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Abdullah Aydogan
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Institutional Foundations of Military Coups: Constitutional Design and Military Centrality

A Dissertation Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Political Science
University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)

By
Abdullah Aydogan
May, 2015

INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY COUPS:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND MILITARY CENTRALITY

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Abstract

This dissertation examines how the likelihood of military coups varies depending on a country's adopted institutions. I focus on two types of institutions—parliamentary versus presidential structures, and the military's political, financial, and judicial privileges. In regard to the former, I propose a novel theoretical argument explaining why parliamentary systems experience fewer military coups. My argument relies on the inherent features of parliamentary systems, which potentially benefit the military elites such that they do not need to conduct a coup to get the policy outcomes and influence they seek. These features are (1) the presence of a government (coalition) formation process to select the chief executive after legislative elections and (2) the vote of no-confidence procedure to terminate a government early. Both of these features allow the military elites to influence the overall ideology of the government without resorting to a direct government takeover.

In regard to the second determinant, military privileges, I argue that the existing ways to capture military centrality, based on the number of military personnel and the military budget, fail to correctly measure the military's political power. In a highly democratic country such as the US or in a highly authoritarian country such as China, these scores might be quite high, although the likelihood of a coup is definitely not. In this dissertation, I propose an alternative measurement method for the centrality of the military in politics that is based on certain military privileges: the existence of military-owned businesses, the extent of the jurisdiction of military courts, whether or not the chief executive or defense minister is a military officer, and how much military elites are

respected during the state's ceremonial meetings. Using this original measure, I also examine the relationship between the military centrality and the likelihood of coups.

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Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES	X
LIST OF FIGURES	XI
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
<i>Multi Method Approach for Researching on Civil-Military Relations.....</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Dissertation Outline.....</i>	<i>7</i>
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENT	10
<i>Studies on Military Coups and Democratic Breakdowns.....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Theoretical Framework.....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Comparing Bargaining in Two Systems.....</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Summary.....</i>	<i>36</i>
CHAPTER 3: EGYPT-TURKEY COMPARISON.....	37
<i>Civil-Military Conflict of Turkey in 1997 Vs. Egypt in 2013.....</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>Outcomes of the Conflicts.....</i>	<i>43</i>
<i>Alternative Arguments.....</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Examples from Other Parliamentary Systems.....</i>	<i>49</i>
<i>Military Strategies in Other Presidential Systems.....</i>	<i>52</i>
<i>Summary.....</i>	<i>52</i>
CHAPTER 4: TESTING THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN.....	56
<i>Data and Method.....</i>	<i>57</i>
<i>Results.....</i>	<i>61</i>
<i>Summary.....</i>	<i>70</i>

CHAPTER 5: MEASURING LATENT MILITARY CENTRALITY	73
<i>Studies on Military Centrality</i>	<i>76</i>
<i>Institutional Dimensions of Military Centrality.....</i>	<i>79</i>
The Financial Dimension	79
The Judicial Dimension.....	81
The Political Dimension	84
<i>Reference and Comparison Categories</i>	<i>85</i>
<i>Comparing Two Methods</i>	<i>87</i>
<i>Military Centrality Index</i>	<i>91</i>
<i>Summary</i>	<i>109</i>
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....	124
<i>Summary of the Findings.....</i>	<i>125</i>
<i>Implications for Democratization and Democratic Breakdowns.....</i>	<i>127</i>
<i>Implications for Civil-Military Relations.....</i>	<i>128</i>
REFERENCES.....	132

List of Tables

TABLE 2.1: COMPARING TWO SYSTEMS.....	21
TABLE 2.2: NOTATIONS FOR THE BARGAINING MODEL	30
TABLE 3.1: COMPARISON BETWEEN EGYPT AND TURKEY.....	40
TABLE 4.1: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PER DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IN SYSTEM YEAR).....	59
TABLE 4.2: PROBIT AND DURATION MODEL RESULTS FOR MILITARY COUP ANALYSIS	65
TABLE 5.1: COUNTRY SCORES ON EACH MILITARY VARIABLE	82
TABLE 5.2: COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS USING OLS REGRESSION	88
TABLE 5.3: COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS USING FACTOR ANALYSIS.....	91
TABLE 5.4: BAYESIAN MARKOV CHAIN MONTE CARLO ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR MILITARY CENTRALITY INDEX	94
TABLE 5.5: PROBABILITY OF HAVING RELATIVELY HIGHER MILITARY CENTRALITY SCORE	96
TABLE 5.6: COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS USING FACTOR ANALYSIS (WITH MILITARY CENTRALITY INDEX).....	99
TABLE 5.7: COMBINED MILITARY CENTRALITY INDEX.....	105

List of Figures

FIGURE 2.1: FREQUENCY OF MILITARY COUPS PER DEMOCRACY LEVEL (1960-2006).....	17
FIGURE 2.2: BARGAINING BETWEEN MILITARY AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE.....	29
FIGURE 2.3: BARGAINING IN NONPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS	33
FIGURE 2.4: BARGAINING IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS	35
FIGURE 4.1: KAPLAN-MEIER SURVIVAL ESTIMATE GRAPHS	64
FIGURE 4.2: POST-ESTIMATION GRAPHS.....	69
FIGURE 5.1: MILITARY CENTRALITY RANKING BY COUNTRY	95
FIGURE 5.2: COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS BY THEIR CORRELATIONS WITH EXPERT ANALYSIS	98
FIGURE 5.3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY CENTRALITY AND COUP RISK	103
FIGURE 5.4: COMBINED MILITARY CENTRALITY RANKING BY COUNTRY	106
FIGURE 5.5: MILITARY CENTRALITY INDEX WITH IMPUTED DATA	108
FIGURE 5.6: CORRELATION OF THE EXPERT ANALYSIS AND THE MILITARY CENTRALITY INDEX (WITH IMPUTED DATA)	109

To my parents, Emine & Bekir Aydođan

Chapter 1: Introduction

More than 200 military coups have taken place in 95 countries over the last 75 years. Although military involvement in politics seems to have diminished following the Cold War, the aftermath of the Arab Spring reminds us that the military still plays a critical role in the politics of many states, and institutional structures are key to understanding this role. Despite these facts, few studies have examined the determinants of military coups in a global context until recently due to the lack of global data (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Instead, most studies focus on specific regions such as Latin America or Africa (for example Stepan, 1988; Jackman, 1978; Fossum, 1967; Decalo, 1990; Agyeman-Duah, 1990; McGowan, 2003; Lunde, 1991; Kposowa and Jenkins, 1993; Dix, 1994; Jia and Liang, 2010). The recent data collection efforts have facilitated global studies on this topic (Svolik, 2012; Powell, 2012; Hiroi and Omori, 2013). However in these global studies the institutional determinants of coups still do not receive sufficient attention.

This dissertation aims to show that (1) the likelihood of a coup is lower in parliamentary systems, and (2) countries in which the military has a high level of economic, judicial, and political influence are more prone to coups. This dissertation encompasses a wide array of research dimensions: discussion of an original theory on the

likelihood of coups, formal game theoretic analysis of the interaction between the military and the politicians, quantitative analysis of a global data from 1960-2001, a qualitative comparative analysis of the civil-military conflicts experienced in two very similar Middle East countries, and finally description and analysis of originally collected data on military centrality.

Extant scholarship on democratic breakdowns discusses the role of constitutional design (presidentialism versus parliamentarism) on the prospects of democratic survival. However, due to the nature of the question, these studies focus only on democratic states. Coups, though, occur even more frequently in semi-democratic regimes, and the above institutions are still relevant in these cases according to several scholars (Gerring et al. 2009). In addition, scholars mostly do not discriminate coups from other types of breakdowns, such as the self-coup of Hitler in Germany or Fujimori in Peru. Moreover, the literature neglects how the military may manipulate the political outcomes so that they may get their desired policies adopted without conducting a coup. In most new democracies and semi-democracies, the military is very politicized and the elites use their power to impact key political decisions at different levels and forms, particularly when the formation of government is under debate (Finer, 1962; Agüero, 1995; Pion-Berlin, 2001; Bland, 1999; Croissant et al., 2010). By neglecting this possibility, scholars have failed to recognize the military's alternative strategies to conducting a coup, particularly in parliamentary systems.

This dissertation argues that unique features inherent to parliamentary systems provide alternative options to the military elites to change the chief executive in order to protect their interests. These features include the existence of a coalition formation

process after elections and early government terminations via a vote of no confidence. I claim that a military willing to control the politics in a parliamentary system is better off as long as at least one ideologically desirable political party becomes a member of the governing coalition. In such a case, this party might behave like a veto player, which blocks government actions in conflict with the military elites' ideology. Moreover, the bargaining during the government formation process is highly opaque (Strøm, 2000, p.281).

I argue that a low level of transparency might provide more room for military influence when a country has a politicized military. In the event that the military fails to influence the government formation process, or in the case that the chief executive later decides to deviate from the military ideology for some reason, the military can try to terminate the government using the vote of no confidence procedure. It may threaten the legislators, or convince them to vote "no," perhaps through a bribe. Indeed, in both parliamentary and presidential systems, the legislative branch generally has the power to dismiss the chief executive. However, in presidential systems the impeachment procedure is more costly, since approval of 2/3 of legislators is necessary, combined with allegations of a serious crime. The requirement for the vote-of-no-confidence-procedure is typically a simple majority. Hence the militaries in presidential systems are less likely to use such alternative strategies compared to those in parliamentary systems.¹

¹ Throughout the dissertation I will treat the semi-presidential systems as similar to presidential ones. Although there are obvious differences between the semi-presidential regimes and the presidential regimes, the way the chief executive is selected is identical. In both cases the chief executive is the president and he/she is elected by direct public

The second institution that I discuss here is the legal military prerogatives. Studies on military coups use the highly problematic military centrality index to capture the political effectiveness of the military within a country (Andreski, 1968; Nordlinger, 1976; Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992; Wang, 1998; Powell, 2012). In these studies military centrality is based on the level of military expenditure and the number of military personnel. However, even established democracies like the US may score very highly on such indicators although the probability of experiencing a military coup is remarkably low. Likewise, an authoritarian state like China and Saudi Arabia scores highly on this index, although the likelihood of a coup is not high.

My approach toward solving this problem is original. It involves considering the power of civilian authority in controlling the military and in limiting the military's involvement in politics. To better examine the institutional privileges of the military, my dissertation involves collecting a more reliable data for military centrality. I create an index of military centrality based on the following questions: Is the chief executive or the defense minister a military officer? Is the chief military officer ranked higher than an ordinary member of the parliament during the official state ceremonies? Do the military elections instead of a government formation process in the parliament. Therefore the chief executive is not accountable to the parliament in both cases. The way the chief executive is selected constitutes the core of the theory proposed here, as there is a reached consensus in the coup literature in which the target of a coup is ousting the chief executive and replacing with more desirable one. Hence it is plausible to treat presidential and semi-presidential systems as identical. However the empirical analysis will control for the possible variation across the regimes.

elites run any enterprises? And finally, does the jurisdiction of military courts exceed the military affairs? For now, the data is limited to 50 countries which score from 1 to 9 in the Polity IV democracy index in 2012, and which have a population higher than three million.

The scholarly contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, it broadens the “presidentialism versus parliamentarism” debate without neglecting a very important feature of semi-democracies, where the unelected political actors (such as military elites) might be highly influential in key political decisions, such as government formation. In this respect I propose a novel theoretical mechanism and test its macro implications on a global data set. Second, unlike the existing efforts to capture the military’s effectiveness, this study proposes a direct and more reliable measure of military centrality, which is based on the military’s institutional prerogatives rather than being based on the number of military personnel and the budget. The next section will discuss and present the methodological approach of this dissertation.

Multi Method Approach for Researching on Civil-Military Relations

Each social science inquiry method has its own relative merits and advantages over others. For example, formal theoretical approaches utilize mathematical modeling techniques to trace the way political outcomes take place (namely, micro-foundations) in decision theoretical or game theoretical settings under certain assumptions. One of the important strengths of formal modeling is the emphasis on the logical consistency and ability to guide to the relevant statistical test (Achen, 2002, 2005; Granato and Scioli 2004; Granato et al., 2010, 2015). Qualitative research approaches, on the other hand, are

seen as using the magnifying glass to better observe the details of causal mechanisms on specific cases. More specifically, these methods offer important advantages on developing the concepts and theoretical frameworks and testing the causal mechanisms (Bates, 2008; Collier et al., 2004; Lieberman, 2005). And finally, quantitative research methods care the details of individual observations relatively less, and aim to demonstrate the big picture through examining the measurable differences among the sufficiently large number of observations. Although each method has its unique advantages to the researchers, none of them is seen as the perfect solution for all the social science questions.

The limits of these methods have also been discussed widely in social science disciplines. For example, qualitative research methods were highly criticized because of lack of generalizability. The formal modeling techniques, on the other hand, were mostly critiqued because of the level of abstraction, empirical inapplicability of some models, and unjustifiability of certain assumptions. And finally, the quantitative methods were often claimed to be disregarding the important factors such as historical circumstances and informal context. Existence of all these merits and limits of these methods created a new research tradition. Advocates of this tradition highlighted the advantages of employing multi method approach that combines formal theoretical, qualitative, and quantitative methodologies (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom, 2010; Granato and Scioli 2004; King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; Tarrow, 2004; Bates et al., 1998; Laitin, 2003). For example, Ostrom and her colleagues argue a social science inquiry that manages to successfully synthesize different research approaches will be superior to others that are solely based on one method. They further state, “Scholars should seek logical coherence

and evidence for causal processes, and should test for the generality of relations by drawing on formal, qualitative, and quantitative methods” (p. 12).

Following this school of thought, this dissertation possesses multi method approach to advance our understanding of the foundations of civil-military relations. For this purpose, the dissertation aimed to combine formal game theoretical analysis, qualitative comparative most similar case study, and quantitative examination of global data. In this vein, the analysis starts with formalization of the theoretical framework, which asserts that military elites’ decision to resort a coup varies across different institutional constraints. Although this formalization helped demonstrating the logical consistency of the argument by using mathematical modeling, its abstract nature limits illustrating the full picture. Hence, in the second step, I employed qualitative in depth case analysis of two highly similar civil-military conflicts. The qualitative analysis demonstrates the validity of the game theoretical framework in the real world. However, the overarching picture is still not complete due to the generalizability issue. Therefore, I employed quantitative data analysis of global data. The following section will outline the dissertation.

Dissertation Outline

The dissertation consists of 6 chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. The second one is the theory chapter where I review the literature and present the theory. It starts with reviewing the studies on military coup and democratic breakdowns. Then it continues with discussing the weaknesses in the literature. I argue that the existing military coup studies did not look at the impact of constitutional design, and the

democratic breakdown studies limited the analysis only to the democratic states. However, there are many countries, which can be classified in terms of constitutional design beyond the democracies. This discussion is followed by describing the theoretical framework both verbally and formally. The game theoretical framework presents how military elites' strategies to get rid of a sitting undesirable chief executive change under different institutional constraints. More specifically, it demonstrates that the threshold for conducting a coup is lower in presidential systems.

In Chapter 3, I compare two highly similar cases of civil-military conflict in Egypt and in Turkey. In both cases hardcore secular military generals faced religious chief executives. And in both cases the military generals achieved their ultimate goals at the end. However, their strategies were different. The comparison of these two cases illustrates how parliamentary system in Turkey provided alternative options to the military generals, which make coup only the second best option. The chapter also examines the Turkish military coup history and discusses them from the perspective of the theory proposed here. The chapter concludes with the examples of military intervention to politics in other parliamentary systems. The theoretical discussion and the empirical examples showed here suggest parliamentary systems may also be detrimental for democratic legitimacy in some circumstances as it may provide some venues open to the military influence. This is contrary to the earlier theories of perils-of-presidentialism literature advocating the superiority of the parliamentary systems in terms of democratic legitimacy.

Chapter 4 is devoted to the quantitative analysis of the macro implication of the main theoretical argument presented here. In contrast to the earlier studies, I have

expanded the data set so that it includes all the cases in which countries can be classified in terms of constitutional design. The results demonstrate that military coups are less likely in parliamentary systems even after controlling for the important covariates such as military legacy. This finding disagrees with the recent theories of perils-of-presidentialism literature arguing that the impact of constitutional design vanishes when the model controls for the military legacy variable.

In Chapter 5, I move on to the discussion of another institutional foundation of military coups: military centrality in politics. The chapter starts with reviewing the literature and discussing certain problems about the way the military centrality concept is measured. Then, I propose an alternative measurement, which is based on institutional privileges of the military in economy, judiciary, and politics. It is followed by presentation of an originally collected data on these institutional privileges. Then, using factor analysis methods, I will create unified military centrality index based on the originally collected data. And finally, I will use this data to explain the likelihood of military coups. The findings demonstrate that the alternative measure, which is based on institutional prerogatives of the military, is superior to the traditional methods. They also show that military coups are more likely if military centrality is higher. Chapter 6 will conclude with the summary of the findings and discussing their possible implications.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Argument

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework that I use to explain how a particular set of institutions shapes military elites' decisions to conduct coup. Recent military coup studies propose convincing theories and test them using large-N data (e.g. Thyne, 2010; Svolik, 2012a; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2010; Powell, 2012; Hiroi and Omori, 2009). However, these studies do not discuss the possible impact of constitutional design – e.g. presidentialism vs. parliamentarism – on the likelihood of coups.

In contrast, the extant literature using global data to examine the effects of constitutional design takes democratic breakdown as its dependent variable (Linz, 1978; Cheibub, 2007; Sing, 2010; Stepan and Skach, 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Maeda, 2010). While democratic breakdown is clearly a phenomenon worth studying, these studies necessarily exclude semi-democratic and non-democratic states — cases in which some semblance of democracy exists and classification in terms of the constitutional design is quite possible. Indeed, Gerring *et al.* (2009, p.338) argue that the distinct characteristics of presidentialism and parliamentarism are apparent and meaningful as long as a modicum of multiparty competition exists. Moreover, if we are

interested in military coups, military elites are almost certainly politically influential in countries beyond those classified as established democracies.

I argue that parliamentary systems are less likely to experience military coups because military elites, as well as the non-military elites who may potentially conduct a coup, have an alternative solution to achieve their policy goals, which makes a coup only the second-best option.² They may influence the members of the parliament to install a chief executive who is desirable from the military perspective. This option might also exist in presidential systems but it is much more applicable in parliamentary systems because only in these systems is the chief executive accountable to the parliament through a vote of confidence, and only in these systems can the executive be shared by a coalition of parties.

The perils-of-presidentialism literature considers military coups as the sole form of military intervention into politics. However, several scholars argue that coups are not the only form of intervention. In most new democracies, the military is highly politicized and it uses its power to impact the key political decisions in varying degrees and forms (Finer, 1962; Croissant et al., 2010, 953; Agüero, 1995; Pion-Berlin, 2001; Bland, 1999). Neglecting this possibility resulted in failure to recognize the military's alternative

² Throughout the dissertation, I refer to “military elites” to simplify the argument. But indeed coups can be conducted by non-military elites as well, and this fits well with the general theoretical framework proposed here. In terms of coup perpetrators I follow the criteria outlined by Powell and Thyne (2011, 250); “...any elite who is part of the state apparatus. These can include non-civilian members of the military and security services or civilian members of the government.”

strategies, which may postpone coup plans. The next section will review the literature on the determinants of military coups and the democratic breakdowns as well as the studies on civil-military relations, which argue that military coup is not the only form of military intervention to politics. The following section will demonstrate the theoretical argument. The fourth section will formalize the theory. And the final section will conclude.

