know or do "goodness" by the grace of God, wherein lies the efficacy of poetry? Greville's position, like that of the Puritan divines, was equivocal. He believed that poetry had no power to make the reader better, and yet he wrote, he says, on the "largest subjects I could think upon" (Life of Sidney, p. 150) with the purpose of providing a "perspective into vice and the unprosperities of it" (Life of Sidney, p. 151).

What exactly these "largest subjects [he] could think upon" were is pertinent to this inquiry. Greville, in this passage, has specific reference to his tragedies and several parts of what was finally to become the long Treatise of Monarchy. The treatise had been begun as a part of the tragedies--"to be for every Act a Chorus"

⁷ Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie in Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden, ed. Allan H. Gilbert (1940; rpt. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), p. 416.

(Life of Sidney, p. 150). Until G. A. Wilkes's attempted dating of the works, it was generally thought that Greville, in this passage from the Life of Sidney, had reference to all the treatises--Humane Learning, Fame and Honour, Warres, and Religion--because they deal from different perspectives with some of the same matters as the Treatise of Monarchy.⁸ As suggested by the titles of the treatises, Greville's subjects were the broad questions of public policy and human conduct. These are subjects well suited to what he called in Humane Learning "the true Art of Eloquence . . .

Whose ends are not to flatter, or beseech,
Insinuate, or perswade, but to declare
What things in Nature good, or euill are.
(Humane Learning, 110)

Poetry, Greville believed,

Can moue, but not remoue, or make impression
Really, either to enrich the Wit
Or, which is lesse, to mend our states by it.
(Humane Learning, 111)

Poetry has no value in itself, but is

Onely as pleasing sauce to dainty food;
Fine foyles for iewels, or enammels grace,

⁸ G. A. Wilkes, "The Sequence of the Writings of Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke," Studies in Philology, 56 (1959), 489-503. For an example of the earlier view see Geoffrey Bullough, "Introduction" to The Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, I, p. 24.

Cast vpon things which in themselues are good;
 Since, if the matter be in Nature vile,
 How can it be made pretious by a stile?
 (Humane Learning, 112)

This, then, in brief, was Greville's Poetic in his later years.⁹ It was an understanding of the art of poetry conditioned at every point by a belief in the depravity of man and all his works. The poet being a man was necessarily feeble in his faculties and feebler yet in the arts of those faculties' devising. Recognizing this fallibility of wit, the poet was constrained to fix his attention on life, nature, and practical experience.

Those for whom Greville intended his compositions were also men and consequently shared in the same native depravity as the poet. Art, Greville believed, had no power to make his readers better than they were. Sidney, in his Arcadia, had intended "to turn the barren Philosophy precepts into pregnant images of life" but he later "discovered, not onely the imperfection, but vanitie of these shadowes, how daintily soever limned: as seeing that even beauty it selfe, in all earthly complexions, was more apt to allure men to evill, than to fashion

⁹ Wilkes and Rebholz agree that the works cited here, The Life of Sir Philip Sidney and A Treatie of Humane Learning, were both written after 1600.

any goodness in them" (Life of Sidney, pp. 15-16).

Knowing himself a lesser poet than his friend, Greville could not expect to improve on Sidney's marvelous failure and so chose not to deal in "the strangeness, or perplexedness of witty Fictions; In which the affections, or imagination, may perchance find exercise, and entertainment, but the memory and judgement no enriching at all" (Life of Sidney, p. 223). The proper subject matter of his poetry was to be drawn directly from life and presented as forthrightly as possible. Even of the most fictional of his works, the tragedies, Greville said, "But he that will behold these Acts upon their true Stage, let him look on that Stage wherein himself is an Actor, even the state he lives in, and for every part he may perchance find a Player, and for every Line (it may be) an instance of life . . ." (Life of Sidney, pp. 224-225).

In his Defence of Poesie, Sidney said of the poet that "he goeth hand in hand with nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts but freely ranging within the zodiac of his own wit."¹⁰ But Greville's view of the poet was much less idealistic; the poet was not at all godlike and was much subordinate to nature,

¹⁰ Sidney, p. 412

believe poetry could persuade man to right conduct, on the other he felt that poetry was at least an ornament to truth and could provide a model of nature. Poetry, he says,

if to describe, or praise
 Goodness, or God she her Ideas frame,
 And like a Maker, her creations raise
 On lines of truth, it beautifies the same;
 And while it seemeth onely but to please,
 Teacheth vs order vnder pleasures name;
 Which in a glasse, shows Nature how to fashion
 Her selfe againe, by ballancing of passion.
 (Humane Learning, 114)

Art remains sound only if it hews close to nature and eschews abstraction. Practical arts--building, surveying, navigation, husbandry--seemed to Greville ideal in this respect,

For thus, these Arts passe, whence they came to life,
 Circle not round in selfe-imagination,
 Begetting Lines upon an abstract wife,
 As children borne for idle contemplation.
 (Humane Learning, 122)

These arts are drawn directly from nature and in turn are immediately applied to nature. Thus, unlike more abstract arts such as rhetoric and poetry, they remain more concrete and are prized chiefly for what they can produce.

Perhaps this last point accounts for Greville's not providing us a fully articulated exposition of his poetic. He intended that the poetry should speak for itself. Indeed, he writes:

Lastly, for the Stile; as it is rich, or poore, according to the estate, and ability of the Writer, so the value of it shall be enhansed, or cried downe according to the grace, and the capacity of the Reader, from which common Fortune of Bookes, I look for no exemption.

(Life of Sidney, p. 225)

Greville's canons of style demand a kind of plainness, an exact correspondence between language and experience, words, and things. Theory was not important to him except as it was derived from experience and applied in practice. Few of Greville's contemporaries made such modest claims for the art of eloquence. The following chapter will examine some of the points on which Greville was at odds with the thought of the age and some on which he was in agreement.

III. THIS CRAFT OF WORDS

In his later years, Fulke Greville's ideas about poetry seem to have been greatly influenced by his rigorous Calvinistic beliefs. The depravity of man and the fallibility of his faculties placed severe limitations on Greville's conception of the poet and his works. The end of true eloquence was "to declare / What things in Nature good, or euill are" (Humane Learning, 110), and poetry was "Onely as pleasing sauce to dainty food" (Humane Learning, 112). Elaborate arts of rhetoric and poetry, Greville thought, were only the vain products of man's corrupt condition. All arts seemed to him vain except those that constantly referred to life, practical use, and nature. And even so, man could not be moved to goodness except by the grace of God.

This did not mean, however, that Greville believed learning should be abandoned in favor of ignorance, or poetry in favor of silence, but only that great caution should be exercised in the pursuit of sciences and arts:

Man must not therefore rashly Science scorne,
But choose, and read with care; since Learning is
A bunch of grapes sprung vp among the thornes,
Where, but by caution, none the harme can misse
(Humane Learning, 62)

Poetry, while we cannot hope "to mend our states by it" (Humane Learning, 111), was for him, nonetheless, an ornament to life and art (Humane Learning, 115).

The poetic of Greville's later years called for a poetry of statement, of direct and unembellished declaration. He wished to reduce experience to precept which could in turn be applied to practice again. This is an extremely restrained view for the Elizabethan period and has few points in common with the predominant theories of eloquence among Greville's contemporaries.

Greville's less than optimistic view of the human capacity for virtue puts his notions about poetry out of step with those of most renaissance theorists. Sidney's exuberant claims for the poet and for poetry cannot easily be contained within the limitations of Greville's view of human nature. Sidney, in his account of the arts, starts off on much the same footing as Greville:

There is no art delivered unto mankind that hath not the works of nature for his principal object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend as they become actors and players, as it were, of what nature will have set forth.¹

¹ Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poetry in Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden, ed. Allan H. Gilbert (1940; rpt. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), p. 412. Further references to this work will be to this edition. Citations will be given parenthetically in the text.

Following this, Sidney remarks briefly on the reliance of various practitioners of arts and sciences on nature. The astronomer, the geometrician and arithmetician, the musician, the natural philosopher, the lawyer, the historian, the grammarian, the rhetorician and logician, the physician and even the metaphysician, he says, all turn to nature for their "principal objects." But, he adds,

Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers poets have done, neither with so pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet-smelling flowers, nor whatsoever else may make the too much loved earth more lovely. Her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden. (Sidney, pp. 412-413)

Greville made no such exception for the poet. In his own work, he found his "creeping Genius more fixed upon the Images of Life, than the Images of Wit" (Life of Sidney, p. 224) and he reserves his moderate praise for poetry "Which in a glasse, shows Nature how to fashion / Her selfe againe, by ballancing of passion" (Humane Learning, 114). For Greville, poetry is a representation of what is or has been. It may serve to redress a former balance or shore up a world "making hast to her last declination" (Humane Learning, 63), but poetry cannot hope to improve upon the world. Greville is concerned with

the accurate representation of nature. In Caelica LXXX, he ponders the distortions which poetry forces:

Clear spirits, which in Images set forth
The wayes of Nature by fine imitation,
Are oft forc'd to Hyperboles of worth,
As oft againe to monstrous declination
(Caelica LXXX)

But when Sidney speaks of imitation he shows no such interest in accuracy to nature. Right poets, he says,

. . . be they which most properly do imitate
to teach and delight, and to imitate borrow
nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be;
but range, only reined with learned discre-
tion, into divine consideration of what may
be and should be. (Sidney, p. 415)

The Poet, for Sidney, is a maker who out of his own wit creates a second nature. He writes not of what is but of "what may be and should be" for the delight and instruction of his audience. This is in sharp contrast to Greville whose concept of the poet is closer in kind to what Sidney calls "the meaner sort of painters, who counterfeit only such faces as are set before them" (Sidney, p. 415).²

² Norman K. Farmer, Jr., "Fulke Greville and the Poetic of the Plain Style," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 11 (1969), 659, argues that there are no significant differences between Sidney's and Greville's views on poetry. "There are important reasons for considering the major distinction between the respective genres in which Sidney's and Greville's views on poetry appear. The circumstances which called forth the Apology demanded an apologia pro arte sua which would persuasively establish the right of all poetry . . . to self-evident status. Greville, on the other hand, wrote more with a philosophical rather than a persuasive intention." But the circumstances in which each took up the subject of poetry

Other renaissance theorists are nearer to Sidney than to Greville in the tone of their remarks about the nature of the poet and of poetry. George Puttenham's praise of the poet in Book I of his Arte of English Poesie is, if anything, even less restrained than Sidney's. For Puttenham, the poet is a maker who "contriues out of his owne braine, both the verse and the matter of his poeme" and an imitator who "can expresse the true and liuely of euey thing that is set before him, and which he taketh in hand to describe."³ Moreover, according to Puttenham, poets were "the first priests, the first prophets, the first Legislators and polititians in the world" (chapter III), and "the first Philosophers, the first Astronomers and Historiographers and Oratours, and Musitiens of the world" (chapter IIII). The poet has been, historically, says Puttenham, a man for all seasons, counselor to princes, expert and accomplished in all things, almost

may themselves be revealingly characteristic. Sidney who believed poetry had a persuasive purpose--to delight and to teach--wrote persuasively; Greville who believed poetry had a philosophical purpose--to declare what good and evil are--wrote philosophically. Furthermore, unless one is prepared to believe that Sidney falsified his views for the sake of the argument, there can hardly be any unity of opinion between the young Sidney and the mature Greville. The barrenness of human wit, as Greville conceives it, could not bring forth such wonders as Sidney envisions.