Studies on Military Coups and Democratic Breakdowns

Existing military coup studies provide promising theories regarding the determinants of coups including income, income growth, income inequality, change in military spending, international factors, and so on (for example, see Thyne, 2010; Londregan and Poole, 1990; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Hiroi and Omori, 2009, Pilster and Böhmelt, 2010; Powell, 2012; Svobik 2012a, 2012b).

However, one possible determinant has not received much attention within this literature: constitutional design. The perils-of-presidentialism literature, in contrast, focuses on constitutional design, but mostly does not separate military coups from other types of democratic breakdown and does not consider the whole universe of cases in which regimes can be classified as presidential or parliamentary (Gerring et al., 2009). What is more, these studies consider military coups as the only method of military interference into politics and neglect how military elites can influence key political decisions in between elections (Finer, 1962; Croissant et al., 2010, p.950). Kuenhn and Lorenz (2011, p.234) state that most of the militaries in the developing world have significant ability to influence not only the public policy but also formation and

dissolution of governments. I argue this ability influences the likelihood of military coups to a great extent.

Linz (1978, 1990a, 1990b) argues that three inherent features make presidential systems more prone to breakdown. The first feature is the existence of separate elections for the legislative and executive branches. He argues that this feature may lead to a dual legitimacy problem when opposing parties dominate these branches. In such cases deadlocks and political conflicts may occur, and as a result, political instability may follow. Such instability may eventually lead to regime breakdown. Secondly, Linz states that in presidential systems the competition for the executive branch is a zero-sum game, hence, the winning party takes all the benefits. This is not the case in parliamentary systems. Even the smallest party that enters to the parliament could join a coalition and enter the executive branch. Hence the losers of the election are not totally excluded from the executive office.

And finally, presidential systems are more rigid since there is a fixed term rule for both parliament and president. Thus, Linz claims presidential systems do not have deadlock-breaking devices if a legislative impasse occurs. Linz argues that parliamentary systems provide legal solutions to terminate deadlocks. For example, a prime minister can call for an early election in case of an impasse.

Although these three inherent features may have some influence on the likelihood of breakdown, Linz does not consider the forms of military influence other than military coups and how they may vary across different institutions. Linz suggests that parliamentary systems are normatively good for democratic legitimacy and survival. However, he does not discuss how the military might benefit differently in parliamentary

systems than in presidential systems. That is to say, Linz disregards how a politically central military might influence the government formation and termination processes. Failure to account for other forms of influence leads to potentially erroneous conclusions about the superiority of democratic legitimacy in parliamentary systems relative to presidential ones.³

Cheibub (2007) does not agree with this perils-of-presidentialism framework.⁴ He argues that military legacy is the key factor explaining the occurrence of democratic breakdowns, rather than the inherent features of presidentialism. Legislative coalitions are common in presidential systems and existence of an institutionally powerful chief executive is not associated with breakdowns. He claims presidentialism was mostly adopted in cases where democracy was not very likely to survive, particularly, in countries with a history of military dictatorship. He states presidential systems experience more breakdowns due to this military-presidential nexus. He describes this process of institutional selection as a *historical accident* (page 23), and he argues that when controlling for military legacy, the impact of constitutional design on democratic breakdown disappears.

³ Hence the theory proposed here is not only flipping Linz's perils-of-presidentialism framework to argue from a parliamentary system perspective. More than that, the theory takes the extra-constitutional mechanisms (such as military elites' influence on certain key political decisions) into account, and examines how they may affect the likelihood of breakdown.

⁴ For earlier debates see Horowitz (1990), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Shugart and Carey (1992), Stepan and Skach (1993), Cheibub and Limongi (2002).

In contrast, this paper argues that parliamentary systems (regardless of the level of democracy) experience fewer coups and coup attempts (not democratic breakdowns), because they provide additional venues where the military may exercise political power without resorting to a coup. As with Linz, Cheibub does not consider military elite strategies other than coups. Even if we keep the status of military legacy fixed, presidential regimes provide fewer venues to the military elites to influence the selection of chief executive compared to what parliamentary systems provide on average. Hence empirical results should confirm the hypothesis that constitutional design matters for the prevalence of coups even after controlling for military legacy. The theory section will discuss this in more detail.

Some other recent studies have criticized Cheibub's military legacy framework. Sing (2010) argues that neither constitutional design nor military legacy influences the likelihood of breakdown of democracies. Instead, US foreign policy and legislative effectiveness are the true, but neglected determinants. Svobik (2008) proposes two distinct mechanisms that explain democratic survival for two sets of democracies—consolidated and unconsolidated. Covariates that explain democratic consolidation are different from those that explain breakdown in unconsolidated democracies. His analysis based upon this distinction reveals that level of economic development, constitutional design, and military legacy are the determinants explaining whether a democracy becomes consolidated, but they do not explain the authoritarian reversals. Instead, reversals are explained by economic recessions.

Maeda (2010) divides the forms of breakdowns into two categories: endogenous and exogenous. The former occurs when the chief executive transforms the regime into

an authoritarian system, such as Fujimori in Peru and Hitler in Germany; and the latter occurs when the chief executive is forced to leave office, usually through a military coup. The results of this study show that presidential systems are more prone to endogenous breakdowns, but being presidential or parliamentary has no impact on exogenous breakdowns when controlling for the military legacy status.


Looking at the above literature, several shortcomings become apparent. First, due to the nature of the question, these studies only consider democratic countries. For example, in both Maeda's and Cheibub's data sets, there are only about 20 military coups across the world, ignoring more than 60 coups that have taken place outside fully democratic contexts—the large majority of coups. The 1967 military coup in Greece is one of these coups. For the years prior to the coup Greece was not categorized as a democracy according to democracy indexes. For example Polity IV categorized Greece as an anocracy (having a democracy score between -5 and 5 on Polity IV's -10 to 10 scale) for those years. However Greece had general elections in 1961 and 1963 and the rules regarding constitutional design were in place during this period until the coup in 1967. And there was at least some modicum of multiparty competition during these years, which enable scholars to be able to code in terms of constitutional design (Gerring et al., 2009). Turkey, before the 1960 coup, and Thailand, before the 1976 and 1991 coups, were also categorized as anocracies. However, the rules dealing with parliamentarism were in place in both countries as well. The above literature lacks all these types of cases.

Figure 2.1 presents the number of military coups that have taken place in different levels of democracy. It shows that only 23 percent of all the coups occurred in

democracies. The 46 percent of them, on the other hand, took place in anocracies. In this analysis, I will expand the data set so that 69 percent of all the coups would be analyzed in terms of the impact of constitutional design. The remaining 31 percent will not be considered in this analysis due to the level of authoritarianism.

Second, there is no consensus on whether constitutional design significantly influences the occurrence of democratic breakdowns when controlling for other possible determinants. Moreover, if there is an impact, an alternative theory must be proposed since Cheibub has tested Linz’s theories regarding the inherent features of presidentialism (such as frequency of deadlocks and winner-takes-all properties), and found that they do not hold.

Figure 2.1: Frequency of Military Coups per Democracy Level (1960-2006)



Note: 31%, in authoritarian states; 46%, in anocracies; 23%, in democracies.

And finally, studies in this literature neglect to consider that in unconsolidated democracies and anocracies, the military (or sometimes other nonpolitical elites) might have substantial influence over the daily politics, particularly during government formation and termination processes.⁵ This factor might significantly change the prospects of the country. Svoboda (2012a) argues that in cases where the ideology of the mass public diverges from the elites' ideology, or the electoral outcomes threaten the redistributive benefits of the elites, they intervene in the political process to protect the status quo. They do this using different means such as mass media, backstage maneuvering with politicians, and only if no other avenues work, military coups.

Also, Finer (1962) touches upon the military's ability to intervene the political process without overt takeover. He states that direct military rule is very different form of

⁵ Crossant *et al.* (2010, p.961) argue that "Once in control of the channels of political recruitment, the military might exploit them in order to safeguard its elevated position and shield political challengers from getting access to the political centre. There is a wide range of possible forms of such behavior, ranging from *ad hoc* political pressure to threats or actual application of physical violence (for example, intimidating political rivals, or cowing rivals' supporters into abstaining from electoral participation). The empirical evidence shows that in the decades following World War II, militaries around the world manipulated or supplanted governments, thereby undermining or effectively abolishing fledgling democratic institutions." For more discussion see Finer (1962), Huntington (1968), Fitch (1998), and Kuru (2012)

governance than the regime of military provenance. He argues that the former one always have an establishment of overt military dictatorship, whereas in the latter one, the military generally act from behind the scenes. He further argues that “the level to which the military press their intervention varies; they do not always supplant the civilian regime. Often they merely substitute one cabinet for another, or again simply subject a cabinet to blackmail.” Finer lists four levels of military intervention to politics (p.4). These are influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplantment. Military may use certain methods or groups of methods to conduct these methods. He lists these methods as follows: (1) The legal channels. (See p.145, for Britain and US examples), (2) Competition and/or collusion with the civilian government. (3) The intimidation of the civilian government. (4) Violence towards the civilian government or threatening the civilian government for not cooperating. (5) Failure to protect the civilian government from the domestic or foreign violent groups. (6) Practicing violence against the civilian government. All these studies agree that military coup is not the only form of military intervention to politics.

Although the scope of this discussion is limited to the military coups, the theoretical framework proposed here have implications for other research areas which use the same key independent variable (parliamentary/presidential distinction) to explain different political issues like civil war (e.g. Reynal-Querol, 2002; Selway and Templeman, 2011; Alanso and Ruiz-Rufino, 2007), and interstate war (e.g. Clark and Nordstrom, 2005; Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Leblang and Chan, 2003). However, these studies also limit the empirical analysis to the democratic states, excluding those cases in

which some semblance of multiparty competition exists and therefore the distinct characteristics of presidentialism and parliamentarism are apparent (Gerring et al., 2009).

Theoretical Framework

The civil-military relations literature have a reached consensus on the target of the military coups as they define the concept. They all agree that the target is to unseat the sitting chief executive, in other words, the head of government (Banks, 2001, p.13–14; Finer, 1962, p.23; Luttwak, 1969, p.12; Marshall and Marshall, 2007, p.1; McGowan, 2003, p.2; Moreno et al, 2004, p.2; O’Kane, 1987, p.22, 37; Taylor and Jodice, 1983; Thompson, 1973, p.6, 52; Powell and Thyne, 2011, p.252). If this is the ultimate aim of the military elites, we need to explore whether or not the military elites can achieve this aim via alternative methods. More importantly, whether or not certain institutional settings provide alternative venues to reach this aim. If there are such alternatives and if they are less costly, military elites would not resort a coup.

This dissertation argues that the inherent features of parliamentary systems provide such alternative solutions. I argue these features create venues open for more military influence at three key political processes in parliamentary systems compared to others: government formation, government termination, and formation of new government after the collapse of previous one. Table 2.1 compares two systems in terms of these features.

Table 2.1: Comparing Two Systems

	Parliamentary Systems	Nonparliamentary Systems
Government/Coalition Formation	Executive Coalitions are widespread	No executive coalitions. (Only legislative or electoral coalitions exist)
Government/Coalition Termination	Via vote of no confidence Procedure (Simple majority rule)	Via impeachment procedure (About 2/3 of the parliament's vote plus crime allegations against the president)
New Government/Coalition Formation	Within the same parliament	New elections or constitutionally mandated successor to be the new head of government

To begin with, a military, which wants to control the politics in a parliamentary system, is better off, and less likely to conduct a coup, as long as at least one ideologically desirable political party becomes a member of a coalition during the government formation process. In such a case, this party might behave like a veto player, which blocks government actions conflicting with the military elites' ideology (Tsebelis, 2002). If the rest of the government insists on those actions, such a dissenting party might threaten to leave the coalition (Strøm, 2000, p.280).

On the other hand, if the military has any preference over the parties that enter the coalition, they can threaten to exclude some parties from the government, as happened in Turkey after the 1995 general elections when the winning Islamist party was excluded from the coalition due to military generals' clear preferences (Sayari, 1996). Similarly in Greece in 1936 the military forced the parliament not to include the communist groups.

The army officers declared that they might revolt if the coalition includes the communists (Finer 1962, p.150).

This type of executive coalition is absent in presidential systems. Although parties may create legislative or electoral coalitions, this does not mean that the executive office is run by multiple parties in these systems. Once in office, the president does not lose it upon dissolution of a legislative or electoral coalition. For example, Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff made an electoral and legislative coalition with nine smaller parties and she has been ruling the country since 2011. However, due to the recent corruption scandal related issues she has lost the support of some of the parties in her coalition. However she still holds her office until the next election even if she loses the majority status in the congress. There is a possibility and public demand for impeachment; however, commentators claim that possibility still remains distant.⁶

On the other hand, in parliamentary systems coalition governments exist and are quite frequent (Martin and Steveson, 2001; Strøm, 2000). And, importantly, prime ministers lose their office if their coalition collapses.

Moreover, the coalition formation process is opaque. Strøm (2000, p.281) argues; “Compared to presidentialism, the requisite bargaining and accommodation is less transparent. Bargaining takes place behind close doors in cabinet or in coalition committees or summits, rather than in the form of proposals and counter-proposals that are shuttled back and forth between different branches of government. Thus, political

⁶ For more information see: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/world/americas/brazils-slumping-economy-and-bribery-scandal-eat-away-at-dilma-rousseffs-popularity.html?_r=0

bargaining is displaced from a public to a private arena, where it will be less informative to the political principles.” This low level of transparency might provide more room for military influence. In contrast, in presidential systems, the chief executive is elected directly by the public, not through a coalition formation process. Hence, selection of the chief executive is more transparent in presidential systems, all else being equal.

Croissant and his colleagues (2010) highlight how a military can exercise its power during the coalition formation processes. He argues that in the developing world the “military can exercise power over the forming or dissolving of governments (for example, by informally supporting a particular coalition open interventions to oust civilian leaders) ... Examples are widespread as the military tried to influence leadership selection in many new democracies” (*ibid*, 957). They argue that even more than military coups, “military influence on elite recruitment takes the form of reserved representation in political decision making”, such as parliamentary seats reserved for military personnel in the Southeast Asian countries (*ibid*, 957). Apparently, in parliamentary systems such reserved seats affect not only the legislation but also the selection of the chief executive, which is accepted as the main target of military coups in general. Although the existence of coalition formation process may make the military elites better off, this does not imply that military coups are less likely if a country has a coalition government. Instead, the theory suggests that military coups are less likely to happen as long as at least one ideologically desirable party (from the military perspective) enters to the coalition.

Secondly, if the military fails to influence the government formation process, or if the chief executive later decides to depart from the military ideology, the military can again intervene in the political process and try to terminate the government by making

threats. Svobik (2012a) touches upon such a strategy. He states “the military exploits its pivotal position by demanding greater institutional autonomy as well as say in policy, and it threatens to intervene, if the civilian leadership departs from a subsequent compromise on these issues.” (*ibid*, 1). In this respect I argue if the civilian government starts pursuing policies against the military ideology, the military may try to threaten the politicians, and the parliamentary systems provide certain alternative options that may help military elites to achieve their ultimate goals.

In parliamentary systems, citizens cast votes only once to determine the composition of the legislative and executive branches. Voters elect legislators and legislators elect the chief executive. Strøm (2000) contrasts the single chain of delegation found in parliamentary systems with the dual chain found in presidential systems. A single chain gives an additional advantage to the military in parliamentary systems, since, in the final stage, fewer actors’ approval is necessary to determine the chief executive in parliamentary systems (roughly 51 percent of the legislators) than it is in presidential systems (roughly 51 percent of the electorate). The military can use the threat of force to push its preferences on the legislators at the time the chief executive is selected.

In parliamentary systems, if the military can persuade enough legislators, the government might be dismissed through a vote of no confidence. Alternatively, there is an impeachment procedure in presidential systems. Typically an impeachment procedure requires at least 2/3 of the legislators’ votes, and the president must be accused of a crime such as corruption.⁷ Ideological reasons cannot be a legal basis for impeachment, but they

⁷ Specific rules regarding impeachment vary across countries. For more discussion of impeachments in Latin America, see Perez-Linan (2007).

can definitely be a basis for a vote of no confidence in parliamentary systems. Because of the rules associated with votes of no confidence and the impeachment procedure, military elites need to pay greater costs to dismiss an ideologically undesirable chief executive in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. Although the prerequisites for executive impeachment are often hard to fully meet, they are not totally absent from the history of presidential systems. Perez-Linan (2007) argues that impeachment procedures recently started to occur more frequently and they became the new form of political instability that replaces the old fashioned military coups (*ibid.* 63). He further claims that just like it was in the previous decades, *governments* continue to breakdown, but in contrast, *regimes* do not fall (*ibid.* 2).

In addition outside of the consolidated democracies, the political parties are mostly weak (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Croissant et al., 2010, Hiroi and Omori, 2009). This feature benefits the military elites significantly. Even when a single party forms the government, the military may be able to buy off some legislators, causing it to lose its majority status in parliamentary countries. In a presidential system, the military will need to buy off a greater number of legislators to impeach a president, all else being equal.

Dismissing an undesirable chief executive cannot be the only goal. The military will also want to influence the selection of the new chief executive. The two systems provide different mechanisms at this stage, too. In presidential systems there are two options; either a constitutionally mandated successor becomes a new chief executive or new elections are held. A constitutionally mandated successor (e.g. vice president) is likely to hold similar views to the chief executive. If an election is held then the public

may elect the same party's candidate or a similar unsatisfactory outcome, from the military's perspective, may happen. Hence, these are not very preferable options for the military in a presidential system. However, in parliamentary systems there is a wide array of alternative politicians in the parliament, at least some of whom can be found to be more respectful to the military elites, after the overturn of a chief executive. Hence, in parliamentary systems, a military coup is a very costly mechanism for change compared with the other avenues that are open to the military elites' influence. In presidential systems, many of these alternate avenues do not exist or are unlikely to result in change.⁸ The next section will formalize the interaction between the politicians and the military.

Comparing Bargaining in Two Systems

Based on the theoretical discussion of the previous section I, now, present a game between the military, the chief executive, and the parliament. The game demonstrates how certain institutional constraints increase or decrease the likelihood of coup and other

⁸ From this perspective, Mubarak's resignation upon the military generals' pressure to step down in 2011 does not fit the argument presented above for how a parliamentary system should operate. After Mubarak's resignation the constitutional rules were not followed. Instead, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces took the control of the executive office and the country in general. Moreover, existing global coup data sets such as the one prepared by Powell and Thyne code this intervention as a military coup, whereas the above argument states that such a pressure is an alternative to a military coup.

types of intervention. The game is based on the assumption that for some exogenous reasons, such as an electoral concern or a pure ideological issue, a chief executive decides to behave against the military ideology. Also I assume the total amount of resources is equal to 1 and it is shared by the chief executive and the military. Say chief executive decides to allocate k amount of resources which is smaller than the military's ideal level k' . The military will enjoy the benefits if and only if the resources are higher than or equal to this threshold.

If the military gets k , the chief executive would get $1-k$. In this setting, if k is equal to 0, chief executive does not acquiesce to the military at all, and gets all of the resources. If k is equal to 1, the chief executive acquiesce to the military hundred percent, and the military gets all of the resources.⁹ Although theoretically plausible, these two extreme cases never happen in the real world where some semblance of democracy with a functioning military institution exists. Instead, the chief executive proposes a policy position k , which is greater than 0 and less than 1. For example, if k is equal to .80, the chief executive proposes a policy position that is relatively close to the military's ideal point. The amount of resources the military would get is .80 and that the chief executive would get is .20.

Figure 2.2 shows the interaction between chief executive and military elites in a complete information extensive form game model. The game formalizes the military's strategy to deal with an undesirable chief executive and shows how it varies across

⁹ These resources are not limited to the military spending. It includes all formal and informal reserves and privileges.

different constitutional designs. The payoffs of the players are written in the following order (military, chief executive, and parliament).

Table 2.2 lists the relevant notations. In the first step, the military has three alternatives to respond to an undesirable chief executive: conduct a coup, try to change the chief executive through threatening the politicians (chief executive and legislators), or do nothing.¹⁰

The game ends if the military selects coup or do-nothing options. In case of a coup, the chief executive loses the office and pays the cost of facing a military coup. Hence his payoff will be $-c_e$. The military on the other hand, will be able to get k' minus the cost of conducting a coup. That is to say the military's payoff will be $k' - c_m$. I also assume that military coups are successful whenever attempted, and after a military coup, the military will abolish the parliament. Hence the parliament will also pay the cost of facing a military coup. Its payoff will be $-c_p$.

¹⁰ This is not the only way military can influence politicians. For example, military may also buy off some legislators or cajole the party leaders to form an alternative coalition that might replace the existing one. But for simplicity I will only consider that military's action is threatening the legislators. Also, here in this game model, I only discuss the feature of confidence voting in parliamentary systems and how it benefits military elites. Existence of coalition governments may also benefit the military. The military may try to exclude/include certain parties from/to the coalition in order to prevent their interests as the previous section underlines. But for simplicity it is not discussed here.

Figure 2.2: Bargaining Between Military and Chief Executive




Table 2.2: Notations for the Bargaining Model

P:	The payoff parliament receives in case there is no exogenous intervention.
k:	The amount of resources chief executive offers to the military.
k':	The amount of resources the military aims to get.
c _e :	The cost chief executive pays when faces military coup.
c _m :	The cost of conducting military coup.
c _p :	The cost parliament pays when faces military coup.
t _e :	The cost chief executive pays when faces military pressure for resignation.
t _m :	The cost of threatening to change the government composition. ($t_m < c_m$)
t _p :	The cost parliament pays when faces threat from military
d _e :	The cost chief executive pays when dismissed by the parliament ($d_e > t_e$).
d _m :	The cost military pays when it forces parliament to dismiss the chief executive.
d _p :	The cost parliament pays when dismisses chief executive due to pressure ($d_p = f(n)$)
n:	Number of legislators necessary to be persuaded to dismiss the chief executive.

If the military prefers to do nothing, the military will get whatever the chief executive offered k . The chief executive will get $1-k$. And finally the parliament will get P , which stands for the aggregate level benefits the parliament would enjoy in case there is no exogenous intervention to the political system by the military. If the military threatens the chief executive, the chief executive will move next. The chief executive may choose to resign as a result of the military pressure and the game ends. In this case, chief executive loses the office and pays the cost of facing the military pressure t_e . Hence the payoff will be $-t_e$. On the other hand, the military achieves its preferred resource level of k' as it manages to oust the sitting undesirable chief executive. However, it pays the cost of pressuring the chief executive t_m . Therefore the payoff will be $k'-t_m$.

Alternatively, chief executive may also think that the military threat is not credible or that he has a significant influence on the faction of the armed forces that

would protect him. Hence the second option is not to resign. In the following decision node, parliament moves. It either goes in line with the military and dismisses the chief executive, or chooses to disobey the military pressure. If the parliament dismisses the chief executive, the chief executive loses everything and pays the cost of facing the military pressure and the cost of being dismissed by the parliament. Hence the chief executive's payoff is $-d_e - t_e$. In this case, the military will again achieve the desired benefit of k' . However, it pays the cost of pressuring the chief executive as well as the parliament. Hence the military's payoff will be $k' - d_m - t_m$. The parliament's payoff will be $P - d_p$, where the d_p stands for the cost of dismissing the democratically elected chief executive.

If parliament does not dismiss the chief executive then the chief executive will have its original resources $(1 - k)$ minus the cost of facing military threat (t_e). In this case, the military's payoff will be $k - d_m - t_m$. The parliament's payoff will be $P - t_p$ where t_p stands for the cost of facing military pressure to dismiss chief executive. The cost of dismissing a chief executive (d_p) is an increasing function of the number of legislators that is constitutionally necessary to dismiss the chief executive (n). In cases where this number is sufficiently large, the cost of dismissing will be high so that it is greater than parliament's cost associated with standing against military pressure (t_p). Hence parliament will not choose to dismiss. On the contrary, where the constitution does not require a large number of legislators for dismissal, parliament will be more likely to choose dismissing chief executive due to military pressure.

The cost associated with standing against military pressure may vary across parliaments and across time. However, n is fixed for a system. In parliamentary systems,

n is 50% of the legislators plus one. The procedure is called confidence/no confidence voting. In presidential systems, n is quite large. Most presidential systems require at least $2/3$ of the legislators to dismiss the chief executive.¹¹ This dismissal mechanism is called impeachment procedure. Hence two scenarios can be drawn: $d_p = f(n) > t_p$ and $d_p = f(n) < t_p$. The game will be solved examining these two scenarios and using backward induction.


i) $d_p = f(n) > t_p$

This scenario is possible on average when n is sufficiently large, which is a characteristic of a nonparliamentary system as it was discussed above. In such a case parliament will choose not to dismiss the chief executive. Given that information, the chief executive has two options to decide: to resign and get $-t_e$ or not to resign and get $1 - k - t_e$. Since $1 - k - t_e$ is greater, chief executive prefers not to resign. In the previous node military decides to conduct a coup, threaten the politicians, or do nothing. If the military prefers coup option, its payoff will be $k' - c_m$, where c_m stands for the cost of conducting military coup. If it prefers threatening option, chief executive will not resign and parliament will not choose to dismiss and hence military gets $k - d_m - t_m$, in which d_m is the cost of threatening the parliament and t_m is the cost of threatening the chief executive. If military chooses to do nothing, it gets k as a payoff, which is greater than $k - d_m - t_m$. Hence

¹¹ In addition, this number of legislators is not sufficient in most cases; chief executive could not be dismissed just because of ideological reasons, although it could be a case for confidence voting in parliamentary settings. He must also be accused of something like corruption, hidden agreements with foreign countries against state interests and so on.

we need to compare k with $k' - c_m$. Here there are two options. First, the cost of conducting a military coup may be greater than the difference between k and k' . In this scenario, the military prefers doing nothing, since $k' - c_m$ becomes less than k . The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for this scenario is (Nothing, Not Resign, Not Dismiss). Second, the cost of conducting a coup may be smaller than the difference between k and k' . In this situation, the military prefers conducting a coup, since $k' - c_m$ becomes greater than k . The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for this scenario is (Coup, Not Resign, Not Dismiss). Figure 2.3 illustrates this scenario.

Figure 2.3: $d_p = f(n) > t_p$ (Nonparliamentary Systems)



ii) $d_p = f(n) < t_p$


The second scenario occurs when parliament's cost for dismissing the chief executive is less than standing against the military pressure. This scenario is more likely to happen in parliamentary settings since n is relatively small if the system is parliamentary. In such a setting, parliament will choose to dismiss the chief executive since $P-d_p$ is greater than $P-t_p$, where P stands for the payoff parliament will aggregately receive in case there is no exogenous intervention. In the previous decision node the chief executive determines to resign or not. His payoff from resignation is $-t_e$. If he chooses not to resign, the parliament would dismiss him. When a chief executive is dismissed by parliament, chief executive loses not only his office, but also his allies within parliament. Hence he additionally pays the cost of being dismissed by parliament ($-d_e$). Chief executive prefers resignation since $-d_e-t_e$ is smaller than $-t_e$. The previous decision node belongs to the military. It chooses from the three alternatives: coup, threatening, or nothing.

The associated payoffs are respectively $(k'-c_m, k'-t_m, k)$. The reason why it gets payoff of $k'-t_m$ when it threatens the chief executive is that chief executive's best response is to resign in the next decision node. There are two options depending on the level of cost of threatening. If the cost of threatening is higher than the difference between k and k' , the military prefers doing nothing, since $k'-t_m$ becomes less than k . The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for this scenario is (Nothing, Resign, Dismiss).

On the other hand, if the cost of threatening is smaller than the difference between k and k' , the military prefers threatening since $k'-t_m$ becomes greater than k and we

already know t_m is smaller than c_m . The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for this scenario is (Threaten, Resign, Dismiss). Figure 2.4 illustrates this scenario.

Figure 2.4: $d_p = f(n) < t_p$ (Parliamentary Systems)



Two conclusions can be drawn out of this game theoretic framework. First, if the cost of reacting against an undesirable chief executive is greater than the difference between what chief executive proposed and what military wants, the military will tend to obey the chief executive. Second, if this cost is relatively small, the military will tend to conduct a coup in nonparliamentary systems and threaten the politicians to oust the sitting chief executive in parliamentary systems.

Summary

This chapter explored the relationship between the constitutional design and likelihood of military coups. It proposed an alternative theory explaining this relationship both verbally and formally. Departing from straightforward postulates in regards to the strategic decisions and political preferences of actors, it presented an analytical model explaining the occurrence of different political outcomes (such as military coup and government breakdown via military pressure) in different institutional settings (such as non-parliamentary systems and parliamentary systems). The basic assumption behind the formal model is that military elites' ultimate aim is to unseat the sitting chief executive as the existing definitions of military coup suggest (Powell and Thyne, 2011). According to the theory, military elites will tend to prefer alternative less costly solutions to achieve this aim if they find any.

I argue constitutional design matters in this regard. One constitutional design provides less costly alternatives such as pressuring the legislators in order to withdraw their support from the government. The cost of pressuring the legislators to withdraw their support is assumed to be an increasing function of the number of legislators that are necessary to be convinced. And we know that parliamentary systems have systematically lower threshold for number of legislators to terminate a government if we compare with the rules regarding impeachment process in nonparliamentary systems. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, parliamentary systems experience less military coups but more military influence on the ongoing political process during the government formation and termination processes. The next section will compare two similar cases of conflict from the perspective of the theory proposed here.

Chapter 3: Egypt-Turkey Comparison

The previous chapter presented a theoretical model regarding the impact of constitutional design on the likelihood of military coups. Now I apply this model to empirical observations. This chapter examines two very similar cases of conflict from the perspective of the impact of constitutional design on the likelihood of coups. The civil-military conflict of Egypt in 2013 resembles that of Turkey in 1997. Nevertheless, the two conflicts resulted in different outcomes: regime breakdown via a military coup in presidential Egypt, and government breakdown due to the military pressure in a parliamentary Turkey. More specifically I will discuss the reaction of the hardcore secular military generals of Turkey in 1997 against the democratically elected political Islamist civilian government under Prime Minister Erbakan versus the reaction of the hardcore secular military generals of Egypt in 2013 against the democratically elected political Islamist civilian government under the President Morsi.

The analysis demonstrates the alternative strategies the Turkish military generals developed to unseat the sitting chief executive, compared with the coup as Egyptian military preferred. The next section will highlight the similarities between the two cases. It will follow with presenting the outcomes of these two civil military conflicts. Then,

there will be a discussion section where I review the possible alternative arguments. And the concluding section will summarize the chapter.

Civil-Military Conflict of Turkey in 1997 Vs. Egypt in 2013

The political experiences of Egypt in 2013, a non-parliamentary system, and Turkey in 1997, a parliamentary system, provide an example showing how parliamentary systems allow for more military influence in politics in between elections, and how militaries developed different strategies against elected governments. These two cases of conflict are selected because their similarities allow us to control for multiple causal factors that can potentially explain the relationship. These similarities are summarized in Table 3.1. First, culturally, these countries are both Muslim majority countries, where the secular elites (in business, bureaucracy, and the military) have been very powerful for several decades. Second, politically, both countries experienced Islamist movements that eventually formed Islamist parties. In Turkey, the National Outlook (*Milli Gorus*) movement attracted pious Muslims who were suppressed by the secular regime. After the first two parties of this movement were banned by the regime, *Refah Partisi* (RP, Welfare Party) was established by Necmettin Erbakan and it gained its first national election victory by winning the largest number of seats in the parliament (158 out of 550) in 1995. In 1996, Erbakan became a prime minister when the RP formed a coalition with a center-right DYP (True Path Party).

Similarly, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a significant Islamic movement. After the ouster of Mubarak, the MB established the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). In the assembly elections, the FJP won the largest number of seats in both

houses (213 out of 508 in the People's Assembly and 56 out of 120 in the Shura Council). Its leader Mohamed Morsi became a president following the 2012 presidential elections. Gümüſcü (2010, 857) classifies these parties (RP and FJP) as extremist rather than as moderate, arguing that they both envisioned an Islamic state in the long run. Their rhetoric and slogans were also similar: 'The True Path is Islam' and 'Islam is the Solution' (Ibrahim, 2013, 20).

In addition, in both cases the military did not merely target the chief executives. Instead, they had a wider goal of eradicating these Islamist movements; courts banned the parties and several of the activities of these movements in the following years. In addition these Islamist parties achieved their first electoral victories in their history in these years, which was a clear threat against the secular military elites' prerogatives.

Table 3.1: Comparison between Egypt and Turkey

	Egypt	Turkey
Culture	Muslim majority society with minority secular elites who have control over the bureaucracy and the military	Muslim majority society with minority secular elites who have control over the bureaucracy and the military
Reactionary Movements	Islamist Movement (Muslim Brotherhood)	Islamist Movement (National Outlook)
Reactionary Political Parties	Islamist Party (Freedom and Justice Party)	Islamist Party (Welfare Party)
Electoral Success	Victory in 2012 elections and gain chief executive's office	Victory in 1995 elections and gain chief executive's office
Legislative Support	213 out of 513 seats (lower) 56 out of 120 seats (upper)	158 out of 550 seats
Economy	Recent bad economic conditions: for example, high inflation rate (18%) in 2008, which is the record for the last 15 years. Plus, Arap Spring had a serious negative impact on the economy.	Recent bad economic conditions: for example, high inflation rate (106%) in 1995, which is the record the last 15 years
Nature of Social Classes	No strong middle class that may support Islamist movements emerged	No strong middle class that may support Islamist movements emerged
Military Prerogatives in Judiciary	The military courts had extensive jurisdiction	The military courts had extensive jurisdiction
Military Prerogatives in the Economy	The military owns and runs big corporations.	The military owns and runs big corporations.
Public Reaction to government	Massive anti-government protests	Massive anti-government protests
Constitutional Design	Semi-Presidentialism	Parliamentarism
Military Reaction	Military Coup	Threatening

Third, the economies of these countries before the electoral victories of both of these Islamist parties were not in good shape. Turkey experienced one of the most

important economic crises of its history in 1995. The inflation rate in 1995 was 106 percent, which was the highest point for the last 15 years. Egypt's economy during the last years was not healthy either. Egypt also achieved its last 15-year record inflation in 2008. In addition its economy was significantly affected by the emergence of the Arab Spring. Socioeconomically, both Egypt and Turkey failed to create strong religious middle classes that may have supported RP during 1990s and FJP during 2010s (Gümüřcü, 2010; Tuğal, 2012). In a similar vein, the civil society institutions that may advocate the rights of these groups during these years were also very weak. In contrast, several large civic organizations took very anti-government stances in both examples. For example in Turkey five highly influential non-governmental organizations made collaborative declarations criticizing the government policies and its ineffectiveness. Indeed they worked hard to mobilize the public against the government and they were very successful.¹² Similarly, in Egypt, the Tamarud (rebellion) movement acted against the government and mobilized the people. The movement forced the president to call for early elections and leave the office.

Fourth, the militaries in both countries are politically and economically powerful. Both militaries run enterprises and control significant portions of the economy. The military courts have quite large jurisdictions, which exceed the military sphere. And in both countries the military is widely seen (and sees itself) as the guardian of the state who aims to protect the country not only from the external enemies but also from the internal

¹² These five organizations are TOBB, TÜRK-İŞ, TESK, DİSK, and TİSK. For more info see *Rakamlarla 28 Şubat Raporu* (February 28 Report with Numbers)

http://www.egitimbirsen.org.tr/ebs_files/files/yayinlarimiz/28_subat_rapor_web.pdf

ones (Tuğal, 2012). History scholars trace back the emergence of the guardian-style militaries in these two countries to the Ottoman Empire period. In both cases the military elites were opposing the Ottoman Sultan's central authority. The army of the *Kavalali Mehmet Ali Paşa* is in the Egypt example, and the Janissary Corps is in the Turkish example (for more info see Hashim, 2011; Kuru, 2009). In addition, the first military regimes in these two countries emerged after the collapse of kingdoms, and the republics' founding fathers are the military generals (Ataturk in Turkey and Nasser in Egypt).

In addition, both countries are the U.S. allies and their militaries receive U.S. support in military affairs. Egypt has been receiving foreign aid from the U.S. since the late 1970s. Turkey does not receive U.S. foreign aid, however, Turkey and the U.S. have been NATO allies since Turkey's membership to the organization in 1952. Both types of partnerships create negative incentives for the occurrence of military coups. The U.S. law prohibits provision of financial aid to a country, which experienced military coup and ruled by the military afterwards. On the other hand, NATO unites countries committing to the democratic principles. Hence the other members do not welcome military coups particularly after the end of the cold war.

And finally, the recent political circumstances before the military reactions in both cases were also quite similar. Both countries experienced significant anti-government protests. On multiple occasions the generals expressed their discomfort with the situations the country was facing. The Western countries like the US and the EU members in both cases also publicly criticized the actions of the ruling Islamist parties both for domestic and international affairs. In addition the major media outlets also took an anti-government stance.

Outcomes of the Conflicts

Despite the aforementioned similarities of these two cases, the militaries in these countries developed different strategies to respond to the actions of the civilian government. On February 28, 1997, the Turkish generals forced the Prime Minister Erbakan to sign a list of policy recommendations that were aimed at securing the secular nature of the state. In this meeting, the military explicitly threatened the government, forcing it to resign. The military also expressed their concerns in other ways. One of the most important incidents occurred after a mayor from the governing party organized 'Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Night' to protest Israel. As a reaction, military tanks rolled onto the streets of the same county, which was a clear signal of a possible military coup (Kuru, 2009).

However, the military in Turkey did not conduct a coup at the end of this process. Instead, it preferred to threaten (and sometimes cajole or buy off) the politicians in order to create a different government that would be more respectful to its ideology. On June 1997, the Prime Minister Erbakan resigned with the intention that Tansu Ciller (leader of DYP, the second coalition party) would become the prime minister. His intention was to alleviate the military's tension. However, during this process 37 legislators resigned from DYP and several of them formed a new party. Because of these resignations, RP-DYP alliance lost the majority status in the parliament. Consequently a new government was formed excluding the RP and DYP. The military's aggressive reaction settled down only after the formation of this new government (Özgen, 2008, p.40). However, the

resignations from the DYP and the emergence of the new party remained highly controversial for a long time.

In the following years, some of the legislators who resigned testified as to what had happened during this process. Hikmet Aydin was one such DYP legislator. In an interview with a journalist in 2009, he confessed that another legislator told him “if the military conducts a coup, you will be the first person jailed”.¹³ He further admitted that several of his friends resigned when they were offered money. Erbakan also claimed that the resignations from DYP occurred either because of fear of the military or bribery. In the following years, Tuncer Kılınç (secretary general of the National Security Council during this process) said, “I am very grateful to those DYP legislators who resigned from their parties, since they prevented a military coup” (Bakı, 2009). Forcing and bribing legislators to resign with the aim to bring down a government is a less costly alternative to a coup in parliamentary systems from the military perspective.