³ George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie, ed. Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker (London: Cambridge University Press, 1936], p. 3.

a lesser deity.⁴

The subject matter of poetry as conceived by Puttenham is "what soeuer wittie and delicate conceit of man meet or worthy to be put in written vers, for any necessary vse of the present time, or good instruction of the posteritie."⁵ The purpose of this poetry is to honor gods, flatter princes, praise virtue, reprove vice, instruct in moral doctrines, reveal sciences and arts, or practically any other purpose "so it be not very scandalous & of euill example."⁶

The breadth of Puttenham's definition of poetry is so sweeping that it easily has room within it for the severely restricted poetry of Greville's ideal. Puttenham makes room for anything so long as it be written in verse, in language out of the ordinary, and not a translation. But there is no place in Greville's poetic for much that Puttenham is willing to include. For Puttenham, poetry "vused for recreation onely, may allowably beare matter not alwayes of the grauest, or of any great commoditie or profit,

⁴ Puttenham, pp. 16-18.

⁵ Puttenham, p. 24

⁶ Puttenham, p. 24.

but rather in some sort, vaine, dissolute, or wanton"7

In short, Puttenham's poetic is commodius, eclectic, anti-pedantic; it is the work of an enthusiastic amateur. As such it has little in common with the grave, narrow, cautious theorizing of Fulke Greville.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, poetic and rhetoric were closely interwoven studies and seldom clearly distinguished. Both Sidney and Puttenham include elements of rhetoric in their discussions of poetry. Sidney himself notes that in his remarks on style he is "straying from poetry to oratory" (Sidney, p. 455). Moreover, the three-fold purpose that Sidney envisions for poetry--to delight, to teach, and to move--is the same as Cicero claims for rhetoric.⁸ And in fact some critics hold that Sidney's poetic was largely rhetorical.⁹ Puttenham, for his part, is essentially dealing in rhetoric in the third book of the

⁷ Puttenham, p. 24.

⁸ Allan H. Gilbert, ed., Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden, p. 460.

⁹ See C. S. Baldwin, Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice (1939; rpt. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), p. 179; and M[arvin] T. H[errick], "Rhetoric and Poetic," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 704.

Arte of English Poesie, "Of Ornament." And throughout his book the rhetorical view is at least implicit. Wilbur Samuel Howell suggests that the difference between oratory and poetry, for Puttenham, is merely a matter of degree rather than of kind. Oratory employs more figurative language than ordinary conversation, and poetry more than oratory. Figurative language, in Puttenham's mind, is the sine qua non of both oratory and poetry.¹⁰

Greville, although he devotes separate stanzas of the Treatie of Humane Learning to rhetoric and poetry, makes no sharp distinction between the two. He characterizes poetry more favorably than rhetoric, but in his comments on both the emphasis is on style or ornament. Ornament in rhetoric is "the painted skinne / Of many words" (Humane Learning, 107); in poetry, "pleasing sauce to dainty food" (Humane Learning, 112). Greville, in his eschewal of the "strangeness and perplexedness of Witty Fictions" (Life of Sidney, p. 223), abandoned one feature of poetry which most clearly distinguishes it from rhetoric.

¹⁰ Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England: 1500-1700 (1956; rpt. New York: Russell, 1961), pp. 327-328.

In any case, the entangled and complex relationship of rhetoric and poetic at this period, and throughout history,¹¹ justifies a closer consideration of rhetoric in the examination of Greville's poetic. From the eighth century to the latter part of the sixteenth, the study of rhetoric in England was dominated by the three patterns of what W. S. Howell calls traditional rhetoric.¹² Traditional rhetoric was derived largely from Cicero and the three patterns that Howell notes are Ciceronian, stylistic, and formulary. The Ciceronian pattern teaches the full five-part scheme of rhetoric taught by Cicero--invention, disposition, style, memory, and delivery. The stylistic pattern concentrates on only the third of these five parts, style. Formulary rhetoric provides models illustrating rhetorical principles which students are to imitate. The three patterns are largely a matter of emphasis, for the stylistic rhetorics generally recognize the legitimate place of the other divisions, invention, disposition, memory, and delivery. Furthermore, there is an element of the formulary pattern in both Ciceronian and stylistic rhetorics.¹³

However, the differences in emphasis are in themselves

¹¹ H[errick], "Rhetoric and Poetics," p. 702.

¹² Howell, pp. 64-65.

¹³ Howell, pp. 6-7, 64-65, 116-138.

suggestive. Howell theorizes that stylistic rhetoric with its emphasis on figurative language is the mode of eloquence to be expected in an hereditary aristocracy. What better way is there, he asks, to appeal to aristocratic governors than through modes of usage which are a direct repudiation of common speech? He further points out that, in fact, rhetorical emphasis in England did shift away from style with the growth of parliamentary government.¹⁴ One may not wish to push the argument quite so far, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that the pyrotechnics of elocutio are chiefly for the benefit of the audience while an emphasis on the first two parts of rhetoric, invention and arrangement, evincés a greater concern for the subject matter of the argument.

One popular work on rhetoric during the sixteenth century in England was Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique. Wilson follows the full Ciceronian pattern, treating all five parts of rhetoric. The bulk of his work, however, is given over to invention and style. Of these two, the larger space is devoted to invention. One of Wilson's first published works was a treatise on logic, The Rule of Reason (1551), and in his rhetoric he recognizes the usefulness of the

¹⁴ Howell, pp. 117-118.

places of logic for rhetorical invention.¹⁵ This emphasis on dealing with matter in Wilson's rhetoric is consistent with Greville's view of true eloquence, as is Wilson's assertion about the necessity of practice in the perfecting of an art.¹⁶ Also, Greville might be expected to approve Wilson's well-known denunciation of "ynkehorne termes."¹⁷

Nevertheless, Wilson's rhetoric is still only a "craft of words." His invention is only a means for finding out "plentiful matter." "The finding out of apt matter," he says, "called otherwise Invention, is a searching out of things true, or things likely, the which may reasonable set forth a matter, and make it appeare probable."¹⁸ Rhetoric is concerned, not with the truth itself, but with the appearance of truth. Its purpose, says Wilson, following Cicero, is "To Teach. / To delight. / And to perswade."¹⁹

¹⁵ Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique, ed. G. H. Mair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pp. 6, 23.

¹⁶ Wilson, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷ Wilson, pp. 162-165.

¹⁸ Wilson, p. 6.

¹⁹ Wilson, p. 2.

Greville's attitude toward rhetoric is rather like that of Socrates in Plato's Gorgias. And, in fact, Greville, in characterizing rhetoric and poetry, employs two similitudes employed by Socrates in the dialogue. Greville accuses rhetoric of "Captiuing reason, with the painted skinne / Of many words" (Humane Learning, 112). Oratory, according to Socrates, is a spurious art corresponding to the true art of government as beauty-culture corresponds to physical training and cookery, to medicine.²⁰ This is not to suggest that Greville was familiar with Plato's dialogue, but rather that his attitude toward rhetoric was similar. Both believed rhetoric to deal with appearance instead of substance.

Wilson, of course, has greater faith in the efficacy of oratory. In his "Preface," he tells the fable of how after the Fall "men lived brutishly in open feeldes" until God's appointed ministers with God-given rhetoric "called them together by vtterance of speech, and perswaded with them what was good, what was bad, & what was gainful for mankind." In consequence these savages

²⁰ Plato, Gorgias, trans. W. Hamilton (Baltimore: Penguin, 1960), pp. 44-48. A similar characterization of the orator's art occurs in the Protagoras.

"became through Nurture and good aduisement, of wilde, sober: of cruell, gentle: of fooles, wise: and of beastes, men: such force hath the tongue, and such is the power of Eloquence and reason"21 Greville, of course, shows no such confidence in the power of arts to improve the lot of mankind.

Wilson, furthermore, for all that he recommends practical experience, says, nonetheless, that "though many by nature without art, haue proued worthy men, yet is arte a surer guide then nature, considering we see as liuely by arte what we do, as though we read a thing in writing, where as Natures doings are not so open to all men."22 Greville's clear preference for nature over books and arts had been adopted as early as Caelica LXVI:23

21 Wilson, "Preface," n. p. Greville alludes to this fable in Caelica XCII, likening this power of eloquence to the nobility: "For be they fooles, or speake they without wit, / We hold them wise, we fooles be-wonder it." And again Greville uses the myth of the Golden Age in the Treatise of Monarchy where order is restored after the fall through the institution of monarchy. Thus, in keeping with Greville's general opinion of arts, man is saved from chaos by the active art of politics and not the "instrumental, following arts" of rhetoric and poetry.

22 Wilson, p. 5.

23 According to Ronald A. Rebholz's suggested dating of the works, this would be sometime prior to 1587. See The Life of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 340.

Caelica, you (whose requests commandments be)
 Advise me to delight my minde with books,
 The Glasse where Art doth to posterity,
 Shew nature naked vnto him that looks,
 Enriching vs, shortning the wayes of wit,
 Which with experience else deare buyeth it.

Caelica, if I obey not but dispute,
 Thinke it is darkenesse, which seeks out a light,
 And to presumption do not it impute,
 If I forsake the way of Infinite;
 Bookes be of men, men but in clouds doe see,
 Of whose embracements Centaures gotten be.
 (Caelica LXVI)

As Bullough notes, Greville, unlike Sidney in Astrophel and Stella 64, is not simply contriving a witty compliment in this treatment of the theme of learning.²⁴ He is expressing a serious notion, and a notion that is directly opposed to the one that Wilson expresses in his work.

Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique is a bookish art, concerned not with truth, but with the means for giving an utterance the appearance of truth to an unlearned audience. Greville's Calvinistic belief in the native depravity of man would not allow him to believe that the orator would use such an art wisely and well. Rhetoric is amoral, and amorality is one of the charges that Greville levels against arts in general:

²⁴ Geoffrey Bullough, ed., The Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), I, 261-262.

Musike instructs me which be lyrike Moodes;
 Let her instruct me rather, how to show
 No weeping voyce for loose of Fortunes goods.
Geometrie giues measure to the earth below;
 Rather let her instruct me, how to measure
 What is enough for need, what fit for pleasure.
 (Humane Learning, 32)

What thing a right line is the learned know;
 But how auailles that him, who in the right
 Of life, and manners doth desire to grow?
What then are all these humane Arts, and lights,
But Seas of errors? In whose depths who sound,
Of truth finde onely shadowes, and no ground.
 (Humane Learning, 34)

Greville's critique of rhetoric is relentlessly harsh. "Arts," he says, "Transform themselves to Craft, Knowledge to Sophistry, / Truth into Rhetorike" (Humane Learning, 40). But Greville's personal investment in poetry was too great, and when he comes to mention that art by name, he softens his line: poetry and music, he says, are "Both, ornaments to life and other Arts, / Whiles they doe serve, and not possesse our hearts" (Humane Learning, 115). And yet except in his attitude toward them he does not sharply distinguish between poetry and rhetoric.

Of the two remaining patterns of traditional rhetoric--stylistic and formulary--the stylistic is undoubtedly the more important. The first full-fledged English formulary rhetoric was Richard Rainolde's Foundacioun of Rhetorike (1563 and not subsequently reprinted until 1945).²⁵

²⁵ Howell, pp. 140-142.

Most of the formularies were intended to provide exercises for schoolboys or, as in the case of William Fullwood's The Enimie of Idlenesse (1568), to supply assistance in letter-writing for the rising merchant class.²⁶ The stylistic pattern, on the other hand, was of central importance in English renaissance works on rhetoric. So important was it that many critics maintain style or elocutio was virtually synonymous with rhetoric in the period.²⁷

Stylistic rhetoric has a long history in England commencing with St. Bede's Liber de schematibus et tropis early in the eighth century.²⁸ Among stylistic rhetorics of the sixteenth century that Howell lists are Richard Sherry's Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550) and Henry Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577). As noted above, this pattern of treating rhetoric suggests a greater concern for dazzling the audience than for dealing adequately with the matter

²⁶ Howell, pp. 143-144; also William G. Crane, Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance (1937; rpt. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 108-102.