The Egyptian military’s strategy against the elected Islamist government was quite different. In fact the military in Egypt also treated the parliament as a tool to achieve their ultimate goals. However, because of the inherent features of presidentialism implementing a similar strategy was highly costly. Hence the military developed a totally different strategy, which eventually ended up with a military coup in July 2013. It started with eliminating the parliamentary power of the Islamist groups. On June 14, 2012 the supreme constitutional court, members of which were appointed by the ex-ante military regime, dissolved the lower house of the parliament, where the Muslim Brotherhood won

¹³ For details of the interview see <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-21699-26-28-subat-ifsaatlari.html> last accessed January 3, 2014

the plurality of the seats and the more conservative political Islamists gained another 20 percent in the last elections. This was seen as a clear threat to the secular nature of the republic by the bureaucratic elites.

The court's justification for this ruling was the existence of constitutional violations during the parliamentary elections. However, the decision was very controversial and several political actors from different backgrounds—excluding the supporters of military backed presidential candidate Ahmad Shafiq who served as a prime minister during the Mubarak era—highly criticized this ruling and perceived it as a clear military intervention to the ongoing democratic political process. Brotherhood affiliated Member of Parliament Mohamed el-Beltagy called the intervention a “fully fledged coup.” Saad Aboud of the Karama (Dignity) Party also said “this is a politicized verdict that constitutes a coup in political life.” The second largest party in the parliament (Salafist Al-Nour Party) also claimed that the decision is a “complete disregard for the free will of the voters.” Saad El Katatny, who was the speaker of the parliament, stated that there is no authority that would dissolve the parliament according to the current laws. He argued the true verdict should be the renewal of the elections for the seats where there is a violation of the law. In his first reaction Morsi stated that he respects the decision. But later he said “a minority are trying to corrupt the nation and take us back. We will go back to the ballot box to say no to those failures, those criminals.” International actors also expressed their concerns about the ruling. For example Hilary Clinton, the Secretary of the US State Department, highly criticized this decision and stated “there can be no going back on the democratic transition.”

The civil-military tension even increased after this decision. Both the foreign and domestic policies of the president Morsi created significant discomfort among the military elites. The tension peaked mid-2013. The anti-government protests were widespread. On July 1st, 2013 the military generals gave a 48-hour ultimatum to the civilian government. They overtly threatened to intervene if the government fails to fulfill their demands. Due to this pressure, four cabinet ministers resigned from their posts on the same day. On the following day, another minister (minister of foreign affairs) also resigned. However Morsi rejected the military pressure, just like his Turkish counterpart Erbakan did in 1997. On July 3, 2013, a coalition led by the Army Chief General Sisi resorted a coup since the military saw no alternative way to oust the president.

To sum up, Egypt and Turkey experienced a very similar civil-military conflict, but the constitutional designs of the countries provided different incentives to the generals so that in one case there was a coup and in the other case there was an intervention to the political process without a coup. Even the resignation of five cabinet ministers suggests important implications for the impact of constitutional design. If it were a parliamentary system, opposition groups in the parliament would ask for a motion of no-confidence. Under such a military pressure, it would be harder to obtain support from the members of the parliament. Just like the resignation of five ministers, several members of the parliament would have withdrawn their support of the government because of their worry for possible military intervention.

Alternative Arguments

Another difference between these two cases is the history of democracy. Turkey had democratic elections for several years, while Egypt had only one. Similarly Turkey's level of economic development had been also higher than Egypt. It may be argued that these would be potential reasons for not experiencing a coup in 1997 in Turkey while experiencing a coup in Egypt in 2013. Even though Turkey had a longer history with democratic elections and higher levels of economic development, the military has always been ready to intervene as they feel they are the guardians of the nation and have duties to protect the state even from the domestic enemies (Jenkins, 2007; Tuğal 2012). In fact, the Turkish military has intervened to the politics in different forms almost every 10 years since the first free elections in 1950. In addition even after the beginning of the AKP period, several coup plots were uncovered and the trial processes still continue, which shows that the military is still trying to intervene to the political process despite the progress and reforms Turkey accomplished recently. Therefore these differences do not invalidate the comparison between the two cases. Moreover, recent military coup studies, such as Powell (2012), show that the level of economic development is not a significant predictor of military coup.

On the other hand, such a high coup frequency in Turkey may create questions on the proposed theory. How can we explain the previous military coups? Why did the generals not prefer the similar strategy to oust the sitting chief executive? Why did they resort to a coup, which is a highly costly alternative if we compare with trying to breakdown the government via vote of no confidence? From 1950 to 1995, military elites intervened to the political process for three times: at 1960, 1971, and 1980. We need to

examine these cases one by one in order to respond these questions. First, the survival duration of the cabinets in between the two military interventions in 1980 and 1971 is on average less than one year. Turkey experienced 9 different cabinets for the 8-year period. This was a highly unusual rate. It is highly likely that military may have intervened the government termination and formation processes in this time period. The theory proposed here does not suggest that military coups are absent in the parliamentary systems. Rather, it claims military elites may have alternative options depending on the type of institution. Maybe, behind closed doors, Turkish generals also tried hard to create a highly desirable civilian government during this process, where 9 cabinets emerged in only 8 years. Their inability may have led them to conduct a coup as a final resort.

The 1971 military intervention is quite different than the other two coups in 1960 and 1980. Although some data sets classify it as a military coup, it does not fit with the general coup frame. It even resembles the 1997 military intervention. Due to the failure of the prime minister in alleviating the street fights between the rightists and the leftists, generals declared a memorandum and forced him to resign. Following this pressure, the prime minister left his office and a new government was formed again within the parliament by independent deputy Nihat Erim, former member of the Republican People's Party. The constitution was not abolished and the new government was formed again within the same democratically elected parliament. Hence the 1971 coup even supports, rather than weakens, the theory proposed here just like the 1997 military intervention.

The 1960 military coup in Turkey was conducted against a civilian government under Prime Minister Menderes. After the first free and fair elections of the Turkish

Republic in 1950 he gained office and served as a prime minister for 10 consecutive years. During this period his party always had a super majority in the parliament. In his last term, for example, his party had a support of 403 out of 536 members of the parliament. The theory proposed here suggests that military coups are the second best option in parliamentary systems on average. I argue that military generals primarily try to take down the government via vote of no-confidence procedure. If this primary option does not work, they tend to choose the alternatives such as coup. As the composition of the parliament shows, such a primary strategy is not easy in this particular case. The military needs to convince or threaten at least 135 members of the parliament from the governing party. Before the 1997 intervention the coalition had 278 members' confidence where the threshold was 272. The generals managed to convince 37 legislators to withdraw their support from the coalition. Influencing those 135 legislators would have been very costly. That could be why the military preferred the coup option in 1960 in Turkey.

Examples from Other Parliamentary Systems

The examples supporting the above theoretical discussion are not limited to these two cases. For example, in 2008, Thailand, a parliamentary system, experienced a civil-military conflict mimicking the Turkish example. The country was experiencing large street protests against the government. While some newspapers had begun mentioning the possibility of a military coup, General Anupong, together with the head of the navy, airforce, and police, gave a prime time TV interview. They publicly declared that the prime minister must resign. The prime minister rejected this call at the beginning. But in

December 2008, the Constitutional Court, members of which were appointed by the last military regime, banned the major ruling party and its top leaders. Consequently, the ruling coalition was dissolved, and a new coalition, which was more respectful to the military ideology, was formed within the same parliament without a new election (Prasirtsuk, 2009). Chambers (2011, p.299) states that “Thereupon, senior Army brass worked to cobble together a new coalition led by the Democrat Party”. He further states that in this government, “several cabinet positions were bequeathed to the military-influenced Bhunjai Thai Party” (Chambers, 2011, p.301). Thailand’s example illustrates how a military can even use the Constitutional Court to influence government change if other avenues do not work.

Spanish governments also experienced similar military pressures. Finer (1962) states several governments collapsed in Spain due to the overt military influence. In 1917 the military generals harshly pressured the prime minister to appoint their preference, La Cierva, as minister of war. As a result of the tension, the Prime Minister had to resign. The new cabinet was built around La Cierva. But this cabinet did not survive even a year. In the next four years two more cabinets fell down due to the army opposition (Finer, 1962, p.152)

Japan provides another example of military intervention to politics to oust the sitting executive and replace with the more desirable one without resorting to a coup. Between 1930-1940, 10 cabinets emerged and fell due to the clear military dissatisfaction and influence on the politics (Yanaga, 1941, p.533). Yanaga highlights this situation as the following: “Ever since the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the army has been in the limelight, and from 1932, beginning with the Saito cabinet, the political parties, the

bureaucrats, and even the palace advisers, could not ignore the power of the military, increasing rapidly under stress of domestic and international crises.” (p.534)

The military influence was specifically strong after 1936 starting with the formation of the Hirota cabinet. Hirota worked hard to form the cabinet, however the military opposed his earlier preferences on some of the posts in the cabinet. He managed to form the cabinet only after he had appeased the military reaction. (Yanaga, 1941, p.535) The military influence was salient even at the termination of this cabinet. On January 21, 1937, the leader of the Seiyukai Party made a speech in the parliament, which was seen as an insult to the army by the war minister as well as the military. The civil military tension increased after this speech. Later the military forced the prime minister to dissolve the parliament. However, Hirota did not accept that. As a response, the war minister withdrew his support from the government and the government collapsed. (Yanaga, 1941, p.535).

These examples show that the reactions of the militaries in Thailand, Spain, and Japan, all of which are parliamentary systems, mimic the Turkish military’s reaction when they face an undesirable chief executive. Although they have a tradition of conducting a military coup as history shows, they have an alternative solution to deal with the undesirable governments.

Military Strategies in Other Presidential Systems

On the other hand, the military reactions in Honduras (2009) and in Ecuador (2000), both of which are presidential systems, mimic the Egyptian example, where the military threat did not result in a compromise. In both cases, before attempting a coup, the military publicly forced the chief executive to resign. Later, the generals offered to have the president exiled and to make the constitutionally mandated successor the new president. But the acting presidents in both cases rejected these offers and did not resign. Consequently the military had only one option to protect their interests – coup. If these had been parliamentary systems, military elites might have used their power to threaten and force some legislators to withdraw their support.

All these cases demonstrate that the militaries across the world primarily try to follow the constitutional rules to achieve their ultimate goals, because these are generally less costly options, which involve only threatening. If these options do not work, they prefer coups as a final resort.

Summary

This chapter examined two very similar civil-military conflicts (one in Turkey in 1997, and the other in Egypt in 2013) as a most similar case analysis. Several cultural, historical, and political similarities as well as the nature of conflict in these two countries provided testing the impact of constitutional design on the likelihood of military coups. Despite many similarities the military generals in these countries developed different strategies to overcome the problem of unacceptable governance.

The military coup literature, as it was highlighted in the previous chapter, underlines that the target of military coup is almost always to unseat the sitting chief executive and replace him/her with a more desirable one. Departing from this assumption, I analyzed Turkish and Egyptian examples of civil-military conflict. The chapter did not assert that the 2013 Egyptian military coup could only be explained by the constitutional design. Instead it asserts and shows that constitutional design had an important role while military generals were developing their strategies against an undesirable chief executive. I contend that if the regime were parliamentary in Egypt, the military generals would have been developed less costly options such as threatening the members of the parliament. Similarly, I contend that if the regime were not a parliamentary system in Turkey, the military generals' best response to the Islamist government would have been to conduct a coup, holding all other covariates constant.

The resignation of five cabinet ministers in Egypt suggests important conclusions regarding the theory proposed here. If the system were parliamentary, upon resignation of these ministers opposition groups may have wanted to benefit out of the situation and may have asked for motion of no-confidence in the parliament. The government would have had hard time to get the support of the 51 percent of the parliament under such a high military pressure. If the ministers are influenced by the military pressure, it is highly likely that several members of the parliament would have been influenced as well and withdraw their support from the government if the system were a parliamentary one in Egypt. The Turkish example illustrated how members of the parliament behaved under high military pressure. Turkish military generals are not alone in developing alternative strategies. Several examples in Spain, Japan, Portugal, and Thailand, all of which are

parliamentary systems, shows that military generals treated parliaments as a tool to achieve their ultimate goals.

One important counter argument about the theory proposed here deals with the high frequency of coup in the Turkish history. If the generals had such an alternative, why did not they use to resolve the earlier civil-military conflicts in 1960, 1971, and 1980? To begin with, the 1980 military coup took place after 9 cabinets emerged and disappeared within the 8-year period. This high frequency of government terminations suggests that several different available forms of governments were tried. Most probably, the military did not find a government that may fulfill their demands within the parliament. Hence the military might have preferred the military coup as a final resort, after they observed all possible forms. This case highly confirms the proposed theory. Secondly the 1971 coup does not fit to the regular definitions of a coup. It even resembles the 1997 military intervention rather than a regular coup. The generals declared a memorandum and forced the prime minister to leave the office. As a response the prime minister left the office and an interim prime minister was elected within the parliament following the constitutional rules. Its only difference from the 1997 military intervention is the fact that the chief executive left the office himself without experiencing legislators' reaction. Therefore this example also supports the theory.

Finally, the 1960 military coup in Turkey is a coup very much similar to the 2013 Egyptian coup. Again the military was thinking the secular nature of the country was under risk and reacted to overcome the problem. However, during those years the governing single party had a super majority in the parliament, which is not very common in parliamentary systems. Most parliamentary governments are coalition governments

and mostly they are minimum winning coalitions, which slightly exceeds the 51 percent threshold of parliamentary support. As the theory proposed here suggests if the government has a super majority, the military will need to convince higher number of legislators to vote “no” in case of a motion of no-confidence. This is probably a reason why the military did not prefer this alternative option in 1960 in Turkey. The next chapter will test the macro implication of the proposed theory.

Chapter 4: Testing the Impact of Constitutional Design

In this chapter I empirically test the impact of constitutional design on the likelihood of military coups. By doing that this study will provide a bridge between the two literatures as I will use the independent variable of the perils-of-presidentialism literature and the dependent variable of the military-coup literature. However, unlike the existing studies within the perils-of-presidentialism literature, I expand the data set so that anocracies, regimes that are neither democracy nor dictatorship, will also be included. While doing this, I follow Gerring *et al.*'s (2009) argument regarding the ways a system can be differentiated in terms of constitutional design. They argue that some semblance of political competition is enough to differentiate parliamentary systems from presidential ones. Hence their data includes anocracies as well as the democracies. And we know only 23 percent of the military coups took place in democratic states, whereas 46 percent of them took place in the anocracies as Figure 2.1 demonstrates. Failure to include this much of military coups may bring erroneous results.

Due to data limitation, particularly for non-democratic states, testing the micro level causal mechanisms suggested by the theory in a large N quantitative setting is a challenge. Such a test requires collection of new global data on military's influence on government formation processes, ideological proximity of legislative parties to the

military ideology and so on. However, the theory also has a macro level implication that non-parliamentary systems should experience more coups than parliamentary ones, which will be tested in a large N setting.

I hypothesize that *parliamentary systems are less likely to experience military coups than presidential systems*. Military elites have alternative options to change the nature of the executive. Namely they can threaten the chief executive and force him to resign so that a desirable government can be formed within the parliament without necessitating new elections, which are always risky for the military elites. Hence government breakdown occurs but regime breakdown does not. Following the above theoretical explanation one can argue that the chief executives in non-parliamentary systems might see that the military has few options other than conducting a coup and hence they might be more willing to give military more resources to keep them satisfied. If this theoretical argument is correct we should expect no variation between the different constitutional designs when the models control for military expenditures. These competing theories will be tested in the next section.

Data and Method

The analysis is based on an annual data for the years 1960-2001 for 103 countries. The unit of analysis is regime year. Those countries that became independent after 1960 enter into the data whenever they declare independence. The dependent variable used in this study was taken from Powell and Thyne (2011). For a given country year it was operationalized as 0 if there was no military coup and 1 if a coup occurred. Powell and Thyne (2011) define a military coup as an “illegal and overt attempt by the military or

other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive that provides at least 7 days of ruling power to the perpetrators” (252). As this definition suggests, the aim is the removal of the executive leader and replacing him with the one who has closer ideology to the elites. Moreover, this definition states that the perpetrator may also be a non-military elite such as civilian members of government. I assume a political actor who has a power to conduct a coup can also use that power to threaten or buy off politicians. In addition, even if the military is not the primary actor, it must play at least a supportive role. If it does not, it can likely prevent coup attempts before they take place, or quickly crush the perpetrators afterwards. Hence using this data set is an appropriate choice in terms of the coup perpetrators and the theory proposed here. The theory presented here speaks also to the coup attempts. I will also test the theory taking coup attempts as the dependent variable. The data again comes from Powell and Thyne (2011).

The key independent variable is the constitutional design obtained from Gerring et al. (2009). It was operationalized as 1 if a system is parliamentary and 0 otherwise. From the perspective of the theory explained above, semi-presidential regimes are identical to presidential ones since the president is elected directly through public elections and he/she has a significant amount of executive power. But, in order to deal with the varying features of semi-presidential systems, the below analysis includes a separate model dropping the semi-presidential systems.

Gerring et al. (2009) classify a wide range of cases in terms of their constitutional design, including several non-democracies.¹⁴ Although scholars like Gandhi and Lust-

¹⁴ Gerring and Thacker (2004, p.305) argue that the impact of institutions will register over several years and may not have immediate impact. Hence their coding of

Okar (2009) argue that institutions might have different functions and goals in non-democracies than they have in democracies, Gerring and his colleagues argue that at least some modicum of multiparty competition would be enough to capture the distinct features instilled by presidentialism and parliamentarism. A vote of confidence may not function in the most authoritarian states, but it could in an anocracy. To deal with this issue analysis, the following analysis uses different thresholds of democracy such as Polity IV scores of -5, 0, and 6. Table 4.1 summarizes the data in terms of the number of parliamentary versus nonparliamentary cases at each democracy level: consolidated democracies (POLITY IV of 10), unconsolidated democracies (POLITY IV between 9 and 6), anocracies (POLITY IV between 5 and -5).

Table 4.1: Constitutional Design per Democracy Level (in system year)

	Non-parliamentary	Parliamentary	Total
Consolidated Democracies	432	1,601	2033
Unconsolidated Democracies	705	425	1130
Anocracies	628	270	898
Total	1765	2296	4061

The analysis also includes several controls. The log of GDP per capita captures the level of development. It is lagged one year and measured in real 1996 dollars. The parliamentarism variable used in this study “represents the *predominant* political arrangement in a country over the (last) two decades” (*ibid.*).

change in the GDP measures the rate of development. The data for these two variables were obtained from Gleditsch (2002). The conventional wisdom states that military coups are more likely in a poor economy (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Belkin and Schofer, 2003). However recent studies by Powell (2012) and Svolik (2012a) show that these two indicators have no substantive impact on the likelihood of coups. The models also control for three military related variables obtained from the Correlates of War Project: change in military expenditure, log of number of military personnel, and soldier quality (military expenditure per soldier). Huntington (1991) argues that civilian governments give some “toys” to the military elites in order to reduce the likelihood of a coup. Svolik (2012a) also argues that civilian governments make a contract with the military in order to be protected by those who are excluded by the regime. According to him, the military demands economic and institutional prerogatives to perform this duty and military coups do not occur as long as civilian governments do not break this contract.