²⁷ See for example Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943), pp. 185-204; and Crane, pp. 57-61.

²⁸ Howell, p. 116.

Ramus's colleague, Audomarus Talaeus (Omer Talon) is sometimes not distinguished from the traditional pattern of stylistic rhetoric to which it is superficially very similar. Considered, however, as a part of the overall reform of the arts envisioned by Ramus, it is quite a different matter.

Ramus's scholarly reputation commences with his 1536 thesis at the University of Paris, entitled "Quaecumque ab Aristotele dicta essent, commentitia esse." He did not, however, consider himself an anti-Aristotelian, but rather an opponent of the accumulated excrescences to Aristotle's thought that had developed over the centuries. His reform of the arts is founded on three principles which, he says, are drawn from Aristotle. According to these principles, the axioms of an art must be, first, universally true; second, homogeneous with the rest of the art; and third, naturally appropriate to the art.³¹

Guided by these principles, Ramus observed that between the arts of logic and rhetoric there was con-

46 (February 1949), 163-171; and Perry Miller, The New England Mind (New York: Macmillan, 1939), 111-153 and 300-330.

³¹ Duhamel, p. 166. Roland MacIlmaine, the first English translator of Ramus, cites these "three documents or rules kept, which in deede ought to be observed in all artes and sciences." He identifies these rules as,

siderable overlap. The means for invention and arrangement of arguments were common to both arts, but, he thought, were proper only to logic. Thus he drove a wedge between the traditional parts of rhetoric, recognizing only style and delivery as its proper parts and leaving invention and disposition to logic. Memory, he believed, was only an ancillary benefit of adequate invention and arrangement.

Two additional principles were important in Ramus's program for the exoteric arts.³² He believed that each of these arts had its proper end and that each should imitate nature. The proper end of logic was to dispute well; the proper end of rhetoric, to speak well. Ramus based his logic on "nature," drawing his examples from literature. Consequently, Ramists' texts are oriented to the practical end in hand and are developed predominantly through example with little space given over to theory.

The three basic principles upon which Ramus

respectively, "Veritie," "Iustice," and "Wisedom." See The Logike of the Moste Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, Calif.: San Fernando State College, 1969), pp. 4-5.

³² Ramus classed the arts as "exoteric": grammar, rhetoric, and logic; and "esoteric": mathematics, physics, and metaphysics (Duhamel, p. 165).

established his reforms held little appeal for Greville. In fact, he seems to have been mocking the Ramists' pretensions when he wrote:

Indeed to teach they confident pretend,
All generall, vniforme Axioms scientificall
Of truth, that want beginning, haue no end,
Demonstratiue, infallible, onely essentiall:
But if these Arts containe this mystery,
It proues them proper to the Deity.
(Humane Learning, 22)

Although Greville does not employ the English Ramists' popular labels--Truth, Justice, Wisdom--for Ramus's three principles, he does provide a clear echo of the explanation of these principles in the 1555 edition of the Dialectic:

Next, an axiom is true or false: true, when it pronounces as the thing itself is; false, when it pronounces to the contrary. The true axiom is necessary or contingent: necessary, when it is always true and cannot possibly be false. And this axiom is named and marked by Aristotle in the first book of his Demonstration [that is, the Posterior Analytics], the mark being "of all"; the impossible, on the contrary, can never be true. Axioms of the arts ought to be affirmed and true generally and necessarily in this fashion, but beyond this they ought also to be homogeneous and reciprocal. A homogeneous axiom is one in which the parts are essential among themselves 33

An axiom is "Demonstrative" (i. e. demonstrable), "when

33 Ramus, as quoted by Howell, pp. 150-151. The translation is Howell's.

it pronounces as the thing itself is"; "infallible," "when it is always true and cannot possibly be false"; and "onely essential," when it is "homogeneous"--that is, an axiom "in which the parts are essential among themselves."

Greville's epistemology would not permit him to accept with equanimity Ramus's confidence in the ability of mere man to arrive surely and safely at first principles. But the poet and the logician are in nearer accord on the more practical issues. Thus Greville wrote:

For Sciences from Nature should be drawne,
As Arts from practice, neuer out of Bookes:
Whose rules are onely left with time in pawne,
To shew how in them Vse, and Nature lookes.
(Humane Learning, 75)

And Ramus similarly wrote:

. . . ars enim dialecticae debet ab imitatione & observatione naturalis dialecticae proficisci.³⁴

Ramus's comment, of course, refers to the specific art of dialectic, while Greville's applies to arts in general, but, as mentioned above, this was a guiding principle of Ramus's reorganization of the arts.

Another similarity between Greville and Ramus

³⁴ Ramus, quoted by Duhamel, p. 168 fn. 27. "The art of dialectic, indeed, ought to proceed from imitation and from observation of natural dialectic."

may be seen in Greville's handling of logic and rhetoric in the Treatie of Humane Learning. In stanzas 102 through 116, he treats the seven liberal arts in basically the usual order--grammar, logic, rhetoric, music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.³⁵ But his treatment does not divide neatly into trivium, the first three arts, and quadrivium, the remaining four. Greville lavishes the greatest share of his attention on logic, rhetoric, and music (with which he brackets poetry). He provides only one stanza for grammar and only one for arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy together.

Greville does not have anything very complimentary to say about logic, but he does offer some suggestions for its reform:

The wise reformers therefore of this Art
Must cut off termes, distinctions, axioms, lawes,
Such as depend either in whole, or part,

³⁵ This familiar system of the arts was inherited by the Middle Ages from late antiquity where the full scheme was found only in the writing of Martianus Capella (De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae) although close approximations may be found earlier in the work of Marcus Terentius Varro and Sextus Empiricus. This scheme had outrun its usefulness as a definitive system of the arts by the twelfth or thirteenth century. See P. O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts," Renaissance Thought II: Papers on Humanism and the Arts (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 173-174.

Vpon this stained sense of words, or sawes:
 Onely admitting precepts of such kinde,
 As without words may be conceiu'd in minde.
 (Humane Learning, 106)

This describes, approximately, the reform of logic undertaken by Peter Ramus. Perry Miller gives the following account of Ramus's reform:

Most of the concepts conventionally listed under the antepredicaments, predicaments, and postpredicaments, he said, belong in physics or metaphysics; others are tautological and superfluous. The remainder he refashioned entirely, doing away with the words "predicables" and "predicaments," and substituting the single term, "arguments," or, as they were often called among his disciples, "reasons." He defined an argument as "whatever is affected to the arguing of something else."³⁶

Ramists, too, were less concerned with words than with things or ideas, "precepts of such kind / As without words may be conceiu'd in minde." Again, Miller says,

The arguments or reasons arise from the things, "as streams from their Fountain, and children from their Parents, resembling and representing their nature." They are "as the image and shadow of the first, symbolically, tacitly, and secretly comprehending the prints and footsteps of those first arguments, wearing their badge and livery." Had Ramists known the terms they would have allowed no distinction between the idea and the "ding-an-sich," or at least so little difference as to prevent the possibility of imperfect correspondence.³⁷

³⁶ Miller, p. 123-124.

³⁷ Miller, p. 149.

significant.³⁹ It is possible that Ramism was at least partially responsible for Greville's poetic style, which Norman K. Farmer has characterized as "plain."⁴⁰ The poet lacked confidence in the capacity of the unaided human intellect to arrive at the degree of truth that Ramus claimed for his system of the arts, but he shared the logician's preference for matter over manner and belief that simple assertion is more eloquent than the subtle proofs of logic or the oft-abused colors of rhetoric.

There remains for consideration yet another development in rhetorical theory and practice current in the latter part of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This is the anti-Ciceronian movement. It was less a specific program for rhetorical reform than an aggregate of tendencies whose history in England can be traced from Erasmus's Ciceronianus (1528) and John Jewell's Oratio contra Rhetoricam (1548).⁴¹ From this movement arose the prose style (or styles, depending on

³⁹ Miller, pp. 331-362.

⁴⁰ Farmer, "Fulke Greville and the Poetic of the Plain Style," 657-670.

⁴¹ George Williamson, The Senecan Amble: Prose Form from Bacon to Collier (1951; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 11-31.

how finely one draws distinctions) variously termed "Attic," "stoic," "Senecan," "philosophical," or "essay." This is the style of Bacon and Montaigne and the foundation of the Royal Society style as prescribed by Sprat in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Although this is a prose style, it bears implications for Greville's poetry, especially in the philosophical ideas with which the style is associated.

The movement is generally marked by a preference for the plain over the ornate, brevity over copiousness, and, as models, authors of Silver Age latinity--Seneca, Tacitus--over Cicero. These and other anti-Ciceronian tendencies have been examined in great intricacy of detail by Morris Croll, whose findings have been further elaborated by Williamson's contributions.⁴² It is not essential here to provide a minute review of these discoveries. However, Croll's summary of the forms of Attic style and their philosophical associations is of interest.

In an article entitled "Attic Prose: Lipsius,

⁴² Morris W. Croll, Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm, ed. J. Max Patrick, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), particularly the first five essays; Williamson, The Senecan Amble.

Montaigne, Bacon," Croll examines the styles of three major figures in anti-Ciceronianism. Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), he concludes, is the founder of the stoic style, modeled in large measure after Seneca, and "of the Neo-Stoic philosophy which usually accompanied it in the first half of the [seventeenth] century."

Montaigne is the first master of what Croll calls "libertine" prose which is also grounded in the Senecan pattern but seeks greater freedom through the imitation of other authors, both ancient and modern, as well. The philosophical tendency associated with this form of Attic style is scepticism. And, finally, there is the prose of political writers, "students of 'prudential wisdom,'" among whom is numbered Bacon. The style of this school, and often its substance, is derived from Tacitus.⁴³

⁴³ Croll, pp. 200-202. Williamson draws much finer distinctions than Croll and his terminology is consequently different. In Williamson's view, the extremes of style are the periodic (Ciceronian) and the loose (Senecan). The varieties of curt style which Croll gathers under the term "Attic," all ultimately related to the Senecan, are distinguished by Williamson accordingly as they are pointed, schematic, or plain. As Williamson himself observes, "This is to separate for analysis what was not distinguished in fact" (p. 60). See particularly the second chapter of The Senecan Amble, "The Rhetorical Forms of Style," pp. 32-60.

As a whole, Attic prose, in Croll's use of the term, refers to the genus humile or philosophical style as opposed to the genus grande or oratorical style. It is characterized by the use of figurae sententiae, figures of thought, and the absence of schemata verborum, schemes of words. The first, figurae sententiae, include metaphor, paradox, aphorism--figures which turn on the substance, the meaning of a passage of writing. The second, schemata verborum, include isocolon, parison, paramoion--schemes of length, form, or sound.⁴⁴ The function of this style, Croll says,

is to express individual variances of experience in contrast with the general and communal ideas which the open design of the oratorical style is so well adapted to contain. Its idiom is that of conversation or is adapted from it, in order that it may flow into and fill up all the nooks and crannies of reality and reproduce its exact image to attentive observation.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Croll, "'Attic Prose' in the Seventeenth Century," p. 54. Williamson, however, argues that the character of a style is determined less by the kind of figures employed than the purpose to which they are put. "Croll," he says, ". . . would differentiate styles too much by the kind of figures employed" (p. 36). Croll himself admits that his description is over-simplified, "mere caricature," but nonetheless "convenient."

⁴⁵ Croll, "'Attic Prose' in the Seventeenth Century," p. 61.