The frequency of military coups may also be a result of countries’ authoritarian status rather than their constitutional design (Agüero, 1995). Therefore, the models consider this possibility using a dummy variable for authoritarian status. Finally, Cheibub (2007) challenges the perils-of-presidentialism framework and argues that the underlying reason is the military legacy instead of constitutional design. In his view, military dictatorships are more likely to prefer presidential systems when they democratize. Democracies with a military legacy are more likely to experience breakdown for reasons such as the existence of a strongly established military institution, according to him. However, the counter argument might also be plausible; if there is a military legacy and strong military establishment then the civilian governments observes this and tries not to

break the *contract* in order to secure their office. Hence, maybe the military legacy can lower the probability of military coups. The model will test this possibility by controlling for military legacy using Cheibub's (2007) measure.

The data analysis involves, first, probit models which are straightforward to interpret and relatively intuitive. And secondly, it presents a duration model, also known as a survival or event history model. The duration model estimates the likelihood that a subject (country) experiences an event (military coup) provided that it had not experienced it until that time. There are several survival models, but the Cox Proportional Hazards model will be used because this study aims to find the impact of the independent variables instead of the shape of underlying hazard rates (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). There are countries that experienced multiple military coups in their history. For example in Ecuador there were 6 coups (1961, 1963, 1966, 1972, 1976, 2000), in Argentina 5 coups (1962, 1966, 1970, 1971, 1976), and in Nigeria 5 coups (1966, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1993). Therefore, it is possible that unobserved country specific factors might impact the probability of a military coup. This makes some polities more prone to military coups. Consequently, it is possible to observe correlated errors among observations within states. In order to deal with this problem, robust standard errors clustered by country are estimated and presented in the results table.

Results

Figures 4.1A-F illustrate the Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of the data with the corresponding confidence intervals. The first three graphs are based on military coup attempts and the remaining three are based on the successful military coups. The y-axis in

these graphs depicts the percent of the cases that have survived and the x-axis depicts the number of years. Figure 1A indicates that at about 15 years almost 50 percent of the cases experience a military coup attempt. Figure 1B shows survival percentages by constitutional design. The parliamentary regimes have a much higher probability of surviving without experiencing any military coup attempt. And the difference between the two types of regimes is statistically significant as the confidence intervals do not overlap if we disregard the first couple of years of survival.

As the figure shows, about 60 percent of the parliamentary cases survive for the first 20 years, whereas only 35 percent of the presidential regimes are able to survive for the same number of years. Parliamentary regimes experience almost zero military coup attempts after 20 years of survival. However, presidential regimes continue to experience coup attempts until 45 years. Only about 25 percent of the presidential regimes survive for 40 years.


This difference might be attributed to the fact that most of the consolidated democratic countries are parliamentary. To control for this, the consolidated democracies, those with a Polity IV score of 10 in 2006, are dropped in Figure 1C. Most of these countries are European parliamentary democracies. The difference is still remarkable. The confidence intervals converge, yet they do not overlap. Within 40 years about 50 percent of the parliamentary regimes survive, while less than 25 percent of the presidential regimes survive.

The last three graphs illustrate the survival rates based on the successful military coup data. Figure 1D shows that if a country survives for about 35 years, the probability of coup is almost zero, as the straight line after 35 years shows. Figure 1E shows 75

percent of the parliamentary systems are able to survive while only 50 percent of the presidential systems can survive for 20 years. The variation holds even if the consolidated democracies are dropped as the Figure 1F illustrates.

Table 4.2 shows the multivariate analyses results. The first model includes only the democracies having Polity IV scores of 6 or higher. The results in this model show that only military legacy and log of GDPPC(lagged) have statistically significant coefficients while the parliamentary variable has statistically insignificant coefficient. This finding confirms Cheibub's (2007) claim. In the models that control for the military legacy status, the impact of the constitutional design variable vanishes. It also confirms two key findings presented by Maeda (2010) with regards to the exogenous breakdowns: first the statistical insignificance of the parliamentary variable, and second the statistical significance of the development variable. However, two problems arise with case selection in this model. Firstly, within this data there are several consolidated democracies that have almost zero probability of experiencing military coup. But including consolidated democracies when examining an issue specific to unconsolidated regimes can produce erroneous results (Svolik, 2008; Wright, 2008). Following this logic the next models excludes established democracies by specifying a Polity IV score of 9 as the upper bound.

Figure 4.1 A-F: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate Graphs



Note: Figure 4.1A and 4.1D illustrates the survival estimates for all countries in the data. Figure 4.1B, 4.1C, 4.1E, and 4.1F illustrate the survival estimates by constitutional design, where the shaded regions are the confidence intervals, the dashed lines (---) represent the parliamentary systems and the solid lines (—) represent the nonparliamentary systems. Figure 4.1A-C are based on coup attempts and Figure 4.1D-F are based on the successful coups.

Table 4.2: Probit and Duration Model Results for Military Coup Analysis

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Duration	Duration	Probit
	No SemiPres				(Attempt)		(Attempt)
	Polity IV 6 to 10	Polity IV 0 to 9	Polity IV -5 to 9	Polity IV 0 to 9			Polity IV -5 to 9
Parliamentary	-0.166 (0.318)	-0.444* (0.247)	-0.435** (0.209)	-0.755*** (0.270)	-0.882** (0.367)	-0.571* (0.296)	-0.346* (0.186)
Change in GDP	-3.015 (2.044)	0.178 (1.658)	-0.737 (1.059)	-1.062 (1.851)	-1.085 (1.641)	-0.768 (1.592)	-1.423 (0.927)
Change in Mil. Exp.	-0.374 (0.363)	0.110 (0.143)	0.048 (0.078)	0.254 (0.164)	-0.050 (0.137)	0.097 (0.114)	0.089 (0.078)
Soldier Quality	-0.167 (0.121)	-0.345*** (0.109)	-0.467*** (0.086)	-0.364*** (0.129)	-0.353*** (0.115)	-0.301*** (0.090)	-0.367*** (0.063)
Log Mil. Personnel	0.065 (0.065)	0.094 (0.073)	0.092* (0.056)	0.126 (0.098)	0.051 (0.075)	0.050 (0.061)	0.070 (0.047)
Log GDPPC(lagged)	-0.436** (0.201)	-0.274 (0.213)	-0.052 (0.166)	-0.179 (0.245)	-0.330 (0.239)	-0.284 (0.192)	-0.056 (0.145)
Authoritarian					-0.400* (0.229)	-0.167 (0.156)	
Military Legacy	-0.625** (0.277)	-0.939*** (0.237)	-0.886*** (0.206)	-1.144*** (0.292)	-1.258*** (0.354)	-0.264 (0.219)	-0.254* (0.144)
Constant	2.752*** (0.994)	3.129** (1.286)	2.427** (0.977)	2.730* (1.576)			1.916** (0.909)
Observations	1,777	1,144	1,434	889	2,788	2,788	1,434

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The second case selection issue deals with the lower bound. The democratic breakdown literature considers only democracies; hence it uses a lower bound of 6 in Polity IV index. However, as discussed above, Gerring et al. (2009) argue that it is possible to identify different features of presidentialism and parliamentarism even for countries scoring below 6. The empirical analysis in their study uses 0 as the lower bound (although even more cases are coded in their data). I apply this lower bound in the second model. The results show that the key independent variable becomes statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level even if the model controls for the military legacy status. It reveals that parliamentary systems are less likely to experience military coups all else being equal. Confirming Powell's (2012) study on military coups, the independent variable for soldier quality also has a statistically significant coefficient. The other independent variable that achieves statistical significance is the military legacy. The results indicate that the impact of Log GDPPC(lagged) disappears as the case selection changes.

In the third model the lower threshold is specified as -5, which means including all the anocracies and excluding all the authoritarian cases. The results remain similar and our statistical confidence in the key independent variable increases. The fourth model is a replication of the second, but drops the semi-presidential systems. The coefficient of the parliamentarism variable becomes statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. In this model change in military expenditure variable is statistically significant in addition to the military legacy and the soldier quality variables. The fifth model presents a duration model. The cases included in this model are all the systems, which Gerring *et*

al. (2009) classified in terms of constitutional design, excluding those countries, which are scored as -6 or lower in 2006 according to Polity IV index. The coefficient for the key independent variable in the this model is -0.88. The associated hazard ratio, 0.41 (calculated by $\exp(-0.88)$), implies that being parliamentary decreases the likelihood of coup by 59%.

The results show that soldier quality (military spending per soldier) and military legacy also have an effect. According to the Model 5, countries with higher soldier quality have a lower probability of experiencing a coup. This finding supports Huntington's argument that democratizing countries should give militaries "toys" (Huntington, 1991). This result also confirms Powell's (2012) findings. The other statistically significant independent variable is the military past, which displays the opposite sign from what we would expect based on Cheibub's (2007) argument. Countries with a military legacy are less likely to experience a military coup. This finding supports my argument that the institutional and economic prerogatives of the military are high in countries with a military legacy, meaning civilians have less incentive to diverge from the military's ideology.

The authoritarianism variable has a statistically significant impact, but only at 90 percent confidence level. The economy related independent variables (GDP growth and log of GDPPC) do not have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of coups according to this model. Although conventional wisdom argues that economic indicators are important determinants of the breakdowns and the military coups, these findings confirm the results of some recent large-N cross country analyses done by Svobik (2012a)

and Powell (2012). And finally, the log of number of military personnel also has a statistically insignificant coefficient.

The last two models in the table tests the impact of constitutional design on the likelihood of military coup attempts. Powell and Thyne (2011) differentiate the coup attempts from the successful coups and their global data include both of these variables. Powell (2012, p.1019) states that coup conspirators “attempt a coup when the expected rewards of the maneuver and its probability of victory are high enough to offset the dire consequences of a failed putsch.” If this is the case, the above theoretical argument should apply to the coup attempts, as it was the case for the successful coups. The sixth and seventh models in Table 2 use coup attempts as the dependent variable. These models also largely confirm the main argument of the paper.


As a robustness check I replicated the Probit analyses controlling for time. I added time, time², and time³ to the models following Carter and Signorino’s (2010) method. The results did not change substantively; hence, they are not presented.

Figures 4.2 A-B and Figures 4.2 C-D show the post-estimation results controlling for the covariates of the Model 6 and Model 5, respectively. These graphs illustrate the survival rates and the smoothed hazard functions, using covariate adjusted survivor function method (Cefalu, 2011). Figure 2A indicates that within 40 years about 67 percent of the nonparliamentary systems experience a military coup attempt while less than 50 percent of the parliamentary systems experience it. The hazard rate is also higher in presidential systems as the Figure 2B shows.

Figure 4.2 C-D show the post-estimation results for a model where the dependent variable is successful military coup, According to Figure 2C parliamentary countries

again have higher survival rates, all else being equal. The probability of surviving for 30 years without experiencing a military coup for a parliamentary system is about 75 percent, whereas that for a non-parliamentary system is about 50 percent. Figure 2D shows that the hazard functions for both sets of countries reach their peaks at about the 22nd year and the hazard rate for the non-parliamentary systems is substantively higher than that of parliamentary ones.

Figure 4.2 A-D: Post-Estimation Graphs



Note: Figure 4.2 A-B is based on the military coup attempt analysis (Model 6), and Figure 4.2 C-D is based on the successful military coup analysis (Model 5). The dashed lines (---) represent the parliamentary systems and the solid lines (—) represent the nonparliamentary systems.

Possible criticisms of the empirical tests presented above include the lack of a direct test of the micro-mechanism of the theory, while instead relying on a stereotypical

view of the differences between parliamentary and presidential systems. In fact, there is variation within these systems. For example, some parliamentary systems have coalition governments while others have single party governments. As the theory states, the existence of coalition governments may be the mechanism that decreases the likelihood of military coups. Hence one can argue that instead of a parliamentary variable, a coalition government variable should be used. But this approach is problematic because we currently do not have a data on the features of coalitions across a sufficiently wide range of countries, in particular whether or not at least one ideologically desirable party (from the military perspective) is in the coalition, as the theory clearly specifies.

In addition, as the theory suggests, military may try to buy off even the members of the governing party in single party governments. Several scholars argued that party discipline is very weak outside the consolidated democracies Hence, testing the impact of coalition governments, as opposed to single party ones, is not a plausible research design.

Summary

This chapter tested the macro implications of the theory presented in earlier chapters. The results obtained here show that parliamentary systems are less likely to experience military coups controlling for several possible determinants, in particular, the military legacy. I argued that military elites often possess significant political power in semi-democracies and non-democracies. These elites may tend to intervene into the political process when they see a possibility of divergence from their preferred policy positions, in other words, when the chief executives break their contracts with the military (Svolik, 2012a). Because the governments in parliamentary regimes are

accountable to the parliament, and because coalition governments are frequent in parliamentary systems, military elites might find alternative less costly strategies, such as influencing the legislators, in order to obtain a desirable government. A military coup might only be a second best option in such regimes. Since these two features do not exist in presidential systems, military elites are more likely to conduct a coup to overthrow an undesirable president.

I argue that the politics in developing countries are not as clear as it is presented. Although we observe no regime breakdown, regimes may face significant threats from the military elites, and parliamentary systems might create additional venues for the elites to influence the politics without conducting a coup. In terms of regime survival, Linz might be correct. My empirical findings may confirm his expectations. But in terms of democratic legitimacy, the same judgment cannot be made without a detailed empirical and historical analysis of the politics of parliamentary systems in the developing world.

As a policy implication, I argue that if the ultimate aim is preventing occurrence of military coups, parliamentary systems may be better for an emerging democracy. However, such a strategy raises significant problems when the country's military has some reserved domains. In such a case, the military elites will not abstain from intervening in the key political decisions such as government formation and termination. This type of intervention significantly weakens the democratic legitimacy of the system. If the aim is wider than eradicating the military coups, and if it includes eradicating the political centrality of the military, some additional measures must be taken. Future studies should investigate the government formation and termination processes of the parliamentary systems outside of the established democracies to capture the military's

influence. The next chapter will explore the sources of the political centrality of militaries particularly through examining the institutional reserved domains of the militaries across the world.

Chapter 5: Measuring Latent Military Centrality

Earlier chapters presented a theoretical framework based on an important assumption, which is the existence of politicized, influential and politically central military. I have argued that in case there is a highly politicized, and influential military, the different types of constitutional designs provides different incentives to the military elites who may tend to conduct a military coup. The qualitative and quantitative analyses demonstrated that the inherent features of parliamentary systems offer alternative less costly options which make military coups only the second best option. However, the theoretical framework raises an important question: How can we measure the political centrality of the military in a global context? This chapter aims to respond to this question. I will discuss the weaknesses of the existing measurement methods and present the alternative method of measurement.

The struggle to obtain efficacious civilian oversight of the military is still one of the most important obstacles residing on the democratization paths of many countries across the world. Comparative studies of civil-military relations, as well as many

international relations studies, discuss “military centrality” as a determinant of military coups, political instability, interstate war, and several other outcomes. Most of these studies measure military centrality as based on the amount of military expenditure and number of military personnel (Andreski, 1968; Nordlinger, 1976; Wells, 1974; Wells and Pollnac, 1988; Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). They argue that in countries where the military has sizable resources, the institutions of civil society, as well as the relative influence of the civilian political decision makers, are mostly weak. Military elites are the dominant actors in the political arena, and the likelihood of a military coup is high. However, the existing measurement approach—based on material resources—provides a limited understanding of the potential influence of the military. From highly democratic countries like the US to highly authoritarian countries like China or Saudi Arabia, such indicators may be relatively high, while the probability of experiencing a military coup is remarkably low.

Alternatively, several other scholars argue that politicized militaries tend to create reserved domains to institutionalize their political influence on the civilian governments (Dix, 1994; Feaver, 1999). This institutionalization may take place across different dimensions such as the economy, the judiciary, and in politics (Stepan, 1988). Following this argument in this chapter I propose an alternative approach for measuring the latent military centrality concept in a global comparative perspective using originally collected financial, judicial, and political indicators. The financial and judicial indicators deal with the existence of military owned businesses and the jurisdiction of military courts respectively. The political indicators include the placement of highest ranked military

general in official state ceremonies with respect to legislators and whether the chief executive or defense minister is a military officer, or not.

In order to perform a validity check, I use the International Country Risk Guide's "military in politics" variable, created by the PRS group—a highly regarded private company that has provided political analyses and country risk forecasts since 1979. The statistical analyses of an original data set from 50 countries across the world illustrate that the alternative method based on financial, judicial, and political indicators of military centrality captures the political influence of the military both significantly and substantively better than the traditional method based on the material resources of the military.

In addition, I use a Bayesian factor analysis method to obtain the latent principal dimension of the military centrality index underlying the financial, judicial and political indicators. As expected, countries with highly influential militaries are located on the one end of this military centrality spectrum while countries with high civilian control over the military are located at the other end. The results show that this index correlates with the expert analysis of military in politics more than the traditional material-resource based measurement of military centrality.

The chapter continues in this sequence. The next section will review the approaches to measuring military centrality. It will be followed by a description of the new method based on the institutional privilege variables and a description of the data. In the following sections I will present a comparison of the two rival methods. Then I will introduce a Bayesian factor analysis measurement of military centrality and its

comparison with the traditional material-resource based measures. The final section will conclude.

Studies on Military Centrality

Several studies of civil-military relations discuss the military centrality concept in order to capture the political autonomy and influence of the military vis-a-vis the civilian governments (Andreski, 1968; Nordlinger, 1976; Wells, 1974; Wells and Pollnac, 1988; Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). The conventional method to measure this latent concept relies on two proxies: the military budget and the number of soldiers. Pilster and Böhmelt (2012, p.363) argue that civilian political leaders are less likely to implement institutional coup-proofing strategies if the number of military officers relative to the population is high: “relatively large armies are politically more central, which deters internal threats in the form of insurgencies or leaders’ implementation of institutional coup-proofing strategies.” Their findings show that leaders are less likely to impose ex-ante controls on the military if the military is politically more central, that is to say, if the size of the military (weighted by population) is high. Jenkins and Kposowa (1992, p.274) also argue that if the military material resources are high (either relative to the national economy or the overall state budget), the civil society and the civilian leadership tend to be weaker. They claim, as a result, the probability of military intervention tends to be higher.

Auvinen (1997, p.182) examines the role of military centrality in the likelihood of political instability and conflicts. He argues that in several nations military institutions possess more effective organizational capacity and more material resources than the

civilian government. And in many developing countries, the military is an active and strong political actor. He states that powerful armed forces will be more likely to exercise influence over the policies of the civilian government and prefer strong over weak reactions to crush the political upheavals and conflicts. He also measures the strength and the centrality of the military using the material strengths of the military. However, even in a highly democratic country such as the U.S. or in a highly authoritarian country such as China, the number of soldiers and the military expenditure might be quite high, although the military autonomy with respect to the civilian government and also the likelihood of a military coup is quite low. Even though measuring political centrality of the military using these material sources might illustrate the political influence of the military in some countries, in a global comparative perspective such a methodology is highly problematic.