The philosophical style is more personal than the oratorical style. It speaks with an individual voice to an individual hearer. It is private rather than public. Quintillian, in urging his Roman audience to the oratorical style, offered this description of the Attic, or philosophical, style:

Greek keels, even the little ones, know well their ports; let ours usually travel under fuller sails, with a stronger breeze swelling our canvas. . . . They have the art of threading their way through the shallows; I would seek somewhat deeper waters, where my bark may be in no danger of foundering.⁴⁶

This is strikingly similar to Greville's metaphor when, describing his own style, he says,

I found my creeping Genius more fixed upon the Images of Life, than the Images of Wit . . . [and chose to write for] those only, that are weather-beaten in the Sea of this World, such as having lost sight of their Gardens, and groves, study to saile on a right course among Rocks, and quick-sands.

(Life of Sidney, p. 224)

This may be an altogether fortuitous coincidence of metaphor, but in both cases the metaphor is apt, and it dramatically underscores the unity between Greville's purpose in writing and the function which Croll ascribes to the Attic style.

Moreover, we have seen in Greville's writing evi-

⁴⁶ Croll, p. 61.

dence of the influence of not one but all three schools of philosophy that Croll finds associated with the various forms of Attic prose. The underlying attitude of the Treatise of Humane Learning, from which many of Greville's comments on style have been drawn, is scepticism. This scepticism Greville meets in turn with stoicism and political philosophy or "pruential wisdom." The whole, of course, is overlaid with his Calvinistic theology.

The first twenty stanzas of Humane Learning are devoted to denying the capacity of human faculties to discover certain truth, and roughly stanzas 21-60, to denying the efficacy of arts and sciences to enhance the feeble capacity of the faculties. This is basically the position of classical scepticism which Bullough suggests Greville may have drawn from the writings of Seneca, Sextus Empiricus, and Cornelius Agrippa.⁴⁷ To this classi-

⁴⁷ Bullough, "Introduction," p. 55. Classically there were two main schools of scepticism, the Academic expounded by Arcesilaus and his successors at the Platonic Academy in Athens from the third to the first centuries B. C. and the Pyrrhonian, followers of Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-275 B. C.) including Sextus Empiricus (fl. c. 200 A. D.). Academics held that knowledge was not possible; Pyrrhonists reserved judgment even on this question. The scepticism of the Academics may have been chiefly a dialectical instrument for confuting the arguments of opponents; that of the Pyrrhonists, on the other hand, was an attitude of mind (επιποξή) by which they achieved an imperturbability (αταραξία) reminiscent of

cal critique of knowledge, Greville added a Christian slant:

This Knowledge is the same forbidden tree,
Which man lusts after to be made his Maker;
For Knowledge is of Powers eternity,
And perfect Glory, the true image-taker;
So as what doth the infinite containe,
Must be as infinite as it againe.
(Humane Learning, 3)

In stanzas 61 through 78, Greville writes of the cautious use of practical arts. His emphasis is on empiricism, experience, and practice, and he seems to have derived many of his ideas from Bacon. Chief among these practical arts is "Government, / Which moulds, and tempers all these serving Arts" (Humane Learning, 79).

His idea of government, too, has a curiously religious cast:

For though the World, and Man can neuer frame
These outward moulds, to cast Gods chosen in;
Nor giue his Spirit where they giue his Name;
That power being neuer granted to the sinne:

the stoics. In the sixteenth century, Peter Ramus was accused by his opponents of being a "nouveau academicien" mainly because of the work of his collaborator, Talon, entitled Academica, an account of academic scepticism. See Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), "Preface," pp. ix-xvii and pp. 1-30; Louis I. Bredvold, The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden (1934; rpt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 16-46; also the entries "Arcesilaus," "Pyrrhon," "Sextus Empiricus" in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

Yet in the world those Orders prosper best,
Which from the word, in seeming, varie least.
(Humane Learning, 87)

Man by his own efforts cannot achieve grace, but in forming his governments he should at least copy the outward appearance of grace. In his views on government, Greville is pragmatic and empirical, like Machiavelli and Bacon, but his rigorous Calvinism would not allow him to ignore the moral and ethical element in his theorizing.⁴⁸

Much of Greville's thought is diffused with stoicism, derived largely from Seneca, which subserves his Calvinism.⁴⁹ Stoicism is particularly evident in the later stanzas of Humane Learning, for example the following:

Now, if this wisdom onely can be found,
By seeking God, euen in the Faith he giues;
If earth, heauen, sea, starres, creatures be
the bound,
Wherein reueal'd his power, and wisdom liues,
If true obedience be the way to this,
And onely who growes better, wiser is:

Then let not curious, silly Flesh conceiue
It selfe more rich, or happy when it knowes
These words of Art, which men (as shells) must cleave,

48 For comment on Greville's debt to Machiavelli and Bacon, see Bullough, pp. 14-18; and with particular reference to the Treatie of Humane Learning, pp. 52-62, passim.

49 Bullough, p. 9.

Before the lifes true wisdom they disclose;
 Nor when they know to teach, they know not what,
 But when their doings men may wonder at.
 (Humane Learning, 138-139)

There is a note of Calvinism in these stanzas in the portrayal of faith not as an appropriate exercise of man's effort, but as the gift of God.⁵⁰ But the central idea of the passage is stoical. Stoics believed that the only wisdom is virtue, and the only good. Virtue consists for the stoics in living in accordance with Nature, wherein God is revealed. The end of knowledge, therefore, is not to know or to teach, but to be good.⁵¹ Another strikingly stoical statement is the following:

Yet some seeke knowledge, meerely but to know,
And idle Curiositie that is;
 Some but to sell, not freely to bestow,
 These gaine and spend both time and wealth amisse;
 Embasing Arts, by basely deeming so:
 Some to be knowne, and vanity is this:
 Some to build others, which is Charity;
 But these to build themselues, who wise men be.
 (Humane Learning, 144)

But Greville believed, as the stoics did not, that men could not "build themselues" without the aid of

⁵⁰ See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. John Allen, I (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1936), p. 639: "By calling faith 'the work' of God, and 'the good pleasure of his goodness,' he [St. Paul] denies it to be the proper effect of human exertion."

⁵¹ See Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945; rpt. New York: Simon and Schuster, n. d.), pp. 252-270; also "Stoa (I)" in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed.

Bullough quotes a reviewer who comments of Greville and Samuel Daniel that "Both of them were really opposed to poetry, to its metaphôr, its hyperbole, its rhetoric; they had both developed to a degree beyond any of their contemporaries save Francis Bacon the prose mind."⁵³

But "plainness" is not in itself an adequate description of Greville's style. He was, it is true, distrustful of ornament and of fiction and partial to direct statement. And yet the bulk of his writing is not prose, but verse. Prosaic verse it may be, but it is verse nonetheless, rhymed and regular. Poetry, Greville says, "while it seemeth only but to please / Teacheth us order under pleasures name" (Humane Learning, 114). Poetry is pleasing but not in itself good. It is, however, orderly and in that corresponds to a higher order in the universe. This is the principle echoed in Greville's political philosophy when he declares that "in the world those orders prosper best / Which from the word, in seeming, varie least" (Humane Learning, 87). God's wisdom and the world's are two

⁵³ From Times Literary Supplement, 5 June 1930, p. 475. Quoted by Geoffrey Bullough, p. 22.

and irreconcilable. In earthly governance, man cannot achieve the perfection of God's law, but he can attempt to achieve the outward form of perfection and vary less "in seeming" from God's word. So, too, in poetry form is not itself important except as it reflects a higher principle and "Teacheth us order under pleasures name."

Greville's purpose was to reduce as far as possible the distance between thought and word--to produce "forms of speech such as from living wisdoms do proceed." His poetry is sparing of ornament, often direct of statement, and sometimes so concise as to abandon perspicuity and grammar. It may be "plain" in some sense, but, more important, it is sententious, aphoristic, gnomic--as will be seen from the examination of the poetry in the following chapter.

IV. FORMS OF SPEECH FROM LIVING WISDOM

Greville's poetic had little in common with the optimistic and rhetorically based theorizing of his friend Sir Philip Sidney and their older contemporary Puttenham. Norman K. Farmer, in equating the views of Greville and Sidney, observes that their apparent differences arise because of the divergent purposes for which they wrote on the subject of poetry.¹ But this difference of purposes is in itself revealing and possibly grounded in the fundamental disparity between the views of the two poets. Sidney the rhetorician and polemicist wrote a Defence of Poesie, a document which Kenneth O. Myrick has shown to be framed on the pattern of a Ciceronian oration.² On the other hand, Greville the philosopher touched upon the subjects of poetry and rhetoric in the context of his examination of the larger pattern of human knowledge--or, perhaps more accurately, human ignorance--in the Treatie of Humane Learning. As Farmer himself comments, "Greville . . . wrote more

¹ Norman K. Farmer, Jr., "Fulke Greville and the Poetic of the Plain Style," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 11 (1969), 659.

² Kenneth O. Myrick, Sir Philip Sidney as Literary Craftsman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), pp. 46-83.

with a philosophical rather than a persuasive intention."³ In the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy (as found, for example, in Plato's Ion and Book X of The Republic) Greville is on the side of Socrates. But Sidney, with the rhetorician's skill, argued that Plato did not banish poetry from his commonwealth by interpreting Plato's general objections to poetry as local and particular objections to the poetry of his epoch.⁴

This is not to suggest, however, that Greville held philosophy in very high esteem, for in his Treatie of Humane Learning he says: "Then what is our high-prais'd Philosophie, / But bookes of Poesie, in Prose compil'd?" (Humane Learning, 29). Even philosophy, for Greville, was corruptible and corrupting when its practitioners paid greater attention to words than to nature: "As if our end liu'd not in reformation, / But Verbes, or Nounes true sense, or declination" (Humane Learning, 31).

Sidney might seek to return a golden world for nature's brazen one, but Greville was a different kind of writer. His theme was the world as it is, practical politics,

³ Farmer, 659.

⁴ Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie in Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden, ed. Allan H. Gilbert (1940; rpt. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), p. 444.

prudential wisdom; his audience, those upon whose foot the black ox had trod, the disillusioned who would not be seduced by the colors of rhetoric. For Greville, the proper end of eloquence was "to declare / What things in Nature good, or euill are" (Humane Learning, 110).

This abbreviated summary of Greville's approach to poetry (derived from the findings of chapter II, above) was compiled from comments made in his later years. Nevertheless, the younger Greville, writing the early sonnets under the powerful influence of Sir Philip Sidney, could have been guided by a similar, though perhaps still unformulated view. An examination of some of the poems of Caelica may suggest what influence Greville's ideas about poetry, which were given full expression only in his mature years, had upon his early works.

Caelica is not a sonnet sequence in the same sense that Astrophel and Stella is. It seems, rather, to be a repository for Greville's shorter works. There is, nevertheless, some thematic development in the sequence as the poet, beginning in the conventional Petrarchan mode, eventually becomes dissatisfied with the neo-Platonic religion of love, and finally turns to the true religion of Christ's divine love.⁵

⁵ Douglas L. Peterson, The English Lyric from Wyatt to Donne (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 252.

It is often supposed that some of the early poems in Caelica were emulative efforts from the time when Sidney, Greville, and Dyer strove in song.⁶ J. M. Purcell has attempted to demonstrate parallelism between the first forty sonnets of Caelica and Astrophel,⁷ and, certainly, Greville often took an idea or image also found in Astrophel and put it to his own use. But once again, the differences between Sidney and Greville may be more important than the similarities.

Among the differences between Greville's sequence and Sidney's, besides those already noted, are the diversity of verse forms that Greville employs, the ironic tone he often adopts, and his tendency toward general rather than particular statement. Although, as a poet, Sidney was more inventive metrically than Greville, Caelica employs a greater variety of verse forms than does Astrophel. Except for the eleven songs, Sidney, in his sequence, uses only the fourteen line sonnet, mostly in some variety of the Italian rather than the English form. The verse forms in

⁶ Sir Philip Sidney, "Dispraye of a Courtly life," The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. William A. Ringler, Jr. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 263. In this poem Sidney speaks of "Striving with my Mates in Song" (l. 45) and marginally identifies his "mates" as Dyer and Greville.

⁷ J. M. Purcell, "Astrophel and Stella and Greville's Caelica," PMLA, 50 (1935), 413-422.

Caelica, on the other hand, include sonnets (all English), sixains, tetrameter couplets (LXXIV, LXXV), rhymed sapphics (VI), and poulter's measure (LXXXIII), to name only some of the forms. Taken together, however, the sonnets and the poems in six line stanzas (sixains) make up more than half of the sequence. Also many other poems in the sequence are basically sonnets in form but run to more or fewer than fourteen lines by the addition or subtraction of a quatrain. As Joan Rees has noted, among the poems of Caelica not in the fourteen-line sonnet form, many are "structures built of sonnet units."⁸ Even the sixains are, in a sense, "sonnet units," for, of Greville's forty fourteen-line sonnets, almost half (seventeen), though English in form, divide logically into octave and sestet. Sonnet XI illustrates this point:

Iuno, that on her head Loues liuerie carried,
 Scorning to weare the markes of Io's pleasure,
 Knew while the Boy in Aequinoctiall tarried,
 His heats would rob the heauen of heavenly treasure,
 Beyond the Tropicks she the Boy doth banish,
 Where smokes must warme, before his fire do blaze,
 And Childrens thoughts not instantly grow Mannish,
 Feare keeping lust there very long at gaze:
 But see how that poore Goddess was deceiued,
 For Womens hearts farre colder there than ice,
 When once the fire of lust they have receiued,
 With two extremes so multiply the vice,
 As neither partie satisfying other,
 Repentence still becomes desires mother.
 (Caelica XI)

⁸ Joan Rees, Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, 1554-1628: A Critical Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 78.

The Cupid story serves only as an introduction to Greville's real subject, the contrast between Mediterranean and northern love, to which he turns after line eight, effectively dividing the poem into octave and sestet. It would appear that Greville is guilty in this sonnet of the faulty construction which John Crowe Ransom finds in about half of Shakespeare's sonnets: the logical structure and the metrical structure are at odds.⁹ For Ransom, the English sonnet form implies a logical structure in which the three quatrains are co-ordinate and the couplet relates to them collectively. Ransom might have said that Greville had done better in this instance to use the Italian form.

But this fault in construction is only apparent. On closer examination the suitability of the metrical design to the logical structure becomes evident. The final six lines are not merely a sestet dressed up in the rhyme scheme of a quatrain and couplet, for the couplet represents another turn--actually a compression--of the thought. The Italian sonnet form is simpler than the English in that it

⁹ John Crowe Ransom, "Shakespeare at Sonnets," The World's Body (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 273. The important point, for the purposes of this study, is that the structure of a sonnet--either octave and sestet or three quatrains and a couplet--implies a corresponding logical structure or organization of content. This understanding of the relationship between form and content in the sonnet is not unique to Ransom. A similar observation may be found, for example, under the entry "Sonnet"

consists of only two parts, octave and sestet, but it is more flexible than the English because both parts provide greater compass for the development of thought. On the other hand, as Ransom says, "The English form, with the more elaborate and repetitive pattern, implies the simpler substance; in this it would be like other complicated forms, such as the ballade or sestina."¹⁰ The Italian form implies thought plus second thought, observation plus counter observation, and so forth. The English form, however, suggests three co-ordinate ideas, propositions, or observations to which, collectively, the couplet applies. The logical structure of Greville's sonnet is different from either of these. As in the Italian form, the first eight lines of Caelica XI introduce the idea that the turn of thought in the sestet will comment upon. But the sestet itself, unlike the sestet of an Italian sonnet, has two parts, the denial of Juno's notion that in northern climes fear keep lust in check and the aphoristic restatement of that denial. If there

in the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex. Preminger, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 781. One need not insist upon the logical rigor with which Ransom declares Shakespeare's flexibility a fault. As the author (L[awrence] J. Z[illman]) of the Encyclopedia entry comments, "Such matters of the relationship between form and content are, however, susceptible of considerable control in the hands of a skilled poet, and the ultimate effect in any given instance may override theoretical considerations in achievement of artistic integrity."

¹⁰ Ransom, p. 277.

is a failure here to match the logical to the metrical design, it is that the second part of the sestet, the aphorism "Repentence still becomes desires mother," is only one line and not the entire couplet.

The significance of this analysis is that it points up the importance of the six-line stanza in Caelica. In addition to being the most frequent verse form in the sequence besides the fourteen line sonnet form itself, the sixain may be seen as being, both logically and metrically, a part of almost half the sonnets. This is to say that in these sonnets the final quatrain and couplet taken together form a unit which stands in a definable relationship to the first eight lines of the poem as the sestet in an Italian sonnet stands in relation to the octave.¹¹ In most of Greville's sonnets the rhyme scheme is abab CDCDEFEGG, but in two the volta, or turn, in the thought after line eight is marked by a change in the rhyme. One of these is Caelica LXXXVI:

The Earth with thunder torn, with fire blasted,
With waters drowned, with windie palsey shaken
Cannot for this with heauen be distasted,
Since thunder, raine and winds from earth are taken:
Man torne with Loue, with inward furies blasted,
Drown'd with despaire, with fleshly lustings shaken,
Cannot for this with heauen be distasted,
Loue, furie, lustings out of man are taken.

¹¹ These sonnets are XI, XV, XVI, XIX, XX, XXXII, XXXV, XXXIX, XL, XLVI, XLIX, LXVII, LXIV, LXV, LXXIII, LXXXVI, CIII.

Then Man, endure thy selfe, those clouds will vanish;
 Life is a Top which whypping Sorrow driueth;
Wisdome must beare what our flesh cannot banish,
The humble lead, the stubborne bootlesse striueth:
 Or Man, forsake thy selfe, to heauen turne thee,
Her flames enlighten Nature, neuer burne thee.
 (Caelica LXXXVI)

In this poem, the rhyme scheme is abababab cdcdee. The first two quatrains are logically parallel: the macrocosm Earth and the microcosm man are both torn by their own passions. The quatrains are rhyme-linked. In the third quatrain, Greville turns from the rehearsal of parallel cases to offer stoic counsel. At this point the rhymes change. In the couplet, Greville changes his counsel from stoic self-containment to Christian self-abnegation. The logical form and the metrical form are perfectly fitted one to the other. In one other sonnet, XVI, the octave is rhyme-linked and the volta marked by a change in the rhyme scheme. The rhyme scheme of sonnet XVI is abababab babacc; the pattern reverses, but the rhymes remain the same.

The sixain is the most frequently occurring stanza unit in the sequence, and among the later poems it is more common than among the earlier ones.¹² The verse treatises, also late productions, are in this stanza. Despite Greville's

¹² Most critics agree that the order in which the poems are printed is approximately the order in which they were written. See G. A. Wilkes, "The Sequence of the Writings of Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke," Studies in Philology, 56 (1959), 489-503; and Ronald A. Rebholz, The Life of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 340.

experimental impulse, it seems that he found early a form which was congenial to his purposes and to which he frequently recurred until it became finally almost his exclusive medium of poetic expression.

The sixain was not a particularly novel form. It was used by many of Greville's contemporaries. Sidney used it for the verse in "The Lady of May" and some of the Arcadia poems; Spenser, for the January eclogue in the Shepherd's Calendar; Shakespeare, for his Venus and Adonis. Most of the extant poems of Edward Dyer, too, are sixains. But the use to which Greville put the form took advantage of the two part structure more consistently than any of these works. The stages through which Greville developed his use of the sixain can be seen in Caelica.

In the early poems of Caelica, Greville often suspends his syntax through the first four lines and frames his predicate in the couplet. Consequently, the sense of the entire stanza is dependent upon the couplet. The first stanza of sonnet I provides an example:

Loue, the delight of all well-thinking minds;
 Delight, the fruit of vertue dearely lov'd;
 Vertue, the highest good, that reason finds;
 Reason, the fire wherein mens thoughts be prov'd;
 Are from the world by Natures power bereft,
 And in one creature, for her glory, left.
(Caelica I)

The first four lines are, in effect, nominal sentences--

"Loue [is] delight," "Delight [is] the fruit of vertue,"

etc.--bound together by the rhetorical device of anadiplosis, but the sense of the stanza as a whole is incomplete until the couplet. The couplet has the effect of explaining or commenting upon the statements of the first four lines. A similar use of the form is found in sonnets III, V, and VIII.

Sonnet IX modifies this pattern. The quatrain poses a question; the couplet frames an answer:

O Loue, thou mortall sphere of powers diuine,
 The paradise of Nature in perfection,
 What makes thee thus thy Kingdome vndermine,
 Vailing thy glories vnder woes reflection?
Tyrannie counsell out of feare doth borrow,
To thinke her Kingdome safe in feare, and sorrow.
 (Caelica IX)

The cryptic and aphoristic answer which compels the reader to draw an analogy between love and tyranny points toward both the subject matter and the style which characterizes Greville's later use of sixains in both Caelica and the treatises.

In many of the later poems in Caelica, the first four lines of a sixain form the foundation on which an aphorism in the couplet is erected. The aphorism is often a conclusion following from the observations in the quatrain:

The Flood that did, and dreadfull Fire that shall,
 Drowne, and burne up the malice of the earth,
 The diuers tongues, and Babylons downe-fall,
 Are nothing to the mans renewed birth;
First, let the Law plough up thy wicked heart,
That Christ may come, and all these types depart,
 (Caelica LXXXVIII)

You that seeke what Life is in Death,
 Now find it aire that once was breath.
 New names vnknowne, old names gone:
 Till time end bodies, but soules none.
 Reader! then make time, while you be
 But steppes to your Eternitie.
 (Caelica LXXXII)

The couplets in these two stanzas address the reader directly with gnomic counsel which follows from the descriptions in the quatrains.

Often in the later poems the couplet is the sententious statement of a general principle which explains the quatrain:

Rewards of earth, Nobilitie and Fame,
 To senses Glorie, and to conscience woe,
 How little be you, for so great a name?
 Yet lesse is he with men that thinks you so.
For earthly Power, that stands by fleshly wit,
Hath banish'd that Truth, which should gouerne it.
 (Caelica XCI)

Fixe then on good desires, and if you finde
 Ambitious dreames or feares of ouer-thwart;
 Changes, temptations, bloomes of earthly minde,
 Yet waue not, since earth change, hath change of
smart.
For lest Man should thinke flesh a seat of blisse,
God workes that his ioy mixt with sorrow is.
 (Caelica XCIV)

In each of these stanzas, the couplet is framed as an aphoristic precept offered in explanation of the preceding lines.

Throughout Caelica, Greville's sixains are often divided between question and answer, example and precept--a particularity in the quatrain answered by a general, aphoristic statement in the couplet. Of course, not all of

Greville's sixains have exactly this pattern, but the pattern occurs often. In all but four of the later poems following the farewell to Cupid in LXXXIV examples may be found. Even in the four exceptions there is a division of labor among the parts of the sixain which suggests Greville's acute awareness of the form in the structuring of his thought. In three of these poems (XCVIII, XCIX, and CIX), the couplet of the sixain serves as a kind of refrain, repeated with variations in each stanza. Thus, in sonnet XCVIII, the couplet of the first stanza, "Lord, I haue sinn'd, and mine iniquity, / Deserues this hell; yet Lord deliuer me," is repeated in the second, and, in the third becomes, "Lord, from this horror of iniquity, / And hellish graue, thou wouldst deliuer me." The fourth exception, sonnet LXXXVII, consists of two sixains. Each is a single sentence of the form "when . . . then," with the conditions expressed in the quatrain and the result contingent upon them, in the couplet:

When as Mans life, the light of humane lust,
 In socket of his earthly lanthorne burnes,
 That all this glory vnto ashes must,
 And generation to corruption turnes;
 Then fond desires that onely feare their end,
 Doe vainely wish for life, but to amend.