Other studies in the comparative civil military literature propose alternative methods to capture the political centrality and influence of the military. Stepan (1988) argues that militaries in the developing world possess significant political power through its institutional prerogatives. He defines these prerogatives as “areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.” He discusses different types of prerogatives in various issue dimensions and classifies the prerogatives as low, medium, and high. For example he argues that in terms of their role in the legal system the military has a high prerogative if “national security laws and military court system

cover large areas of political and civil society”, and if “domain where military can be tried in civil courts is very limited” (Stepan, 1988, p.97). He also argues that in regards to their role in the state enterprises, the military has a high prerogative when military officers control key state enterprises. Another example is with regard to the military participation in the government portfolio. He argues that the military prerogative is higher if military participation in the cabinet is high. ¹

Narcis Serra, Spain’s Defense Minister from 1982 to 1991, confirms the above suggestion. In his book, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, he describes the all-important measures to successfully control the military during democratization processes. He argues that countries aiming to remove the military’s influence in politics should eliminate the military prerogatives in the judiciary and the economy. He claims that the military justice system should not be allowed to try civilians and the military justice jurisdiction should only include military crimes. He argues that the trial of military officers in military courts on a nonmilitary related issue is a corporate preserve and privilege for the military officers. He also suggests that civilian governments should privatize military owned businesses (Serra, 2010, p.84)

¹ Stepan states eight more roles and issue areas through which military may have certain prerogatives: Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the political system, military relationship to the chief executive, coordination of defense sector, role of legislature, role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees, role in intelligence, role in police, and role in military promotions. However, these are relatively more difficult to quantify and measure in a global comparative perspective.

Kuru (2012) builds on the above military prerogatives argument by adding another dimension to the discussion of military influence: ranking of military generals in state protocol meetings' order of precedence. He states that certain rules and laws create institutional privileges for the military and foster unaccountability in democratizing countries. As a result of these prerogatives, military generals hardly feel that the civilian politicians are their superiors. Hence within the state hierarchy they may ask for more prominent positions. Kuru (2012, p.43) gives order of precedence in official state ceremonies as an example and compares the US and Turkey in this regard. In Turkey, the highest ranked military officer has the fourth highest position, coming right after the president, speaker of the national assembly, and prime minister. Such a ranking is highly unlikely in a nation where the military is not central in the political arena and entirely subordinate to civilian control. For example, in the US the highest ranked military officer is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is located after the state governors, senators, representatives, and even the postmaster general and chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. The next section will discuss the financial, judicial and political dimensions in detail.

Institutional Dimensions of Military Centrality

The Financial Dimension

Military owned corporations operate in many countries such as Honduras, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, Nigeria, Serbia, and in sectors such as mining, tourism, manufacturing, media, transportation, automobile, and banking. Mani (2010)

defines this special type of entrepreneurship as “the innovative creation of resources and means of production by commissioned military officers acting in an institutional capacity as formal owners, managers and stakeholders of enterprises that generate financial resources or goods directly benefiting the military.” She argues that oftentimes their activities are lawful; however, they are not always transparent and fair.

Existence of such corporations is detrimental to the democratization and the wellbeing of a country for four main reasons. First, it provides extra independence and autonomy to the military generals as they secure some level of resources. The military elites will feel less accountable to the civilian politicians. Naturally, the military already has a monopoly on the use of the state’s coercive power. If the military also obtains control of large financial resources, civilian politicians would entirely lose control over the military. Second, in most cases the way these corporations operate is highly obscure and away from public scrutiny and auditing. Hence the civilian government does not know the real need of the defense spending. Third, low level of transparency will increase the level of corruption.

Finally, the expansion of military owned businesses will also significantly influence the professionalism and institutional cohesion of the military. On the one hand, if a substantive portion of the military officers are employed in business activities, the combat readiness and the professional training of soldiers will be greatly weakened. On the other hand, if some military elites receive financial benefits higher than others, the institutional cohesion among the members of the military will be affected. This may potentially lead to competition among the soldiers to obtain more benefits and better positions. For of all these reasons, examining the military owned businesses provides

better understanding of the nature of civil-military relations and a useful measure of civilian oversight of the military (Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011; Brömmelhörster and Paes, 2003).

The first column in Table 5.1 shows whether a country has any military owned business (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). It shows that militaries of 20 countries in the data run corporations, whereas in 21 other countries there are no military owned business. Countries are coded mostly based on the secondary scholarly sources examining this particular topic (e.g. Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011; Brömmelhörster and Paes, 2003; Transparency International). In cases where these sources lack information, I resorted to country experts to generate the data. Appendix 1A shows the sources used for each observation.

The Judicial Dimension

The second institutional dimension of the military centrality takes into account the military prerogatives in the judiciary. More specifically, it deals with the jurisdiction of the military courts. Existence of a separate military justice system is not necessarily a threat to the civilian supremacy over the military. There are several examples of well-functioning military justice systems in consolidated democracies, where the military is fully controlled by the civilian authorities. In these systems military courts mostly cannot try civilians. Moreover, often times, military courts in consolidated democracies are not allowed to try soldiers in cases of allegations of human rights abuses.

Table 5.1: Country Scores on Each Military Variable

Country	Financial	Judicial	Political (Ceremonial)	Political (Cabinet)	Military in Politics (Expert Analysis)	Number of Military Personal per 1000 citizens	Military Expenditure (%of GDP)
Albania	0	0	0	0	2	4.75	1.3
Algeria	1	1		0	6	9.30	5.0
Argentina	0	0	1	0	3	2.64	0.7
Bangladesh	1		1	0	7	1.55	1.2
Belgium		0	1	0	0	2.92	1.0
Bolivia	1	1	0	0	6	8.45	1.5
Brazil	0	1	1	0	4	3.80	1.4
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	2	6.14	1.5
Colombia	1	0	1	0	8	10.02	3.4
Congo, Dem. R.	1	1		1	12	2.14	1.3
Croatia	0			0	2	4.51	1.7
Czech Rep.	0	0	0	0	0	2.61	1.0
Dominican Rep.		1		1	6	6.43	0.6
Ecuador	1	1	1	0	9	4.34	3.0
El Salvador	1	1	0	0	7	4.50	1.1
Ethiopia	0	1		0	10	1.79	0.8
France	0	0	0	0	1	5.28	2.2
Ghana	0			0	6	0.72	0.5
Guatemala	1	1	0	0	4	3.15	0.5
Guinea		0		1	11	1.25	2.2
Honduras	1	1		0	5	2.65	1.2
India	0	0	1	0	4	2.48	2.4
Indonesia	1	1	0	1	7	3.00	0.9
Iraq	1	1		0	12	27.02	3.4
Kenya	0	0	0	0	4	0.78	1.6
Korea, South	0	0	0	0	4	13.62	2.6
Lebanon	0	1		1	8	19.22	4.4
Liberia		0		0	6	0.55	0.7
Malawi	0	0		0	4	0.53	1.4
Malaysia	0		1	0	2	4.93	1.5
Mexico	0	1		0	5	3.12	0.6
Moldova		1	1	0	4	2.24	0.3
Nicaragua	1	0		0	6	2.14	0.8
Nigeria	1	1	0	0	8	1.13	0.5
Pakistan	1	1	1	0	8	5.94	3.5
Panama	0	0	0	0	2	3.59	0.0
Paraguay		0	0	0	9	4.08	1.6
Peru		1	0	0	3	6.74	1.4
Philippines	0	0		1	6	1.87	1.3
Romania	0	1		0	2	7.01	1.3
Russia	1	1	0	0	4	9.60	4.2
Senegal		0		0	7	1.70	0.0
Serbia	1			0	4	3.79	2.0
Sierra Leone		1		0	7	1.92	0.0
South Africa	0	0	1	0	2	1.28	1.2
Sri Lanka	0	1	0	0	8	11.14	2.7
Thailand	1	0		0	8	6.87	1.5
Turkey	1	0	1	0	8	8.30	2.3
Ukraine	1			0	2	4.61	2.9
Zimbabwe	1			0	8	4.22	2.6

Outside of established democracies, though, the picture is quite different. Particularly in countries where the military has had a significant influence in politics, the jurisdiction of military courts is large. For example, until the 2010 referendum, the Turkish military courts were allowed to try soldiers who committed human rights violations as well as civilians. Even more interestingly, military officers who plotted a coup had been tried by the military judges; however, such a regulation provides extensive impunity to the military generals. The 2010 referendum significantly restricted the jurisdiction of military courts as well as the military's influence on the politics in general (Kuru, 2012). The military of Mexico also used the military justice system in order to protect their officers from civilian oversight, particularly when the soldiers were accused of human rights abuses while combating drug trafficking (Wilkinson, 2011). International human rights organizations strongly criticize the judicial practices where the military courts try military officers as such practices create significant impunity and unfair trials as in the Mexican case.

Kyle and Reiter (2013) examine the jurisdictions military courts and their influence on civil-military relations in Latin America. They argue that when the military court jurisdiction includes trial of soldiers who committed crimes, which are covered by the civilian laws, military justice becomes a rival institution to the civilian courts. This outcome weakens the ability of civilian oversight of the military. As a result the rule of law is undermined, civil-military relations is strained, and finally respect to democratic norms and human rights diminishes. However, they underline that the existence of

military courts is not detrimental per se; instead, the extent of their jurisdiction is the real cause of the problem.

The second column in Table 5.1 illustrates the level of jurisdiction of military courts. If a military court can try civilians, or soldiers who have committed human rights violation, the country is scored as one, otherwise scored as zero.² It shows in 22 countries within this data the military justice system has an extensive jurisdiction, and in 21 cases it is highly limited. The sources of the coding can be seen in Appendix 1B.

The Political Dimension

The political dimension has two components. The first regards the ranking of the highest-level military officer in the order of precedence in state ceremonies. More specifically this variable was operationalized as whether the highest level military officer is ranked in place higher than the members of the parliament (coded as one), or not (coded as zero). The third column in Table 5.1 shows that in 16 countries the highest-level general is ranked lower than an ordinary legislator. However, in 12 countries this is not the case. For example in Argentina, the Chief of Joint Staff of the Armed Forces (*Jefe Del Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas*) is located in the 8th position, right after the cabinet ministers. The senators and deputies come at the 19th position. This ranking is also very similar in Brazil. The highest ranked military officers' position is 12, whereas the senators and deputies are located in the 20th and 21st positions. In Pakistan,

² In some cases, military justice jurisdiction includes civilians “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field” like in the US case. These examples are not regarded as trial of civilians by military justice.

even the chief of the army staff, chief of the naval staff, and chief of the air staff are ranked higher than the members of the Senate and National Assembly of Pakistan.

Some countries publish their order of precedence lists on their official website. In some other cases, presidential decrees list them, and secondary sources publish these decrees online. In such cases I obtained the lists from the web pages. For others, I contacted consulates and embassies of the countries to get these data.

The second component deals with the representation of the military in the cabinet as the chief executive or defense minister. In countries where any of these cabinet members is a military general, the influence of the military on politics is very high. Beck et al. (2001) use this variable to measure the existence of the military's political influence behind the scenes in countries where a minimum level of electoral competition exists. In highly democratized countries, cabinet ministers tend not be active soldiers. The fourth column in Table 5.1 shows six countries having either a defense minister or chief executive who is also a military officer. In the Philippines and the Dominican Republic, the defense ministers are military officers, whereas in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Lebanon and Indonesia, chief executives are military officers. This data is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).

Reference and Comparison Categories

As a point of reference for a validity check, I use “the military in politics” variable in the International Country Risk Guide created by the PRS Group (Howell, 2011). The PRS Group is a private political and economic research and risk analysis company operating since 1979. PRS Group researchers and country experts collect

political and economic information on each country and convert it into more descriptive data. The data is frequently used by many scholarly articles in the political science, economy, and finance disciplines (e.g. Hanson, 2013; Böhmelt et al., 2014; Oetzel et al., 2001; Aizenman and Marion, 2004). The fifth column in Table 5.1 shows how countries are scored by this “military in politics” index. The scores range from 0 to 12, higher numbers suggesting more military influence in politics. The countries with the lowest military influence are Belgium and France whereas those with the highest military influence are the Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq.

The comparison category, which is comprised of material-resource variables, has two components: number of military personnel for every 1000 citizens and the amount of military expenditure as a percent of GDP. The last two columns in Table 5.1 show these values for each country. Iraq’s military has almost 27 soldiers for each 1000 citizen, which is the highest score in this variable. Ghana, Liberia, and Malawi, on the other hand, score lowest in terms of military personnel. Algeria, Lebanon, and Russia are the only countries that have military expenditure, which is more than four percent of the GDP. Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Panama are the countries that scored lowest in this index.

The data set contains information on 50 countries around the world. These countries are selected primarily based on their democracy levels according to the Polity IV index. In highly democratic countries, the military will obviously have almost no political influence. In very dictatorial, regimes the military’s political influence will be a relatively less relevant topic in terms of democratic civilian supremacy over the military. Hence, only those countries with a Polity IV score higher than 0 and less than 10 (in a -10

to 10 scale) are included. Those countries with a population of less than 3 million are also excluded due to the data collection difficulties in these countries.

Comparing Two Methods

In order to compare the two approaches to measuring military centrality, I conduct regression analysis. I compare the p-values, joint statistical significance levels and adjusted R-Squared levels of each group of explanatory variables, using “military in politics” as the dependent variable. Nine observations on the financial dimension, seven observations on the judicial dimension and twenty-two observations on the political dimensions are missing. To deal with the issue of missing cases, I use a multiple imputation method (Rubin, 1987). I set the number of imputations for each missing observation to 20.

Table 5.2 illustrates the results comparing the two approaches discussed to measure military centrality. The analysis compares the extent to which these two sets of variables (institutional-privilege variables vs. material-resource variables) explain the variation in the reference category. I examine the statistical significance levels of the independent variables, joint F-test statistics, and adjusted R-squared values. The first four variables are the institutional-privilege variables for the new measurement method described above. The last two are the number of military personnel and military expenditure variables, which form the traditional way of capturing military centrality, namely material-resource variables. The dependent variable, which is treated as a reference category for checking validity, is the “military in politics” variable.

Table 5.2: Comparison of Two Methods Using OLS Regression

VARIABLES	(1A) Military in Politics	(2A) Military in Politics	(3A) Military in Politics	(1B) Military in Politics	(2B) Military in Politics	(3B) Military in Politics
Financial	2.928*** (0.930)	2.789*** (0.813)		2.447** (1.049)	2.768** (1.043)	
Judicial	0.639 (0.879)	0.878 (0.859)		1.657 (1.025)	1.550 (1.040)	
Political (Ceremonial)	0.882 (0.993)	1.006 (0.920)		1.835* (0.947)	1.565* (0.844)	
Political (Cabinet)	2.950** (1.366)	3.024** (1.434)		1.117 (1.985)	0.462 (1.970)	
Military Personnel	0.183 (0.121)		0.115 (0.113)	0.203 (0.160)		0.058 (0.214)
Military Expenditure	-0.343 (0.464)		0.249 (0.474)	-0.063 (0.538)		0.811 (0.677)
Constant	2.631*** (0.888)	2.807*** (0.757)	4.466*** (0.733)	1.226 (0.893)	2.220*** (0.638)	3.009** (1.154)
Observations	50	50	50	22	22	22
F-test (Inst. Var.)	4.29	4.88		6.59	7.38	
Prob>F (Inst. Var.)	0.0069	0.0032		0.003	0.001	
F-test (Persn. and Exp.)	1.32		1.70	1.34		1.61
Prob>F (Persn. and Exp.)	0.2785		0.193	0.292		0.226
R-squared	0.498 (mean)	0.482 (mean)	0.068	0.690	0.635	0.145
Adjusted R-squared	0.428 (mean)	0.436 (mean)	0.068	0.566	0.549	0.055

Note: Models 1A and 2A includes imputed observations. Hence the R-squared and adjusted R-squared values are calculated by taking the mean of the imputed model statistics. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The first column shows that only two institutional-privilege variables are statistically significant: financial and political (cabinet). Neither of the traditional measures—military personnel and expenditure—has a statistically significant coefficient. The joint F-test statistics also show that the institutional dimension variables capture more variation in the index than the traditional measures of military centrality. The p-value for the joint F-test of the institutional variables is 0.0069 (statistically significant at 99 percent confidence level), whereas that of military personnel and expenditure is 0.2785 (not statistically significant even at 90 percent confidence level). The second and the third models include the two groups of variables separately. Again the new measurement method captures more variation than the traditional one. The associated p-value for the former is 0.0032, while that for the latter is 0.1933.

Comparing the R-squared values also confirms the above findings. The R-squared for the whole model (first column) is 0.498, which is to say that the independent variables of the whole model explain 49.8 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. If we keep only the institutional variables approach (second column) the R-squared drops to 0.482. However, when we keep only the variables of the traditional approach (third column), it becomes 0.068. This means that if we use only the new method, independent variables explain almost 48.2 percent of the variation in the dependent variable, whereas using only the traditional method, independent variables explain 6.8 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the reason why the R-squared for the second model is higher than the one for the third model may be because of the fact that the former has four variables while the latter has only two variables. We know as we

increase the number of variables, R-squared increases. However the same is not true for the adjusted R-squared. Hence I also compare the adjusted R-squared values in the two models. Model 2A still performs better than Model 3A. The adjusted R-squared values in these models are 0.436 and 0.068, respectively.

For 22 countries within these data, there are no missing observations. Hence I replicated the above analysis on this set without applying any multiple imputation algorithms. The last three columns in Table 5.2 show the results based on this set of countries. The results largely confirm the findings in the previous table where the missing observations were filled using the multiple imputation method. There are only two differences in terms of the statistical significance of the coefficients. First, the political (cabinet) variable is no longer statistically significant in the Models 2A and 2B. Second, the political (ceremonial) variable is statistically significant although at 90 percent confidence level. The F-test, R-squared and Adjusted R-squared statistics also confirm the superiority of the institutional privilege variables.

Lastly, I have conducted factor analysis to compare these two groups of variables. Table 5.3 shows results from both one-dimensional and three-dimensional analyses. The first column indicates that the PRS expert analysis variable is loaded most heavily on to the first dimension. The next two most heavily loaded variables are the financial and judicial indicators of military centrality. The material resource variables are the fourth and fifth most heavily loaded ones. The variation between the two sets of variables is even more remarkable in the three-dimensional factor analysis. The two sets of variables loads on to the different dimensions of the latent military centrality. The first dimension is most heavily loaded by the expert analysis and the institutional privilege variables.

Table 5.3: Comparison of Two Methods Using Factor Analysis

	One Dimensional		Three Dimensional			
	Factor1	Uniq.	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniq.
Financial	0.7767	0.3968	0.8179	0.0949	0.0108	0.3219
Judicial	0.6390	0.5917	0.7364	-0.0032	-0.1832	0.4242
Political(ceremonial)	0.1726	0.9702	0.0729	0.0558	0.7044	0.4954
Political(cabinet)	0.1505	0.9773	0.3081	-0.2409	-0.2102	0.8029
Expert Analysis	0.8594	0.2614	0.8184	0.2335	0.2125	0.2306
Military Personnel	0.4063	0.8349	0.0993	0.7843	-0.1139	0.362
Military Expenditure	0.5217	0.7278	0.2021	0.7273	0.2837	0.3498
Eigenvalues			2.2398	1.1675	0.6060	

Note: “Uniq.” stands for Uniqueness.

The second dimension, on the other hand, is most heavily loaded by the material resource variables. The difference between the eigenvalue of the first dimension (2.23984) and the second dimension (1.16746) shows that the first dimension has very high explanatory power compared to the second one.

All these results confirm the hypothesis that the institutional-privilege variables explain the variation in the military centrality and political influence better than the material-resource variables. The next section will move one more step further and discuss generating of a military centrality index using the above institutional indicators.