But when this life is from the body fled,
 To see it selfe in that eternall Glasse,
Where time doth end, and thoughts accuse the dead,
Where all to come, is one with all that was;
 Then liuing men aske how he left his breath,
 Thatwhile he liued neuer thought of death.
 (Caelica LXXXVII)

In neither stanza of this poem does Greville employ the couplet for the framing of a terse philosophical generalization as he characteristically does in these later poems. The poem taken as a whole, however, is itself a striking and ironic comment on how men live and die.

As suggested in the preceding chapters, Greville, unlike many of his contemporaries, did not believe eloquence to be a matter of copiousness or of creating a golden world in the place of brazen nature. For Greville, true eloquence collapsed the distance between thought and expression and produced "forms of speech / Such as from liuing wisdomes doe proceed" (Humane Learning, 110). His tendency toward general rather than particular statement and the increasingly aphoristic nature of his poems in Caelica reflect this principle. So too it seems likely that Greville preferred the six-line stanza form because of the structural potential of the couplet to serve as an aphoristic "tail" to the quatrain. The sixain is an almost ideal form for Greville's kind of eloquence: the quatrain provides ample compass for life, or particularity, from which wisdom is condensed in the couplet.

Greville began his career as a poet writing sonnets in the Petrarchan mode, perhaps in emulation of his friend, Sir Philip Sidney. But even in his sonnets his thought seems to turn to larger themes, to seek the general, the universal truth, rather than the witty compliment. As

George Williamson observes,

In Fulke Greville the Petrarchan is already getting lost in the philosopher. Sententia becomes a style in him Certainly Greville cultivates the antithetic rhetoric of sententious writing, and in his use of metaphor resembles Bacon more than Donne.¹³

Greville's tendency from the beginning seems to have been away from lyric poetry and toward forms which would provide him greater scope for the pursuit of ideas. G. A. Wilkes explains his development as follows:

Greville's progression from the sonnet sequence to the Senecan play, and from the chorus to the discursive poem, marks his gradual realization of his identity as a reflective poet. The tendency to probe, speculate, and discuss that could find only an imperfect expression in Caelica, that had been encouraged, and yet still held under constraint, by the movement to the drama, found in the verse treatise its full scope and exercise.¹⁴

In the treatises, Greville was finally free from the "strangeness and perplexedness of witty fiction." He dealt directly with ideas and wrote, as C. S. Lewis says, "genuinely didactic verse, utterly unadorned and dependent for interest almost exclusively on its intellectual

¹³ George Williamson, The Proper Wit of Poetry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 28.

¹⁴ G. A. Wilkes, "General Introduction" to The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion, ed. G. A. Wilkes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 6.

content."¹⁵

The treatises are all written in the six-line stanza, the development of which in the Caelica poems has been traced earlier in this chapter. The sententiousness of Greville's style becomes even more marked in the treatises, for in them sentence is virtually all there is--no personae, no narrative, no Petrarchan ornament or conventional compliment, but only ideas, dense, compressed, and shaped into verse which "Teacheth vs order vnder pleasures name" (Humane Learning, 114). Greville wrote five works in this genre--Of Monarchy, Humane Learning, Fame and Honour, Warre, and Religion. Of these, the Treatise of Religion is probably the latest and in Greville's estimation the most important.¹⁶

Stylistically there are no significant differences between the treatises. Of Monarchy, the earliest and longest of them, had its beginning in the choruses of Greville's Senecan dramas. Consequently, it is concerned, as the dramas are, with issues of practical politics. The later treatises consider some of the same matters, not in terms

¹⁵ C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, Excluding Drama (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 524.

¹⁶ Wilkes, p. 16.

of political practice, but sub specie aeternitatis.¹⁷

As Wilkes says,

Through A Treatie of Warres, An Inquisition upon Fame and Honour, and A Treatie of Humane Learning Greville had been working, through a reconsideration of his earlier themes, towards a new metaphysic. In A Treatie of Religion it receives its final statement. The problem to which he addresses himself is the one that had occupied him almost from Caelica onward, the problem of mortal imperfection and its cure.¹⁸

The Treatise of Religion is, in a sense, the culmination of Greville's career as a poet, and as such it is the most suitable work in which to examine the poet's mature style.

In the Treatise of Religion it may be seen that Greville does not cultivate "the antithetic rhetoric of sententious writing"--to borrow Williamson's phrase--for its own sake. Rather there seems to be a deep cleft, an unresolved dualism, in Greville's world view.¹⁹ Perhaps

¹⁷ Wilkes, pp. 8-10, makes the same point and observes that the difference in purpose between Monarchy and the other treatises goes far toward explaining apparent contradictions and complexities in Greville's thought.

¹⁸ Wilkes, p. 16.

¹⁹ Joan Rees disagrees: "Greville's work does not at all reflect a conflict between two warring halves of experience." Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, 1554-1628: A Critical Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 6. The two halves of experience reflected in Greville's work, the worldly and the spiritual, may not be "warring," but they are separate and distinct.

because it captures this division of thought with such eloquent simplicity, Greville's declaration in a letter to John Coke has been much quoted: "I know the world and believe in God."²⁰ Antithesis in Greville's work goes deeper than syntax. It is not merely the rhetoric of sententious writing, but an abiding concern of his thought which marks the larger organization of his work as well as the individual turns of phrase.

In Caelica, for example, Greville begins with poems of earthly love, but in sonnet LXXXIV bids Cupid farewell and turns his mind to divine love, to "thoughts that please me less, and less betray me" (Caelica LXXXIV). The Treatise of Humane Learning, too, is founded in the similar division between knowledge and faith. In it Greville casts in- to doubt sense, reason, arts, and sciences--all the faculties of human knowledge--to make way for faith. And in the Treatise of Religion, Greville's subject is the sinfulness of man and the grace of God.

Greville announces his subject in the first three stanzas of the treatise: the fall from creation through sin and salvation through grace. Greville pursues the

²⁰ Greville, quoted by Ronald A. Rebholz, p. 216. The quotation may also be found in Geoffrey Bullough, "Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke," Modern Language Review, 28 (1933), 1; and Douglas Bush, English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century: 1600-1660, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 99; and Rees, p. 6.

exposition of his subject through branching pairs of opposites. There are two classes of fallen creatures, men and angels:

His Image that first made us in perfection,
 From Angells differinge most in time and place;
 They fall by pride, and we by their infection,
 Their doome is past, we yet stande under grace:
 They would be Gods, we would their evill knowe;
 Man findes a Christ, these Angells doe not so.²¹

Among fallen creatures, there are those to whom grace is available (men) and those to whom grace is not available (angels). Men know God through their sense, and sense is of two kinds, inward and outward: "Without, in power, we see him everie where; / Within, we rest not, till we find him there" (Religion, 7). Inwardly, questions arise in man's heart:

Questions againe which in our harts arise
 (Sinne lovinge knowledge, not humilitie)
 Though they be curiouse, Godlesse, and unwise,
 Yet prove our nature feels a Deitie
 (Religion, 9)

Man's inward nature is divided between spirit and flesh, between knowledge of God and self-love:

. . . if our nature were not strangellie mixt,
 But what it knewe, it could easilie doe;
 Men should (even by this spirit) in fleshe and blood,
 Gro happilie adorers of the good.
 (Religion, 12)

²¹ Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, A Treatise of Religion in The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion, ed. G. A. Wilkes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 203. Further references to this work will be to this edition. Citations will be given by stanza number parenthetically in the text.

The corruption of man's inward nature leads him "To seeke God, and Religion from without" (Religion, 14). Outwardly man finds religion imaged in "blinde affections" or in "wittie passions"; if the first, it is "Grosse superstition," if the second, "politique pretense" (Religion, 17). And yet there is in the world a true religion:

But as there lives a true God in the heaven,
So is there a true Religion here on earth:
By nature? no, by grace; not gotte, but given;
Inspir'd, not taught; from God a second birth.
God dwelleth neare about us, even within,
Worckinge the goodnesse, censuringe the sinne.
(Religion, 34)

This true religion is in turn distinguished from "heathen vertue, which they doe define / To be a state of minde, by custome wrought" (Religion, 36).

More than verbal wit, more than sententious rhetoric, the antithetical structure which may be seen in both the larger and the smaller elements of A Treatise of Religion is rooted in the subject matter of the poem, the divided nature of man. The treatise is about God and man, spirit and flesh, and throughout Greville distinguishes clearly between these:

Mixe not in functions God and earth together;
The wisdome of the world, and his, are two;
One latitude can well agree to neither;
In each, men have their beinges, as they doe:
The world doth build without, our God within;
He traffiques goodnesse, and she traffiques sinne.
(Religion, 98)

In his insistence upon the dual nature of truth--the world's wisdom and God's--Greville resembles Bacon. Basil Willey observes of Bacon that

He is concerned to insist that Truth is two-fold. There is truth of religion, and truth of science; and these different kinds of truth must be kept separate. This position is the inevitable result of any attempt to combine nominalism in philosophy with acceptance of religious dogma If you hold that individual "things" are alone real, and reject universals and abstractions as "names," mere flatus vocis: if you do this, and yet cling to a body of doctrine like the Christian, which implies that much else is "real" besides "things", you have no alternative but to accept the strange dichotomy of "Truth", and to try, as far as possible, to keep the two kinds from contaminating each other.²²

Greville, too, as a matter of practical philosophy, prefers to look to nature and practical use--to "things"--rather than theory and scholastic speculation for worldly truth. Bacon and Greville, however, do not actually "reject universals and abstractions." Both deal extensively in their writings in aphorisms which purport to be statements of general and universal truth. It might have been more exact to say that Bacon and Greville "reject universals and abstractions" as first principles, that they are empiricists and prefer inductive to deductive reasoning, that they are partial to arts and sciences that "Circle not round in selfe-imagination" (Humane Learning, 122).

²² Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background , (1934; rpt. Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1953), p. 35.

In both writers there is this twofold division of truth--the truth of revealed religion and the truth of practical experience. Willey observes that Bacon "wished to keep science pure from religion; the opposite part of the process--keeping religion pure from science--did not interest him nearly so much."²³ The reverse might be said of Greville, at least with respect to the Treatise of Religion. That is to say, Greville is more concerned to keep religion pure from science. In any case, both Bacon and Greville labor under the division of truth which inevitably arises from holding to an epistemology which recognizes the reality only of things and a metaphysic which recognizes a transcendent reality.

Both Greville and Bacon are aphoristic writers with a world view divided between practical experience and divine revelation. But this is not to say (in paraphrase of Oscar Wilde's remark about Meredith and Browning) that "Bacon is a prose Greville--and so is Greville. He uses poetry as a medium for writing prose." Bacon's approach to writing aphorisms is essentially different from Greville's. Of writing aphoristically, Bacon says,

. . . it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for aphorisms, except they be superficial, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustra-

²³ Willey, p. 37.

tion is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation: and there fore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded.²⁴

Bacon himself does not always live up to this ideal of aphoristic style. As Williamson observes, "Two tendencies in [Bacon's] Essays have often been pointed out: one toward greater concreteness of style and one toward more organized structure. This development seems to have been achieved by an increasing use of the elements which Bacon says are cut off in aphorisms" ²⁵ Greville's style, although often terse, asyndetic, and elliptical, is never devoid of illustration, example, and connection as Bacon would have aphoristic writing be. The choice itself of writing in verse rather than prose suggests a greater orderliness than Bacon demands of the aphorist. Moreover, the Treatise of Religion--and the same might be said of the other treatises--is not only a loose collection of pearls, but is strung together on a thread of argument that can be followed by the attentive reader.

²⁴ Francis Bacon, as quoted by George Williamson, The Senecan Amble: A Study in Prose Form from Bacon to Collier (1951; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 156.

²⁵ Williamson, The Senecan Amble, pp. 180-181.

Bacon, of course, was not a disciple of chaos. Williamson reminds us that "for Bacon cutting off connexion and order does not mean surrendering to disorder; rather it means not introducing more order than there is in the thought itself, or not elaborating a deceptive appearance of connected and finished discourse."²⁶ But even thus qualified, Bacon's prescriptions for aphoristic writing look toward a much looser kind of production than Greville customarily provides. Greville's poetry is certainly aphoristic. Grosart, in the "Essay Critical and Elucidatory" published in his edition of Greville's works, quotes fifty-one "sententious, terse, thought-packed, VITAL [sic] aphorisms" from the poetry.²⁷ And he adds that "Without the slightest effort I could bring five times or tenfold as many more, of the same weight and point."²⁸ But Greville's aphorisms usually come as the answer to a question, the summation of a series of observations, or the conclusion of an argument.

²⁶ Williamson, The Senecan Amble, p. 181.

²⁷ Alexander B. Grosart, ed., The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, II (1870; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1966), p. xlix. The aphorisms are quoted on pp. 1-lvii.

²⁸ Grosart, p. 1.

Greville's six-line stanza form is particularly well adapted to this combination of exposition and aphorism. Typically, in the Treatise of Religion, the first four lines of a stanza are questions or observations, and the couplet a sententious answer or comment. The first stanza of the Treatise of Religion follows this pattern:

What makes these manie lawes, these reynes of Power,
 Wherewith mankind thus fettered is and bound?
 These diverse worships which mens soules deflowre,
 Nature, and God, with noveltie confound?
 Tis ignorance, sinne, infidelitie,
 By which we falne from our Creation be.
(Religion, 1)

Greville begins by asking the ancient question: what is the cause of evil in the world? But he asks it in specific terms: why is man's law inconsistent with the law of God? His answer, in the couplet, is the conventional Christian answer. Man through his sinfulness has fallen from the original condition of his creation. The couplet is a direct statement the purpose of which is "not to flatter, or beseech, / Insinuate, or perswade, but to declare" (Humane Learning, 110). It is, in the nature of aphorism, a succinct statement of a general truth. Moreover, the couplet is entirely self-contained. It can stand alone. Finally, like most aphorisms, it has a clear form, in this case only the couplet form, which aids the memory, for aphorisms should be not only direct and succinct, but also memorable. Often Greville's couplets employ additional rhetorical

schemes--parallelism, antithesis, chiasmus--to sharpen the aphoristic point. The fourth stanza of the Treatise of Religion, for example, contrasts the condition of men and fallen angels and sums up the observations of the quatrain in the following couplet: They would be Gods, we would their evill knowe; / Man findes a Christ, these Angells doe not so" (Religion, 4). The couplet is framed as a chiasmus, the first half of the first line corresponding to the second of the second line, and vice versa. The couplet of stanza seven is composed of parallel and antithetical clauses: "Without, in power, we see him everie where; / Within, we rest not, till we finde him there" (Religion, 7). This last example chimes upon St. Augustine: "Our hearts find no peace until they rest in you."²⁹ The verse form, the rhetorical schemes, and the allusion all contribute to the memorability of the couplet and enhance its aphoristic quality.

Not all the stanzas in the treatise are rounded out with neat, sententious couplets. Sometimes a couplet, although not sufficiently self-contained to have the full force of aphorism, serves, nevertheless, as a tag to the quatrain:

²⁹ St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 21.

Questions againe which in our harts arise
 (Sinne lovinge knowledge, not humilitie)
 Though they be curiouse, Godlesse, and unwise,
 Yet prove our nature feeles a Deitie:
 For if these strifes rose out of other grounds,
 Man were to God, as deafnesse is to soundes.
 (Religion, 9)

In this stanza, the couplet cannot stand alone. It explains the statement of the quatrain, or at least re-states it by implicitly denying the alternative. The stanza might be roughly paraphrased thus: even our doubts prove that we feel a deity, for if they have another cause, it would mean that we do not feel a deity (which is unacceptable). The proposition will not bear close logical analysis. It is a tautology.³⁰ Nevertheless, the analogy in the final line exhibits the pithiness and wit expected of aphorism. It states again the thought of the quatrain, but is not alone intelligible without the preceding lines.

³⁰ Poetry, of course, is not required to be strictly logical. This stanza, however, might be taken as an extreme example of Ramist dialectic, as described by Perry Miller. According to Miller, Ramists believed that "true doctrine is a series of axioms, and correct propositions are so self-evident that in almost all cases doubt can be resolved by the mere statement of alternatives in the disjunctive syllogism" (The New England Mind [New York: Macmillan, 1939], p. 151). Thus, the propositions are arrayed in the quatrain: our doubts imply that we feel a deity; and in the couplet: our doubts imply that we do not feel a deity. The second proposition, at least to Greville's mind, is patently false. The alternatives need only be stated for the truth to be known. In the full form of the disjunctive syllogism, a second premiss would be required to deny one of the alternative propositions. Ramists, and Greville in this instance, leap from the disjuncts of the first premiss to an unstated and presumably obvious conclusion.

In still other stanzas there is no logical division between quatrain and couplet. The couplet simply follows as an unbroken continuation of the thought begun in the quatrain. Stanza eight is of this type:

Then seeke we must, that course is naturall
 For owned soules, to finde their owner out;
 Our free remorses, when our natures fall,
 When we doe well, our harts made free from doubt,
 Prove service due to one Omnipotence,
 And Nature, of Religion to have sense.
(Religion, 8)

Stanzas like this one are relatively rare in the treatise and are really violations of the form which ideally calls for a division of labor between the quatrain and the couplet. Usually the first four lines of a stanza provide the examples, illustrations, and connection that Bacon says are cut off in aphoristic writing, while the couplets contain summations, explanations, conclusions often framed with sententious point.

The quatrains, while they may exceed the demands of Bacon, still are not expansive rhetoric. They are direct and unadorned statements or questions rarely employing figurative language. In the treatises, and particularly in the exposition of the quatrains, one can see most clearly what critics such as Norman Farmer mean when they classify Greville's style as "plain."³¹

³¹ Norman K. Farmer, Jr., "Fulke Greville and the Poetic of the Plain Style," 657-670.

But Greville's poetry is not clearly within either of the major traditions of plain style in the English Renaissance. In his study of Ben Jonson's poetry, Wesley Trimpi quotes a seventeenth century treatise by Edmund Bolton which cites Raleigh, Greville, Donne, and Jonson as four poets who wrote in a plain style. Trimpi then observes that "For an accurate description of the changing conventions in the 1590's, however, the styles of Jonson and Donne must be distinguished from Raleigh's and in part from Greville's."³² The style of Jonson and, presumably, that of Donne, is the newly emergent classical plain style, arising in England in the 1590's and modeled upon the style of Latin satirists, epigrammatists, and comic writers; the style of Raleigh, the older native tradition of plain style. At least in Trimpi's opinion, Greville, apparently, does not belong entirely in either camp.

The chief difference between the classical and the native plain styles, in Trimpi's analysis, lies in the greater flexibility of the former. There are two major forces that go into the shaping of a line of verse, metrical form and the syntax of the language. In the native plain style, metrical form is the predominant factor, while in

³² Wesley Trimpi, Ben Jonson's Poems: A Study of the Plain Style (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 115.

the classical plain style normal idiomatic syntax predominates. The metrical form of the native plain style is frequently found in didactic poems of the middle ages such as Chaucer's "Fle fro the prees," and in the work of such sixteenth century poets as Wyatt, Gascoigne, and Raleigh. Typically, in the native plain style, each line is end-stopped and in each the caesura falls regularly after the fourth syllable. This is essentially the form recommended by Gascoigne in his "Certayne Notes of Instruction Concerning the Making of Verse or Ryme in English," where he advises that "in a verse of eight sillables the pause will stand best in the middest; in a verse of tenne it will best be placed at the ende of the first foure sillables"33

The prevailing metrical pattern that Trimpi finds in the native plain style demands that syntactical units be cut to fit the line length and to allow for a marked, regular caesura. The classical plain style, on the other hand, which Ben Jonson advocated and practiced, strove for a more idiomatic syntax, allowing caesuras--often more than one per line--to fall where they would.

33 George Gascoigne, "Certayne Notes of Instruction Concerning the Making of Verse or Ryme in English," English Literary Criticism: The Renaissance, ed. O. B. Hardison, Jr. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), p. 81.

Greville does not fit neatly into either the native or the classical tradition of the plain style. His lines have neither the rigid metrical form of the native style nor the easy idiomatic syntax of the classical. Rather Greville seems determined to pack as much thought into a stanza as he can without regard for end-stopping or caesural placement and sometimes even at the expense of clear syntax. Greville's style, in fact, resembles more the style of seventeenth century masters of prose, as described by Morris W. Croll:

The syntactic connections of a sentence become loose and casual; great strains are imposed upon tenuous frail links; parentheses are abused; digression becomes licentious; anacoluthon is frequent and passes unnoticed; even the limits of sentences are not clearly marked, and it is sometimes difficult to say where one begins and another ends.³⁴

Anacoluthon is not frequent in Greville's poetry, but otherwise this description fits well. In stanzas such as the following the syntax is obscure because of the lack of connection and the ellipses:

Yea, Prince of earth let man assume to be,
Nay more, of man let man himselfe be God,
Yet, without God, a slave of slaves is he;
To others, wonder; to himselfe a rod:

³⁴ Morris W. Croll, "The Baroque Style in Prose," *Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm*, ed. J. Max Patrick, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 232.

Restlesse despayre, desire, and desolation,
The more secure, the more abomination,
(Religion, 6)

And even this sacred band, this heavenlie breath,
In man his understanding, knowledge is;
Obedience, in his will; in conscience, faith;
Affection, love, in death it selfe, a blisse;
In bodie, temperance; in life, humilitie;
Pledge to the mortall of eternitie.
(Religion, 47)

Stanza 47 above might be paraphrased as follows: the Holy Spirit ("this heavenly breath"; the "sacred band" which draws man to God) is manifested in man's understanding and knowledge; in his will it is obedience; in his conscience, faith; in affection, love; and even in death it is bliss; in his body, temperance; in his life, humilitie. In summary, the Holy Spirit working in man's life is a pledge to mortal flesh of immortality. This paraphrase is simply an expansion, a filling-in of the ellipses. Greville's verse may be plain, but it does not have the idiomatic ease of Jonson. It is densely packed with ideas, but not in the way that the verse of Donne is. The density of Greville's verse does not arise from the discordia concors which Dr. Johnson found in metaphysical poetry and in which "The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together" ³⁵ Greville, rather, in his more intense passages like those quoted above, inundates the reader with a host of related ideas which are not yoked

35 Samuel Johnson, The Life of Abraham Cowley,
in Johnson: Prose and Poetry, ed. Mona Wilson (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 798.

together at all, at least not with the usual copulatives, conjunctions, and subordinating elements of English syntax. The effect is of prose cut to the shape of poetry by the omission of everything that is not essential--useful though it may be--to the sense of the passage.