Military Centrality Index

The findings of the previous section demonstrated that institutional-privilege variables perform better than the material-resource variables in explaining the political

influence of military. In this analysis I used an expert analysis created by the PRS Group as the reference. These data are a great source for comparative purposes and they are highly regarded in various literatures, as has already been discussed. However, the PRS Group is a private company and does not provide free access to the data.³ This limits scholarly work on this topic. In addition, the data are not reproducible. Only the data analysts working for the company know the details of the data generating process. They do not explain the whole process of how they calculate each score in their data description materials, which is understandable, as they have commercial concerns. As a result, the accumulation of knowledge and improvements in the measurement method is highly limited. Therefore, from a scholarly perspective, there is a need to create an alternative index for the political centrality of the military, which is easily reproducible, transparent in terms of the data generating process, and freely accessible. I use a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo factor analysis method (Quinn, 2004) to obtain the principal dimension of military centrality from the institutional-privilege variables.

In recent years, the political science discipline experienced a dramatic increase in the applications of Bayesian factor analyses, particularly when researchers are interested in capturing latent concepts such as the level of democracy across countries, ideological positions of political actors, effectiveness of international organizations and so on (Pemstein et al., 2010, Gray and Slapin, 2012; Clinton, 2004). In this vein, this section uses a Bayesian factor analysis method to capture the latent military centrality concept, which has not been done previously in the literature.

³ For example currently the full data on one military-in-politics variable for a year (e.g. 2014) costs \$388.08.

I conducted this analysis using MCMCpack, which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation package written in R statistical software language. I fixed the number of burn-in iterations at 50,000. The algorithm saved every 200th iteration, throughout a total of 200,000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo iterations. The convergence was checked following Plummer and his colleagues' (2009) tool—the Geweke convergence diagnostic—and a graphical examination of the parameter estimates.

Table 5.4 shows the results of this analysis for 22 countries where there is no missing data. The list starts at the top with countries having the highest military centrality and ends at the bottom with the lowest military centrality. Czech Republic, Panama, and Bulgaria are the countries with lowest military centrality scores. The military centrality scores are highest in Indonesia, Pakistan and Ecuador.

Table 5.4: Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo Estimation Results for Military Centrality Index

Country	Military Centrality Index	Standard Deviation	Naive Standard Error	Standard Error
Indonesia	1.12984	0.5004	0.015825	0.017968
Pakistan	0.94892	0.3667	0.011595	0.011595
Ecuador	0.94512	0.3884	0.012284	0.012284
Bolivia	0.93003	0.3941	0.012462	0.013206
Russia	0.92787	0.38	0.012016	0.010663
El Salvador	0.92748	0.3968	0.012549	0.012549
Nigeria	0.9123	0.3888	0.012295	0.012295
Guatemala	0.91136	0.4001	0.012651	0.012651
Colombia	0.27466	0.6816	0.021553	0.021553
Turkey	0.25909	0.6571	0.020781	0.020781
Brazil	-0.06776	0.6644	0.02101	0.02101
Sri Lanka	-0.12526	0.6521	0.02062	0.02062
South Africa	-0.74827	0.3719	0.011762	0.011762
Argentina	-0.75653	0.3926	0.012416	0.012726
India	-0.75848	0.3938	0.012452	0.012452
Albania	-0.78509	0.3768	0.011915	0.011915
Korea, South	-0.79627	0.3759	0.011889	0.011889
France	-0.79951	0.364	0.011512	0.011508
Kenya	-0.80672	0.3757	0.01188	0.01188
Bulgaria	-0.80771	0.3631	0.011483	0.011483
Panama	-0.80912	0.3751	0.011862	0.011862
Czech Republic	-0.81035	0.3823	0.012088	0.012088

Figure 5.1: Military Centrality Ranking by Country




Figure 5.1 illustrates the country positions on this military centrality spectrum, ranking from highest to lowest. The lines around the factor scores represent the 95 percent Bayesian credible intervals. Although these intervals seem to be extensive, with significant overlaps between each other, this may be misleading (if we treat them as regular 95 percent confidence intervals), due to the ways these factor scores are calculated. A better way to capture the statistical difference of one country score from another is to estimate the percentage of draws where a country's military centrality index score is greater than another country's score (Quinn, 2004).

Table 5.5: Probability of Having Relatively Higher Military Centrality Score


	Indonesia	Brazil	South Africa
Albania	0.004	0.188	0.467
Argentina	0.005	0.186	0.479
Bolivia	0.371	0.884	0.995
Brazil	0.068	-	0.818
Bulgaria	0.003	0.152	0.449
Colombia	0.144	0.622	0.904
Czech Republic	0.003	0.176	0.457
Ecuador	0.376	0.899	0.995
El Salvador	0.363	0.888	0.993
France	0.004	0.17	0.447
Guatemala	0.355	0.889	0.992
India	0.006	0.184	0.491
Indonesia	-	0.932	0.994
Kenya	0.004	0.159	0.468
Korea, South	0.004	0.179	0.474
Nigeria	0.371	0.894	0.995
Pakistan	0.396	0.916	0.997
Panama	0.003	0.153	0.443
Russia	0.374	0.893	0.992
South Africa	0.006	0.182	-
Sri Lanka	0.062	0.466	0.792
Turkey	0.147	0.620	0.900

Table 5.5 shows the probability of having a military centrality score greater than that of Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa, respectively. For example, the probability that Pakistan would have a military centrality score higher than Indonesia's score is 39.6 percent, whereas, the probability that Czech Republic would have a military centrality score higher than Indonesia's score is 0.3 percent. Similarly, the probability that Argentina would have military centrality higher than Brazil is 19 percent; whereas the probability that Ecuador would have higher military centrality than Brazil is 89.9 percent. And finally, the likelihood of Nigeria having a military centrality score higher than South Africa is 99.5 percent, while the likelihood of Kenya having a military centrality score higher than South Africa is 47 percent.

Figure 5.2 demonstrates a comparison of the military centrality index against traditional measurement approaches. The results indicate that the institutional-privilege based measurement of military centrality correlates with the expert analysis more than the traditional methods do. The correlation scores of expert analysis with the military centrality index, the number of personnel, and amount of expenditure are 0.73, 0.28, and 0.38, respectively. Indonesia and South Korea seem to be especially interesting cases. Although the number of military personnel and level of spending are both high in South Korea, the level of military centrality is quite low. The picture is opposite in Indonesia case. Material resources of military are very low, however, the Indonesian military is very central in politics as the first graph in Figure 5.2 summarizes. The military centrality index classifies these cases consistent with the expert analysis. In some other countries the scores are consistent in all of the four variables. For example Argentina scores very

low in the military centrality index, the level of military expenditure, the number of military personnel, as well as the expert analysis index.

Figure 5.2: Comparison of Two Methods by their Correlations with Expert Analysis



Another way to compare the validity of different measures is to conduct a factor analysis to observe how each variable loads on to the most discernible latent dimensions. Table 5.6 shows the rotated factor loadings of each variable where the number of dimensions is set for one and three, respectively. The first column indicates that the military centrality index loads on to the first dimension most heavily, as its factor score is 0.9766. The next most highly loaded variables are that of financial indicator, judicial indicator, expert analysis, and political (cabinet) indicator. The variables with lowest factor loadings are military expenditure, military personnel and political (ceremonial). When the number of dimensions is increased to three, the factor loadings of the variables change slightly for the first dimension, keeping the rank order of the variables identical. However, the rank order changes in the second dimension. The expenditure and personnel variables are there very heavily loaded.

Table 5.6: Comparison of Two Methods Using Factor Analysis (with Military Centrality Index)

	One Dimensional		Three Dimensional			
	Factor 1	Uniq.	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniq.
Financial	0.911	0.1701	0.911	-0.0027	-0.1302	0.1532
Judicial	0.8556	0.268	0.8556	-0.2271	0.051	0.2138
Political (ceremonial)	0.0576	0.9967	0.0576	0.3775	-0.5692	0.5302
Political (cabinet)	0.3066	0.906	0.3066	-0.6364	0.232	0.4472
Expert Analysis	0.7913	0.3739	0.7913	0.2078	-0.1303	0.3137
Military Personnel	0.2323	0.946	0.2323	0.5733	0.5007	0.3666
Military Expenditure	0.3241	0.895	0.3241	0.6901	0.1584	0.3937
Mil. Centrality Index	0.9766	0.0462	0.9766	-0.1547	-0.0287	0.0215
Eigenvalues			3.398	1.470	0.690	

Note: Uniq. stands for Uniqueness.

Nevertheless, the eigenvalue for this dimension (1.470) is very small compared to the first dimension (3.398). This suggests that the second dimension has very little explanatory power compared to the first one. The eigenvalue of the third dimension is even smaller, at 0.690. Therefore the results confirm the superiority of the military centrality index as well as the institutional-privilege variables in explaining the latent military centrality compared to the traditional methods.

I also compare the military centrality index with other more frequently used data regarding military influence. In this regard, one of the important variables that aim to measure military presence in politics is Cheibub's (2007) military legacy variable, which I have used as a control variable in the previous chapter. Cheibub argues that those countries, which had historical experience of military dictatorship, are more likely to be unstable. Therefore the likelihood of military coups is higher in those countries. I argue that coming from a military dictatorship, per se, should not be a reason for being unstable. Instead, the important factor is whether a country managed to eradicate the military influence on politics or not. If they succeeded in this, they are more likely to be stable. If they failed to do so, instability may continue as a norm. There are several examples. For example Argentina, South Korea, and Panama are countries with a history of military dictatorship, as Cheibub's data presents. However, they are ranked among the countries with very low military influence on the military centrality scale. These countries are also ranked very low in the expert analysis in terms of the military influence in politics.

On the other hand, there are some countries without military legacy, but they are ranked high both in the military centrality index and in the expert analysis. For example in Cheibub's data set, Russia, Ecuador, and Pakistan are among the countries lacking military legacy. However military influence in politics is high in these countries according to both my index and the expert analysis. The correlation coefficients also support the superiority of the military centrality index. The correlation coefficient for the military centrality and the expert analysis is 0.73, whereas the correlation between the military legacy and the expert analysis is only 0.29. The results confirm that coming from a military dictatorship background does not necessarily mean a country would have a more influential military. In some cases this may be true. However, the more important question is whether the civilian governments managed to abolish the political power of the military, or not.

Relationship Between the Military Centrality and Likelihood of Coup

Earlier sections of this chapter highlighted the literature on the relationship between the military centrality and the likelihood of coups. On the other hand, I have also showed that the existing ways to capture military centrality is problematic and my approach has demonstrated crucial advantages in many respects. Now I move a step further and test the relationship between the military centrality, which I generated using institutional variables, and the likelihood of coups.

However, one important challenge in such an analysis is finding a suitable military coup data that can be analyzed together with the military centrality data, which is in the cross sectional format. The future plans involve expanding the data across space

and time. This will enable time series cross sectional analysis where the dependent variable is the occurrence of military coup, as in Chapter IV. However, in the military centrality data's current form, I cannot use the occurrence of military coup as a dependent variable since there will be almost no variation.


One alternative is using the military coup likelihood data set created by Ulfelder (2015). At the beginning of each year, Ulfelder calculates and publishes the probability of experiencing a military coup in more than 150 countries using a Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm applied to logistic regressions. His analysis consistently ranks certain countries as having high coup risk, such as Mali, which had a coup in 2012 after several decades of stable government (Powell, 2014). Another country that experienced a coup in 2012 is Guinea-Bissau. Both of these countries were ranked among the ten most risky countries in his analysis published at the beginning of 2012. Guinea-Bissau was even ranked at second place. His algorithm uses several factors as input, such as the level of insurgence in the region and the country, recent coup activity, regime durability, political salience of elite ethnicity, coup attempt frequency in the region, colonial origin, and infant mortality rate. Although this is not a raw data, I found it highly useful considering the nature of my independent variable.

To test the relationship between military centrality and the likelihood of coup (in 2015), I first examined their correlation scores. The correlation score between these two variables is 0.5678. The associated p-value is 0.0058, which suggest a highly statistically significant correlation. I have also conducted binary regression where the coup risk is the dependent variable. The results show that the slope coefficient is 0.0079 where the standard error is 0.0026 and the p-value is 0.006. This also confirms the statistically

significant relationship between the two variables. In other words, countries with higher military centrality are more likely to experience military coups.

Figure 5.3 shows the fitted scatter plot for this relationship, with country labels. It shows countries like Nigeria and Pakistan are ranked very high in both variables, whereas countries like France, Czech Republic and South Korea are scored very low in both indexes. In the middle there are four countries (Brazil, Turkey, Colombia, and Sri Lanka), which are scored moderately in both the military coup risk variable and the military centrality variable, which was based on the institutional privilege variables. The next section will go one step further and will generate a combined military centrality index, which uses both the institutional privilege and material resource variables.

Figure 5.3: The Relationship between the Military Centrality and Coup Risk



Combined Military Centrality Index


I have already discussed the issues related to measuring military centrality solely based on material resources. However, as it is a highly common method in the literature, it would be useful to generate a combined index where the two sets of indicators of military centrality were pooled. I used the same algorithm and logic to create this combined index. Table 5.7 shows the results of the Bayesian factor analysis scores for each country. And Figure 5.4 illustrates the factor scores with the confidence intervals. Russia is scored highest in this index, which is a four-position increase if we compare it with the former military centrality index. Other countries with the highest military centrality are Pakistan, Ecuador, and Colombia. The rankings of Pakistan and Ecuador were also two and three in the former index. However, Colombia's ranking was nine in the previous one.

The countries with the lowest military centrality in this combined index are Panama, Czech Republic, Argentina, and South Africa. Although the first two of these countries have the same rankings as the previous one, Argentina and South Africa's rankings changed significantly. Both of their rankings dropped by 6 positions: Argentina dropped from 14 to 20 and South Africa dropped from 13 to 19. Indonesia is the country the ranking of which changed the most. It was ranked as having the highest military centrality in the previous index. The combined military centrality index ranks Indonesia at the 9th position.

Table 5.7: Combined Military Centrality Index

Country	Military Centrality Index	Standard Deviation	Naive Standard Error	Standard Error
Russia	1.242	0.657	0.021	0.024
Pakistan	1.029	0.458	0.014	0.017
Ecuador	0.806	0.403	0.013	0.014
Colombia	0.800	0.671	0.021	0.025
Turkey	0.434	0.491	0.016	0.016
Bolivia	0.422	0.552	0.017	0.021
Sri Lanka	0.325	0.688	0.022	0.025
El Salvador	0.192	0.699	0.022	0.027
Indonesia	0.113	0.918	0.029	0.036
South Korea	0.081	0.866	0.027	0.034
Guatemala	-0.008	0.842	0.027	0.033
Nigeria	-0.101	0.898	0.028	0.035
Brazil	-0.195	0.471	0.015	0.016
India	-0.224	0.590	0.019	0.026
France	-0.289	0.551	0.017	0.020
Bulgaria	-0.478	0.446	0.014	0.016
Albania	-0.562	0.425	0.013	0.015
Kenya	-0.582	0.455	0.014	0.015
South Africa	-0.599	0.453	0.014	0.018
Argentina	-0.698	0.420	0.013	0.015
Czech Republic	-0.722	0.401	0.013	0.013
Panama	-0.963	0.504	0.016	0.016

Figure 5.4: Combined Military Centrality Ranking by Country




Military Centrality Index with Imputed Data

This section is devoted to synthesizing a military centrality index using the imputed data. The military centrality index, which was generated in the previous sections, was based on a data on 22 countries where there is no missing observations. This section overcomes the missing observation issue. I utilize the 20 imputations, which were

generated in the previous sections. I fill the missing observations by calculating the averages of these imputations.

Figure 5.5 demonstrates the ranking of 50 countries in terms of their military centrality index score. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan and Ecuador are the countries with highest military centrality score. Belgium, Albania and France are ranked as countries with the lowest military centrality. I performed two validity checks. First I compared these results with the ones I previously obtained using the 22 countries, where there is no missing data. These are highly consistent. The correlation score for the 22 common countries in both analyses is 0.99.

Figure 5.5: Military Centrality Index with Imputed Data



Second, I compared these results with the “military in politics” variable of the expert analysis. Figure 5.6 illustrates the associated scatter plot. The correlation between the expert analysis and the military centrality index based on the imputed data is 0.60. Although it is lower than the correlation score that we obtained without imputation (0.73), it is still very high.

political power, since even a highly democratic country such as the US or a highly authoritarian country such as China and Saudi Arabia may score quite high, while the likelihood of a coup is not high and the military is mostly under the civilian control.

This chapter proposed an alternative method which is based on the military's institutional privileges: the existence of military-owned businesses, the extent of the jurisdiction of military courts, how military elites are ranked during the official state meetings and ceremonies, and whether the chief executive or defense minister is a military officer or not. I have collected data for 50 countries across the world on these institutional privileges. This chapter showed that my alternative measure is superior to the conventional methods. While performing the comparison I used a global expert analysis data as a reference category. The results suggest that if we are interested in capturing the political centrality and influence of the military across the world, a better way to capture this variation is to look at the institutional prerogatives the military elites possess instead of the material resources such as military spending and number of soldiers.

This study does not contribute *only* to the civil-military relations literature. Instead it contributes to the larger comparative and international relations subfields where the civilian supremacy over the military institution is considered as an independent variable. These research areas may include democratization, interstate/intrastate war, conflict resolution, insurgency and terrorism, foreign aid, interstate trade, and so on. The next chapter summarizes the substantive chapters of the dissertation and discusses the possible implications of the dissertation for different research fields.

Appendix 1A

Country	Source
Albania	Julinda Abdi (country expert)
Algeria	Transparency International
Argentina	Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011
Bangladesh	Transparency International
Belgium	N/A
Bolivia	Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011
Brazil	Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011
Bulgaria	Transparency International
Colombia	Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Paes & Shaw 2004
Croatia	Transparency International
Czech Republic	Transparency International
Dominican Republic	N/A
Ecuador	Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011
El Salvador	Castro&Zamora 2004
Ethiopia	Transparency International
France	Transparency International
Ghana	Transparency International
Guatemala	Castro&Zamora 2004
Guinea	N/A
Honduras	Castro&Zamora 2004

Country	Source
India	Transparency International
Indonesia	McCulloch 2004
Iraq	Transparency International
Kenya	Transparency International
Korea, South	Transparency International
Lebanon	Transparency International
Liberia	N/A
Malawi	Birthe Annkathrijn Pater (country expert)
Malaysia	Transparency International
Mexico	Transparency International
Moldova	N/A
Nicaragua	Castro&Zamora 2004
Nigeria	Transparency International
Pakistan	Siddiqa-Agha 2004
Panama	Castro&Zamora 2004
Paraguay	N/A
Peru	N/A
Philippines	Lee 2008
Romania	Zulean (country expert)
Russia	Gonchar 2004
Senegal	N/A
Serbia	Transparency International

Country	Source
Sierra Leone	N/A
South Africa	Transparency International
Sri Lanka	Transparency International
Thailand	Transparency International
Turkey	Mani, 2007, 2010, 2011
Ukraine	Transparency International
Zimbabwe	Transparency International

Appendix 1B

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
0	Albania	Julinda Abdi (country expert)	Expert Judgment
1	Algeria	Amnesty International	2010 country report gives examples of civilians who were tried by military courts.
0	Argentina	Kyle and Reiter 2012	"In Argentina, in August 2008, the Congress annulled the country's Code of Military Justice, which had been in place since 1984, and federal civilian courts now handle all cases." Page 37 Also see Human Rights Watch, "Country Summary: Argentina," January 2009.
	Bangladesh	N/A	
0	Belgium	Manacorda and Mariniello 2013	"Likewise, in the last 30 years, Denmark, Slovenia, Estonia, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Belgium have also opted for the abolition of military jurisdiction in peacetime" Page 562. Also see Audreu-Guzmán 2004 Page 159
1	Bolivia	Kyle and Reiter 2012	"Similarly, a civilian court charged members of the Bolivian military with homicide, grievous bodily harm, and assault in the suppression of street riots in 2003. The military, however, argued that civilian courts did not have jurisdiction, and the court soon transferred the case to a military tribunal, which acquitted the defendants of all charges." Page 30. Also see Human Rights Watch, "Bolivia: Ruling Holds Military Accountable for Rights Abuses," May 6, 2004.

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
1	Brazil	Kyle and Reiter 2012, 2013	"In Brazil, civilian reformers have not been strong enough or active enough to reform the system completely. The military police, who are reserve and auxiliary units of the regular military, patrol the streets, maintain public order, respond to crimes, and make arrests. Military courts judge the military police for most crimes they commit." Page 38. See Also Human Rights Watch, "Lethal Force: Police Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo," December 2009. "Despite formal changes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the militaries in these countries retain significant control over the investigation of charges, and actively work to obstruct the transfer of cases to civilian courts or refuse to release evidence when requested by civilian authorities." Page 381 Kyle and Reiter 2013
0	Bulgaria	Viktor Pavlov (country expert)	Viktor Pavlov – senior expert at MoD of the Republic of Bulgaria, responded to an expert survey on military court jurisdictions. This survey was conducted by International Society for Military Law and the Law of War at the Conference on military jurisdiction Rhodes (Greece), 28 September 2011 to 2 October 2011.
0	Colombia	Kyle and Reiter 2013; Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"Recent legislative changes in Colombia, similarly, have mandated that cases of alleged human rights violations be transferred from military to civilian courts. The military is becoming increasingly cooperative in shifting appropriate cases out of its jurisdiction." Page 381, Kyle and Reiter 2013

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
1	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"Military tribunals have jurisdiction over misdemeanors and disciplinary matters as well as criminal matters. Their jurisdiction encompasses the offences listed in the Code of Military Justice, offences against the laws and customs of war committed on Congolese territory, ordinary offences committed as a result of service and ordinary offences committed inside military installations" Page 249 "Despite these important advances, the military justice system remains a weak institution. To date, only a small fraction of the total number of acts of sexual violence committed by soldiers has been prosecuted." Page 47 Human Rights Watch. Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo
	Croatia	N/A	
0	Czech Republic	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"In fact, during the 1980s and 1990s, military courts in peacetime were abolished in many countries, for example, Denmark, Slovenia, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Senegal." Page 159
1	Dominican Republic	Kyle and Reiter 2013	Despite formal changes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the militaries in these countries retain significant control over the investigation of charges, and actively work to obstruct the transfer of cases to civilian courts or refuse to release evidence when requested by civilian authorities. Page 381
1	Ecuador	Kyle and Reiter 2013	Despite formal changes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the militaries in these countries retain significant control over the investigation of charges, and actively work to obstruct the transfer of cases to civilian courts or refuse to release evidence when requested by civilian authorities. Page 381

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
1	El Salvador	Kyle and Reiter 2013	Despite formal changes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the militaries in these countries retain significant control over the investigation of charges, and actively work to obstruct the transfer of cases to civilian courts or refuse to release evidence when requested by civilian authorities. Page 381
1	Ethiopia	Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report	"Criminal matters related to the military are handled by military tribunals. Military tribunals may not try civilians except in certain cases involving allegations of threats to national security."
0	France	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"In fact, during the 1980s and 1990s, military courts in peacetime were abolished in many countries, for example, Denmark, Slovenia, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Senegal." Page 159
	Ghana	N/A	
1	Guatemala	Kyle and Reiter 2012, 2013	Despite formal changes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the militaries in these countries retain significant control over the investigation of charges, and actively work to obstruct the transfer of cases to civilian courts or refuse to release evidence when requested by civilian authorities. Page 381

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
0	Guinea	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"In its Observations to Guinea, the Human Rights Committee welcomed the fact that military courts had been abolished as a result of the Basic Law with constitutional status adopted by referendum on 23 December 1990" Page 68 "Since the consideration of the initial report, it should be pointed out that Guinea has adopted a basic law which has the value of a constitution and contains a title concerning fundamental rights and freedoms; the Law was adopted by referendum on 23 December 1990. The military courts and the State Security Court have been discontinued." United Nations document CCPR/C/79/Add.20, 29 April 1993, paragraph 3.
1	Honduras	Kyle and Reiter 2013	Despite formal changes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the militaries in these countries retain significant control over the investigation of charges, and actively work to obstruct the transfer of cases to civilian courts or refuse to release evidence when requested by civilian authorities. Page 381
0	India	Madan Singh (country expert)	"The act and section of military law (section 71 of the Air Force Act 1950) further specifies that an act of rape, culpable homicide or culpable homicide not amounting to murder will not be tried by a military court but only by a civil court, unless the crime is against a person subject to military law."
1	Indonesia	Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report	"On September 23, three military personnel from the 742nd Infantry Battalion/Satya Wira Yudha-Mataram allegedly assaulted a priest, Beatus Ninu, in Kupang Regency, after the priest asked the soldiers to quiet down. After an investigation, the case was passed to a military court for prosecution."

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
1	Iraq	Omar Faraj (country expert)	"The military court jurisdiction will apply on the defendant in the following crimes apart from the time of the crime) If the military personal has committed any of the crimes set out in the Military Penal Code or other penal laws which did not result to a personal right for individuals. b) If the military has committed any of the crimes stipulated in other penal laws rather than this law against another military and may have been related to the work of the military, the military court or military authorities have the right to send the case to the civil courts."
0	Kenya	Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report	"Military personnel are tried by court-martial, and verdicts may be appealed through military court channels. The chief justice appoints attorneys for military personnel on a case-by-case basis. Military courts do not afford defendants all the rights that civilian courts provide. Military courts are not empowered to try civilians."
0	Korea, South	Jun Ji-hye (country expert)	Expert Judgment
1	Lebanon	Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi's statement	Justice Minister Rifi talked about military justice: "We want to stop trying civilians in the military court. [military officers] are not law specialists, and there are doubts over the fairness of the verdicts" The Daily Star
0	Liberia	Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report	"The armed forces lack military justice system"
0	Malawi	Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report, Rachel Ellet (country expert)	"The Malawi Defense Force (MDF) has courts martial but no military or security tribunals. Military personnel accused and tried by courts martial are afforded the same rights as persons accused in civil criminal courts. MDF courts martial can try civilians in cases concerning military operations; however, this has not occurred."
	Malaysia	N/A	

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
1	Mexico	Kyle and Reiter 2013	Despite formal changes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the militaries in these countries retain significant control over the investigation of charges, and actively work to obstruct the transfer of cases to civilian courts or refuse to release evidence when requested by civilian authorities. Page 381
1	Moldova	Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report	"The military court system, which operated independently of the civilian courts, also suffered problems with corruption and inefficiency similar to those of the civilian courts. The jurisdiction of military courts extends to crimes committed by active duty, reserve, and retired military personnel. Military courts can also try civilians for crimes committed against military personnel."
0	Nicaragua	Kyle and Reiter 2013; Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"while Nicaragua maintains its military and accompanying military court system, the country undertook a series of reforms in the early 1990s; and civilian courts have jurisdiction over members of the military for common crimes and human rights violations, and there are no jurisdictional battles between the two judicial systems." Page 381, Kyle and Reiter 2013
1	Nigeria	Ihuoma Chiedozie, Freke Ette (country experts)	"The Supreme Court on Friday, June 7, 2013 affirmed the life sentence handed down to a naval officer (by military court), Felix Olanrewaju Odunlami, who killed a commercial motorcyclist in Lagos in 2005."
1	Pakistan	Reema Omar (country expert)	"Civilian courts should try cases of missing persons." "We must therefore look at whether, under international standards, military officials should be tried by military courts when they are accused of perpetrating enforced disappearances."
0	Panama	Kyle and Reiter 2013	"On the positive end of the spectrum, the constitution of Panama eliminated its military and, subsequently, its military judicial system." Page 381

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
0	Paraguay	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"The Paraguayan Constitution only authorizes military courts to try civilians in the event of an international armed conflict." (Article 174 of the 1992 Constitution) Page 161
1	Peru	Kyle and Reiter 2013	"On the negative end of the spectrum, in the face of court rulings against such practices, Peruvian lawmakers recently passed new legislation specifically granting military courts jurisdiction over any crimes—including human rights violations—committed by the military." Page 381
0	Philippines	Global Military Justice Reform Report	"military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents' case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of 'service-connected offenses or crimes'" set forth in the governing statute."
1	Romania	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"The military courts try offences committed by members of the military up to and including the rank of captain, offences committed by civilians working with the military forces and offences committed by civilians. The latter include failure to enlist, refusal to do military service and offences against military goods and property." Page 319
1	Russia	Solomon 2008	"the military tribunals heard 80 000 civil cases (mainly of this kind), as opposed to only 15 000 criminal cases. One should note as well that criminal cases included more ordinary crimes than offenses relating to military service" Page 3
0	Senegal	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"In fact, during the 1980s and 1990s, military courts in peacetime were abolished in many countries, for example, Denmark, Slovenia, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Senegal." Page 159
	Serbia	N/A	

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
1	Sierra Leone	Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report	"The RSLAF has its own military justice system, although soldiers can be tried in civilian courts depending on the type of crime committed. The decision of which system to use was sometimes made on an ad hoc basis and was prone to pressure from RSLAF leadership."
0	South Africa	Audreu-Guzmán 2004	"the High Court of South Africa which, in March 2001, ordered application of the Code of Military Justice to be suspended. The High Court took the view prima facie that military criminal jurisdiction was incompatible with the principle of equality before the law and the right to judicial protection guaranteed in the Constitution. In the opinion of the High Court, "[t]he military is not immunized from the democratic change. Maintaining discipline in the defense force does not justify the infringement of the rights of soldiers, by enforcing such military discipline through an unconstitutional prosecuting structure" page 160
1	Sri Lanka	Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena (country expert)	"they can try military officers on a civilian related offence related to a non-military issue (ie; killing of unarmed civilians by military officers). Generally the current practice is that military courts resolve these cases though in the past, one of the most significant judgments delivered on civilian killings by the military was by a civilian court (Wijesuriya vs the State) . Now, that practice is no longer followed and the matters are automatically referred to a military court under the present political dispensation."
0	Thailand	Institute of Developing Economies Report	"However, the following cases shall not be under the jurisdiction of the Military Court (1) Cases in which a person under the jurisdiction of the Military Court and a person outside the jurisdiction of the Military Court have jointly committed crime (2) Cases connected with the case under the jurisdiction of the civilian court"

Judicial	Country	Source	Note
0	Turkey	Kuru 2012	“2010 was a particularly important year. In February, the Security and Public Order Cooperation (EMASYA) Protocols, which had allowed the military to take security precautions in cities without the permission of governors, were cancelled. In September, a constitutional amendment package was approved by referendum, which opened the YAŞ’s expulsion decisions to judicial review, prevented the military court from prosecuting civilians, and empowered civilian courts to prosecute military officers, particularly on charges of plotting coups.”
	Ukraine	N/A	
	Zimbabwe	N/A	

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation has aimed to examine the gray areas between the two extreme points on the civil-military relationship scale. On the one end of this scale, there are countries with full civilian control of the military. And on the other end, there are countries with full military control of the governmental institutions, namely military regimes. Civil-military relations seem to be less interesting at these extreme points. This dissertation has focused on countries where the level of democratic civilian control of the military is in the mid-range. More specifically, I have tried to understand how the military may act behind the scenes to achieve its ultimate goals, how such a strategy may influence the likelihood of coups, and how certain institutional privileges may increase the military's effectiveness in such countries.

This is one of the first studies to examine the institutional determinants of military coups. While other studies examine the impact of certain institutions, such as existence of a military regime, on the likelihood of military coups (e.g. Powell, 2012), no previous study has examined the impact of constitutional design on a global data set, which includes all the regimes that can be classified as presidential or parliamentary. Moreover, previous military coup studies use misleading measures of military centrality, which are

based on material resources that the military obtains. To create an alternative measure, I have collected an original data set on militaries' institutional privileges and examined their impact on the likelihood of coups.

This research project has advanced the study of civil-military relations by introducing institutional explanations for one of the most serious outcomes of civil-military conflict, namely military coup, by formalizing the interaction between the elected politicians and the military generals, by systematically testing the alternative theories of coups against each other, and then by introducing and analyzing an originally collected data set regarding the military's institutional privileges on certain issue dimensions. In this final chapter I summarize the findings of the previous chapters and discuss the possible implications of these findings in terms of the broader literatures on democratization and civil-military relations.

Summary of the Findings

Previous studies on democratic breakdown discussed the extent to which presidentialism influences the likelihood of authoritarian reversals. However, authoritarian reversal is an overarching concept under which military coup is only one of the different forms. Within this particular literature only one study, Maeda (2010), differentiated forms of breakdowns and examined the impact of constitutional design on the likelihood of military coups. However, Maeda focused only on the democratic states, as this literature does as a whole, due to the nature of their research question. In this study, I broadened the cases to include the countries in which at least some modicum of multiparty competition exists and in which the difference between presidentialism and

parliamentarism is observable and meaningful (Gerring et al., 2009). The results show that the constitutional design matters even after controlling for the military dictatorship history of a country. This is a very important finding since the recent empirical studies on this topic have claimed that the impact of constitutional design disappears as the models control for the impact of military regime legacy (Cheibub, 2007).

Another important finding is in regard to the military centrality concept. Several earlier studies have attempted to measure military centrality concept (Andreski, 1968; Nordlinger, 1976; Wells, 1974; Wells and Pollnac, 1988; Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). However their methodology is limited to the material resources of the military such as military expenditure and personnel. However, I demonstrate that these material resources are not the perfect proxy for military centrality. Countries in which the military is under civilian control may also invest a lot in the military affairs. For example, a conflict with a neighboring country may trigger increases in military expenditure. Hence high military spending does not necessarily reflect high political centrality of the military.

Several other studies proposed an institutional approach to measure the political centrality of the military (Stepan, 1988; Serra, 2010; Kuru, 2012). However, no other study has used this approach to collect relevant data and measure the political centrality in a global context. Based on these institutional arguments, I design an alternative measurement method and collect an original data set to generate a military centrality index. The findings show that the alternative measure developed here is a better proxy of military influence on politics. In addition, the results confirm the initial hypothesis that the likelihood of military coups is higher if the military centrality is higher. The next two

sections will discuss the possible implications for different comparative politics research fields.

Implications for Democratization and Democratic Breakdowns

The existing scholarship discusses whether a particular constitutional design is superior. Juan Linz (1978, 1990a, 1990b) argues that parliamentary systems provide stronger democratic foundations and improve survival rates. On the other hand, Jose A. Cheibub (2007) asserts that being presidential or parliamentary does not matter, when controlling for a country's military dictatorship history. The analysis in my dissertation provides empirical evidence showing that being parliamentary decreases the likelihood of military coups, even controlling for military legacy. However, this does not mean parliamentarism is superior in terms of democratic legitimacy, since the military may achieve its ultimate goals without a coup in parliamentary systems. Several militaries in parliamentary systems, such as Spain, Japan, Thailand, and Portugal, achieved their ultimate aims without a coup in different time periods in their history. These examples were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. However even more importantly I demonstrated in the same chapter how Turkish generals solved their issues without resorting a coup and how this was different from the Egyptian military generals' strategies.

In this respect, the study partially disagrees with the arguments of both of the aforementioned political scientists. That is to say, the theoretical argument does not praise the parliamentary systems in terms of democratic legitimacy (in contrast to what Linz' theory suggests) and the empirical analysis shows the impact of constitutional

design is valid even after controlling for military legacy (in contrast to what Cheibub suggests).

Implications for Civil-Military Relations

The dissertation also has some implications for the broader study of civil-military relations. Although free and fair electoral systems have been expanding quite rapidly across the world, civilian supremacy over the military is not improving as rapidly. Outside of developed Western societies, the civilian governments of only a few countries have managed to take their military under their command. For others, there are varying degrees of civilian supremacy, and measuring this variation is challenging.

The discussion regarding the impact of constitutional design on the frequency of military coups suggests two striking points. First, parliamentary systems are less likely to experience military coups. Second, this low frequency does not mean parliamentary systems offer more democratic legitimacy, as the qualitative case analysis illustrates that parliamentary systems provide more venues that can be subject to military influence. This means that there is a trade-off between being exposed to a military coup and being exposed to a rather continuous military influence on politics. From a normative standpoint, I find both outcomes to be detrimental to the democratic legitimacy of the system. On the one hand, the military destroys the democratic governance and the citizens easily observe this political situation, on the other hand, the military has a potential to continuously undermine the democratic principles behind the scenes, in which the public rarely realizes. Therefore, the real challenge in terms of civil-military relations is limiting the political centrality of the military so that they neither tend to

conduct a coup nor are inclined to abuse the potential weaknesses of the democratic system.

This discussion raises other questions. How can we measure the military's political centrality? And how can the civilian leadership eradicate the military centrality? The previous chapter presented a promising way to capture the levels of centrality across the world. Articulating the best strategy to eradicate the potential political power of the military, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, Turkey's recent experiences with the existing ruling AK Party provide important insights in this respect. Several commentators and scholars now argue that the military supremacy in Turkey has significantly weakened during the last decade. Although one portion of the story is about the empowerment of the civil society, another portion is about the government policies. I argue civilian governments should not impatiently aim to demolish the existence of military supremacy within their countries over a short period of time. Instead, civilian leaders should develop long term plans to achieve their ultimate goals. Otherwise, while trying to eliminate the military influence, governments may face a severe military intervention, which may result in losing all previous democratic gains.

Remarks from one senior Muslim Brotherhood leader, made a few months before the recent military coup in Egypt, summarize this point well. In an interview with a Turkish scholar, he states with pride that, "It took you [Turks] twenty years to solve the problem of civil-military relations, but we did it in two years." (Kuru, 2013) Apparently, this person is of the view that the Muslim Brotherhood administration's policies eradicated the political centrality of the military, even within a very short period of time. However, in the end, the country faced a military coup. Unlike the Egyptian example, the

Turkish governing AK Party tried to undermine the political centrality of the military step-by-step, extending the plan to several years. The Turkish military's political centrality significantly weakened on each of the three institutional dimensions mentioned in the previous chapter. However, this decay was gradual, and during the first years of its governance the AK Party preferred not to create any discomfort among the military elites.

Only after eight years of governance have they started to behave proactively to weaken the military's influence. In this vein, the government publicly supported the prosecution of military generals who are accused of plotting a coup. One of the most important supports was enacting laws limiting the jurisdiction of military courts for those military officers who plot a coup. With this legislation, soldiers who plot a coup no longer have a chance to be tried in military courts. Next, the government diminished the military generals' high rankings during the official state ceremonies, although the current situation is still not compatible with democratic norms. And finally, the government is recently working on ways to overcome the tax exemption and impunity of the military owned businesses in Turkey.

Future research will seek to find ways to test the micro mechanisms of the impact of constitutional design on the likelihood of coups. To do so, I will examine government formation and termination processes that occurred since the end of World War II. This analysis will also include the cases of impeachment procedures in presidential systems. The point of interest is to find whether military influence exists or not. The cases where such influence exists will be coded as being a covert military coup. This data will be used to assess the underlying reasoning and the micro mechanisms explaining the relationship between the military coups and constitutional design.

Future research will also include expanding the data on military centrality. The first step is to complete the data for all of the countries across the world. Then I will move on to conducting more archival research to find out how countries were scored on each dimension of military centrality in the previous years. Completion of this data collection, by expanding both across time and space, will greatly benefit global analyses in various research areas in which the civilian supremacy over the military is of interest.

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