According to Croll, the seventeenth century movement in prose represented by Lipsius, Montaigne, and Bacon "preferred the forms that express the energy and labor of minds seeking truth, not without dust and heat, to the forms that express a contented sense of the enjoyment and possession of it."³⁶ The verse of Greville's treatises, too, has such an effect. The terse elliptical sentences packed together in stanza after stanza do not "express a contented sense of the enjoyment and possession of [truth]," but rather the urgency of knowing, understanding, and doing God's will:

Then man! Rest on this feelinge from above,
Plant thou thy faith on this celestiall way.
The world is made for use; God is for Love;
Sorrowe for sinne; Knowledge, but to obay;
Feare and temptation, to refine and prove;
The heaven for joyes; Desire that it may
Finde peace in endlesse, boundlesse, heavenly
things;
Place it elsewhere, it desolation bringes.
(Religion, 114)

In this series of brief elliptical clauses joined only by semicolons, Greville attempts to compress as much as he can of all that he has already said in the treatise about God's

³⁶ Croll, p. 208.

truth and the world's before the stanza and the treatise come to rest in the final couplet.

In Caelica Greville experimented with a variety of poetic forms, conventions, and themes, and in the sequence can be found a tendency toward the brief, elliptical, and sententious style which he brought to its final refinement in the treatises. Rarely has there been a more prosaic poet than Greville of the treatises, a poet less intoxicated with words, more concerned for ideas and the direct expression of them. Bullough, in the introduction to his edition of Greville's poems and dramas, quotes a reviewer for the Times Literary Supplement who argues that both Greville and Samuel Daniel "were really opposed to poetry, to its metaphor, its hyperbole, its rhetoric; they had both developed to a degree beyond any of their contemporaries save Francis Bacon the prose mind."³⁷ Bullough himself puts it another way. Of Greville he says, "He is terribly sane, too sane indeed for great art."³⁸ He was capable, as at times in the Treatise of Religion, of the passionate apprehension and expression of thought, but the expression was direct, almost like prose. And perhaps this is what Bullough means in calling Greville "sane." There is something slightly mad

³⁷ Bullough, p. 22.

³⁸ Bullough, p. 23.

in the obliqueness of poetry, in symbol, allegory, and metaphor which persist in calling one thing by another's name, something megalomaniacal in making new worlds in the place of God's own creation. By this measure, Greville, in the treatises, was indeed "sane."

V. Conclusion

This study began by considering the diverse and apparently inconsistent comments that have been made by various critics about the style of Fulke Greville's poetry. It was hypothesized that if Greville's own ideas about poetry could be determined and compared to those prevalent in his time, distinctive features of his poetic would be brought to light, the effects of which should be discernible in his poetry. It was found that Greville, unlike many of his contemporaries, preferred a poetry of direct statement, sparing of the devices of fiction, metaphor, hyperbole, a poetry to meet head-on the experience of life and condense its wisdom to precept.

These ideas were formulated in Greville's later years. In his youth, under the influence of Sir Philip Sidney, he wrote a different kind of poetry. But even in the poems of Caelica his developing interest in the forms and themes of his later work can be seen. These forms and themes are better suited to the kind of poetry that Greville in his later years recommended, and they found their full scope of use and expression in the treatises.

In her critical biography of Fulke Greville, Joan Rees complains that "In the face of the varied accomplishment of Caelica it is difficult to know what value can be given to the term 'plain style' which is sometimes offered as a quasi-technical description of Greville's way of writing."¹ On the other hand, however, in the face of the direct statement and sparse imagery of his treatises, it is less difficult to understand the term "plain style," although the term is not fully adequate. Some of the difficulty in coming to grips with Greville's style arises from a failure to see his work steadily and to see it whole. Stylistic description which may be applicable to the treatises is not necessarily applicable to the sonnets. At least some of the confusion about Greville's style is a matter of over-simplified labelling.

The diverse genres of lyric and treatise are not likely to exhibit, on the surface, many similarities of style. At a deeper level, however, the works of an author are likely, even in different genres, to reflect similar preoccupations and tendencies. As Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon said, "Le style est l'homme meme." Greville's divided world view, his Calvinism, his political opinions are the common denomi-

¹ Joan Rees, Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, 1554-1628: A Critical Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 117.

nators of his poetry. These are not, in themselves, stylistic traits, but they are manifested in certain broad characteristics of Greville's work. The themes of Caelica, divided between worldly and divine love, the tendency in the lyrics toward general rather than particular statement, and the development of the six-line stanza to serve this tendency toward aphorism are the manifestations of Greville's basic concerns and theories about poetry which are brought to maturity in his later works, the treatises.

Greville began writing under the powerful influence of Sir Philip Sidney, and his earliest works, the poems of Caelica, bear the stamp of that influence. When Greville abandoned the lyric mode of Caelica, his own distinctive voice began to come through more clearly. But it is Greville's lyrics that have received the highest praise. In fact, Yvor Winters has said, "It is my own opinion that he [Greville] should be ranked along with Gascoigne, Raleigh, Shakespeare, Jonson, and Donne as one of the most considerable lyric poets of the century."² And yet the lyrics are not Greville's most characteristic productions. They are not the kind of work that displays most fully what, in the estimation of Greville's mature years, is the true nature of eloquence and purpose

² Yvor Winters, "The 16th Century Lyric in England," Elizabethan Poetry: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Paul J. Alpers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 110.

of poetry. Unlike Sidney, unlike Puttenham, Greville did not believe that the beauties of poetry could serve the classical purpose--to delight and to teach. But Greville was, nonetheless, a didactic poet. In his treatises he wrote, as C. S. Lewis says, "genuinely didactic verse, verse utterly unadorned and dependent for interest almost exclusively on its intellectual content."³

Greville's was a didacticism different from that described by Sidney. Poetry cannot make its readers good, since, he believed, one cannot be, or do, good except by the grace of God. And yet there are worldly duties to be fulfilled, practical matters in which the poet might have some modest influence. Greville's Calvinistic belief in the fallen and sinful nature of man, it was argued in chapter II above, imposed limitations upon his conception of the poet, his audience, and his subject matter. Fallen man cannot be good; the poet, also fallen, cannot make him good; but, in the conduct of the world's business, he can at least be counselled to pursue the outward appearance of goodness, for ". . . in the world those Orders prosper best, / Which from the word, in seeming, varie least" (Humane Learning, 87). Government

³ C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, Excluding Drama (1954; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 524.

which for Greville is the chief of arts, can establish order in the world, but such order is merely the shadow of God's word. The lesser arts, the "instrumentall following Arts" (Humane Learning, 102), including poetry, can do even less. But still, poetry, properly used, "Teacheth vs order vnder pleasures name" (Humane Learning, 114). The poet's efficacy extends only to this world, and while he may influence the conduct of the world's business, he cannot change men's hearts. Poetry, in its orderliness and form, is, like government, only a shadow of universal order. It cannot make a better world, but it is a hedge against chaos "Which in a glasse, shows Nature how to fashion / Her selfe againe, by ballancing of passion" (Humane Learning, 114).

Greville was, as Bullough says, "a religious reactionary . . . withdrawn into a Puritan scepticism of which Calvin himself would not have approved."⁴ This understanding of human nature both influenced Greville's choice of subject matter and shaped his style. It led him away from the "strangeness and perplexedness of witty Fictions; In which the affections, or imagination, may perchance find exercise, but the memory and judgement no enriching at all" (Life of Sidney, p. 223). The Poet is a man and by definition imper-

⁴ Geoffrey Bullough, "Introduction" to The Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, I (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1938), 62.

fect. So, too, are his audience men "who study to saile on a right course among Rocks, and quicksands" (Life of Sidney, p. 224). Such precepts, then, as will guide men on this course are, for Greville, the proper subject matter of poetry.

In the Caelica sonnets, as Maclean observes, Greville characteristically "moves from particular instance or experience to general precept or semi-philosophical observation."⁵ In chapter IV above, it was shown how Greville, in Caelica, adapted the form of his verse to serve this tendency toward generalization and precept. From the short poems of Caelica, Greville next moved to the drama which provided him greater scope for the formulation of philosophical statement, but left him still confined within a structure of fiction. Consequently, he turned to the verse treatise, a genre which he derived from the chorus of the drama and which, under his hand, was devoted exclusively to the exposition of philosophy and the sententious formulation of its precepts.

Greville's main philosophical preoccupations--prudential wisdom, scepticism, stoicism--are those that Morris Croll has detected in the work of the leading anti-Ciceronian

⁵ Hugh N. Maclean, "Greville's 'Poetic,'" Studies in Philology, 61 (April 1964), 172.

prose stylists of the period.⁶ As shown in preceding chapters, Greville, like his younger contemporary Sir Francis Bacon, was a pragmatist in political and social matters. Both Greville and Bacon held to a twofold division of truth--the truth of religion and the truth of science. Basil Willey, in his account of Bacon's thought, observes that "Men have never found it easy to live 'in divided and distinguished worlds'; they will have the one, or the other, exclusively, but not both at once."⁷ Bacon lived exclusively in the pragmatic, empirical world of things. But Greville was the exception to this rule of exclusiveness. He granted to God's truth the greater reality, but knew that man, because of his corrupt nature, had to live in the world of things. Man is both flesh and spirit, and, in A Treatise of Religion, Greville advises,

Mixe not in functions God, and earth together;
 The wisdom of the world, and his, are two;
 One latitude can well agree to neither;
 In each, men have their beinges, as they doe:
 The world doth build without, our God within;
 He traffiques goodnesse, and she traffiques sinne.
 (Religion, 98)

The three major philosophical strains detected in Greville's

⁶ Morris W. Croll, "Attic Prose: Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon," Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm, ed. J. Max Patrick, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 200-202.

⁷ Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background (1935; rpt. Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1953), p. 34.

thought relate directly to his dichotomous world view. The prudential wisdom, or political philosophy, that has such a prominent place in his writing reflects his knowledge of the world and of man's needs for living in the world. The scepticism, noted particularly in the first sixty stanzas of the Treatie of Humane Learning, in abolishing the authority of human faculties, serves his belief in God, which is fideistic and which denies the ultimate worth of any wholly human effort. His stoicism enables him to peer into the gulf between man and God without flinching.

Like Bacon and other anti-Ciceronian stylists in prose, Greville was an aphorist. He wrote poetry because he believed that the discipline of verse was itself a lesson in universal order. But his pragmatism was essentially different from Bacon's. Bacon's was optimistic, liberal materialism. As Bullough observes, however, "Greville's Machiavellian maxims were a counsel of despair, frail hope of salvaging a civilization in decline."⁸

Thus Greville brought to his work the thought of his time, but weighed it in the balance of his own preoccupations. He produced neither graceful, courtly poems like Sidney's, nor brisk aphoristic essays, like Bacon's. His vision of the world was bleaker than either Sidney's or Bacon's, and

⁸ Bullough, pp. 17-18

that vision informed his works.

One cannot find, and should not expect to find, complete stylistic consistency between the works of an author in genres as diverse as lyric and treatise. But going behind the works to the mind that produced them, one can see that the treatises and not the lyrics are the most characteristic of Greville's compositions, and that even in the lyrics he tended toward a poetry of philosophical statement. It is not surprising that most categorizations of Greville's style seem misleading, for his is a poetry almost sui generis, having neither clear antecedents nor descendants. As shown in chapter IV, Greville is neither heir to "Drab Age" plainness nor the precursor of metaphysical style. He has neither the courtly grace of Sidney nor the classical ease of Jonson. But his poems have an excellence of their own, and especially the Treatie of Humane Learning and the Treatise of Religion, have a wholly intellectual majesty and passion which make them more than merely versified prose and raise them to the level of genuine poetry. Greville's works are not a kind of poetry which at present inspires great critical acclaim. They are difficult works, but works which deserve a place of their own in our understanding of the full scope of poetic achievement in the period.

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